The Russian Navy
The Russian Navy
The Russian Navy
Executive Summary.........................................................................................................iii
Preface.............................................................................................................................v
Introduction: Russian Naval History: From the Kievan Rus’ to Today’s Russia....................xiii
Outlook...........................................................................................................................43
Additional resources:
Posters of the Russian Navy Major Forces by Fleet, Russian Navy New Construction, and the Russian Federation Navy (map) are located
inside the back cover.
i
Published by the
Office of Naval Intelligence
December 2015
Cleared for public release by Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review (DOPSR Case 16-S-0274)
This report contains copyrighted material. Copying and disseminating the contents are prohibited without the permission of the copyright owners. When feasible,
copyright permission has been sought for those pictures where copyright was known, and attribution to those sources, when known, has been given.
ii
Executive Summary
This publication, The Russian Navy – A battled to maintain that access, directly
Historic Transition, is intended to provide supported Russia’s land forces in times of
the reader with a basic introduction to the imperial expansion and in the expulsion of
Russian Navy and an appreciation of current invaders, been part of the strategic nuclear
developments that will shape Russia’s navy deterrence triad, and demonstrated a global
and its operations in the 21st century. presence in the national interest. Political and
military strategy and the role and mission of
Because the U.S. Navy operates worldwide the Navy evolved as the Russian state grew,
and the Russian Navy is an advanced, globally faced challenges, was transformed into the
capable force, its history, capabilities, missions, Soviet Union by revolution, repelled invasion,
and role within the Russian state and armed and encountered disintegration.
forces should be clearly understood. The
new technologically advanced Russian Navy, “The Russian Navy is being equipped with the
increasingly armed with the KALIBR family of
weapons, will be able to more capably defend
newest; including precision long-range strike
the maritime approaches to the Russian weapons, and has big nuclear power. Naval
Federation and exert significant influence in forces today are capable of operating for a
adjacent seas. This multi-purpose force will be long time and with high combat readiness in
the forward-layered defense of Russia and its operationally important areas of the global
maritime exclusive economic zone and will be ocean.”
able to promote Russian diplomatic interests,
advance maritime science, combat piracy, and
- Admiral Viktor Chirkov
provide humanitarian assistance. Commander-in-Chief, Russian Navy
iii
production capabilities required to advance interest, manned by a new generation of post-
it became ever more sophisticated and Soviet officers and enlisted personnel.
varied. In addition to production for its own
needs, foreign sales shifted from selling The research, technical development, and
masts, caulking pitch, and rope to a variety production enabling the achievement of
of highly capable ships, submarines, and these goals have and will continue to be
related weapons systems today sold to or co- accompanied by a robust program of naval
produced with a number of foreign states. arms sales to other countries. The quantity
and quality of the ships, submarines, and
As Russia asserts itself on the world stage, armaments sold will transform the current
it is giving priority of effort and funding to capabilities of recipient states and, in some
recapitalizing its navy, which is going through cases, potentially enable them to improve the
a major transition from the legacy Soviet Navy quality of indigenous arms production.
to a Russian Navy that should reflect the latest
achievements of Russian advances in science
and technology. “Thanks to the bravery of sailors, the talent
of shipbuilders, and the daring of explorers,
On the basis of currently available data it is pioneers, and naval leaders our nation has
projected that the Russian Navy will retain its
core missions. Although the national defense
held fast as a great maritime power. This
mission of the strategic and general purpose status is a huge responsibility for us as we
navy has remained, today’s fiscal realities face history, our ancestors who created
require that the decreased number of major Russia’s maritime glory, and, of course, future
naval platforms be multi-mission capable generations to whom we must pass a modern
and armed with the latest capabilities in and strong Navy.”
weapons; sensors; and command, control,
communications, computer, intelligence,
- Vladimir Putin, President
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) Russian Federation Navy Day, 26 July 2015
systems. Russia has begun, and over the next
decade will make large strides in fielding a
21st century navy capable of a dependable
national defense, an impressive but limited
presence in more distant global areas of
NOTE: The contents of this publication reflect information gathered from a broad range of publicly available
source material that is considered to be effectively accurate and authoritative.
iv
Preface
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in organizational disarray and financial neglect as
December 1991, Russia inherited the majority the Russian leadership focused on the priorities
of the former Soviet Navy, including its afloat of national transformation from the framework
assets, naval bases, and an extensive network of the totalitarian and socialist Soviet state into
of shore facilities. a fledgling democracy embracing a market
economy. During this “time of troubles,”
The immediate post-Soviet period was fraught most naval programs were either suspended
with major difficulties as the Soviet Navy first or halted altogether. Only efforts to improve
became the Commonwealth of Independent command and control systems and less-
States (CIS) Navy and finally transitioned expensive new design work continued to be
to the Russian Federation (Russian) Navy pursued.
(RFN). These early years were marked by
v
Russia inherited virtually all of a huge legacy were justified on the basis that it was better to
Soviet Navy, however—largely because Fleet concentrate limited funds and effort and save
Admiral of the Soviet Union Sergey Gorshkov, some of the best and most useful ships and
Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy for submarines rather than attempt to save all and
almost 30 years, wanted to keep what he had thereby save nothing.
built—many of the Soviet Navy’s submarines,
surface ships, and auxiliaries had long outlived Since 2000, as Russia’s governmental order
their usefulness, but were retained to maintain and economy have stabilized, there has been
impressive numbers. The post-Soviet naval a focused and funded effort to revitalize
leadership faced daunting decisions to triage the Russian military—including the Navy.
this legacy. Once assessments were made Suspended construction programs are
and decisions taken, fully three-quarters to now moving toward completion and new
five-sixths of the Soviet-era inventory was construction programs are beginning to
written off. Even some submarines and surface provide the Navy with 21st-century submarine
ships that were both combat-capable and and surface platforms.
had service lives remaining were removed if
deemed no longer cost-effective to maintain Another issue, dividing the Black Sea portion
(about one-third had long expired service of the Soviet Navy with newly independent
lives; another third was composed of units Ukraine, was settled only in 1997. As part of
deemed no longer combat-effective under this process, Russia concluded a base lease
current warfare conditions). Difficult decisions agreement with Ukraine under which Russia
retained use of more than 100 naval facilities
on the Crimean Peninsula through 2017. The
lease agreement provided for the possibility of
bi-laterally agreed extensions, and in 2010, it
was mutually agreed to extend the agreement
for 25 years through 2042 with a possible
additional five years (through 2047) through
the Russian-Ukrainian naval base for gas
agreement, or Kharkiv Pact.
vi
Ministry of Defense Armed conflict. An armed conflict can have
The Russian Federation Ministry of Defense an international character (involving two or
website addresses the missions of the Russian more states) or an internal character (with the
Armed Forces. These have evolved due to the conduct of armed combat within the borders
changing foreign political situation of recent of one state’s territory).
years and new domestic priorities to ensure
national security. These missions are structured An armed conflict can be the consequence
along four basic directions: of the growth of an armed incident, a border
• Deterrence of military and military- conflict, armed actions, and other armed
political threats to the security or interests collisions of limited scale, in which means of
of the Russian Federation armed combat are used to resolve the conflict.
• Ensuring the economic and political
interests of the Russian Federation Local war. A war between two or more states,
• Conducting operations by armed forces limited in political goals, in which military
in peacetime actions are conducted, as a rule, within
• Use of military force (wartime) the boundaries of the belligerent states and
dominantly touch only the interests of these
The peculiarity of the development of the states (territorial, economic, political, etc.).
world military-political situation makes it
possible for the execution of one mission A local war can be conducted by groups of
to grow into another, because the more troops deployed in the conflict region, with
problematic political situations—from Russia’s possible reinforcement by the deployment of
point of view of its security—have a complex supplementary forces from other axes and
and multi-dimensional character. with the conduct of a partial mobilization.
Under certain conditions, local wars can grow
One of the forms of resolving political, into a regional or large-scale war.
national-ethnic, regional, territorial, and other
conflicts is using armed warfare when the state Regional war. A war with the participation
(or states) participating in military actions does of two or more states (groups of states) or a
not transition to the particular condition called region with national or coalition armed forces,
war. As a rule, the parties pursue individual using both conventional and nuclear means
military-political goals in armed conflict. of attack on a territory defined by the bounds
of one region and its adjacent maritime
The Russian Armed Forces train for direct or oceanic waters, air, and outer space, in
participation in the following types of defined* the course of which the parties will pursue
military conflicts: important military-political goals.
vii
The full deployment of the armed forces,
economy, and the great intensity of all of the
forces of the participating states are necessary
for the conduct of regional war. In case states or
their allies having nuclear weapons participate,
a regional war is characterized by the threat of
transitioning to the use of nuclear weapons.
viii
The Armed Forces • Naval Infantry and Coastal Missile and
The Armed Forces structurally comprise three Artillery Troops
services: • Naval shore establishment (headquarters,
• Ground Forces communications, intelligence, maintenance
• Air and Air Defense Forces and repair, education and training, etc.)
• Navy
and three branches: The Navy’s peacetime missions are:
• Strategic Missile Troops (Strategic Rocket • Deter. Maintain strategic nuclear deterrent
Forces) forces—strategic nuclear-powered ballistic
• Aerospace Defense Troops (Space Troops) missile submarines (SSBNs)—in permanent
• Airborne Troops ready status, able to deliver a timely
retaliatory strike or deploy in times of
Navy growing tension to deter an attack against
The Navy is the Russian Armed Forces’ service Russia.
whose mission is the armed protection of • Defend. Maintain and deploy constant
Russia’s interests and the conduct of combat ready general-purpose naval forces to
operations in maritime and oceanic theaters protect and defend Russia’s national
of military operations. The Navy is capable interests both in adjacent seas as well as in
of delivering nuclear and conventional strikes more distant waters.
against an enemy’s land facilities, destroying • Demonstrate. Use the select deployment
enemy naval formations at sea and in base, of general-purpose forces as an
interdicting enemy maritime and oceanic sea “instrument of state” to support Russian
lines of communication while protecting its foreign policy.
own shipping, cooperating with ground forces
in continental theaters of military operations, In times of increased tension and war, the
making amphibious landings, repelling enemy Navy’s priority missions are:
landings, and fulfilling other missions. • Protect. Protect the sea-based strategic
deterrent force.
The Russian Navy is composed of • Interdict. Interdict or blunt an aero-space
interconnected components, spanning the attack against Russia from the maritime
gamut from combat forces to all elements of directions.
supporting infrastructure:
• Command staff Strategic Deterrence
• Submarine forces The Russian Navy contributes to Russia’s
• Surface forces strategic nuclear deterrent forces by
• Naval auxiliaries maintaining nuclear-powered ballistic
• Naval aviation missile-armed submarines (SSBNs) carrying
ix
intercontinental range surface ships, and
ballistic missiles. aircraft out to about
These missiles can be 1,000nm from
launched while the Russia’s frontier,
SSBNs are surfaced with the intention
and moored at their of eliminating or
homeports, while blunting the effects
they are on patrol in of such long range
protected waters in land attack cruise
seas adjacent to Russia, missiles by attacking
or after surfacing SSBN Yuriy Dolgorukiy at sunset their launching
through the ice when platforms (surface
patrolling under the Arctic ice pack. ships, submarines, and aircraft). These forward-
deployed forces could be protected by their
Strategic “Bastions” own self-defense means as well as by fighter
SSBN patrol areas in adjacent seas, generally aircraft deployed on an aircraft carrier.
referred to as “bastions,” are protected against
enemy forces by a combination of fixed Intermediate/close-in defense. Were enemy
sensor installations, and anti-submarine forces naval forces to more closely approach Russian
composed of submarines, surface ships, and territory, they would encounter smaller surface
aircraft. combatants and diesel submarines armed with
anti-ship and anti-submarine cruise missiles
Layered Defense and torpedoes. The immediate approaches
The Navy is Russia’s only armed forces service would be defended by coastal defense anti-
capable of providing for an extended layered ship cruise missiles and mine fields. Direct
defense of Russian territory. This approach is assaults on coastal territory would encounter
predicated on engaging potential enemy forces Naval Infantry and Ground Forces.
as soon as their long-range weapons can
threaten and be brought to bear on Russian Legal Basis
territory. For the purposes of illustration, such Russian military and naval activity and
threat weapons could be long range land organization are defined by a series of
attack cruise missiles. fundamental documents at the national level.
They are:
Forward defense. In order to provide for • Russian Federation Constitution, 12
forward defense, the Russian Navy could December 1993
deploy anti-ship and anti-submarine missile- • Russian Federation law “On Security,” 15
armed nuclear-powered submarines, major December 2010
x
• Russian Federation law “On the State
Defense Order,” 29 December 2012
• Russian Federation law “On Defense,” 31
May 1996 (as amended)
o Section IV. Russian Federation Armed
Forces, other Troops, and military
formations and organizations
o Article 10. Russian Federation Armed
Forces and their purpose, Para 2. The
purpose of the Russian Federation
Armed Forces is to repulse aggression
directed against the Russian Federation,
the armed protection of the integrity
and inviolability of Russian Federation
territory, and the conduct of missions in
accordance with federal constitutional
laws and the Russian Federation’s
international treaties.
• Military Doctrine, Presidential decree of 5
February 2010, as updated December 2014
• Russian Federation Maritime Doctrine
through 2020, Presidential decree of 27 July
2001, updated through July 2015
• Regulation “On the Ministry of Defense,”
Presidential decree of 16 August 2004, as
amended through 27 June 2007
• Russian Federation National Security
Strategy through 2020, Presidential decree
of 12 May 2009 (superceded National
Security Concepts of 1997 and 2000)
xi
“Any ruler that has but ground troops
has one hand, but one that has also a
navy has both.”
- Peter the Great
xii
Introduction:
xiii
now Sitka, Alaska, and a coastal provisioning
outpost at Fort Ross just 65 miles north of San
Francisco, California.
xiv
and out-maneuvered by an allied force of The Soviet Navy
dominantly steam-driven ships. The third When the Bolsheviks finally established
war, in 1877–78, saw the first use of what control over all of Russia after the Russian
can be considered the forerunner of modern Civil War that followed the Revolution, the
torpedoes. There were also two wars with naval forces were tattered and scattered. A
Persia in 1803–1813 and 1826–1827 in significant portion of the remainder that had
which the Caspian Flotilla participated and survived Tsushima and World War I had
gained a secure foothold along the northern fled the country, carrying refugees to various
Caspian Sea. Western countries. A large part of the Imperial
Black Sea Fleet found is last anchorage in
The Russian naval advances and achievements Bizerte, Algeria.
in the 1800s were brought to an end at the
beginning of the 20th century by the Battle The institutions of the Navy carried on, led
of Tsushima Straits in the Russo-Japanese War by officers who considered themselves
of 1904–1905. The Russian Pacific Fleet was apolitical and wished to remain to serve their
unprepared for the developed might of the country. The new order accepted them, but
Japanese Navy. In an early engagement the with conditions. They were never fully trusted
cruiser Varyag perished in an uneven battle at and “political officers” were assigned to watch
Chemulpo (Incheon). To reinforce the Pacific over their actions and decisions, which had
Fleet, a late decision was made to send a to be countersigned by the political officers in
sizable portion of the Baltic Fleet, Russia’s order to be valid. The final chapter for many
largest, around Africa and through the Indian of them was written by bullets in blood when
Ocean to attempt to turn the tide of battle. By the purges (“repressions”) of the 1930s swept
the time the fleet neared Japan, it was weary away the loyal and experienced vestiges of
and worn from the 220-day transit. The the past. Under Joseph Dzhugashvili (Stalin),
Japanese Navy made short work of the pride the forced fulfillment of ambitious plans for
of the Russian Navy. massive industrialization was undertaken.
These plans included the recapitalization of
Plans were made to rebuild the Navy. In 1913, shipyards, including the large shipyards in
the lead unit of the NOVIK Class destroyers Leningrad (St. Petersburg) and Nikolayev, and
was delivered, capable of an impressive 37.7 the construction of an entirely new shipyard
knots. at Severodvinsk (originally called Sudostroy,
then Molotovsk) on the White Sea. Likewise,
The navy that was lost at Tsushima was barely designs were drawn up for new warships,
beginning to be replaced when the next blow both surface and submarines. Once again, the
fell—the Russian Revolution of 1917. construction of a new navy had begun.
xv
The Great Patriotic War The southern front saw the Germans
And, once again, catastrophe intervened. overwhelm Crimea. The forces of the Black
On 22 June 1941, Nazi Germany invaded Sea Fleet retreated to Novorossiysk and
the Soviet Union: Operation Barbarossa had from there assisted the counter-offensive that
begun. Though there had been indications of eventually repelled and ejected the invader. It
eastward German troop movements, the only was in these actions that then Rear Admiral
formation of the Soviet Armed Forces that was S.G. Gorshkov, in charge of the naval forces,
fully combat-ready that day was the Baltic came in close contact with N.S. Khrushchev
Fleet. Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral and L.I. Brezhnev, both of whom were political
N.G. Kuznetsov had taken upon himself the officers in this sector of the war.
responsibility for issuing the readiness order
without waiting for the normal functioning of
the military bureaucracy. To illustrate the extent of the German
invasion of the Soviet Union and its
The German forces laid siege to Leningrad consequences in terms more familiar to
for 900 days and advanced to the outskirts of a U.S. audience, envision the following:
Moscow. Many Baltic Fleet ships managed Nazi Germany geographically abutting
to retreat to Leningrad where they continued the United States’ eastern seaboard with
to function as slightly mobile long-range no intervening land or water. In the early
artillery and anti-aircraft batteries. While morning of 22 June 1941, the invading forces
the German Navy dominantly succeeded in would have simultaneously advanced on a
front stretching from Boston, Massachusetts
“bottling up” the fleet in the Gulf of Finland
to Savannah, Georgia. The United States
using thousands of mines as “corks,” some
would be forced to move all of its east coast
Soviet diesel submarine crews managed to heavy industries to the Rocky Mountains.
thread the minefields and inflict considerable The farthest point of German penetration
damage on German shipping in the Baltic. would be Des Moines, Iowa, and the great
Many of the fleet’s sailors and officers and all tank Battle of Kursk would take place in
of the Naval Infantry joined the ranks of the Cincinnati, Ohio. Instead of the WWII U.S.
ground forces to stop the invader and pushed military death toll of some 400,000, there
him back. would be upward of at least 12 million (25+
million by others), counting both servicemen
German advances in the north effectively and civilians, with most of their blood shed
into their own soil. This traumatic event
contained counterattack operations by the
was seared into the consciousness of every
Northern Fleet operating out of the Kola Gulf
Soviet citizen and all would continue to
and the White Sea. And here also, submarine sacrifice much to ensure that war would
crews were able to slip out and inflict not come again.
damage.
xvi
Once Germany was defeated, the wartime When cruise missiles were added to surface
alliance between the U.S., U.K., and the ships in the 1950s, the age of long-range naval
Soviet Union evaporated and the chill of the artillery duels was a thing of the past. Of
Cold War soon set in. Interpreting the Soviet course, every advance in a capability to attack
advance into Eastern Europe and the retention called forth efforts to provide for an effective
of control there differently, both East and West defense. Extensive efforts were focused on
warily eyed each other. developing anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
capabilities by using submarines, surface ships,
The development and use of the atom bomb helicopters, long-range aviation, and fixed
cast the long shadow of its mushroom cloud sensor systems.
over all military calculations. The world did
not yet know all of the consequences and By the late 1960s, under the able and
after-effects of radiation exposure and many visionary leadership of Fleet Admiral of the
considered the development of nuclear Soviet Union S.G. Gorshkov and his close
arsenals to be yet another step in future personal connections with the leadership
warfighting. of the Communist Party and Government,
the USSR had built and was continuing to
On the naval side, the Soviet Union once construct an impressive navy. In response to
again developed programs to rebuild. the mention of the huge numbers of hastily
The acquisition of German technology, built platforms with a tone that questioned
documentation, and scientists allowed both their quality, a Soviet naval officer reportedly
the USSR and the West to advance their naval said, “Quantity has a quality of its own.” The
capabilities. The war had shown the utility of 1974 first edition of the U.S. Department of the
longer-range weapons: the German V-1 “flying Navy publication “Understanding Soviet Naval
bomb” cruise missiles and the V-2 ballistic Developments” noted the general-purpose
missiles became the starting points for the Soviet Navy as having 245 active nuclear-
development of whole families of ground- and powered and diesel-electric submarines and
sea-launched weapons. The launch of the USS 222 major surface warships. In addition, there
Nautilus ushered in the age of naval nuclear were 61 nuclear-powered and diesel-electric
power and true submarines—warships that ballistic missile submarines.
could dive and operate submerged, limited
only by the endurance of their human crew. By the 1970s, the leadership of both the U.S.
When cruise and ballistic missiles were and the USSR decided that the arms race
added to submarines, the capability to hold could not go on unchecked. Negotiations led
an adversary at risk or the ability to launch a to treaties limiting strategic nuclear arms, first
surprise attack was greatly increased. SALT and then START. Other negotiations
led to a bilateral agreement aimed at making
xvii
the middle-aged M.S. Gorbachev succeeded
the quickly dying geriatric parade of Brezhnev,
Andropov, and Chernenko, a time of change
came to the USSR. For the first time since
the Revolution, things could be described
as they really were, rather than as the Party
ideology insisted they be. Growing global
communications capabilities broke down the
barriers of radio jamming and press censorship.
The massive but fragile Soviet edifice began
to show cracks, and on Christmas Day, 25
December 1991, it disintegrated.
xviii
develop new, more modern and capable
designs and systems.
xix
xx
Chapter One:
Strategy –
Fulfilling National Missions
1
position to significantly contribute to the advance of the German Army in its surprise
operations of a weak Russian army in the attack on the USSR (Operation Barbarossa)
context of a ground war in Europe. In the Far supported by the German Navy effectively
East, the limited capabilities of the Pacific Fleet bottled up the Baltic Fleet once it withdrew
and the basing of a portion of it in China at to bases in and near Leningrad in the Gulf
the leasehold of Port Arthur did not permit of Finland. Even the fact that the Soviet
mounting an adequate defense against attack fleet was put on war readiness just before
by a more capable and numerically larger the start of the offensive was not enough to
Japanese Navy. The geographic reality of stall the German advance in the Baltic. The
Russia’s widely separated maritime frontage Soviet Northern Fleet, which was just being
did not in 1904 and still does not today developed in the 1930s, was also forced
support the strategic utility of sending ships into a defensive posture. The same fate befell
from one fleet to support another in their the Black Sea Fleet, which was significantly
defensive missions. diminished with the capture of Sevastopol.
Most naval personnel ended up fighting
Each fleet and the Caspian Flotilla must ashore alongside the army as the entire
be effectively self-sufficient to perform its nation fought to expel the invader.
missions in its region of responsibility in
conjunction with whatever other armed forces By the end of the war, resistance and exploits
branches are directly available. by a handful of submarine crews in the Baltic
and North and the construction of numerous
Soviet Navy Roles and Missions small craft in the Black Sea allowed the Soviet
The early Soviet Period saw the virtual Navy to support the Red Army in rolling back
disappearance of the Navy with most of its the invader. In the Pacific, the modest forces
ships either sunk or scuttled during World War of the Pacific Fleet entered the war close to
I or removed to foreign ports by departing the last moment in order to join in the spoils
contingents of forces opposing the Bolshevik of victory. This overall experience left an
Revolutions and Communist rule. Prior to indelible imprint on the Soviet political and
World War II, the Soviet Union worked military establishment, and for many years, the
steadily to rebuild its navy and the navy’s Navy’s role remained the support of the Army.
mission together with that of the Red Army In fact, Soviet military theoreticians asserted
was limited to protecting the gains of the that because of the nature of the Soviet Navy,
Revolution. there could not be a “naval strategy” as
distinct from “military strategy.”
World War II - the Great Patriotic War. The
onset of World War II found the Soviet Navy Post-war Soviet Navy. After the war, the Soviet
in a defensive posture at its bases. The rapid Union once again embarked on building a
2
navy; however, the pace was slow and the Strategic Deterrence. The development of
Navy’s mission remained ill-defined. the ballistic missile submarine changed the
strategic playing field. The adversary could
Post Cuban Missile Crisis. When the Soviet now be threatened with assured destruction
Union was embarrassed over the 1962 Cuban from invisible platforms lurking in the offshore
Missile Crisis, it provided Admiral Gorshkov, ocean depths. At first, Soviet submarine-
Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy launched ballistic missiles were of relatively
for almost 30 years, with the opportunity short range, necessitating long transits to get
and justification to promote equipping the within target range. They also made noisy
Navy with capabilities significantly beyond Soviet submarines vulnerable to detection
those required for the direct support of and prosecution by fixed acoustic sensor
the Army. Gorshkov postulated that the systems, shore-based maritime patrol aircraft,
Navy, acting relatively alone, could achieve and attack submarines and surface ships. The
decisive strategic goals in Oceanic Theaters development of longer-range ballistic missiles
of Military Operations (Oceanic TMOs; in allowed the submarines that carried them to
Russian: Oceanic TVD). Pursuing his vision patrol closer to their home bases where they
and using his close wartime connections with could be protected by various general-purpose
the Soviet political leadership, he was able forces and even reach their targets from their
to push through robust weapons and sensor home piers or after surfacing through the
development as well as shipbuilding programs. Arctic icecap.
These programs gave the Soviet Navy a role Conventional Forces. Robust, general-purpose
in strategic defense by creating more capable forces were developed and built to support
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines the layered defense of the homeland. Small
that could threaten the United States and combatants and minesweepers protected
its NATO allies with nuclear weapons. The adjacent home waters and were tasked to
construction of a large number of general- ensure that naval forces could not be bottled
purpose conventional and nuclear-powered up in their bases. Larger, more seaworthy
submarines together with numerous surface forces with greater endurance were deployed
combatants—all armed with cruise missiles— beyond adjacent seas to guard against
further threatened U.S. and Allied naval incursions into the outer approaches to
forces deployed in the Atlantic, Indian, and the Soviet Union. At the height of the Cold
Pacific Oceans, and the Mediterranean Sea. War, the Soviet Navy deployed submarine
The Soviet posture took on very offensive and surface forces globally to confront and
dimensions as the temperature of the Cold monitor U.S. and Allied naval forces in
War rose. order to preclude a surprise attack against
the USSR. This constant shadowing posture
3
Layered Defense. Having
acquired the means to
strike targets at long ranges
using ballistic missiles
launched from nuclear-
powered submarines, it
was now possible to
directly protect them
and the country against
attacks from the sea. To
accomplish this, the Navy
developed a layered
defense strategy. Today,
the outer limit of this
layered defense can be
generally defined as
about 1,000 nautical
miles (TOMAHAWK land
attack cruise missile range)
from the Russian frontier
or from Moscow. For 1000nm range rings – Perceived TLAM threat to Russian homeland
western Russia, this outer
was characterized as “the battle for the first only a military but also an ideological and
salvo.” Due to an objective regard for Western political component, each side embraced
capabilities, the Soviet sailors who manned a “zero sum” calculus whereby any win by
the forward-deployed submarines and ships one was automatically seen as a loss by the
were under no illusion that they would survive other. The USSR chose to support various
the initial stages of a war, but their mission was anti-colonial or anti-Western movements in
to preempt or blunt the expected attack, to the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and
attempt to “kill the archer” and thereby lessen Southeast Asia. This East-West contest of
the number of incoming “arrows” aimed at wills played out in “proxy wars” where the
their homeland that would have to be dealt warring sides were openly or clandestinely
with by other defending forces. supported and equipped either by the
Soviet Union or the United States. In many
Local Conflicts and Proxy Wars. Because the cases, Soviet advisors accompanied the
confrontation between East and West had not equipment to provide training, and in some
4
bound runs through the
Greenland-Iceland-United
Kingdom gap separating
the North Atlantic from
the Norwegian Sea. In
the Mediterranean, the
line runs roughly north-
south at the boot of Italy
defining the eastern and
western Mediterranean.
In the Pacific, there are
no easily identifiable
geographic bounds at the
1,000 nm range (distances
from three points provide
general orientation). The
disintegration of the USSR
did more to change Russia’s
strategic defense depth on
land (a loss of about 300
1000nm range rings – Perceived TLAM threat to Russian homeland (Pacific) miles) but had negligible
effect on seaward concerns.
cases, to actually operate weapons systems it has filed a claim to extended continental
in wartime conditions. This activity provided shelf rights in accordance with United Nations
opportunities to slough off excess or outdated Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
equipment, test new battlefield weapons mandated procedures. Russia is taking steps
or applications, and gain intelligence on the to enhance its ability to protect its exclusive
equipment and tactics of the opposing side. economic zone (EEZ), monitor and control the
use of the Northern Sea Route within that EEZ,
Today. Russia’s wartime naval strategy remains and improve its ability to affect search and
focused on nuclear deterrence and layered rescue (SAR) operations in the Russian Arctic.
defense as described above. Russia is paying
specific attention to peripheral defense,
particularly in the Arctic where it assesses the
effects of global climate change will potentially
increase foreign maritime presence and where
5
6
Chapter Two:
Organization
The Russian Navy is composed of acquisitions of strategic importance, i.e. the
interconnected components, spanning the SEVERODVINSK and the DOLGORUKIY
gamut from combat forces to all elements of submarine projects. This will include
supporting infrastructure: management of the Russian aircraft carrier
• Command staff project as well.
• Submarine forces
• Surface forces Historically, the CINC Navy exercises
• Naval auxiliaries command authority over and provides
• Naval aviation administrative direction to the Navy. In this
• Naval Infantry and Coastal Missile respect, this position somewhat combines
and Artillery Troops the historical functions of the U.S. Chief of
• Naval shore establishment Naval Operations and the Secretary of the
(headquarters, communications, Navy.
intelligence, maintenance and repair,
education and training, etc.) The Chief of Staff/First Deputy CINC is the
second in command and is responsible for
The headquarters of the Russian Navy was all operational issues and direct support. His
recently relocated from Moscow to its organization includes the Main Operational
historical home in the Admiralty building in Directorate and the Navy’s Main Command
St. Petersburg. The move is complete and the Post, as well as direct support elements such
new Navy Command Center is functioning. as communications and intelligence.
Operations are directed and administrative
orders and actions taken emanate from The Deputy CINC, the third person at the
St. Petersburg. The Commander-in-Chief top, oversees on a day-to-day basis all of the
(CINC) of the Russian Navy, Admiral Viktor administrative elements such as personnel,
Viktorovich Chirkov, officially runs the Navy education, shipbuilding and armaments,
from the new headquarters, but will always logistics, and engineering and billeting.
share time between the seat of government He has command authority over naval
in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Like his U.S. operations only when functioning as the
counterpart, Admiral Chirkov oversees and Acting CINC.
is ultimately responsible for all new weapons
7
The CINC Navy and the Main Navy Staff, combatants. Aboard first line ships and
responding to orders from the National submarines, the Commanding Officer has
Command Authority and in accordance both a Senior Assistant (Executive Officer)
with procedures and guidelines issued by and another Assistant.
the General Staff, and likely in coordination
with the appropriate new Joint Strategic Within the fleet order of battle, individual
Commands, issue commands and directives ships and submarines are classified as 1st,
to the Northern, Baltic, Black Sea, and 2nd, and 3rd rank. The rank of commanding
Pacific Fleets as well as the Caspian Flotilla. officers (Captains 1st – O-6, 2nd – O-5, and
3rd – O-4 Rank) nominally corresponds to
The command structures of the individual the rank of ship commanded.
fleets and the Caspian Flotilla parallel those • 1st Rank – SSBNs, SSGNs, newest SSNs,
of the headquarters organization. CV, CGNs, CGs.
• 2nd Rank – older SSNs, SSs, DDGs, DDs,
The practice of the commander having two FFGs, FFs, LSTs.
deputies extends down to all major fleet • 3rd Rank – PGs, PGGs, etc.
8
Admiral Viktor Chirkov
Commander-in-Chief
Russian Navy
Admiral Chirkov, appointed Commander-in-Chief Continued executive support and reliable funding
of the Russian Navy in May 2012, is a lifelong are critical to the fulfillment of Russia’s national
surface officer with extensive experience in the plans for renewing and developing its naval might.
Pacific and Baltic Fleets. He replaced Admiral
Vysotskiy at a time when the chiefs of all three Because of the longstanding process by which
services—Ground Forces, Air Forces, and Navy— senior officers are groomed for high command
were apparently losing their direct command as well as the procedures and traditions of the
functions to the Main Operational Directorate Russian Armed Forces, no significant changes
of the General Staff. In the case of the Navy, this of focus or policy were expected in the change
occurred in November 2011. In the new Armed from Vysotskiy to Chirkov and none have been
Forces structure, the focus of the Main Navy Staff observed. Political policy is developed, set, and
is concentrated on man, train, and equip issues. promulgated by the Presidential executive. Military
However, imprecise press reports indicate that policy also flows from the Russian president and is
the specific command functions of the service developed and executed in conjunction with the
CINCs remain unresolved. This senior personnel Minister of Defense and the General Staff.
transition also came as the Navy’s Main Staff
moved from Moscow to its historic home at the In the course of his career, Chirkov gained at-sea
Admiralty building in St. Petersburg, located on operational experience as a junior officer in the
Palace Square across from the headquarters of Pacific Fleet (PACFLT). Continuing to serve in the
the recently established Joint Strategic Command Pacific, he rose to command of an UDALOY I
West/Western Military District housed in the destroyer, higher to group command, and then
building of the former Imperial General Staff. to combined force command in charge of all
Russian forces—submarine, surface-, air-, and
Chirkov came to the helm as the Navy embarked land-based on the Kamchatka Peninsula. With
on a very ambitious shipbuilding, infrastructure, his posting to the Baltic Fleet, he gained broader
and personnel development program to create insight and exposure to the European theater
a new, modern, 21st-century Russian Navy. and visited most of the Baltic countries while
Upon his appointment, Chirkov said, “The most also hosting many visitors to the Baltic Fleet at its
important thing for Russia is to build the fleet with main base in Baltiysk, Kaliningrad Oblast, and to
support of the president and like-minded persons. St. Petersburg. Prior to his appointment as CINC
My experience of commanding the fleet on the Russian Navy, there were rumors that he would
country’s western maritime frontier will allow me return to Vladivostok and be posted to command
to assess the full importance and responsibility the Pacific Fleet, but clearly higher command
of this appointment.” He gave his assurance that decided otherwise and appointed him to head the
within the framework of the underway reform, Russian Navy.
the Navy will continue to defend and ensure the
country’s security along all of its maritime frontiers. (Chronology next page)
9
ADMIRAL VIKTOR CHIRKOV
CHRONOLOGY
1979–1982 Attended and graduated from S.O. Makarov Higher Naval School, Vladivostok,
USSR
Commissioned as Lieutenant (U.S. O-1 equivalent)
Commander of Mine-Torpedo Department, Patrol Ship, Pacific Fleet
Assistant to CO of PACFLT patrol ship
Executive officer, KOTLIN DD VOZBUZHDENNYY, Pacific Fleet
1997 Graduated N.G. Kuznetsov Naval Academy, St. Petersburg (by correspondence)
(U.S. Naval War College equivalent)
2000–Jun 2005 Chief of Staff/1st Deputy Commander, Northeast Group of Troops and Forces,
Pacific Fleet
Jun 2005–Feb 2007 Commander, Primorsk Combined Forces Flotilla, Vladivostok, Pacific Fleet
Feb 2007–Sep 2009 Chief of Staff / 1st Deputy Commander, Baltic Fleet
Decorations:
Order “For Service to the Nation in the Armed Forces”, 3rd Degree
Order “For Military Achievement”
Order “For Naval Achievement”
10
Future Leadership
The Russian military leadership structure is
the product of many decades of history and
tradition. Due to the enormity of the Russian
land, and for the most part, the difficulty
and expense of moving and finding suitable
housing, most of the Russian officer corps,
Navy as well as Ground Forces, have tended
to remain relatively geographically stationary.
11
Career Ladders Path to Command
The Russian Armed Forces, and specifically The classic path to command, both at sea and
the Navy, have fairly rigid careers ladders. The at the higher leadership levels of the Navy,
Russian military system does not train and is through the navigation specialty—with
educate “generalists”; the focus is on “masters weapons as a close second. Navigation and
of their craft.” Newly commissioned officers weapons specialists are always “where the
are screened and selected for command action is.” They constantly work in close
possibilities early. This selection is dominantly proximity to, in coordination with, and under
made by commanding officers at the Captain the direct command of their commanding
2nd Rank (O-5) and Captain 1st Rank (O-6) officers. Under such working conditions, they
level, since these same officers are responsible have the opportunity to closely observe the
for awarding the early promotions in rank. workings and practice of the art of command,
As noted previously, only once reaching and conversely, they are constantly under the
the Captain 2nd Rank level are promotion watchful eyes of their seniors.
considerations usually made by senior
organizational staff and senior commanders. A A typical path is to rise from commander of a
young, newly commissioned officer coming specific team to division and department head.
to his first ship or submarine places his career From there, the decision is made whether a
fate in the hands of his commanding officer. promising officer is deemed fit for command,
The military educational system focuses on at which point he would be considered for the
qualifying officers for their initial assignments position as assistant to the Executive Officer
in specific specialties. A fleet/unit assignment of that ship, or effectively, third in Command.
choice preference is given to those graduating This position is typically held for three to five
at the top of their class (gold medalist/red years, and then the transition to Executive
diploma). This qualification also plays a Officer is made; this position is held for four
significant role in the perception of selecting to five years. With a background of success,
commanding officers. he will then move on to be Commanding
Officer. Command may be aboard that vessel
Career paths are set early. Young officers with or transition to another ship to serve as the
specialties in navigation and weapons have Commander. It is not at all the exception that
the best chance for advancement to command this entire portion of a naval career can be
positions. Officers with specialties in engineer- spent on a single ship or submarine or those
ing, communications, and so on, dominantly of the same class. There are, of course, some
will only have career paths in those special- breaks for en route courses; however, there
ties and will not qualify for command. In this are no ship-shore rotations. The only times
regard, the Russian Navy functions similarly to of relatively prolonged “shore” periods is
many European navies. when the assigned ship or submarine is
12
down for maintenance or overhaul. In this are scrutinized at the Navy Main Staff and
way, the first twenty years of a naval career Defense Ministry levels, but those to fleet
becomes the “ship” rotation. Only when command positions also are reviewed at
an officer is assigned to a group staff does the presidential level. These are executive
a “shore” rotation truly begin. However, decisions; no legislative review or approval is
even as a member of a group staff, there required.
are still extended periods spent at sea
overseeing training, exercises, certifications, or According to standing legislation, the age
deployments. limit for service in the rank of admiral is 60.
This can be extended “at the pleasure of the
With all of this as prologue, the path to the President” in one-year increments.
very top of the naval leadership pyramid is
a combination of many early pre-selections. Current information regarding Russian Navy
Many early-made decisions preclude leadership is available on the pullout inside the
options to rise to the top. When reviewing back cover.
candidates for senior formation and fleet
command, only those officers who are the
top performing commanders at lower levels
are in the running. Again, the only path to
high command is for those firmly entrenched
in the “command” line.
13
14
Chapter Three
Procurement:
Shift to Quality Over Quantity
15
Russian Navy Strategic and General Purpose Forces marked by drastically cut
Order of Battle (OOB) 2015 military budgets. The result
North- Baltic Black Caspian Pacific
Totals was the further degradation of
ern Fleet Fleet Sea Fleet Flotilla Fleet
a fleet already badly in need
SSBN 7 5 12
of maintenance and repair.
SSGN/SSN 17 9 26
SS 6 2 4 8 18
Submarine totals 56
The charts (see foldouts)
CV 1 1
depicting the Russian Navy’s
CGN 2 2
current major combatant
CG 1 1 1 3 order of battle (OOB) clearly
DD 4 4 8 show that the average age
DDG 1 2 1 2 6 of most of the ships and
FFG 1 1 submarines is more than 20
FF 6 2 2 10 years. A nominal service
Major Surface totals 31 life for most Soviet ships
FFL 6 6 9 21 and submarines when built
PGG 6 11 9 4 15 45 was considered to be 25
PG 7 4 11 years. With diligent care and
LST 4 4 7 4 19 appropriate maintenance,
LCU 2 1 3 the service lives of the larger,
Minor Surface totals 99 more robustly built units
can be extended by five to
For naval platform purchases, the emphasis ten years—possibly fifteen. These fleet OOB
has been—with the sole exception of strategic charts depict such selected extended service
systems—on multipurpose platforms designed lives and also clearly illustrate the current age
with sufficient capability and margin for future of Russia’s Soviet legacy fleet.
modernization in order to maximize the use of
the basic hull and propulsion systems. Overall, these charts, a more accurate and
detailed version of which undoubtedly graces
Renewal Imperative a wall in the Russian Navy’s shipbuilding
In late 1991, when the Russian Navy inherited and repair directorate, clearly shows that the
its current order of battle of Soviet legacy ships Russian Navy faces the imperative of new
and submarines, these platforms had already construction in order to avoid disappearing
seen years of service. in the 2020 timeframe. An additional chart
depicts the staus of new construction
The waning years of the USSR and the programs.
formative decade of post-Soviet Russia were
16
The Future Fleet
Russia’s national leadership has recognized future naval needs, and has approved and funded
a broad shipbuilding program that will result in a new 21st-century Russian Navy. The Navy’s
major combatants will dominantly comprise multipurpose submarines and surface ships capable
of conducting aerospace defense, anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare unlike their mostly single
mission Soviet predecessors. The following briefly describes both the major programs underway
and several that are expected to be pursued in the future. (See the chart, similar in format to that
showing the current major combatant order of battle, depicting the status of new construction.)
Submarines
“The nuclear submarine fleet is the priority in the
Navy shipbuilding program.”
- Admiral Viktor Chirkov,
Commander-in-Chief, Russian Navy
6 July 2015
17
The Yuriy Dolgorukiy was finally accepted into The specific missions of SEVERODVINSK
the Russian Fleet on 10 January 2013, sev- SSGN include anti-submarine warfare (ASW),
eral years later than originally expected. The anti-surface warfare (ASuW), as well as land
second unit, Aleksandr Nevskiy, was delivered attack missions. This submarine class will be
in late December 2013 and the third—Vladi- armed with a wide range of advanced cruise
mir Monomakh—is completing sea trials. Two missiles to destroy enemy ships and targets
more units, Knyaz Vladimir and Knyaz Oleg, ashore. The lead unit was launched on 15
are under construction in Severodvinsk, Russia. June 2010 and commissioned for trial service
It has been publicly announced that construc- on 17 January 2014, some ten years after
tion program is to deliver eight units by the construction began. Eight are planned to be
end of 2020. built through 2020.
18
KILO Class
PETERSBURG Class Basic Characteristics:
Basic Characteristics: Type SS
Type SS (Russian) Varshavyanka
(Russian) Lada Design # 636.3
Design # 677 Length 73.8 meters
Length ~67 meters Displacement (full) 3,950 tons
Displacement (full) ~1,800 tons Propulsion Diesel-electric
Propulsion Diesel-electric Speed 20 knots
Speed ~20 knots Crew 52
Crew ~35 Main Armament KALIBR from torpedo tubes
a final design has been approved. Based on in 2005. The future of hull three, laid down in
typical timelines for submarine development, a 2006, remains uncertain.
launch prior to 2020 is unlikely.
Advanced Non-Nuclear General Purpose
PETERSBURG Class SS Submarine
(limited series construction uncertain) (projected, not in construction)
The PETERSBURG SS, also known as Lada Work on a future non-nuclear submarine,
and Design 677, is a diesel-electric submarine design covername Kalina, has been
intended to be a technological advance on announced with work underway at the Rubin
the KILO Design 636, specifically with regard Design Bureau. It is expected to have an air-
to propulsion, sonar, and combat information independent propulsion plant (AIP). Laydown
support. The class is the product of the Rubin of the lead unit is projected soon after 2020.
Central Marine Equipment Design Bureau and
was built by the Admiralty Shipyard, both are Unlike the case with submarines, the Navy
in St. Petersburg. The lead hull Sankt Peterburg, approached the recapitalization of its surface
laid down in 1997 and commissioned in fleet starting with smaller sized units and
2010 for trial operation, is now located in the progressively building larger ones.
Northern Fleet. During initial trials problems
were encountered with the electric propulsion
system, the main sonar, and combat
information system. It has been reported that
these issues have been resolved and work has
restarted on hull two Kronshtadt, laid down
19
Surface Combatants
ASTRAKHAN Class PG
Patrol Combatant
The Astrakhan is the lead ship of the Buyan
or Project 21630 PG designed by Zelenodolsk
Project Design Bureau and built by the Almaz
SVIYAZHSK Class
Shipyard in St. Petersburg. The lead unit was
Basic Characteristics:
laid down 30 January 2004, was launched 10
September 2005, and was commissioned 13 Type PGG
September 2006. This class is dominantly be- (Russian) Buyan-M
ing deployed in the Caspian Sea. Design # 21631
Length 74 meters
The Astrakhan was first displayed during Displacement (full) ~950 tons
the annual Navy Day parade on the Neva
Propulsion Diesel
River in St. Petersburg before delivering it
Speed 25 knots
to the Russian Navy’s Caspian Flotilla on 1
September 2006. Two more units, Volgodonsk Crew 30–35
20
MAJOR COMBATANTS Far East at the Amur Shipyard in the city of
Komsomolsk on the Amur River.
BYKOV Class FFLG Guided Missile Corvette
(in series construction) The warship is designed for operations in
The Design 22160 BYKOV Class was adjacent maritime zones, fighting enemy
designed by the Severnoye (Northern) Design surface ships and submarines, as well as to
Bureau in St. Petersburg and is being built at provide naval gunfire support for amphibious
Zelenodolsk Shipyard. At about 1,500 tons landings. It is also a replacement for the
displacement and armed with KALIBR family GRISHA Class frigates (FFL). The ship has a
and Yakhont missiles, these corvettes will helicopter landing pad and hangar (for 1x Ka-
perform adjacent water patrol duties likely in 27) and is equipped with the latest electronic
the Black and Baltic Seas. Two units, Vasiliy equipment and communications systems.
Bykov and Dmitriy Rogachev, were laid down
in 2014, with the first to be commissioned as Steregushchiy, the lead hull, was laid down
early as 2016. in December 2001, launched in May 2006,
and began initial sea trials in November
STEREGUSHCHIY Class FF Frigate/FFG 2006; it required 15 months of trials and
Guided Missile Frigate equipment testing before commissioning in
(in series construction) late February 2008. As of August 2015, four
The Design 20380 STEREGUSHCHIY Class hulls (Steregushchiy, Soobrazitelnyy, Boykiy,
was designed by the Almaz Central Naval and Stoykiy) have been launched and
Design Bureau in St. Petersburg and is commissioned in St. Petersburg. Beginning
being built by the (Severnaya Verf) Northern with Boykiy, the design included a VLS cell
Shipyard in the same city. Construction for the REDUT/POLIMENT (SA-NX-28) air
of additional units is also underway in the defense missile system; this changed the type
designation from FF to FFG. At the Far East
Amur Shipyard, workers laid the keel for their
first STEREGUSHCHIY hull, the Sovershennyy,
in late June 2006 with an estimated delivery
date of 2011. It was finally launched in
May 2015. A second unit, Gromkiy, was
reported laid down on 17 February 2012.
The STEREGUSHCHIY design has an export
version, Design 20382 Tigr.
STEREGUSHCHIY Class
Modified STEREGUSHCHIY Class FFG
basic characteristics:
Guided Missile Frigate
Type FF (in series construction)
Design # 20380 The Design 20385 Gremyashchiy is a
Length 104.5 meters modification of the original 20380 design with
Displacement (full) 2,220 tons the installation of improved radar system and
a VLS cell capable of launching the KALIBR
Propulsion Diesel
family of missiles and the YAKHONT anti-ship
Speed ~27 knots
cruise missile. Due to problems arising from
Crew ~100 economic sanctions against Russia related to
21
The GRIGOROVICH Class, Design 11356,
STEREGUSHCHIY (GREMYASHCHIY) Class
was designed by the Severnoye (Northern)
basic characteristics:
Design Bureau in St. Petersburg, and built by
Type FFG the Yantar Shipyard in Kaliningrad. It is the
Design # 20385 latest variation of the long-produced KRIVAK
Length 104.5 meters FFG and in some respects could be called a
Displacement (full) 2,200 tons KRIVAK V design. (KRIVAK I and II – Soviet
Propulsion Diesel
Navy; KRIVAK III – Soviet Border Guards;
KRIVAK IV – the TALWAR Class for India.)
Speed ~27 knots
The lead unit, Admiral Grigorovich, is in sea
Crew ~100
trials and the second unit, Admiral Essen, was
Main Armament 8x VLS KALIBR launched on 7 November 2014. It was to be
followed by four additional units: Admiral
Ukraine, the inability to acquire German diesel Makarov, Admiral Butakov, Admiral Istomin,
propulsion systems will likely limit this design and Admiral Kornilov. Admiral Makarov will
to two ships, Gremyashchiy and Provornyy. be completed but the last three have been
There have been reports of work on another cancelled because of Russia’s inability to
improved 20386 design. acquire marine gas turbines from Ukraine due
to imposed sanctions.
GRIGOROVICH Class FFGS
Guided Missile Frigate Due to delays in constructing the new design
(in series construction) GORSHKOV Class frigates and a critical need
to replace the aging inventory of the Black Sea
Fleet, the decision was made to order six units
of this proven design. An additional benefit
was the fact that the Yantar Shipyard already
had proven assembly experience with this
design, having built a series for India. All six
GRIGOROVICH units were expected to be in
the Black Sea by 2020.
22
New Generation Destroyer (DDG)
(projected, not in construction)
A design development program, covername
Lider [Leader] and possibly Design 23560, is
underway to replace the aging UDALOY and
SOVREMENNYY class inventories. Depending
on propulsion type, the design could be a
8,000 to 18,000 ton ship combining both
destroyer and cruiser characteristics with
robust air, surface, and submarine warfare, as
GORSHKOV Class well as anti-missile defense capabilities.
basic characteristics:
Type FFG
Russia reportedly intends to build six such
ships for both the Northern and Pacific fleets
Design # 22350
(12 total). The lead unit is not likely to be built
Length 130 meters
earlier than the mid-2020s.
Displacement (full) 4,500 tons
Propulsion Diesel-Gas Turbine Press reports have mentioned that the
Speed ~30 knots propulsion for this class, whether conventional
Main Armament 16x VLS KALIBR gas turbine or nuclear, is not yet determined.
The resolution may depend on decisions yet
2010. However, it has undergone a long post- to be made regarding a new aircraft carrier
launch fitting out period. FADMSU Gorshkov which, if built, is likely to be nuclear-powered.
may be commissioned in 2015, and assigned
to the Baltic Fleet.
23
New Generation CVN aerial vehicles (UAVs). Unlike the KUZNETSOV
Vice Admiral (retired) Anatoliy Shlemov, of CV that was built with 12 SS-N-19 anti-ship
the United Shipbuilding Corporation, spoke to cruise missiles, the new carrier will not carry
design progress as of 2009 on a future aircraft surface-to-surface cruise missiles. Its propulsion
carrier program. Russian designers are currently plant would be nuclear-powered, providing
working on the aircraft carrier’s requirements the ship with a full power speed around 29
and tactical-technical tasks. This preliminary knots. At least three nuclear-powered aircraft
design work is being conducted by the Neva carriers have been discussed; one for the
Planning and Design Bureau in conjunction Northern Fleet, one for the Pacific Fleet, and
with the Krylov State Scientific Center in St. a third hull—a replacement carrier—would be
Petersburg, which also designed the previous undergoing scheduled repairs. Former Navy
KIEV and KUZNETSOV Class carriers. A model CINC Vladimir Masorin stated in 2007 that six
of a new carrier, preliminary Design 23000 aircraft carriers would be necessary, three each
covername Shtorm (Storm), was displayed at in the Northern and Pacific Fleets: one active,
the International Maritime Defense Show in St. one in training, and one in maintenance.
Petersburg both in 2013 and 2015.
Construction of a new CV poses a challenge
Very preliminary published characteristics for Russia. The KIEV and KUZNETSOV Class
reveal that the new aircraft carrier will carry a carriers were built at Chernomorskoye Shipyard
new generation of jet fighters and unmanned in Nikolayev, Ukraine, now unavailable to the
Russians. Two shipyards in Russia that could
solicit such a contract are the Baltic Shipyard
in St. Petersburg and Sevmash Shipyard
in Severodvinsk. These two shipbuilding
enterprises reportedly have requested to be
retooled and reequipped. They also want
new technologies to be introduced in order
to increase their plant’s production efficiency.
However, there have been plans to close Baltic
Shipyard by the 2020s and ambitious shipyard
development plans for Sevmash have been
discussed. In addition to manufacturing issues,
the Russian Navy will have to solve issues of
New generation CVN
Basic Characteristics: basing, support, new frigate/destroyer escorts,
training, and billeting for thousands of carrier
Type CVN crew members.
(Russian) Shtorm
Design # 23000 Although recent statements by the naval
Length ~300 meters leadership continue to promote the
Displacement (full) ~100,000 tons construction of aircraft carriers, it is likely that
there will be extensive discussion and debate
Propulsion Nuclear
before final decisions are made. In light of the
Speed ~30 knots
extensive work required to enable Russia to
Crew 4,000–5,000 build an aircraft carrier, construction is not
Main Armament 80–90 aircraft likely to begin until about the mid-2020s.
24
Amphibious ships
GREN Class
basic characteristics:
Type LST
Design # 11711
Propulsion Diesel
Speed 18 knots
Crew 100
25
modular surface ship construction concepts
that are critical for short build times (two
years for the MISTRAL vice up to six for
standard production at a Russian shipyard). A
fully integrated digital system to manage and
operate all ships’ systems was incorporated in
the MISTRAL design. The actual construction
of the first two ships was a joint effort with
the forward halves built in St. Nazaire, France,
and the stern halves, housing the well deck
and helicopter hangar, built at the Russian
Baltic Shipyard, St. Petersburg. Final assembly MISTRAL Class
and initial sea trials were conducted in basic characteristics:
France. The acquisition of MISTRALs and Type LHA
their basing in the Pacific Fleet would have
Length 199 meters
provided the Russian Navy with significant
Displacement (full) 21,300 tons
power projection options and also would
allow Russia to more effectively participate in Propulsion Diesel-electric
The original French MISTRAL design was However, due to current events in Ukraine, the
modified for Russian use by incorporating a purchase contract has been cancelled with
stronger in-water hull to allow for possible use France in possession of the two ships and
in ice conditions and a higher hangar deck obligated to refund Russia’s investment in the
clearance to accommodate the size of the construction.
Ka-29 assault and the naval version of the Ka-
52 Alligator attack helicopters planned to be
deployed aboard. The ship was to be able to
carry up to 16 helicopters and the helicopters,
weapons, and military communications
capability would be of Russian origin. When
completed, these units would be able to
embark 450 Naval Infantry and varying load-
outs of armored personnel carriers and/or tanks.
26
Auxiliary Vessels
27
The lead unit, Igor Belousov, was laid down been commissioned. Former Navy CINC
on 24 December 2005. Planned delivery to Fleet Admiral Vladimir Masorin said that a
the Navy was to be in 2011. As of mid-2015 production order for four hulls (one for each
the lead unit is undergoing trials and has not fleet) would be requested.
The Russian Navy signed a contract in February 2009 for two classes of oceanographic
ships. “These ships are designed for studying the seas and oceans and will pave the way
for the rebirth and revival of Russia’s powerful science and research fleet,” said Vice
Admiral Aleksey Burilichev, the head of the Defense Ministry’s Main Directorate for Deep-
sea Research. Both were designed by the Almaz Central Naval Design Bureau and will be
constructed at Yantar Shipyard, Kaliningrad.
SELIGER
Oceanographic Research Vessel
The SELIGER Class research vessel was
designed by the Almaz Design Bureau, St.
Petersburg and built by Yantar Shipyard in
Kaliningrad.
28
lead hull, Yantar, was laid down on 8 July 2010,
launched in December 2012, sea trials and
delivery to the Navy was planned for 2014.
Yantar concluded sea trials in early 2015, was
commissioned, and embarked on its maiden
voyage into the Atlantic in August 2015 to
further test all of its installed equipment.
29
Naval Aviation
The Russian Navy’s aviation arm comprises shore-based and shipborne aircraft. The medium-
range IL-38 MAY and long-range Tu-142 BEAR F maritime patrol/anti-submarine warfare
(ASW) aircraft, Su-24 FENCER frontline bombers, and a variety of rotary- (helicopter) and
fixed-wing transport aircraft make up the shore-based naval aviation force. Shipborne
aircraft are the Ka-27 HELIX helicopters which have ASW and search and rescue (SAR)
variants. The unique Independent Shipborne Fighter Regiment, the nucleus of KUZNETSOV-
class aircraft carrier air wing, is composed of Su-33 FLANKER D and Su-25 UTG FROGFOOT
D. The regiment focuses on frontline aircraft as well as future aircraft development efforts.
Only new developments are addressed below.
ASW Aircraft
Fighter Aircraft
PAK-FA Future Fifth-Generation Fighter “Perspektivnyy Aviatsionnyy Kompleks Fron-
(in developmental testing) tovoy Aviatsii,” or “Advanced Aircraft System
The first Russian fifth-generation fighter pro- for Frontline Aviation.” Sukhoy has publicly
gram, called the PAK-FA, is a single-seat, used the designator “T-50,” while at least one
medium-heavyweight, multi-role fighter air- Indian publication has called it “PMF.” This
craft designed primarily by the Russian com- developmental weapons system has a number
pany Sukhoy. The term “PAK-FA,” as used by of informal names as its air force and naval
Russian and Indian officials, is an acronym for designators have not been announced.
30
In terms of concept, the PAK-FA is supposed MiG-29K
to conform to all the basic attributes of the The operational life span of the Su-33 fighter,
fifth-generation fighter. [Concepts integral to currently operating aboard Admiral Kuznetsov¸
the definition of 5th Generation capability is coming to an end in 2015 and the Russian
are platforms capable of sharing information Navy has chosen the MiG-29K as a replacement
to increase the availability of the Common because of lower costs. The MiG-29K was
Operating Picture (COP).] These include low originally ordered by the Indian Navy for the
radar cross-section and infrared signature, INS Vikramaditya and the job of developing
a high level of integration of the onboard and fielding the aircraft was financed by the
equipment, weapons disposed in internal Indian government. Billed as a 4++ generation
compartments, a supersonic cruising speed fighter, the aircraft features advanced air-to-air
without the use of afterburners, and super- and air-to-ground radar capability along with
maneuverability. digital touch displays and HOTAS in the cockpit.
The avionics used by the MiG-29K allow for the
PAK-FA flight tests began in January 2010. incorporation of advanced PGM munitions.
Russia has four PAK-FA test aircraft in its
inventory, with two more to be added in 2015. The aircraft is substantially strengthened to
Series production of the T-50 aircraft could survive the carrier environment. It also features
start as early as 2015 scheduled for Russian Air a four-channel fly-by-wire system, allowing
Force’s acceptance in 2016. for precise control when coming aboard the
aircraft carrier. Additionally, the operators will
It can be logically considered that the further enjoy the added feature of folding wings to aid
development of the PAK-FA program could in the movement of the aircraft in the carrier
include the future fighter for a new aircraft environment. The Russian Navy expects to
carrier that could become operational by the acquire 24 fighters at a total cost of 1 billion
early 2030s, if Russia decides to build it. dollars.
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Helicopters
Ka-52 Alligator
The Ka-52 HOKUM B, nicknamed “Alligator,” Aircraft Plant of up to 32 Ka-52K helicopters is
is a two-seat, coaxial rotor, day-and-night- set to begin in 2015.
capable attack helicopter. The Ka-52 was
designed primarily as an air-to-ground attack Ka-29
helicopter with side-by-side seating. Weapons The Russian Navy has used some variant of
load includes unguided rockets, antitank the HELIX platform for the past 40 years. The
guided missiles (ATGMs), and machine guns. aircraft is inherently stable because of the
The Ka-52K, nicknamed “Katran,” was initially double counter-rotating rotor blades, which
reported as the Ka-52MD (Morskogo Desanta/ makes it ideal for application in the maritime
assault) and will be a Ka-52 modified for environment.
maritime operations. The modifications likely
include folding rotor blades and weapons Designated as the Ka-29TB (Transportno
pylons. Internal modifications include Boyevoy/Combat transport), it features a crew
upgrades to the wiring and the electrical of three who sit side-by-side. The center seat
instruments, which will need to be more is the weapons operator, responsible for firing
resistant to an aggressive damp and salty the weapons on the hard points and the
environment. The helicopter will also be cannon on the starboard side of the aircraft.
equipped with rescue rafts/vests, airframe The aircraft has nighttime assault capability
floats, and a new crew escape system. Lastly, as well. The complement of aircraft aboard
the under-frame supports will be strengthened the MISTRAL class amphibious vessels was to
because under rolling/pitching conditions feature up to 16 Kamov products, up to eight
a helicopter may strike the helicopter deck of which would be the Ka-29TB.
harder than when landing on the ground. The
future delivery from the Arseneyev’s Progress
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Weapons
*The “E” denotes the export version. Russian domestic variants assessed to be more capable.
33
considerable range and firepower to a smaller
vessel. In addition to being used by Russia,
where it is designated the 3M-24, the export KALIBR
version (3M-24E) has been purchased by
Algeria, India, and Vietnam. Russia plans to deploy KALIBR capability
on all new design construction nuclear and
SS-N-26 STROBILE (YAKHONT/ONIKS) non-nuclear submarines, corvettes, frigates,
and larger surface ships. KALIBR provides
even modest platforms, such as corvettes,
with significant offensive capability and,
with the use of the land attack missile, all
platforms have a significant ability to hold
SS-N-26 STROBILE distant fixed ground targets at risk using
conventional warheads. The proliferation
of this capability within the new Russian
The recently-fielded 3M-55E* YAKHONT Navy is profoundly changing its ability
(SS-N-26 STROBILE), also known as ONIKS to deter, threaten or destroy adversary
(ONYX), succeeds previous SS-N-7, -9, -12, targets. It can be logically assumed that
and -19 anti-ship cruise missiles. This 300 KALIBR capability will be retrofitted
km-range (export variant) missile flies Mach on those larger Soviet legacy ships and
2.5, is equipped with an advanced radar submarines that undergo major overhauls
and/or modernization1.
seeker, and conducts evasive maneuvers to
increase its survivability. Unlike the MOSKIT
missiles, which are launched from inclined 1
High ranking Russian defense industry official,
12 December 2011
launchers, the YAKHONT can be launched
vertically. Vertical launch decreases reaction
time against targets in any direction, while
also reducing a ship’s radar signature by • an anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM), the SS-
eliminating protrusive launch canisters above N-27 SIZZLER, and
deck. The YAKHONT can also be salvo • an anti-submarine missile, the 91R.
fired, and is currently launched from ships,
coastal defense launch vehicles, and the Although all are capable of being launched
SEVERODVINSK SSGN. Russia has exported vertically using a vertical launch system (VLS),
the YAKHONT as part of the Bastion coastal they are also launched from an inclined
defense missile system. orientation, from ground launchers, or from
submarine torpedo tubes. The ASCM and
KALIBR WEAPONS FAMILY LACM incorporate salvo capability and
KALIBR is the more capable Russian waypoint navigation. These technologies allow
domestic version of the export KLUB family of multiple weapons to be launched against
weapons, one of Russia’s most comprehensive either a single or group of ships, and approach
export offerings. Heavily marketed for 10 from different directions, significantly
years, the KLUB system was designed for complicating the target’s defensive task.
ship, submarine, air, and coastal-launched Information on the export versions is used
applications. The KALIBR family includes: below in lieu of unavailable details on the
• a land attack cruise missile (LACM), the domestic variants.
SS-N-30
34
SS-N-30 (3M-14) Land Attack Cruise Missile
The 3M-14E* LACM is visually similar to
the 3M-54E1. Equipped with a 450 kg
conventional warhead, waypoint navigation,
and a 300-km range, the 3M-14E delivers a
high range of land-attack options for ships,
submarines, aircraft, and ground launchers. It
is generally accepted that Russian domestic
variants of export systems have improved
operational characteristics over their export SS-N-30
counterparts. In this regard the reported
operational range for the KALIBR family Admiral Vitko said that new units joining the
3M14 SS-N-30 LACM is 300 to 1,5001/2,5002 fleet will have weapons with a range in excess
kilometers (160 to 930/1,550 mi). Responding of 1,500 km (930 mi). (Map depicts nominal
to a question from President Putin in 1,000-mi range rings from possible launch
September 2014, Black Sea Fleet commander points in Russia’s adjacent seas.)
T
KALIBR LAND ATTACK CRUISE MISSILE RANGES
A F
R
D 201 5
10/
1000nm range rings – Nominal KALIBR LACM ranges from fleet areas
Andrey Kokoshin, former Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Defense and Secretary of the Russian Security Council, 24 March 2011
2
35
more flexible missiles with longer-range and
improved electronic and kinematic defense
penetration features. Russian ASCM research
is expected to focus on achieving hypersonic
speeds and improving seeker capabilities,
including the possible use of advanced radar
seekers that allow improved countermeasure
discrimination. The ongoing development of
ASCMs with improved design features such
as supersonic speed, evasive maneuvers,
SS-N-27 SIZZLER and advanced terminal seekers will present
continuing challenges to U.S. and allied naval
forces.
SS-N-27 SIZZLER (3M-54) Anti-ship Cruise
Missile Torpedoes
For anti-ship applications, the KLUB family Russia maintains the world’s largest and most
offers the choice of either the 3M-54E* or the diversified inventory of torpedoes. It continues
3M-54E1. The 3M-54E is a three-stage missile to develop, produce, and export both Anti-
with a booster, subsonic cruise stage, and Submarine Warfare (ASW) and Anti-Surface
supersonic terminal/kill stage. With a 220 km Warfare (ASUW) torpedoes; the most recently-
(119 nm) range, supersonic kill vehicle, and developed heavyweight torpedoes are dual-
terminal maneuvers, the 3M-54E represents purpose, utilizing wake-homing in the ASUW
a unique anti-ship weapon. The 3M-54E1 is role and active/passive acoustic homing in
a subsonic anti-ship cruise missile. Although the ASW role. Russian torpedoes and torpedo
it cruises at a similar speed as the 3M-24E, countermeasures are often proliferated to other
the 3M-54E1 features a larger warhead and a countries as part of the sale or lease of Russian
much longer range: 300 km versus the smaller submarines.
3M-24E’s range of 150 km.
Russia has historically been a leader in
91R Anti-submarine Missile developing and implementing new technology
The final parts of the KLUB system, available for torpedoes. It was the first country to field
only for submarines and ships, are the 91RE1 wake-homing torpedoes, a super-cavitating
(submarine) and 91RTE2 (ship-launched) anti- torpedo, and a super heavyweight 65-cm
submarine missiles. The submarine-launched torpedo. One of Russia’s newest torpedoes
91RE1 has a range of up to 50 km, and the is the multi-purpose depth homing torpedo
ship-launched 91RTE2 has a range of 40 (UGST), which entered service in 2002. The
km. These weapons have a longer range UGST has a monopropellant-fueled axial
and quicker weapon delivery time than a piston engine with pump jet propulsor. It is
conventional torpedo. When fired in a salvo, capable of acoustic, wire-guided, and wake-
up to four weapons can be deployed against a homing modes and is designed to be fired
single target. from both submarines and surface ships. It is
advertised as being able to reach speeds of
It is expected that Russia will continue to up to 50 knots and having detection ranges of
develop its ASCM capabilities, pursuing faster, up to 2.5 km for submarines and 1.2 km for
36
surface ships. Technology from this weapon is
believed to have proliferated to China.
37
target it is engaging. The system is effective mirrors, lenses, and exotic laser materials like
to a minimum altitude of five meters and diodes and non-linear optical crystals.
maintains its effectiveness in the presence of
intensive jamming. Rail Guns
Electro-dynamic gun systems are being
The RIF-M is an advanced, long-range naval developed that use electrical energy for
SAM system intended to provide area air 2,000+ m/s muzzle velocity. The near- and
defense from aircraft, cruise missiles, and mid-term combustion-based technologies are
ballistic missiles out to a maximum range a transitional step to the creation of a railgun.
of 200 km (108 nm). The engagement of The major issue for Russia is maintaining
targets is possible at a minimum altitude of 10 rail life through material science, transition
meters through approximately 27,000 meters management, and rail geometry. Another
at speeds of up to 2,700 m/s. The system continuing issue remains pulse power. To
can engage as many as six targets with up increase and maintain pulse power, Russia’s
to twelve missiles and can operate in the new developments comprise of capacitor
presence of intensive jamming. inductors, rotating machines, and flux
compression generators. Non-traditional
Lasers designs of the system include reconnection
Russia’s directed energy weapons program launchers and linear accelerators.
utilizes radio frequencies in order to use
electromagnetic energy to damage or disrupt
electronics. The lasers use a high-intensity
light to disrupt sensors and thermally damage
structures. Low-energy devices are already
being completed for use in electro-optic
countermeasures. Russia’s long-term goal is
a high-energy weapon with anti-satellite and
cruise missile defense capability.
38
Chapter Four
39
Commissioned Officers of the Russian Navy1 Russian naval
aviators first graduate
from an Air Force
commissioning and
flight training school
and then transfer to
naval aviation where
they undergo more
specialized training
for specific aircraft
and over water
operations.
Naval Infantry
Warrant Officers and Enlisted Rates of the Russian Navy
1 officers attend
Combined Arms
commissioning
schools.
More specialized
officers, such as
those in the technical
communications
and civil engineering
fields, also graduate
from appropriate
A midshipman can specialize in specialty commissioning schools and not from
navigation, weapons systems, engineering, the above mentioned Naval Institutes.
communications, computer and information
systems, meteorology, hydrography, naval In the course of his career progression, an
architecture, or intelligence. The five officer may be sent to obtain specialized
years of study and included fleet practical qualifications or qualification upgrades at
experience are structured to prepare the the Advanced Special Officers Courses (St.
young officer specifically for the duties of his Petersburg). This institution also provides
first assignment in one of the four fleets or the specific courses for prospective Executive
Caspian Flotilla. Officers and Commanding Officers.
40
Staff Academy (U.S. National Defense
University equivalent) for higher level officer
education. General Staff Academy credentials
are required for assignment to senior fleet
command, joint command, and Defense
Ministry positions.
41
to create a fully functional non-commissioned Relative to the other services, the Russian Navy
officer corps. In principle, the Russian Navy began to seriously assess its organizational
has had enlisted personnel whose rate structure and manning early in the first decade
designation would be equivalent to U.S. of the 21st century. Significant adjustments had
Navy Chief Petty Officers; however, actual already been made prior to the announcement
equivalency is yet to be achieved. of the latest Defense Ministry reforms. As
a result, among the main services (Ground
Conscripts. Conscripted sailors are required Forces, Air Forces and Navy) the Navy has
to serve a minimum of one year of service been the least affected by ongoing changes.
and receive four to six weeks of basic training
prior to their first assignment. Although
unpopular in media reporting, the draft is
necessary to replace previously conscripted
sailors and retirees throughout the fleet. With
a renewed emphasis on force readiness, within
the navy conscripts normally are assigned
to either shore duty or to ships in extended
maintenance. Relatively few serve on
deployed ships.
Reform in Progress
The Russian military is in the process of
a significant draw-down in forces and a
further down-sizing restructuring. As Russia’s
perception of NATO as a threat has evolved,
irregular and asymmetric threats have arisen,
and market forces have emphasized cost-
effectiveness, the Russian leadership decided
that the country no longer needs the massive
force structure of the Soviet Union. The Soviet
legacy military came with large numbers
of officers at the O-5 and O-6 level. These
numbers were incompatible with the new
Armed Forces structure and the Defense
Ministry moved to trim this portion of the
officer corps and provide for early retirements
for personnel deemed no longer required.
42
Outlook
In the next 10–15 years, the Russian Navy The new submarine and ship classes will
will continue its historic transition to a new incorporate the latest advances in militarily
21st-century navy. A modest number of new significant areas such as: weapons; sensors;
class ships and submarines will enter the command, control and communication
Navy by the turn of the decade. Continuing capabilities; signature reduction; electronic
series construction and the start of several countermeasures; and automation and
more sophisticated and complex new classes habitability. More technologically advanced
are projected for the next decade. The new total ship systems requiring smaller crews
construction will be accompanied by the will be complemented with personnel better
maintenance and extension in service of the trained and educated to exploit the full
most capable Soviet legacy units. potential of their combat systems.
43
and maintenance, overcoming the impact of
current sanctions, and the recapitalization
of related infrastructure will not be easy to
sustain and will require constant effort.
Future Forces
The future 21st-century Russian Navy is
projected to be more capable on a unit-by-
unit basis than at present but not significantly
larger in overall order of battle numbers.
Barring unexpected changes in the global
Proposed Ka-52K naval attack variant political and economic environment, the
Navy’s missions are expected to remain the
The development of extended and interlinked same: to deter potential adversaries with
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance strategic sea-based nuclear forces, to defend
systems within the “World Ocean” Federal the nation and its interests using the navy’s
Targeted Program initiated in 1997 was general purpose forces, and to use the Navy
intended to make Russian naval and other as an “instrument of state” to support Russia’s
military and civilian systems more integrated diplomatic efforts, initiatives, and national
and interoperable, and, if successful, was interests.
planned to support better informed and timely
direction of the Navy by commanders both
afloat and ashore.
Challenges
The achievement of these goals will not be
without challenges. Continued understanding
of the role and capabilities of the Navy by
Russia’s leaders, securing sufficient and reliable
long-range funding for ship construction
44