N

BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY

LAW SCHOOL

INDIA AND HER

NEIGHBOUR
ASSIGNMENT FOR POLITICAL
SCIENCE
BHANU PRAKASH PANDEY

SUBMITTED TO : B.A.LL.B(H)
Dr. MANOJ MISHRA IVthsem.
16225BLTO69

2018

VARANASI
Table of Contents
Emergent Order in South Asia ....................................................................................................................... 13
World Views ................................................................................................................................................... 15
Kashmir Problem............................................................................................................................................. 20
Nuclear Issue ................................................................................................................................................... 22
Bangladesh ...................................................................................................................................................... 26
Sri Lanka ......................................................................................................................................................... 27
Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan civil war ............................................................................................... 27
Commercial ties............................................................................................................................................... 28
Fishing disputes ............................................................................................................................................... 29
Development Cooperation............................................................................................................................... 29
Other areas of Cooperation ............................................................................................................................. 30
Conclusion....................................................................................................................................................... 30
 INDIA AND HER NEIGHBOURS

1) INTRODUCTION

South Asia is a most complex, volatile and one of the most socially and politically divided
and region of the world. The region of South Asia mainly consists of eight states:
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan. It is home
to 1.4 billion people, more than 20 percent of the world population. Thus, about one-fifth of
humanity lives between the western reaches of Afghanistan and Pakistan on one side and the
eastern reaches of Bangladesh and India on the other. It is a region that lies between the sea
routes of the Indian Ocean (Persian Gulf and the Asia-Pacific) and the land routes of Central
Asia connecting Europe to the East. It is a large reservoir of natural and human resources,
making it a prime destination for finance capital, a lucrative market for trade and a source of
cheap raw material. It also sits at the confluence of the richest sources of oil, gas, rubber,
manganese, copper, gold, tea, cotton, rice and jute and is the transit point for most of the
resources and manufactures that cris-cross the world. Moreover, it is the most heavily
militarized and bureaucratized zone in the world and it has a variety of complex and violent
primordial ethnic groups. Geopolitically, the region of South Asia is identified as that which
lies south of the former Soviet Union and China, south of the Himalayas; bordering in the
east by Myanmar (Burma) and in the west by Afghanistan. In a sense Myanmar and
Afghanistan are border line states of the regions of South East Asia and South West Asia
respectively. The creation of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) in 1985 represented the recognition of the geopolitical entity of South Asia. The
methodologies used for identifying the regional area as consisting of geographically
proximate and interacting states sharing some degree of common ethnic, linguistic, cultural,
social and historical bonds, became the basis of the formation of the association. The
countries included in this regional organisation are Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives,
Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

2) South Asian Regional State System: Basic Features

The basic characteristics of the South Asian regional state system are as follows:

India, by virtue of its geographic size and location, economic and industrial base and military
strength occupies a pivotal position in the region. The Indian aspirations for leadership,
dominance or hegemony are a product of these geopolitical conditions of the region.
 South Asia, minus India, has two kinds of powers. Pakistan is one major power that can limit
Indian hegemonic aspirations. Pakistan’s own limitations come from its geographic location and
economic and military potentials. Unlike the pre 1971 Pakistan, the present Pakistan without its
eastern linkage lies on the border of South Asia. It shares close ideological affinity with the
Islamic West Asian State system. Pakistan may be described as a major power of the region and
classified as a ‘bargainer’ or a ‘partner’ in the South Asian state system. Pakistan does not have
the ability to substitute India as a leader of the region, yet it can bargain with India for
partnership in the decision-making of the region.
The other type of countries would include the smaller countries like Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh,
Sri Lanka and Maldives. They can pose problems to the core power through extra regional
intervention, or their own internal stability. They can also legitimise the dominance of the core
power by acceptance of the balance of power in the region.

The major and most active power relationships in South Asia are affected by the intrusive
powers. These extra regional powers, like the United States, Russia (formerly USSR), China and
others have influenced policies of the region. All the South Asian countries, including India,
have sought to use the extra regional powers’ ability to influence to their advantage.

3) Emergent Order in South Asia

a) The initial impulse of the Asian States on attaining independence was to isolate themselves
from the Cold War bloc politics. The Indian approach under Nehru focused on the need to
develop an independent understanding of world affairs and a peace policy. The application of
these principles came in the series of conferences that took place in Asia that sought to
establish the framework of peace through regionalism. The Asian Relations Conference
(Delhi, 1947) was the first such conference that gathered the leaders of Asian countries that
were still in the process of emerging from the colonial fold. It sought to establish an Asian
identity and a common approach to such issues like peace and development. The Conference
on Indonesia (Delhi, 1949) sought to create an international public opinion against
colonialism and support the freedom movement in Indonesia. The Colombo Conference
(1954) and the Afro-Asian Bandung Conference (1955) laid the foundations of regionalism.
The former was a conference of South and South East Asian countries and the latter that of
Afro-Asian countries. These conferences represented the growth of regionalism in the Third
World, especially Asia. The Bandung Conference was to spell out the principles of Peaceful
Coexistence (Panchsheel) as principles that should govern the relations between states. The
movement towards regionalism did not create any institutional arrangements in Asia. It
remained as an effort in identifying the common concerns of post colonial states focusing on
the problems of development.
 b) Unfortunately, regionalism never became a fundamental concern of the Afro-Asian states.
Some of the obstacles to regionalism came from colonial legacies like the presence of large
minorities within countries, unsettled borders, clash of elite, etc. The onslaught of Cold War
in Asia after the Korean war proved to be the turning point for regionalism in the region.
Bandung became the last Afro-Asian conference to be held. Though efforts were made to
revive the spirit of regionalism, they remained unsuccessful.

c) The mid-1950s saw a shift away from regionalism towards the development of non-
alignment. At one level, nonalignment became a redefinition of the basic principles of
regionalism as stated in the Panchsheel formulations, but with a distinct thrust on
independence and peace. At another level, it was a redefinition of independent understanding
of world affairs within the emergent framework of Cold War rivalry. What is noteworthy is
that both, regionalism and non-alignment, made no effort to translate ‘movements’ into a
structure or an organisation. At the South Asian level, one can identify two ‘models’ for
order in the regional state system. The first was based on the realities of the geopolitical
situation of 1947. This model was based more on the potentials of India to be a major power
in South Asia, rather than actual power realities. This model appeared to go unquestioned
until the 1962 debacle at the hands of the Chinese. The India-China war put into question the
Indian claims for a great power status in the region of South Asia. The second model was a
product of the 1971 conflict with Pakistan. The creation of Bangladesh and the Simla
Agreement (1972) became the basis of this new model. The 1971-72 model was based on the
recognition of India’s power status in South Asia. Pakistan’s acceptance of this status was
implicit in the signing of the Simla agreement. Both the United States and the Soviet Union
appeared to grant legitimacy to the new Indian position in South Asia. New Delhi’s success
in opening up a dialogue with China indicated a similar legitimacy from China.

4) INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

a) Certain important historical and geographic compulsions that surfaced at the time of the
partition of India in 1947 have had significant bearing on the thinking of both the countries.
Islam was considered as a rallying point for national unity of a people who claimed to hold a
different national identity. It became a separatist force that was not in line with the national
mainstream of anti-colonial struggle. This has been accepted as a root of the creation of
Pakistan. There are three important issues these countries face in their bilateral relations: (i)
the difference in world views, (ii) the dispute over Kashmir and (iii) the problem of nuclear
confrontation.
5) World Views

a) India and Pakistan, as two core countries of South Asia had different worldviews that
determined their foreign policies. During the early years after independence, the Indian
worldview had been dominated by concerns about building a regional identity of the post-
colonial nations of Asia. One of the important aspects of this policy was opposition to the
extra regional intervention in South Asia. India sought to keep the South Asian issues within
the ambit of South Asian countries. Opposition to the entry of Cold War alliances in Asia and
eventual path of non-alignment is part of this worldview. The period from 1947 to 1971 saw
two trends in India’s approach towards South Asia. One was the trend that was initiated by
Nehru. It focused on regionalism as the dominant theme. The second emerged during the Lal
Bahadur Shastri years. This came in the aftermath of the 1962 war and the need for resetting
the Indian worldview keeping in mind its capabilities. Shastri was to stress on bilateralism as
the key to foreign policy, especially in relation to South Asian countries. It is in the post-
1971 period that India developed a coherent South Asia policy that was to determine India’s
approach towards its South Asian neighbours. The base of this policy lay in India’s power
status in South Asia. The architecture of the policy rested on a combination of two
approaches: regionalism that was now restricted to South Asia and the consequent perception
of South Asia as a regional state system; and bilateralism, which was the basis of the Simla
Agreement of 1972.

b) Pakistan’s perception of its role emerged from the realisation of two simultaneous forces—
the geopolitics of the country that was divided between East and West Pakistan and the
Islamic worldview. The former placed Pakistan firmly in the South Asian regional state
system while the latter brought it close to the Islamic world of West Asia. Pakistan thus saw
itself as a nation with two distinct identities and roles, that of a South Asian power and that
of an Islamic West Asian power that was to eventually emerge as an important country of the
Organisation of Islamic Conference. One of the dominant security concerns that Pakistan
sought to address right from its inception is that of fear of India. The problem of Pakistan’s
foreign and defence policy revolved around this central theme of Indian domination and
safeguards that were to be instituted to counter this threat. Pakistan’s attempts to establish
linkages with the Islamic world, with China and participate in the military alliances of the
United States can be understood within this security concern of Pakistan. These links
provided an opportunity for Pakistan to counteract India’s desire to dominate in what India
considered its sphere of influence.
6) Kashmir Problem

a) This fundamental diversity in the views of India and Pakistan manifests on the issue of
Kashmir, an issue that has come to be identified by Pakistan as the core of the bilateral
divide. Kashmir, like Junagadh and Hyderabad, opted to decide its future as to whether to
join India or to merge with Pakistan. In case of Hyderabad and Junagadh, the Indian
government took steps to ensure that the wishes of the overwhelming local Hindu populace
were respected and hastened the process of merger of these two states in the Indian Union.

b) Kashmir had a peculiar problem. It had distinct distribution patterns of its population, with
the Ladakh area being predominantly Buddhist, the Jammu region Hindu and the Kashmir
valley Muslim. Pakistan sought to force the pace of the decision making on Kashmir by
permitting the ‘irregular army’ to enter Kashmir. Maharaja Hari Singh, realising the potential
problems, signed the Instrument of Accession with India, thus merging the state of Jammu
and Kashmir with the Indian Union. The first Indo- Pakistan war that followed the merger of
Kashmir into India left the state partitioned. India took the matter to the United Nations and
agreed to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir to ascertain the wishes of the Kashmiris. According to
the cease-fire resolution adopted by the UN Security Council, the plebiscite was conditional
upon the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from Kashmir and the restoration of the situation to
the pre 1947 position. This condition was never met by Pakistan and the plebiscite also never
came to be conducted.

c) Kashmir has seen a tumultuous history since the first war of 1948. The new government
formed by Sheikh Abdullah, a Kashmiri leader of long standing, came to be dismissed in
1953. Sheikh Abdullah was relieved of his post as his party the National Conference refused
to accept the accession to India as final and vaguely talked of the final settlement of the state
of Kashmir in the future. Sheikh Abdullah was brought back to head the government in
Kashmir in 1975 after he and Indira Gandhi signed an agreement. Now Sheikh Abdullah had
given up the earlier separatist demand and had accepted Kashmir to be legitimately a part of
India. In 1965, India and Pakistan fought a war over Kashmir. This war, as the Pakistani Air
Marshal Asghar Khan put it, was a war to solve the problem once and for all. The Tashkent
Conference (1966) also failed to provide any results. Though, the 1971 war was more a war
about the future of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh, it had a definite aspect of
Kashmir about it.

d) The Shimla Agreement of 1972 formalised the emergent situation on Kashmir. The
agreement sought to establish some basic principles of Indo-Pakistan interaction. The
Agreement specifically refers to bilateralism and acceptance of durable peace as the
framework of resolving future India-Pakistan problems. On the very vital issue of Kashmir
the agreement states: ‘In Jammu and Kashmir the line of actual control resulting from the
cease fire of 17 December 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the
recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally irrespective of
mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain the threat
 or the use of force in violation of this line’

e) The Shimla Agreement sought to create a new framework of interaction for India and
Pakistan and freeze the issue of Kashmir along the Line of Control indefinitely. One
understands from the writings of Indian leaders involved in the making of this agreement that
there was an implicit understanding of converting the LOC into a boundary in the eventual
future. It is in this context that the return of Sheikh Abdullah became significant. Now India
had a Kashmiri leader, heading a Kashmiri party the National Conference, taking the position
that Kashmir is part of India. This was tantamount to a plebiscite. This was the test of the
right to self-determination that the Kashmiris had been promised by the plebiscite. India
could now talk of political legitimacy for the accession of Kashmir to India.

f) Several developments appear to complicate the problem in Kashmir in the 1980s. Global
Islamic resurgence came to be a force to reckon with. The growth of fundamentalist Islamic
groups and the spread in their activity had become a matter of concern even for the United
States. Pakistan was in a unique position in those days. Given its relatively liberal Islamic
posture and the possibility of emergent democratic governments in Pakistan led it to retain a
relatively close relationship with United States. On the other hand, it had excellent relations
with the core Islamic world. It had an excellent access to the new Afghan government of
Taliban and also to other radical Islamic organisations. Pakistan thus appears to have
benefited from the then international situation.The post-1975 developments on Kashmir
constitute the beginning of an entirely new chapter in its history. Adverse reactions to Sheikh
Abdullah rule started in the late 1970s. Partly it was a product of the growing divide between
the ruling class in Kashmir and the common populace that remained deprived of the fruits of
development that the state sought to create. Partly, it was the product of resultant frustration
that came to be created in the minds of the Kashmiri about the utility of Indian rule. One of
the significant popular level movements came in the form of the Jammu & Kashmir
Liberation Front (JKLF). As an organisation that had strong Pakistani connections, the JKLF
demanded the right to self-determination for the Kashmiris to join Pakistan.

g) Infiltration and insurgency has been a long pattern in Pakistani strategy on Kashmir. Prior to
the 1965 war Pakistan had used this approach with little success. The failure to solve the
problem through the use of force in 1965 and 1971 had led to a change in strategy. Now
infiltration took the shape of low intensity conflict. Efforts to paralyse the local law and order
situation and create uncertainty in the region came to be the tactics of the day. The large scale
exit of the Kashmiri pundits from the valley was part of this protracted strategy.

h) This Pakistani strategy was buttressed with a new clarion call of human rights violation. In
the early 1990s, concern about violation of human rights had suddenly acquired newly found
acceptance. In Bosnia, Chechnya and elsewhere, the world appeared to have suddenly
become sensitive to human rights. In Kashmir too, the old paradigm of self-determination
was fast replaced by the new paradigm of human rights violation. Suddenly the situation in
Kashmir came to be analysed almost entirely along the human dimension. Demands came to
 be made by the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), followed by the European powers
for an on-thes pot survey of violation of human rights by the Indian forces. The Indian
government was persuaded enough to create a National Human Rights Commission of its
own to monitor the problem. It took several years for the international community to
acknowledge that terrorist outfits also violate human rights and that the responsibility of
violation cannot be that of the Government alone.

i) In 1999 India and Pakistan came into conflict over an intrusion by Pakistan into Kargil. Was
the crossing of the LOC by the Mujahideens, and the Pakistani troops a logical culmination
of the ongoing approach taken on Kashmir? Did it represent an assessment by Pakistan that
time was ripe to exert direct force by crossing the LOC and force India to resolve the
Kashmir problem? Several explanations may be given for this Pakistani adventurism. One,
that Pakistan must have assessed the time as being ripe for such an action to achieve its goal
about accession of Kashmir. The political uncertainty in India and the obvious lack of
consensus across the political spectrum in India would have also been one of the
considerations. Two, this assessment must have been a military and intelligence assessment
based on the active participation of the militant outfits. It was quite likely that the civil
government was pulled into this decision after it was in place. If this be true it confirms the
pattern of Pakistani politics that is dominated by competing interests of the army, the civilian
representative elite, the intelligence units and the Islamic groups. The Pakistani premier’s
constant disclaim about the involvement of Government in the Kargil action may not be
entirely true. Such actions cannot take place without the knowledge and participation of the
government (and that includes the army). But his statement may also indicate the truth that he
has very little control over the Pakistan army and militant groups in Kargil. History shows
that the creators of such groups eventually cease to control them as they tend to have a
momentum of their own

j) Having committed itself in Kargil, Pakistan appeared to have taken on more than it could
digest. The international public opinion has shifted away from Pakistan. Its old and trusted
ally China took a neutral position and advised restraint and dialogue. The Pakistani Premier
was not able to move the United States either. The US visit of Premier Sharif proved
counterproductive. The Americans asked Pakistan to withdraw its troops to the LOC and
begin a dialogue with India. Eventually, India did manage to push back the Pakistani
infiltration.

7) Nuclear Issue

a) The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998 had generated a great deal of
debate on the rationale and implications of these actions taken by both the governments.
Much of the debate focused on the security considerations of this action, the regional threat
dimensions and internal political compulsions. The Indian articulation focused on the threats
from Pakistan and China, while Pakistan targeted India. The central questions raised about
the Indian tests had been in the ‘why’ and ‘why now’ category. The debates used two distinct
paradigms for analysis, the first using the security rationale and the second, the
 developmental rationale. The debates based on the first focused on the perceived threats from
the regional order as manifested by Pakistan and China. The positions about the exact nature
of threats and the methods of tackling these threats would vary from party to party at a
political level. In case of the Pakistani tests, the answers would be more specific, in that they
would point to India as the central culprit. Further, in both cases there would be very strong
internal political compulsions. Now that the tests have confirmed the nuclear weapon
capability (or actual weapon status) it may be safe to presume that the nations have achieved
whatever minimal nuclear ambitions they had cherished.

b) The Indian nuclear tests of May 1998 represented a demonstration of capabilities—

technological and political. Technological capabilities were in the context of the denial of
access to advanced technologies that India experienced over the years. The political
capability represented the demonstration of political will of the elite to take on the G-7
regime. It is this reassertion of the ability to take independent decisions in face of anticipated
sanctions that makes the nuclear test a symbol of a resurgent Third World. It is at that level
that both, the Indian and Pakistani tests, demonstrate a commonality of approaches.
c) The Draft outline of Indian Nuclear Doctrine released on 17 August 1999 argued for
autonomy in decision making about security for India. It takes the long established Indian
line that security is an integral part of India’s developmental process. It expresses concerns
about the possible disruption of peace and stability and the consequent need to create a
deterrence capability to ensure the pursuit of development. It argued that in the absence of a
global nuclear disarmament policy, India’s strategic interests required an effective credible
deterrence and adequate retaliatory capability should deterrence fail. It continues to hold on
the ‘no first use doctrine’ and the civilian control of nuclear decision- making.

d) The utility of nuclear deterrence (at whatever level) between India and Pakistan may be still
unclear. But the Kargil conflict presented a threshold (a ‘glass ceiling’, to borrow from
feminist terminology) beyond which the two powers may not be able to escalate their
conflict. This threshold, in the form of the Line of Control was adhered to by India and was
also imposed by the United States and China on Pakistan. In the short run, one may have to
make a distinction between conventional security considerations which include border
conflicts and internal security problems on the one hand, and nuclear strategies on the other.
Therefore, there is the need to reinitiate the nuclear dialogue of 1985 that sought to create an
agreement on not attacking each others’ nuclear installations. This can now be supplemented
by a declaration on ‘no-first-use’ policy.

e) Both India and Pakistan would have to stress on the need to develop their peaceful- uses
programme for its economic and industrial growth. This may require the two countries to
bargain with the developed world for the transfer of advance technology. The threat of
sanctions on dual use technologies and the limited room for negotiations make it necessary
for India and Pakistan to pool their resources for bargaining with the developed countries.
8) Dialogue

a) One must make a specific reference to the various attempts to establish a dialogue between
the two countries and discuss their success and failures. India and Pakistan have signed two
important treaties after they had fought border wars. The Tashkent Agreement (1966) saw a
meeting of Indian prime minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani president Ayub Khan.
The agreement succeeded in freezing the Kashmir dispute but did not resolve the problems.
The Simla Agreement (1972) saw an interaction between Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and
Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who eventually went on to become the prime minister
of Pakistan.
b) There have been other occasions when the leaders of these two countries have had an
opportunity to exchange views. One of these has been on the occasion of SAARC or Non-
aligned Movement summit meetings. Such meetings were usually carried on the sidelines of
the summits. Perhaps the more well-known recent meetings have been those between Prime
Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and Pakistan Premier Nawaz Shariff at Lahore (1999) and
Vajpayee’s meeting with General Pervez Musharraf at Agra (2001). The former saw the
inauguration of the Delhi- Lahore Bus service and the signing of Lahore Declaration which
reiterated the principle of bilateral approach to Indo-Pak problems, while the latter ended
without any significant gains. In 2003 Prime Minister Vajpayee once again called for a
comprehensive dialogue with Pakistan. This initiative saw some forward movement with the
exchange of parliamentary delegations and some informal talks that began between the two
countries. Both, India and Pakistan share some common post colonial legacies. Both have
attempted to address the problems of pluralistic societies and overcome the resistance of
feudal tendencies in their efforts at political and economic modernisation. Both have strained
their political institutions to accommodate socio- political upheavals. One may argue that the
Indian experiment appears to have survived the test of time and that its political institutions
have been able to cope with the demands placed on them. On the other hand Pakistan still
continues to experiment with its institutions in search of stability.

9) INDIA AND OTHER NATIONS OF SOUTH ASIA

British colonial policies have influenced India’s approach towards the small powers of South
Asia. Two important legacies have been carried over in Indian thinking: One, it is the Indian
‘responsibility’ to look after the security needs of the small powers. This ‘responsibility’, in
terms of security, is understood in the context of an ‘extended frontier’ or a ‘defence
perimetre’ approach. This meant that care would have to be taken to ensure that these
countries do not become open to outside intervention. Two, India sought to avoid
interference in the internal affairs of these countries except in exceptional circumstances.
These circumstances were security considerations as interpreted by India. For example,
following the creation of Bangladesh the Indian position has always been that the security
and integrity of these states would be of vital national interest to India.
10) INDIA-NEPAL RELATIONS

a) Indian policy towards Nepal is determined by the following considerations: (i) the geopolitics
of Nepal makes it a landlocked country sandwiched between India and China. Access to
Nepal is easier from the Indian side; (ii) historically, both countries have shared a common
security perception; (iii) there exists a great deal of cultural affinity between the two
countries; Nepal is not only the birth place of Gautam Buddha but is also the only Hindu
kingdom in the world.
b) The parameters of bilateral relations came to be defined in the context of two treaties that
India and Nepal signed in 1950: The Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the Treaty of Trade
and Commerce. The former was a security arrangement that took into account the possible
threat of the Chinese from across the border. It provided for a close cooperation between
India and Nepal on matters relating to Nepal’s security, thus ensuring that Nepal does not
come under the Chinese sphere of influence. The second treaty provided for trade and transit
arrangements with Nepal. The terminology of this treaty was subject to several discussions
over the years. Since this was a ten year treaty that was to be renewed regularly, the
discussions became important. One major change came in the phraseology of the treaty in
1971. The term ‘freedom of transit’ was replaced by ‘right of transit’. Another important
change that took place during the Janata Government was the splitting up of this treaty into
separate treaties, one for trade and dealing with transit.

c) In 1970s Nepal came forward with a fundamentally new approach to its foreign policy. In
aformal announcement in 1975 Nepal proposed the establishment of a Zone of Peace for the
region of Nepal. The proposal sought to adhere to the policy of peace, non- alignment and
peaceful coexistence. The central purpose of this policy appeared to be the reassertion of
Nepal’s sovereignty and its identity that it feared was being submerged by Indian
domination. While this proposal still stands as an objective of Nepal’s foreign policy today,
India did not accept it. Instead, India favours the entire South Asia as zone of peace.

d) The movement towards restoration of democracy in Nepal began in 1980s. The creation of
the new constitution providing for a constitutional monarchy in 1990 was a welcome step in
the restoration of democracy. Since 1990 Nepal, like the UK, is a constitutional monarchy
with a parliamentary democracy.

e) The Indian attitude towards Nepal is linked to several factors. One concerns Nepal’s attitude
towards China. Nepal. In fact what was of critical concern to India was the reported
agreement between China and Nepal for sharing of intelligence. India is also concerned about
the open access that Pakistani militant organisations are suspect of getting in Nepal. The
highjacking of an Indian Airlines plane from Nepal is just one example of the I.S.I. using
Nepal’s territory for terrorism against India. On the part of Nepal, it views India as a
dominant neighbour that it would like to balance by making some overtures with China.
Nepal has broadly accepted the ‘special relationship’ with India. The strong historical and
socio-cultural links ensure that this relationship will continue. However, Nepal is looking for
greater economic flexibility from India in its economic/trade related issues.
11) Bangladesh

a) India had actively participated in the freedom struggle of Bangladesh in the wake of the
Pakistani repression of the people of erstwhile East Pakistan in 1971. India also had an
interest in ending a ‘two frontier threat’ that East and West Pakistan had posed to it since its
independence. The 1972 Indo-Bangladesh Friendship Treaty was an attempt to assert India’s
interest in the security and integrity of the new nation. The Treaty stipulated that the two
countries would not enter into or participate in military alliances directed against one another.
However, the goodwill in Indo- Bangladesh relations did not stay for long.

b) Between 1972 and 1975, India had a fairly good relationship with Bangladesh. Bangladesh
was the largest recipient of the Indian aid. India also concluded various border demarcations
that had been pending for long with Pakistan. The agreements involved the incorporation of
various Bengali Muslim enclaves into Bangladesh without compensation. Later, in 1982,
India agreed to lease the Tin Bhiga corridor to Bangladesh ‘in perpetuity’. But it did not
materialise due to Indian Parliament’s refusal to amend the Constitution to lease the Tin
Bigha. India’s relations with Bangladesh deteriorated after the killing of Sheikh Mujibur
Rehman in 1975. There have been three important points of dispute between India and
Bangladesh. One concerns the problem over the Farakka Barrage; two is the issue of the New
Moore or the Purbasha Island and third is the question of the Bangladeshi infiltration from
across the borders, especially the Chakma refugees.

c) The construction of the Farakka barrage had started in 1962. The aim of the project was to
divert the water from the Ganges to the Hoogly so as to flush out and desilt the Calcutta port.
The then government of Pakistan had objected to this as it would have created water scarcity
for the area in East Pakistan. In 1972 India and Bangladesh agreed to create a Joint Rivers
Commission; however, the talks on the Farakka barrage continued to fail. It was only in 1978
that an agreement was signed between the two countries on the sharing of waters. But it
lapsed after five years. Eventually in 1996 a treaty on sharing of Ganga waters was
concluded, between India and Bangladesh, for 30 years. It takes care of the needs of water for
both the countries during the ‘lean period’. In 1981, the Indian Navy laid claim to the island
of New Moore that had been emerging in the mouth of the Ganga delta. This became a bone
of contention between the two countries. The island called Talpatty by Bangladesh and
Purbasha, by West Bengal is not inhabited. It can be resolved on the basis of the principle of
mean line. Bangladesh has also objected to India’s attempts to fence the border to prevent
infiltration of Bangladeshis into the North Eastern territories of India. This, besides the flow
of the Chakma refugees into India, has created border tensions between the two countries.
12) Sri Lanka

a) Bilateral relations between the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the Republic
of India have been generally friendly, but were controversially affected by the Sri Lankan
civil war and by the failure of Indian intervention during the war. India is the only neighbour
of Sri Lanka, separated by the Palk Strait; both nations occupy a strategic position in South
Asia and have sought to build a common security umbrella in the Indian Ocean. Historically
and culturally, the two nations have been considerably close, with 70% of Sri Lankans
continuing to follow Theravada Buddhism to this day

13) Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan civil war

a) In the 1970s-1980s, private entities and elements in the state government of Tamil Nadu were
believed to be encouraging the funding and training for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam, a separatist insurgent force. In 1987, faced with growing anger amongst its own
Tamils, and a flood of refugees, India intervened directly in the conflict for the first time after
the Sri Lankan government attempted to regain control of the northern Jaffna region by
means of an economic blockade and military assaults, India supplied food and medicine by
air and sea. After subsequent negotiations, India and Sri Lanka entered into an
agreement/13th amendment. The peace accord assigned a certain degree of regional
autonomy in the Tamil areas with Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF)
controlling the regional council and called for the Tamil militant groups to lay down their
arms. Further India was to send a peacekeeping force, named the IPKF to Sri Lanka to
enforce the disarmament and to watch over the regional council. Even though the accord was
signed between the governments of Sri Lanka and India, with the Tamil Tigers and other
Tamil militant groups not having a role in the signing of the accord, most Tamil militant
groups accepted this agreement, the LTTE rejected the accord, The result was that the LTTE
now found itself engaged in military conflict with the Indian Army, and launched their first
attack on an Indian army rations truck on October 8, killing five Indian para- commandos
who were on board by strapping burning tires around their necks. The government of India
then decided that the IPKF should disarm the LTTE by force, and the Indian Army launched
number of assaults on the LTTE, including a month-long campaign dubbed Operation Pawan
to win control of the Jaffna peninsula from the LTTE. The Indian army's subsequent anti-
LTTE operations made it extremely unpopular amongst many Tamils in Sri Lanka. The
conflict between the LTTE and the Indian Army left over 1,000 Indian soldiers dead.

b) The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, which had been unpopular amongst Sri Lankans for giving
India a major influence, now became a source of nationalist anger and resentment as the
IPKF was drawn fully into the conflict. Sri Lankans protested the presence of the IPKF, and
the newly-elected Sri Lankan president Ranasinghe Premadasa demanded its withdrawal,
which was completed by March 1990. on May 21, 1991, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated and
the LTTE was alleged to be the perpetrator. As a result India declared the LTTE to be a
terrorist outfit in 1992. Bilateral relations improved in the 1990s and India supported the
 peace process but has resisted calls to get involved again.

c) India has also been wary of and criticised the extensive military involvement of Pakistan in
the conflict, accusing the latter of supplying lethal weaponry and encouraging Sri Lanka to
pursue military action rather than peaceful negotiations to end the civil war.

14) Commercial ties

a) India and Sri Lanka are member nations of several regional and multilateral organisations
such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), South Asia Co-
operative Environment Programme, South Asian Economic Union and BIMSTEC, working
to enhance cultural and commercial ties. Since a bilateral free trade agreement was signed
and came into effect in 2000, Indo-Sri Lankan trade rose 128% by 2004 and quadrupled by
2006, reaching USD 2.6 billion. Between 2000 and 2004, India's exports to Sri Lanka in the
last four years increased by 113%, from USD 618 million to$1,319 million while Sri Lankan
exports to India increased by 342%, from $44 million to USD $194 million Indian exports
account for 14% of Sri Lanka’s global imports. India is also the fifth largest export
destination for Sri Lankan goods, accounting for 3.6% of its exports.

b) Both nations are also signatories of the South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA).
Negotiations are also underway to expand the free trade agreement to forge stronger
commercial relations and increase corporate investment and ventures in various industries.
The year 2010 is predicted to be the best year for bilateral trade on record, with Sri Lanka's
exports to India increasing by 45% over the first seven months of the year. India's National
Thermal Power Corp (NTPC) is also scheduled to build a 500 MW thermal power plant in
Sampoor (Sampur). The NTPC claims that this plan will take the Indo-Sri Lankan
relationship to new level
15) Fishing disputes

a) There have been several alleged incidents of Sri Lankan Navy personnel firing on Indian
fishermen fishing in the Palk Strait, where India and Sri Lanka are only separated by 12
nautical miles. Indian Government has always taken up the issue of safety of Indian
fishermen on a priority basis with the Government of Sri Lanka. Presently there is no
bonafide Indian fisherman in the Sri Lankan custody. A Joint Working Group (JWG)
has been constituted to deal with the issues related to Indian fishermen straying in Sri
Lankan territorial waters, work out modalities for prevention of use of force against
them and the early release of confiscated boats and explore possibilities of working
towards bilateral arrangements for licensed fishing. The JWG last met in Jan 2006. India
officially protested against Sri Lanka Navy for its alleged involvement in attacks on
Indian fishermen on January 12, 2011. Even after the official protest, another fisherman
was killed in a brutal manner on Jan 22, 2011. Over 530 fishermen have been killed in
the last 30 years. The apathetic attitude of the Indian government and the national media
towards the alleged killing of Tamil Nadu fishermen by the Sri Lankan Navy is being
strongly condemned. Several Tamil Nadu politicians like Vaiko and Jayalalitha have
condemned the federal government for not doing enough to stop the killing of Indian
Tamil fishermen

16) Development Cooperation

a) India is active in a number of areas of development activity in Sri Lanka. About one-
sixth of the total development credit granted by Government of India is made available
to Sri Lanka. In the recent past three lines of credit were extended to Sri Lanka: US$
100 million for capital goods, consumer durables, consultancy services and food items,
US$ 31 million for supply of 300,000 MT of wheat and US$ 150 million for purchase of
petroleum products. All of these lines of credit have been fully utilized. Another line of
credit of US$ 100 million is now being made available for rehabilitation of the
Colombo- Matara railway.

b) A number of development projects are implemented under ‘Aid to Sri Lanka’ funds. In
2006-07, the budget for ‘Aid to Sri Lanka’ was Rs 28.2 Crs. A training programme for
465 Sri Lankan Police officers has been commenced in Dec 2005. Another 400 Sri
Lankan Police personnel are being trained for the course of ‘Maintenance of Public
Order’. Indian governments have also showed interest in collaborating with their Sri
Lankan counterparts on building tourism between the two countries based on shared
religious heritage.
17) Other areas of Cooperation

a) The India-Sri-Lanka bilateral agreement on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons was

signed on June 9, 2010. The agreement provides for the conditions under which such
transfers can take place and the various obligations of the transferring state and the
receiving state. Accordingly, the requests made by eligible persons are processed by the
Sri Lanka and forwarded to India for completion of the necessary legal procedures. The
transferred persons would be completing the remainder of their terms in India.
Sentenced Persons belonging to Kerala and Tamilnadu have been transferred under the
agreement from Srilanka to India. But later Sri Lanka changed its position that it will
prosecute Indian fishermen arrested for poaching instead of arranging for their early
release.

18) Conclusion

a) To conclude, the Indian policy towards the smaller powers of South Asia has been more
explicitly seen since the Indira Gandhi days. India supports and encourages regional
democracies and has sought to tie up its regional primacy through series of regional, and
bilateral arrangements, covering a wide range of agreements in the areas of defence,
trade and science and technology. Yet difficulties continue to remain in coming to an
understanding with India. Divisions and mistrust continues to dominate the region. The
commonality of the region leads the small powers to continue to assert their differences
so as to regain a sense of identity and independence.