The State and Migrant Women:

Diverging Hopes in the Making of “Multicultural

Families” in Contemporary Korea

Kim Hyun Mee

Abstract

This paper provides an in-depth understanding of the current condi-

tions and the status of migrant women in Korea by examining the
Korean government policy relating to them. The rapid increase in the
number of migrant women in recent years has initiated a new type of
family known as the “multicultural family.” This has also fuelled active
discussions about cultural diversity and multiculturalism.
However, the concept of “multicultural families” is appropriated by
the Korean government, which does not recognize the different cultural
backgrounds and aspirations of migrant women, to cope with the mul-
titude of social problems, such as declining birth rates, rising divorce
rates, and sex ratio imbalances, in the marriage market. This paper
argues that the multicultural family in Korea is a site where Korea as a
nation, civil society in Korea, and migrant women as a category strug-
gle over the meaning of the term “multicultural.”

Keywords: multicultural family, cross-border marriage, international

marriage, migrant women, marriage migrants, multiculturalism,
migration, marriage brokers

* The Korean version of this paper was presented at the international conference
“Knowledge Production and Challenges of Feminisms in the Glocal Era,” organized
by the Korean Women’s Institute, Ewha Womans University, South Korea, Novem-
ber 1-2, 2007.

Kim Hyun Mee (Kim, Hyeon-mi) is currently an associate professor in the Department
of Sociology at Yonsei University, Korea. She received her Ph.D in Anthropology from
University of Washington in 1995. Her current research includes the Korean pop cul-
ture flow in the Asian regions and global migration issues including cross-border mar-
riage in Korea. Email: [email protected].
The State and Migrant Women 101

Introduction

The “Getting Rural Bachelors Married” project began in the 1990s,

but international marriages between Korean men and Asian women
boomed in Korea from the year 2000. Today, seven years later, there
are more than 11,000 migrant women who have come to Korea
through international marriages. It is predicted that by 2020, the
number of households with such migrant women will comprise
twenty percent of the total number of households in Korea. It is true
that migrant women, the first “settler type” immigrants to come to
Korea, have paved the way for reconsidering the “pure blood” ideol-
ogy or “ethnic nationalism” in Korea. “Multiculturalism” has
become the theme of many academic conferences, and the national
government and local governments, as well as NGOs, have also
actively carried out a variety of programs to help migrant women get
successfully settled. The rapid increase in the number of migrant
women has created a new family type, called the “multicultural fam-
ily.” However, what the Korean government wants from the multi-
cultural family is a family based on traditional family values, that is,
one that upholds patriarchy and emphasizes reproduction. The gov-
ernment’s notion of the multicultural family is a far cry from the
mutual coexistence of cultures, which is the core of multicultural-
ism. Foreign women with diverse cultural backgrounds and desires
are on the brink of being reduced to a homogenous social minority
group.
In a way, “migration through marriage” suggests that there is a
sense of openness within Korean society that men and women could
establish social, economical, and sexual bonds regardless of national-
ity, ethnicity, and region. The explosion of international marriages is
not a phenomenon unique to Korea. Japan and Taiwan have also
seen a significant increase in international marriages between the
native men and other Asian women since the 1980s. These two coun-
tries and Korea share something in common: they are all promoting
international marriages to resolve the problem of declining birth
rates. The nuclear family, which is founded on the heterosexual fami-
102 KOREA JOURNAL / WINTER 2007

ly model, has served the function of reproducing social members and

sustaining capitalism through a gendered labor division with the hus-
band as breadwinner and the wife as homemaker. However, as
men’s status as breadwinner becomes unstable and women’s eco-
nomic power increases, the number of men who find themselves in a
more inferior position in the marriage market starts to increase.
International marriage in Korea since the 1990s is global in the sense
that a large number of foreign women are encouraged to move to
Korea to remedy the regional imbalances within the potential mar-
riage population. It is also “problematic” because, in the course of
promoting international marriage, the central and local governments
have collaborated with commercial international marriage brokers to
form an “international marriage brokerage system.” In this regard,
international marriage is not only a personal problem involving the
people seeking to marry, but also a social issue strewn with problems
such as the economic gaps between countries due to rapid globaliza-
tion, blind faith in a heterosexual marriage model that is based on
dichotomized gender roles, and the strategies of commercial marriage
brokers.
In this social context, migrant women are struggling everyday to
establish their social status and stabilize their living conditions. How-
ever, the Korean government has created a Korean “multicultural
family,” using both material and symbolic resources in the name of
assisting in the social integration of migrant women into Korean soci-
ety. The Korean government’s global project of creating the “multi-
cultural family” cannot be consistent or thorough, due to the diversi-
ty of desires, differences, and unpredictability on the part of the par-
ticipants. Most importantly, the kinds of social relations that migrant
women establish with their Korean families and every single process
of multicultural family formation are diverse, fragmented, and indi-
vidualistic. This paper argues that the multicultural family in Korea is
a place in which Korea as a nation, civil society in Korea, and
migrant women struggle over meaning of the term “multicultural.”
To do so, I will discuss the history of the multicultural family and
demonstrate the falsity of the Korean government’s notion of the
The State and Migrant Women 103

multicultural family. I will illustrate that there are various interpreta-

tions of the meaning of family, based on interviews I have conducted
with migrant women since 2004.

The Birth of the “Multicultural Family” in Korea

The term “multicultural family” is a notion shaped within the histori-

cal context of Korea’s international marriages. After 2000, various
grassroots organizations and NGOs working for migrant women and
those in international marriages used the term “double-culture fami-
ly,” in an effort to replace the word “international marriage family,”
until “multicultural family” was adopted as a term considered to be
more open to cultural diversity. The term “multiculturalism” was
coined in Korea after the racial, sexual, and class violence stemming
from ethnic nationalism based on pure-blood ideology was thought to
seriously encroach on the rights of migrant workers, biracial people,
and migrant women. Multiculturalism in Korea is thus used as a
counter-concept to Korea’s violent mono-ethnicity, rather than its
general meaning of recognizing or having a mutual understanding of
cultural difference.
The word “multicultural family” first appeared in government
documents at the suggestion of an NGO. In 2003, “Hifamily,” an
activist organization focused on families, submitted a petition to the
National Human Rights Commission saying that the use of the word
“mixed blood” (honhyeol) was a human rights violation, and sought
to replace the term with “the second generation of a multicultural
family.” Since 2005, migrant women have been at the center of the
Korean government’s attention, and it hence started using the word
“multicultural family.” As the government started using the word
“multicultural family,” the term “deteriorated” into a “technology of
governance” that justifies governmental intervention. Ong, using the
Foucauldian concept, defines neoliberalism as a technology of gover-
nance, or a “profoundly active way of rationalizing governing and
self-governing in order to ‘optimize’” (2006, 3). I also argue that the
104 KOREA JOURNAL / WINTER 2007

multicultural family is appropriated by the Korean government as

part of its endeavor to mobilize foreign women in order to achieve
the nationalist project of boosting the country’s population. In 2006,
the Korean government suddenly announced “a change into a multi-
cultural, multiethnical society,” hence introducing a multicultural dis-
course focusing on state-led migration (Oh 2007, 31).
Beginning in January 2006, while awaiting the visit of American
football player Hines Ward, born of a Korean mother and American
father, the Korean president ordered a number of new policies for
biracial people and foreigners. At that time, the media was responsi-
ble for conveying an array of messages, such as reporting on the fear
that the offspring of migrant women or migrant workers could
become an influential political group in the future and cause unrest,
and hope that they would benefit the Korean economy by continuing
the Korean pop culture wave (Moon 2006). In this context, as “multi-
cultural family” became the official term used by the government and
NGOs, a consensus was reached that systematic support for multicul-
tural families should be provided. Integrating the offspring of migrant
women into Korea’s nationalistic profit relations gained importance
in policy-making. Therefore, even though the implications of “human
trafficking” in the broker-involved process of female migration have
hardly changed, government research is focusing on “social conver-
gence discourse” rather than on the structural violence migrant
women experience. Recent government policies aimed at the social
integration of women tend to merge in one direction. In April 2006,
the “Plan for Promoting the Social Integration of Migrant Women,
Biracial people, and Immigrants” was announced. This plan, which
envisioned social integration and creation of a multicultural society,
idealistically aims at eliminating human rights violation, and prob-
lems of maladjustment and poverty that migrant women often experi-
ence after migrating to Korea and settling there (Kim Yee-Sun et al.
2006). Since 2006, there has been a so-called boom in research pro-
jects on marriage migrants, which was driven by a sudden increase
in the number of projects that were supported and sponsored by the
central and local governments in the name of investigating the cur-
The State and Migrant Women 105

rent status of marriage migrants and social service programs and

events geared towards them.

The Multicultural Family as Project Making

In the historical context of civil society’s budding recognition of mul-

ticulturalism, Korea’s multicultural family is appropriated by govern-
ments, both central and local, to create specific types of migrant
women subjects. While support programs for women organized at
the grassroots level have been mainly led by NGOs to enhance
migrant women’s abilities as “cultural translators,” the government’s
efforts simply reinforce prevailing attitudes in Korea of using women
as uniform objects to achieve the state-building project. The current
multicultural family system is a governance structure jointly created
by the nation, local government, and marriage brokers. My explana-
tion of these three tiers of agents follows.

The New Definition of the Multicultural Family

Since the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family established a cen-

ter for the support of migrant women’s families in 2006, the number
has now grown to thirty-seven. Each government ministry under-
takes multicultural family projects in competition with each other:
the Ministry of Education and Human Resources Development works
through the local human resources development center; the Ministry
of Culture and Tourism, through the local culture center; and the
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, through the visiting educational
helper project, which provides Korean language education, Korean
cooking classes, Korean culture exposure, and counseling. All these
form part of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family’s prepara-
tion for implementing the “multicultural family support policy law.”
The report on which the law was based defines the multicultural
family:
106 KOREA JOURNAL / WINTER 2007

The multicultural family refers to a family formed by a Korean citi-

zen and a legally residing marriage migrant or foreign worker
through matrimony, kinship, or adoption. Families created by the
marriage between foreigners of different nationalities or denizens
are excluded (Park and Cho 2007).

Interestingly, while “multicultural family” was used in the past as an

umbrella term to refer not only to foreign brides but also to marriages
between foreigners who migrated to Korea and Sae teo people (North
Korean defectors), the law actually limits its support only to “legal”
marriage migrants. The objective of the law is to provide marriage
migrants with an education in Korean history, the Korean language,
and traditional Korean etiquette, along with marriage and child-rear-
ing counseling services. All of these are intended for the “assimila-
tion” of foreign women into Korean society. As one statement indi-
cates, “Providing a contact network for marriage migrants through
the state and local governments, or similar measures to support their
preservation of culture and language, is not desirable at all as it will
hinder their integration into Korean society,” this policy reflects the
nation-state’s anxiety about changes to Korean society. The law also
discriminates between legal/illegal migrants, male/female marriage
migrants, and strictly legal marriage and common law marriage
based on intimacy. In fact, foreign men, including migrant workers
who married Korean women, are not supported by any service,
including education. As Jung Hyesil (2007) points out, since the
boundary of the multicultural family is limited to “legal settlers” mar-
ried to natives, whether they are legal or not, migrant workers who
are not married to Koreans, African families who came to Korea as
refugees, and overseas Chinese families are excluded.
This became evident after 2006, when government documents
and officials openly referred to migrant women collectively as “an
object that can be used to resolve Korea’s low birth, aging society cri-
sis.” The reason that social integration has become the main goal of
migrant women policy is because foreign women are perceived as the
most easily mobilized resource to solve the various family crises and
The State and Migrant Women 107

care-work burden facing Korean society. In Korea, the “crisis of the

family” and low birth rate has, since 2000, become important themes
of various social agendas. The goals of middle-class families have
been reduced to expanding opportunities for their children to achieve
success in life as parents dedicate all their material and emotional
resources to education, hence a process of class reproduction. In
Korea, where investments in public resources for child-raising and
education are virtually absent, “the small family” model is used as a
family survival tactic. Competition among families leads to a “de-ter-
ritorialized” strategy for obtaining “transnational resources,” and for
this reason, there are more separated families like “gireogi family,”
“global households,” and “single-parent household” than there are
families that actually reside together.
On the other hand, the family crisis facing the urban lower class
or the rural community is such that men are being increasingly
deprived of the material, social, and cultural resources to obtain a
“heterosexual” family. The only strategy they can use to form a fami-
ly is to convert economic gaps between countries into personal
advantage. Since 2000, family planning in Korea has focused on
examining the reasons for the persistent low birth rate, analyzing the
socioeconomic outcomes, and preparing solutions. For middle-class
families, however, who are already widely aware of the economic
costs and losses from raising children and buying a house at the
same time, the government’s “naïve” birth encouragement plans
were doomed to fail. The Korean government’s interest in migrant
women comes at a time when the Korean government’s birth policy
has failed to take off with Korean natives. When international mar-
riages first began to increase in the 1990s, the central government
was indifferent, therefore policies for migrant women were absent.
The government’s only concern was to track down foreign women
who came to Korea through “fake marriages.” From 2006, however,
the introduction of the “healthy family law,” which was made to
resolve problems such as the low birth rate, high divorce rate, and
aging society, led to the discovery of migrant women as easier targets
for policy-making. Migrant women were quickly perceived by the
108 KOREA JOURNAL / WINTER 2007

government as the most easily mobilized resources to resolve the

social problems of low birth rate and aging problems. In fact, that the
frame of the migrant women support plan came from the Presidential
Committee on Aging Society and Population Policy reveals the popu-
lation policy-focused nature of the government plan.
Interestingly, current policies on migrant women and family
planning policies in the 1970s have many things in common. Family
planning from 1970-1980 “[was] carried out in a very isolated way,
by reaching a quantified goal of each region through bureaucratic
measures.” The Planned Parenthood Federation of Korea (PPFK)
placed two family planning officers in every public health center in
Korea, and one education officer in each of the 1,473 towns and
townships.” The government did not mind performing “illegal inter-
vention” and “violation” of women’s bodies as long as the govern-
ment could reach its goal (Hwang 2005, 108-109). If the maternal
image of contraception as an act of patriarchy is the image that gov-
erned the family planning era, it thus made women who give birth to
Korean babies the focus of today’s multicultural family support plan.
The instrumentalization of maternity in policy-making is indeed per-
sistent. The Korean government’s policy focuses more on the mainte-
nance and reproduction of the Korean family, rather than on “multi-
culturalism.”
While the government uses the foreign spouses of Korean men to
resolve family crises, it also marginalizes them at the same time.
Interestingly, migrant women who have divorced or left their Korean
families still appear as “seceders” in governmental literature, includ-
ing that of the Ministry of Justice. While recruiting foreign women
who have become the spouses of Korean citizens, it also marginalizes
them. Examples of this are evident in the way that national support
and concern for migrant women’s Korean education and adjustment
have sharply increased while the women’s legal status remains frail.
A migrant woman’s legal status is dependent on her husband,’ the
basis of which lies in proving that she is the mother of his children.
Prior to obtaining Korean nationality, migrant women who are apply-
ing for Korean nationality or to visa extension in order to remain in
The State and Migrant Women 109

Korea are required to obtain a fidelity guarantee by having their hus-

bands accompany them. Furthermore, employment is prohibited dur-
ing a divorce suit (So 2005). Interestingly enough, while migrant
women are included in the revised December 2005 Natural Basic
Livelihood Security Law, they are allowed benefits and legally enti-
tled to become the beneficiary of the “Welfare Protection Law for
Parents” only as mothers of children with Korean fathers. Their
access to public resources is only as “mothers” of their children (Kim
MJ 2007). Migrant women therefore do not have the choice not to
bear children. Childless foreign women fail to qualify as model
migrant women. Their rights in Korea depend on how successfully
they have fulfilled their purpose in family-making, in other words, in
housekeeping, child-bearing, and child-rearing. Because the migra-
tion of women enforces Korea’s familism, government policy sup-
porting migrant women thus focuses on settlement plans for the sake
of maintaining the “family.” In doing so, it reinforces social tenden-
cies to ignore women’s cries for help when they experience domestic
violence and abuse at the hands of their husbands and in-laws. The
fact that there are only two government-sponsored shelters for
migrant women across the country proves this.

Marriage Support Programs by Local Governments

Local governments started encouraging international marriage in the

1990s, with the campaign slogan of “giving rural bachelors a chance
to marry.” Since the 1990s, Korea, like Japan and Taiwan, began to
actively recruit foreign brides for farmers in rural areas who are in a
very disadvantageous position in the Korean marriage market. Cross-
border marriage was, in fact, started by local governments as a strate-
gy for alleviating the farmers’ marriage difficulties. Since 1992, local
governments, agricultural associations as well as the government-
funded Research Association for the Welfare of Farm and Fishing Vil-
lages have been recruiting rural bachelors to join marriage tours to
China (Lee H. 2006; Freeman 2005). The local governments also find
it more convenient to rely on marriage brokers to secure a constant
110 KOREA JOURNAL / WINTER 2007

supply of women from other Asian countries. Local governments have

been playing a pivotal role in the formation of international marriages.
Given that the country’s birth rate is low, and that rural popula-
tion is on the decrease as more farmers head for cities, family plan-
ning aimed at migrant women is indeed very important for the sur-
vival of rural communities in Korea. Local governments are compet-
ing to implement local laws with regard to “international marriage
support programs for farmers and fishermen.” One of these laws
states that single men aged 35 to 50 and working in the agricultural
or fishing industries can apply for financial support ranging from 3 to
8 million Korean won (US$ 3,200 to 8,600) to assist them in finding a
wife through international marriage. As of May 2007, 60 cities and
local governments have implemented a similar act, with all the bud-
gets totaling 2.85 billion Korean Won (Han K. 2007). Representatives
of local governments are rushing rural men off into the international
marriage market instead of making long-term policies that would
help improve rural areas, which will experience even more difficul-
ties after the Free Trade Agreements (FTA). Various proposals, such
as “providing subsidies for childbirth and monetary support for deliv-
ery, supplies needed for child-raising, and child-rearing,” are surfac-
ing in rural areas, where “‘preventing people from leaving’ has
become the major task for sustaining and providing budget for
administrative organization” (Kim J. 2007, 50).

Marriage Brokers’ “Sales Warranty”

Under the limited influence of the state-run migrant women’s support

center, the realities in which Korean-style “multicultural families” are
situated are diverse and hence vastly different. However, since the
majority of international marriages between Asian women and Kore-
an men are handled by well-organized brokerage systems, brokers
thus play a significant role in helping migrant women adapt to Korea.
Within the process of the creation, sustenance, and change of the
multicultural family, various agents such as brokers, extended Kore-
an families, and the social networks of migrant women also play
The State and Migrant Women 111

important roles. In this context, migrant women expand the Korean-

style multicultural family by combining their desires, motives, lack of
resources and power, and adaptive strategies.
In a survey of 164 women in rural areas, 54.1 percent received
Korean language education. Among these women, 43.3 percent replied
that they learned Korean through lectures provided by marriage bro-
kerage companies (Yi S. 2007). Brokers therefore play the most impor-
tant role in the early stage of migrant women’s family-making process.
They commence this service after marriages have taken place and
migrant women have arrived in Korea. Since both men and women in
the initial stages of marriage discover disparate information about their
spouses before and after marriage, the “conflicts” therefore inevitably
occurred. At this stage, the brokers play a role in resolving conflicts,
by discussing “cultural differences” and related issues. Brokers’ “in-
warranty” services include counseling by telephone, paying visits, run-
ning Korean language classes, and inviting couples to their offices
(Han and Seol 2006, 59). One broker calls their company’s service
“emotional management.” This means that the brokers have to man-
age the “emotions” of both Korean men and their foreign wives in the
early stages of marriage, when disappointments arise due to differing
expectations and ideals about each other.
Most brokers maintain a custom of “guaranteeing the bride” after
marriage for a duration of six months to one year, in order to lure
more Korean men into using their services. For example, if a divorce
occurs due to the fault of the foreign bride, or if she leaves the fami-
ly, the broker promises to introduce a new foreign woman to that
Korean man. The Korean man can go on another matchmaking trip,
paying only for actual expenses incurred, such as airfare. Brokers
often introduce foreign women who are already in Korea to Korean
men. To avoid further complaints from the men, brokers instruct
them on how to “accommodate” foreign women. Some tactics used
are to “get them pregnant fast,” “don’t let them roam about outside,”
and “don’t let them contact women from the same country, either on
the phone or in person.” One company’s president even describes his
role as “father” to these migrant women, and would often advise
112 KOREA JOURNAL / WINTER 2007

them to treat their husbands well (Han and Seol 2006, 60):

One broker said “they (Vietnamese migrant women) are 21 to 23

years old. I think they have to be beaten once in a while, like what
I do to my children. I take care of them on behalf of their parents-
in-laws, who are too old to oversee the brides. But whenever I beat
them, I call the brides’ parents and ask for approval,” justifying his
violence towards the women (Kim J. 2007, 52).

Most of them simply attribute all conflicts to “cultural differences”

and “misunderstandings,” saying that these would be resolved after
couples have acculturated to being with each other. In-warranty ser-
vices thus play an important role in maintaining the reputation of
brokerage companies, as well as in losing it. Brokers invest more
time and energy in providing in-warranty services in Korea than in
arranging overseas weddings, as it is where they derive and maintain
their profits. This is why 72.9 percent of companies in the interna-
tional marriage business provides in-warranty services (Han and Seol
2006). While in-warranty services are essential to preventing losses,
it can also be rather costly at the same time. Transportation expenses
and interpreter fees are needed in visiting households to resolve con-
flicts. Less in-warranty services thus mean more profit. One broker
said to me that “nothing is left of your brokerage after ten service
sessions.” Large brokerage companies with professional management
and regulations talk Korean men into signing a contract stating that
they will not seek in-warranty services. A newly formed brokerage
circle, called the Association of International Marriage Counseling,
also swears it will not hesitate to invest great resources in in-warran-
ty services. The existence of the multicultural family is very depen-
dent upon in-warranty services provided by brokers (Kim J. 2007).
However, they tend to simply order the migrant women to obey the
demands of their Korean husbands and families, rather than making
the service a venue for negotiations between husbands and wives.
One Mongolian woman said to me that a broker once visited her
household with an interpreter but spoke only to her husband without
asking her anything.
The State and Migrant Women 113

Women Practicing the Multicultural Family:

The Ideal of the Modern Family and “Prepared Maternity”

If the marriage migrant women policy reflects the demands and influ-
ences of Korean families, it ignores those of migrant women for
“social and familial recognition for their mother tongue and native
culture,” the most important factor in the creation of the multicultur-
al family (Kim Y. 2007, 30). Many migrant women acknowledge the
importance of treating their husbands and family members with the
same amount of education that they receive in learning the Korean
language and about Korean tradition.1 These women say that the
biggest difficulty they experience is coping with the Korean family
culture, which is still often maintained in a premodern style, wherein
the married son lives with his parents. Like Korean women, migrant
women also consider their relationships with parents-in-law the most
difficult (Seol et al. 2006, 100). In other countries, this intergenera-
tional combination usually applies to some upper- and middle-class
people who need to hand down their economic and cultural assets to
the next generation. In Korea, however, this intergenerational combi-
nation occurs in almost every class, and they do so in the name of
tradition, etiquette, and custom. The mother-in-law plays the biggest
role in propagating this intergenerational combination. As a stranger
among her husband’s family members, a woman gains power only
by giving birth to a child, thereby producing a paternal family.
In Korea, where the characteristics of the “uterine family” are
maintained, maternal power is exercised by making children (espe-
cially boys) emotionally dependent on their mothers. In the “multi-
cultural family,” the mother-in-law considers it her duty to mold her
daughter-in-law into the fabric of the family. In many cases, mothers-
in-law extensively control the eating habits, manners, etiquette,

1. When questioned about the necessary educational programs that husbands should
receive, 27 out of 108 replied saying that “education regarding wife’s nation and
culture’ was important, while 26 cited “education in the wife’s native language”,
and 18 said “education regarding international marriage” (Yi 2007).
114 KOREA JOURNAL / WINTER 2007

working styles, and even sexual behavior of daughters-in-law. There

are many examples of mothers-in-law making their foreign daugh-
ters-in-law eat only rice and kimchi so that they will get “quickly
accustomed” to Korea. Many mothers-in-law insist that daughters-in-
law formally greet them every morning and night, saying that this is
a Korean custom. This even occurs among lower-class families,
where daughters-in-law are not to expect material compensation for
their obedience. Mothers-in-law are thus the main agents in trans-
forming foreign women into Korean women. All the Chinese, Viet-
namese, Filipino, and Mongolian women whom I met said that they
have never heard of mothers-in-law living with daughters-in-law, nor
do they understand this custom. Meanwhile, Korean men have differ-
ent expectations of Filipino or Vietnamese women, thinking that
“they will be obedient and good to my parents” or “they look similar
to Koreans” (Seol et al. 2006). Brokers are responsible for creating
some of these orientalist images of these Asian women as “familial
and obedient women,” whereas foreign women actually perceive the
nuclear family as the norm, as shaped by their experiences in social-
ist backgrounds or the limitations of their class backgrounds.
Though different in varying degrees, Chinese and Vietnamese
women have internalized the notion of labor equity under socialism.
Foreign brides express their dissatisfaction with their married lives in
terms of “the rigid gendered dichotomization of work and domestici-
ty” (Freeman 2005, 97), economic dependence, and powerlessness.
These women have chosen international marriage to escape the prob-
lems in their societies in order to lead a life more compatible with
their outlook on the world. A recurring theme in the stories of Viet-
namese women is the desire to depart from the lifestyles their moth-
ers lead, whose daily life begins in the fields from the break of dawn
and involves endlessly performing household chores to support their
families. These migrant women aspire to make their own nuclear
families, and live and work in cities.
The women often believe that international marriage would
enable them to become modern mothers. Their image of Korea is that
of a rich country that has embraced capitalism and modernity. Their
The State and Migrant Women 115

idea of a typical nuclear family is couple-centered, filled with roman-

tic love, intimacy, and modern maternity. Relatively young Viet-
namese women say that while they did not have feelings for Korean
men, who are typically much older, prior to marrying, they had
thought that these men would “love only me” and “care for me,” and
that they would be able to form romantic relationships. One Mongo-
lian woman who left graduate school to come to Korea said that she
had believed marrying a Korean man would give her the opportunity
to “concentrate” on raising children:

There are many cases in Mongolia in which young people in their

early twenties just give birth to children and get married without
any preparation. The reason I chose a Korean man is because I
heard that they buy houses and everything before marriage, and
they have a strong sense of responsibility. I have heard that the
men coming over to get married are old because it takes a long time
to get prepared. I believed that as a mother, I would be able to raise
children at home while my husband support the family.

This woman had married with the belief that “prepared maternity”
was possible, but now she has experienced violence from both her
husband and mother-in-law, and is selling shoes and pins on the
street for a living. Since many migrant women were unaware that
many older Korean men typically lack economic resources, are not
well-educated, and may have even left the labor market, they mar-
ried based on their idealized image of Korean men without suspicion.
They believed that while the man supported the family, they could
realize their dreams of establishing a modern family and fulfill their
imagined role of “high quality emotional care, systematic guidance
and education, and rational operation of the family economy”
(Hwang 2005). Those Filipino women who have had experience
working as domestic maids before coming to Korea through interna-
tional marriages want to experience and practice genuine maternity,
as opposed to “commercialized” maternity (Chang 2007). Also, Kore-
an-Chinese women and Mongolian women wish to move to Korea
with their children from previous marriages in their hometowns, but
116 KOREA JOURNAL / WINTER 2007

they have to constantly prove that their marriages to Korean men are
not “disguised marriages” for that purpose. A Korean-Chinese
woman, who divorced after 15 years of marriage and tried to bring
her son from China following the death of her former husband, told
me that her Korean husband and parents-in-law accused her of fraud
and claimed that she had faked the second marriage in order to bring
her son to Korea, and even planned to steal their money.
Child-bearing and child-rearing are also problems caught in
webs of power relations. One recommendation given by brokers to
prevent migrant women from running away and making them accul-
turate quickly is by “getting the women pregnant.” Thus, a serious
problem that emerged in the course of the interviews with migrant
women is that “pregnancy” and childbirth in many cases are not
considered “blessed” events that help strengthen the marital bond.
Many studies about international marriages have interpreted child-
birth positively for foreign women since it is said to improve marital
relations by providing the assurance that the women will not run
away. However, such an interpretation does not apply in many
cases. Strong opposition from husbands, especially due to concerns
about having “mixed-blood children,” sometimes leads to abortion.
In some cases, Korean men and migrant women who have both
internalized and taken for granted the idea that their children will
experience discrimination in Korea deliberately avoid pregnancy, and
some husbands even force their wives to abort. Moreover, those
Korean men who treat foreign women simply as sexual objects or
docile housekeepers sometimes express strong objections when these
women become “normal” wives upon becoming pregnant and giving
birth. On the contrary, some Korean men tend to avoid taking the
responsibility of creating the idealized nuclear family consisting of a
couple and their children.
Meanwhile, migrant women are very realistic when it comes to
matters such as raising children and maintaining the family, quite dif-
ferent from the Korean government’s expectations of the multicultur-
al family. While child-rearing in Korea is a heavy responsibility for
both Korean and migrant women, migrant women tend to actively
The State and Migrant Women 117

control childbirth the longer they stay in Korea.2 Migrant women are
surprised by the substantial amount of money needed to raise their
children and the lack of public facilities for children. Many also give
up whatever hope they have of getting a job. The women I met dur-
ing this research said that even if they love children they “cannot
give birth to more children. We don’t have enough money. We can’t
raise them,” with some resorting to birth control as an inevitability.
Similar to marriages among natives in Korea, divorce rates
among “multicultural families” are also soaring. The number of mar-
riages between Korean men and foreign women that ended in divorce
rose from 401 cases out of the total number of 11,017 in 2002, 583
out of 19,214 in 2003, 1,611 out of 25,594 in 2004, and 2,444 out of
31,180 in 2005 (Seol et al. 2006, 21-22). These migrant women are
thus deviating from the so-called state-governed status of marriage
migrants. Since the legal process for divorce is not simple, many
women either return to their home countries without getting divorced
or remain in hiding in Korea. Some of the women I met who had
children at the time of their divorce said they have to simply accept
their existence with “fatherless” children. While lamenting that their
early experiences of being raised by a sacrificial mother in the
absence of a father are being repeated once again in their lives, they
stress it is better to remove their children from “the violent father”
and describe separation from their husbands as a “choice.” Some
other migrant women have come to realize that their husbands are
economically and socially marginalized, and they conclude rather
quickly that they should not rely on their husbands for support.
Instead, they seek “economic independence” through part-time and
temporary jobs, and earn a living while staying at a friend’s house
and returning home periodically.
As women begin to realize the discrepancies between their initial
expectations before migrating and the actual reality during the early

2. As stated in the report, the women who replied saying they “have no plans for
future childbirth” cited difficult family circumstances and the economic burden of
child-rearing and providing education as the main reasons (Seol et al. 2006).
118 KOREA JOURNAL / WINTER 2007

stages of settlement, they develop survival strategies by deciding

what to “trade” or “exchange” with their husbands. Existing litera-
ture on international marriage shows how many migrant women deal
with their situations by reverting to strategies such as sleeping in dif-
ferent rooms, leaving home, threatening divorce, refusing a divorce,
gaining emotional support from other women from the same coun-
tries, and pressuring their husbands (Yoon 2004; Lee 2005; Han G.
2006; Kim Jung Sun 2007). Sometimes the cultural coercion to
become a Korean daughter-in-law does not work, and disparity is
maintained between Korean mothers and migrant daughters-in-law in
terms of what should be done about their reproductive labor. Their
expectations of their husbands and family members are lowered,
leading to their refusal to respond to difficulties: some migrant
women simply choose to lie in their rooms and not come out when
spoken communication is difficult, free access to the outside world is
not granted, or economic resources are not provided. The women
may be reproached for being “stubborn” or “lazy,” but the husbands
and family members are unable to force the women to obey. This
“weapon of the weak” that many migrant women use is thus
expressed at times by blatantly refusing to conform to basic labor and
manners.

Conclusion

The Korean government’s “multicultural family” is a “categorical”

structure formed for the interpellation of migrant women subjects by
the state. The multicultural family is based on mono-cultural imagi-
nation, but migrant women in this global age are deconstructing or
expanding the boundaries of the multicultural family by either abid-
ing by or resisting the coerced processes of Korean family-making. As
Piper and Roces (2003) point out, female migrants through interna-
tional marriage not only acquire the status of wife or mother, but also
as worker and naturalized citizen as time goes by. The women are
not “strangers inside families,” who silently follow the state-led
The State and Migrant Women 119

“multicultural family” scenario of learning the Korean language, get-

ting accustomed to Korean culture and reproducing for the country’s
labor force. They are agents who struggle to seek and newly locate
their existence within the family; between the family and the commu-
nity; and outside the family. The families that migrant women form
are not mere copies of the meaning of maternity and family acquired
from within their own cultural contexts, but manifestation of the
image of the modern family combined with the “motive” of migra-
tion. In due course, migrant women come to experience just how dis-
tant the Korean family is from their ideals, hence prompting them to
devise various survival strategies. The reason Korea’s migrant
women support policy concentrates on Korean language education
and the learning of Korean customs is because it is based on the nar-
row idea that these women are merely the dependents of their Kore-
an husbands. However, it is important to understand that migrant
women are active agents who seek to obtain multiple statuses along
every step in the process of deciding to migrate, settle, and plan for
the future. The “structural enforcements” made by the “multicultural
family” project exercises violence by bundling women into the same
closed category of instrumental objects. Against this violence, women
are reincarnated into “survivors” and “cultural interpreters” through
everyday life and practice.

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