1. G.R. No.

151258 February 1, 2012

ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 154954

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
The HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, Jr.,
JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO
GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO
MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE
FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN, PERCIVAL BRIGOLA, PAUL
ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH
LLEDO, and RONAN DE GUZMAN, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 155101

FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080

GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner,

vs.
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ
SARUCA, Jr., and ANSELMO ADRIANO, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

The public outrage over the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa – the victim in this case – on 10
February 1991 led to a very strong clamor to put an end to hazing.1 Due in large part to the brave
efforts of his mother, petitioner Gerarda Villa, groups were organized, condemning his senseless
and tragic death. This widespread condemnation prompted Congress to enact a special law, which
became effective in 1995, that would criminalize hazing.2 The intent of the law was to discourage
members from making hazing a requirement for joining their sorority, fraternity, organization, or
association.3 Moreover, the law was meant to counteract the exculpatory implications of "consent"
and "initial innocent act" in the conduct of initiation rites by making the mere act of hazing punishable
or mala prohibita.4

Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing activities in the country.5 Within a year of his
death, six more cases of hazing-related deaths emerged – those of Frederick Cahiyang of the
University of Visayas in Cebu; Raul Camaligan of San Beda College; Felipe Narne of Pamantasan
ng Araullo in Cabanatuan City; Dennis Cenedoza of the Cavite Naval Training Center; Joselito
Mangga of the Philippine Merchant Marine Institute; and Joselito Hernandez of the University of the
Philippines in Baguio City.6

Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this case the general
condemnation of a hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe a fundamental principle in
our criminal justice system – "[N]o act constitutes a crime… unless it is made so by law."7 Nullum
crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Even if an act is viewed by a large section of the populace as immoral
or injurious, it cannot be considered a crime, absent any law prohibiting its commission. As
interpreters of the law, judges are called upon to set aside emotion, to resist being swayed by strong
public sentiments, and to rule strictly based on the elements of the offense and the facts allowed in
evidence.
Before the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No. 151258 (Villareal v. People), G.R.
No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People), and G.R. Nos. 178057
and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona).

Facts

The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court of Appeals (CA)8 and the trial court,9 are as follows:

In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar
"Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert"
Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).

On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila Fraternity
(Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufo’s Restaurant to have
dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the
neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be
physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for
three days. After their "briefing," they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for
the commencement of their initiation.

Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults from the
Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota court of
the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were
then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites included the "Indian Run,"
which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering
blows to the neophytes; the "Bicol Express," which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their
backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over
their legs; the "Rounds," in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the
"auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation
rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on their thighs
by two Aquilans; and the "Auxies’ Privilege Round," in which the auxiliaries were given the
opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also
indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They survived their first day of initiation.

On the morning of their second day – 9 February 1991 – the neophytes were made to present comic
plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila
Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or
legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment
them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing
that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day officially
ended.

After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members10 Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio
Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson
Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he
reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected
the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle
blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him
complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings,
Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the
initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at
the carport.

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and incoherent
mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just
overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans
started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him
warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was
pronounced dead on arrival.

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans:

In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)

1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)

2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)

 3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)

4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)

5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)

6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)

7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)

8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)

9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)

10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)

11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)

12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)

13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)

14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)

15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)

16. Antonio General (General)

17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)

18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)

19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)

20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)

21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)

22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)

23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)

24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)

25. Adel Abas (Abas)

26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)

In Criminal Case No. C-38340

1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)

2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)

3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)

4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)

5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)

6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)

7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)

8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)

 9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)

Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried.11 On the
other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in
abeyance due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.12

On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), holding
the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion
temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.13 A few weeks after the trial court rendered its
judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused
commenced anew.14

On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520)15 set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial
court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of each of the accused
according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the following
Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:

1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants – Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez,

De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero,
Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) – were acquitted, as their individual
guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

2. Four of the accused-appellants – Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano
Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) – were found guilty of the crime of slight
physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They were also ordered to
jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of ₱ 30,000 as indemnity.

3. Two of the accused-appellants – Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal – were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal. They
were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of ₱
50,000 and to pay the additional amount of ₱ 1,000,000 by way of moral damages.

On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against accused
Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial.16 Meanwhile, on different dates
between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of
accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.17 On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos.
89060 & 9015318 reversed the trial court’s Orders and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.19

From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually brought
before this Court.

G.R. No. 151258 – Villareal v. People

The instant case refers to accused Villareal’s Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. The
Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly committed by the CA in its Decision dated 10 January
2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520 – first, denial of due process; and, second, conviction absent proof
beyond reasonable doubt.20

While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner Villareal filed a Notice of
Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the Notice, petitioner Villareal died on 13 March
2011. Counsel thus asserts that the subject matter of the Petition previously filed by petitioner does
not survive the death of the accused.

G.R. No. 155101 – Dizon v. People

Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari, questioning the CA’s Decision dated
10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520.21 Petitioner sets forth
two main issues – first, that he was denied due process when the CA sustained the trial court’s
forfeiture of his right to present evidence; and, second, that he was deprived of due process when
the CA did not apply to him the same "ratio decidendi that served as basis of acquittal of the other
accused."22

As regards the first issue, the trial court made a ruling, which forfeited Dizon’s right to present
evidence during trial. The trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on an earlier date since a
co-accused, Antonio General, no longer presented separate evidence during trial. According to
Dizon, his right should not have been considered as waived because he was justified in asking for a
postponement. He argues that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the hearing dates and in fact
insisted that he was ready to present evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule, and not on an
earlier hearing date.

Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that he should have likewise been acquitted, like
the other accused, since his acts were also part of the traditional initiation rites and were not tainted
by evil motives.23 He claims that the additional paddling session was part of the official activity of the
fraternity. He also points out that one of the neophytes admitted that the chairperson of the initiation
rites "decided that [Lenny] was fit enough to undergo the initiation so Mr. Villareal proceeded to do
the paddling…."24 Further, petitioner echoes the argument of the Solicitor General that "the individual
blows inflicted by Dizon and Villareal could not have resulted in Lenny’s death."25 The Solicitor
General purportedly averred that, "on the contrary, Dr. Arizala testified that the injuries suffered by
Lenny could not be considered fatal if taken individually, but if taken collectively, the result is the
violent death of the victim."26

Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA that he was motivated by ill will. He claims that Lenny’s
father could not have stolen the parking space of Dizon’s father, since the latter did not have a car,
and their fathers did not work in the same place or office. Revenge for the loss of the parking space
was the alleged ill motive of Dizon. According to petitioner, his utterances regarding a stolen parking
space were only part of the "psychological initiation." He then cites the testimony of Lenny’s co-
neophyte – witness Marquez – who admitted knowing "it was not true and that he was just making it
up…."27

Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill will was negated by his show of concern
for Villa after the initiation rites. Dizon alludes to the testimony of one of the neophytes, who
mentioned that the former had kicked the leg of the neophyte and told him to switch places with
Lenny to prevent the latter’s chills. When the chills did not stop, Dizon, together with Victorino,
helped Lenny through a sleeping bag and made him sit on a chair. According to petitioner, his
alleged ill motivation is contradicted by his manifestation of compassion and concern for the victim’s
well-being.

G.R. No. 154954 – People v. Court of Appeals

This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CA’s Decision dated 10 January
2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520, insofar as it acquitted 19
(Victorino et al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.) of the accused Aquilans of the lesser crime of slight
physical injuries.28 According to the Solicitor General, the CA erred in holding that there could have
been no conspiracy to commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity initiation had not yet been criminalized
at the time Lenny died.

In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should have been upheld,
inasmuch as it found that there was conspiracy to inflict physical injuries on Lenny. Since the injuries
led to the victim’s death, petitioner posits that the accused Aquilans are criminally liable for the
resulting crime of homicide, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.29 The said article
provides: "Criminal liability shall be incurred… [b]y any person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended."

Petitioner also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable. According to the Solicitor
General, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in
setting aside the trial court’s finding of conspiracy and in ruling that the criminal liability of all the
accused must be based on their individual participation in the commission of the crime.

G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 – Villa v. Escalona

Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, praying for the reversal of the CA’s
Decision dated 25 October 2006 and Resolution dated 17 May 2007 in CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060
and 90153.30 The Petition involves the dismissal of the criminal charge filed against Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.

Due to "several pending incidents," the trial court ordered a separate trial for accused Escalona,
Saruca, Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S. Fernandez, and Cabangon (Criminal
Case No. C-38340) to commence after proceedings against the 26 other accused in Criminal Case
No. C-38340(91) shall have terminated. On 8 November 1993, the trial court found the 26 accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, the proceedings in Criminal Case No. C-38340
involving the nine other co-accused recommenced on 29 November 1993. For "various reasons," the
initial trial of the case did not commence until 28 March 2005, or almost 12 years after the
arraignment of the nine accused.
Petitioner Villa assails the CA’s dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the 9 accused, namely,
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the accused failed to assert their right to
speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She also points out that the prosecution cannot be
faulted for the delay, as the original records and the required evidence were not at its disposal, but
were still in the appellate court.

We resolve herein the various issues that we group into five.

Issues

1. Whether the forfeiture of petitioner Dizon’s right to present evidence constitutes denial of
due process;

2. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for
violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial;

3. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and adjudicated the
liability of each accused according to individual participation;

4. Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and

5. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced Tecson, Ama,
Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries.

Discussion

Resolution on Preliminary Matters

G.R. No. 151258 – Villareal v. People

In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending resolution, this Court took
note of counsel for petitioner’s Notice of Death of Party.

According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal penalties is totally
extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is
extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment. The term "personal penalties" refers to the
service of personal or imprisonment penalties,31while the term "pecuniary penalties" (las pecuniarias)
refers to fines and costs,32 including civil liability predicated on the criminal offense complained of
(i.e., civil liability ex delicto).33 However, civil liability based on a source of obligation other than the
delict survives the death of the accused and is recoverable through a separate civil action.34

Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal liability for both personal
and pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly arising from the delict complained of.
Consequently, his Petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against him deemed closed
and terminated.

G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)

In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the dates for the reception of evidence for
accused-petitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and 22nd of September; and the 5th and 12 of October
1993.35 The Order likewise stated that "it will not entertain any postponement and that all the accused
who have not yet presented their respective evidence should be ready at all times down the line,
with their evidence on all said dates. Failure on their part to present evidence when required shall
therefore be construed as waiver to present evidence."36

However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for another accused manifested in open court that his client –
Antonio General – would no longer present separate evidence. Instead, the counsel would adopt the
testimonial evidence of the other accused who had already testified.37 Because of this development
and pursuant to the trial court’s Order that the parties "should be ready at all times down the line,"
the trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on the next trial date – 25 August 1993 – instead
of his originally assigned dates. The original dates were supposed to start two weeks later, or on 8
September 1993.38 Counsel for accused Dizon was not able to present evidence on the accelerated
date. To address the situation, counsel filed a Constancia on 25 August 1993, alleging that he had to
appear in a previously scheduled case, and that he would be ready to present evidence on the dates
originally assigned to his clients.39 The trial court denied the Manifestation on the same date and
treated the Constancia as a motion for postponement, in violation of the three-day-notice rule under
the Rules of Court.40 Consequently, the trial court ruled that the failure of Dizon to present evidence
amounted to a waiver of that right.41

Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he was deprived of due process of law when the trial
court forfeited his right to present evidence. According to him, the postponement of the 25 August
1993 hearing should have been considered justified, since his original pre-assigned trial dates were
not supposed to start until 8 September 1993, when he was scheduled to present evidence. He
posits that he was ready to present evidence on the dates assigned to him. He also points out that
he did not ask for a resetting of any of the said hearing dates; that he in fact insisted on being
allowed to present evidence on the dates fixed by the trial court. Thus, he contends that the trial
court erred in accelerating the schedule of presentation of evidence, thereby invalidating the finding
of his guilt.

The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution
itself.42 Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused …
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel…" This constitutional right includes the right
to present evidence in one’s defense,43 as well as the right to be present and defend oneself in
person at every stage of the proceedings.44

In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,45 the Sandiganbayan set the hearing of the defense’s presentation
of evidence for 21, 22 and 23 June 1995. The 21 June 1995 hearing was cancelled due to "lack of
quorum in the regular membership" of the Sandiganbayan’s Second Division and upon the
agreement of the parties. The hearing was reset for the next day, 22 June 1995, but Crisostomo and
his counsel failed to attend. The Sandiganbayan, on the very same day, issued an Order directing
the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Crisostomo and the confiscation of his surety bond. The
Order further declared that he had waived his right to present evidence because of his
nonappearance at "yesterday’s and today’s scheduled hearings." In ruling against the Order, we held
thus:

Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, Crisostomo’s non-
appearance during the 22 June 1995 trial was merely a waiver of his right to be present for trial on
such date only and not for the succeeding trial dates…

xxx xxx xxx

Moreover, Crisostomo’s absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing should not have been deemed as a
waiver of his right to present evidence. While constitutional rights may be waived, such waiver must
be clear and must be coupled with an actual intention to relinquish the right. Crisostomo did not
voluntarily waive in person or even through his counsel the right to present evidence. The
Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver due to the agreement of the prosecution, Calingayan, and
Calingayan's counsel.

In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the present case, the court is
called upon to see to it that the accused is personally made aware of the consequences of a waiver
of the right to present evidence. In fact, it is not enough that the accused is simply warned of the
consequences of another failure to attend the succeeding hearings. The court must first explain to
the accused personally in clear terms the exact nature and consequences of a waiver. Crisostomo
was not even forewarned. The Sandiganbayan simply went ahead to deprive Crisostomo of his right
to present evidence without even allowing Crisostomo to explain his absence on the 22 June 1995
hearing.

Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence in a criminal case involving a grave penalty is not
assumed and taken lightly. The presence of the accused and his counsel is indispensable so that
the court could personally conduct a searching inquiry into the waiver x x x.46 (Emphasis supplied)

The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present evidence on 25 August
1993 as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the contrary, it should have considered the
excuse of counsel justified, especially since counsel for another accused – General – had made a
last-minute adoption of testimonial evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates; and since
Dizon was not scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At any rate, the trial court pre-assigned five
hearing dates for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to impose its Order strictly, the most it
could have done was to forfeit one out of the five days set for Dizon’s testimonial evidence. Stripping
the accused of all his pre-assigned trial dates constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to due process.

Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an invalid waiver of the right to present
evidence and be heard does not per se work to vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal case or to
enforce an automatic remand of the case to the trial court.47 In People v. Bodoso, we ruled that where
facts have adequately been represented in a criminal case, and no procedural unfairness or
irregularity has prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver, the
rule is that a guilty verdict may nevertheless be upheld if the judgment is supported beyond
reasonable doubt by the evidence on record.48

We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts on record to resolve the case at bar.
Neither can we see any "procedural unfairness or irregularity" that would substantially prejudice
either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver. In fact, the arguments set forth
by accused Dizon in his Petition corroborate the material facts relevant to decide the matter. Instead,
what he is really contesting in his Petition is the application of the law to the facts by the trial court
and the CA. Petitioner Dizon admits direct participation in the hazing of Lenny Villa by alleging in his
Petition that "all actions of the petitioner were part of the traditional rites," and that "the alleged
extension of the initiation rites was not outside the official activity of the fraternity."49 He even argues
that "Dizon did not request for the extension and he participated only after the activity was
sanctioned."50

For one reason or another, the case has been passed or turned over from one judge or justice to
another – at the trial court, at the CA, and even at the Supreme Court. Remanding the case for the
reception of the evidence of petitioner Dizon would only inflict further injustice on the parties. This
case has been going on for almost two decades. Its resolution is long overdue. Since the key facts
necessary to decide the case have already been determined, we shall proceed to decide it.

G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)

Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano should not have
been dismissed, since they failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of
time. She points out that the accused failed to raise a protest during the dormancy of the criminal
case against them, and that they asserted their right only after the trial court had dismissed the case
against their co-accused Concepcion. Petitioner also emphasizes that the trial court denied the
respective Motions to Dismiss filed by Saruca, Escalona, Ramos, and Adriano, because it found that
"the prosecution could not be faulted for the delay in the movement of this case when the original
records and the evidence it may require were not at its disposal as these were in the Court of
Appeals."51

The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution.52 This right requires that there be a trial free from vexatious, capricious or
oppressive delays.53 The right is deemed violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified
postponements of trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being
tried and for no cause or justifiable motive.54 In determining the right of the accused to speedy trial,
courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the
scheduled hearings of the case.55 The conduct of both the prosecution and the defense must be
weighed.56 Also to be considered are factors such as the length of delay, the assertion or non-
assertion of the right, and the prejudice wrought upon the defendant.57

We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case pursuant to the right of
the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal.58 As a consequence, an appeal or a
reconsideration of the dismissal would amount to a violation of the principle of double jeopardy.59 As
we have previously discussed, however, where the dismissal of the case is capricious, certiorari
lies.60 The rule on double jeopardy is not triggered when a petition challenges the validity of the order
of dismissal instead of the correctness thereof.61 Rather, grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of
jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents double jeopardy from attaching.62

We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CA’s dismissal of the case against accused
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right to speedy trial. The
court held thus:

An examination of the procedural history of this case would reveal that the following factors
contributed to the slow progress of the proceedings in the case below:

xxx xxx xxx

5) The fact that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals and the prosecution’s
failure to comply with the order of the court a quo requiring them to secure certified true copies of the
same.

xxx xxx xxx

While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors that contributed to the delay of
the trial of the petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless hold that their right to speedy trial has been
utterly violated in this case x x x.
 xxx xxx xxx

[T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the records of the case were
elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the prosecution’s failure to comply with the order of the court a
quo requiring it to secure certified true copies of the same. What is glaring from the records is the
fact that as early as September 21, 1995, the court a quo already issued an Order requiring the
prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to secure the complete records of the case from the
Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not comply with the said Order as in fact, the same directive
was repeated by the court a quo in an Order dated December 27, 1995. Still, there was no
compliance on the part of the prosecution. It is not stated when such order was complied with. It
appears, however, that even until August 5, 2002, the said records were still not at the disposal of
the trial court because the lack of it was made the basis of the said court in granting the motion to
dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion x x x.

xxx xxx xxx

It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a period of almost
seven years, there was no action at all on the part of the court a quo. Except for the pleadings filed
by both the prosecution and the petitioners, the latest of which was on January 29, 1996, followed by
petitioner Saruca’s motion to set case for trial on August 17, 1998 which the court did not act upon,
the case remained dormant for a considerable length of time. This prolonged inactivity whatsoever is
precisely the kind of delay that the constitution frowns upon x x x.63(Emphasis supplied)

This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information was filed against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon, Concepcion, and De Vera.64 On
29 November 1993, they were all arraigned.65 Unfortunately, the initial trial of the case did not
commence until 28 March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.66

As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained interval or inactivity of the
Sandiganbayan for close to five years since the arraignment of the accused amounts to an
unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases – a clear violation of the right of the accused to a
speedy disposition of cases.67 Thus, we held:

The delay in this case measures up to the unreasonableness of the delay in the disposition of cases
in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where the Court found the delay of six years by the
Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints to be violative of the constitutionally guaranteed
right to a speedy disposition of cases; similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the Ombudsman, where the
Court held that the delay of almost six years disregarded the Ombudsman's duty to act promptly on
complaints before him; and in Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan, where the Court held that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in not quashing the information which was filed six
years after the initiatory complaint was filed and thereby depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case. So it must be in the instant case, where the reinvestigation by the
Ombudsman has dragged on for a decade already.68 (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89060 that accused
Escalona et al.’s right to speedy trial was violated. Since there is nothing in the records that would
show that the subject of this Petition includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez, Cabangon, and De
Vera, the effects of this ruling shall be limited to accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.

G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)

The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It dictates that when a
person is charged with an offense, and the case is terminated – either by acquittal or conviction or in
any other manner without the consent of the accused – the accused cannot again be charged with
the same or an identical offense.69This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and
conscience.70 It is embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in idem found in the common law of
England and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence.71 It found expression in the Spanish Law,
in the Constitution of the United States, and in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights
of the citizen,72 viz:

Article III – Bill of Rights

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.

Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which implements this particular constitutional right,
provides as follows:73
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by
a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the
charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.

The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment in order to reverse
the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court or through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the
same Rules.74 The requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a) there is a valid
complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a competent court; (c) the defendant pleaded to the
charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him or her was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the defendant’s express consent.75

As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, "[a] verdict of acquittal is
immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts,
will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several
avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument
of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also
serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively
retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State,
following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater
penalty."76 We further stressed that "an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a
direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal."77

This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower court’s acquittal of the
accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following recognized exceptions: (1)
where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount
to a deprivation of due process;78 (2) where there is a finding of mistrial;79 or (3) where there has been
a grave abuse of discretion.80

The third instance refers to this Court’s judicial power under Rule 65 to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government.81 Here, the party asking for the review must show
the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a
patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility;82 or a blatant abuse of authority to a
point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice.83 In such an
event, the accused cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy.84

The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks the reversal of (1) the
acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et al. for the lesser crime of slight
physical injuries, both on the basis of a misappreciation of facts and evidence. According to the
Petition, "the decision of the Court of Appeals is not in accordance with law because private
complainant and petitioner were denied due process of law when the public respondent completely
ignored the a) Position Paper x x x b) the Motion for Partial Reconsideration x x x and c) the
petitioner’s Comment x x x."85 Allegedly, the CA ignored evidence when it adopted the theory of
individual responsibility; set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court; and failed to apply
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.86 The Solicitor General also assails the finding that the physical
blows were inflicted only by Dizon and Villareal, as well as the appreciation of Lenny Villa’s consent
to hazing.87

In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine, reassess, and reweigh the probative value
of the evidence presented by the parties.88 In People v. Maquiling, we held that grave abuse of
discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and
the evidence.89 Mere errors of judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and not by an application for a writ of certiorari.90 Therefore, pursuant
to the rule on double jeopardy, we are constrained to deny the Petition contra Victorino et al. – the
19 acquitted fraternity members.

We, however, modify the assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug – the
four fraternity members convicted of slight physical injuries.

Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy similarly applies when the
state seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against the accused.91 We have also recognized,
however, that certiorari may be used to correct an abusive judgment upon a clear demonstration that
the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to
dispense justice.92 The present case is one of those instances of grave abuse of discretion.

In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug, the CA
reasoned thus:

Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with the exclusion of the fatal wounds inflicted by
the accused Dizon and Villareal, the injuries sustained by the victim as a result of the physical
punishment heaped on him were serious in nature. However, by reason of the death of the victim,
there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or the medical attendance
required. To do so, at this stage would be merely speculative. In a prosecution for this crime where
the category of the offense and the severity of the penalty depend on the period of illness or
incapacity for labor, the length of this period must likewise be proved beyond reasonable doubt in
much the same manner as the same act charged [People v. Codilla, CA-G.R. No. 4079-R, June 26,
1950]. And when proof of the said period is absent, the crime committed should be deemed only as
slight physical injuries [People v. De los Santos, CA, 59 O.G. 4393, citing People v. Penesa, 81 Phil.
398]. As such, this Court is constrained to rule that the injuries inflicted by the appellants, Tecson,
Ama, Almeda and Bantug, Jr., are only slight and not serious, in nature.93 (Emphasis supplied and
citations included)

The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa94 in finding that the four accused should
be held guilty only of slight physical injuries. According to the CA, because of "the death of the
victim, there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or medical
attendance required."95 The reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced. A review of that case would
reveal that the accused therein was guilty merely of slight physical injuries, because the victim’s
injuries neither caused incapacity for labor nor required medical attendance.96Furthermore, he did not
die.97 His injuries were not even serious.98 Since Penesa involved a case in which the victim allegedly
suffered physical injuries and not death, the ruling cited by the CA was patently inapplicable.

On the contrary, the CA’s ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug were liable
merely for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own findings of fact. According to the court,
the four accused "were found to have inflicted more than the usual punishment undertaken during
such initiation rites on the person of Villa."99 It then adopted the NBI medico-legal officer’s findings
that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villa’s death was the "multiple traumatic injuries" he suffered
from the initiation rites.100 Considering that the CA found that the "physical punishment heaped on
[Lenny Villa was] serious in nature,"101 it was patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal
liability to slight physical injuries, which is a light felony.

Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable for the
consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a person is
found to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical injuries
that results in the death of the victim, courts are required to automatically apply the legal framework
governing the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to discretion.

The CA’s application of the legal framework governing physical injuries – punished under Articles
262 to 266 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies – is therefore tantamount to a
whimsical, capricious, and abusive exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. According
to the Revised Penal Code, the mandatory and legally imposable penalty in case the victim dies
should be based on the framework governing the destruction of the life of a person, punished under
Articles 246 to 261 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies, and not under the
aforementioned provisions. We emphasize that these two types of felonies are distinct from and
legally inconsistent with each other, in that the accused cannot be held criminally liable for physical
injuries when actual death occurs.102

Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon – as if only their acts, in and of themselves,
caused the death of Lenny Villa – is contrary to the CA’s own findings. From proof that the death of
the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he suffered,103 the only logical conclusion
is that criminal responsibility should redound to all those who have been proven to have directly
participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The accumulation of bruising on his body
caused him to suffer cardiac arrest. Accordingly, we find that the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug
criminally liable for slight physical injuries. As an allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy,
we therefore give due course to the Petition in G.R. No. 154954.

Resolution on Ultimate Findings

According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the time) punishable as a crime, the
intentional infliction of physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless a felonious act under Articles 263 to
266 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in ruling against the accused, the court a quo found that
pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity members were guilty of
homicide, as it was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the physical injuries they had
intentionally inflicted.104

The CA modified the trial court’s finding of criminal liability. It ruled that there could have been no
conspiracy since the neophytes, including Lenny Villa, had knowingly consented to the conduct of
hazing during their initiation rites. The accused fraternity members, therefore, were liable only for the
consequences of their individual acts. Accordingly, 19 of the accused – Victorino et al. – were
acquitted; 4 of them – Tecson et al. – were found guilty of slight physical injuries; and the remaining
2 – Dizon and Villareal – were found guilty of homicide.

The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case wherein the perpetrator clearly commits
a felony in order to take revenge upon, to gain advantage over, to harm maliciously, or to get even
with, the victim. Rather, the case involves an ex ante situation in which a man – driven by his own
desire to join a society of men – pledged to go through physically and psychologically strenuous
admission rituals, just so he could enter the fraternity. Thus, in order to understand how our criminal
laws apply to such situation absent the Anti-Hazing Law, we deem it necessary to make a brief
exposition on the underlying concepts shaping intentional felonies, as well as on the nature of
physical and psychological initiations widely known as hazing.

Intentional Felony and Conspiracy

Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of thought.105 The classical theory posits that
a human person is essentially a moral creature with an absolute free will to choose between good
and evil.106 It asserts that one should only be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long
as free will appears unimpaired.107 The basic postulate of the classical penal system is that humans
are rational and calculating beings who guide their actions with reference to the principles of
pleasure and pain.108 They refrain from criminal acts if threatened with punishment sufficient to cancel
the hope of possible gain or advantage in committing the crime.109 Here, criminal liability is thus based
on the free will and moral blame of the actor.110 The identity of mens rea – defined as a guilty mind, a
guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent – is the predominant consideration.111 Thus, it is not
enough to do what the law prohibits.112 In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that
the act be committed by means of dolo or "malice."113

The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence, and
intent.114 The first element, freedom, refers to an act done with deliberation and with power to choose
between two things.115 The second element, intelligence, concerns the ability to determine the
morality of human acts, as well as the capacity to distinguish between a licit and an illicit act.116 The
last element, intent, involves an aim or a determination to do a certain act.117

The element of intent – on which this Court shall focus – is described as the state of mind
accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act.118 It refers to the purpose of the mind and the
resolve with which a person proceeds.119 It does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act,
while intent concerns the result of the act.120 While motive is the "moving power" that impels one to
action for a definite result, intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means to produce the
result.121 On the other hand, the term "felonious" means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or
proceeding from an evil heart or purpose.122 With these elements taken together, the requirement of
intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of
mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of
dolus malus – that the act or omission be done "willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent,"
and "with malice aforethought."123 The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea – a crime is
not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent.124 As is required
of the other elements of a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt.125

In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in order for conspiracy to attach. Article 8 of
the Revised Penal Code – which provides that "conspiracy exists when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it" – is to be
interpreted to refer only to felonies committed by means of dolo or malice. The phrase "coming to an
agreement" connotes the existence of a prefaced "intent" to cause injury to another, an element
present only in intentional felonies. In culpable felonies or criminal negligence, the injury inflicted on
another is unintentional, the wrong done being simply the result of an act performed without malice
or criminal design.126 Here, a person performs an initial lawful deed; however, due to negligence,
imprudence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill, the deed results in a wrongful act.127 Verily, a deliberate
intent to do an unlawful act, which is a requisite in conspiracy, is inconsistent with the idea of a
felony committed by means of culpa.128

The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in establishing
the commission of the intentional felony of homicide.129 Being mala in se, the felony of homicide
requires the existence of malice or dolo130 immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of
injuries.131 Intent to kill – or animus interficendi – cannot and should not be inferred, unless there is
proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.132 Furthermore, the victim’s death must not have been
the product of accident, natural cause, or suicide.133 If death resulted from an act executed without
malice or criminal intent – but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence – the act must be
qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.134

Hazing and other forms of initiation rites

The notion of hazing is not a recent development in our society.135 It is said that, throughout history,
hazing in some form or another has been associated with organizations ranging from military groups
to indigenous tribes.136 Some say that elements of hazing can be traced back to the Middle Ages,
during which new students who enrolled in European universities worked as servants for
upperclassmen.137 It is believed that the concept of hazing is rooted in ancient Greece,138 where young
men recruited into the military were tested with pain or challenged to demonstrate the limits of their
loyalty and to prepare the recruits for battle.139 Modern fraternities and sororities espouse some
connection to these values of ancient Greek civilization.140 According to a scholar, this concept lends
historical legitimacy to a "tradition" or "ritual" whereby prospective members are asked to prove their
worthiness and loyalty to the organization in which they seek to attain membership through hazing.141

Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity system, custom requires a student wishing to join an
organization to receive an invitation in order to be a neophyte for a particular chapter.142 The
neophyte period is usually one to two semesters long.143 During the "program," neophytes are
required to interview and to get to know the active members of the chapter; to learn chapter history;
to understand the principles of the organization; to maintain a specified grade point average; to
participate in the organization’s activities; and to show dignity and respect for their fellow neophytes,
the organization, and its active and alumni members.144 Some chapters require the initiation activities
for a recruit to involve hazing acts during the entire neophyte stage.145

Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation rite or ritual that serves as prerequisite for
admission to an organization.146 In hazing, the "recruit," "pledge," "neophyte," "initiate," "applicant" –
or any other term by which the organization may refer to such a person – is generally placed in
embarrassing or humiliating situations, like being forced to do menial, silly, foolish, or other similar
tasks or activities.147 It encompasses different forms of conduct that humiliate, degrade, abuse, or
physically endanger those who desire membership in the organization.148 These acts usually involve
physical or psychological suffering or injury.149

The concept of initiation rites in the country is nothing new. In fact, more than a century ago, our
national hero – Andres Bonifacio – organized a secret society named Kataastaasan
Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (The Highest and Most Venerable
Association of the Sons and Daughters of the Nation).150 The Katipunan, or KKK, started as a small
confraternity believed to be inspired by European Freemasonry, as well as by confraternities or
sodalities approved by the Catholic Church.151 The Katipunan’s ideology was brought home to each
member through the society’s initiation ritual.152 It is said that initiates were brought to a dark room,
lit by a single point of illumination, and were asked a series of questions to determine their
fitness, loyalty, courage, and resolve.153 They were made to go through vigorous trials such as
"pagsuot sa isang lungga" or "[pagtalon] sa balon."154 It would seem that they were also made
to withstand the blow of "pangherong bakal sa pisngi" and to endure a "matalas na
punyal."155 As a final step in the ritual, the neophyte Katipunero was made to sign membership
papers with the his own blood.156

It is believed that the Greek fraternity system was transported by the Americans to the Philippines in
the late 19th century. As can be seen in the following instances, the manner of hazing in the United
States was jarringly similar to that inflicted by the Aquila Fraternity on Lenny Villa.

Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point Academy forced the fourth classmen to do exhausting
physical exercises that sometimes resulted in permanent physical damage; to eat or drink
unpalatable foods; and in various ways to humiliate themselves.157 In 1901, General Douglas
MacArthur got involved in a congressional investigation of hazing at the academy during his second
year at West Point.158

In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, decided in 1985, the candidate-victim was injured during the
shriner’s hazing event, which was part of the initiation ceremonies for Hejaz membership.159 The ritual
involved what was known as the "mattress-rotating barrel trick."160 It required each candidate to slide
down an eight to nine-foot-high metal board onto connected mattresses leading to a barrel, over
which the candidate was required to climb.161Members of Hejaz would stand on each side of the
mattresses and barrel and fun-paddle candidates en route to the barrel.162

In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine paratroopers in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, were
seen performing a ceremony in which they pinned paratrooper jump wings directly onto the neophyte
paratroopers’ chests.163 The victims were shown writhing and crying out in pain as others pounded
the spiked medals through the shirts and into the chests of the victims.164
In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast Missouri State University chapter of Kappa Alpha
Psi invited male students to enter into a pledgeship program.165 The fraternity members subjected the
pledges to repeated physical abuse including repeated, open-hand strikes at the nape, the chest,
and the back; caning of the bare soles of the feet and buttocks; blows to the back with the use of a
heavy book and a cookie sheet while the pledges were on their hands and knees; various kicks and
punches to the body; and "body slamming," an activity in which active members of the fraternity lifted
pledges up in the air and dropped them to the ground.166 The fraternity members then put the pledges
through a seven-station circle of physical abuse.167

In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the pledge-victim went through hazing by fraternity members of
the Kappa Alpha Order at the Auburn University in Alabama.168 The hazing included the following: (1)
having to dig a ditch and jump into it after it had been filled with water, urine, feces, dinner leftovers,
and vomit; (2) receiving paddlings on the buttocks; (3) being pushed and kicked, often onto walls or
into pits and trash cans; (4) eating foods like peppers, hot sauce, butter, and "yerks" (a mixture of hot
sauce, mayonnaise, butter, beans, and other items); (5) doing chores for the fraternity and its
members, such as cleaning the fraternity house and yard, being designated as driver, and running
errands; (6) appearing regularly at 2 a.m. "meetings," during which the pledges would be hazed for a
couple of hours; and (7) "running the gauntlet," during which the pledges were pushed, kicked, and
hit as they ran down a hallway and descended down a flight of stairs.169

In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided in 1999, the victim – Sylvester Lloyd – was accepted
to pledge at the Cornell University chapter of the Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity.170 He participated in
initiation activities, which included various forms of physical beatings and torture, psychological
coercion and embarrassment.171

In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, decided in 2002, the initiate-victim suffered injuries from
hazing activities during the fraternity’s initiation rites.172 Kenner and the other initiates went through
psychological and physical hazing, including being paddled on the buttocks for more than 200
times.173

In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones – a university student in Florida – sought initiation into the campus
chapter of the Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity during the 2005-06 academic year.174 The pledge’s efforts
to join the fraternity culminated in a series of initiation rituals conducted in four nights. Jones,
together with other candidates, was blindfolded, verbally harassed, and caned on his face and
buttocks.175 In these rituals described as "preliminaries," which lasted for two evenings, he received
approximately 60 canings on his buttocks.176 During the last two days of the hazing, the rituals
intensified.177 The pledges sustained roughly 210 cane strikes during the four-night initiation.178 Jones
and several other candidates passed out.179

The purported raison d’être behind hazing practices is the proverbial "birth by fire," through which the
pledge who has successfully withstood the hazing proves his or her worth.180 Some organizations
even believe that hazing is the path to enlightenment. It is said that this process enables the
organization to establish unity among the pledges and, hence, reinforces and ensures the future of
the organization.181 Alleged benefits of joining include leadership opportunities; improved academic
performance; higher self-esteem; professional networking opportunities; and the esprit d’corp
associated with close, almost filial, friendship and common cause.182

Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.

The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in 1874 in response to hazing in the military.183 The
hazing of recruits and plebes in the armed services was so prevalent that Congress prohibited all
forms of military hazing, harmful or not.184 It was not until 1901 that Illinois passed the first state anti-
hazing law, criminalizing conduct "whereby any one sustains an injury to his [or her] person
therefrom."185

However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, due in large part to the efforts of the Committee to
Halt Useless College Killings and other similar organizations, that states increasingly began to enact
legislation prohibiting and/or criminalizing hazing.186 As of 2008, all but six states had enacted criminal
or civil statutes proscribing hazing.187 Most anti-hazing laws in the U.S. treat hazing as a
misdemeanor and carry relatively light consequences for even the most severe situations.188 Only a
few states with anti-hazing laws consider hazing as a felony in case death or great bodily harm
occurs.189

Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, except hazing that results in death or
great bodily harm, which is a Class 4 felony.190 In a Class 4 felony, a sentence of imprisonment shall
be for a term of not less than one year and not more than three years.191 Indiana criminal law provides
that a person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally performs hazing that results in serious
bodily injury to a person commits criminal recklessness, a Class D felony.192
The offense becomes a Class C felony if committed by means of a deadly weapon.193 As an element
of a Class C felony – criminal recklessness – resulting in serious bodily injury, death falls under the
category of "serious bodily injury."194 A person who commits a Class C felony is imprisoned for a fixed
term of between two (2) and eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence being four (4)
years.195 Pursuant to Missouri law, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, unless the act creates a
substantial risk to the life of the student or prospective member, in which case it becomes a Class C
felony.196 A Class C felony provides for an imprisonment term not to exceed seven years.197

In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another is a state jail felony.198 An individual adjudged guilty
of a state jail felony is punished by confinement in a state jail for any term of not more than two years
or not less than 180 days.199 Under Utah law, if hazing results in serious bodily injury, the hazer is
guilty of a third-degree felony.200 A person who has been convicted of a third-degree felony may be
sentenced to imprisonment for a term not to exceed five years.201 West Virginia law provides that if
the act of hazing would otherwise be deemed a felony, the hazer may be found guilty thereof and
subject to penalties provided therefor.202 In Wisconsin, a person is guilty of a Class G felony if hazing
results in the death of another.203 A Class G felony carries a fine not to exceed $25,000 or
imprisonment not to exceed 10 years, or both.204

In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing were left with limited remedies, as there was no hazing
statute.205 This situation was exemplified in Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity, wherein Barry
Ballou’s family resorted to a civil action for wrongful death, since there was no anti-hazing statute in
South Carolina until 1994.206

The existence of animus interficendi or intent to kill not proven beyond reasonable doubt

The presence of an ex ante situation – in this case, fraternity initiation rites – does not automatically
amount to the absence of malicious intent or dolus malus. If it is proven beyond reasonable doubt
that the perpetrators were equipped with a guilty mind – whether or not there is a contextual
background or factual premise – they are still criminally liable for intentional felony.

The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement that – with the exception of
Villareal and Dizon – accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug did not have the animus
interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa or the other neophytes. We shall no longer disturb this finding.

As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the trial court and found that the two
accused had the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa, not merely to inflict physical injuries
on him. It justified its finding of homicide against Dizon by holding that he had apparently been
motivated by ill will while beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his father’s parking space had
been stolen by the victim’s father.207 As to Villareal, the court said that the accused suspected the
family of Bienvenido Marquez, one of the neophytes, to have had a hand in the death of Villareal’s
brother.208 The CA then ruled as follows:

The two had their own axes to grind against Villa and Marquez. It was very clear that they acted with
evil and criminal intent. The evidence on this matter is unrebutted and so for the death of Villa,
appellants Dizon and Villarealmust and should face the consequence of their acts, that is, to be held
liable for the crime of homicide.209 (Emphasis supplied)

We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.

The appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of Bienvenido Marquez to determine the
existence of animus interficendi. For a full appreciation of the context in which the supposed
utterances were made, the Court deems it necessary to reproduce the relevant portions of witness
Marquez’s testimony:

Witness We were brought up into [Michael Musngi’s] room and we were briefed as to what to expect
during the next three days and we were told the members of the fraternity and their batch and we
were also told about the fraternity song, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Witness We were escorted out of [Michael Musngi’s] house and we were made to ride a van and we
were brought to another place in Kalookan City which I later found to be the place of Mariano
Almeda, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Witness Upon arrival, we were instructed to bow our head down and to link our arms and then the
driver of the van and other members of the Aquilans who were inside left us inside the van, sir.
 xxx xxx xxx

Witness We heard voices shouted outside the van to the effect, "Villa akin ka," "Asuncion Patay ka"
and the people outside pound the van, rock the van, sir.

Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall in what tone of voice and how strong a voice these remarks
uttered upon your arrival?

Witness Some were almost shouting, you could feel the sense of excitement in their voices, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Atty. Tadiar During all these times that the van was being rocked through and through, what were
the voices or utterances that you heard?

Witness "Villa akin ka," "Asuncion patay ka," "Recinto patay ka sa amin," etc., sir.

Atty. Tadiar And those utterances and threats, how long did they continue during the rocking of the
van which lasted for 5 minutes?

xxx xxx xxx

Witness Even after they rocked the van, we still kept on hearing voices, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Atty. Tadiar During the time that this rounds [of physical beating] were being inflicted, was there any
utterances by anybody?

Witness Yes sir. Some were piercing, some were discouraging, and some were encouraging others
who were pounding and beating us, it was just like a fiesta atmosphere, actually some of them
enjoyed looking us being pounded, sir.

Atty. Tadiar Do you recall what were those voices that you heard?

Witness One particular utterance always said was, they asked us whether "matigas pa yan, kayang-
kaya pa niyan."

Atty. Tadiar Do you know who in particular uttered those particular words that you quote?

Witness I cannot particularly point to because there were utterances simultaneously, I could not
really pin point who uttered those words, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Atty. Tadiar Were there any utterances that you heard during the conduct of this Bicol Express?

Witness Yes, sir I heard utterances.

Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall to this Honorable Court what were the utterances that you
remember?

Witness For example, one person particularly Boyet Dizon stepped on my thigh, he would say that
and I quote "ito, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko," so that would in turn sort of
justifying him in inflicting more serious pain on me. So instead of just walking, he would jump on my
thighs and then after on was Lenny Villa. He was saying to the effect that "this guy, his father stole
the parking space of my father," sir. So, that’s why he inflicted more pain on Villa and that went on,
sir.

Atty. Tadiar And you were referring to which particular accused?

Witness Boyet Dizon, sir.

Atty. Tadiar When Boyet Dizon at that particular time was accusing you of having your family have
his brother killed, what was your response?
Witness Of course, I knew sir that it was not true and that he was just making it up sir. So he said
that I knew nothing of that incident. However, he just in fact after the Bicol Express, he kept on
uttering those words/statements so that it would in turn justify him and to give me harder blows, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Atty. Tadiar You mentioned about Dizon in particular mentioning that Lenny Villa’s father stole the
parking space allotted for his father, do you recall who were within hearing distance when that
utterance was made?

Witness Yes, sir. All of the neophytes heard that utterance, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Witness There were different times made this accusation so there were different people who heard
from time to time, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Atty. Tadiar Can you tell the Honorable Court when was the next accusation against Lenny Villa’s
father was made?

Witness When we were line up against the wall, Boyet Dizon came near to us and when Lenny
Villa’s turn, I heard him uttered those statements, sir.

Atty. Tadiar What happened after he made this accusation to Lenny Villa’s father?

Witness He continued to inflict blows on Lenny Villa.

Atty. Tadiar How were those blows inflicted?

Witness There were slaps and he knelt on Lenny Villa’s thighs and sometime he stand up and he
kicked his thighs and sometimes jumped at it, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Atty. Tadiar We would go on to the second day but not right now. You mentioned also that
accusations made by Dizon "you or your family had his brother killed," can you inform this Honorable
Court what exactly were the accusations that were charged against you while inflicting blows upon
you in particular?

Witness While he was inflicting blows upon me, he told me in particular if I knew that his family who
had his brother killed, and he said that his brother was an NPA, sir so I knew that it was just a story
that he made up and I said that I knew nothing about it and he continued inflicting blows on me, sir.
And another incident was when a talk was being given, Dizon was on another part of the pelota court
and I was sort of looking and we saw that he was drinking beer, and he said and I quote: "Marquez,
Marquez, ano ang tinitingin-tingin mo diyan, ikaw yung pamilya mo ang nagpapatay sa aking
kapatid, yari ka sa akin," sir.

Atty. Tadiar What else?

Witness That’s all, sir.

Atty. Tadiar And on that first night of February 8, 1991, did ever a doctor or a physician came around
as promised to you earlier?

Witness No, sir.210 (Emphasis supplied)

On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido Marquez testified thus:

Judge Purisima When you testified on direct examination Mr. Marquez, have you stated that there
was a briefing that was conducted immediately before your initiation as regards to what to expect
during the initiation, did I hear you right?

Witness Yes, sir.

Judge Purisima Who did the briefing?

Witness Mr. Michael Musngi, sir and Nelson Victorino.

Judge Purisima Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court what they told you to expect during the
initiation?

Witness They told us at the time we would be brought to a particular place, we would be mocked at,
sir.

Judge Purisima So, you expected to be mocked at, ridiculed, humiliated etc., and the likes?

Witness Yes, sir.

Judge Purisima You were also told beforehand that there would be physical contact?

Witness Yes, sir at the briefing.

xxx xxx xxx

Witness Yes, sir, because they informed that we could immediately go back to school. All the bruises
would be limited to our arms and legs, sir. So, if we wear the regular school uniforms like long
sleeves, it would be covered actually so we have no thinking that our face would be slapped, sir.

Judge Purisima So, you mean to say that beforehand that you would have bruises on your body but
that will be covered?

Witness Yes, sir.

JudgePurisima So, what kind of physical contact or implements that you expect that would create
bruises to your body?

Witness At that point I am already sure that there would be hitting by a paddling or paddle, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Judge Purisima Now, will you admit Mr. Marquez that much of the initiation procedures is
psychological in nature?

Witness Combination, sir.211 (Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

Atty. Jimenez The initiation that was conducted did not consist only of physical initiation, meaning
body contact, is that correct?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez Part of the initiation was the so-called psychological initiation, correct?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez And this consisted of making you believe of things calculated to terrify you, scare you,
correct?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez In other words, the initiating masters made belief situation intended to, I repeat, terrify
you, frighten you, scare you into perhaps quitting the initiation, is this correct?

Witness Sometimes sir, yes.

Atty. Jimenez You said on direct that while Mr. Dizon was initiating you, he said or he was supposed
to have said according to you that your family were responsible for the killing of his brother who was
an NPA, do you remember saying that?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez You also said in connection with that statement said to you by Dizon that you did not
believe him because that is not true, correct?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez In other words, he was only psychologizing you perhaps, the purpose as I have
mentioned before, terrifying you, scaring you or frightening you into quitting the initiation, this is
correct?

Witness No, sir, perhaps it is one but the main reason, I think, why he was saying those things was
because he wanted to inflict injury.

Atty. Jimenez He did not tell that to you. That is your only perception, correct?

Witness No, sir, because at one point, while he was telling this to Villareal, he was hitting me.

Atty. Jimenez But did you not say earlier that you [were] subjected to the same forms of initiation by
all the initiating masters? You said that earlier, right?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez Are you saying also that the others who jumped on you or kicked you said something
similar as was told to you by Mr. Dizon?

Witness No, sir.

Atty. Jimenez But the fact remains that in the Bicol Express for instance, the masters would run on
your thighs, right?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez This was the regular procedure that was followed by the initiating masters not only on
you but also on the other neophytes?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez In other words, it is fair to say that whatever forms of initiation was administered by
one master, was also administered by one master on a neophyte, was also administered by another
master on the other neophyte, this is correct?

Witness Yes, sir.212 (Emphasis supplied)

According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives attributed by the CA to Dizon and Villareal
were "baseless,"213 since the statements of the accused were "just part of the psychological initiation
calculated to instill fear on the part of the neophytes"; that "[t]here is no element of truth in it as
testified by Bienvenido Marquez"; and that the "harsh words uttered by Petitioner and Villareal are
part of ‘tradition’ concurred and accepted by all the fraternity members during their initiation rites."214

We agree with the Solicitor General.

The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez reveals a glaring mistake of substantial proportion on
the part of the CA – it mistook the utterances of Dizon for those of Villareal. Such inaccuracy cannot
be tolerated, especially because it was the CA’s primary basis for finding that Villarreal had the intent
to kill Lenny Villa, thereby making Villareal guilty of the intentional felony of homicide. To repeat,
according to Bienvenido Marquez’s testimony, as reproduced above, it was Dizon who uttered both
"accusations" against Villa and Marquez; Villareal had no participation whatsoever in the specific
threats referred to by the CA. It was "Boyet Dizon [who] stepped on [Marquez’s] thigh"; and who told
witness Marquez, "[I]to, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko." It was also Dizon who
jumped on Villa’s thighs while saying, "[T]his guy, his father stole the parking space of my father."
With the testimony clarified, we find that the CA had no basis for concluding the existence of intent to
kill based solely thereon.

As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon, we refer to the entire factual milieu
and contextual premise of the incident to fully appreciate and understand the testimony of witness
Marquez. At the outset, the neophytes were briefed that they would be subjected to psychological
pressure in order to scare them. They knew that they would be mocked, ridiculed, and intimidated.
They heard fraternity members shout, "Patay ka, Recinto," "Yari ka, Recinto," "Villa, akin ka,"
"Asuncion, gulpi ka," "Putang ina mo, Asuncion," "Putang ina nyo, patay kayo sa amin," or some
other words to that effect.215 While beating the neophytes, Dizon accused Marquez of the death of the
former’s purported NPA brother, and then blamed Lenny Villa’s father for stealing the parking space
of Dizon’s father. According to the Solicitor General, these statements, including those of the
accused Dizon, were all part of the psychological initiation employed by the Aquila Fraternity.216

Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizon’s way of inflicting psychological pressure was through
hurling make-believe accusations at the initiates. He concocted the fictitious stories, so that he could
"justify" giving the neophytes harder blows, all in the context of fraternity initiation and role playing.
Even one of the neophytes admitted that the accusations were untrue and made-up.

The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct of hazing. In fact, during the
Senate deliberations on the then proposed Anti-Hazing Law, former Senator Lina spoke as follows:

Senator Lina. -- so as to capture the intent that we conveyed during the period of interpellations on
why we included the phrase "or psychological pain and suffering."

xxx xxx xxx

So that if no direct physical harm is inflicted upon the neophyte or the recruit but the recruit or
neophyte is made to undergo certain acts which I already described yesterday, like playing the
Russian roulette extensively to test the readiness and the willingness of the neophyte or recruit to
continue his desire to be a member of the fraternity, sorority or similar organization or playing and
putting a noose on the neck of the neophyte or recruit, making the recruit or neophyte stand on the
ledge of the fourth floor of the building facing outside, asking him to jump outside after making him
turn around several times but the reality is that he will be made to jump towards the inside portion of
the building – these are the mental or psychological tests that are resorted to by these organizations,
sororities or fraternities. The doctors who appeared during the public hearing testified that such acts
can result in some mental aberration, that they can even lead to psychosis, neurosis or insanity. This
is what we want to prevent.217 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizon’s behavior must not be automatically viewed as
evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny Villa. Rather, it must be taken within the context
of the fraternity’s psychological initiation. This Court points out that it was not even established
whether the fathers of Dizon and Villa really had any familiarity with each other as would lend
credence to the veracity of Dizon’s threats. The testimony of Lenny’s co-neophyte, Marquez, only
confirmed this view. According to Marquez, he "knew it was not true and that [Dizon] was just
making it up…."218 Even the trial court did not give weight to the utterances of Dizon as constituting
intent to kill: "[T]he cumulative acts of all the accused were not directed toward killing Villa, but
merely to inflict physical harm as part of the fraternity initiation rites x x x."219 The Solicitor General
shares the same view.

Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of homicide under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the existence of intent to kill. Animus interficendi cannot and
should not be inferred unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.220 Instead, we
adopt and reinstate the finding of the trial court in part, insofar as it ruled that none of the fraternity
members had the specific intent to kill Lenny Villa.221

The existence of animus iniuriandi or malicious intent to injure not proven beyond reasonable doubt

The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny
Villa. Echoing the Decision of the trial court, the Solicitor General then posits that since all of the
accused fraternity members conspired to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa and death ensued, all
of them should be liable for the crime of homicide pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal
Code.

In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal
Code,222 the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala
in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of
the wrongdoer – iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused
cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical injuries under the Revised
Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the
physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain
bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt
act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in
an intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his
intentions are.223

Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances224 that the mere infliction of physical injuries, absent
malicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony. In Bagajo v.
People,225 the accused teacher, using a bamboo stick, whipped one of her students behind her legs
and thighs as a form of discipline. The student suffered lesions and bruises from the corporal
punishment. In reversing the trial court’s finding of criminal liability for slight physical injuries, this
Court stated thus: "Independently of any civil or administrative responsibility … [w]e are persuaded
that she did not do what she had done with criminal intent … the means she actually used was
moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent intent." Considering the
applicable laws, we then ruled that "as a matter of law, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for
her act of whipping her pupil." In People v. Carmen,226 the accused members of the religious group
known as the Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima – under the guise of a "ritual or treatment" –
plunged the head of the victim into a barrel of water, banged his head against a bench, pounded his
chest with fists, and stabbed him on the side with a kitchen knife, in order to cure him of "nervous
breakdown" by expelling through those means the bad spirits possessing him. The collective acts of
the group caused the death of the victim. Since malicious intent was not proven, we reversed the
trial court’s finding of liability for murder under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code and instead ruled
that the accused should be held criminally liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under
Article 365 thereof.

Indeed, the threshold question is whether the accused’s initial acts of inflicting physical pain on the
neophytes were attended by animus iniuriandi amounting to a felonious act punishable under the
Revised Penal Code, thereby making it subject to Article 4(1) thereof. In People v. Regato, we ruled
that malicious intent must be judged by the action, conduct, and external acts of the accused.227 What
persons do is the best index of their intention.228 We have also ruled that the method employed, the
kind of weapon used, and the parts of the body on which the injury was inflicted may be
determinative of the intent of the perpetrator.229 The Court shall thus examine the whole contextual
background surrounding the death of Lenny Villa.

Lenny died during Aquila’s fraternity initiation rites. The night before the commencement of the rites,
they were briefed on what to expect. They were told that there would be physical beatings, that the
whole event would last for three days, and that they could quit anytime. On their first night, they were
subjected to "traditional" initiation rites, including the "Indian Run," "Bicol Express," "Rounds," and
the "Auxies’ Privilege Round." The beatings were predominantly directed at the neophytes’ arms and
legs.

In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to present comic plays and to play
rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s principles.
Late in the afternoon, they were once again subjected to "traditional" initiation rituals. When the
rituals were officially reopened on the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, the neophytes were
subjected to another "traditional" ritual – paddling by the fraternity.

During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned to the neophytes. The auxiliaries protected
the neophytes by functioning as human barriers and shielding them from those who were designated
to inflict physical and psychological pain on the initiates.230 It was their regular duty to stop foul or
excessive physical blows; to help the neophytes to "pump" their legs in order that their blood would
circulate; to facilitate a rest interval after every physical activity or "round"; to serve food and water;
to tell jokes; to coach the initiates; and to give them whatever they needed.

These rituals were performed with Lenny’s consent.231 A few days before the "rites," he asked both
his parents for permission to join the Aquila Fraternity.232 His father knew that Lenny would go through
an initiation process and would be gone for three days.233 The CA found as follows:

It is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly and voluntarily consented to undergo physical
initiation and hazing. As can be gleaned from the narration of facts, they voluntarily agreed to join
the initiation rites to become members of the Aquila Legis Fraternity. Prior to the initiation, they were
given briefings on what to expect. It is of common knowledge that before admission in a fraternity,
the neophytes will undergo a rite of passage. Thus, they were made aware that traditional methods
such as mocking, psychological tests and physical punishment would take place. They knew that the
initiation would involve beatings and other forms of hazing. They were also told of their right and
opportunity to quit at any time they wanted to. In fact, prosecution witness Navera testified that
accused Tecson told him that "after a week, you can already play basketball." Prosecution witness
Marquez for his part, admitted that he knew that the initiates would be hit "in the arms and legs," that
a wooden paddle would be used to hit them and that he expected bruises on his arms and legs….
Indeed, there can be no fraternity initiation without consenting neophytes.234 (Emphasis supplied)

Even after going through Aquila’s grueling traditional rituals during the first day, Lenny continued his
participation and finished the second day of initiation.

Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof showing clear malicious
intent, we are constrained to rule that the specific animus iniuriandi was not present in this case.
Even if the specific acts of punching, kicking, paddling, and other modes of inflicting physical pain
were done voluntarily, freely, and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the elements of freedom and
intelligence in the felony of physical injuries, the fundamental ingredient of criminal intent was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, all that was proven was that the acts were done
pursuant to tradition. Although the additional "rounds" on the second night were held upon the
insistence of Villareal and Dizon, the initiations were officially reopened with the consent of the head
of the initiation rites; and the accused fraternity members still participated in the rituals, including the
paddling, which were performed pursuant to tradition. Other than the paddle, no other "weapon" was
used to inflict injuries on Lenny. The targeted body parts were predominantly the legs and the arms.
The designation of roles, including the role of auxiliaries, which were assigned for the specific
purpose of lending assistance to and taking care of the neophytes during the initiation rites, further
belied the presence of malicious intent. All those who wished to join the fraternity went through the
same process of "traditional" initiation; there is no proof that Lenny Villa was specifically targeted or
given a different treatment. We stress that Congress itself recognized that hazing is uniquely
different from common crimes.235 The totality of the circumstances must therefore be taken into
consideration.

The underlying context and motive in which the infliction of physical injuries was rooted may also be
determined by Lenny’s continued participation in the initiation and consent to the method used even
after the first day. The following discussion of the framers of the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law is
enlightening:

Senator Guingona. Most of these acts, if not all, are already punished under the Revised Penal
Code.

Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Guingona. If hazing is done at present and it results in death, the charge would be murder
or homicide.

Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Guingona. If it does not result in death, it may be frustrated homicide or serious physical
injuries.

Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Guingona. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse does so it can be penalized under
rape or acts of lasciviousness.

Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Guingona. So, what is the rationale for making a new offense under this definition of the
crime of hazing?

Senator Lina. To discourage persons or group of persons either composing a sorority, fraternity or
any association from making this requirement of initiation that has already resulted in these specific
acts or results, Mr. President.

That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the land that no group or
association can require the act of physical initiation before a person can become a member without
being held criminally liable.

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Guingona. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that imposition? Because the
distinguished Sponsor has said that he is not punishing a mere organization, he is not seeking the
punishment of an initiation into a club or organization, he is seeking the punishment of certain acts
that resulted in death, et cetera as a result of hazing which are already covered crimes.

The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage hazing, abusive hazing, but it
may be a legitimate defense for invoking two or more charges or offenses, because these very same
acts are already punishable under the Revised Penal Code.

That is my difficulty, Mr. President.

Senator Lina. x x x

Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling difference: When a person or group of
persons resort to hazing as a requirement for gaining entry into an organization, the intent to commit
a wrong is not visible or is not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in these specific crimes, Mr.
President, let us say there is death or there is homicide, mutilation, if one files a case, then the
intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if the crime of hazing is the basis, what is
important is the result from the act of hazing.

To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter the sororities or fraternities;
that they should really shun this activity called "hazing." Because, initially, these fraternities or
sororities do not even consider having a neophyte killed or maimed or that acts of lasciviousness are
even committed initially, Mr. President.

So, what we want to discourage is the so-called initial innocent act. That is why there is need to
institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang sorority ay magre-recruit.
Wala talaga silang intensiyong makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay pa iyong kaso. Pero
dito sa anim o pito na namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin talaga iyong
neophyte. So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng murder kung namatay
na, ay after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin sa mga kabataan na: "Huwag ninyong
gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at kung mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa inyo."

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Guingona. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the distinguished Sponsor. But I am
again disturbed by his statement that the prosecution does not have to prove the intent that resulted
in the death, that resulted in the serious physical injuries, that resulted in the acts of lasciviousness
or deranged mind. We do not have to prove the willful intent of the accused in proving or establishing
the crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a novel situation where we create the special crime without
having to go into the intent, which is one of the basic elements of any crime.

If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to initiate, then there is no offense.
And even the distinguished Sponsor admits that the organization, the intent to initiate, the intent to
have a new society or a new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What are punishable are the acts
that lead to the result. But if these results are not going to be proven by intent, but just because there
was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb the basic concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr.
President.

Senator Lina. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being criminalized because in the context
of what is happening in the sororities and fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no one will admit
that their intention is to maim or to kill. So, we are already criminalizing the fact of inflicting physical
pain. Mr. President, it is a criminal act and we want it stopped, deterred, discouraged.

If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the masters intended to kill or the
masters intended to maim. What is important is the result of the act of hazing. Otherwise, the
masters or those who inflict the physical pain can easily escape responsibility and say, "We did not
have the intention to kill. This is part of our initiation rites. This is normal. We do not have any
intention to kill or maim."

This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged therefore with the ordinary
crime of homicide, mutilation, et cetera, where the prosecution will have a difficulty proving the
elements if they are separate offenses.

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Guingona. Mr. President, assuming there was a group that initiated and a person died. The
charge is murder. My question is: Under this bill if it becomes a law, would the prosecution have to
prove conspiracy or not anymore?

Senator Lina. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing x x x

Senator Guingona. The persons are present. First, would the prosecution have to prove conspiracy?
Second, would the prosecution have to prove intent to kill or not?

Senator Lina. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if that occurs, there is no need to
prove intent to kill.

Senator Guingona. But the charge is murder.

Senator Lina. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It should be hazing, Mr.
President. 236 (Emphasis supplied)
During a discussion between Senator Biazon and Senator Lina on the issue of whether to include
sodomy as a punishable act under the Anti-Hazing Law, Senator Lina further clarified thus:

Senator Biazon. Mr. President, this Representation has no objection to the inclusion of sodomy as
one of the conditions resulting from hazing as necessary to be punished. However, the act of
sodomy can be committed by two persons with or without consent.

To make it clearer, what is being punished here is the commission of sodomy forced into another
individual by another individual. I move, Mr. President, that sodomy be modified by the phrase
"without consent" for purposes of this section.

Senator Lina. I am afraid, Mr. President, that if we qualify sodomy with the concept that it is only
going to aggravate the crime of hazing if it is done without consent will change a lot of concepts
here. Because the results from hazing aggravate the offense with or without consent. In fact, when a
person joins a fraternity, sorority, or any association for that matter, it can be with or without the
consent of the intended victim. The fact that a person joins a sorority or fraternity with his consent
does not negate the crime of hazing.

This is a proposed law intended to protect the citizens from the malpractices that attend initiation
which may have been announced with or without physical infliction of pain or injury, Mr. President.
Regardless of whether there is announcement that there will be physical hazing or whether there is
none, and therefore, the neophyte is duped into joining a fraternity is of no moment. What is
important is that there is an infliction of physical pain.

The bottom line of this law is that a citizen even has to be protected from himself if he joins a
fraternity, so that at a certain point in time, the State, the individual, or the parents of the victim can
run after the perpetrators of the crime, regardless of whether or not there was consent on the part of
the victim.

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Lina. Mr. President, I understand the position taken by the distinguished Gentleman from
Cavite and Metro Manila. It is correct that society sometimes adopts new mores, traditions, and
practices.

In this bill, we are not going to encroach into the private proclivities of some individuals when they do
their acts in private as we do not take a peek into the private rooms of couples. They can do their
thing if they want to make love in ways that are not considered acceptable by the mainstream of
society. That is not something that the State should prohibit.

But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such that the act may even be
entered into with consent. It is not only sodomy. The infliction of pain may be done with the consent
of the neophyte. If the law is passed, that does not make the act of hazing not punishable because
the neophyte accepted the infliction of pain upon himself.

If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator said, "Well, he allowed it upon
himself. He consented to it." So, if we allow that reasoning that sodomy was done with the consent
of the victim, then we would not have passed any law at all. There will be no significance if we pass
this bill, because it will always be a defense that the victim allowed the infliction of pain or suffering.
He accepted it as part of the initiation rites.

But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to prohibit. That the defense of
consent will not apply because the very act of inflicting physical pain or psychological suffering is, by
itself, a punishable act. The result of the act of hazing, like death or physical injuries merely
aggravates the act with higher penalties. But the defense of consent is not going to nullify the
criminal nature of the act.

So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the offense if it is committed
without consent of the victim, then the whole foundation of this proposed law will collapse.

Senator Biazon. Thank you, Mr. President.

Senator Lina. Thank you very much.

The President. Is there any objection to the committee amendment? (Silence.) The Chair hears
none; the same is approved.237

(Emphasis supplied)
Realizing the implication of removing the state’s burden to prove intent, Senator Lina, the principal
author of the Senate Bill, said:

I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the idea of intent or whether
there it is mala in seor mala prohibita. There can be a radical amendment if that is the point that he
wants to go to.

If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a special law on hazing. We will not
include this anymore under the Revised Penal Code. That is a possibility. I will not foreclose that
suggestion, Mr. President.238(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core principle of mala
in se adhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did not simply enact an amendment
thereto. Instead, it created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita.
This dilemma faced by Congress is further proof of how the nature of hazing – unique as against
typical crimes – cast a cloud of doubt on whether society considered the act as an inherently wrong
conduct or mala in se at the time. It is safe to presume that Lenny’s parents would not have
consented239 to his participation in Aquila Fraternity’s initiation rites if the practice of hazing were
considered by them as mala in se.

Furthermore, in Vedaña v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice (now retired Chief
Justice) Hilario Davide that "in our nation’s very recent history, the people have spoken, through
Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of … hazing, [an] act[] previously considered harmless by
custom, as criminal."240 Although it may be regarded as a simple obiter dictum, the statement
nonetheless shows recognition that hazing – or the conduct of initiation rites through physical and/or
psychological suffering – has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law,
there was to some extent a lacuna in the law; hazing was not clearly considered an intentional
felony. And when there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of
the accused. In dubio pro reo.

For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to rule against the trial
court’s finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no proof
beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries or animus
iniuriandi as required in mala in se cases, considering the contextual background of his death, the
unique nature of hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.

The accused fraternity members guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide

The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity
members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies
that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the
wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.

Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which an
immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of
precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it.241 In this case, the danger is visible
and consciously appreciated by the actor.242In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises
an act done without grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a
mere lack of foresight or skill.243 Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not
openly visible. 244

The test245 for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a
prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the
person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law
imposes on the doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous results of the act. Failure to
do so constitutes negligence.246

As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the degree of
precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved.247 If, on account of a
certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the individual who
chooses to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, in order to prevent or
avoid damage or injury.248 In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required.249 It is thus
possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an
individual, "from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort."250 The duty of the person to
employ more or less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.251

There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa.

According to the NBI medico-legal officer, Lenny died of cardiac failure secondary to multiple
traumatic injuries.252The officer explained that cardiac failure refers to the failure of the heart to work
as a pump and as part of the circulatory system due to the lack of blood.253 In the present case, the
victim’s heart could no longer work as a pumping organ, because it was deprived of its requisite
blood and oxygen.254 The deprivation was due to the "channeling" of the blood supply from the entire
circulatory system – including the heart, arteries, veins, venules, and capillaries – to the thigh, leg,
and arm areas of Lenny, thus causing the formation of multiple hematomas or blood clots.255 The
multiple hematomas were wide, thick, and deep,256 indicating that these could have resulted mainly
from injuries sustained by the victim from fist blows, knee blows, paddles, or the like.257 Repeated
blows to those areas caused the blood to gradually ooze out of the capillaries until the circulating
blood became so markedly diminished as to produce death. 258 The officer also found that the brain,
liver, kidney, pancreas, intestines, and all other organs seen in the abdominals, as well as the
thoracic organ in the lungs, were pale due to the lack of blood, which was redirected to the thighs
and forearms.259 It was concluded that there was nothing in the heart that would indicate that the
victim suffered from a previous cardiac arrest or disease.260

The multiple hematomas or bruises found in Lenny Villa’s arms and thighs, resulting from repeated
blows to those areas, caused the loss of blood from his vital organs and led to his eventual death.
These hematomas must be taken in the light of the hazing activities performed on him by the Aquila
Fraternity. According to the testimonies of the co-neophytes of Lenny, they were punched, kicked,
elbowed, kneed, stamped on; and hit with different objects on their arms, legs, and thighs.261 They
were also "paddled" at the back of their thighs or legs;262 and slapped on their faces.263 They were
made to play rough basketball.264 Witness Marquez testified on Lenny, saying: "[T]inamaan daw sya
sa spine."265 The NBI medico-legal officer explained that the death of the victim was the cumulative
effect of the multiple injuries suffered by the latter.266 The relevant portion of the testimony is as
follows:

Atty. Tadiar Doctor, there was, rather, it was your testimony on various cross examinations of
defense counsels that the injuries that you have enumerated on the body of the deceased Lenny
Villa previously marked as Exhibit "G-1" to "G-14" individually by themselves would not cause the
death of the victim. The question I am going to propound to you is what is the cumulative effect of all
of these injuries marked from Exhibit "G-1" to "G-14"?

Witness All together nothing in concert to cause to the demise of the victim. So, it is not fair for us to
isolate such injuries here because we are talking of the whole body. At the same manner that as a
car would not run minus one (1) wheel. No, the more humane in human approach is to interpret all
those injuries in whole and not in part.267

There is also evidence to show that some of the accused fraternity members were drinking during
the initiation rites.268

Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to recklessness, which
made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be remembered that organizations owe
to their initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the process.269 With the foregoing facts, we
rule that the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medico-
legal officer found that the victim’s death was the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered, criminal
responsibility redounds to all those who directly participated in and contributed to the infliction of
physical injuries.

It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have been prevented, or at least
mitigated, had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity – accused Dizon and Villareal – restrained themselves
from insisting on reopening the initiation rites. Although this point did not matter in the end, as
records would show that the other fraternity members participated in the reopened initiation rites –
having in mind the concept of "seniority" in fraternities – the implication of the presence of alumni
should be seen as a point of review in future legislation. We further note that some of the fraternity
members were intoxicated during Lenny’s initiation rites. In this light, the Court submits to Congress,
for legislative consideration, the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication
and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating
circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.

It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly – or unwittingly –impose the misery of hazing and
employ appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There must be a better way to establish
"kinship." A neophyte admitted that he joined the fraternity to have more friends and to avail himself
of the benefits it offered, such as tips during bar examinations.270 Another initiate did not give up,
because he feared being looked down upon as a quitter, and because he felt he did not have a
choice.271 Thus, for Lenny Villa and the other neophytes, joining the Aquila Fraternity entailed a leap
in the dark. By giving consent under the circumstances, they left their fates in the hands of the
fraternity members. Unfortunately, the hands to which lives were entrusted were barbaric as they
were reckless.
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall cover
only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law been in effect
then, these five accused fraternity members would have all been convicted of the crime of hazing
punishable by reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment).272 Since there was no law prohibiting the act of
hazing when Lenny died, we are constrained to rule according to existing laws at the time of his
death. The CA found that the prosecution failed to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, Victorino et al.’s
individual participation in the infliction of physical injuries upon Lenny Villa.273 As to accused Villareal,
his criminal liability was totally extinguished by the fact of his death, pursuant to Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code.

Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be interpreted without prejudice to the applicability of the Anti-
Hazing Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore, the modification of criminal liability from slight
physical injuries to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall apply only with respect to
accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.

The accused liable to pay damages

The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Lenny Villa in the amounts of ₱ 50,000 as civil
indemnity ex delicto and ₱ 1,000,000 as moral damages, to be jointly and severally paid by accused
Dizon and Villareal. It also awarded the amount of ₱ 30,000 as indemnity to be jointly and severally
paid by accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson. 1âwphi1

Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically awarded for the sole fact of death of the victim.274 In
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,275 we sustain the CA’s award of indemnity in the amount of
₱ 50,000.

The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or compensatory damages, including expenses incurred
in connection with the death of the victim, so long as the claim is supported by tangible
documents.276 Though we are prepared to award actual damages, the Court is prevented from
granting them, since the records are bereft of any evidence to show that actual expenses were
incurred or proven during trial. Furthermore, in the appeal, the Solicitor General does not interpose
any claim for actual damages.277

The heirs of the deceased may recover moral damages for the grief suffered on account of the
victim’s death.278 This penalty is pursuant to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code, which provides that the
"spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and the ascendants of the deceased may demand
moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased."279 Thus, we hereby we
affirm the CA’s award of moral damages in the amount of ₱ 1,000,000.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of
homicide is hereby MODIFIED and set aside IN PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954
– finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson
guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries – is also MODIFIED and set aside in part. Instead,
Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent
Tecson are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. They
are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa
civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of ₱ 50,000, and moral damages in the amount of ₱
1,000,000, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of the finality
of this Decision until satisfaction.280 Costs de oficio.

The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby affirmed. The
appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise affirmed. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of
the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case
against Artemio Villareal deemed closed and TERMINATED.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the
fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as
aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the Opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Sponsorship Speech of former Senator Joey Lina, Senate Transcript of Session
Proceedings No. 34 (08 October 1992) 9th Congress, 1st Regular Sess. at 21-22 [hereinafter
Senate TSP No. 34].

2
Id.

3
Senate Transcript of Session Proceedings No. 47 (10 November 1992) 9th Congress, 1st
Regular Sess. at 20-21, 24-27 [hereinafter Senate TSP No. 47].

4
Id.; Senate Transcript of Session Proceedings No. 62 (14 December 1992) 9th Congress,
1st Regular Sess. at 15 [hereinafter Senate TSP No. 62].

5
Senate TSP No. 34, supra note 1.

6
Id.

7
U.S. v. Taylor, 28 Phil 599 (1914). The Court declared, "In the Philippine Islands there exist
no crimes such as are known in the United States and England as common law crimes;" id.
at 604.

8
CA Decision (People v. Dizon, CA-G.R. CR No. 15520), pp. 1-5; rollo (G.R. No. 151258),
pp. 62-66.

9
RTC Decision [People v. Dizon, Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)], pp. 1-57; rollo (G.R. No.
151258), pp. 109-167.

10
As explained in the Petition for Review of Villareal, "resident brods" are those fraternity
members who are currently students of the Ateneo Law School, while "alumni brods" are
those fraternity members who are graduates or former students of the law school; see
Villareal’s Petition for Review (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258), pp. 5-7; rollo (G.R. No.
151258), pp. 17-19.
11
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 2, supra note 9; rollo, p. 110.

12
Id.

13
Id. at 66-67; rollo, pp. 175-176.

CA Decision (Escalona v. RTC, CA-G.R. SP No. 89060), p. 4; rollo (G.R. No. 178057), p.
14

131.

Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola and concurred in by Associate Justices

15

Rodrigo V. Cosico and Eliezer R. de los Santos (with Concurring Opinion).

RTC Decision (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. 38340), p. 21; rollo (G.R. No. 178057), p.
16

1114.

17
CA Decision (Escalona v. RTC), pp. 12-14, supra note 14; rollo, pp. 139-141.

Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and concurred in by Associate

18

Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Hakim S. Abdulwahid.

19
CA Decision (Escalona v. RTC), pp. 37-39, supra note 14; rollo, pp. 166-168.

20
Villareal’s Petition for Review (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258), p. 13; rollo, p. 25.

21
Dizon’s Petition for Review (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), p. 1; rollo, p. 3.

22
Id. at 17; rollo, p. 19.

23
Id. at 10; rollo, p. 12.

24
Id. at 22; rollo, p. 24.

25
Id. at 23; rollo, p. 25.

26
Id. at 23-24; rollo, pp. 25-26.

27
Id. at 26; rollo, p. 28.

28
People’s Petition for Certiorari (People v. CA, G.R. No. 154954), p. 2; rollo, p. 13.

29
Id. at 167; rollo, p. 118.

Villa’s Petition for Review on Certiorari (Villa v. Escalona, G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080),
30

p. 1; rollo, p. 84.

31
Petralba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81337, 16 August 1991, 200 SCRA 644.

People v. Badeo, G.R. No. 72990, 21 November 1991, 204 SCRA 122, citing J. Aquino’s
32

Concurring Opinion in People v. Satorre, G.R. No. L-26282, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 439.

People v. Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 239; People v. Bunay,
33

G.R. No. 171268, 14 September 2010, 630 SCRA 445.

34
People v. Bunay, supra, citing People v. Bayotas, supra.

35
CA Decision (People v. Dizon), p. 7, supra note 8; rollo, p. 68.

36
Id.

37
Id.

38
Id.

39
Id. at 7-8; rollo, pp. 68-69.

40
Id. at 8; rollo, p. 69.
41
Id.

People v. Banihit, 393 Phil. 465 (2000); People v. Hernandez, 328 Phil. 1123 (1996), citing
42

People v. Dichoso, 96 SCRA 957 (1980); and People v. Angco, 103 Phil. 33 (1958).

43
People v. Hapa, 413 Phil. 679 (2001), citing People v. Diaz, 311 SCRA 585 (1999).

44
People v. Hapa, supra, citing Parada v. Veneracion, 336 Phil. 354, 360 (1997).

45
Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan, 495 Phil. 718 (2005).

46
Id.

47
People v. Bodoso, 446 Phil. 838 (2003).

48
Id.

49
Dizon’s Petition for Review, supra note 21 at 20; rollo, p. 22.

50
Id. at 23; rollo, p. 25.

51
Villa’s Petition for Review on Certiorari, supra note 30 at 19; rollo, p. 102.

52
People v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. 154218 & 154372, 28 August 2006, 499 SCRA 688.

People v. Tampal, 314 Phil. 35 (1995), citing Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA 298
53

(1991); Acebedo v. Sarmiento, 146 Phil. 820 (1970).

54
People v. Tampal, supra; Acebedo v. Sarmiento, supra.

55
People v. Tampal, supra.

56
Id.

57
Id.

People v. Hernandez, supra note 52, citing People v. Tampal, supra; Philippine Savings
58

Bank v. Spouses Bermoy, 471 SCRA 94, 107 (2005); People v. Bans, 239 SCRA 48 (1994);
People v. Declaro, 170 SCRA 142 (1989); and People v. Quizada, 160 SCRA 516 (1988).

59
See People v. Hernandez, supra note 52.

60
Id.

61
Id.

62
Id.

63
CA Decision (Escalona v. RTC), pp. 24-30, supra note 14; rollo, pp. 151-157.

64
Id. at 4; rollo, p. 131.

65
Id.

66
Id.

67
Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, 407 Phil. 985 (2001).

68
Id.

69
Melo v. People, 85 Phil. 766 (1950).

70
Id.

71
Id.
72
Id.

73
People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 168982, 5 August 2009, 595 SCRA 438.

74
Id.; People v. Maquiling, 368 Phil. 169 (1999).

People v. Velasco, 394 Phil. 517 (2000), citing Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 117, Sec
75

7; Paulin v. Gimenez, G. R. No. 103323, 21 January 1993, 217 SCRA 386; Comelec v. Court
of Appeals, G. R. No. 108120, 26 January 1994, 229 SCRA 501; People v. Maquiling, supra
note 74.

People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, G.R. No. 159261, 21 February 2007, 516 SCRA
76

383, 397, citing People v. Serrano, 315 SCRA 686, 689 (1999).

People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, supra, citing People v. Velasco, 340 SCRA 207,
77

240 (2000).

Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 228 Phil. 42 (1986), citing People v. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166
78

(1985); Combate v. San Jose, 135 SCRA 693 (1985); People v. Catolico, 38 SCRA 389
(1971); and People v. Navarro, 63 SCRA 264 (1975).

People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, supra note 76 [citing People v. Tria-Tirona, 463
79

SCRA 462, 469-470 (2005); and People v. Velasco, 340 SCRA 207 (2000)]; People v. Court
of Appeals and Francisco, 468 Phil. 1 (2004); Galman v. Sandiganbayan, supra, citing
People v. Bocar, supra.

People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, supra note 76, citing People v. Serrano, supra note
80

76 at 690; People v. De Grano, G.R. No. 167710, 5 June 2009, 588 SCRA 550.

People v. Nazareno, supra note 73; De Vera v. De Vera, G.R. No. 172832, 7 April 2009,
81

584 SCRA 506.

82
People v. Nazareno, supra note 73; De Vera v. De Vera, supra.

83
People v. De Grano, supra note 80, citing People v. Maquiling, supra note 74 at 704.

84
Id.

85
People’s Petition for Certiorari, p. 8, supra note 28; rollo, p. 19.

86
Id. at 80-81; rollo, pp. 91-92.

87
Id. at 82-86; rollo, pp. 93-97.

See Francisco v. Desierto, G.R. No. 154117, 2 October 2009, 602 SCRA 50, citing First
88

Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 171989, 4 July 2007, 526 SCRA 564, 578.

People v. Maquiling, supra note 74, citing Teknika Skills and Trade Services v. Secretary of
89

Labor and Employment, 273 SCRA 10 (1997).

People v. Maquiling, supra note 74, citing Medina v. City Sheriff of Manila, 276 SCRA 133,
90

(1997); Jamer v. National Labor Relations Commission, 278 SCRA 632 (1997); and Azores
v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 252 SCRA 387 (1996).

De Vera v. De Vera, supra note 81; People v. Dela Torre, 430 Phil. 420 (2002); People v.
91

Leones, 418 Phil. 804 (2001); People v. Ruiz, 171 Phil. 400 (1978); People v. Pomeroy, 97
Phil. 927 (1955), citing People v. Ang Cho Kio, 95 Phil. 475 (1954).

See generally People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, supra note 76; and People v. Court
92

of Appeals and Francisco, supra note 79.

93
CA Decision (People v. Dizon), pp. 21-22, supra note 8; rollo, pp. 82-83.

94
People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398 (1948).

95
CA Decision (People v. Dizon), pp. 21-22, supra note 8; rollo, pp. 82-83.
96
People v. Penesa, supra note 94.

97
Id.

98
Id.

99
CA Decision (People v. Dizon), p. 16, supra note 8; rollo, p. 77.

100
Id. at 21; rollo, p. 82.

101
Id.

102
See footnote 1 of Corpus v. Paje, 139 Phil. 429 (1969).

103
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 61, supra note 9; rollo, p. 170.

104
Id. at 58; rollo, p. 167.

Ramon C. Aquino, The Revised Penal Code – Volume One 3 (1961); see People v.
105

Estrada, 389 Phil. 216 (2000); People v. Sandiganbayan, 341 Phil. 503 (1997).

Vicente J. Francisco, The Revised Penal Code: Annotated and Commented – Book One 4
106

(3rd ed. 1958); see People v. Estrada, supra.

107
Francisco, supra at 4; People v. Estrada, supra.

108
Aquino, supra note 105 at 3.

109
Id.

110
Guillermo B. Guevara, Penal Sciences and Philippine Criminal Law 6 (1974).

111
People v. Sandiganbayan, 341 Phil. 503 (1997).

112
Francisco, supra note 106 at 33.

113
Id. at 33-34.

114
Mariano A. Albert, The Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815) 21-24 (1946).

115
Id. at 21.

116
Id. at 21.

117
Guevarra v. Almodovar, 251 Phil. 427 (1989), citing 46 CJS Intent 1103.

Black’s Law Dictionary 670 (8th abr. ed. 2005); see People v. Regato, 212 Phil. 268
118

(1984).

119
Guevarra v. Almodovar, supra note 117.

120
Albert, supra note 114 at 23.

People v. Ballesteros, 349 Phil. 366 (1998); Bagajo v. Marave, 176 Phil. 20 (1978), citing
121

People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 297; 61 N.E. 286, 296; 62 L.R.A. 193.

122
Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 118 at 520.

123
See Francisco, supra note 106 at 34; Albert, supra note 114 at 23-25.

124
U.S. v. Catolico, 18 Phil. 504 (1911); U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488 (1910).

U.S. v. Barnes, 8 Phil. 59 (1907); Dado v. People, 440 Phil. 521 (2002), citing Mondragon
125

v. People, 17 SCRA 476, 481 (1966); People v. Villanueva, 51 Phil. 488 (1928); U.S. v.
Reyes, 30 Phil. 551 (1915); U.S. v. Mendoza, 38 Phil. 691 (1918); People v. Montes, 53 Phil.
323 (1929); People v. Pacusbas, 64 Phil. 614 (1937); and People v. Penesa, supra note 94.
 People v. Fallorina, 468 Phil. 816 (2004), citing People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257 (1943);
126

Francisco, supra note 106 at 51-52, citing People v. Sara, 55 Phil. 939 (1931).

127
See generally Francisco, supra note 106 at 51.

Id. at 52; People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257 (1943), citing People v. Nanquil, 43 Phil. 232
128

(1922); People v. Bindoy, 56 Phil. 15 (1931).

Mahawan v. People, G.R. No. 176609, 18 December 2008, 574 SCRA 737, citing Rivera v.
129

People, G.R. No. 166326, 25 January 2006, 480 SCRA 188, 196-197.

130
People v. Quijada, 328 Phil. 505 (1996).

131
Mahawan v. People, supra note 129, citing Rivera v. People, supra note 129.

132
Dado v. People, supra note 125.

People v. Delim, 444 Phil. 430, 450 (2003), citing Wharton, Criminal Law – Vol. 1, 473-474
133

(12th ed., 1932).

See People v. Garcia, 467 Phil. 1102 (2004), citing People v. Carmen, G.R. No. 137268,
134

26 March 2001, 355 SCRA 267; U.S. v. Tayongtong, 21 Phil. 476 (1912); see generally U.S.
v. Maleza, 14 Phil. 468 (1909).

A. Catherine Kendrick, Ex Parte Barran: In Search of Standard Legislation for Fraternity

135

Hazing Liability, 24 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 407 (2000)

136
Id.

137
In re Khalil H., No. 08110, 2010 WL 4540458 (N.Y. App. Div. Nov. 9, 2010) (U.S.) [citing
Kuzmich, Comment, In Vino Mortuus: Fraternal Hazing and Alcohol-Related Deaths, 31
McGeorge L Rev. 1087, 1088-1089 (2000); and Symposium, The Works of Plato (The
Modern Library 1956)]; Gregory E. Rutledge, Hell Night Hath No Fury Like a Pledge Scorned
... and Injured: Hazing Litigation in U.S. Colleges and Universities, 25 J.C. & U.L. 361, 368-9
(1998); Kendrick, 24 Am. J. Trial Advoc.

138
In re Khalil H., supra; Rutledge, supra.

Jamie Ball, This Will Go Down on Your Permanent Record (But We'll Never Tell): How the
139

Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act May Help Colleges and Universities Keep
Hazing a Secret, 33 Sw. U. L. Rev. 477, 480 (2004), citing Rutledge, supra.

140
Id.

141
Id.

Kendrick, supra note 135, citing Scott Patrick McBride, Comment, Freedom of Association
142

in the Public University Setting: How Broad is the Right to Freely Participate in Greek Life?,
23 U. Dayton L. Rev. 133, 147-8 (1997).

143
Id.

144
Id.

145
Id., citing Ex parte Barran, 730 So.2d 203 (Ala. 1998) (U.S.).

See generally Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 8049 (1995), otherwise known as the Anti-Hazing
146

Law.

147
Id.

In re Khalil H., supra note 137, citing Webster's Third International Dictionary, 1041 (1986);
148

and People v. Lenti, 44 Misc.2d 118, 253 N.Y.S.2d 9 (N.Y. Nassau County Ct. 1964) (U.S.).

See generally Republic Act No. 8049 (1995), Sec. 1, otherwise known as the Anti-Hazing
149

Law; Susan Lipkins, Hazing: Defining and Understanding Psychological Damages, 2

Ann.2007 AAJ-CLE 2481 (2007).
150
Reynaldo C. Ileto, The Diorama Experience: A Visual History of the Philippines 84 (2004).

151
Id.

152
Id.

Id.; see Philippine Insurrection Records, Reel 31, Folder 514/10 – Cartilla del Katipunan,
153

quoted in Luis Camara Dery, Alay sa Inang Bayan: Panibagong Pagbibigay Kahulugan sa
Kasaysayan ng Himagsikan ng 1896, 16-24 (1999).

154
Philippine Insurrection Records, supra, quoted in Dery, supra at 17.

155
Philippine Insurrection Records, supra, quoted in Dery, supra at 18.

156
Ileto, supra note 150.

157
Stephen E. Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country: A History of West Point 222 (1999).

158
Id.

159
Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, 285 S.C. 348, 329 S.E.2d 753 (S.C. 1985) (U.S.).
(The South Carolina Supreme Court held, inter alia, that (1) evidence supported the jury
finding that the manner in which the association carried out "mattress-rotating barrel trick," a
hazing event, was hazardous and constituted actionable negligence; and (2) the candidate
was not barred from recovery by the doctrine of assumption of risk. Id.)

160
Id.

161
Id.

162
Id.

CNN U.S., Pentagon Brass Disgusted by Marine Hazing Ceremony, January 31, 1997,
163

available at<http://articles.cnn.com/1997-01-31/us/9701_31_hazing_1_hazing-incident-
camp-lejeune-marines?_s=PM:US> (visited 3 December 2010); see also Gregory E.
Rutledge, Hell Night Hath No Fury Like a Pledge Scorned ... and Injured: Hazing Litigation in
U.S. Colleges and Universities, 25 J.C. & U.L. 361, 364 (1998).

164
CNN U.S., supra; see also Rutledge, supra.

State v. Allen, 905 S.W.2d 874, 875 (Mo. 1995) (U.S.). (One of the pledges – Michael
165

Davis – blacked out and never regained consciousness. He died the following afternoon. The
Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the trial court’s conviction of hazing. Id.)

166
Id.

167
Id.

Ex parte Barran, 730 So.2d 203 (Ala. 1998) (U.S.). (The Alabama Supreme Court ruled
168

that the (1) pledge knew and appreciated the risks inherent in hazing; and (2) pledge
voluntarily exposed himself to hazing, supporting the fraternity's assumption of the risk
defense. Consequently, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and
reinstated the ruling of the trial court, which entered the summary judgment in favor of the
defendants with respect to the victim’s negligence claims. The case was remanded as to the
other matters. Id.)

169
Id.

170
Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, No. 96-CV-348, 97-CV-565, 1999 WL 47153 (Dist. Ct.,
N.D. N.Y., 1999) (U.S.). (The plaintiff filed a law suit against Cornell University for the latter’s
liability resulting from the injuries the former sustained during the alleged hazing by the
fraternity. The New York district court granted defendant Cornell’s motion to dismiss the
plaintiff’s complaint. Id.)

171
Id.

Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, Inc., 808 A.2d 178 (Pa. Super.Ct. 2002). (The
172

Pennsylvania Superior Court held that: (1) the fraternity owed the duty to protect the initiate
from harm; (2) breach of duty by fraternity was not established; (3) individual fraternity
members owed the duty to protect the initiate from harm; and (4) the evidence raised the
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the fraternity's chapter advisor breached the
duty of care to initiate. Id.)

173
Id.

174
Morton v. State, 988 So.2d 698 (Flo. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (U.S.). (The District Court of
Appeal of Florida reversed the conviction for felony hazing and remanded the case for a new
trial because of erroneous jury instruction. Id.)

175
Id.

176
Id.

177
Id.

178
Id.

179
Id.

180
Rutledge, supra note 137.

Rutledge, supra note 137, citing Fraternity Hazing: Is that Anyway to Treat a Brother?,
181

TRIAL, September 1991, at 63.

Rutledge, supra note 137, [citing Robert D. Bickel & Peter F. Lake, Reconceptualizing the
182

University's Duty to Provide A Safe Learning Environment: A Criticism of the Doctrine of In

Loco Parentis and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 20 J.C. & U.L. 261 (1994); Jennifer L.
Spaziano, It's All Fun and Games Until Someone Loses an Eye: An Analysis of University
Liability for Actions of Student Organizations, 22 Pepp. L. Rev. 213 (1994); Fraternity
Hazing: Is that Anyway to Treat a Brother?, TRIAL, Sept. 1991, at 63; and Byron L. Leflore,
Jr., Alcohol and Hazing Risks in College Fraternities: Re-evaluating Vicarious and Custodial
Liability of National Fraternities, 7 Rev. Litig. 191, 210 (1988)].

Darryll M. Halcomb Lewis, The Criminalization of Fraternity, Non-Fraternity and Non-

183

Collegiate Hazing, 61 Miss. L.J. 111, 117 (1991), citing Benjamin, The Trouble at the Naval
Academy, 60 The Independent 154, 155 (1906). According to Lewis, the 1874 statute
outlawing hazing was directed specifically at the United States Naval Academy.

Gregory L. Acquaviva, Protecting Students from the Wrongs of Hazing Rites: A Proposal
184

for Strengthening New Jersey's Anti-Hazing Act, 26 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 305, 311 (2008),
citing Lewis, supra note 183 at 118.

185
Acquaviva, supra, citing Lewis, supra note 183 at 118-119.

186
Acquaviva, supra, citing Lewis, supra note 183 at 119.

187
Acquaviva, supra at 313.

Amie Pelletier, Note, Regulation of Rites: The Effect and Enforcement of Current Anti-
188

Hazing Statutes, 28 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 377, 377 (2002).

189
Id.

190
Id., citing 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 120/10 (1992) (U.S.).

191
730 ILCS 5/5-8-2 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 96-1482 of the 2010 Sess.) (U.S.).

192
Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-2-2 (U.S.).

193
Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-2-2 (U.S.).

Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-2-2 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Sess.) (U.S.) citing State v.
194

Lewis, 883 N.E.2d 847 (Ind. App. 2008) (U.S.).

195
Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-6 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Sess.) (U.S.).
196
Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 578.365 (2001) (U.S.).

Mo. Stat. Ann. § 558.011 (West, Westlaw through 2010 First Extraordinary Gen. Ass.
197

Sess.).

198
Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 37.152 (Vernon 1996) (U.S.).

Tex. Stat. Code Ann., Penal Code § 12.35 (Vernon, Westlaw through 2009 Legis. Sess.)
199

(U.S.).

200
Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-107.5 (1999) (U.S.).

201
Utah Code Ann. 1953 § 76-3-203 (Westlaw through 2010 Gen. Sess.) (U.S.).

202
Pelletier, supra note 188, citing W. Va. Code § 18-16-3 (1999) (U.S.).

203
See Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Wis. Stat. § 948.51 (1996) (U.S.).

204
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 939.50 (Westlaw through 2009 Act 406) (U.S.).

205
Pelletier, supra note 188 at 381.

206
Id.

207
CA Decision (People v. Dizon), p. 15, supra note 8; rollo, p. 76.

208
Id.

209
Id.

TSN, 21 April 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 68-72, 90-91, 100-102,
210

108-109, 127-134.

211
TSN, 26 May 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 29-32, 43.

212
TSN, 3 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 24-28.

People’s Comment (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), p. 131; rollo, p. 626; People’s
213

Comment (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258), p. 120-3; rollo, pp. 727-730.

People’s Comment (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), pp. 130-131; rollo, pp. 625-626;
214

People’s Comment (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258), pp. 120-123; rollo, pp. 727-730.

215
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], pp. 18-35, supra note 9; rollo, pp. 127-144.

People’s Comment (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), pp. 130-131; rollo, pp. 625-626;
216

People’s Comment (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258), pp. 120-123; rollo, pp. 727-730.

217
Senate TSP No. 51 (17 November 1992) 9th Congress, 1st Regular Sess., pp. 12-13.

TSN, 21 April 1992(People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 68-72, 90-91, 100-102,
218

108-109, 127-134; see TSN, 26 May 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp.
29-32, 43; and TSN, 3 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 24-28.

219
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 58, supra note 9; rollo, p. 167.

220
Dado v. People, supra note 125.

221
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 58, supra note 9; rollo, p. 167.

The aforementioned articles refer to the Revised Penal Code provisions on Physical
222

Injuries. These are the following: (a) Art. 262 – Mutilation; (b) Art. 263 – Serious Physical
Injuries; (c) Art. 264 – Administering Injurious Substances or Beverages; (d) Art. 265 – Less
Serious Physical Injuries; and, (e) Art. 266 – Slight Physical Injuries and Maltreatment.

Cf. United States v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488 (1910); and Calimutan v. People, 517 Phil. 272
223

(2006).
 Cf. Calimutan v. People, supra, citing People v. Carmen, 407 Phil. 564 (2001); People v.
224

Nocum, 77 Phil. 1018 (1947); People v. Sara, 55 Phil 939 (1931); and People v. Ramirez, 48
Phil 204 (1925).

225
176 Phil. 20 (1978).

226
People v. Carmen, supra note 224.

227
People v. Regato, supra note 118.

228
Id.

229
Cf. People v. Penesa, supra note 94.

230
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], pp. 38-44, supra note 9; rollo, pp. 147-153.

231
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], pp. 18-35, supra note 9; rollo, pp. 127-144.

RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 38, supra note 9; rollo, p. 147; TSN, 16
232

July 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), p. 108.

RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 38, supra note 9; rollo, p. 147; TSN, 16
233

July 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), p. 109.

234
CA Decision (People v. Dizon), pp. 13-14, supra note 8; rollo, pp. 74-75.

235
Senate TSP No. 47, supra note 3.

236
Senate TSP No. 47, supra note 3.

237
Senate TSP No. 62, supra note 4 at 13-15.

238
Senate TSP No. 47, supra note 3.

RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 38, supra note 9; rollo, p. 147; TSN, 16
239

July 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 108-109.

240
Vedaña v. Valencia, 356 Phil. 317, 332 (1998).

Caminos v. People, 587 SCRA 348 (2009) citing Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code:
241

Criminal Law – Book One 995 (15th ed. 2001); People v. Vistan, 42 Phil 107 (1921), citing
U.S. vs. Gomez, G.R. No. 14068, 17 January 1919 (unreported); U.S. v. Manabat, 28 Phil.
560 (1914).

242
People v. Vistan, supra, citing U.S. vs. Gomez, supra.

243
Id.

244
Id.

Gaid v. People, G.R. No. 171636, 7 April 2009, 584 SCRA 489; Gan v. Court of Appeals,
245

247-A Phil. 460 (1988).

246
Gaid v. People, supra; Gan v. Court of Appeals, supra.

Gaid v. People, supra; People v. Vistan, supra note 241, citing U.S. vs. Gomez, supra note
247

241.

248
Id.

249
Id.

250
See Gaid v. People, supra note 245, at 503 (Velasco, J., dissenting).

251
Id.

252
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 37, supra note 9; rollo, p. 146.
253
Id.

254
Id. at 36; rollo, p. 145.

255
Id.; TSN, 24 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 52-67.

256
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 37, supra note 9; rollo, p. 146.

257
Id.; TSN, 24 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 68-69.

RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 37, supra note 9; rollo, p. 146; TSN, 24
258

June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 70-71.

259
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 37, supra note 9; rollo, p. 146.

260
TSN, 24 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), p. 50.

261
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 18-21, supra note 9; rollo, p. 127-130.

262
Id. at 23; rollo, p. 132.

263
Id. at 25; rollo, p. 134.

264
Id. at 26; rollo, p. 135.

265
TSN, 21 April 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 175-176.

266
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 61, supra note 9; rollo, p. 170.

267
TSN, 16 July 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 92-93.

268
TSN, 21 April 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 110-111.

Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity, 291 S.C. 140, 352 S.E.2d 488 (S.C. App. 1986)
269

(U.S.) citing Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, 285 S.C. 348, 329 S.E.2d 753 (S.C. 1985)
(U.S.).

270
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 34, supra note 9; rollo, p. 143.

271
Id. at 27; rollo, p. 136.

272
Republic Act No. 8049 (1995), Sec. 4(1), otherwise known as the Anti-Hazing Law.

273
CA Decision (People v. Dizon), p. 22, supra note 8; rollo, p. 83.

Briñas v. People, 211 Phil. 37 (1983); see also People v. Yanson, G.R. No. 179195, 3
274

October 2011, citing People v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 189580, 9 February 2011.

People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 189847, 30 May 2011 [citing People v. Flores, G.R. No.
275

188315, 25 August 2010; People v. Lindo, G.R. No. 189818, 9 August 2010; People v. Ogan,
G.R. No. 186461, 5 July 2010; andPeople v. Cadap, G.R. No. 190633, 5 July 2010].

276
Seguritan v. People, G.R. No. 172896, 19 April 2010, 618 SCRA 406.

People’s Consolidated Memoranda (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), p. 144; rollo, p.
277

1709.

Heirs of Ochoa v. G & S Transport Corporation, G.R. No. 170071, 9 March 2011, citing
278

Victory Liner Inc. v. Gammad, 486 Phil. 574, 592-593 (2004).

279
Id.

Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97412, 17 July 1994, 234
280

SCRA 78.
 THIRD DIVISION

2. G.R. No. 190912 January 12, 2015

GARY FANTASTICO and ROLANDO VILLANUEVA, Petitioners,

vs.
ELPIDIO MALICSE, SR. and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, dated January 20, 2010, of petitioners Gary Fantastico and Rolando
Villanueva assailing the Decision2dated August 31, 2007 and Resolution3 dated January 7, 2010 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G. R. CR. No. 31719, affirming the Decision4 dated March 31, 2008
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Manila, in Criminal Case No. 93-127049, finding petitioners
guilty of attempted murder.

The following are the antecedents:

On the afternoon of June 27, 1993, Elpidio Malicse, Sr. (Elpidio) was outside the house of his sister
Isabelita Iguiron (Isabelita) in Pandacan, Manila when all of a sudden, he heard Isabelita's son,
Winston, throwing invectives at him. Thus, Elpidio confronted Isabelita but she also cursed him,
which prompted the former to slapthe latter. On that occasion, Elpidio was under the influence of
alcohol.

The Barangay Chairman heard what transpired and went to the place where the commotion was
taking place inorder to pacify those who were involved. Elpidio was eventually persuaded to go
home where he drank some coffee. Thereafter, Elpidio went back to the house of Isabelita to offer
reconciliation. On his way there, he passed by the house of Kagawad Andy Antonio and requested
the latter to accompany him, but was instead told to go back home, leaving Elpidio to proceed alone.

Upon reaching Isabelita's house, Elpidio saw the former's son, Titus Iguiron (Titus) and her son-in-
law Gary Fantastico (Gary) and asked the two where he can find their parents. Titus and Gary
responded, "putang ina mo, and kulit mo, lumayas ka, punyeta ka."

In his anger with the response of Titus and Gary, Elpidio kicked the door open and saw Isabelita's
elder son, Salvador Iguiron (Salvador) behind the door holding a rattan stick or arnis. Salvador hit
Elpidio on the right side of his head that forced the latter tobow his head but Salvador delivered a
second blow that hit Elpidio on the right eyebrow. Salvador attempted to hit Elpidio for the third time
but the latter got hold of the rattan stick and the two wrestled on the floor and grappled for the
possession of the same rattan stick. Then Titus ran towards the two and sprayed something on
Elpidio's face. Not being able to free himself from the clutches of Salvador and to extricate himself,
Elpidio bit Salvador's head.

Gary hit Elpidio on the right side of his head with a tomahawk axe when the latter was about to go
out of the house. Elpidio tried to defend himself but was unable to take the tomahawk axe from Gary.
Elpidio walked away from Titus but Gary, still armed with the tomahawk axe and Salvador, with
hisarnis, including Titus, chased him.

Roland (Rolly) Villanueva, without any warning, hit Elpidio on the back of his head with a lead pipe
which caused the latter to fall on the ground. Elpidio begged his assailants tostop, but to no avail.
Salvador hit him countless times on his thighs, legsand knees using the rattan stick.

While he was simultaneously being beaten up by Salvador, Titus, Gary, Rolly, Nestor, Eugene and
Tommy, he tried to cover his face with his arm. Gary hit him with the tomahawk axe on his right leg,
between the knees and the ankle of his leg, which caused the fracture on his legs and knees. Rolly
hit Elpidio's head with a lead pipe, while Tommy hit him with a piece of wood on the back of his
shoulder.

Thereafter, a certain "Mang Gil" tried to break them off but Titus and Gary shouted at him: "Huwag
makialam, away ng mag-anak ito" and the two continued to maul Elpidio. The people who witnessed
the incident shouted "maawa na kayo" but they only stopped battering him when a bystander fainted
because of the incident. Elpidio then pretended to be dead. It was then that concerned neighbors
approached him and rushed him to the emergency room of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH).

Thus, a case for Attempted Murder under Article 248, in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal
Code, was filed against Salvador Iguiron, Titus Malicse Iguiron, Saligan Malicse Iguiron, Tommy
Ballesteros, Nestor Ballesteros, Eugene Surigao and petitioners Gary Fantastico and Rolando
Villanueva. The Information reads:

That on or about June 27, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery and taking advantage of superior strength,
commence the commission of the crime ofmurder directly by overt acts, to wit: by then and there
hitting the head of Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y de Leon with a piece of rattan, axe, pipe and a piece of
wood and mauling him, but the said accused did not perform all the acts of execution which should
have produced the crime of murder, as a consequence, by reason of causes other than their own
spontaneous desistance, that is, the injuries inflicted upon Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y de Leon are not
necessarily mortal.

They all pleaded "not guilty." The defense, during trial, presented the following version of the events
that transpired:

Around 4:30 p.m. of June 27, 1993, Salvador was at the second floor of their house when he heard
his tenth son Winston crying while the latter was being castigated by Elpidio. He went down and told
Elpidio to come back the next day to settle. His wife Isabelita called the Barangay Chairman two
blocks away. Barangay Chairman Joseph Ramos and Elpidio's wife and daughter went to the house
and Elpidio was given warm water, but he showered his daughter and Winston withit. Elpidio was
brought to his house and the former told the Barangay Chairman that it was a family problem. Elpidio
went back to the house of Salvador where Titus was sitting on the sofa. Elpidio asked Titus to open
the door until the former kicked the door open. Titus escaped through the open door and Salvador
went out of the house because another child was on the roof, afraid that the said child might fall.
Thereafter, Elpidio went to the street.

According to petitioner Gary Fantastico, he was inside their house with his wife and Titus when the
incident occurred. He and his wife ran upstairs, while Titus went out when Elpidio hit the door.
Elpidio had a reputation for hurting people when drunk and Gary learned that Elpidio was brought to
the hospital because he was mauled by the people.

During trial, one of the accused, Salvador Iguiron died. Eventually, the trial court, in a Decision dated
March 31, 2008, acquitted Titus Iguiron, Saligan Iguiron and Tommy Ballesteros but found Gary
Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Attempted Murder. The
dispositive portion of the said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Court finds Gary Fantastico and Rolando
Villanueva GUILTY of the crime of attempted murder and sentences them to an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years and one(1) day as minimum, to ten (10) years as
maximum. They are also ordered to pay the actual damages of ₱17,300.00 and moral damages of
₱10,000.00.

Accused Titus Iguiron, Saligan Iguiron and Tommy Ballesteros ACQUITTED.

SO ORDERED.

After their motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioners appealed the case to the CA, but the
latter court affirmed the decision of the RTC and disposed the case as follows: WHEREFORE,
finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, we hereby AFFIRM the same and
DISMISS the instant appeal.

SO ORDERED.

A motion for reconsideration was filed, but it was denied by the same court.

Hence, the present petition.

Petitioners stated the following arguments:

THE CONCLUSIONS DRAWN BY THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT FROM
THE FACTS OF THE CASE ARE INCORRECT.

THE INFORMATION ITSELF IN THIS CASE DOES NOT ALLEGE ALL THE ELEMENTS AND THE
NECESSARY INGREDIENTS OF THE SPECIFIC CRIME OF ATTEMPTED MURDER. NOT ALL
OF THE ELEMENTSOF ATTEMPTED MURDER ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE. THERE IS NO
TREACHERY OR ANY OTHER QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE TO SPEAK OF IN THIS CASE.
THE LOWER COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE PRESENCE
OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

THERE ARE MANIFEST MISTAKES IN THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
AND THE TRIAL COURT.

THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONERS WAS BASED ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE

DEFENSE EVIDENCE, NOT ON THE STRENGTH OF THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE.

THE TESTIMONY OF THE RESPONDENT THAT IT WAS THE PETITIONERS WHO ATTACKED
HIM IS INDEED UNCORROBORATED AND THUS SELF-SERVING.

CLEARLY, THERE ARE SO MUCH REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN THE DECISION OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS AND THE LOWER COURT THAT INJURIOUSLY AFFECTED THE SUBSTANTIAL
RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONERS AND THESE SHOULD BE CORRECTED BY THIS HONORABLE
COURT.

At the outset, it bears stressing that under the Rules of Court, an appeal by certiorari to this Court
should only raise questions of law distinctly set forth in the petition.5

In the present case, the issuesand arguments presented by the petitioners involve questions of
facts. Therefore, the present petition is at once dismissible for its failure to comply with the
requirement of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, that the petition should only raise questions of law. The
distinction between a "question of law" and a "question of fact" is settled. There is a "question of law"
when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state offacts, and which does
not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties- litigants.
On the other hand, there is a "question of fact" when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth
or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether
or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct, is a question of law.6

At any rate, the arguments of herein petitioners deserve scant consideration.

It is the contention of the petitionersthat the Information filed against them was defective because it
did not state all the elements of the crime charged. However, a close reading of the Information
would show the contrary. The Information partly reads:

x x x but the said accused did not perform all the acts of the execution which should have produced
the crime of murder, as a consequence, by reason of causes other than their own spontaneous
desistance, that is, the injuries inflicted upon Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y de Leon are not necessarily
mortal.

From the above-quoted portion of the Information, it is clear that all the elements of the crime of
attempted murder has been included.

The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines an attempt to commit a felony,
thus:

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts,
and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.7

The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:

The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;

He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;

The offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;

The non-performance of all acts ofexecution was due to cause or accident other than his
spontaneous desistance.8

The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two (2) elements, namely:

(1) That there be external acts;

(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.9
The Court in People v. Lizada10 elaborated on the concept of an overt or external act, thus:

An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to
commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its
complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor
bythe spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete
offense. The raison d'etre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the
conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal;
and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality ofbeing equivocal that
must be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the
commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been
committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can
say with certainty what the intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt act should have
been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the "first or
some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the
preparations are made." The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is
necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words
of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense.11

Petitioners question the inclusion of the phrase "not necessarily mortal" in the allegations in the
Information. According to them, the inclusion of that phrase means that there is an absence of an
intent to kill on their part. Intent to kill is a state of mind that the courts can discern only through
external manifestations, i.e., acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and
immediately thereafter. In Rivera v. People,12 this Court considered the following factors to determine
the presence of an intent to kill: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and
number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or
immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was
committed and the motives of the accused. This Court also considers motive and the words uttered
by the offender at the time he inflicted injuries on the victim as additional determinative factors.13 All
of these, were proven during the trial. Needless to say, with or without the phrase, what is important
is that all the elements of attempted murder are still alleged in the Information. Section 6, Rule 110
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states:

Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is sufficient if it states

the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of
the commission of the offense; and the place wherein the offense was committed.

In any case, it is now too late for petitioners to assail the sufficiency of the Information on the ground
that the elements of the crime of attempted murder are lacking. Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court provides:

SEC. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor.- The failure of the accused to
assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either
because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be
deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs
(a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule.

Anent the probative value and weight given to the testimony of Elpidio by the CA and the RTC, the
same is not ridden with any error. In People v. Alvarado,14 we held that greater weight is given to the
positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witness than the accused's denial and
explanation concerning the commission of the crime. This is so inasmuch as mere denials are self-
serving evidence that cannot obtain evidentiary weight greater than the declaration of credible
witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.15

It is clear from the records that Elpidio was able to make a positive identification of the petitionersas
the assailants, thus:

Q. Then what happened next Mr. Witness?

A. When I was able to free myself from Salvador Iguiron, I got out of the door of the house,
then, I saw Gary was hiding in the kitchen door holding an axe. Tonahawk with blade of ax
was dull and had a handle of one foot, with the diameter of one inch.

Q. Why did you know that the ax blade of the tom was dull? (sic)

A. I also used that.

Q. Where do you usually keep that in the house of Iguiron?

A. In the kitchen.

Q. How far is that kitchen from where Gary emerged from?

A. He is right in the kitchen.

Q. Then what happened?

A. When I was able to free myself from Salvador, Gary Iguiron was hiding in the kitchen door
and holding a tomhack(sic) whose edge is dull and he hit me on my right side and my
headand I got injury (sic) and blood profusely oozing, I want to get hold of the tomhawk (sic).

Q. Were you able to get of the tomhawk (sic) from Gary?

A. No sir.16

xxxx

Q. You said while on that street somebody hit you from behind, who was that?

A. Rolly Villanueva.

Q. Why do you say that it was Rolly Villanueva, considering that it was hit from behind?

A. Because they were about 5 of them at the main gate of the compound.

Q. Who are they?

A. Rolando Villanueva, Nestor Ballesteros, Tommy Ballesteros, Eugene Surigao, Saligan

Iguiron.

Q. You said you were hit by Rolando from behind, do you have occasion to see first before
you were hit?

A. When I was hit I fell down and I was able to see who hit (sic), I saw him.

Q. When you fell down, you were able to realize it was Rolando Villanueva who hit you, you
mean you realized what he used in hitting you from behind?

A. It was a pipe. 1/2 inch thick, 24 inches in length.

Q. You said you fell down because of the blow of Rolando Villanueva and you saw him
holding that pipe, how was he holding the pipe when you saw him?

A. When I fell down he was about trying to hit me again.17

In connection therewith, one must not forget the well entrenched rule that findings of facts of
the trial court, its calibration of the testimonial evidence of the parties as well as its
conclusion on its findings, are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. This is because
of the unique advantage of the trial court to observe, at close range, the conduct, demeanor
and deportment of the witness as they testify.18 The rule finds an even more stringent
application where the said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.19

It is also of utmost significance that the testimony of Elpidio is corroborated by the medico-
legal findings as testified by Dr. Edgar Michael Eufemio, PGH Chief Resident Doctor of the
Department of Orthopedics. He testified as to the following:

Q. And as head of that office, Mr. Witness, why are you here today?

A. Actually, I was called upon by the complainant to rectify regarding, the findings
supposedly seen when he was admitted and when I saw him in one of the sessions of our
Out Patient Department.

Q. When was this follow-up session at your department did you see this complainant?

A. Based on the chart, I think it was four (4) months post injury when I first saw the patient.
 Q. Why does he has (sic) to makea follow up in your department?

A. Based on this chart, he sustained bilateral leg fractures which necessitated casting.
Normally, casting would take around three (3) months only but since the nature of his
fracture was relatively unstable, I think it necessitated prolong immobilization in a case.

PROSECUTOR TEVES:

Q. Did you personally attend on his needs on that date when you saw him?

A. Yes, ma'am.

Q. And what could have been the cause of these injuries he sustained? A. I think one of his
leg has close fracture, meaning, probably it was caused by a blunt injury rather than a
hacking injury, one on the left side, with an open wound which was very much compatible
with a hack at the leg area.20

Petitioners also claim that the prosecution was not able to prove the presence of treachery or any
other qualifying circumstance.

In this particular case, there was no treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a
warning and ina swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. For treachery tobe considered, two elements
must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no
opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted.21 From the facts proven by the prosecution, the incident was spontaneous,
thus, the second element of treachery is wanting. The incident, which happened at the spur of the
moment, negates the possibility that the petitioners consciously adopted means to execute the crime
committed. There is no treachery where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted
but was just triggered by the sudden infuriation on the partof the accused because of the provocative
act of the victim.22

The RTC, however, was correct in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior
strength, thus:

In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to establish that Salvador Iguiron hit Elpidio Malicsi, Sr.
twice on the head as he was entered (sic) the house of the former. Gary Fantastico hit the victim on
the right side of the head with an axe or tomahawk. The evidence also show that Rolando "Rolly"
Villanueva hit the victim on the head with a lead pipe. And outside while the victim was lying down,
Gary hit the legs of the victim with the tomahawk. lvador also hit the victim with the rattan stick on
the thighs, legs and knees. And Titus Iguiron hit the victim's private organ with a piece of wood. The
Provisional Medical Slip (Exh. "D"), Medico Legal Certificate and Leg Sketch (Exh. "D-2") and the
fracture sheet (Exh. "D-4") all prove that the victim suffered injuries to both legs and multiple
lacerations on his head. The injury on one leg which was a close fracture was caused by a blunt
instrument like a piece of wood. This injury was caused by Salvador Iguiron. The other leg suffered
an open fracture caused by a sharp object like a large knife or axe. This was caused by Gary
Fantastico who used the tomahawk or axe on the victim. The multiple lacerations on the head were
caused by Gary, Rolly and Salvador as it was proven that they hit Elpidio on the head. There is no
sufficient evidence that the other, accused, namely Saligan Iguiron Y Malicsi, Tommy Ballesteros,
Nestor Ballesteros and Eugene Surigao harmed or injured the victim. Titus having sprayed Elpidio
with the tear gas is not sufficiently proven. Neither was the alleged blow by Titus, using a piece of
wood, on the victim's private organ sufficiently established as the medical certificate did not show
any injury on that part of the body of the victim.

The said injuries inflicted on the complainant after he went back to his sister Isabelita's
house. Whenhe kicked the door, the melee began. And the sequence of the injuries is proven by
1âw phi 1

victim's testimony. But it was a lopsided attack as the victim was unarmed, while his attackers were
all armed (rattan stick, tomahawk and lead pipe). And the victim was also drunk. This establishes the
element of abuse of superior strength. The suddenness of the blow inflicted by Salvador on Elpidio
when he entered the premises show that the former was ready to hit the victim and was waiting for
him to enter. It afforded Elpidio no means to defend himself. And Salvador consciously adopted the
said actuation. He hit Elpidio twice on the head. Treachery is present in this case and must be
considered an aggravating circumstance against Salvador Iguiron. Rolly Villanueva, Gary Fantastico
and Salvador Iguiron were all armed while Elpidio, inebriated, had nothing to defend himself with.
There is clearly present here the circumstance of abuse of superior strength.23 (Emphasis supplied)
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the
victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous
for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime."24 "The fact
that there were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was
committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of the
aggressors and the victim."25 The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the
advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage.26 "To take advantage of
superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense
available to the person attacked."27 The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on
the age, size, and strength of the parties.28

Anent the penalty imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, which is an indeterminate penalty of
eight (8) years and one (1) day as minimum, to ten (10) years as maximum and ordered them to pay
actual damages of ₱17,300.00 and moral damages of ₱10,000.00, this Court finds an obvious error.

For the crime of attempted murder, the penalty shall be prision mayor, since Article 51 of the
Revised Penal Code states that a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony.29 Under
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the sentence shall be that which could be properly
imposed in view of the attending circumstances, and the minimum shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code. Absent any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance in this case, the maximum of the sentence should be within the range of
prision mayor in its medium term, which has a duration of eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10)
years; and that the minimum should be within the range of prision correccional, which has a duration
of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Therefore, the penalty imposed should have been
imprisonment from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated
January 20, 2010 of petitioners Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva is hereby DENIED.
Consequently, the Decision dated August 31, 2007 and Resolution dated January 7, 2010 of the
Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the petitioners are sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six ( 6) years of prision correccional, as minimum,
to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. Petitioners are also ORDERED to
pay Pl 7,300.00 as actual damages, as well as Pl 0,000.00 moral damages as originally ordered by
the RTC. In addition, interest is imposed on all damages awarded at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from date of finality of judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA JR. BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo, pp. 3-120.

2
Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, with Associate Justices Vicente S. E.
Veloso and Marlene Gonzales-Sison, concurring.

3
Rollo, pp. 26-28.

4
Penned by Presiding Judge Cicero D. Jurado, Jr.; id., at 60-65.

5
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 45, Sec. 1.

6
Sarsaba v. Vda. de Te,G.R. No. 175910, July 30, 2009, 594 SCRA 410, 420.

7
Rivera v. People, 515 Phil. 824, 833 (2006).

8
Id., citing People v. Lizada, 444 Phil. 67 (2003).

9
Reyes, Revised Penal Code, 1981, Vol. I, p. 98.

10
People v. Lizada, supranote 8.

11
Id. at 98-99.

12
Supra note 7, citing People v. Delim, 444 Phil. 430, 450 (2003).

13
Epifanio v. People, 552 Phil. 620, 630 (2007).

14
341 Phil. 725, 734 (1997).

15
People v. Gidoc, 604 Phil. 702, 713 (2009).

16
TSN, August 29, 1994, pp. 20-22.

17
Id. at 24-26.

18
People v. Dumadag, G.R. No. 147196, June 4, 2004, 431 SCRA 65, 70.

19
People v. Cabugatan, G.R. No. 172019, February 12, 2007, 515 SCRA 537, 547.

20
TSN, July 23, 1996, pp. 5-6.

21
People of the Philippines v. Danilo Feliciano, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014,
citing People v. Leozar Dela Cruz,G.R. No. 188353, February 16, 2010, 612 SCRA 738, 747
[Per J. Velasco, Third Division], citing People v. Amazan, 402 Phil. 247, 270 (2001) [Per J.
Mendoza, Second Division]; People v. Bato, 401 Phil. 415, 431 (2000) [Per J. Pardo, First
Division]; People v. Albarido, G.R. No. 102367, October 25, 2001, 368 SCRA 194.

22
See People v. Tavas, G.R. No. 123969, February 11, 1999, 303 SCRA 86.

23
Rollo, pp. 63-64.

24
People v. Daquipil, 310 Phil. 327, 348 (1995).

25
People v. Casingal, 312 Phil. 945, 956 (1995).

26
People v. Escoto, 313 Phil. 785, 800-801 (1995).

27
People v. Ventura, 477 Phil. 458, 484 (2004).
28
People v. Moka, 273 Phil. 610, 621 (1991).

29
People v. Adallom, GR. No. 182522, March 7, 2012, 667 SCRA 652, 680.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 183652 February 25, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and AAA, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, 21st DIVISION, MINDANAO STATION, RAYMUND CARAMPATANA,
JOEFHEL OPORTO, and MOISES ALQUIZOLA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated June 6, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN. The CA reversed and set aside the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Branch 21, dated
February 28, 2006 in Criminal Case No. 21-1211, and acquitted private respondents Raymund
Carampatana, Joefhel Oporto, and Moises Alquizola of the crime of rape for the prosecution's failure
to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In a Second Amended Information dated June 23, 2004, private respondents Carampatana, Oporto
and Alquizola werecharged, together with Christian John Lim, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel
Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold Batoctoy, and Joseph Villame, for allegedly raping AAA,3 to wit:

That on or about 10:30 o’clock in the evening of March 25, 2004 at Alson’s Palace, Maranding, Lala,
Lanao del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this HonorableCourt, the above-named
accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd designs forcefully drunk AAA, a 16-year-old minor, with an
intoxicating liquor and once intoxicated, brought said AAA at about dawn of March 26, 2004 at
Alquizola Lodging house, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte and also within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, and once inside said lodging house, accused RAYMUND CARAMPATANA and
JOEPHEL OPORTO took turns in having carnal knowledge against the will of AAA while accused
MOISES ALQUIZOLA, with lewd designs, kissed her against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by their respective counsels, entered a plea of not guilty to the
offense charged.5

Following pre-trial,6 trial on the merits ensued. Accused Christian John Lim, however, remains at-
large.

The factual antecedents follow:

On March 25, 2004, around 8:00 a.m., AAA attended her high school graduation ceremony.
Afterwards, they had a luncheon party at their house in Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte. AAA then
asked permission from her mother to go to the Maranding Stage Plaza because she and her
bandmates had to perform for an election campaign. She went home at around 4:00 p.m. from the
plaza. At about 7:00 p.m., AAA told her father that she would be attending a graduation dinner party
with her friends. AAA, together with Lim, Oporto, and Carampatana, ate dinner at the house of one
Mark Gemeno at Purok, Bulahan, Maranding. After eating, Lim invited them to go to Alson’s Palace,
which was merely a walking distance away from Gemeno’s house. Outside the Alson’s Palace, they
were greeted by Aldrin Montesco, Junver Alquizola, and Cherry Mae Fiel. After a while, they went
inside and proceeded to a bedroom on the second floor where they again saw Montesco with Harold
Batoctoy, Jansen Roda, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, a certain Diego, and one Angelo.
Rudinas suggested that they have a drinking session to celebrate their graduation, to which the rest
agreed.

They all contributed and it was Joseph Villame who bought the drinks – two (2) bottles of Emperador
Brandy. Then they arranged themselves in a circle for the drinking spree. Two (2) glasses were
being passed around: one glass containing the sweetener (Pepsi) and the other glass containing the
liquor. At first, AAA refused to drink because she had never tried hard liquor before. During the
session, they shared their problems with each other. When it was AAA’s turn, she became emotional
and started crying. It was then that she took her first shot. The glasses were passed around and she
consumed more or less five (5) glasses of Emperador Brandy. Thereafter, she felt dizzy so she laid
her head down on Oporto’s lap. Oporto then started kissing her head and they would remove her
baseball cap. This angered her so she told them to stop, and simply tried to hide her face with the
cap. But they just laughed at her. Then, Roda also kissed her. At that time, AAA was already sleepy,
but they still forced her to take another shot. They helped her stand up and make her drink. She
even heard Lim say, "Hubuga na, hubuga na," (You make her drunk, you make her drunk). She
likewise heard someone say, "You drink it, you drink it." She leaned on Oporto’s lap again, then she
fell asleep. They woke her up and Lim gave her the Emperador Brandy bottle to drink the remaining
liquor inside. She tried to refuse but they insisted, so she drank directly from the bottle. Again, she
fell asleep.

The next thing she knew, Roda and Batoctoy were carrying her down the stairs, and then she was
asleep again. When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was already at the Alquizola
Lodging House. She recognized that place because she had been there before. She would
thereafter fall back asleep and wake up again. And during one of the times that she was conscious,
she saw Oporto on top of her, kissing her on different parts of her body, and having intercourse with
her. She started crying. She tried to resist when she felt pain in her genitals. She also saw
Carampatana and Moises Alquizola inside the room, watching as Oporto abused her. At one point,
AAA woke up while Carampatana was inserting his penis into her private organ. She cried and told
him to stop. Alquizola then joined and started to kiss her. For the last time, she fell unconscious.

When she woke up, it was already 7:00a.m. of the next day. She was all alone. Her body felt heavy
and exhausted. She found herself with her shirt on but without her lower garments. The upper half of
her body was on top of the bed but her feet were on the floor. There were also red stains on her
shirt. After dressing up, she hailed a trisikad and went home. When AAA reached their house, her
father was waiting for her and was already furious. When she told them that she was raped, her
mother started hitting her. They brought her to the Lala Police Station to make a report. Thereafter,
they proceeded to the district hospital for her medical examination.

Dr. Cyrus Acusta of the Kapatagan District Hospital examined AAA in the morning of March 26,
2004, and found an old hymenal laceration at 5 o’clock position and hyperemia or redness at the
posterior fornices. The vaginal smear likewise revealed the presence of sperm.

On the other hand, accused denied that they raped AAA. According to the defense witnesses, in the
evening of March 25, 2004, Oporto, Carampatana, Lim, and AAA had dinner at Gemeno’s house.
Gemeno then invited Oporto to attend the graduation party hosted by Montesco at Alson’s Palace,
owned by the latter’s family. When they reached the place, Oporto told Montesco that they had to
leave for Barangay Tenazas to fetch one Arcie Ariola. At about 11:30 p.m., Oporto and
Carampatana returned to Alson’s Palace but could not find AAA and Lim. The party subsequently
ended, but the group agreed to celebrate further. AAA, Rudinas, Dela Cruz, Lim, and Oporto
contributed for two (2) bottles of Emperador Brandy and one (1) liter of Pepsi. Several persons were
in the room at that time: AAA, Carampatana, Oporto, Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, Villame,
and Lim. Also present but did not join the drinking were Gemeno, Montesco, Angelo Ugnabia, Al Jalil
Diego, Mohamad Janisah Manalao, one Caga, and a certain Bantulan. Gemeno told AAA not to
drink but the latter did not listen and instead told him not to tell her aunt. During the drinking session,
AAA rested on Oporto’s lap. She even showed her scorpion tattoo on her buttocks. And when her
legs grazed Batoctoy’s crotch, she remarked, "What was that, penis?" Roda then approached AAA
to kiss her, and the latter kissed him back. Oporto did the sameand AAA also kissed him. After
Oporto, Roda and AAA kissed each other again.

Meanwhile, earlier that evening, at around 9:00 p.m., Moises Alquizola was at the Alquizola Lodging
House drinking beer with his cousin, Junver, and Fiel. They stopped drinking at around midnight. Fiel
then requested Alquizola to accompany her to Alson’s Palace to see her friends there. They
proceeded to the second floor and there they saw AAA lying on Oporto’s lap. Fiel told AAA to go
home because her mother might get angry. AAA could not look her in the eye, just shook her head,
and said, "I just stay here." Alquizola and Fiel then went back to the lodging house. After thirty
minutes, they went to Alson’s Palace again,and saw AAA and Oporto kissing each other. AAA was
lying on his lap while holding his neck. Subsequently, they went back to the lodging house to resume
drinking.

After drinking, Batoctoy offered to bring AAA home. But she refused and instead instructed them to
take her to the Alquizola Lodging House because she has a big problem. AAA, Lim, and
Carampatana rode a motorcycle to the lodging house. When they arrived, AAA approached
Alquizola and told him, "Kuya, I want to sleep here for the meantime." Alquizola then opened Room
No. 4 where AAA, Oporto, and Carampatana stayed. There were two beds inside, a single bed and
a double-sized bed. AAA lay down on the single bed and looked at Carampatana. The latter
approached her and they kissed. He then removed her shirt and AAA voluntarily raised her hands to
give way. Carampatana likewise removed her brassiere. All the while, Oporto was at the foot of the
bed. Thereafter, Oporto also removed her pants. AAA even lifted her buttocks to make it easier for
him to pull her underwear down. Oporto then went to AAA and kissed her on the lips. Carampatana,
on the other hand, placed himself in between AAA’s legs and had intercourse with her. When he
finished, he put on his shorts and went back to Alson’s Palace to get some sleep. When he left,
Oporto and AAA were still kissing. Alquizola then entered the room. When AAA saw him, she said,
"Come Kuya, embrace me because I have a problem." Alquizola thus started kissing AAA’s breasts.
Oporto stood up and opened his pants. AAA held his penis and performed fellatio on him. Then
Oporto and Alquizola changed positions. Oporto proceeded to have sexual intercourse with AAA.
During that time, AAA was moaning and calling his name. Afterwards, Oporto went outside and slept
with Alquizola on the carpet. Oporto then had intercourse with AAA two more times. At 3:00 a.m., he
went back to Alson’s Palace to sleep. At around 6:00 a.m., Oporto and Carampatana went back to
the lodging house. They tried to wake AAA up, but she did not move so they just left and went home.
Alquizola had gone outside but he came back before 7:00 a.m. However, AAA was no longer there
when he arrived.

On February 28, 2006, the RTC found private respondents Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. It, however, acquitted Dela Cruz, Rudinas,
Roda, Batoctoy, and Villame for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered:

a) Finding accused Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the indivisible prison term of reclusion
perpetua; to pay AAA the amount of ₱50,000.00 for and by way of civil indemnity;

b) Finding accused Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged,
and the court hereby sentences him to suffer a prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years also of prision mayor as maximum; to pay
AAA the sum of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and another amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity;

c) Finding accused Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as ACCOMPLICE in

the commission of the crime charged, and the court hereby sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum; to pay AAA the
amount of ₱30,000.00 as moral damages and another sum of ₱30,000.00 for and by way of
civil indemnity;

d) Finding accused Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold Batoctoy
and Joseph Villame NOT GUILTY of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove
their guilt therefor beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court acquits them of said
charge; and e) Ordering accused Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola to pay, jointly and
severally, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees and expenses of litigations; and the
costs of suit.

The full period of the preventive imprisonment of accused Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola shall
be credited to them and deducted from their prison terms provided they comply with the
requirements of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

Accused Raymund Carampatana surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 and detained since then
up to the present. Accused Alquizola also surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 and detained
since then up to this time, while accused Joefhel Oporto who likewise surrendered voluntarily on 26
March 2004 was ordered released to the custody of the DSWD, Lala, Lanao del Norte on 31 March
2004, and subsequently posted cash bond for his provisional liberty on 17 September 2004 duly
approved by this court, thus resulted to an order of even date for his release from the custody of the
DSWD.

Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files without prejudice on the prosecution to
prosecute the case against accused Christian John Lim as soon as he is apprehended.

SO ORDERED.7

Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, private respondents brought the case to the CA. On June 6, 2008,
the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision reversing the trial court’s ruling and,
consequently, acquitted private respondents. The decretal portion of said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding reversible errors therefrom, the Decision on appeal is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. For lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellants RAYMUND
CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO and MOISES ALQUIZOLA are instead ACQUITTED of the
crime charged.
SO ORDERED.8

In sum, the CA found that the prosecution failed to prove private respondents’ guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. It gave more credence to the version of the defense and ruled that AAA
consented to the sexual congress. She was wide awake and aware of what private respondents
were doing before the intercourse. She never showed any physical resistance, never shouted for
help, and never fought against her alleged ravishers. The appellate court further relied on the
medical report which showed the presence of an old hymenal laceration on AAA’s genitalia, giving
the impression that she has had some carnal knowledge with a man before. The CA also stressed
that AAA’s mother’s unusual reaction of hitting her when she discovered what happened to her
daughter was more consistent with that of a parent who found out that her child just had premarital
sex rather than one who was sexually assaulted.

On July 29, 2008, AAA, through her private counsel, filed a Petition for Certiorari9 under Rule 65,
questioning the CA Decision which reversed private respondents’ conviction and ardently contending
that the same was made with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Thus, AAA raises this lone issue in her petition:

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

ACQUITTING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.10

The private respondents present the following arguments in their Comment dated November 7, 2008
to assail the petition:

I.

A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IS IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND THE

PROSECUTION CANNOT APPEAL THE ACQUITTAL BECAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROHIBITION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

II.

THE PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ON THE PART OF PUBLIC
RESPONDENT.

III.

CERTIORARI WILL NOT LIE UNLESS A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS FIRST FILED. IV.
THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IS THE APPELLATE COUNSEL OF THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES IN ALL CRIMINAL CASES.11

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its own Comment on April 1, 2009. It assigns the
following errors:

I.

THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT MAY VALIDLY APPEAL AN ORDER OF ACQUITTAL AS TO THE

CIVIL ASPECT OF THE CRIME.

II.

THE APPELLATE DECISION OF ACQUITTAL IS NULL AND VOID FOR HAVING BEEN
RENDERED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION, AN EXCEPTION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.12

The Court will first resolve the procedural issues.

At the onset, the Court stresses that rules of procedure are meant to be tools to facilitate a fair and
orderly conduct of proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must not get in the way of achieving
substantial justice. As long as their purpose is sufficiently met and no violation of due process and
fair play takes place, the rules should be liberally construed.13 Liberal construction of the rules is the
controlling principle to effect substantial justice. The relaxation or suspension of procedural rules, or
the exemption of a case from their operation, is warranted when compelling reasons exist or when
the purpose of justice requires it. Thus, litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their
merits and not on sheer technicalities.14
As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment
rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. The reason is that a judgment of acquittal is
immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is barred from appealing lest the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy be violated.15 Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.

Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the accused may appeal, but only with
respect to the civil aspect of the decision. Or, said judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the lower court, in acquitting
the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering
the assailed judgment null and void.16 If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting petitioner’s
prayer is not tantamount to putting private respondents in double jeopardy.17

As to the party with the proper legal standing to bring the action, the Court said in People v.
Santiago:18

It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the
private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the
prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If
a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the
criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor
General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or
complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may
appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.

In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is
alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or
on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved.
In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The
complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action
questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing,
complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may
be prosecuted in [the] name of said complainant.19 Private respondents argue that the action should
have been filed by the State through the OSG. True, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused
or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on
behalf of the State. This is because the authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases
before the Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the OSG.20

Here, AAA filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit at the instance of her private counsel,
primarily imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA when it acquitted private
respondents. As the aggrieved party, AAA clearly has the right to bring the action in her name and
maintain the criminal prosecution. She has an immense interest in obtaining justice in the case
precisely because she is the subject of the violation. Further, as held in Dela Rosa v. CA,21 where the
Court sustained the private offended party’s right in a criminal case to file a special civil action for
certiorari to question the validity of the judgment of dismissal and ruled that the Solicitor General’s
intervention was not necessary, the recourse of the complainant to the Court is proper since it was
brought in her own name and not in that of the People of the Philippines. In any event, the OSG joins
petitioner’s cause in its Comment,22 thereby fulfilling the requirement that all criminal actions shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.23

Private respondents further claim that even assuming, merely for the sake of argument, that AAA
can file the special civil action for certiorari without violating their right against double jeopardy, still, it
must be dismissed for petitioner’s failure to previously file a motion for reconsideration. True, a
motion for reconsideration is a condicio sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari. Its
purpose is for the court to have an opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it
by reexamination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. This rule, however, is not
absolute and admits well-defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as
where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those
raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution
of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a
motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and
there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is
urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in
the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in
which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law
or where public interest is involved.24

Here, petitioner’s case amply falls within the exception. AAA raises the same questions as those
raised and passed upon in the lower court, essentially revolving on the guilt of the private
respondents. There is also an urgent necessity to resolve the issues, for any further delay would
prejudice the interests, not only of the petitioner, but likewise that of the Government. And, as will
soon be discussed, the CA decision is a patent nullity for lack of due process and for having been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

For the writ of certiorari to issue, the respondent court must be shown to have acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An acquittal is considered tainted with
grave abuse of discretion when it is shown that the prosecution’s right to due process was violated
or that the trial conducted was a sham. The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate and
establish that the respondent court blatantly abused its authority such as to deprive itself of its very
power to dispense justice.25

AAA claims in her petition that the CA, in evident display of grave abuse of judicial discretion, totally
disregarded her testimony as well as the trial court’s findings of fact, thereby adopting hook, line, and
sinker, the private respondents’ narration of facts.

The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be
considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility.26 There is grave abuse of discretion when the disputed act
of the lower court goes beyond the limits of discretion thus effecting an injustice.27

The Court finds that the petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of proving that the
respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in acquitting private respondents.

It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely relied on the evidence presented by the
defense and utterly disregarded that of the prosecution. At first, it may seem that its narration of the
facts28 of the case was meticulously culled from the evidence of both parties. But a more careful
perusal will reveal that it was simply lifted, if not altogether parroted, from the testimonies of the
accused, especially that of Oporto,29 Carampatana,30 and Alquizola,31 the accused-appellants in the
case before it. The appellate court merely echoed the private respondents’ testimonies, particularly
those as to the specific events that transpired during the crucial period - from the dinner at
Gemeno’s house to the following morning at the Alquizola Lodging House. As a result, it presented
the private respondents’ account and allegations as though these were the established facts of the
case, which it later conveniently utilized to support its ruling of acquittal.

Due process requires that, in reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider the entire evidence
presented, regardless of the party who offered the same.32 It simply cannot acknowledge that of one
party and turn a blind eye to that of the other. It cannot appreciate one party’s cause and brush the
other aside. This rule becomes particularly significant in this case because the parties tendered
contradicting versions of the incident. The victim is crying rape but the accused are saying it was a
consensual sexual rendezvous. Thus, the CA’s blatant disregard of material prosecution evidence
and outward bias in favor of that of the defense constitutes grave abuse of discretion resulting in
violation of petitioner’s right to due process.33

Moreover, the CA likewise easily swept under the rug the observations of the RTC and made its own
flimsy findings to justify its decision of acquittal.

First, the appellate court held that AAA was, in fact, conscious during the whole ordeal. The fact that
she never showed any physical resistance, never cried out for help, and never fought against the
private respondents, bolsters the claim of the latter that the sexual acts were indeed consensual.

But the CA seemed to forget that AAA was heavily intoxicated at the time of the assault. Article 266-
A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides:

Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed–

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

 b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;

2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

Under the aforecited provision, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of
the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve years of
age.34 Here, the accused intentionally made AAA consume hard liquor more than she could handle.
They still forced her to drink even when she was already obviously inebriated. They never denied
having sexual intercourse with AAA, but the latter was clearly deprived of reason or unconscious at
the time the private respondents ravished her. The CA, however, readily concluded that she agreed
to the sexual act simply because she did not shout or offer any physical resistance, disregarding her
testimony that she was rendered weak and dizzy by intoxication, thereby facilitating the commission
of the crime.35 The appellate court never provided any reason why AAA’s testimony should deserve
scant or no weight at all, or why it cannot be accorded any credence. In reviewing rape cases, the
lone testimony of the victim is and should be, by itself, sufficient to warrant a judgment of conviction
if found to be credible. Also, it has been established that when a woman declares that she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that she has been raped, and where her
testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on that basis alone. This is
because from the nature of the offense, the sole evidence that can usually be offered to establish the
guilt of the accused is the complainant’s testimony itself.36 The trial court correctly ruled that if AAA
was not truthful to her accusation, she would not have opened herself to the rough and tumble of a
public trial. AAA was certainly not enjoying the prying eyes of those who were listening as she
narrated her harrowing experience.37

AAA positively identified the private respondents as the ones who violated her. She tried to resist,
but because of the presence of alcohol, her assaulters still prevailed. The RTC found AAA’s
testimony simple and candid, indicating that she was telling the truth. The trial court likewise
observed that her answers to the lengthy and humiliating questions were simple and straightforward,
negating the possibility of a rehearsed testimony.38 Thus:

Atty. Jesus M. Generalao (on direct):

xxxx

Q: Now, you said also when the Court asked you that you went asleep, when did you regain
your consciousness?

A: They woke me up and wanted me to drink the remaining wine inside the bottle of
Emperador Brandy.

xxxx

Q: What do you mean that they hide you (sic) to drink the remaining contained (sic) of the
bottle of Emperador Brandy?

A: They gave me the bottle, sir, and I was trying to refuse but they insisted.

Q: Who handed over to you that bottle, if you can remember?

A: It was Christian John Lim, sir.

Q: Did you drink that Emperador directly from the bottle?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What happened after that?

A: I fell asleep again, sir.

Q: When did you regain your consciousness?

A: When somebody was carrying me down to the spiral stairs.

Q: Can you remember the person or persons who was or who were carrying you?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who?

A: They were Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy.

Q: If you can still remember, how did Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy carry you?

A: I placed my hands to their shoulder (sic), sir:

xxxx

Q: After that, what happened, if any?

A: I was already asleep, sir, when we went downstairs.

Q: You mean to say that you cannot remember anymore?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, when again did you regain your consciousness?

A: When we entered the room and the light was switch (sic) on, I was awakened by the flash
of light.

Q: Do you have any idea, where were you when you were awakened that (sic) flash of light.

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where?

A: Alquizola Lodging House, sir.

xxxx

Q: When you regained your consciousness from the flash of light, what happened?

A: I loss (sic) my consciousness again, sir.

Q: So, you fell asleep again?

A: Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q: When did you wake-up (sic) again?

A: When I feel (sic) heavy on top of me, sir.

Q: So you wake-up (sic) again, whom did you see?

A: It was Joefhel Oporto, sir.

Q: He was on top of you?

A: Yes, sir. (Witness is crying while answering)

Q: What was you (sic) reaction when you found that Joefhel Oporto was on top of you?

A: I was starting to cry, sir.

Q: Aside from starting to cry, what else is (sic) your reaction?

A: I was saying don’t because I feel pain my private organ (sic).

Q: What did Joefhel Oporto do, when you (sic) those words?

A: He was kissing on the different part (sic) of my body then he sexually abused me.

ATTY. GENERALAO: We want to make it on record, Your Honor, that the witness is crying.

xxxx

ATTY. GENERALAO: May I continue, Your Honor.

COURT: Continue.

ATTY. GENERALAO: Aside from Joefhel Oporto was found (sic) on top of you, who else was
there inside that room?

A: Moises Alquizola and Raymund Carampatana, sir.

Q: With respect to Raymund Carampatana, what was he doing?

A: He was at my feet while looking at us.

Q: Was it dress (sic) up or undressed?

A: Dressed up, sir.

Q: What about Moises Alquizola, what was he doing?

A: He was beside us standing and looking at me, sir.

Q: Was he dressed up or undressed?

A: I could not remember, sir.

xxxx

Q: After that, what happened?

A: I went asleep again, sir.

Q: Then, when again did you or when again did you wake up?

A: When I feel (sic)pain something inside my private part (sic), I saw Raymund
Carampatana, sir.

Q: On top of you?

A: No, sir, because he was in between my legs, sir.

Q: What was your reaction?

A: I was starting to cry again, sir, and told him don’t.

Q: At that point, who else was inside that room when you found Raymund Carampatana?

A: Only the three of them, sir.

Q: Including Moises Alquizola?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was he doing?

A: He was started (sic) to kiss me.

 Q: Where in particular?

A: In my face, sir.

Q: Then after that, what happened?

A: I fell asleep again, sir.

Q: Now, before you went asleep again (sic), what did you feel when you said that you feel
(sic) something in your private part when you saw Raymund Carampatana?

A: He inserted his penis in my private organ, sir.

Q: Then after that you fell asleep again?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: When did you wake-up (sic)?

A: I woke up at about 7:00 o’clock a.m in the next (sic) day, sir.39

On the other hand, the RTC was not convinced with the explanation of the defense. It noted that
their account of the events was seemingly unusual and incredible.40 Besides, the defense of
consensual copulation was belatedly invoked and seemed to have been a last ditch effort to avoid
culpability. The accused never mentioned about the same at the pre-trial stage. The trial court only
came to know about it when it was their turn to take the witness stand, catching the court by
surprise.41 More importantly, it must be emphasized that when the accused in a rape case claims that
the sexual intercourse between him and the complainant was consensual, as in this case, the
burden of evidence shifts to him, such that he is now enjoined to adduce sufficient evidence to prove
the relationship. Being an affirmative defense that needs convincing proof, it must be established
with sufficient evidence that the intercourse was indeed consensual.42 Generally, the burden of proof
is upon the prosecution to establish each and every element of the crime and that it is the accused
who is responsible for its commission. This is because in criminal cases, conviction must rest on a
moral certainty of guilt.43 Burden of evidence is that logical necessity which rests on a party at any
particular time during the trial to create a prima facie case in his favor or to overthrow one when
created against him. A prima facie case arises when the party having the burden of proof has
produced evidence sufficient to support a finding and adjudication for him of the issue in
litigation.44 However, when the accused alleges consensual sexual congress, he needs convincing
proof such as love notes, mementos, and credible witnesses attesting to the romantic or sexual
relationship between the offender and his supposed victim. Having admitted to carnal knowledge of
the complainant, the burden now shifts to the accused to prove his defense by substantial
evidence.45

Here, the accused themselves admitted to having carnal knowledge of AAA but unfortunately failed
to discharge the burden required of them. Carampatana narrated that upon reaching the room at the
lodging house, AAA lay down on the bed and looked at him. He then approached her and they
kissed. He removed her shirt and brassiere. Thereafter, Oporto also removed AAA’s lower garments
and then went to kiss AAA. Carampatana then placed himself in between AAA’s legs and had
intercourse with her.46 On the other hand, Oporto himself testified that he had sexual intercourse with
AAA three times. While Carampatana was removing AAA’s shirt and brassiere, Oporto was watching
at the foot of the bed. Then he removed her pants and underwear, and AAA even lifted her buttocks
to make it easier for him to pull the clothes down. When Carampatana left after having sexual
intercourse with AAA, according to Oporto, he then stood up, opened his pants, and took out his
penis so that AAA could perform fellatio on him. Then he proceeded to have sexual intercourse with
AAA. Afterwards, Oporto went outside and slept with Alquizola on the carpet. After a few minutes, he
woke up and went back to the room and again had intercourse with AAA. He went back to sleep and
after some time, he woke up to the sound of AAA vomitting. Shortly thereafter, he made love with
AAA for the third and last time.47 Despite said shameless admission, however, the accused failed to
sufficiently prove that the lack of any physical resistance on AAA’s part amounts to approval or
permission. They failed to show that AAA had sexual intercourse with them out of her own volition,
and not simply because she was seriously intoxicated at that time, and therefore could not have
given a valid and intelligent consent to the sexual act.

The RTC also noticed that Fiel, one of the defense witnesses, was showy and exaggerated when
testifying, even flashing a thumbs-up to some of the accused after her testimony, an indication of a
rehearsed witness.48 To be believed, the testimony must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness; it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve as probable under the attending circumstances.49
When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is even
conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of
weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the
witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the
appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence.50 Matters of credibility are addressed
basically to the trial judge who is in a better position than the appellate court to appreciate the weight
and evidentiary value of the testimonies of witnesses who have personally appeared before
him.51 The appellate courts are far detached from the details and drama during trial and have to rely
solely on the records of the case in its review. On the matter of credence and credibility of witnesses,
therefore, the Court acknowledges said limitations and recognizes the advantage of the trial court
whose findings must be given due deference.52 Since the CA and the private respondents failed to
show any palpable error, arbitrariness, or capriciousness on the findings of fact of the trial court,
these findings deserve great weight and are deemed conclusive and binding.53

The CA continued, belaboring on the fact that the examining physician found old hymenal laceration
on AAA’s private organ. The lack of a fresh hymenal laceration, which is expected to be present
when the alleged sexual encounter is involuntary, could mean that AAA actually consented to the
fornication. According to Dr. Acusta, when sex is consensual, the vagina becomes lubricated and the
insertion of the penis will not cause any laceration. It presumed that complainant, therefore, was no
longer innocent considering the presence of old hymenal laceration that could have resulted from
her previous sexual encounters. The defense, however, failed to show that AAA was sexually
promiscuous and known for organizing or even joining sex orgies. It must be noted that AAA was a
minor, barely 17 years old at the time of the incident, having just graduated from high school on that
same day. In a similar case,54 the Court held: x x x Indeed, no woman would have consented to have
sexual intercourse with two men — or three, according to Antonio Gallardo — in the presence of
each other, unless she were a prostitute or as morally debased as one. Certainly, the record before
Us contains no indication that Farmacita, a 14-year old, first-year high school student, can be so
characterized. On the contrary, her testimony in court evinced the simplicity and candor peculiar to
her youth. In fact, appellants could not even suggest any reason why Farmacita would falsely impute
to them the commission of the crime charged.55

No woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination
of her private parts, and be subjected to public trial and humiliation if her claim were not true.56 And
even if she were indeed highly promiscuous at such a young age, the same could still not prove that
no rape was actually committed. Even a complainant who was a woman of loose morals could still
be the victim of rape. Even a prostitute may be a victim of rape. The victim’s moral character in rape
is immaterial where, as in this case, it is shown that the victim was deprived of reason or was
rendered unconscious through intoxication to enable the private respondents to have sex with her.
Moreover, the essence of rape is the carnal knowledge of a woman against her consent.57 A freshly
broken hymen is not one of its essential elements. Even if the hymen of the victim was still intact, the
possibility of rape cannot be ruled out. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina,
even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a conviction for rape. To repeat,
rupture of the hymen or laceration of any part of the woman’s genitalia is not indispensable to a
conviction for rape.58 Neither does AAA’s mother’s act of hitting her after learning about the rape
prove anything. It is a truism that "the workings of the human mind when placed under emotional
stress are unpredictable, and the people react differently."59 Different people react differently to a
given type of situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted
with a strange, startling or frightful experience.60 At most, it merely indicates the frustration and
dismay of a mother upon learning that her daughter had been defiled after partying late the night
before. It is a settled rule that when there is no showing that private complainant was impelled by
improper motive in making the accusation against the accused, her complaint is entitled to full faith
and credence.61 So if AAA in fact consented to the sexual act, why did she still need to immediately
tell her parents about it when she could have just kept it to herself? Why did she ever have to shout
rape? She was not caught in the act of making love with any of the private respondents,62 nor was
she shown to have been in a relationship with any of them of which her family disapproved.63 She
never became pregnant as a result of the deed. And if AAA cried rape to save her reputation, why
would she have to drag the private respondents into the case and identify them as her rapists?
Absent any circumstance indicating the contrary, she brought the charge against the private
respondents simply because she was, in fact, violated and she wants to obtain justice. Her zeal in
prosecuting the case, even after the CA had already acquitted the private respondents, evinces the
truth that she merely seeks justice for her honor that has been debased.64 Unfortunately, the CA
chose to ignore these telling pieces of evidence. Its findings are against the logic and effect of the
facts as presented by AAA in support of her complaint,65 contrary to common human experience, and
in utter disregard of the relevant laws and jurisprudence on the crime of rape.

Lastly, the trial court pronounced that Alquizola was not part of the conspiracy because his
participation in the crime was uncertain,66 citing People v. Lobrigo.67 It found that his participation was
not in furtherance of the plan, if any, to commit the crime of rape.68 The Court, however, finds that the
RTC erred in ruling that Alquizola’s liability is not of a conspirator, but that of a mere accomplice. To
establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a
crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same
objective. Conspiracy is proved if there is convincing evidence to sustain a finding that the
malefactors committed an offense in furtherance of a common objective pursued in concert.69 Proof
of conspiracy need not even rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the collective
conduct of the parties before, during or after the commission of the crime indicating a common
understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense.70

In Lobrigo, the Court declared:

We note that the testimonies of witnesses with respect to Gregorio's and Dominador's participation in
the crime conflict on material points.

Doubt exists as to whether Gregorio and Dominador were carrying weapons during the mauling and
whether they participated in the mauling by more than just boxing the victim. Noel stated that they
did not, Domingo stated that they did.

In conspiracy, evidence as to who administered the fatal blow is not necessary. In this case, the rule
1âw phi1

is not applicable because conspiracy with respect to Gregorio and Dominador is not proven. Their
exact participation in the crime is uncertain.71 (Emphasis Supplied)

In People v. Dela Torre,72 the Court upheld the findings of the lower courts that there was conspiracy:

The RTC held that:

While [it] is true that it was only Leo Amoroso who actually ravished the victim based on the
testimony of the private complainant that Amoroso succeeded in inserting his penis to her private
parts and that Reynaldo dela Torre and Ritchie Bisaya merely kissed her and fondled her private
parts, accused [D]ela Torre can likewise be held liable for the bestial acts of Amoroso as it is quite
apparent that the three of them conspired and mutually helped one another in raping the young
victim.

The Court of Appeals held that:

[W]hile [Dela Torre] did not have carnal knowledge with [AAA], his tacit and spontaneous
participation and cooperation of pulling her towards the parked jeep, molesting her and doing
nothing to prevent the commission of the rape, made him a co-conspirator. As such, he was properly
adjudged as a principal in the commission of the crime.73

Here, unlike in the foregoing case of Lobrigo, Alquizola’s participation in the crime is not at all
uncertain. As the caretaker of the Alquizola Lodging House, he provided a room so the rape could
be accomplished with ease and furtiveness. He was likewise inside the room, intently watching,
while Oporto and Carampatana sexually abused AAA. He did not do anything to stop the bestial acts
of his companions. He even admitted to kissing AAA’s lips, breasts, and other parts of her body.
Indubitably, there was conspiracy among Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola to sexually abuse
AAA. Hence, the act of any one was the act of all, and each of them, Alquizola including, is equally
guilty of the crime of rape. While it is true that the RTC found Alquizola guilty as mere accomplice,
when he appealed from the decision of the trial court,74 he waived the constitutional safeguard
against double jeopardy and threw the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is
then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or
unfavorable to the accused-appellant.75

Finally, the Court notes that although the prosecution filed only a single Information, it, however,
actually charged the accused of several rapes. As a general rule, a complaint or information must
charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is defective.76 The rationale behind this rule prohibiting
duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the accused the necessary knowledge of the charge
against him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State should not heap upon
the accused two or more charges which might confuse him in his defense.77 Non-compliance with
this rule is a ground78 for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule117 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he
enters his plea,79 otherwise, the defect is deemed waived.80 The accused herein, however, cannot
avail of this defense simply because they did not file a motion to quash questioning the validity of the
Information during their arraignment. Thus, they are deemed to have waived their right to question
the same. Also, where the allegations of the acts imputed to the accused are merely different counts
specifying the acts of perpetration of the same crime, as in the instant case, there is no duplicity to
speak of.81 There is likewise no violation of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges
against them because the Information, in fact, stated that they "took turns in having carnal
knowledge against the will of AAA" on March 25, 2004.82 Further, allegations made and the evidence
presented to support the same reveal that AAA was indeed raped and defiled several times. Here,
according to the accused themselves, after undressing AAA, Carampatana positioned himself in
between her legs and had intercourse with her. On the other hand, Oporto admitted that he had
sexual intercourse with AAA three times. When two or more offenses are charged in a single
complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of
as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for each
offense.83 Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola can then be held liable for more than one crime of
rape, or a total of four (4) counts in all, with conspiracy extant among the three of them during the
commission of each of the four violations. Each of the accused shall thus be held liable for every act
of rape committed by the other. But while Oporto himself testified that he inserted his sexual organ
into AAA’s mouth, the Court cannot convict him of rape through sexual assault therefor because the
same was not included in the Information. This is, however, without prejudice to the filing of a case
of rape through sexual assault as long as prescription has not yet set in.

Anent the appropriate penalty to be imposed, rape committed by two or more persons is punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death under Article 266-B of the RPC. But in view of the presence of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and the absence of an aggravating circumstance to
offset the same, the lighter penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon them,84 for each
count. With regard to Oporto, appreciating in his favor the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority, the proper imposable penalty upon him is reclusion temporal, being the penalty next lower
to reclusion perpetua to death. Being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
applicable. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Oporto can be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty the minimum of which shall be within the range of prision mayor(the penalty next lower in
degree to reclusion temporal) and the maximum of which shall be within the range of reclusion
temporal in its minimum period, there being the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, and there being no aggravating circumstance. 85 With that, the Court shall impose the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, for each count of
rape committed. 86 However, Oporto shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51,
R.A. No. 9344,87which extends even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21)
years, so long as he committed the crime when he was still a child,88 and provides for the
confinement of convicted children as follows:89

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. – A
child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve
his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and
other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the
BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

Hence, in the proper execution of judgment by the lower court, the foregoing provision should be
taken into consideration by the judge in order to accord children in conflict with the law, who have
already gone beyond twenty-one (21) years of age, the proper treatment envisioned by law.

As to their civil liability, all of them shall pay AAA the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
another ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, in each case. Exemplary damages of ₱30,000.00 shall
likewise be imposed by way of an example and to deter others from committing the same bestial
acts.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated
June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN is REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The Court hereby renders judgment:

a) Finding accused-respondent Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt

of four (4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua in each case;

b) Finding accused-respondent Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four ( 4)

counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from six ( 6) years and one ( 1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve
(12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, in each case; and

c) Finding accused-respondent Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four (

4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua in each case.

The Court hereby ORDERS the accused-respondents to pay AAA, jointly and severally, the amounts
of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, for each of the four (4) counts of rape. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for
its appropriate action in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344. Let the records of this
case be forwarded to the court of origin for the execution of judgment.

SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO* MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza, per Special
Order No. 1934 dated February 11, 2015.

1
Penned by Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybanez, with Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and
Mario V. Lopez; concurring; rollo, pp. 69-103.

2
Penned by Judge Jacob T. Malik; rollo, pp. 28-67.

3
In line with the Court's ruling in People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, September 19,
2006, 502 SCRA 419, 426; citing Rule on Violence Against Women and their Children, Sec.
40; Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 9262, Rule XI, Sec. 63, otherwise
known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act," the real names of the
rape victims will not be disclosed.

The Court will instead use fictitious initials to represent them throughout the decision.
The personal circumstances of the victims or any other information tending to
establish or compromise their identities will likewise be withheld.

4
Records, pp. 39-40.

5
Id. at 58, 86, 157-162.

6
Id. at 157-172.

7
Rollo, pp. 66-67.

8
Id. at 102. (Emphasis in the original)

9
Id. at 3-27.
10
Id. at 10.

11
Id. at 241-242.

12
Id. at 292, 298.

Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. CA, G.R. No. 165155, April 13, 2010, 618
13

SCRA 181, 184.

Asia United Bank v. Goodland Company, Inc., G.R. No. 188051, November 22, 2010, 635
14

SCRA 637, 645.

M. GUBAT, THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED 481 (3rd

15

ed. 2009).

16
Id. at 481-482.

Goodland Company, Inc. v. Co and Chan, G.R. No. 196685, December 14, 2011, 662
17

SCRA 692, 701.

18
255 Phil. 851 (1989).

19
People v. Santiago, supra, at 861-862. (Emphasis ours)

20
Bautista v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 189754, October 24, 2012, 684 SCRA 521, 534.

21
323 Phil. 596 (1996).

22
Rollo, pp. 272-301.

23
Merciales v. CA, 429 Phil. 70, 79 (2002).

24
Republic v. Bayao, G.R. No. 179492, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 313, 323.

25
People v. CA, G.R. No. 198589, July 25, 2012.

26
Yu v. Reyes Carpio, G.R. No. 189207, June 15, 2011, 652 SCRA 341, 348.

27
Dissenting Opinion of then Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee in Chemplex (Phils.), Inc.
v. Hon. Pamatian, 156 Phil. 408, 457 (1974).

28
Rollo, pp. 72-78.

29
Id. at 38-41.

30
Id. at 46-48.

31
Id. at 42-43.

32
Equitable PCIBank v. Caguioa, 504 Phil. 242, 249 (2005).

33
Id.

34
People v. Padigos, G.R. No. 181202, December 5, 2012, 687 SCRA 245, 255.

35
People v. Hon. Cabral, 362 Phil. 697, 712 (1999).

36
People v. Rivera, 414 Phil. 430, 453 (2001).

37
Rollo, p. 55.

38
Id.

39
Rollo, pp. 49-53.

40
Id. at 58-59.
41
Id. at 57-58.

42
People v. Alcober, G.R. No. 192941, November 13, 2013, 709 SCRA 479, 488.

43
Timbal v. CA, 423 Phil. 617, 623 (2001).

44
People v. Mirandilla, G.R. No. 186417, July 27, 2011, 654 SCRA 761, 772.

45
People v. Mantis, 477 Phil. 275, 287 (2004).

46
Rollo, p. 48.

47
Id. at 40-41.

48
Id. at 60.

49
People v. Dejillo, G.R. No. 185005, December 10, 2012, 687 SCRA 537, 553.

50
People v. Apattad, G.R. No. 193188, August 10, 2011, 655 SCRA 335, 349.

51
Valbueco, Inc. v. Province of Bataan, G.R. No. 173829, June 10, 2013, 698 SCRA 57, 77.

52
People v. Vergara, G.R. No. 177763, July 3, 2013, 700 SCRA 412, 421.

53
People v. Apattad, supra note 50, at 350.

54
People v. Soriano, 146 Phil. 585 (1970).

55
Id. at 589. (Emphasis ours)

56
People v. Zabala, 456 Phil. 237, 243.

57
People v. Baluya, 430 Phil. 349. 363 (2002).

58
People v. Dimacuha, 467 Phil. 342, 350 (2004).

59
People v. Buenviaje, 408 Philo. 342, 346 (2001).

60
People v. Jorolan, 452 Phil. 698. 714 (2003).

61
People v. Balya, supra note 57.

62
People v. Singson, G.R. No. 194719, September 21, 2011, 658 SCRA 185, 192.

63
People v. Ramos, 467 Phil 376, 389 (2004).

64
People v. Baluya, supra note 57, at 364.

65
Chempex (Phils.), Inc. v. Hon. Pamatian, supra note 27.

66
Rollo, p. 63.

67
410 Phil. 283, 291 (2001).

68
Rollo, p. 62.

69
People v. Peralta, 134 Phil. 703, 722-723 (1968).

70
People v. Gambao, G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013, 706 SCRA 508, 527.

71
People v. Jabonera, supra note 67. (Emphasis ourts)

72
588 Phil. 937 (2008).

73
People v. Dela Torre, supra, at 943. (Citations omitted)
74
Rollo, p. 81.

75
Supra note 44.

76
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 110, Section 13.

77
Supra note 15, at 90.

Section 3. Grounds. — The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on
78

any of the following grounds:

xxxx

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for
various offenses is prescribed by law;

xxxx

Section 1. Time to move to quash. — At any time before entering his plea, the accused
79

may move to quash the complaint or information.

80
People v. Lucena, 408 Phil. 172, 191 (2001).

81
Supra note 15, at 91; citing Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 2, 9th ed., p. 271.

82
Supra note 4.

83
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 120, Section 3.

84
Revised Penal Code, Art. 63, par. 3.

85
Revised Penal Code, Art. 64 (2).

86
People v. Monticalvo, G.R. No. 193507, January 30, 2013.

Entitled AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND

87

WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL

UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

88
People v. Jacinto, G.R. No. 182239, March 16, 2011.

89
People v. Sarcia, G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009.
 FIRST DIVISION

October 22, 2014

G.R. No. 207629

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
ARNEL VILLALBA y DURAN and RANDY VILLALBA SARCO, Accused-Appellants

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before the Court is the Decision1 dated September 25, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 00844-MIN, which affirmed, with modifications as to the amount of damages imposed, the
Judgment2 dated February 18, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City, Branch 33, in
Criminal Case No. 11736, finding accused-appellants Amel Villalba y Duran (Amel) and Randy
Villalba y Sarco (Randy) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the murder of Ma:ximillian Casona y
Lacroix: (Ma:ximillian).

In the Information dated May 1, 2006 filed with the RTC, accusedappellants were charged as
follows:

That on or about the 29th day of April 2006 at 2:30 o'clock in the morning, more or less, at Capitol A
venue, near Gaisano Mall, Butuan City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of superior strength, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, attack and stab one MAXIMILLIAN CASONA Y
LACROIX, with the use of an ice pick, hitting the latter at his left breast and left portion of his
stomach, which directly caused his death incurring damages which maybe proven in Court.3

Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty during their arraignment on August 8, 2006.4

At the pre-trial conference held on July 19, 2007,5 the parties stipulated only as to the time and place
of the stabbing incident, i.e., at around 2:00 in the early morning of April 29, 2006 near the Gaisano
Mall in Butuan City. Thereafter, trial ensued.

The prosecution presented the testimonies of three persons who witnessed the stabbing incident:
Maximillian’s widow Josephine B. Casona (Josephine),6 Homer Ferdinand B. Hermosura
(Homer),7 and Frederick L. Apolinario (Frederick).8 The prosecution also called to the witness stand
the physicians who attended to Maximillian before his death, namely, cardiologist Dr. Annalisa A.
Gonzalez (Gonzalez)9 and surgeon Dr. Edesio C. Urag (Urag).10 Last to testify for the prosecution
was Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Inocencio T. Amora (P/Insp. Amora),11 the investigator assigned to the
case and the apprehending officer of accused-appellants.

The documentary exhibits of the prosecution consisted of the respective Sworn Statements, all
dated May 1, 2006, of Josephine, Homer, and Frederick;12 the police blotter entry dated April 29,
2006 which reported Maximillian’s stabbing and death;13 the police blotter entry dated April 30, 2006
which reported the subsequent arrests of accused-appellants for illegal gambling and concealment
of deadly weapon;14 the Affidavit of Apprehension dated April 30, 2006 jointly executed by P/Insp.
Amora, Senior Police Officer (SPO) 3 Antonio A. Claros, Police Officer (PO) 3 Rey Gabrielle B.
Maderal, and PO2 Judan Q. Alvizo;15 three photographs depicting Frederick’s identification of
accused-appellants as Maximillian’s assailants;16 a sketch and description of the puncture wounds
found on Maximillian’s body prepared by Dr. Urag;17 Maximillian’s Certificate of Death;18 and the
hospital and burial expenses in the total amount of ₱55,225.60 incurred by Josephine.19 These
exhibits were all admitted in evidence by the RTC in its Order dated February 29, 2008.20

The prosecution’s evidence established the following version of events:

Maximillian, a college instructor, attended a farewell party for his students at Moff’s Restaurant and
Cocktail Lounge along JC Aquino Avenue in Butuan City on the night of April 28, 2006. Maximillian
was accompanied by his wife Josephine and their friends Frederick, Homer, and Homer’s wife
Marilou.

Around 2:30 in the morning of April 29, 2006, Josephine begged Maximillian that they already go
home. Josephine reminded Maximillian of the lateness of the hour and of the great amount of liquor
that he had already consumed. Maximillian still did not want to leave, but Josephine insisted. Angry,
Maximillian rushed out of the restaurant and headed towards the direction of the Gaisano Mall in
Butuan City. Josephine asked Frederick to catch up with Maximillian. Josephine, Homer, and
Marilou then trailed about 10 meters behind Maximillian and Frederick.

When they turned the corner of JC Avenue and Capitol Drive, Maximillian and Frederick chanced
upon accused-appellants and their girlfriends. Maximillian’s group and accused-appellants’ group did
not know each other prior to the early morning of April 29, 2006. Maximillian suddenly ordered
accused-appellants to wear their shirts, and then asked accused-appellant Arnel, "How much is
that?" referring to accused-appellant Arnel’s girlfriend. Frederick intervened and told accused-
appellant Arnel, "Brod, don’t mind him. He is a little bit drunk." Accused-appellant Arnel replied, "That
was nothing, Kuya." However, Maximillian and accusedappellant Arnel continued to stare at each
other. Moments later, Maximillian tried to get hold of accused-appellant Arnel’s left arm but the latter
was able to wave away Maximillian’s hand. Accused-appellant Randy blocked Maximillian’s way and
held Maximillian’s hand/s as accusedappellant Arnel hit Maximillian on the chest and abdomen. At
this point, it appeared to eyewitnesses Frederick, Josephine, and Homer that Maximillian was just
being boxed by accused-appellant Arnel. Frederick tried to break the scuffle, as Josephine and
Homer, who were only five meters away, came running to help. Accused-appellants stepped back
and then ran away. Despite telling Josephine that he was stabbed, Maximillian still chased accused-
appellants, with Frederick and Homer at his heels. Stones were thrown their way but none of them
were hit. All of a sudden, Maximillian fell to the ground. Josephine checked Maximillian’s body yet
found no blood or wound. Assuming that Maximillian was simply drunk and in pain because of the
fist fight, Josephine, with the help of Frederick and Homer, brought Maximillian home on board a
motorized "trisikad." During the ride home, Maximillian was unconscious but snoring heavily.
However, when they were already at their house, Josephine felt that Maximillian had no more pulse
and his eyes had turned white. Josephine, again with Frederick and Homer, rushed Maximillian to
Manuel J. Santos Hospital.

Maximillian arrived at the hospital at around 3:00 in the morning of April 29, 2006. Dr. Gonzalez, the
attending physician at the emergency room, noticed that Maximillian was already unresponsive and
had no more heartbeat. Dr. Gonzalez performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation and was able to
revive Maximillian. Dr. Gonzalez conducted close physical examination of Maximillian’s body and
discovered two hardly visible stab wounds located at the latter’s left chest and abdomen. Dr.
Gonzalez immediately referred Maximillian to Dr. Urag, a surgeon.

As a result of his own examination, Dr. Urag reported that Maximillian’s stab wounds both had a
lateral width of about 3-5 mm, and that the stab wound on Maximillian’s chest penetrated the
pericardium of his heart, which caused the entry of fluid into the said organ. The delay in the
discovery of the fatal chest wound and the lack of hospital facilities rendered it too late to save
Maximillian. Resultantly, Maximillian died of "Cardio Pulmonary Arrest secondary to Pericardial
Tamponade secondary to penetrating stab wound left chest." Dr. Urag called Maximillian’s wounds
as puncture wounds, which could be caused by any sharp instrument or bladed weapon, or even
nails.

Josephine reported Maximillian’s stabbing and death to the police on April 29, 2006. P/Insp. Amora,
then the Chief of the General Investigation Section of the Butuan City Police Office, took charge of
the investigation of Maximillian’s case. P/Insp. Amora conducted an ocular inspection of the scene of
the crime and was able to identify accused-appellants as the suspects. The following day, April 30,
2006, P/Insp. Amora came upon information that accused-appellants were in P-1 Barangay
Imadejas Subdivision, Butuan City. P/Insp. Amora proceeded to the given location and there found
accused-appellants playing and betting on a game of cards. The police immediately arrested
accused-appellants for illegal gambling and brought them to the police station. Upon being informed
of accusedappellants’ arrest, Josephine and Frederick arrived at the police station and identified
accused-appellants as Maximillian’s assailants.

Accused-appellants testified in their own defense.

Accused-appellant Arnel21 while admitting his presence at the time and scene of the crime, narrated
a different version of the events surrounding Maximillian’s stabbing.

According to accused-appellant Arnel, at around 2:30 in the morning of April 29, 2006, he was with
his girlfriend Jenny and friends Johndale and Tata in the vicinity of Gaisano Mall, waiting for a
tricycle. When Jenny was about to board a tricycle, four persons, who all looked drunk, came out of
a store. One of these four persons, who turned out to be Maximillian, approached and asked
accused-appellant Arnel how much was the girl he was with. Maximillian’s crude remark angered
Jenny, who immediately left with Tata, on board the tricycle. A companion of Maximillian approached
accused-appellant Arnel and requested him to bear with Maximillian who was already drunk.
Accused-appellant Arnel expressed that he understood the situation. However, Maximillian suddenly
blocked the way of accusedappellant Arnel and Johndale. Maximillian punched accused-appellant
Arnel, hitting the latter on the neck, just below his left ear. Johndale was able to run away. Accused-
appellant Arnel asked Maximillian why the latter hit him. Instead of answering the question,
Maximillian threw back another question, asking if accused-appellant Arnel was brave. Accused-
appellant Arnel looked for a stone to throw at Maximillian to fend off the latter, but saw none. What
accused-appellant found and grabbed as a weapon to defend himself was a barbeque stick, about
six inches long. Accusedappellant Arnel stabbed Maximillian once with the barbecue stick on the left
side of the body, after which, the barbecue stick broke. When stabbed, Maximillian did not show any
reaction but just walked away from accusedappellant. At that point, Maximillian’s three companions
also began to attack accused-appellant Arnel. After their attack, Maximillian’s three companions left.
Accused-appellant Arnel sat down for a while near Gaisano Mall, then went home. The following
day, accused-appellant Arnel was apprehended by the police. Accused-appellant Arnel was
surprised to learn from the police that Maximillian had died. Accused-appellant Arnel insisted that he
had no intention of killing Maximillian and denied any knowledge of how Maximillian sustained the
second stab wound. Accused-appellant Arnel further clarified that it was his friend Johndale, not his
cousin accused-appellant Randy, who was with him when he encountered Maximillian the early
morning of April 29, 2006.

Accused-appellant Randy22 narrated on the witness stand that he was at his house in Barangay
Doongan with his wife and children in the early morning of April 29, 2006. Accused-appellant Randy
knew nothing about Maximillian’s stabbing and death. Accused-appellant Randy was with his wife at
the house of a traffic aide called Puspus in Lower Doongan when he was accosted by the police.
The police asked accused-appellant Randy for the whereabouts of his cousin accused-appellant
Arnel. When accusedappellant Randy answered that he did not know, the police immediately
arrested him and brought him to the police station. At the police station, the police promised that
they would drop the charges against accused-appellant Randy if the latter would reveal where
accused-appellant Arnel was. Accused-appellant Randy thus told the police that accused-appellant
Arnel was in Pareja Subdivision. Accused-appellant Arnel was indeed found and arrested in Pareja
Subdivision and was also brought to the police station. Accused-appellants were then presented
before a witness to Maximillian’s stabbing. The witness was wearing a cap and a cover on his face.
The witness first pointed only at accused-appellant Arnel, but after some coaching from the police,
the witness also pointed at accused-appellant Randy.

On February 18, 2010, the RTC promulgated its Judgment convicting accused-appellants as
charged. The trial court found that the prosecution had duly established the essential elements of
murder, and rejected the uncorroborated claim of self-defense of accused-appellant Arnel and
defenses of denial and alibi of accused-appellant Randy. The trial court held that Maximillian’s killing
was murder given the presence of the qualifying circumstances of abuse of superior strength and
treachery, but not evident premeditation. The RTC sentenced accused-appellants thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court finds accused Arnel Villalba and Randy Villalba
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, qualified by treachery and abuse of superior strength, with no mitigating
circumstance. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, banning the imposition of the death penalty, said
accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without possibility of
parole. The accused are further ORDERED to pay the heirs of Maximillian Casona the amounts of
SEVENTY[-]FIVE THOUSAND (₱75,000.00) PESOS as civil indemnity, TWENTY[-]FIVE
THOUSAND (₱25,000.00) PESOS as exemplary damages, FIFTY[-]FIVE THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED TWENTY[-]FIVE PESOS AND SIXTY CENTAVOS (₱55,225.60) as actual damages,
FIFTY THOUSAND (₱50,000.00) PESOS as moral damages, and TWENTY THOUSAND
(₱20,000.00) PESOS as attorney’s fees.23

Accused-appellants appealed their conviction before the Court of Appeals, based on the following
grounds:

[I] THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME
OF MURDER DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREM[E]DITATION

[II] THE COURT A QUO LIKEWISE ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF

THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE
GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

[III] THE COURT A QUO ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE EXISTENCE OF SELF-
DEFENSE ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ARNEL VILLALBA.24

On September 25, 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision affirming the conviction
of accused-appellants for murder. Like the RTC, the appellate court gave scant consideration to
accused-appellants’ unsubstantiated defenses. The appellate court likewise agreed with the finding
of the RTC that treachery attended Maximillian’s killing, reasoning thus:

The court a quo for its part, had this to say about its finding of treachery:
The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape. Frontal attack can be treacherous when it is
sudden and unexpected and the victim is unarmed. What is decisive is that the execution of the
attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate (People v. De Guzman, G.R.
No. 173197, April 24, 2007).

Thus, there was treachery when accused Randy Villalba held the hand of the victim who was drunk
while his co-accused Arnel Villalba simultaneously boxed and stabbed the deceased, thereby
insuring its execution to kill the victim without risk to themselves arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. Treachery qualifies the killing to murder (Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code).

We agree with the court a quo.

Jurisprudence abounds in holding that an altercation between the victim and the accused
immediately before the attack upon the victim does not necessarily negate the presence of
treachery. This was reiterated in People v. Jabian [G.R. No. 132913-14, April 4, 2001], viz:

Accused-appellant Jabian’s suggestion that an argument between the parties preceded the slaying
as testified to by Ruel Lipalam, coupled with the fact that the attack was frontal, as shown by location
of the wound, and that therefore the killing of Jose Sammy was not sudden or unexpected as to
negate a finding of treachery, cannot be sustained. There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend to directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. Thus, it has been held that the fact that the attack
was preceded by a fight, or even when the victim was forewarned of danger to his person does not
negate treachery. In this case, accused-appellant Jimmy Magaro held both arms of the victim behind
his back, effectively rendering the latter incapable of defending himself while the other accused
stabbed him in the chest. As correctly pointed out by the trial court, the victim was "a virtual sitting
duck when stabbed by Jabian because he was hand clasped by Magaro in order to be so stabbed,
without any risk whatsoever to the two accused arising from any useful defense which Jose Sammy
might make."

In addition, the Supreme Court has ruled in a number of cases that treachery attends the killing of a
person who is drunk, unarmed, has no opportunity to defend himself and the attack is sudden.

In the case at hand, it was established by the prosecution witnesses that appellant Randy held an
intoxicated Maximillian while appellant Arnel stabbed him. Consequently, at the time of the attack,
the victim was not in the position to defend himself. Clearly then, the court a quo’s finding of
treachery is justified. At the same time, this collaborative manner of the attack supports the finding of
conspiracy.25

The Court of Appeals though modified the amount of damages awarded. The dispositive portion of
the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:

FOR THE REASONS STATED, the appeal is DENIED. The RTC Decision in Criminal Case No.
11736 finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS;

1. Moral damages are awarded in the increased amount of Php75,000;

2. Exemplary damages are awarded in the increased amount of Php30,000; and

3. Interest at the rate of 6% per annum on all damages from April 29, 2006 up to the finality of this
Decision, and interest at 12% per annum on these damages from date of finality of this Decision until
fully paid shall likewise be paid by accusedappellants to the heirs of Maximillian Casona.26

Hence, the instant appeal.

The Court gave the parties the opportunity to file their respective supplemental briefs27 but the parties
manifested that they had already exhausted their arguments before the Court of Appeals.28

Accused-appellant Arnel asserts that he cannot be adjudged criminally liable for the resulting death
of Maximillian as he only stabbed Maximillian in self-defense. Accused-appellant also argues that
treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify the killing of Maximillian to murder, as even the
prosecution admits that provocation and aggression came from Maximillian and that an altercation
between accused-appellant Arnel and Maximillian preceded the stabbing.
Accused-appellant Randy insists on his alibi, i.e., that he was at home with his family and not in the
company of accused-appellant Arnel on April 29, 2006 near the Gaisano Mall.

The Court finds partial merit in the instant appeal.

At the outset, the Court bears in mind the following pronouncement in People v. Gerolaga29 :

In this Decision, this Court emphasizes the need to review the facts and details of appealed cases
with meticulous, laser-like precision. While, as a rule, the findings of fact of trial courts are accorded
great respect by appellate tribunals, still, the latter must wade through the mass of evidence in order
to ensure that the trial court did not overlook or misapprehend little details that could spell the
innocence of the accused, or at least mitigate their guilt. This is but consistent with the doctrine that
all doubts must be resolved in their favor. Indeed, it is far better to set free a thousand guilty persons
than to unjustly punish an innocent one.

The Court, after a meticulous review of the records of the case, finds bases to downgrade accused-
appellant Arnel’s crime from murder to homicide and to absolve accused-appellant Randy of any
criminal liability for Maximillian’s death.

The Court begins with the undisputed facts: Maximillian and Frederick, followed by Josephine,
Homer, and Marilou, chanced upon accused-appellant Arnel, his girlfriend Jenny, and two other
companions, somewhere along Capitol Drive, near the vicinity of Gaisano Mall in Butuan City, at
around 2:30 in the morning of April 29, 2006. These two groups did not know each other prior to
April 29, 2006. Maximillian addressed an insulting remark towards Jenny causing tension between
Maximillian and accused-appellant Arnel. A scuffle ensued between the two men and accused-
appellant Arnel eventually stabbed Maximillian on the chest with a sharp instrument, causing a
puncture wound that penetrated Maximillian’s heart and ultimately caused Maximillian’s death.

Prosecution witnesses Josephine and Frederick had positively identified both accused-appellants at
the police station soon after accusedappellants’ arrest. The same prosecution witnesses, together
with Homer, would again positively identify both accused-appellants in open court during trial.
Hence, accused-appellant Randy’s presence at the time and place of Maximillian’s stabbing was
duly established. Accused-appellant Randy was not able to attribute any ill motive on the part of the
three prosecution witnesses that could have impelled them to testify against him. Where there is
nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their
positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand, under the solemnity of an oath, deserve
full faith and credence. It necessarily prevails over alibi and denial, especially when neither alibi nor
denial is substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.30 Nonetheless, accused-appellant Randy’s
presence at the time and place of Maximillian’s stabbing does not necessarily mean that the former
should bear criminal liability for the latter’s death, as the Court will subsequently discuss herein.

The Information charged accused-appellants with Maximillian’s murder, alleging that accused-
appellants, acting in conspiracy with each other, and with abuse of superior strength, treachery,
and/or evident premeditation, stabbed Maximillian with an icepick.

On conspiracy

Jurisprudence requires that conspiracy must be proven as the crime itself. Conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to
commit it. Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred
from the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the
commission of the offense. It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and
entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by
which an illegal objective is to be carried out. The rule is that conviction is proper upon proof that the
accused acted in concert, each of them doing his part to fulfill the common design to kill the victim.31

There is no clear evidence that accused-appellants had a common design to kill Maximillian. To
recall, Maximillian’s group and accusedappellants’ group completely met by chance that fateful early
morning of April 29, 2006 near Gaisano Mall. They did not know each other before this meeting. The
events swiftly happened, in a matter of minutes, from the meeting of the two groups, to Maximillian’s
insulting remark to Jenny, to the scuffle between Maximillian and accused-appellant Arnel, and to
accused-appellant Arnel’s stabbing of Maximillian.

The scuffle between Maximillian and accused-appellant Arnel broke out because the former tried to
grab the latter’s arm. It was at this point that prosecution witnesses saw accused-appellant Randy
block Maximillian’s way and hold Maximillian’s hand/s. Josephine testified that accusedappellant
Randy held only Maximillian’s left hand, and Frederick narrated that accused-appellant Randy held
both of Maximillian’s hands; but neither of these witnesses was able to describe the extent that
Maximillian’s ability to defend himself or flee was impaired by accused-appellant Randy’s hold on his
hand/s. Given the circumstances, the Court has serious doubts that accused-appellant Randy so
acted to ensure that accused-appellant Arnel would be able to stab and kill Maximillian. It is
completely reasonable and plausible that accused-appellant Randy was merely stepping in to stop
Maximillian from further attacking his cousin accused-appellant Arnel. There was no proof that
accused-appellant Randy had prior knowledge that accused-appellant Arnel carried a sharp weapon
with him or that accusedappellant Arnel intended to stab Maximillian.

In fact, there is no strong evidence of the weapon accused-appellant Arnel used in stabbing
Maximillian. None of the prosecution witnesses actually saw accused-appellant use an ice pick or
any other weapon. Josephine, Homer, and Frederick did not even know that Maximillian was
stabbed, believing that he was just punched by accused-appellant Arnel.

For his part, accused-appellant Arnel admitted stabbing Maximillian but asserted that he used only a
barbecue stick which he found in the area. A barbecue stick, with a sharp end, could cause a
puncture wound consistent with that which killed Maximillian. That accused-appellant Arnel used a
barbecue stick he found in the area as weapon shows that he acted instantaneously and
spontaneously in stabbing Maximillian, thus, further negating the possibility that he conspired with
accused-appellant Randy to commit the stabbing.

On the qualifying circumstances for murder

The prosecution likewise failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt any of the alleged circumstances
which would qualify the killing of Maximillian to murder.

The RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, already found that there was no evident premeditation.
The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by
cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time
sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. For it to be appreciated, the following must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time
between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his
act.32As the Court already discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the events leading to the stabbing
of Maximillian by accusedappellant Arnel happened swiftly and unexpectedly, with accused-
appellant Arnel instantaneously and spontaneously stabbing Maximillian with a barbecue stick he
found in the area. Accused-appellant Arnel clearly had no opportunity for cool thought and reflection
prior to stabbing Maximillian.

Unlike the RTC and the Court of Appeals, however, the Court finds no treachery in accused-
appellant Arnel’s stabbing of Maximillian. That accused-appellant Randy was present or that
Maximillian was unarmed and drunk at the time of the stabbing are not sufficient to constitute
treachery. Neither do said circumstances constitute abuse of superior strength.

Treachery is defined under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code as follows:

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing the
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

Based on the above definition, two conditions must be present in order to constitute treachery: (1)
the employment of such means of execution that gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate, and (2) the meas was deliberately or consciously adopted. Jurisprudence,
however, has qualified that the suddenness of the attack , the vulnerability of the position of the
victim of the time of the attack, or even tha fact that the victim was unarmed, do not by themselves
render the attack as treacherous, to wit:

This Court has held that the suddenness of the attack, the infliction of the wound from behind
the victim, the vulnerable position of the victim at the time the attack was made, or the fact
that the victim was unarmed, do not by themselves render the attack as treacherous. This is of
particular significance in a case of an instantaneous attack made by the accused whereby he gained
an advantageous position over the victim when the latter accidentally fell and was rendered
defenseless. The means employed for the commission of the crime or the mode of attack must
be shown to have been consciously or deliberately adopted by the accused to insure the
consummation of the crime and at the same time eliminate or reduce the risk of retaliation
from the intended victim. For the rules on treachery to apply, the sudden attack must have
been preconceived by the accused, unexpected by the victim, and without provocation on the
part of the latter. Treachery is never presumed. Like the rules on conspiracy, it is required that
the manner of attack must be shown to have been attended by treachery as conclusively as the
crime itself.33 (Emphasis supplied.)
The elements of treachery are wanting in this case. At the risk of sounding repetitive, the Court once
more emphasizes the swiftness of the events that took place on April 29, 2006 when Maximillian’s
group unexpectedly came upon accused-appellants’ group. The tension and physical violence
between Maximillian and accused-appellant Arnel quickly escalated from a verbal exchange, to a
physical scuffle, and then to the stabbing of Maximillian by accused-appellant Arnel. Accused-
appellant Arnel merely found a barbecue stick in the area which he used to stab Maximillian. The
barbecue stick could hardly be a weapon of choice and accused-appellant Arnel obviously used it
only in desperation. Moreover, it cannot be said that Maximillian did not expect at all some form of
attack from accused-appellant Arnel. Maximillian provoked accused-appellant Arnel by making a
crude remark about the latter’s girlfriend, then grabbing accused-appellant Arnel’s arm, and taunting
accused-appellant Arnel if he was brave. It would appear that Maximillian was, in fact, spoiling for a
fight. In addition, as the Court previously observed herein, it cannot simply assume in the absence of
proof that accused-appellant Randy held Maximillian’s hand/s to prevent the latter from retaliating as
accusedappellant Arnel stabbed Maximillian. Accused-appellant Randy could just as well be holding
Maximillian’s hand/s to stop Maximillian from further attacking accused-appellant Arnel during the
scuffle. Lastly, the Court is unconvinced that accused-appellant Arnel took advantage of
Maximillian’s drunken state. No clear and convincing evidence has been presented to show the
degree of Maximillian’s intoxication or if it had even affected his strength and intelligence.

As for abuse of superior strength, it is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces
between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously
advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the
crime. The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se establish that
the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative
strength of the aggressors and the victim. The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely
sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage.34

In the case at bar, Maximillian was with Frederick when they first chanced upon accused-appellants,
an even match of two against two, therefore disputing any allegation of inequality of forces between
the two sides. Moreover, given the doubts as to accused-appellant Randy’s actual participation in
the stabbing, it cannot be said that the two accusedappellants had used their combined strength
against Maximillian to ensure the latter’s death.

Without any qualifying circumstance, the stabbing and death of Maximillian is a homicide rather than
a murder.

The respective criminal liabilities of accused-appellants

In the absence of conspiracy, the respective criminal liability of accused-appellants would depend on
the precise participation of each in the crime.1âwphi1

Accused-appellant Arnel had already admitted to stabbing Maximillian with a barbecue stick, which
eventually caused the latter’s death. Unless he is able to prove to the satisfaction of the Court his
claim of self-defense as a justifying circumstance, accused-appellant Arnel’s conviction for the crime
of homicide becomes inevitable.35

It is a hornbook doctrine that when self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the
appellant to prove the elements of that claim, i.e., (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim,
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.36

Accused-appellant Arnel failed to establish the unlawful aggression of Maximillian at the time he
stabbed the latter.

Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful aggression

attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing as there is nothing to repel. The
unlawful aggression of the victim must put the life and personal safety of the person defending
himself in actual peril. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude does not constitute unlawful
aggression.37

In this case, accused-appellant Arnel’s contemplated threat to his life or limb when he stabbed
Maximillian was not real or imminent. Maximillian merely uttered insulting remarks to accused-
appellant Arnel and the latter’s girlfriend, Jenny. Accused-appellant Arnel even admitted that
Frederick, Maximillian’s companion, immediately intervened and apologized for Maximillian’s unruly
conduct. Granting that Maximillian did punch accused-appellant Arnel and hit the latter below his left
ear, accusedappellant Arnel could have simply hit Maximillian back. Instead, accusedappellant Arnel
used a barbeque stick to stab Maximillian on the chest, which was evidently not commensurate, and
well overboard, as compared to the aggression exhibited by Maximillian to him.
The penalty prescribed by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code for the crime of homicide is
reclusion temporal. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the sentence shall be
that which could be properly imposed in view of the attending circumstances, and the minimum shall
be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.

Absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstance in this case, the maximum of the sentence
should be within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium term which has a duration of fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months; and that
the minimum should be within the range of prision mayor which has a duration of six (6) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years. In the instant case, the Court sentences accused-appellant Arnel to
imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion

temporal, as maximum.

As to the civil indemnity and damages, based on current jurisprudence, the Court orders accused-
appellant Amel to pay Maximillian's heirs the amount of Fifty-Five Thousand Two Hundred Twenty-
Five Pesos and Sixty Centavos (₱55,225.60) as actual damages, Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(₱75,000.00) as moral damages, and another Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as civil
indemnity.

Absent any evidence that accused-appellant Randy acted with criminal intent in holding Maximillian's
hand/s at about the same time that accused-appellant Amel stabbed Maximillian, the Court absolves
accusedappellant Randy of any criminal and civil liability for Maximillian' s death.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appeal of accusedappellants is PARTIALLY

GRANTED.

The Court finds accused-appellant ARNEL VILLALBA y DURAN GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Homicide, for which he is SENTENCED to imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ORDERED to pay
the heirs of Maximillian Casona the amounts of P55,225.60 as actual damages, ₱75,000.00 as
moral damages, and another P75,000.00 as civil indemnity plus interest on all damages awarded at
the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this decision until fully satisfied.

The Court ACQUITS accused-appellant RANDY VILLALBA y SARCO on the crime charged for
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes

1
CA rollo, pp. 75-88; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello with Associate
Justices Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap and Renato C. Francisco, concurring.

2
Id. at 23-36; penned by Presiding Judge Edgar G. Manilag.

3
Records, p. 1.

4
Id. at 20.

5
Id. at 46-47.

6
TSN, August 22, 2007.

7
TSN, August 29, 2007.

8
TSN, September 19, 2007.

9
TSN, September 12, 2007.

10
Id.

11
TSN, January 24, 2008.

12
Records, pp. 5-10.

13
Id. at 201.

14
Id. at 202.

15
Id. at 11.

16
Id. at 200.

17
Id. at 199.

18
Id. at 193.

19
Id. at 195-198.

20
Id. at 203.

21
TSN, April 11, 2008.

22
TSN, November 28, 2008.

23
Records, pp. 287-288.

24
CA rollo, pp. 9-10.

25
Rollo, pp. 12-13.

26
Id. at 15.

27
Id. at 22.

28
Id. at 23-24, 26-27.

29
331 Phil. 441, 446 (1996).

30
People v. Galicia, G.R. No. 191063, October 9, 2013, 707 SCRA 267, 282.

31
People v. Quinao, 336 Phil. 475, 488-489 (1997).

32
People v. Duavis, G.R. No. 190861, December 7, 2011, 661 SCRA 775, 784.
33
People v. Dagani, 530 Phil. 501, 520-521 (2006)

34
People v. Beduya, G.R. No. 175315, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 275, 284.

35
People v. Cawaling, 355 Phil. 1, 37 (1998).

36
People v. Duavis, supra note 32 at 782.

37
People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 190340, July 24, 2013, 702 SCRA 204, 215.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 209373 July 30, 2014

JOEL YONGCO and JULIETO LAÑOJAN, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209414

ANECITO TANGIAN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

This treats of the consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 in relation to Rule
125 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1 and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 00549-MIN, dated January 21, 2013 and September 10, 2013, respectively. Said
rulings affirmed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision convicting petitioners of qualified theft.

The Facts

Petitioners Joel Yongco, Julieta Lafiojan, and Anecito Tangian, Jr. were employees of the City
Government of Iligan. Tangian worked as a garbage truck driver for the city, while Yongco and
Lañojanwere security guards assigned to protect the premises of the City Engineer’s Office (CEO).
On November 14, 2005, an Information was filed before the RTC, Branch 5 in Iligan City, Lanao del
Norte charging the three with Qualified Theft. The information docketed as Crim. Case No. 12092
reads:

That on or about April 16, 2005, in the City of Ilagan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, being then regular and casual employees of the City
government as drivers and helpers respectively, of a garbage truck with Plate No. 496, conspiring
and confederating togetherand mutually helping each other, with grave abuse of confidence reposed
upon them by the city government, and with intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away the following articles, to wit: one (1) unit transmission, boom,
differential of Tamaraw and l-beam of Nissan with a total value of ₱40,000.00, belonging to the City
government of Ilagan, represented by Atty. Rommel Abragan of the City Legal Office, Iligan City,
withoutthe consent and against the will of the said owner in the aforesaid sum of ₱40,000.00,
Philippine Currency.2

During the arraignment held on February 16, 2006, accused petitioners entered a plea of not guilty
tothe offense charged. Pre-trial was then conducted and closed on July 25, 2006. Thereafter, trial on
the merits ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented as one ofits witnesses a casual employee of the city government, Pablo
Salosod,who testified that on April 16, 2005 at around 1:30 a.m., while attending a wake at the
Cosmopolitan Funeral Parlor, he was fetched and requestedby petitioner Tangian to accompany him
to the CEO. At the office garage, Salosod and his fellow garbage collectors were allegedly directed
by petitioners Tangian and Yongco to load car parts that petitioners considered aswaste items, the
subject items of the theft, on the truck driven by Tangian. They then drove to Tominobo, Iligan City
where the materials were unloaded in front of Delfin Junk Store, and before the truck left the shop,
Salosod allegedly saw petitioner Lañojan giving a thumbs-up sign to Tangian. On the way back,
Tangian allegedly confessed to Salosod that it was Lañojan who requested that the items be brought
at the junk shop. Another employee, Rommel Ocaonilla, corroborated the testimony of Salosod.
Prosecution witness Oliveros Garcia meanwhile testified witnessing the unloading of the items in
front of the junk store, after which, Lañojan covered the items up with a sack. The following morning,
he allegedly saw Lañojan’s brother-in-law, who coincidentally works at the shop, take the items
inside.

Witnesses Dioscoro Galorio and Atty. Ulysses Lagcao, employee and consultant of the city
government, respectively, testified that they conducted investigations relative to the incidentand
found out that the items stolen consisted of one Nissan transmission,one unit boom, one Nissan I-
beam, and one differential of Tamaraw, with total valuation of PhP 12,000. Upon their investigation,
they recommended tothe city legal officer the filing of the present criminal case against the three
petitioners.

Version of the Defense

In defense, petitioners testified intheir behalves. Their testimony is summarized by the CA in the
Decision now on appeal in the following wise:

Joel Yongco, 34, single, x x x and a casual employee, testified that, on August 9, 2004, he was
issued a Job Order and detailed at the Civil Security Unit (CSU). He was assigned to guard the
building installation of the CEO. On April 15, 2005, he was on duty with his companion, one Mr.
Quintana. They relieved Lañojan and one Mr. Enumerables. Lañojan gave him (Yongco) four gate
passes and saidthat the area would have to be cleared because the "Bacod" Iliganvehicle would be
arriving. Yongco read the entries on one of[the] gate passes. Theyread: "Loaded assorted scraps
with remark to be thrown atthe dump site." At the bottom of the gate pass was the "note" of
EngineerCabahug with the signatures of the guards, Lañojan and Enumerables. From 5:00 PM to
12:00 midnight on April 15, 2005, there was only one shipment of scrap iron to the dump site. The
dump truck driven by Tangian entered the CEO premises at around 11:00 o’clock in the evening of
the same date. Tangian went to the yard where the scrap iron were situated and asked Yongco to
accompany and help him. Tangian gathered the scrap materials and the four of them (Tangian,
Yongco, and the 2 helpers of Tangian) loaded the said scrap to the dump truck. At around 12:45
P.M., after loading the items, Tangian drove away without giving a gate pass to the guards on duty.
Yongco did not ask Tangian for a gate pass because Yongco had one companion in the guard
house to get the gate pass.

Julieto Lañojan, 48, who was working in the CSU division for 20 years and assigned to guard the
CEO, testified that he was not on duty on April 15 and 16, 2005; he was on duty on April 14, 2005 at
7:00 A.M. up to April 15, 2005 of the same time. When Yongco and Quintana relieved him on April
15, 2005 at 7:00 in the morning, he gave the four gate passes which were used to ship outassorted
scrap irons to them to be kept for the file. Engineer Cabahug was the one who directed the removal
of the scrap iron because the area of the CEO would have to be cleared since new trucks for the
government were coming. His house, which was along the national highway, was about 40-50
metersaway from Delfin Junk Store. He knew Oliveros Garcia who was a kagawad of Tominobo,
Iligan City. Aside from that, Garcia had filed an ejectment case against him (Lañojan), which was still
pending in court.

xxxx

Anecito Tangian, Jr., 59, garbage truck driver at the City Engineer’s Office for 16 years, testified that
his highest level of educational attainment was Grade I. It was his tour of duty on April 15, 2005 at
9:00 o’clock in the evening up to April 16, 2005 at 6:00 o’clock in the morning. At around 5:30 in the
morning of April 15, 2005, Lañojan asked him to load scrap materials onto the garbage truck and to
bring them to the Delfin Junk Store in Tominobo. He asked Lañojan if there were any problems
about the loading ofthe said items. Lañojan answered that there were no problems about the loading
of the same, that the City Garbage would have to be cleared considering that "BACOD" trucks would
be arriving at thatarea. He followed Lañojan because the latter was the guard at the City Garage.
When hearrived for duty at the City Garage at around 9:00 in the evening, Yongco asked him if
Lañojan already informed him about the loading of the items. After that he checked up the garbage
truck while Yongco and the two helpers were loading the items. He did not know how many items
were loaded because he only helped the three of them during the loading of the differential. After
loading the scrap materials, Tangian and the two helpers drove away from the City Garage. They
dropped by the Cosmo Funeral Homes for more than an hour before they proceeded to Tominobo.
When they reached Delfin Junk Store, Lañojan gave a thumbs-up sign to Tangian, which meant
okay. He then left and started his work collecting garbage.3

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On April 11, 2008, the RTC held petitioners liable for qualified theft via conspiracy. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Julieto Lañojan, Anecito Tangian,
Jr., and Joel Yongco GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Theft defined and
penalized under Article 310 in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code, and the said
accused are hereby sentencedto a penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years, eight (8) monthsand
twenty (20) days of prision correccionalmaximum as the minimum term, to ten (10) years and eight
(8) months of prision mayormaximum, as the maximum term, of their indeterminate sentence
including the accessory penalties thereof.

SO ORDERED.4

Aggrieved, petitioners, in their appeal, prayed that the CA reverse the RTC Decision. Petitioner
Tangian reiterated in his Brief that he should not be considered as a conspirator since he merely
innocentlyobeyed Lañojan’s instructions on the assumption that the latter was his superior and that
Lañojan was authorized to get rid of the scrap materials in the CEO premises and that he had no
criminal intent whatsoever.

In their joint brief, Yongco and Lañojan also disclaimed the existence of a conspiracy. Yongco, in his
defense, argued that Tangian and his two other helpers asked for his assistance which he extended
ingood faith, in view of Lañojan’s statement earlier that day that the office garage has to be cleared.
Lañojan, on the other hand, insisted that he cannot be considered as a conspirator since he was not
present at the time of taking, and that the mere giving of a thumbs-up sign to Tangian when the latter
delivered the materials to the junk shop does not amount to conspiracy.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On January 21, 2013, the CA issued the assailed Decision denying petitioners’ appeals. In affirming
the RTC Decision in toto, the CA ruled that there was indeed conspiracy because Tangian could
nothave taken out the items without a gate pass, but with the security guard Yongco’s participation,
he was able to do justthat. The CA also ruled that it is implausible that Tangian would just leave the
items in front of the junk shop unattended. Thus, the appellate court appreciated the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses that Lañojan’s presence was not merely coincidental and that his thumbs-
up and his subsequent act of covering the materials with sacks indicate that the plan was for him to
receive the said items. Petitioners, via motion for reconsideration, sought the CA’s reversal of the
Decision only for the appellate court to deny the same through its challenged Resolution dated
September 10, 2013.

Not contented with the adverted Decision of the CA as reiterated in the Resolution, petitioners
Yongco and Lañojan jointly filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari while petitioner Tangian
separately filed his own. The two petitions were later consolidated by this Court for resolution
1âwphi 1

herein.

The Issue

As with most criminal cases, the main issue in the instant case is whether or not the CA erred in
sustaining petitioners’ conviction. Central to resolving this issue is determining whether or not there
indeed existed conspiracy between petitioners in committing the offense charged.

The Court’s Ruling

The petitions are bereft of merit.

Article 310, in relation to Art. 308,of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines Qualified Theft, thusly:

ART. 308. Who are liable for theft.—Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but
without violence, against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal
property of another without the latter’s consent.

Theft is likewise committed by:

1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local
authorities or to its owner;

2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove
or make use of the fruits or objects of the damage caused by him; and

3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or
which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fishupon the
same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or other forestor farm products.
 xxxx

ART. 310. Qualified Theft.—The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic
servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or
large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fishtaken from a
fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic
eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. (emphasis added)

Synthesizing the foregoing provisions, the elements of Qualified Theft, committed with grave abuse
of discretion, can simply be enumerated as follows:

1. Taking of personal property;

2. That the said property belongs to another;

3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;

4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;

5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of
force upon things; and

6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.5

As correctly observed by the appellatecourt, all of the elements of Qualified Theft are present in this
case, viz:

There is no dispute that the items (transmission, boom arm, differential assembly, and I-beam) which
are the subject matter of this case belong to the CEO of Iligan City. There is no dispute that these
1âw phi1

items, although considered "heap of scrap," have not yet been declared unserviceable or waste by
the proper authority or office. Nor have they been marked for proper disposal. Unless properly
disposed in accordance with Section 379 of the Local Government Code, these items are still
government properties or owned by the City of Iligan.

There is also no dispute that these items were taken away from the CEO and were already under
completeand effective control of the persons taking the same. This is because these items were
loaded onto the garbage truck driven by Tangian and brought to Tominobo at the Delfin Junk Store.

Apparently, the taking of these items was without the consent of the CEO of Iligan City because
there was no gate pass issued to that effect. Evidence shows that when the garbage truck left the
premises of the CEO, no gate pass was surrendered by Tangian. Yongco did not bother to ask for a
gate pass on the pretext that there was another guard on duty at the gate.

Intent to gain or animus lucrandiis an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the
offender of the thing subject to asportation. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is
the intent to gain. Since these items werebrought to the junk store, intent to gain becomes obvious.
The presumption of animus lucrandihas not been overturned.

It is equally patent that the taking of these items was done with grave abuse of confidence. The
accused in this case, itbears stressing, were guards and drivers with access tothe entrance and exit
of the CEO premises. In other words,they enjoyed the trust and confidence reposed on them by their
employer (the City ofIligan) to haveaccess throughout the CEO premises on account of their
respective duties. More so since the primary function of the CSU is to guard the properties, including
the said items, of the CEO. It was this trust and confidence that was gravely abused by them that
makes the theft qualified.6

Concisely stated, the fact of taking without consent is indubitable. Indeed, petitioners hinge their plea
for acquittal and supporting argument primarily on their lack of criminal intent and the observed
conspiracy.

Addressing the issue head on, We uphold the findings of the appellate court. No error can be
ascribed to the CA when it determined the existence of conspiracy between and among petitioners
in this case.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and
decide to commit it.7Well-settled is the rule that in conspiracy, direct proof of a previousagreement is
not necessary as it may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner by which the offense was
perpetrated.8 It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during, or after the commission
of the crime which, when taken together, would be enough to reveal a community of criminaldesign,
as the proof of conspiracy is frequently made by evidenceof a chain of circumstances.9

In the case at bar, even though there is no showing of a prior agreement among the accused, their
separate acts taken and viewed together are actually connected and complementedeach other
indicating a unity of criminal design and purpose.10

Tangian’s complicity in the illicit deedwas manifest from the fact, as he himself admitted, that he was
the one who personally transported the stolen items from the CEO to the junkshop. His claim that he
was not aware of any irregularity in the act he performed is rendered dubious by his 16 years of
service as truck driver for the City of Iligan. To be sure, his record of service argues against his claim
of ignorance of the standard protocol that a gate pass to be issued by the CEO property custodian
should first be secured before taking out items from the CEO compound, including alleged waste
materials. He should also know better than to assume that Lañojan can authorize the withdrawal of
items without the requisite gate pass since Lañojan’s duty, as security guard, is precisely to prevent
the same.

Similarly, Yongco’s claim of good faith is belied by his own admission that he knew of the office
procedure that a gate pass is required every time something is taken out of the CEO premises. In
fact, four gate passes were given to him that morning by Lañojan, covering waste materials
withdrawn during the latter’s shift. At the very least, this should have reminded him of his duty to
demand a gate pass for property leaving the CEO premises. Neither memory lapses orlapses in the
performance of his duty will explain Yongco’s failure to demand a gate pass.The only viable
explanation is that he was in connivance with other petitioners.11

Lastly, the RTC, with valid reason, tagged Lañojan as having instigated and marshalled the entire
scheme. To quote the trial court:

x x x As shown above, it appears that Lañojan broached the idea to Yongco that the items subject of
this case will be withdrawn under the pretext of clearing the CEO scrap yard of unserviceable waste
materials. Then Lañojan gave Yongco 4 gate passes apparently to be used to coverup or
camouflage the actual withdrawallater that evening. Then Lañojan told Tangian to load the items
under the same ploy of clearing the scrap yard of unserviceable waste materials and that they will
not encounter any problem. Finally, Lañojan was seen by Brgy. Kag. Oliveros Garcia at 1:30 o’clock
in the morning of April 16, 2005 receiving the items as they were dumped near the Delfin Junk
Store,Tominobo, Iligan City. After the items were dumped, Lañojan then gave Tangian the "thumbs-
up" sign, meaning everything is okay – clear proof of meeting of minds between Tangian and
Lañojan, and their collusion to steal the items under the pretext of disposing unserviceable waste
materials. This non-verbal "thumbs-up" sign was also seenby the truck helper Salosod.12 x x x

In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Once conspiracy is established, all the conspirators are
answerable as co-principals regardless of the extent or degree of their participation.13 The guilt of one
is the guilt of all. It is common design which is the essence of conspiracy—conspirators may act
separately or together in different manners but always leading to the same unlawful result. The
character and effect of conspiracy are not to be adjudged by dismembering it and viewing its
separate parts but only by looking at it as a whole—acts done to giveeffect to conspiracy may be, in
fact, wholly innocent acts.14 Applying this doctrine in the case at bench, it can reasonably be
concluded that despite Lañojan’s lack of physical participation in hauling the items to Tangian’s truck
and bringing them to the junk shop, he can still be liable for Qualified Theft via conspiracy. All told,
there is no cogent reason for us todisturb the findings of the appellate court, affirmatory of those of
the trial court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated petitions are hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. The CA's January 21, 2013 Decision and September 10, 2013 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No.
00549-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.* JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Acting member per Special Order No. 1691 dated May 22, 2014.

1
Penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja and concurred in by Associate Justices Ma.
Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla and Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob.

2
Rollo (G.R. No. 209373), p. 12.

3
Id. at 15-17.

4
Id. at 108-109.

5
People v. Mirto, G.R. No. 193497, October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 796, 807.

6
Rollo (G.R. No. 209373), pp. 19-20.

7
RPC, Art. 8(2).

8
Aquino v. Paiste, G.R. No. 147782, June 25, 2008, 555 SCRA 255, 271-272.

9
People v. Anticamara, G.R. No. 178771, June 8, 2011, 651 SCRA 489, 506.

10
Rollo (G.R. No. 209373), p. 104.

11
Id. at 26.

12
Id. at 107.

13
Aquino v. Paiste, supra note 8, at 272.

Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163593, December 16,
14

2005, 478 SCRA 387, 415.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 205298 September 10, 2014

EOPOLDO QUINTOS y DELAMOR, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, Acting C.J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 dated 31 July 2012 and
Resolution3 dated 11 January 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33776, affirming the
Joint Decision4 dated 20 October 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan (trial
court) in Criminal Case Nos. L-8340, L-8341 and L-8342.

The Facts

Petitioner Leopoldo Quintos y Del Amor (p~titioner) was charged, in conspiracy with his brothers
Pedro, Rolly and Lando, all surnamed Quintos, and Narciso Bµni for frustrated homicide and
homicide.

The Information5 in Criminal Case No. L-8341 reads, in part:

That on or about January 15, 2008 in the afternoon at Brgy. Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused in conspiracywith each other, with
intent to kill, did then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously accost, maul and hack with bolo
and samurai Robert M. dela Cruz who suffered hacking wounds, several lacerations and contusions
on the different parts of his body, thus, the accused performedall the acts of execution which would
produce homicide as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of the
timely medical intervention applied on him that prevented his death, to the prejudice and damage of
the said Robert dela Cruz.

CONTRARY to Article 249 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Information6 in Criminal Case No. L-8342 reads, in part:

That on or about January 15, 2008 in the afternoon at Brgy. Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused in conspiracy with each other,
with intent to kill, did then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously accost, maul and hack with
bolo and samurai Felomina dela Cruz who suffered hacking wounds and several lacerations on the
different parts of her body, thus, the accused performed all the acts of execution which would
produce homicide as a consequence but which,nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of the
timely medical intervention applied on him that prevented his (sic) death, to the prejudice and
damage of the said Felomina dela Cruz.

CONTRARY to Article 249 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.

In Criminal Case No. L-8340, an Amended Information7 was filed when the victim Freddie dela Cruz
died:

That on or about January 15, 2008 in the afternoon at Brgy. Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused in conspiracy with each other,
with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously accost, maul and hack with
bolo and samurai Freddie dela Cruz who suffered hacking wounds on the different parts of his body,
which caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Freddie dela Cruz.

CONTRARY to Article 249 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.

Of the five accused, Pedro Quintos, Narciso Buni and petitioner were arrested. Rolly and Lando
evaded arrest and remainat large. Petitioner, Pedro and Narciso all pled not guilty to the charges
brought against them.

The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely: Eduardo Oyando, Felomina dela Cruz, Robert
dela Cruz, Police Officer Bernardo Cerezo, and Dr. Saniata V. Fernandez.

The defense presented two witnesses, namely, petitioner and Pedro Quintos. Narciso Buni jumped
bail before he could testify. Petitioner’s sister was also scheduled to testify, but since her testimony
would only be corroborative, the prosecution admitted her testimony.8

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution established that at about 3:30 p.m. of 15 January 2008, Freddie dela Cruz, Robert
dela Cruz, Felomina dela Cruz, and Eduardo Oyando were walking along the barangay road of
Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan. They were on their way to the town proper when they were accosted
by Pedro Quintos, Rolly Quintos, Lando Quintos,Narciso Buni and petitioner. Pedro was wielding a
samurai, Lando, Narciso and petitioner were carrying bolos, and Rolly was holding a big stone.
Robert, Freddie, Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, and Eduardo Oyando ran back towards their
house, but the five attackers caught up with them.

Pedro struck Robert dela Cruz withthe samurai, but the latter parried the attack with his left hand.
Robert dela Cruz attempted to gain control of the samurai, but Rolly hit him in the face, near the jaw,
with the stone Rolly was carrying. Robert dela Cruz lost his hold of the samurai and fell to the
ground.

Lando struck Freddie dela Cruz at the back of his head, which caused the latter to fall face up.
Petitioner joined Lando in hacking Freddie dela Cruz, who, while defending himself with his hands,
sustained injuries on his right hand and lost a few fingers on his left. Rolly then crushed Freddie dela
Cruz’s chest with the same stone he usedto hit Robert dela Cruz in the face.

Pedro advanced towards Felomina dela Cruz as the latter moved towards Robert dela Cruz. Pedro
pulledFelomina dela Cruz’s hair, slashed her nape with the samurai, and then kicked her to the
ground.

Eduardo Oyando was forced to stand aside and was prevented from helping the dela Cruzes
because Narciso Buni was aiming a bolo at him. The attackers left when they were done, and only
then was Eduardo Oyando able to approach the victims and call for help.

Robert, Freddie and Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, were brought to the hospital. They were
treated for the injuries sustained from the attack.

After a few days, Freddie dela Cruz diedfrom his injuries. Before he died, Freddie dela Cruz
identified Pedro and Lando Quintos as his attackers.

Version of the Defense

The defense presented a different version of the events. In the afternoon of 15 January 2008,
Robert, Freddie, Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, and Eduardo Oyando came to the Quintos’
house looking for trouble. Pedro, who was in the front portion ofthe house, went out to try and pacify
them. Robert dela Cruz punched Pedro first, hitting him in the face. Robert dela Cruz then went to
Felomina dela Cruz and took a bolo wrapped in a towel that the latter was holding. Pedro and Robert
dela Cruz grappled for the bolo. Felomina dela Cruz approached the two and tried to help Robert
dela Cruz, and in the process got slashed with the bolo. The scuffle resulted in Robert dela Cruz
falling to the ground and Pedro gaining control of the bolo.

Pedro then noticed that Freddie dela Cruz, who was holding a bolo, was fighting with Lando. Pedro
hurried over and hacked Freddie dela Cruz to defend his brother Lando. According to Pedro, his
senses dimmed and he did not remember how many times hehacked Freddie dela Cruz. His
brothers pacified him, and Pedro went with them back to the house; while Robert, Freddie and
Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, were brought to the hospital.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court gave full faith and credit to the version of the prosecution. Petitioner was found guilty
for the crime of homicide for the death of Freddie dela Cruz. However, the trial court held that the
uncertainty on the nature of the wounds of Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz warrants the
appreciation of a lesser gravity of the crime from frustrated homicide to attempted homicide.9
The dispositive portion ofthe Joint Decision dated 20 October 2010 reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the Court finds:

IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. L-8340

Accused PEDRO QUINTOS, POLDO QUINTOS and NARCISO BUNI GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE as defined in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. The
prescribed penalty for Homicide is reclusion temporalwhich is from twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to twenty years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty should be taken
from the penalty one (1) degree lower than the imposable penalty which is Prision Mayorin its full
extent, the range of which is from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Appreciating no
mitigating circumstances in favor of the accused, the accused is accordingly sentenced from EIGHT
(8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS,
EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as maximum.

Accused are further ORDERED to pay the heirs of Freddie Dela Cruz, the amounts of (a) Php
75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) Php 75,000.00 as moral damages; (c) Php 57,286.00 as actual
damages; (d) and Php 15,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. L-8341

Accused PEDRO QUINTOS, POLDO QUINTOS and NARCISO BUNI GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE and are meted with an indeterminate sentence of
Two (2) months and One (1) day of arresto mayoras minimum to Two (2) years, Four (4) months and
One (1) day of prision correccionalas maximum.

Accused are furthered (sic) ordered to pay Robert dela Cruz actual damages in the amount of Php
1,650.00and moral damages in the amount of Php 15,000.00.

IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. L-8342

Accused PEDRO QUINTOS, POLDO QUINTOS and NARCISO BUNI GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE and are meted with an indeterminate sentence of
Two (2) months and One (1) day or arresto mayoras minimum to Two (2) years, Four (4) months and
One (1) day of prision correccionalas maximum.

Accused are furthered (sic) ordered to pay Felomina dela Cruz actual damages in the amount of Php
3,750.00 and moral damages in the amount of Php 15,000.00.

In all cases, considering that Pedro Quintos and Poldo Quintos have undergone preventive
imprisonment,they shall be credited in the service of their sentences with the time they have
undergone preventive imprisonment subject to the conditionsprovided for in Article 29 of the Revised
Penal Code.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.10

Petitioner and Pedro Quintos appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial
court gravely erred in convicting them despite the prosecution’s failure to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals found the appeal bereft of merit, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the assailed Joint Decision dated October 20,
2010of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, inCriminal Case Nos. L-8340,
L-8341 and L-8342 is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

SO ORDERED.11

Hence, this petition.

The Issues
Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for: (1) affirming the conviction, despite the prosecution’s
failure to prove petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) finding that conspiracy exists, in
particular, that a finding of conspiracy should not be leftto conjecture, in light of the alleged failure of
the prosecution to present evidence that petitioner took part in inflicting injuries on the victims in
furtherance ofa common design to kill.12

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is unmeritorious.

Review of Questionsof Fact Improper

The review on certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to questions of law. This Court
does not weigh all over again the evidence already consideredin the proceedings below.13 The
narrow ambit of review prescribed under this rule allows us to swiftly dispose of such appeals. This
rule, of course, admits of exceptions applicable to those rare petitions whose peculiar factual milieu
justifies relaxation of the Rules such as based on speculation or conjectures, or overlooked
undisputed facts which, if duly considered, lead to a different conclusion.14

In the present case, petitioner finds fault in the decisions of the trial and appellate courts, alleging
that had the said courts given weight to the defense evidence, conviction would not have been
justified. This is clearly an invitation for the Court to review the probative value of the evidence
presented in the proceedings below.

A question of law arises when there isdoubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while
there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.15 For a
question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants.16 Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence
presented, the question posed is one of fact.17

Petitioner attempts to justify the review of facts by alleging that the courts a quo indulged in
conjectures and surmises. However, a careful reading of the decisions of the trial and appellate
courts shows that such is not the case here. The discussion of the trial court deals extensively with
evidence from both sides, weighing each accordingly. Similarly, the appellate court evaluated the
evidenceof the prosecution and the defense alike.

Uniform findings of factof the trial and appellate courts deserve grave respect, and in the absence of
any compelling reason to deviate therefrom, are final and conclusive upon this Court. We thus
proceed with our review without disturbing the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.

Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

Petitioner avers that his conviction was not supported by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. His
argumentrevolves mainly on self-defense, defense of relatives and absence of conspiracy.

We are not persuaded. The records of this case show that the prosecution witnesses Eduardo
Oyando, Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz positively and consistently identified the accused
and relayed the sequence of events. Their testimonies are corroborated by the evidence presented
by the doctors who attended the hacking victims, as well as by the police officer who took the
statement ofFreddie dela Cruz before the latter died.

We must emphasize that the trial court found the prosecution witnesses credible. The assessment
ofthe trial court on this point is generally binding on this Court, and noneof the exceptions to this rule
are obtaining here. Further, the trial court found that the prosecution witnesses did not have any
motive to testify falsely against the accused.

Pedro Quintos admitted to hacking Robert dela Cruz and Freddie dela Cruz, and hitting Felomina
dela Cruz, invoking self-defense. Because of Pedro’s admissions, he and his co-conspirators
assumed the burden to establish such defense by credible, clear and convincing evidence;

otherwise, the same admissions would lead to their conviction.18

We held in People v. Nugas:

x x x Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when it is uncorroborated by independent and

competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, the accused must discharge
the burden of proof by relying on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the
State’s evidence, because the existence of self-defense is a separate issue from the existence ofthe
crime, and establishing selfdefense does not require orinvolve the negation of any of the elements of
the offense itself.

To escape liability, the accused must show by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that:
(a) the victim committed unlawful aggression amounting to an actual or imminent threat to the life
and limb of the accused claiming self-defense; (b) there was reasonable necessity in the means
employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (c) there was lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the accused claiming self-defense or at least any provocation executed by
the accused claiming self-defense was not the proximate and immediate cause of the victim’s
aggression.19

Both petitioner and Pedro also testified that Pedro hacked Freddie in defense of their brother
Lando.20 The defense of relatives argument likewise fails in light of the lack of unlawful aggression on
the part of the victims. For the accused to be entitled to exoneration based on defense of relatives,
complete or incomplete, it is essential that there be unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, for
if there is no unlawful aggression, there would be nothing to prevent or repel.21

The discussion of the Court of Appeals on this point is well-taken:

We are hardly persuaded by accused-appellants’ allegations that they were acting in self-defense
because the victims were committing unlawful aggression. We foundthe following loopholes:

First, as Pedro claims in his testimony, the dela Cruzes were shouting for the brothers of Pedro
tocome out of the house. No actual sudden or imminent attack, however, was performed. It has been
ruled that mere intimidating or threatening words, even if said aloud, do not constitute unlawful
aggression. Thus, in People vs. Cajurao, the Supreme Court held that:

There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete unless there is clear and convincing proof of
unlawful aggression on the partof the victim. The unlawful aggression, a constitutive element of self-
defense, must be real or at least imminent and not merely imaginary. A belief that a person is about
to be attacked is not sufficient. Even an intimidating or threatening attitude is by no means enough.
Unlawful aggressionpresupposes an actual or imminent danger on the life or limb of a person. Mere
shouting, an[d] intimidating or threatening attitude of the victim does not constitute unlawful
aggression. Unlawful aggression refers to an attack that has actually broken out or materialized or at
the very least is clearly imminent; it cannot consist in oral threats or merely a threatening stance or
posture.

Furthermore, as Pedro testified, the dela Cruzes were shouting for his brothers to go out, but then,
Pedro was the one who went out. If, indeed, the dela Cruzes had some anger or aggression at that
time, it was definitely not directed at Pedro.

Then, as Pedro went down to pacify the dela Cruzes, Pedro and Robert dela Cruz engaged in a fist
fight. Robert turned and ran towards his mother, Felomina to allegedly get a bolo which was in
Felomina’s possession and concealed under a towel. Ifthis is true, Robert had already retreated and
was trying to arm himself to level the supposed fight with Pedro. Thus, from Pedro’s narration,
itcannot be definitely said that the dela Cruzes went to the house of the accused-appellants with the
determined intention to inflict serious harm on Pedro.

Second, Pedro claims that he was trying to defend his brother Lando Quintos who was lying on the
ground and being attacked by the deceased Freddie dela Cruz. According to him, he hacked Freddie
before the latter could stab Lando. Pedro would like to impress upon the court that Lando was also
involved in the fight against the dela Cruzes. However, in the same testimony, Pedro said that it was
he alone who was fighting Robert, Freddie and Felomina, and that his brothers, including Lando,
were "just there, sir, pacifying."

Third, despite the alleged savagery that transpired, surprisingly, accused-appellants did not report
the incident to the police. During crossexamination, Pedro admitted that:

Q: After you were threatened and you did not report of the alleged incident that happened on
January 15 as what you are telling now?

A: No sir.

Q: In fact even after you were allegedly brought to the hospital and you were treated you did not
even rel[a]y to the police or even to your barangay the alleged incident which you are now narrating,
am I correct?

A: I was not able to report anymore because after I was treated to the hospital I was brought directly
to the jail, sir.
It is doctrinal that, for evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind
can approve as probable under the circumstances. We find it difficult to believe that accused-
appellants, who vehemently claim to be the aggrieved parties, did not report the incident tothe
police. Pedro’s alleged treatment or confinement in the hospital did notprevent them from doing so.
Pedro had at least three brothers: Poldo, Rolly and Lando; not to mention his mother and sister, who
could have easily gone to the police to report the alleged attack upon them by the delaCruzes. This
omission, therefore, casts doubt on the veracity of the account of the accused-appellants.

Lastly, the nature of the wounds inflicted on the deceased and the other victims negate[s] the
accused-appellants’ claim of self-defense. According to the medical certificate of Freddie dela Cruz,
he suffered cardio-respiratory arrest, septicemia and multiple hacking wounds. Then, in the death
certificate, it was further stated that Freddie dela Cruz suffered "amputation of left and right hand."
Meanwhile, with respect to Robert dela Cruz, the attending physician, Dr. Saniata V. Fernandez,
testified that the victim suffered lacerated wounds on the forehead, lower lip and left hand. As for
Felomina dela Cruz, she also suffered almost similar lacerated wounds.

It has been ruled that the presence of a large number of wounds on the part of the victim, their
nature and location disprove self-defense and instead indicate a determined effort to kill the victim[s].
In the case at bar, as already explained, the wounds on Freddie, Robert and Felomina, all surnamed
dela Cruz, negate accused-appellant’s claim of self-defense.

We have contrasted the claim of self-defense to the evidence presented by the prosecution and this
Court believes that the version of the latter is more credible and consistent with the truth. As a matter
of fact, by simply admitting that they attacked Freddie dela Cruz and the two other victims, the case
against the accused-appellants had become irrefutable. x x x.22

Existence of Conspiracy

Petitioner alleges that the prosecution did not present evidence of his participation in the attacks on
Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz. He also argues that his mere presence during the said
attacks does not by itself show concurrence of wills and unity of purpose.

Petitioner’s presence during the commission of the crime was wellestablished as he himself testified
to that fact. Assuming that he was merely present during the attack, inaction does not exculpate him.
1âw phi 1

To exempt himself from criminal liability, a conspirator must have performed an overt act to
dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the commission
thereof.23

Indeed, mere presence does not signify conspiracy. However, neither does it indicate the lack
thereof Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the acts of the accused themselves
when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.24 In
fact, the prosecution established that petitioner was actively involved in the attack on Freddie dela
Cruz.

In People v. De Leon,25 we held:.

x x x To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even
take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the
execution of the conspiracy. Each conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which
may appear unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effort to achieve their.
common criminal objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators. The precise extent or mo[r]ality of participation of each of them becomes secondary,
since all the conspirators are principals.

The acts of petitioner before, during and after the attacks on Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela
Cruz disclose his agreement with the joint purpose and design in the commission of the felony. The
facts, found by the trial and appellate courts,.establish that petitioner, together with his brothers and
Narciso Buni, all of them armed, accosted the dela Cruzes, and gave chase even as the latter were
retreating towards their house. During the attacks, each conspirator had a different task. After the
attacks, all the accused left the felled dela Cruzes for dead, clearly showing their united purpose in
the felonies committed. The act of one is the act of all. With the conspiracy proved, the conviction of
petitioner was in order.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31
July 2012 and the Resolution dated 11 January 2013 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33776.

SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1767 dated 27 August 2014.

1
Under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

2
Rollo, pp. 32-48. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., with Presiding Justice
Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Associate Justice Rodi IV. Zalameda, concurring.

3
Id. at 50-51.

4
Id. at 72-9 I. Penned by Presiding Judge Robert P. Fangayen.

5
Records, Vol. 2, p. 1.

6
Id., Vol. 3, p. 1.

7
Id., Vol. 1, p. 49.

8
Id., Vol. 1, p. 185.

9
Rollo, p. 88.

10
Id. at 90-91.

11
Id. at 47.

12
Id. at 21.

13
Serra v. Mumar, G.R. No. 193861, 14 March 2012, 668 SCRA 335.

14
Lopez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 199294, 31 July 2013, 703 SCRA 118, 126.

Republic of the Philippines v. Malabanan, G.R. No. 169067, 6 October 2010, 632 SCRA
15

338, 345.

16
Id.

17
Id.
18
Belbis, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 181052, 14 November 2012, 685 SCRA 518, 533.

19
G.R. No. 172606, 23 November 2011, 661 SCRA 159, 166-167.

20
TSN, 10 November 2009, pp. 11-13; TSN, 30 June 2009, pp. 10-11.

21
People v. Aleta, 603 Phil. 571, 581 (2009), citing People v. Caabay, 456 Phil. 792 (2003).

22
Rollo, pp. 42-45.

23
People v. De Leon, 608 Phil. 701, 721 (2009).

24
People v. Durana, 333 Phil. 148, 156 (1996).

25
Supra note 23, at 720.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 207818 July 23, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ALEX DE LOS SANTOS, Accused-Appellant.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

For review is the Decision1 dated September 17, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 03790 which affirmed the Judgment2 dated January 7, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Tuao, Cagayan, Branch 11, in Criminal Case No. 1165-T, convicting Alex De Los Santos
(accused-appellant) of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.

The Facts

Accused-appellant was indicted for killing one Fernando A. Catriz (Catriz) through an information
articulating the following criminal charges, viz:

That on or about April 06, 2004, inthe Municipality of Tuao, Province of Cagayan and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused ALEX De LOS SANTOS y AGINAWAN armed
with long bolo with intent to kill, with treachery and treachery, (sic) did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hack FERNANDO A[.] CATRIZ, inflicting upon him
several hack wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his death. CONTRARY TO
LAW.3

Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant entered a "not guilty" plea. Pre-trial and trial thereafter
ensued. The prosecution presented the testimonies of Reynaldo Bayudan (Bayudan), the victim’s
nephew and an eyewitness to the incident, and Dr. Exuperio Yuaga (Dr. Yuaga), Municipal Health
Officer of Tuao, Cagayan. The prosecution also adopted the testimony of Eduardo Archibido which
was presented during the hearing on the petition for bail. Taken together with documentary evidence
marked as Exhibits A to E, the evidence for the prosecution showed that:

Catriz and the accused-appellant werebrothers-in-law. The former’s wife was the latter’s sister. At
about 4:00 p.m. of April 6, 2004, Catriz and Bayudan were at BarangayMungo, Tuao, Cagayan,
unloading culled cob chickens from a Toyota Tamaraw vehicle. While Bayudan and Catriz were
transferring the chickens into a cage beside the vehicle, the accused-appellant suddenly appeared
behind Catriz and hacked him on his right shoulder with a tabas(long-bladed bolo). The impact from
the blow caused the handle of the tabasto dislodge thus enabling Catriz to run towards the nearest
house. The accused-appellant, however, drew a "Rambo-type" knife, pursued Catriz and repeatedly
stabbed him until he fell. Pleading for his life, Catriz kneeled infront of the accused-appellant and
asked him to stop. His pleas were not heeded though and the accused-appellant continued stabbing
him until he fell again on the ground. Upon seeing the lifeless Catriz, the accused-appellant jumped
and exclaimed: "Happy New Year, natayen ni Ferdie!" (Happy New Year, Ferdie is dead!). The
accused-appellant thereafter went to a nearby pump well and nonchalantly washed his
hands.4 Meanwhile, Bayudan ran towards a nearby house for fear of his life.5

Dr. Yuaga testified that based on his post-mortem examination of the cadaver, Catriz sustained 11
stab wounds, four (4) of which were in the mid extremity of the heart area that could cause
instantaneous death while two (2) were located at the back portion ofhis body. Catriz also sustained
one (1) incised wound on the left scapula. His cause of death was "hypovolemic shock, secondary to
multiple stab wounds."6

The witnesses for the defense werethe accused-appellant himself and his uncle, Joseph Aginawang
(Aginawang). According to them, on the night of April 4, 2004, they had a drinking spree with Catriz.
After consuming two bottles of gin, Catriz asked the accused-appellant if he can till the family lot in
Bagumbayan, Tuao, Cagayan. When the accused-appellant answered that he cannot decide on the
matter since the land is family-owned, Catriz suddenly stood up and slapped the accused-appellant’s
face.

The accused-appellant did not takeoffense and simply left, while Catriz summoned his wife and
children, and headed home. Catriz, however, returned between 9:00 to 10:00 p.m. looking for the
1âw phi1
accused-appellant but didn’t find him. Catriz was again unable to find the accused-appellant when
he returned the next day.

On April 6, 2004, at about 4:00 p.m., the accused-appellant saw Catriz unloading chickens. He
approached him and offered help, but Catriz pushed him away causing the accused-appellant
tostumble down. Catriz then tried to hack the accused-appellant twice with a bolobut the latter was
able to dodge the attacks. On Catriz’s third attempt, the accused-appellant got hold of a knife from
the wall of a nearby house and defended himself by plunging the same on Catriz. When Catriz again
attempted to hack the accused-appellant, the latter shoved the knife against him once more. The
accused-appellant failed to recall how many times he stabbed Catriz because he got dizzy and lost
touch with his senses.

Dazed with what he has just witnessed, Aginawang ran to the back of a house towards a creek. The
accused-appellant, on the other hand, proceeded towards the road where he met one Abe Ballesil
who accompanied him, upon his request, to the police station to surrender.7

Ruling of the RTC

In its Decision8 dated January 7, 2008, the RTC sustained the testimony of prosecution witness
Bayudan, as corroborated by Dr. Yuaga’s post-mortem examination, that the accused-appellant
struck a hacking blow on Catriz from behind. Treachery was also found to have attended the killing
because while Catriz was on a kneeling position begging for his life, the accused-appellant
continued to stabhim. At that moment, Catriz was totally helpless while the accused-appellant was in
no danger from any retaliation.

The accused-appellant’s allegation of self-defense was rejected because: (1) he failed to claim it
atthe earliest opportunity when he surrendered to the police station; (2) the number and seriousness
of the wounds he inflicted on Catriz showed a determined effort on his part to kill the victim; and (3)
he failed to surrender the weapon to the police and he instead threw it away. Accordingly,the RTC
ruling was disposed as follows, viz:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the herein accused
ALEX DE LOS SA[N]TOS, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of MURDER, defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentencing him:

1. To suffer imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua;

2. To pay civil indemnity/damages to the heirs of the victim Fernando Catriz[;]

2.1 The amount of [P]50,000.00 as death indemnity;

2.2 The amount of [P]25,000.00 as moral damages;

2.3 The amount of [P]20,000.00 as nominal damages in lieu of actual damages; and

2.4 The amount of [P]25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

3. To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.9

Ruling of the CA

The CA affirmed the conviction and penalty meted upon the accused-appellant adding that "the
attitude and behavior of Catriz at that time certainly did not constitute the unlawful aggression which
the law requires." The CA further found the defense version of the events unbelievable because the
accused-appellant’s claim that he was at a disadvantageous position from Catriz’s relentless assault
is belied by the fact that the former was actually unscathed.The presence of a knife which the
accused-appellant picked up to repel Catriz’s alleged attack was likewise held highly specious since
it seems tosuggest that knives are scattered around the walls of houses in Mungo, Tuao, Cagayan.
Thus, the CA ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the
appeal filed in this case. The Decision dated January 7, 2008 rendered by Branch 11 of the Regional
Trial Court in Tuao, Cagayan in Criminal Case No. 1165-T is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.10
The accused-appellant is now before the Court pleading for his acquittal based on the same and
sole argument11raised in his Appellant’s Brief12 before the CA that the trial court gravely erred in not
giving credence to his claim of self-defense.

Ruling of the Court

The Court affirms the accused-appellant’s conviction. It is immediately apparent thatthe argument
proffered by the accused-appellant essentially assails the evaluation by the trial court of the
testimony of the prosecution’s principal witness, Bayudan, and its ruling that the same satisfactorily
repudiatedhis claim of self-defense.

Basic is the rule that the matter ofassigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and
most competently performed by the trial judge, who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the
witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various indiciaavailable but not reflected on the
record. Hence, the corollary principle that absent any showing that the trial court overlooked
substantial facts and circumstances that would affect the final disposition of the case, appellate
courts are bound to give due deference and respect to its evaluation of the credibility of an
eyewitness and his testimony as well as its probative value amidst the rest of the other evidence on
record.13

The Court sees no compelling reason to depart from the foregoing tenets especially considering the
accused-appellant’s failure to pinpoint significant details, which if considered, will alter the outcome
of the trial court’s judgment and the affirmation accorded it by the CA.

Even an assiduous examination ofthe records of the case yields a similar finding: the factual basis of
accused-appellant’s plea of self-defense cannot relieve him fromcriminal liability. Generally, the
burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt rather
than upon the accused that he was in fact innocent. However, if the accused admits killing the victim,
but pleads self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted to him to prove such defense by clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on his
part.14 Self-defense, when invoked, as a justifying circumstance implies the admission by the
accused that he committed the criminal act.15 Thus, to escape criminal liability, the accused must
prove by clear and convincing evidence the concurrence of the following requisites under the second
paragraph of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), viz: (1) unlawful aggression; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.16

Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying circumstance
ofself-defense. Without it, there can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, that can
validly be invoked.17 "There is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he puts in actual
or imminent danger the life, limb, or right of the person invoking self-defense. There must be actual
physical force or actual use of a weapon."18 "It is present only when the one attacked faces real and
immediate threat to one’s life."19

Here, the accused-appellant failed toprove that unlawful aggression was initiated by Catriz. The1âw phi1

physical evidence of Catriz’s incised wound on the left scapula belies the version ofevents adduced
by the defense and is more consistent with the narration of the prosecution’s eyewitness Bayudan –
that the initial blow came from the accused-appellant who suddenly emerged behind Catriz and
hacked him. The testimony of expert witness Dr. Yuaga further confirmed that such incised wound
could have been inflicted from behind.

The accused-appellant’sclaim that Catriz boxed him first and then tried to hack him with a bolois
grounded on contradictory, hence, unreliable testimonies. According to defense witness Aginawang,
he saw Catriz push and then box the accused-appellant. It is noticeable, however, from the accused-
appellant’s own narration that the detail relating to the punching is absent. Also, Aginawang admitted
oncross-examination that it was the accused-appellant who delivered the first aggression by
stabbing Catriz.20

Further, the Court agrees with the CA’s observation that the presence of a knife in the wall of the
nearby house was highly dubious. The immediate availability of a knife within the accused-
appellant’s convenient reach in a public place at the exact moment that he was allegedly being
hacked by Catriz is too inconceivable to warrant trustworthiness. The sequence of the narration of
eyewitness Bayudan is more rational and thus in accord with the spontaneity of a truthful account
that – all the while, the accused-appellant had the knife in his possession and he used it to continue
stabbing Catriz when the first weapon he used dislodged from its handle.

Further, the location, the number and gravity of the wounds inflicted on Catriz indicate a determined
effort to kill and not merely to defend. Based on Dr. Yuaga’s post-mortem examination, 4 of the 11
stab wounds inflicted on Catriz were in the mid extremity of the heart area sufficient to cause
instantaneous death. True enough, Catriz died of "hypovolemic shock, secondary to multiple stab
wounds." It has been repeatedly ruled that the nature, number and location of the wounds sustained
by the victim disprove a plea of self-defense.21

In fine, the courts a quo were correct in finding that the accused-appellant failed to discharge his
burden of proving the justifying circumstance of self-defense.

The Court also upholds the findings of the courts a quo that the killing of Catriz by the accused-
appellant was attended with treachery.

"There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specifically to ensure the
execution of the crime without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. To establish treachery, two elements must concur: (a) that at the time of the attack, the victim
was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) that the offender consciously adopted the particular
means of attack employed."22

"The essence of treachery lies inthe attack that comes without warning, and the attack is swift,
deliberate and unexpected, and affords the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to
resist or escape, thereby ensuring its accomplishment without the risk to the aggressor, without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack
madeit impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate."23

It is evident in this case that, astestified by eyewitness Bayudan, the accused-appellant attacked
Catriz whenthe latter was defenseless and unable to retaliate. The accused-appellantcommenced
his attack from behind Catriz and when the latter eventually fell down to his knees begging for his
life, the accused-appellant continued stabbing him. Clearly, the accused-appellant took advantage of
the vulnerable position of Catriz to ensure the successful execution of the offense without risk, and
deny the victim the opportunity to defend himself.

Treachery qualifies the killing to murder. Under Article 248 of the RPC, the penalty for murder is
reclusion perpetuato death. The two penalties being both indivisible and there being no mitigating
nor aggravating circumstance to consider, the lesser of the two penalties which is reclusion
perpetuashould be imposed pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 63 of the RPC.24 Hence, the
courts a quo correctly sentenced the accused-appellant to reclusion perpetua.

The accused-appellant shall not beeligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346
which states that "[p]ersons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose
sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole
under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."25

The award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages were correct. Civil indemnity
is mandatory upon proof of the fact of death of the victim and the culpability of the accused for such
death.26 Despite the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs’ mental anguish and emotional
suffering, the award of moral damages is also proper in view of the recognized fact that death
invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s
family.27 The heirs of the victim are likewise entitled to exemplary damages since the killing was
attended by treachery.28

However, in conformity with current jurisprudence, the amounts granted by the courts a quoshall be
increased to ₱75,000.00 for civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 for moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 for
exemplary damages.29

The award of nominal damages mustbe deleted and replaced with temperate damages in the
amount of ₱25,000.00.30 Nominal damages are proper when there is no proof of actual damages;
and when it is granted, it is as if there was in fact no damage at all.31 Temperate damages, on the
other hand, are awarded when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot be proved with certainty.32 There is no doubt that pecuniary expenses were incurred
in the funeral and burial of Catriz and the award of temperate damages shall answer for the same.33

Lastly, all the monetary awards shall earn an interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per
annumfrom the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.34

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated September 17, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03790 finding accused-appellant Alex De Los Santos GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder is herebyAFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Accused-appellant Alex De Los Santos is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetuawithout eligibility for parole and is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Fernando Catriz,
the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages, plus interest at the rate of six percent
( 6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.

The accused-appellant shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, with Associate Justices Michael P. Elbinias
and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela, concurring; CA rollo, pp. 130-142.

2
Issued by Judge Orlando D. Beltran; id. at 9-17.

3
Id. at 9.

4
Id. at 10.

5
Id. at 132.

6
Id. at 10.

7
Id. at 11-12.

8
Id. at 9-17.

9
Id. at 16-17.

10
Id. at 141.

11
Accused-appellant’s Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplemental Brief), rollo, pp. 31-32.

12
CA rollo, pp. 109-122.

13
People v. Credo, G.R. No. 197360, July 3, 2013, 700 SCRA 633, 644.

14
Flores v. People, G.R. No. 181354, February 27, 2013, 692 SCRA 127, 140-141.

15
People v. Maningding, G.R. No. 195665, September 14, 2011, 657 SCRA 804, 813.
16
People v. Concillado, G.R. No. 181204, November 28, 2011, 661 SCRA 363, 379.

17
People v. Paycana, Jr., 574 Phil. 780, 787 (2008).

18
People v. Comillo, Jr., G.R. No. 186538, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 756, 772.

19
Flores v. People, supra at 142.

20
Rollo, pp. 138-140.

21
People v. Campos,G.R. No. 176061, July 4, 2011, 653 SCRA 99, 110.

22
Id. at 111-112, citing People v. Dela Cruz, 594 Phil. 381, 395 (2008).

23
People v. Nugas, G.R. No. 172606, November 23, 2011, 661 SCRA 159, 169-170.

24
People v. Campos, supra note 21, at 114.

25
See People v. Dejillo,G.R. No. 185005, December 10, 2012, 687 SCRA 537, 556.

26
People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 187683, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 364, 374.

27
People v. Fontanilla, G.R. No. 177743, January 25, 2012, 664 SCRA 150, 161-162.

28
Id. at 163-164.

Resolution dated March 24, 2014, G.R. No. 184596 (People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-
29

Appellee v. Estela Lopez, Accused-Appellant).

30
People v. Del Castillo, G.R. No. 169084, January 18, 2012, 663 SCRA 226, 250-251.

31
Rafols v. Batangas Transportation Co., 62 O.G. No. 437968, 7 C.A. Rep. (2s) 93-94, as
cited in Philippine Law on Torts and Damages,Volume 2, J. Cezar S. Sangco.

32
People v. Fontanilla, supra at 162-163.

33
People of the Philippines v. Estela Lopez, supra.

Resolution dated February 24, 2014, G.R. No. 177754 (People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-
34

Appellee v. Anacleto Barbachano y Marquez and Hermingol Barbachano y Samaniego,

Accused-Appellant).
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 192150 October 1, 2014

FEDERICO SABAY, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review in this petition for review on certiorari1 the decision2 dated October 23, 2009 and the
resolution3 dated March 22, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31532.

The CA affirmed the April 28, 2008 decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City,
Branch 126, finding petitioner Federico Sabay guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of
Slight Physical Injuries. The RTC decision in tum affirmed the Metropolitan Trial Court's (MTC)
judgment.

The Antecedent Facts

At around three o’clock to four o’clock in the afternoon of June 12, 2001, while the petitioner and his
daughter Erlinda Sabay (Erlinda) were busy laying wood and water pipes in the yard of Godofredo
Lopez (Godofredo), the latter confronted the petitioner about his (the petitioner’s) alleged intrusion
into Godofredo’s property. A verbal altercation ensued between them.

In the course of the verbal exchange, Erlinda hit Godofredo on the head with a hard object. The
petitioner joined in by throwing a stone at Godofredo’s face, breaking the latter’s eyeglasses.
Godofredo claimed that as a result, he felt dizzy.5 The petitioner and Erlinda then shouted at
Godofredo and threatened to kill him.

Immediately thereafter, Jervie Lopez (Jervie) came and pacified the three. But in the course his
efforts, he was hit in the hand with a bolo.6 The neighbors intervened not long after and pacified the
parties.

The Medico Legal Certificates7 dated June 12, 2001 showed that Godofredo suffered a contusion on
the left parietal area of his head and an abrasion in his left cheek, while Jerviesustained a wound in
his right palm.

On June 13, 2001, Godofredo and Jervie filed a complaint against the petitioner before the
barangay.8 The parties agreed to settle the complaint based on the recommendation of the building
inspector and reflected their agreement in their Kasunduang Pag-aayos9 (Kasunduan) dated June
20, 2001. The Kasunduan, however, was not implemented because the building inspector failed to
make the promised recommendation to resolve the boundary dispute between the parties.10 Thus,
the Office of the Barangay Captain issued a Certificate to File an Action.

The petitioner was accordingly charged before the MTC with the crime of Physical Injuries under two
(2) Informations11 that read:

Criminal Case No. 209934

That on or about the 12th day of June 2001, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without justifiable cause, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hit with a bolo one JERVIE LOPEZ, thereby inflicting
upon the latter physical injuries which required and will require medical attendance for not more than
seven (7) days or incapacitated or will incapacitate said victim from performing his habitual work for
the same period of time.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 209935

That on or about the 12th day of June 2001, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without justifiable cause, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hit with a bolo one GODOFREDO LOPEZ, thereby
inflicting upon the latter physical injuries which required and will require medical attendance for not
more than seven (7) days or incapacitated or will incapacitate said victim from performing his
habitual work for the same period of time.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The petitioner, together with his daughter Erlinda, was also charged with Light Threats12 for allegedly
uttering threatening words against the private complainant, Godofredo.

When arraigned, both accused pleadednot guilty to all the charges. Trial on the merits thereafter
ensued.

At the trial, the prosecution presented the following eyewitnesses: Rodolfo Lata, Sr. y Dolping
(Rodolfo) and Dina Perez y Alapaap (Dina) (who both testified on the details of the crime);
Godofredo; Jervie; and Dr. Melissa Palugod (Godofredo’s attending physician). The defense, on the
other hand, presented the petitioner, Wilfredo Verdad and Caridad Sabay.

The petitioner denied the charge and claimed that he had simply acted in self-defense. He narrated
that on the date of the incident while he was putting a monument on his lot, Godofredo suddenly hit
him with an iron bar in his right hand, causing him injuries. Jesus Lopez (Jessie), Godofredo’s son,
went out of their house and with a .38 caliber gun, fired the gun at him. To defend himself, he got a
stone and threw it at Godofredo.

The MTC’s and the RTC’s Rulings

In its decision, MTC believed the prosecution's version of the incident and found the petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of slight physical injuries. The MTC, however, dismissed
the light threats charged, as this offense is deemed absorbed in the crime of slight physical injuries.
Further, it absolved Erlinda for the crime of light threats as there was no allegation that she uttered
threatening words against Godofredo.

The MTC rejected the petitioner’s claim of self-defense for lack of clear, convincing and satisfactory
supporting evidence. The MTC held that the petitioner failed to prove that there had been unlawful
aggression by Godofredo; he did not even present the medical certificate of his injury as evidence.
The dispositive partof its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Federico Sabay y Bactol is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of Slight Physical Injuries and is meted a penalty
ofimprisonment of Eleven (11) Days for each count as there is neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance.

SO ORDERED.

In due course, the petitioner appealed his judgment to the RTC, which fully affirmed the MTC’s
decision.

The petitioner sought recourse with the CA, arguing in this appeal that: (1) the MTC has no
jurisdiction over the case in view of the prosecution’s failure to offer the Certification to File an Action
in evidence; and (2) the trial court erred in not sustaining his claim of self-defense.

The CA’s Ruling

The CA rejected the petitioner’s arguments and affirmed the RTC’s decision. The CA held that even
if there had been no formal offer of exhibit pursuant to Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules on
Evidence, the Certification to File an Action could still be admitted against the adverse party if, first, it
has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, it has been incorporated into the
records of the case. Noting that the Certification to File an Action was identified by the complainants
and is attached to the records of the case, the CA ruled that an exception to Section 34, Rule 132 of
the Rules on Evidence could be recognized.

The CA also dismissed the petitioner’s plea of self-defense. The CA ruled that self-defense is
essentially a factual matter that isbest addressed by the trial court; in the absence of any showing
that both the MTC and the RTC overlooked weighty and substantial facts or circumstances that
could alter their conclusion, the appellate court saw no reason to disturb their factual ruling.
On March 22, 2010, the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration; hence, the present
petition.

The Issues

On the basis of the same arguments raised before the CA, the petitioner questions: (1) the
jurisdiction of the MTC over the criminal cases in view of the alleged inadmissibility ofthe
Certification to File Action; and (2) the lower court’s finding of guilt, its appreciation of the evidence
and its rejection of the claim of self-defense.

The Court’s Ruling

We find no reversible error committed by the CA and affirm the petitioner’s conviction for two counts
of slight physical injuries.

On the first issue, the petitioner contends that the lower courts erred in disregarding the existence of
the Kasunduan executed by the parties before the Lupon. This existing settlement between the
parties rendered the Certification to File an Action without factual and legal basis, and is hence null
and void. The petitioner also contendsthat the CA erred in not holding that the MTC has no
jurisdiction over the criminal cases in view of the noncompliance (i.e., issuance of the Certification
toFile an Action despite the existence of an agreement) with conciliation procedures under
Presidential Decree No. 1508.

We see no merit in these contentions.

The Office of the Barangay Captain Cannot be Precluded From Issuing a Certification to File an
Action Where NoActual Settlement Was Reached; the Certification to File an Action

Issued by The Office of The Barangay is Valid.

The present case was indisputably referred to the Barangay Luponfor conciliation prior to the
institution of the criminal cases before the MTC. The parties in fact admitted that a meeting before
the Lupontranspired between them, resulting in a Kasunduan.

Although they initially agreed to settle their case, the Kasunduanthat embodied their agreement was
never implemented; no actual settlement materialized as the building inspector failed to make his
promised recommendation to settle the dispute. The Barangay Captain was thus compelled to issue
a Certification to File an Action, indicating that the disputing parties did not reach any settlement.

The CA correctly observed and considered the situation: the settlement of the case was conditioned
on the recommendation of the building inspector; with no recommendation, no resolution of the
conflict likewise took place.

Furthermore, the BarangayCaptain, as a public official, is presumed to act regularly in the

performance of official duty.13 In the absence of contrary evidence, this presumption prevails; his
issuance of the disputed Certification to File an Action was regular and pursuant to law.14 Thus, the
Barangay Captain properly issued the Certification to File an Action.

Even granting that an irregularity had intervened in the Barangay Captain’s issuance of the
Certification toFile and Action, we note that this irregularity is not a jurisdictional flaw that warrants
the dismissal of the criminal cases before the MTC. As we held in Diu v. Court of Appeals:15

Also, the conciliation procedure under Presidential Decree No. 1508 is not a jurisdictional
requirement and non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower courts had
already acquired over the subject matter and private respondents as defendants therein. Similarly, in
Garces v. Court of Appeals,16 we stated that:

In fine, we have held in the past that prior recourse to the conciliation procedure required under P.D.
1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement, non-compliance with which would deprive a court of its
jurisdiction either over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant.

Thus, the MTC has jurisdiction to try and hear the petitioner’s case; the claimed irregularity in
conciliation procedure, particularly in the issuance of the Certification to File an Action, did not
deprive the court of its jurisdiction. If at all, the irregularity merely affected the parties’ cause of
action.17

The petitioner next contends thateven if there was a valid Certification to File an Action, the lower
courts still erred in admitting the Certificate into evidence as the prosecution did not formally offer it
as required by the Rules on Evidence. He emphasizes that in Fideldia v. Sps. Mulato,18 the Court
held that a formal offer is necessary because judges are required to base their findings solely upon
evidence offered by the parties. In the absence of a formal offer, the Certification is not admissible
pursuant to Section 412 of Republic Act No. 7160, and cannot be considered by the court.

We do not find this argument sufficiently persuasive.

The Certification to File an Action is Admissible.

Section 34 of Rule 132 of our Rules on Evidence provides that the court cannot consider any
evidence that has not been formally offered.19 Formal offer means that the offering party shall inform
the court of the purpose of introducing its exhibits into evidence, to assist the court in ruling on their
admissibility in case the adverse party objects.20 Without a formal offer of evidence, courts cannot
take notice of this evidence even if this has been previously marked and identified.

This rule, however, admits of anexception. The Court, in the appropriate cases, has relaxed the
formal-offer rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted.

The cases of People v. Napat-a,21 People v. Mate,22 and The Heirs of Romana Saves, et al. v. The
Heirs of Escolastico Saves, et al.,23 to cite a few, enumerated the requirements so that evidence, not
previously offered, can be admitted, namely: first, the evidence must have been duly identified by
testimony duly recorded and, second, the evidence must have been incorporated in the records of
the case.

In the present case, we find that the requisites for the relaxation of the formal-offer rule are
present. As the lower courts correctly observed, Godofredo identified the Certification to File an
1âwphi1

Action during his crossexamination, to wit:24

Q: And I’m referring to you thisCertification from the Office of the Brgy. docketed as 181-01, is this
the one you are referring to?

A: This is with respect to the hitting of my head.

Atty. Bihag: At this juncture, your Honor, we would like to request that this particular certification
referring to the case 181-01 entitled Mr. Godofredo Lopez, Mr. Jervie Lopez versus Mr. Federico
Sabay and Mrs. Erlinda Castro, be marked as Exh. "1" for the defense. [TSN, Godofredo Lopez,
page 119; emphasis ours.]

Although the Certification was not formally offered in evidence, it was marked as Exhibit "1" and
attached to the records of the case.25 Significantly, the petitioner never objected to Godofredo’s
testimony, particularly with the identification and marking of the Certification. In these lights, the
Court sees no reason why the Certification should not be admitted.

The Claim of Self-Defense

On the claim of self-defense, we recognize that the factual findings and conclusions of the RTC,
especially when affirmed by the CA as in this case, are entitled to great weight and respect and are
deemed final and conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record.26

In the absence of any indication thatthe trial and the appellate courts overlooked facts or
circumstances that would result in a different ruling in this case, we will not disturb their factual
findings.27

We thus uphold the rulings of the RTC and the CA which found the elements of the crime of slight
physical injuries fully established during the trial. The RTC and the CA correctly rejected the
petitioner’s claim of selfdefense because he did not substantiate it with clear and convincing proof.

Self-defense as a justifying circumstance under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
implies the admission by the accused that he committed the acts that would have been criminal in
character had it not been for the presence of circumstances whose legal consequences negate the
commission of a crime.28 The plea of self-defense in order to exculpate the accused must be duly
proven. The most basic rule is that no self-defense can be recognized until unlawful aggression is
established.29

Since the accused alleges self-defense, he carries the burden of evidence to prove that he satisfied
the elements required by law;30 he who alleges must prove. By admitting the commission of the act
charged and pleading avoidance based on the law, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence
to prove that the facts that the legal avoidance requires are present; the weakness of the
prosecution’s evidence is immaterial after he admitted the commission of the act charged.31
In this case, the petitioner admitted the acts attributed to him, and only pleads that he acted in self-
defense. His case essentially rests on the existence of unlawful aggression – that Godofredo hit him
with an iron bar on his right hand.

As the RTC and the CA pointed out, the petitioner failed to substantiate his claimed self-defense
because he did not even present any medical certificate as supporting evidence, notwithstanding his
claim that he consulted a doctor. Nor did he everpresent the doctor he allegedly consulted. His
contention, too, that he was attacked by Godofredo and was shot with a .38 caliber gun by Jessie
was refuted by the prosecution eyewitnesses – Rodolfo and Dina – who both testified that it was the
petitioner who had attacked Godofredo.

The prosecution eyewitnesses' testimonies were supported by the medico legal certificates showing
that Godofredo sustained a contusion on the left parietal area of his head and an abrasion on his left
cheek. These medico legal findings are consistent with Godofredo' s claim that the petitioner hit him
and inflicted physical injuries.

In sum, we are fully satisfied that the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
slight physical injuries, as the lower courts found. His claim of self-defense fails for lack of supporting
evidence; he failed to present any evidence of unlawful aggression and cannot thus be said to have
hit Godofredo as a measure to defend himself.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the appeal and AFFIRM the decision dated October
23, 2009 and the resolution dated March 22, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
31532.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo, pp. 32-52.

2
Id. at 8-25; penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, and concurred in by
Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso.

3
Id. at 27-28.

4
Id. at 99-106; penned by Acting Presiding Judge Oscar P. Barrientos.

5
CA rollo, p. 77.
6
Id.

7
Id. at 79 and 88.

8
Id. at 92

9
Id. at 84

10
Id. at 121.

11
Id. at 68-69.

12
Article 285 of the Revised Penal Code.

13
Section 3 (m), Rule 131 of the Rules on Evidence.

Empaynado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91606, December 17, 1991, 204 SCRA 870,
14

877.

15
G.R. No. 115213, December 19, 1995, 251 SCRA 472, 478-479.

16
245 Phil. 450, 455 (1988).

17
San Miguel Village School v. Pundogar, 255 Phil. 689, 693-695 (1989).

18
586 Phil. 7, 15 (2008).

Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court states: "Sec. 34. The court shall consider no
19

evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered
must be specified."

Star Two (SPV-AMC), Inc. v. Ko, G.R. No. 185454, March 23, 2011, 646 SCRA 371, 375-
20

376.

21
258-A Phil. 994 (1989).

22
191 Phil. 72 (1981).

23
G.R. No. 152866, October 6, 2010, 632 SCRA 236.

24
CA rollo, TSN, p. 119.

25
Id.

Maxwell Heavy Equipment Corporation v. Yu, G.R. No. 179395, December 15, 2010, 638
26

SCRA 653, 658.

27
Ilagan-Mendoza v. Urcia, 574 Phil. 90, 101 (2008).

People of the Philippines v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 195534, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 590,
28

595-596.

29
The People of the Philippine Islands v. Apolinario, 58 Phil. 586 (1933).

30
Supranote 28.

People of the Philippines v. Mediado, G.R. No. 169871, February 2, 2011, 641 SCRA 366,
31

370-371.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 189405 November 19, 2014

SHERWIN DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CARLOS ALBERTO L. GONZALES, in behalf of his
deceased brother, JEFFREY WERNHER L. GONZALES, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and
set aside the May 7, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 89257, finding
petitioner Sherwin Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, and its
August 19, 2009 Resolution2 denying his motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner was charged with the crime of Homicide in an Information3 dated March 2, 2005, which
alleged:

That on or about the 1st day of January 2005, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent to kill and with the use of
an unlicensed firearm, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot one JEFFREY WERNHER GONZALES Y LIM on the head, thereby inflicting upon the latter
serious and moral gunshot wound which directly caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

According to the prosecution, on January 1, 2005, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, petitioner went to
the office of Sykes Asia Inc. located at the 25th Floor of Robinson’s Summit Center,Ayala Avenue,
Makati City. When petitioner was already inside the building, he went to the work station of the
deceased victim, Jeffrey Wernher L. Gonzales (Jeffrey), who, by the configuration of the eye witness
Antonette Managbanag’s sketch, was seated fronting his computer terminal, with his back towards
the aisle. As petitioner approached Jeffrey from the back, petitioner was already holding a gun
pointed at the back of Jeffrey’s head. At the last second, Jeffrey managed to deflect the hand of
petitioner holding the gun, and a short struggle for the possession of the gun ensued thereafter.
Petitioner won the struggle and remained in possession of the said gun. Petitioner then pointed the
gun at Jeffrey’s face, pulled the trigger four (4) times, the fourth shot finally discharging the bullet
that hit Jeffrey in the forehead, eventually killing him. Finally, after shooting Jeffrey, petitioner fled the
office.

The defense recounted a different version of the facts.

Petitioner claimed that on January1, 2005, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, more or less, petitioner,
together with his children, went to Sykes Asia, the workplace of his wife, Darlene Dela Cruz
(Darlene), located at the 25th Floor of Robinson’s Summit Building in Makati City, to fetch the latter
so that their family could spend time and celebrate together the New Year’s Day. Before entering the
Robinson’s Summit Building, petitioner underwent the regular security check-up/procedures. He was
frisked by the guards-on-duty manning the main entrance of said building and no firearm was found
in his possession. He registered his name at the security logbook and surrendered a valid I.D.

Upon reaching the 25th Floor of the same building, a security guard manning the entrance once
again frisked petitioner and, likewise, found no gun in his possession; hence, he was allowed to
enter the premises of Sykes Asia. The security guard also pointed to him the direction towards his
wife’s table.

However, as Darlene was then not on her table, petitioner approached a certain man and asked the
latter as to the possible whereabouts of Darlene. The person whom petitioner had talked towas the
deceased-victim, Jeffrey. After casually introducing himself as the husband of Darlene, Jeffrey curtly
told him, "Bakit mo hinahanap si Darlene?"to which he answered, "Nagpapasundo kasi sa akin."The
response given by Jeffrey shocked and appalled petitioner: "Ayaw na nga ng asawa mo sayo
sinusundo mo pa!"
Shocked by the words and reaction of Jeffrey, petitioner tried to inquire from Jeffrey who he was. But
Jeffrey suddenly cursed petitioner. Then, Jeffrey suddenly picked up something in his chair which
happened to be a gun and pointed the same at petitioner’s face followed by a clicking sound. The
gun, however, did not fire.

Seeing imminent danger to his life,petitioner grappled with Jeffrey for the possession of the
gun.While grappling, the gunclicked for two (2) to three (3) more times. Again, the gun did not fire.

Petitioner was able to wrest away the gun from Jeffrey and tried to run away to avoid any further
confrontation with the latter.However, Jeffrey immediately blocked petitioner’s path and shouted,
"Guard! Guard!" Immediately then, Jeffrey took hold ofa big fire extinguisher, aimed and was about
to smash the same on petitioner’s head.

Acting instinctively, petitioner parried the attack while still holding the gun. While in the act of
parrying, the gun accidentally fired due to the reasonable force and contact that his parrying hand
had made with the fire extinguisher and the single bullet discharged hit the forehead of Jeffrey,
which caused the latter to fall on the floor and die.

Petitioner left the gun and went out ofthe premises of Sykes Asia and proceeded towards the
elevator. On his way to the elevator, he heard Darlene shout, "Sherwin anong nangyari?", but he
was not able to answer.

After said incident, Darlene abandoned petitioner and brought with her their two (2) young children.
Petitioner later learned that Darlene and Jeffrey had an illicit relationship when he received a copy of
the blog of Darlene, dated January 30, 2005, sent by his friend.

During his arraignment, on August 22, 2005, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded "Not
Guilty" to the charge. Thereafter, pretrial conference was conducted on even date and trial on the
merits ensued thereafter.

During the trial of the case, the prosecution presented the oral testimonies of Marie Antonette
Managbanag (Managbanag), Maria Angelina Pelaez (Pelaez) and Carlos Alberto Lim Gonzales
(Gonzales), respectively. The prosecution likewise formally offered several pieces of documentary
evidence to support its claim.

For its part, the defense presented aswitnesses, petitioner himself; his brother, Simeon Sander Dela
Cruz III (Cruz), Greg Lasmarias Elbanvuena (Elbanvuena) and Managbanag, who was recalled to
the witness stand as witness for the defense.

On February 26, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)of Makati City, Branch 147, rendered a
Decision5 finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, as defined and
penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the fallo thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, Judgment is rendered finding herein accused Sherwin Dela Cruz y Gloria Guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide as defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) years and
One (1) day of prision mayor medium as Minimum to Fourteen (14) years eight (8) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal medium as Maximum; to indemnify the Heirs of Jeffrey Wernher
Gonzales y Lim in the amount of ₱50,000.00 plus moral damages in the amount of ₱1 Million, and to
pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.6

On March 28, 2007, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal, while private respondent, through the private
prosecutor, filed a Notice of Appeal on April 11, 2007 insofar as the sentence rendered against
petitioner is concerned and the civil damages awarded.

After the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals (CA). However, the latter denied their appeal and affirmed the RTC decision with
modification on the civil liability of petitioner. The decretal portion of the Decision7 reads:
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 147
dated 26 February 2007 finding accused-appellant Sherwin Dela Cruz y Gloria GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime ofHomicide with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

(2) the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;

(3) the amount of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages;

 (4) the amount of ₱3,022,641.71 as damages for loss of earning capacity.

(5) to pay the costs of the litigation.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition.

Raised are the following issues for resolution:

1. WHETHER ALL THE REQUISITES OF THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-

DEFENSE, AS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE, ARE
PRESENT IN THIS CASE.

2. WHETHER THE FIRING OF THE GUN WHEREIN ONLY A SINGLE BULLET WAS
DISCHARGED THEREFROM WAS MERELY ACCIDENTAL WHICH OCCURRED DURING
THE TIME THAT THE PETITIONER-APPELLANT WAS STILL IN THE ACT OF
DEFENDING HIMSELF FROM THE CONTINUOUS UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION OF THE
DECEASED VICTIM.

3. WHETHER THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PROVE ALL THE ESSENTIAL

ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE.

4. WHETHER THE PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE IS

APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE.

5. WHETHER PETITIONER-APPELLANT MAY BE HELD CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE

DEATH OF THE VICTIM ARISING FROM THE ACCIDENT THAT TRANSPIRED.9

There is no question that petitioner authored the death of the deceased-victim, Jeffrey. What is
leftfor determination by this Court is whether the elements of self-defenseexist to exculpate petitioner
from the criminal liability for Homicide.

The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3)
lackof sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.10 In other words,
there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused,
who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to
resist the attack.11

Considering that self-defense totally exonerates the accused from any criminal liability, it is well
settled thatwhen he invokes the same, it becomes incumbent upon him to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself.12 The burden of proving that the
killing was justified and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor shifts upon him.13 As such, he
must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution for, even
if the prosecution evidence is weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused himself has admitted
the killing.14

Measured against this criteria, wefind that petitioner's defense is sorely wanting. Hence, his petition
must be denied.

First. The evidence on record does not support petitioner's contention that unlawful aggression was
employed by the deceased-victim, Jeffrey, against him.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden,
unexpected or imminent danger — not merely threatening and intimidating action.15 There is
aggression, only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to his life.16 The peril sought
to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely speculative.17 In the case at bar, other than
petitioner’s testimony, the defense did not adduce evidence to show that Jeffrey condescendingly
responded to petitioner’s questions or initiated the confrontation before the shooting incident; that
Jeffrey pulled a gun from his chair and tried to shoot petitioner but failed — an assault which may
have caused petitioner to fear for his life.

Even assuming arguendothat the gun originated from Jeffrey and an altercation transpired, and
therefore, danger may have in fact existed, the imminence of that danger had already ceased the
moment petitioner disarmed Jeffrey by wresting the gun from the latter. After petitioner had
successfully seized it, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would have
necessitated the need to kill Jeffrey. As aptly observed by the RTC, petitioner had every opportunity
to run away from the scene and seek help but refused to do so, thus:
In this case, accused and the victim grappled for possession of the gun. Accused admitted that he
1avvphi1

wrested the gun from the victim. From that point in time until the victim shouted "guard, guard", then
took the fire extinguisher, there was no unlawful aggression coming from the victim. Accused had
the opportunity to run away. Therefore, even assuming that the aggression with use of the gun
initially came from the victim, the fact remains that it ceased when the gun was wrested away by the
accused from the victim. It is settled that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer
has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is
committed (Peo Vs. Tagana, 424 SCRA 620). A person making a defense has no more right to
attack an aggressor when the unlawful aggression has ceased (PeoVs. Pateo, 430 SCRA 609).

Accused alleged that the victimwas about to smash the fire extinguisher on his (accused’s) headbut
he parried it with his hand holding the gun. This is doubtful as nothing in the records is or would be
corroborative of it.In contrast, the two (2) Prosecution witnesses whose credibility was not
impeached, both gave the impression that the victim got the fire extinguisher to shieldhimself from
the accused who was then already in possession of the gun.18

Thus, when an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-
defense has no right to kill or even wound the former aggressor.19 To be sure, when the present
victim no longer persisted in his purpose or action to the extent that the object of his attack was no
longer in peril, there was no more unlawful aggression that would warrant legal self-defense on the
part of the offender.20 Undoubtedly, petitioner went beyond the call of self-preservation when he
proceeded to inflict excessive, atrocious and fatal injuries on Jeffrey, even when the allegedly
unlawful aggression had already ceased.

More, a review of the testimony of the prosecution witness, Pelaez, will show that if there was
unlawful aggression in the instant case, the same rather emanated from petitioner, thus: DIRECT
EXAMINATION

Atty. Mariano:

Q: Can you relate to the Court, Ms. Witness, how did this incident happen?

A: We were still at work, we were expecting calls but there were no calls at the moment and I was
standing at my work station and then Sherwin approached Jeff and he pointed a gun at the back of
the head of Jeff.

Q: And then what happened?

A: And then Jeff parried the gun and they started struggling for the possession of the gun.

Q: How far were you from this struggle when you witnessed it?

A: Probably 10 to 12 feet.

Q: Going back to your story, Ms. Witness, you mentioned that after Jeffrey warded off the gun, they
started to struggle, what happened after that, if any?

A: After they struggled, the gun clicked three times and then after that Jeff tried to get hold of the fire
extinguisher and the fourth shot went off and then Jeffrey fell down.

Q: And who was holding the gun?

A: Sherwin was holding the gun. (TSN, Oct. 17, 2005, pp. 12-14) CROSS-EXAMINATION: Atty.
Agoot:

Q: So you did not see when Sherwin approached Jeffrey because he came from the other side?
Atty. Mariano:

Objection, your Honor, witness already answered that.

Atty. Agoot:

I am on cross examination, your Honor.

COURT

You didn’t not see when he approached Jeffrey? A: No, as I said, I saw him point the gun at the back
of Jeff and he did not come from my side so that means…
COURT

No, the question is, You did not actually see Sherwin approached Jeffrey?

A: I saw him already at the back of Jeffrey.

Atty. Agoot

He was already at the back of Jeffrey when you saw him?

A: Yes, Sir.

(TSN, Oct. 17, 2005, pp. 26-27)21

Clearly, petitioner's allegation that when he approached Jeffrey, the latter pulled a gun from his chair
and tried to shoot him, is not corroborated by separate competent evidence. Pitted against the
testimony of prosecution witnesses, Managbanag and Pelaez, it pales incomparison and loses
probative value. We have, on more thanone occasion, ruled that the plea of self-defense cannot be
justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but
also extremely doubtful in itself.22

In addition, other than petitioner’s testimony, there is dearth of evidence showing that the alleged
unlawful aggression on the part of Jeffrey continued when he blocked the path of petitioner while the
latter tried to run away to avoid further confrontation with Jeffrey. We also agree with the findings of
the RTC that there was no proof evincing that Jeffrey aimed and intended to smash the big fire
extinguisher on petitioner’s head. Alternatively, the prosecution witnesses maintained an impression
that Jeffrey used the same to shield himself from petitioner who was then in possession of the gun, a
deadly weapon. An excerpt of the testimony of Managbanag bares just that, to wit:

Atty. Agoot

Q: And then after pulling the fire extinguisher from the wall Jeffrey again faced the person who was
holding the gun already?

Witness:

A: He was holding the fire extinguisher like this.

COURT

For the record.

Atty. Mariano:

Witness demonstrating how the victim Jeffrey Gonzales was holding the fire extinguisher upright with
his right hand above the fire extinguisher and his left hand below the fire extinguisher.

Witness:

The left hand would support the weight basically.

Atty. Agoot

Q: And then he used that fire extinguisher to protect himself from the slapping of that person who
was in possession of the gun?

Witness

A: Yes, sir.

Atty. Agoot

Q: And then after that there was again a grappling?

Witness
A: No more grappling for possession. Because Jeffrey was still holding the fire extinguisher at
thattime. And then he fell holding on to the fire extinguisher.

Atty. Agoot

Q: You said here which I quote "binaril siya ng lalaki ng sunod-sunod pero hindi pumutok" Do you
affirmand confirm this statement?

Witness

A: Yes, sir. They were pushing each other. The other person was trying to point the gun at Jeffrey
and Jeffrey was trying to cover himself with the fire extinguisher so nagkakatulakan sila at the same
time.

Atty. Agoot

Q: You said that the gun clicked, how many times did the gun click without firing?

Witness

A: Three (3) times, sir.

Atty. Agoot

Q: And what did the late Jeffrey do when the gun clicked but did not fire?

Witness

A: They were still pushing each other at that time.

Atty. Agoot

Q: Using the fire extinguisher, heused that to push against the person…

Witness

A: Basically trying to cover himself and trying to push away the person who was pointing the gun at
him.

Atty. Agoot

Q: And why do you know that Jeffrey was trying hard to push the fire extinguisher?

Witness

A: Because I was seated roughly about 5 to 6 feet away from them. So I clearly saw what was going
on at that time.

(Direct Examination of Marie Antonette Managbanag for the Defense, TSN dated 04 September
2006, pp. 12-17, emphasis supplied)23

Petitioner’s contention that Jeffrey’s unlawful aggression was continuous and imminent is, therefore,
devoid of merit.

Given that the criteria of unlawful aggression is indubitably absent in the instant case, the severe
wounds inflicted by petitioner upon Jeffrey was unwarranted and, therefore, cannot be considered a
justifying circumstance under pertinent laws and jurisprudence.

Second. Even assuming that the unlawful aggression emanated from the deceased victim, Jeffrey,
the means employed by petitioner was not reasonably commensurate to the nature and extent of the
alleged attack, which he sought to avert. As held by the Court in People v. Obordo:24

Even assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, accused-
appellant likewise failed to prove that the means he employed to repel Homer's punch was
reasonable. The means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational
equivalence between the means of attack and the defense. Accused appellant claimed that the
victim punched him and was trying to get something from his waist, so he (accused-appellant)
stabbed the victim with his hunting knife. His act of immediately stabbing Homer and inflicting a
wound on a vital part ofthe victim's body was unreasonable and unnecessary considering that, as
alleged by accused-appellant himself, the victim used his bare fist in throwing a punch at him.25

Indeed, the means employed by a person resorting to self-defense must be rationally necessary to
prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. The opposite was, however, employed by petitioner, as
correctly pointed out by the RTC, thus:

The victim was holding the fire extinguisher while the second was holding the gun. The gun and the
discharge thereof was unnecessary and disproportionate to repel the alleged aggression with the
use of fire extinguisher. The rule is that the means employed by the person invoking self-defense
contemplates a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense (Peo vs. Obordo,
382 SCRA 98).

It was the accused who was in a vantage position as he was armed with a gun, as against the victim
who was armed, so to speak, with a fire extinguisher, which is not a deadly weapon. Under the
circumstances, accused’s alleged fear was unfounded. The Supreme Court has ruled that neither an
imagined impending attack nor an impending or threatening attitude is sufficient to constitute
unlawful aggression (Catalina Security Agency Vs. Gonzales-Decano, 429 SCRA 628). It is a settled
rule that to constitute aggression, the person attacked must be confronted by a real threat on his
lifeand limb; and the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, not merely imaginary (Senoja
v. Peo., 440 SCRA 695).26

If petitioner had honestly believed that Jeffrey was trying to kill him, he should have just run, despite
any obstruction, considering that he was already in possession of the gun. He could have also
immediately sought help from the people around him, specifically the guard stationed at the floor
where the shooting incident happened. In fact, he could have reported the incident to the authorities
as soon as he had opportunity to do so, if it was indeed an accident or a cry of self-preservation. Yet,
petitioner never did any of that.

We find it highly specious for petitioner to go through the process of tussling and hassling with
Jeffrey, and inthe end, shooting the latter on the forehead, not only once, but four times, the last shot
finally killing him, if he had no intention to hurt Jeffrey. Thus:

Moreover, the Prosecution’s eyewitnesses were consistent in declaring that while there was prior
struggle for the possession of the gun, it was nevertheless accused who was holding the gun at the
time of the actual firing thereof (TSN, p. 30, October 10, 2005; TSN, p. 14, October 17, 2005).
Witness Managbanag even alleged that while the victim (Jeffrey), who was in possession of the fire
extinguisher, and the accused were pushing each other, accused pointed the gun at the victim. She
heard three (3) clicks and on the 4th , the gun fired (TSN, p. 12, October 10, 2005). Under the
circumstances, it cannot be safely said that the gun was or could have been fired accidentally. The
discharge of the gun which led to the victim’s death was no longer made in the course of the grapple
and/or struggle for the possession of the gun.27

The observation of the RTC dispels any doubt that the gun may have been shot accidentally to the
detriment of Jeffrey. The fire was neither a disaster nor a misfortune of sorts. While petitioner may
nothave intended to kill Jeffrey at the onset, at the time he clicked the trigger thrice consecutively,
his intent to hurt (or even kill) Jeffrey was too plain to be disregarded. We have held in the pastthat
the nature and number of wounds are constantly and unremittingly considered important indicia
which disprove a plea of self-defense.28 Thus, petitioner’s contention that an accident simultaneously
occurred while hewas in the act of self-defense is simply absurd and preposterous at best. There
could nothave been an accident because the victim herein suffered a gunshot wound on his head, a
vital part of the body and, thus, demonstrates a criminal mind resolved to end the life of the victim.

Besides, petitioner’s failure to inform the police of the unlawful aggression on the part of Jeffrey and
to surrender the gun that he used to kill the victim militates against his claim of self-defense.29

In view of the foregoing, we find it illogical to discuss further the third element of self-defense since it
is recognized that unlawful aggression is a conditio sine qua nonfor upholding the justifying
circumstance of self-defense.30 If there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of self-
defense will have no basis.31 Hence, there is no basis to entertain petitioner’s argument that a
privileged mitigating circumstance of selfdefense is applicable in this case, because unless the
victim has committed unlawful aggression against the other, there can be no self-defense, complete
or incomplete, on the part of the latter.32

Anent petitioner’s argument thatthe RTC erred when it failed to consider as suppression of evidence
the prosecution’s alleged deliberate omission to present the testimonies of the security guards-on-
duty at the time of the shooting incident, the same fails to persuade. We concur with the decision of
the CA on this point, to wit:
Having admitted the killing of the victim, the burden of evidence that he acted in self-defense, shifted
to accused-appellant Dela Cruz. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of the prosecution’s evidence, for, even if the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved
after his open admission of responsibility for the killing.

The security guards on duty at the time of the subject incident were at the disposal of both the
prosecution and the defense. The defense did not proffer proof that the prosecution prevented the
security guards from testifying. There is therefore no basis for it to conclude that the prosecution is
guilty of suppression of evidence.

The defense could have easily presented the security guards if it is of the opinion that their [the
security guards] testimonies were vital and material to the case of the defense. It could have
compelled the security guards on duty to appear before the court. xxx.33

It is worthy to note that the question of whether petitioner acted in self-defense is essentially a
question of fact.34 It is the peculiar province of the trial court to determine the credibility of witnesses
and related questions of fact because of its superior advantage in observing the conduct and
demeanor of witnesses while testifying.35 This being so and in the absence of a showing that the CA
and the RTC failed to appreciate facts or circumstances of such weight and substance that would
have merited petitioner's acquittal, this Court finds no compelling reason to disturb the ruling of the
CA that petitioner did not act in self-defense.36

In this regard, we do not subscribe to petitioner’s contention that since the incident transpired in
Jeffrey’s office, and the witnesses presented by the prosecution are known officemates of Jeffrey,
the witnesses are expected to testify in favor of Jeffrey and against petitioner. Ascorrectly pointed
out by respondent, there appears no motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify
against petitioner.37 The fact that they are officemates of Jeffrey does not justify a conclusion that
Managbanag and Pelaez would concoct or fabricate stories in favorof Jeffrey for the mere purpose
of implicating petitioner with such a serious crime, especially since they are testifying under oath.

All told, we find no basis to doubt ordispute, much less overturn, the findings of the RTC and the CA
that the elements of homicide are present in the instant case as amply shown by the testimonies of
the prosecution eyewitnesses, and they constitute sufficient proof of the guilt of petitioner beyond
cavil or doubt.

Nevertheless, with regard to the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of use of an

unlicensed firearm, we deviate from the findings of the CA. A perusal of the Information will show
that the use of unlicensed firearm was expressly alleged in the killing of Jeffrey. This allegation was
further proved during trial by the presentation of the Certification from the PNP Firearms and
Explosives Division, dated November 11, 2005, certifying that petitioner is not a licensed/registered
firearm holder of any kind and calibre, per verification from the records of the said Division.
Accordingly, under Paragraph 3 of Section 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, amending Section 1 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance, to wit:

xxxx

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

x x x x.

Under Article 249 of the RPC, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. There being an
aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm, the penalty imposable on petitioner should
be in its maximum period.38Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the petitioner shall be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
maximum, as the minimum penalty, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal maximum, as the maximum penalty.

As to the award of civil indemnity, moral damages, and damages for loss of earning capacity in favor
ofprivate respondent, we sustain the findings of the CA in so far as they are in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence. In addition, we find the grant of exemplary damages in the present case in
order, since the presence of special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm has been
established.39 Based on current jurisprudence, the award of exemplary damages for homicide is
₱30,000.00.40

Finally, pursuant to this Court’s ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames,41 an interest of six percent (6%)
per annum on the aggregate amount awarded for civil indemnity and damages for loss of earning
capacity shall be imposed, computed from the time of finality of this Decision until full payment
thereof.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The May 7, 2009 Decision and August 19, 2009 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89257, finding petitioner Sherwin Dela Cruz guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS,
to wit:

(1) Petitioner shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor maximum, as the minimum penalty, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum, as the maximum penalty;

(2) Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim the following:

a. the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

b. the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;

c. the amount of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages;

d. the amount of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages;

e. the amount of ₱3,022,641.71 as damages for loss of earning capacity;

f. for the civil indemnity and the damages for loss of earning capacity, an interest of
six percent (6%) per annum, computed from the time of finality of this Decision until
full payment thereof; and

g. the costs of the litigation.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITEO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes

1
Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, with Associate Justices Edgardo P.
Cruz and Isaias P. Dicdican, concurring; Annex "A" to Petition, rollo, pp. 55-74.

2
Id. at 75-76.

3
Annex "C" to Petition, id. at 114.

4
Emphasis supplied.

5
Annex "P" to Petition, rollo, pp. 236-242.

6
Id at 242.

7
Supranote 1.

8
Id. at 73.

9
Id. at 24.

10
People v. Escarlos, 457 Phil. 580, 595 (2003).

11
Id. at 594-595.

12
Jacobo v. Court of Appeals, 337 Phil. 7, 18 (1997).

13
Id.

14
Id.

15
Supra note 10, at 596.

16
Id.

17
Id

18
Supranote 5, at 240-241. (Emphasis supplied)

19
Supra note 10, at 597.

20
Id.

21
Comment on Petition, id. at 385-386. (Emphasis supplied)

22
Supra note 12, at 22.

23
Annex "N" to Petition, rollo, pp. 172-173.

24
431 Phil. 691 (2002).

25
People v. Obordo, supra, at 712.

26
Supranote 5, at 241. (Emphasis supplied)

27
Id.at 240. (Emphasis supplied)

28
People v. Figuracion, 415 Phil. 12, 26 (2001).

29
Id.at 28.

30
Supranote 12, at 598.

31
Id.

32
Id.
33
Supranote 1, at 69. (Emphasis supplied)

34
Supra note 12, at 22.

35
Id. at 18.

36
Id. at 22-23.

37
Supranote 21, at 390.

38
Revised Penal Code, Art. 64, par. 3.

39
Palaganas v. People, 533 Phil. 169, 198 (2006).

40
Id.

41
G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 7903 SCRA 439 (2013).
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 200793 June 4, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MILAN ROXAS y AGUILUZ, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03473 dated
August 16, 2011, which affirmed with modification the Judgment2 of Branch 94, Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City dated December 11, 2007 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-91967 to Q-00-91971
finding accused-appellant Milan Roxas y Aguiluz guilty of five counts of rape against AAA,3 a minor
who was 9 years old at the time of the first rape and 10 years old at the time of the succeeding four
rapes.

Five Informations were filed against accused-appellant Roxas, charging him as follows:

1. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91967: That on or about the 9th day of August 1998 in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused with force and intimidation did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of sexual assault at knifepoint upon the person of
[AAA] his own niece a minor 10 years of age by then and there blindfolding her, then
removed her shorts and underwear then accused inserted his penis inside her vagina and
thereafter had carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her consent.4

2. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91968:

That on or about the 28th day of July 1998 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused with force and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit acts of sexual assault at knifepoint upon the person of [AAA] his
own niece a minor 10 years of age by then and there blindfolding her and removing
her shorts and underwear and inserting his penis inside her vagina and thereafter
had carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her consent.5

3. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91969:

That on or about the 16th day of September 1997 in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused with force and intimidation did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of sexual assault at knifepoint upon the
person of [AAA] his own niece a minor 9 years of age by then and there laying her on
the chairs inside the bathroom, then blindfolded her and then removed her shorts
and underwear then accused inserted his penis inside her vagina and thereafter had
carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her consent.6

4. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91970:

That on or about the 20th day of March 1998 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused with force and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit acts of sexual assault at knifepoint upon the person of [AAA] his
own niece a minor 10 years of age by then and there laying her down on a bed inside
his grandparents’ room then blindfolded her, then removed her shorts and
underwear, then accused inserted his penis inside her vagina and thereafter had
carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her consent.7

5. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91971:

That on or about the 11th day of May 1998 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused with force and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit acts of sexual assault at knifepoint upon the person of [AAA] his
own niece a minor 10 years of age by then and there removing her shorts and
underwear and inserting his penis inside her vagina and thereafter had carnal
 knowledge of her against her will and without her consent.8 Accused-appellant Roxas
entered a plea of Not Guilty to all the crimes charged.9

The prosecution’s factual account based on the testimony of AAA was concisely stated by the Office
of the Solicitor General in its Appellee’s Brief, as follows:

On 16 September 1997, [AAA], who was then 9 years of age, was at her grandmother [CCC]’s
house located on [XXX], Quezon City. In the morning of said date, she was at the dirty kitchen with
her aunt [ZZZ] who was then washing clothes. Her aunt asked her if she had already taken a bath,
she replied in the negative.

Her uncle, accused-appellant, overheard their conversation so he volunteered to give [AAA] a bath.
Subsequently, he brought her upstairs to the bathroom.

While inside the bathroom, accused-appellant told [AAA] to turn around. After she complied with his
directive, he blindfolded her. [AAA] started to wonder what the accused-appellant was doing so she
told him that he was supposed to give her a bath. Accused-appellant told her that they would play
first for a while.

He turned her around three (3) times and then, removed her shorts and underwear. After that, he sat
on a chair, which was inside the bathroom, and raised both of her legs.

Thereafter, she felt him on top of her. She also felt accused-appellant’s penis enter her vagina which
she found painful.

She cried and shouted the name of her aunt, but accused-appellant got angry and poked a sharp
instrument on her neck. [AAA] did not report the incident because accused-appellant threatened to
cut her tongue and to kill her and her mother.

[AAA] was raped again on 20 March 1998 while she was at the same house of her paternal
grandparents. She was on the terrace on the second floor of the house when accused-appellant,
who was in her grandparents’ bedroom at that time, called her. She hesitated to go near him
because she was afraid that he might rape her again.

Accused-appellant then went to the terrace and dragged her to the bedroom of her grandparents.
She could not run anymore nor shout for help because aside from the fact that there was nobody
else in the room, accused-appellant was holding a pointed weapon.

While [AAA] and accused-appellant were inside the room, he blindfolded her, removed her shorts
and underwear, and then laid her down the bed. Thereafter, he moved on top of her and inserted his
penis in her vagina. Again, she did not report the incident because of accused-appellant’s threats
should she report the incident to anybody.

Another incident of rape took place on 11 May 1998while [AAA] was again at her paternal
grandparents’ house. On the said date, she was alone in the living room on the second floor of the
house when accused-appellant called her. She did not accede to his bidding because she was
scared of him. Thereafter, he shouted at her and demanded that she come near him, so she went to
him.

He brought her inside her grandmother’s bedroom and upon reaching the room, he immediately
blindfolded her and poked a bladed weapon on her neck. He turned her around three (3) times,
removed her shorts and underwear, laid her down the bed, moved on top of her, and inserted his
penis in her vagina. Again, the accused-appellant threatened her so she did not report what had
happened.

[AAA]’s ordeal did not stop there. She was raped for the fourth time on 28 July 1998 at her paternal
grandparents’ house. She and the accused were incidentally alone in the living room on the second
1âwphi1

floor of the house. He asked her to go with him inside the bedroom of her grandparents, but she did
not get up from her seat. So accused-appellant pulled her toward the bedroom. She tried to free
herself, but he poked a pointed instrument at her.

Accused-appellant committed the same acts he had perpetrated on [AAA] during her three [previous]
rape incidents: he removed her shorts and underwear, laid her on the bed, moved on top of her and
thereafter, inserted his penis in her vagina. She was again threatened by the accused-appellant not
to tell anybody about the incident or else he would cut her tongue and kill her and her mother.

The fifth and last incident of rape happened on 09 August 1998. At that time, [AAA] was at the
terrace on the second floor of her paternal grandparents’ house; and accused-appellant also
happened to be there. He pulled her and brought her inside the room, blindfolded her, and turned
her around three (3) times. He employed the same method in raping her: he removed her shorts and
underwear, laid her on the bed and moved on top of her. She tried to push him and raise her shorts
and panty, but she did not succeed because he poked a pointed instrument on her neck. Thereafter,
he inserted his penis in her vagina. Again, she did not report the incident to anyone because she
was scared of his threats.10 (Emphases supplied, citations omitted.)

In contrast, the defense presented four witnesses: AAA’s mother (BBB), AAA’s two brothers (DDD
and EEE), and Dr. Agnes Aglipay, Regional Psychiatrist of the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology. The defense’s statement of the antecedent facts as contained in the Appellant’s Brief is
reproduced here:

Accused Milan Roxas denied having raped [AAA] on all the five (5) counts of rape.

[DDD], brother of herein private complainant, testified that his aunt in the maternal side, [Tita YYY],
induced him by giving toys if he would tell his father that the accused was raping his sister, [AAA].
Upon prodding of his maternal aunt, [DDD],who was only eight (8) years old then, told his father that
he saw the accused rape his sister. His father ran amuck which led to the filing of the instant case.

On subsequent days, while [DDD]and [AAA] were in a grocery store buying something, their [Tito
XXX], [Tito WWW] and [Tita YYY] arrived on board an FX vehicle. [Tita YYY] told [DDD] that they will
be going to buy toys. [DDD] said that he will first ask permission from his grandfather, but [Tita YYY]
said that it would only take a few minutes and they will bring them home afterwards. [AAA] was
brought to SSDD, a place under the administration of the DSWD, while [DDD] was brought to
Caloocan. On the following day, he was brought to Muñoz, in a rented house of his [Tita YYY] and
her husband. [DDD] stayed there for almost a year. He was forbidden to go outside as the door was
always locked. When [his Tita VVV] arrived from Japan they went to Tarlac where his paternal
grandmother fetched him.

[EEE], brother of herein private complainant, likewise testified that when [his Tita VVV] arrived, they
went to North Olympus, Quezon City where [his] maternal relatives reside. On one occasion, he saw
his sister, [AAA] and his maternal uncle [Tito XXX] entered one of the bedrooms. He tried to open
the door to see what the duo were doing, but it was locked. [EEE] looked for a wire and was able to
open the door. He saw private complainant on top of his [TitoXXX], both naked. When the duo saw
him, private complainant and his [Tito XXX] stood up. The latter threatened him not to tell anybody or
he will cut off his tongue.

On November 26, 1999, [BBB], mother of the private complainant testified that her two (2) children,
[AAA] and [DDD], were missing. She looked for them, but to no avail. So she went to the police
station to have it blottered. Later did she know when she called her sister who resides in Project 6,
Quezon City that [DDD] was brought to Ilocos and [AAA] at the SSDD in Kamuning by her 3 brothers
and sister. She filed a case of kidnapping against his brother [Tito WWW]. [Tito WWW], however,
promised to return her children if she will have the said case dismissed which she did.

She denied the allegations that[her] brother-in-law, herein accused, raped her daughter, [AAA]. In
fact, before the filing of the present rape cases there was one rape case filed on September 22,
1999 which was dismissed because [AAA] retracted her statements. As told to [BBB] by her
daughter [AAA], she was not raped by herein accused. She told a lie and made the false accusation
against the accused, because she does not want to put the blame on any of her maternal relatives.
[AAA] was greatly indebted to her maternal grandmother and her maternal uncles and aunts
because they had taken care of her since she was three (3) years old.

Dr. Agnes Aglipay, Regional Psychiatrist of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology testified
that based on her examination of the accused, she concluded that he is suffering from a mild mental
retardation with a mental age of nine (9) to ten (10) years old. She observed that the subject was
aware that he was being accused of rape, but he had consistently denied the allegations against
him.11 (Citations omitted.)

The RTC of Quezon City rendered its Judgment on December 11, 2007, finding accused-appellant
Roxas guilty as charged in each of the five Informations filed against him. The dispositive portion
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt in all five (5) counts of rape as recited in the information[s] and sentences
accused MILAN ROXAS:

1) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91967 – to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify
the offended party [AAA] the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay moral damages in the sum of
Php50,000.00, and to pay the costs;
 2) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91968 – to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify
the offended party [AAA] the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay moral damages in the sum of
Php50,000.00, and to pay the costs;

3) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91969 – to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify
the offended party [AAA] the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay moral damages in the sum of
Php50,000.00, and to pay the costs;

4) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91970 – to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify
the offended party [AAA] the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay moral damages in the sum of
Php50,000.00, and to pay the costs; and

5) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91971 – to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify
the offended party [AAA] the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay moral damages in the sum of
Php50,000.00, and to pay the costs.

To credit in favor of the herein accused the full period of his detention in accordance with law.
Resultantly, all pending incidents are deemed moot and academic.12

The RTC held that accused-appellant Roxas is not exempt from criminal responsibility on the ground
that he cannot be considered a minor or an imbecile or insane person, since Dr. Aglipay merely
testified that he was an eighteen-year old with a mental development comparable to that of children
between nine to ten years old. The RTC found the testimony of AAA credible, and found the
testimonies of the defense witnesses to be "flimsy."

Accused-appellant Roxas elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, where the case was docketed
as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03473. Accused-appellant Roxas submitted the following Assignment of
Errors in the appellate court:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT’S TESTIMONY.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.13

On August 16, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, modifying the Judgment
of the RTC as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Judgment dated 11 December 2007 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, in the case entitled People of the Philippines vs. Milan Roxas y
Aguiluz", docketed therein as Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-91967 to Q-00-91971, is AFFIRMED with
modification that accused-appellant is ordered to pay private complainant on each count civil
indemnity in the amount of ₱75,000.00, moral damages in the amount of ₱75,000.00, and exemplary
damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00, for each count of rape.14 Hence, accused-appellant Roxas
interposed this appeal, where he, in his Supplemental Brief, presented an Additional Assignment of
Error:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL

COURT’S DECISION GIVING CREDENCE TO THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT’S TESTIMONY.15

Accused-appellant Roxas claims that the testimony of AAA is replete with inconsistencies and
narrations that are contrary to common experience, human nature and the natural course of
things.16 Accused-appellant Roxas likewise points out that under Republic Act No. 9344 or the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, minors fifteen (15) years old and below are exempt from
criminal responsibility. Accused-appellant Roxas claims that since he has a mental age of nine years
old, he should also be "exempt from criminal liability although his chronological age at the time of the
commission of the crime was already eighteen years old."17

In the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 934418 is explicit in
providing that:

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the
time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall
be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth anniversary of his/her
birthdate.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from
criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with
discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in
accordance with this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability,
which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws. (Emphasis supplied.)

In determining age for purposes of exemption from criminal liability, Section 6 clearly refers to the
age as determined by the anniversary of one’s birth date, and not the mental age as argued by
accused-appellant Roxas. When the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no
room for construction or interpretation. Only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may
the court interpret or construe its true intent.19

On the matter of the credibility of AAA, we carefully examined AAA’s testimony and found ourselves
in agreement with the assessment of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. As observed by the
appellate court:

We note that she recounted her ordeal in a logical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner,
without any artificialities or pretensions that would tarnish the veracity of her testimony. She recalled
the tragic experience and positively identified accused-appellant as the one who ravished her on five
occasions. Her testimony was unshaken by a grueling cross-examination and there is no impression
whatsoever that the same is a mere fabrication. For her to come out in the open and publicly
describe her harrowing experience at a trial can only be taken as a badge of her sincerity and the
truth of her claims.20

We further underscore that AAA was merely 14 years old at the time she testified.21 We have
repeatedly held that testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when
a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age
and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not
only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to
which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.22

It is likewise axiomatic that when it comes to evaluating the credibility of the testimonies of the
witnesses, great respect is accorded to the findings of the trial judge who is in a better position to
observe the demeanor, facial expression, and manner of testifying of witnesses, and to decide who
among them is telling the truth.23 As the trial court further observed, the defense witnesses were not
eyewitnesses. A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge;
that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as provided in the Rules of Court.24 AAA’s
mother and brothers were not present when the five rapes allegedly occurred, and therefore any
testimony on their part as to whether or not the complained acts actually happened is hearsay.

We shall now discuss the criminal liability of accused-appellant Roxas. As stated above, the trial
court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape.

The first rape incident was committed in July 1997, and therefore the law applicable is Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 which provides:

ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. The crime of rape shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

xxxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

The succeeding counts of rape were committed after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 8353 on
October 22,1997, which transported the rape provision of the Revised Penal Code to Title 8 under
Crimes against Persons, and amended the same to its present wording:

Article 266-A. Rape, When And How Committed. — Rape is committed —

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

Article 266-B. Penalties. — Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

xxxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim[.]

While it appears that the circumstance of minority under Article 335 (old rape provision) and Article
266-B was sufficiently proven, the allegation of the relationship between AAA and accused-appellant
Roxas is considered insufficient under present jurisprudence. This Court has thus held:

However, as regards the allegation in the Information that appellant is an uncle of the victim, we
agree with the Court of Appeals that the same did not sufficiently satisfy the requirements of Art. 335
of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., it must be succinctly stated that appellant is a relative within the 3rd
civil degree by consanguinity or affinity. It is immaterial that appellant admitted that the victim is his
niece. In the same manner, it is irrelevant that "AAA" testified that appellant is her uncle. We held in
People v. Velasquez:

However, the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty on accused-appellant, applying Section
11 of Republic Act No. 7659. We have consistently held that the circumstances under the
1âw phi 1

amendatory provisions of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659, the attendance of which could mandate the
imposition of the single indivisible penalty of death, are in the nature of qualifying circumstances
which cannot be proved as such unless alleged in the information. Even in cases where such
circumstances are proved, the death penalty cannot be imposed where the information failed to
allege them. To impose the death penalty on the basis of a qualifying circumstance which has not
been alleged in the information would violate the accused's constitutional and statutory right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

While the informations in this case alleged that accused-appellant is the uncle of the two victims,
they did not state that he is their relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. The
testimonial evidence that accused-appellant's wife and Luisa de Guzman are sisters is immaterial.
The circumstance that accused-appellant is a relative of the victims by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree must be alleged in the information. In the case at bar, the allegation that
accused-appellant is the uncle of private complainants was not sufficient to satisfy the special
qualifying circumstance of relationship. It was necessary to specifically allege that such relationship
was within the third civil degree. Hence, accused-appellant can only be convicted of simple rape on
two counts, for which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua in each case.25
In the case at bar, the allegation that AAA was accused-appellant Roxas’s "niece" in each
Information is therefore insufficient to constitute the qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship. Instead, the applicable qualifying circumstance is that of the use of a deadly weapon,
for which the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Since there was no other aggravating
circumstance alleged in the Information and proven during the trial, the imposed penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count of rape is nonetheless proper even as we overturn the lower courts’
appreciation of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship.

For consistency with prevailing jurisprudence, we reduce the awards of civil indemnity and moral
damages to ₱50,000.00 each, for each count of rape. The award of exemplary damages in the
amount of ₱30,000.00 for each count, on the other hand, is in line with recent
jurisprudence.26 WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03473
dated August 16, 2011 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amount of civil
indemnity and moral damages awarded to the complainant are reduced to ₱50,000.00 each, for
each count of rape, plus legal interest upon the amounts of indemnity and damages awarded at the
rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo, pp. 2-32; penned by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz with Associate Justices
Isaias P. Dicdican and Agnes Reyes-Carpio, concurring.

2
CA rollo, pp. 59-70.

3
In line with the ruling of this Court in People v. Cabalquinto (533 Phil. 703 [2006]), the real
name and identity of the rape victim is withheld and, instead, fictitious initials are used to
represent her. Also, the personal circumstances of the victim or any other information
tending to establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family, are
not disclosed in this decision. Instead, the rape victim and her immediate family shall herein
be referred to as AAA to EEE, while her uncles and aunts shall be referred to as WWW to
ZZZ.

4
Records, p. 2.

5
Id. at 4.

6
Id. at 10.

7
Id. at 16.
8
Id. at 22.

9
Id. at 312.

10
CA rollo, pp. 94-99.

11
Id. at 47-50.

12
Id. at 69-70.

13
Id. at 42.

14
Rollo, p. 31.

15
Id. at 46.

16
Id. at 48.

17
Id. at 51-52.

18
As amended by Republic Act No. 10630.

19
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 378 Phil. 10, 22
(1999).

20
Rollo, p. 13.

21
TSN, August 3, 2003, p. 3.

22
People v. Araojo, 616 Phil. 275, 287 (2009).

23
People v. Estoya, G.R. No. 200531, December 5,2012, 687 SCRA 376, 383.

24
Rule 130, Section 36.

25
People v. Estrada, G.R. No. 178318, January 15, 2010, 610 SCRA 222, 234-235.

26
People v. Manigo, G.R. No. 194612, January 27, 2014.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 183202 June 2, 2014

ALBERTO ALMOJUELA y VILLANUEVA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45, seeking the reversal of the
Court of Appeals' (CA) decision2 dated March 17, 2008 and resolution3 dated June 2, 2008 in CA-
G.R. CR. No. 29268. These assailed rulings affirmed with modification the decision4 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, dated January 27, 2005 in Criminal Case No. 93-129891, finding
petitioner Alberto Almojuela y Villanueva (Almojuela) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide.

Factual Antecedents

This case stemmed from two informations for attempted homicide and homicide filed with the RTC of
Manila, Branch 39, against accused Almojuela.5 The trial court dismissed the charge for attempted
homicide for insufficiency of evidence.6 The information for homicide is quoted below:

That on or about November 21, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring
and confederating with one whose true name, identity and present whereabouts are (sic)still
unknown and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Ricardo Quejong y Bello by
then and there stabbing him with a bladed weapon twice, hitting him on the left side of his back,
thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his
death thereafter.

Contrary to law.7

During arraignment, Almojuela entered a plea of "not guilty". Pre-trial conference was conducted
then trial on the merits followed.8 Two different versions of the facts surrounding the victim Ricardo
Quejong’s (Quejong) death surfaced.

The Prosecution’s Version

Sanito Masula (Masula) narrated the prosecution’s account of the events which transpired on
November 21, 1993, the crime’s date.9

At around 8:00 in the evening, Masula, Quejong, Jose Buenhijo Paz (Paz), along with some others,
were on their way home from a party when they encountered Almojuela, who was having a drinking
spree with his friends in front of his house.

Almojuela called on Paz and shouted, "Matagal ka nang namumuro sa akin," to which, Paz replied,
"Ganoon ba? What do you want?" Immediately, a fight ensued between the two. In the course of the
fight, Almojuela stabbed Paz in his right arm, causing the latter to retreat. It was at this point that
Quejong joined in the fight and grappled with Almojuela to the ground. A certain Dale Abarquez
(Kagawad Abarquez) at that point, came to pacify the parties. But the two men did not heed the
kagawad’s order and continued wrestling with each other. This prompted Kagawad Abarquez to hit
Quejong twice in his back and to fire two warning shots in the air. On hearing the gunshots, Quejong
and his group immediately ran away.10

Masula testified that he did not actually see Almojuela stab Quejong when they were grappling on
the ground. However, he also said that he noticed blood on Quejong’s back.11 On Quejong’s way
home, their friends saw that he had stab wounds in his back. They immediately rushed him to the
University of Santo Tomas Hospital where he died approximately two to three hours from
admission.12
 The Defense’s Version

The evidence for the defense showed that on November 21, 1993, Almojuela was cooking pulutan
for his drinking buddies Felicisimo Venezuela and Winfred Evangelista, when his daughter told him
that smoke was entering their house. He checked the report and saw the group of Paz, Quejong,
Masula, and others, smoking marijuana. Almojuela confronted the group, to which Paz responded by
cursing him. Despite this response, Almojuela simply went inside his house and continued with his
cooking.13

When Paz’s group was already high on drugs, they called on Almojuela and challenged him to a
fistfight, which he accepted. The fight only ended when Almojuela’s neighbors came to pacify them.
But as Almojuela was about to enter his house, Quejong pulled him, leading to another fight. They
were grappling on the ground when Kagawad Abarquez arrived to intervene to stop the fight. No one
heeded the kagawad; hence, he fired two warning shots in the air. The shots forced Quejong and his
group to scamper away.14

At around 10:30 in the evening of the same day, policemen came to Almojuela’s house. They did not
find him because he hid at the kamoteng kahoy thicket near his house. He did not know though that
Quejong sustained any serious injury since they only engaged in a fistfight; no bladed weapon was
used. He voluntarily surrendered himself, however, when he learned from Kagawad Abarquez that
Quejong had died from stab wounds. He surrendered to SPO1 Danilo Vidad through the assistance
of a certain SPO4 Soriano, the following day.15

The RTC’s Ruling

In its decision dated January 27, 2005, the RTC found Almojuela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
homicide, and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day as maximum. It also ordered him
to pay the following indemnities to the heirs of Quejong: ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱50,000.00
as moral damages; ₱832,000.00 for loss of earning capacity; ₱35,000.00 for funeral expenses; and
₱10,000.00 for litigation expenses.

The RTC gave great weight to Masula’s testimony. Although Masula did not actually see Almojuela
use a knife on Quejong, strong evidence still existed to support his conviction.

Only three persons were actually involved in the fight – Almojuela, Quejong and Paz. Since only
Almojuela was armed with a knife and in fact he wounded Paz in his right arm, it was reasonable to
conclude that he also stabbed Quejong.16 The RTC noted that Paz could not have stabbed Quejong
as he himself was wounded.

The RTC did not give credence to the testimony of Winfred Evangelista that Almojuela never held a
bladed weapon during the fight. This statement was inconsistent with his earlier claim that Almojuela
tried to take a knife away from Quejong’s hand. The RTC concluded that Evangelista lied in open
court.17

The CA’s Ruling

The CA affirmed Almojuela’s conviction but reduced the RTC’s imposed penalty to six (6) years and
eight (8) months of prision mayor as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum.18

The CA appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender; and noted that, although
Almojuela hid when policemen first visited him in his home, he still voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities the day after the incident.19

The CA also gave evidentiary weight to the attendant circumstantial evidence. It noted that the
pieces of circumstantial evidence, taken together, form an unbroken chain leading to the reasonable
conclusion that Almojuela committed the crime charged. The CA reasoned out:

As established by the testimonies, it is apparent that only Jose Buenhijo Paz, victim Ricardo
Quejong and accused ALMOJUELA were involved in the brawl and of the three of them it was
accused ALMOJUELA who was likely to have stabbed the victim. He was the one who had the
motive since he held a grudge against Jose Buenhijo Paz and he was the one who confronted the
group of the victim. It was accused ALMOJUELA and the victim Ricardo Quejong who wrestled with
each other, thus only accused ALMOJUELA could have inflicted the fatal injury to the (sic) Ricardo
Quejong. It was also highly unlikely that Jose Buenhijo Paz had inflicted the injury since he himself
was injured by the knife that stabbed the victim Ricardo Quejong. It was in fact Jose Buenhijo Paz
who was being aided by the victim Ricardo Quejong against the assault of accused ALMOJUELA.20
 The Petition

In his Rule 45 petition before us, Almojuela imputes error on the CA for finding that the prosecution’s
evidence was sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

He maintains that the circumstantial evidence is not strong enough to identify him as the crime’s
perpetrator. Even assuming that he did stab Quejong, he submits that the CA failed to appreciate the
mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense. Paz and Quejong ganged up on him, forcing him
to repel their unlawful aggression with a bladed weapon.21

On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), argues that only questions of law may be reviewed in a Rule 45 petition, and that the findings
of fact by the trial court, if affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive and binding on the Supreme
Court.

The OSG also maintains that the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support Almojuela’s
conviction. Also, the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense should not be appreciated
since it was Almojuela who started the unlawful aggression.22

The Court’s Ruling

We DENY the petition.

Circumstantial evidence as basis for conviction

We find it clear, based on the records and the evidence adduced by both parties, that no direct
evidence points to Almojuela as the one who stabbed Quejong in the night of November 21, 1993.

Lest this statement be misunderstood, a finding of guilt is still possible despite the absence of direct
evidence. Conviction based on circumstantial evidence may result if sufficient circumstances, proven
and taken together, create an unbroken chain leading to the reasonable conclusion that the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, was the author of the crime.23

Circumstantial evidence may be characterized as that evidence that proves a fact or series of facts
from which the facts in issue may be established by inference.24 Under the Revised Rules on
Evidence, a conviction based on circumstantial evidence may be sustained if the following requisites
are all present:

a. There is more than one circumstance;

b. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

c. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond

reasonable doubt.25

In People v. Galvez,26 we laid down the basic guidelines that judges must observe when faced with
merely circumstantial evidence in deciding criminal cases. The probative value of such
circumstantial evidence must be distilled using the following:

a. Circumstantial evidence should be acted upon with caution;

b. All the essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt;

c. The facts must exclude every other theory but that of the guilt of the accused; and

d. The facts must establish with certainty the guilt of the accused so as to convince beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused was the perpetrator of the offense. The peculiarity of
circumstantial evidence is that the series of events pointing to the commission of a felony is
appreciated not singly but collectively. The guilt of the accused cannot be deduced from
scrutinizing just one(1) particular piece of evidence.

They are like puzzle pieces which when put together reveal a convincing picture pointing to the
conclusion that the accused is the author of the crime.27

In the present case, the RTC and the CA relied on the following circumstances in concluding that
Almojuela was the perpetrator of the crime:
 1. Almojuela orally provoked Paz when the latter and his group passed by Almojuela’s
house;

2. A fight ensued between them and Almojuela wounded Paz’s right arm with a knife;

3. The wounded Paz retreated and Quejong next fought with Almojuela;

4. During Quejong and Almojuela’s fight, they grappled and wrestled with each other on the
ground;

5. Quejong and Almojuela were only pacified when Kagawad Abarquez came and fired two
gunshots in the air;

6. Masula did not see Almojuela stab Quejong but he saw blood in Quejong’s back during
the fight;

7. Quejong’s group scampered away after the gunshots. On Quejong’s way home, one of his
friends noticed that he had stab wounds in his back;

8. Quejong was immediately rushed to the hospital where he expired a few hours after; and

9. Almojuela hid when policemen came to his home to investigate.

The nine circumstances, individually, are not sufficient to support Almojuela’s conviction. But taken
together, they constitute an unbroken chain leading to the reasonable conclusion that Almojuela is
guilty of the crime of homicide.

First,Almojuela was the one whoprovoked Paz and his group to a fight. His unlawful aggression was
the starting cause of the events which led to Quejong’s death.

Second, Masula categorically testified that only Almojuela was armed with a knife during the fight. In
fact, he hit Paz in his right arm, forcing the latter to retreat.

Third, only three persons actually were involved in the fight: Almojuela, Paz and Quejong. Paz was
wounded, forcing him to retreat. This fact renders it improbable that Paz was the one who stabbed
Quejong. Thus, Almojuela alone was the perpetrator.

Fourth, although Masula admitted that he did not actually see Almojuela stab Quejong, he testified
that he saw blood on Quejong’s back during his fight with Almojuela.

Fifth, after Quejong and his group scurried away from the scene, his friend noticed that he had stab
wounds in his back. Almojuela did not present any evidence that Quejong figured in any other fight
with another person after the fight with Almojuela. In fact, Quejong was immediately rushed to the
hospital.

Sixth, Almojuela hidin the kamoteng kahoy thicket near his house when policemen visited him for
investigation. We have repeatedly held that flight is an indication of guilt. The flight of an accused, in
the absence of a credible explanation, is a circumstance from which guilt may be inferred. An
innocent person will normally grasp the first available opportunity to defend himself and assert his
innocence.28

These proven circumstances lead to the reasonable conclusion that Almojuela stabbed Quejong
during their fight, causing the latter’s subsequent death.

The mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-defense and voluntary surrender

Almojuela argues that even if he did stab Quejong, the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-
defense should be appreciated in his favor. An incomplete self-defense is appreciated when:

a. there is unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;

b. the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression is not reasonably
necessary; and

c. there is lack of provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

There can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed
unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense.29 This mitigating circumstance
is inapplicable in the present case because the unlawful aggression did not start from the victim
Quejong but from Almojuela. The prosecution proved that it was Almojuela who first challenged Paz
and his group to a fight. Almojuela came prepared to fight and was in fact armed with a bladed
weapon.

Moreover, the third element is also absent since there is no lack of sufficient provocation on
Almojuela’s part as shown by his confrontational stance right from the start.

We affirm, however, the CA’s ruling that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should
be appreciated in favor of Almojuela. For voluntary surrender to apply, the following requisites must
concur:

a. the offender had not been actually arrested;

b. the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent; and

c. the surrender was voluntary.

The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to submit himself to
the authorities either because he acknowledged his guilt or he wished to save the authorities the
trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture.30

Although Almojuela hid when policemen first visited him in his home, it was also duly proven that
soon after he learned of Quejong’s death, Almojuela voluntarily gave himself up to a certain SPO4
Soriano who then turned him over to SPO1 Danilo Vidad of the Western Police District.31 Under
these facts, all the elements of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender are present in this
case.

The awarded indemnities

We note that the RTC awarded ₱35,000.00 as funeral expenses to the heirs of Quejong; this amount
was affirmed by the CA. However, since no documentary evidence was presented to support this
1âwphi 1

claim, it cannot be awarded. Nonetheless, an award of₱25,000.00 as temperate damages in

homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of the said expenses is presented during trial.
Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered since it cannot be
denied that the heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss, though the exact amount was not
proven.32

We also -delete the award of litigation expenses for lack of actual proof. We additionally impose a
6% interest on all the monetary awards for damages to be reckoned from the date of finality of this
decision until fully paid.

As a final note, the general rule is that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by
the CA, deserve great weight and respect.33

These factual findings should not be disturbed on appeal, unless these are facts of weight and
substance that were overlooked or misinterpreted and that would materially affect the disposition of
the case.34 We have carefully scrutinized the records and we find no reason to deviate from the RTC
and CA's findings. We see no indication that the trial court, whose findings the CA affirmed -
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case.
Thus, we defer to the trial court on the findings of facts as it was in the best position to assess and
determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties.35

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition and AFFIRM the March 17, 2008
decision and June 2, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 29268 with the
following MODIFICATIONS: (a) the awarded funeral and litigation expenses are deleted; (b) the
petitioner is ordered to pay the victim's heirs ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual
damages; and (c) he is further ordered to pay the victim's heirs interest on all damages awarded at
the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.36

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo, pp. 10-29.

2
Id. at 68-84.

3
Id. at 90.

4
Id. at 50-57.

5
Id. at 69.

6
Id. at 12.

7
Id. at 51.

8
Id. at 70.

9
Ibid.

10
TSN, March 17, 1994, pp. 4-7.

11
Id. at 7.

12
Id. at 8-10.

13
TSN, August 12, 2000, pp. 4-5.

14
Id. at 6-8.

15
Id. at 8-11.

16
Rollo, p. 53.

17
Id. at 54.
18
Id. at 83-84.

19
Id. at 83.

20
Id. at 80.

21
Id. at 19-25.

22
Id. at 103-109.

23
People v. Vda. de Quijano, G.R. No. 102045, March 17, 1993, 220 SCRA 66, 73.

24
Id. at 72.

25
RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Section 4.

26
G.R. No. 157221, 548 Phil. 436 (2007).

27
Id. at 460-461, citing People v. Monje, G.R. No. 146689, 438 Phil. 716 (2002).

People v. Diaz, G.R. No. 133737, 443 Phil. 67, 89 (2003), citing People v. Del Mundo, G.R.
28

No. 138929, 418 Phil. 740 (2001).

29
People v. Dolorido, G.R. No. 191721, January 12, 2011, 639 SCRA 496, 503.

30
De Vera v. De Vera, G.R. No. 172832, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 506, 515.

31
Rollo, pp. 82-83.

32
Licyayo v. People, G.R. No. 169425, 571 Phil. 310, 329 (2008).

33
People v. Estrada, G.R. No. 178318, January 15, 2010, 610 SCRA 222, 231.

34
Bautista v. Castillo Mercado, G.R. No. 174405, 585 Phil. 389, 398 (2008).

35
People v. Estrada, supra note 33.

36
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board Circular No. 799, series of 2013, effective July
l, 2013; Dario Nacar v. Gallery Frames and/or Felipe Bordey, Jr., G.R. No. 189871, August
13, 2013, 703 SCRA439.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 201858 June 4, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JENNY LIKIRAN alias "Loloy", Accused-Appellant.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

Jenny Likiran (accused-appellant) was convicted of the crime of Murder by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malaybalay City, Branch 8, for the death of Rolando Sareno, Sr. (Sareno ). In its
Decision1 dated July 17, 2006, the RTC disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Loloy Likiran guilty of the crime of Murder and imposes upon
him the penalty of Reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of [P]50,000.00 as
civil indemnity; [P]50,000.00 moral damages; [P]30,000.00 actual damages, and [P]10,000.00
attorney's fee and to pay the costs. This court has no jurisdiction over Jerome alias Caro Likiran as
he is not impleaded in the information.

SO ORDERED.2

The incident that led to the death of Sareno happened on the wee hour of March 19, 2000 in
BarangayBugca-on, Lantapon, Bukidnon. It was the eve of the town fiesta and a dance was being
held at the basketball court. Prosecution witnesses Celso Dagangon (Dagangon), Prescado
Mercado (Mercado) and Constancio Goloceno (Goloceno) testified that on said night, they were at
the dance together with Sareno at around 8:00 p.m. After a few hours, while Mercado and Goloceno
were inside the dance area, Jerome Likiran3 (Jerome), the accused-appellant’s brother, punched
Mercado on the mouth. Goloceno was about to assist Mercado when he saw that Jerome was
armed with a short firearm while the accused-appellant was holding a hunting knife, so he backed
off. Dagangon and Sareno, who were outside the dance area, heard the commotion. Afterwards,
Jerome approached Sareno and shot him several times. With Sareno fallen, the accused-appellant
stabbed him on the back. It was Dagangon who saw the incident first-hand as he was only three
meters from where Sareno was. Dagangon was able to bring Sareno to the hospital only after
Jerome and the accused-appellant left, but Sareno was already dead at that point. Sareno suffered
multiple gunshot wounds and a stab wound at the left scapular area.4

The accused-appellant, however, denied any involvement in the crime. While he admitted that he
was at the dance, he did not go outside when the commotion happened. Heand Jerome stayed
within the area where the sound machine was located and they only heard the gunshots outside.
Other witnesses testified in the accused-appellant’s defense, with Edgar Indanon testifying that he
saw the stabbing incident and that it was some other unknown person, and not the accused-
appellant, who was the culprit; and Eleuterio Quiñopa stating that he was with the accused-appellant
and Jerome inside the dance hall at the time the commotion occurred.

The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish the accused-appellant’s
culpability.5 Prosecution witness Dagangon’s positive identification of the accused-appellant was
held sufficient by the RTC to convict the latter of the crime of murder.6 The RTC also rejected the
accused-appellant’s defense of denial as it was not supported by evidence. It also ruled that alibi
cannot favor the accused-appellant since he failed to prove that it was impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime on the night of March 19, 2000.7

The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision in toto per assailed Decision8 dated July 27,
2011, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated July 17, 2006 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 8 of Malaybalay City, in Criminal Case No. 10439-00 is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.

SO ORDERED.9

The CA sustained the findings of the RTC as regards the identity of the accused-appellant as one of
the perpetrators of the crime. The CA, nevertheless, deviated from the RTC’s conclusion that there
was conspiracy between Jerome and the accused-appellant, and that abuse of superior strength
attended the commission of the crime. According to the CA, the information failed to contain the
allegation of conspiracy, and the evidence for the prosecution failed to establish that Jerome and the
accused-appellant ganged up on the victim.10

The CA, however, sustained the RTC’s finding of treachery.11

The accused-appellant protested his conviction.12 According to him, the prosecution failed to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the accused-appellant argued that the
prosecution failed to prove the identity of the assailant and his culpability.13

Upon review, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the RTC,
as affirmed by the CA, including their assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. Factual findings
of the trial court are, except for compelling or exceptional reasons, conclusive to the Court especially
when fully supported by evidence and affirmed by the CA.14

The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal.15In
this case, the identity of the accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime has been
adequately established by the prosecution, more particularly by the testimony of Dagangon. The
Court cannot sustain the accused-appellant’s argument that it was impossible for Dagangon to see
the assailant considering that there was no evidence to show that the place where the crime
occurred was lighted. As found by the CA, Dagangon was only three meters away from the accused-
appellant and Jerome and had a good view of them. Moreover, there was no distraction that could
have disrupted Dagangon’s attention. He even immediately identified the accused-appellant and
Jerome during police investigation, and there is no showing that Dagangon was informed by the
police beforehand that the accused-appellant was one of the suspects.16 Positive identification by a
prosecution witness of the accused as one of the perpetrators of the crime is entitled to greater
weight than alibi and denial.17 Such positive identification gains further ground in the absence of any
ill motive on the part of a witness to falsely testify against an accused.18

The accused-appellant also asserted that the information charged him of murder committed by
attacking, assaulting, stabbing and shooting Sareno, thereby causing his instantaneous death.19 The
accused-appellant argued that the evidence on record established that Sareno was in fact shot by
some other person.20 At this juncture, the Court notes that the testimony of Dagangon, indeed,
identified two assailants – the accused-appellant and his brother, Jerome; however, it was only the
accused-appellant who was charged with the death of Sareno. Defense witnesses also testified that
Jerome died on March 12, 2005.21

The CA disregarded the accused-appellant’s contention and ruled that "the cause of death was not
made an issue in the court a quo" and the Certificate of Death was admitted during the pre-trial
conference as proof of the fact and cause of death.22 And even assuming that the cause of death
was an issue, the CA still held the accused-appellant liable for the death of Sareno on the basis of
the Court’s ruling in People v. Pilola.23

The Court reviewed the records of this case and finds sufficient basis for the CA’s disregard of the
accused-appellant’s argument.

The pre-trial agreement issued by the RTC states that one of the matters stipulated upon and
admitted by the prosecution and the defense was that the Certificate of Death issued by Dr. Cidric
Dael (Dr. Dael) of the Bukidnon Provincial Hospital and reviewed by the Rural Health Physician of
Malaybalay City "is admitted as proof of fact and cause of death due to multiple stab wound scapular
area."24 Stipulation of facts during pre-trial is allowed by Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Section 2 of Rule 118, meanwhile, prescribes that all agreements or admissions made or
entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and
counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused.25 In this case, while it appears that the
pre-trial agreement was signed only by the prosecution and defense counsel, the same may
nevertheless be admitted given that the defense failed to object to its admission.26 Moreover, a death
certificate issued by a municipal health officer in the regular performance of his duty is prima facie
evidence of the cause of death of the victim.27 Note that the certificate of death issued by Dr. Dael
provides the following:

CAUSES OF DEATH

Immediate cause : DOA

Antecedent cause : Multiple GSW

Underlying cause : Stab wound scapular area (L)28

The accused-appellant, therefore, is bound by his admission of Sareno’s cause of death.29

More importantly, the accused-appellant is criminally liable for the natural and logical consequence
resulting from his act of stabbing Sareno. It may be that he was not the shooter, it is nevertheless
true that the stab wound he inflicted on Sareno contributed to the latter’s death. In Quinto v.
Andres,30 the Court stated that:

If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in jeopardy and
death follows as a consequence of their felonious act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its
criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in producing the factual result. The offender is
criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to
the death of the victim. A different doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away
from human life a salutary and essential safeguard. x x x[.]31 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

The Court, however, cannot agree with the RTC and CA’s conclusion that the killing of Sareno was
attended by treachery, qualifying the crime to murder.

Treachery is appreciated as a qualifying circumstance when the following elements are shown: a)
the malefactor employed means, method, or manner of execution affording the person attacked no
opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and b) the means, method, or manner of execution was
deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender.32 Treachery is not present when the killing is not
premeditated, or where the sudden attack is not preconceived and deliberately adopted, but is just
triggered by a sudden infuriation on the part of the accused as a result of a provocative act of the
victim, or when the killing is done at the spur of the moment.33

In this case, the testimony of the prosecution witnesses all point to the fact that the shooting and
stabbing of Sareno was actually a spur of the moment incident, a result of the brawl that happened
during the barrio dance. The prosecution failed to show that the accused-appellant and his brother
Jerome deliberately planned the means by which they would harm Sareno. In fact, what was
revealed by the prosecution evidence was that Sareno was an innocent bystander who unfortunately
became a target of the accused-appellant and Jerome’s rampage. Consequently, the accused-
appellant should be liable only for the lesser crime of Homicide.

In convictions for homicide, Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) prescribes the penalty of
reclusion temporal, which ranges from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years.34 In
the absence of any modifying circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its medium
period,35 or from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,36 the maximum of the penalty to be
imposed on the accused-appellant shall be within the range of reclusion temporal medium,37 and the
minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC for the
offense,38 or prision mayor in any of its periods, which ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years.39 There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the Court thereby
sentences the accused-appellant to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision
mayor medium, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum.

With regard to the damages awarded, the Court affirms the award of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00) civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) moral damages, as these are in
accord with the Court's judicial policy on the matter.40 These, on top of the Thirty Thousand Pesos
(₱30,000.00) actual damages and Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) attorney's fees awarded by
the RTC and affirmed by the CA. Further, the monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of six
percent ( 6%) per annum from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.41

The Court, moreover, deletes the attorney's fees awarded by the RTC as there is nothing on record
proving that the heirs of Sareno actually incurred such expense. Attorney's fees are in the concept of
actual or compensatory damages allowed under the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of
the Civil Code,42 and absent any evidence supporting its grant, the same must be deleted for lack of
factual basis.
1âw phi 1

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 27, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00484 is MODIFIED in that accused-appellant Jenny Likiran alias "Loloy" is hereby found guilty of
the lesser crime of HOMICIDE, and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty often (10) years
of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. Further, the award of attorney's fees is hereby DELETED.

Interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum shall be imposed on all the damages awarded, to
earn from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.

In all other respects, the Court of Appeals decision is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Issued by Presiding Judge Pelagio B. Estopia; CA rollo, pp. 20A-42.

2
Id. at 42.

3
Also known as Caro in other parts of the records.

4
Rollo, p. 4.

5
Jerome was not named co-accused in the Information for murder filed in Criminal Case No.
10439-00.

6
CA rollo, p. 32.

7
Id. at 34-37.

8
Penned by Associate Justice Carmelita Salandanan Manahan, with Associate Justices
Romulo V. Borja and Edgardo T. Lloren, concurring; rollo, pp. 3-18.

9
Id. at 17.

10
Id. at 13-15.

11
Id. at 15.

12
The accused-appellant, through the Public Attorney’s Office, manifested that he will not file
a supplemental brief, the arguments for his acquittal having been exhaustively discussed in
the Appellant’s Brief filed with the CA. See Resolution dated July 17, 2013.

13
CA rollo, p. 15.

14
People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 196434, October 24, 2012, 684 SCRA 604, 608.

15
People v. Villarico, Sr., G.R. No. 158362, April 4, 2011, 647 SCRA 43, 53.

16
Rollo, pp. 10-12.
17
People v. Tomas,Sr., G.R. No. 192251, February 16, 2011, 643 SCRA 530, 547-548.

18
People v. Rarugal, G.R. No. 188603, January 16, 2013, 688 SCRA 646, 654.

19
CA rollo, p. 17.

20
Id.

21
Id. at 26, 28.

22
Rollo, pp. 13-14.

23
453 Phil. 1 (2003).

24
Records, p. 83-A.

25
See Chua-Burce v. Court of Appeals, 387 Phil. 15, 24 (2000).

26
People v. Marollano, 342 Phil. 38, 54-55 (1997).

27
People v. Crisostomo, 243 Phil. 211, 217-218 (1988).

28
Records, p. 9.

29
Section 4, Rule 118 provides: "After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order
reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind
the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of, and control the course of the action
during the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice." (Emphasis ours)

30
493 Phil. 643 (2005).

31
Id. at 653.

32
People of the Philippines v. Javier Cañaveras, G.R. No. 193839, November 27, 2013.

33
Id., citing People v. Teriapil, G.R. No. 191361, March 2, 2011, 644 SCRA 491, People v.
Tigle, 465 Phil. 368 (2004), and People v. Badajos, 464 Phil. 762 (2004).

34
REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 27.

35
REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 64(1).

36
Act No. 4103, as amended.

37
Act No. 4103, Section 1.

38
Id.

39
REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 27.

People of the Philippines v. Erwin Tamayo y Bautista, G.R. No. 196960, March 12, 20 I 4;
40

Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey Guevarra v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170462,
February 5, 2014.

41
People v. Cabungan, G.R. No. 189355, January 23, 2013, 689 SCRA 236.

42
See People v. Hernandez, 476 Phil. 66, 91 (2004).
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 189850 September 22, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
REYNALDO TORRES, JAY TORRES, BOBBY TORRES @ ROBERTO TORRES y NAVA, and
RONNIE TORRES,Accused,

BOBBY TORRES @ ROBERTO TORRES y NAVA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This is an appeal from the July 23, 2009 Decision1 ofthe Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 02925, which modified the December 5, 2006 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Manila, Branch 27 in Criminal Case No. 02-200171. The RTC found appellant Bobby Torres
@Roberto Torres y Nava (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder but on
appeal, the CA found appellant guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

Factual Antecedents

On January 28, 2004, an Amended lnformation3 was filed before the charging siblings Reynaldo
Torres (Reynaldo), Jay Torres (Jay), Ronnie Torres (Ronnie) and appellant with the special complex
crime ofrobbery withhomicide committed against Jaime M. Espino (Espino). The Amended
Information contained the following accusatory allegations:

That on or about September 21, 2001, inthe City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, armed
with bladed weapons, conspiring and confederating together with one malefactor whose true name,
real identity and present whereabouts [is] still unknown and helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and by means of force, violence, and
intimidation,to wit: while one JAIME M. ESPINO was on board his car and travelling along C.M.
Recto Avenue corner Ylaya St., Tondo , this City, by blocking his path and forcibly grabbing from the
latter his belt-bag; that on the occasion of the said robbery and by reason thereof, the herein
accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, did thenand there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to kill, attack, assault, use personal violence and abuse of superior strength upon the said
JAIME M.ESPINO and that when the latter resisted, by then and there stabbing the latter with bladed
weapons on x x x different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple stab wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter, and afterwhich, divest, take, rob
and carry away a belt-bag, wallet, necklace, watch and ring of undetermined amount, belonging to
said JAIME M. ESPINO.

Contrary to law.4

Only appellant was arrested. Reynaldo, Jay and Ronnie remain at-large to date. During arraignment,
appellantentered a plea of "not guilty".5 After the termination of the pre-trial conference, trial ensued.6

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented as eyewitnesses Eduardo Umali (Umali), a butcher, and MerlitoMacapar
(Macapar), a cigarette vendor. Also presented were Dr. Romeo T. Salen (Dr. Salen), who testified on
the cause of death of Espino. From their testimonies,7 the following facts emerged:

At around 10:00 p.m. of September 21,2001, Espino was driving his car along C.M. Recto Avenue in
Divisoria, Manila when Ronnie suddenly blocked his path. Espino alighted from his vehicle and
approached Ronnie, who tried to grab his belt-bag. Espino resisted and struggled with Ronnie for the
possession of his belt-bag but the latter’s brothers, Jay, Rey, appellant, and an unidentified
companion suddenly appeared. With all of them brandishing bladed weapons, appellant and his
brothers took turns in stabbing Espino in different parts of his body while the unidentified companion
held him by the neck. When Espino was already sprawled on the ground, they took his belt-bag,
wallet and jewelries and immediately fled.

Espino was rushed to the hospital butwas pronounced dead on arrival. In his Medico-Legal Report
No. W-658-2001,8 Dr. Salen concluded that Espino died of multiple stab wounds caused by sharp
bladedinstruments. The back portion of his head bore two stab wounds while his body suffered four
stab wounds which proved fatal. Considering the number and varying measurements of the wounds,
Dr. Salen opined that there weremore than one assailant.

To prove the civil aspect of the case, Espino’s daughter, Winnie EspinoFajardo (Winnie) testified that
the pieces of jewelry stolen from her father consisted of a necklace worth ₱35,000.00, bracelet worth
₱15,000.00, wristwatch worth ₱10,000.00 and two rings worth ₱10,000.00 each. As for their
expenses, Winnie said that ₱25,000.00 was spent for the burial lot and ₱37,000.00 for the funeral
services. She stated further that Espino was 51 years old at the time of his death and was earning
₱3,000.00 a day asa meat vendor.9

Version of the Defense

Appellant denied any participation in the crime. He testified that at around 10:00 p.m. of September
21, 2001, he was with his girlfriend, Merlita Hilario (Merlita). They proceeded to the house oftheir
friend, Marilou Garcia (Marilou), in Villaruel, Tayuman, Manila where they had a drinking session
which lasted until they fell asleep. They did not leave their friend’s house until the following morning
when they went home. Thereupon, he was told that policemen were looking for him because his
brothers got involved in an altercation that resulted in the death of someone.10Merlita and Marilou
corroborated appellant’s alibi in their respective testimonies.11

From the testimony of another defense witness, Jorna Yabut-Torres (Jorna), wife of Ronnie, the
defense’s version of the incidentemerged as follows:

In the evening of September 21, 2001, Jorna and Ronnie were sharing jokes with other vendors in
Divisoria when a car stopped a few meters from their stall. The driver alighted and asked why they
were laughing. Ronnie replied that it had nothing to do with him. The driver seemed drunk since he
walked back to his vehicle in an unsteady manner. Moments later, the driver returned and stabbed
Ronnie on the wrist with a knife. Jay saw the assault on his brother, Ronnie, and got a bolo which he
used to hack the driver repeatedly. Thereafter, Ronnie and Jay fled.12 Ditas Biescas-Mangilya, a
vegetable vendor in Divisoria, corroborated Jorna’s version of the incident in her testimony.13

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its December 5, 2006 Decision,14 the RTC held that appellant could not have committed robbery. It
ratiocinated, viz:

Prosecution witness Merlito D. Macapar testified that Ronnie took the belt bag of the deceased while
Bobby and the rest took his wristwatch, ring and necklace. However, on cross-examination, witness
admitted that he did not see who took the ring, wristwatch and necklace because as soon as the
deceased fell on the ground, accused and companions surrounded him. Merlito’s testimony was
contradicted by Eduardo Umali on a vital point. Thus, Merlito testified that there was an exchange of
heated words. There was no intimation whatsoever what the altercation was about. He was ten
meters away. No such altercation, however, took place according to Eduardo who was barely five
meters away. This tainted the testimony of Merlitoand Eduardo with suspicion. When material
witnesses contradict themselves on vital points, the element of doubt is injected and cannot be
lightly disregarded. That was not all though. Merlito testified [that] several people witnessed the
incident. The stall of the victim’s daughter was about ten meters from the crime scene, which was a
few meters from the stall of Ronnie. They both had been in their respective stalls for quite sometime.
The principal prosecution witnesses are familiar with the deceased and the accused except for the
unidentified companion as they often see them at the vicinity. Thus, in all likelihood, accused and the
victim are familiar if not know each other very well. The perpetration of robbery at the place was thus
unlikely.

Even granting that the element of taking is present, still, accused cannot be held liable for the
complex crime of robbery with homicide for the reason that it was not indubitably shown that the
mainpurpose of the accused was to rob the victim. To the mind of the Court, this is precisely the
reason why the prosecution skipped the utterances made by the protagonist[s] during the attack. To
sustain a [conviction] for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, the original criminal
design of the culprit must be robbery and the homicide is perpetrated with a view to the
consummation of the robbery, or by reason or on the occasion of the robbery (People vs. Ponciano,
204 SCRA 627).

xxxx

The crime of robbery not having been indubitably established, the accused cannot be convicted of
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.15
The RTC thus concluded that appellant can only be liable for the killing of Espino. It held him guilty
of murder after it found the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, which was alleged
in the Information and duly established by the prosecution. Moreover, the RTC ruled that conspiracy
among the accused attended the crime.

Anent the civil aspect of the case, the RTC granted civil indemnity, actual and moral damages to the
heirs of Espino,but denied the claim for loss of earning capacity for lack of documentary evidence.

The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds accused Bobby Torres y Nava,
"Guilty" beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength attended the commission of the crime and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of ₱50,000.00, the
additional sum of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, actual damages in the amount of ₱62,000.00 and
to pay the costs.

Let alias warrant of arrest issue against accused Reynaldo Torres, Jay Torres and Ronnie Torres.

SO ORDERED.16

Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration17which was denied in an Order18 dated April 10, 2007.

Hence, appellant appealed to the CA.19

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In modifying the ruling of the RTC, i.e., finding appellant guilty of robbery with homicide instead of
murder, the CA found that the primary intention of appellant and his co-accusedwas to rob Espino
and his killing was only incidental to the robbery. The blocking of Espino’s car and the struggle for
possession of his belt-bag after he alighted are clear manifestations of the intent to commit robbery.
The dispositive portion of the July 23, 2009 Decision20 of the CA reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of foregoing, the appealed decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 27 dated
December 5, 2006 is hereby MODIFIED in that appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of ROBBERY with HOMICIDE and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The trial court’s award to the heirs of the victim, Jaime Espino, of civil indemnity
in the amount of ₱50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00, and actual damages in
the amount of ₱62,000.00 as well as its order to appellant to pay the costs of suit, are hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.21

Hence, this present appeal.

Assignment of Errors

Appellant imputes upon the CA the following errorsin his Supplemental Brief.22

The acquittal of the accused-appellant in the robbery charge should be left undisturbed as being final
and executory which cannot be overturned without violating the proscription against double
jeopardy.23

The appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it reviewed the entire case despite the fact that
the accused-appellant only appealed his conviction for murder.24

It was an error to convict the accused-appellant of the crimes charged considering that his guilt was
notproven beyond reasonable doubt.25

Our Ruling

The appeal is unmeritorious.

In an appeal by an accused, he waives his right not to be subject to double jeopardy.

Appellant maintains thatthe CA erred in finding him liable for robbery with homicide as charged in the
Amended Information. He argues that his appeal to the CA was limited to his conviction for murder
and excluded his acquittal for robbery. And by appealing his conviction for murder, he does not
waive his constitutional right not to be subject to double jeopardy for the crime of robbery. He claims
that even assuming that the RTC erred in acquitting him of the robbery charge, such error can no
longer be questioned on appeal.

We cannot give credence to appellant’s contentions. "An appeal in [a] criminal case opens the entire
case for review on any question including one not raised by the parties."26 "[W]hen an accused
appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against double
jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called
upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the
appellant."27 In other words, when appellant appealed the RTC’s judgment of conviction for murder,
he is deemed to have abandoned his right to invoke the prohibition on double jeopardy since it
became the duty of the appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the appealed judgment.
Thus, appellant could not have been placed twice in jeopardy when the CA modified the ruling of the
RTC by finding him guilty of robbery with homicide as charged in the Information instead of murder.

Appellant is guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide.

"Robbery with homicide exists ‘when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on occasion, of
the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the
following elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent togain; (3)
with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the
robbery, the crime of homicide, as usedin its generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires
certitude that the robbery is the main purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing ismerely
incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may
occur before, during or after the robbery’."28

In this case, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the primary intention of
appellant and his companions was to rob Espino. Umali and Macapar, the eyewitnesses presented
by the prosecution, testified that at around 10:00 p.m. of September 21, 2001, appellant’s brother
and co-accused, Ronnie, blocked Espino’s car at the corner of C.M. Recto Avenue and Ylaya Street.
When Espino alighted from his vehicle, Ronnie attempted to grab his beltbag. A struggle for
possession of the belt-bag ensued. It was at this juncture that appellant and the other co-accused
joined the fray and stabbed Espino several times in the head and body. When Espino fell to the
pavement from his stab wounds, appellant, Ronnie and their cohorts got hold of the victim’s wallet,
beltbag, wristwatch and jewelry then fled together.29

From the foregoing, it is clear that the primordial intention of appellant and his companions was to
rob Espino. Had they primarily intended to kill Espino, they would have immediately stabbed him to
death. However, the fact that Ronnie initially wrestled with appellant for possession of the belt-bag
clearly shows that the central aim was to commit robbery against Espino.This intention was
confirmed by the accused’s taking of Espino’s belt-bag, wallet, wrist-watch and jewelries after he
was stabbed to death. The killing was therefore merely incidental, resulting by reason oron occasion
of the robbery.

The testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses are worthy of credence.

Appellant attempts to discredit Umali and Macapar by asserting that there are glaring contradictions
in their testimonies. He calls attention to the RTC’s observation that Macapar gave conflicting
testimonies on whether he actually witnessed who among appellant and his cohorts took Espino’s
valuables after he fell to the ground. Appellant asserts further that Umali’s testimony that an
altercation did not precede the commission of the crime contradicts the testimony of Macapar that a
heated exchange of words occurred prior to the incident. He also claims that it is contrary to human
nature for Espino to alight from his car at 10:00 p.m. while in possession of a large amount of money
without fear of an impending hold-up.

We are not persuaded. The inconsistencies attributed to the prosecution’s eyewitnesses involve
minor details, too trivial to adversely affect their credibility. Said inconsistencies do not depart from
the fact that these eyewitnesses saw the robbery and the fatal stabbing of Espino by appellant and
his cohorts. "[T]o the extent that inconsistencies were in fact shown, they appear to the Court to
relate to details of peripheral significance which do not negate or dissolve the positive identification
by [Umali and Macapar of appellant] as the perpetrator of the crime."30"Inaccuracies may in fact
suggest that the witnesses are telling the truth and have not been rehearsed. Witnesses are not
expected to remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall."31

Moreover, it is unlikely that Espino feared alighting from his vehicle at a late hour while in
possessionof a huge amount of money since he was a vendor doing business in the vicinity where
the incident occurred. He was familiar with the people and their activities in the premises. In view of
the above, the Court finds that the CA properly lent full credence to the testimonies of Umali and
Macapar.
The weapons are not the corpus delicti.

Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient for his conviction since the weapons used in the
stabbing of Espino were not presented. In other words, he asserts that it was improper to convict him
because the corpus delictihad not been established.

We disagree. ‘"[C]orpus delictirefers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the
body or substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in the crime
of kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the person murdered’ or, in this case, [the weapons used
in the commission of robbery with homicide]. ‘Since the corpus delictiis the fact of the commission of
the crime, this Court has ruled that even a single witness’ uncorroborated testimony, if credible may
suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delictimay even be established by
circumstantial evidence.’"32

In this case, the corpus delictiwas established by the evidence on record. The prosecution
eyewitnesses testified that appellant and his cohorts used knives to perpetrate the crime. Their
testimonies on the existence and use of weapons in committing the offense was supported by the
medical findings of Dr. Salen who conducted the post-mortem examination. Dr. Salen found that
Espino sustained several stab wounds with varying measurements which were caused by sharp
bladed instruments. Appellant is therefore mistaken in arguing that the failure to present the
weapons used in killing Espino was fatal to the cause of the prosecution.

The defenses of denial and alibi cannot prosper.

We are in complete agreement with the RTC and the CA in finding lack of merit in appellant’s
defenses of denialand alibi.

Appellant claims that he was in a drinking session in his friend’s house in Villaruel, Tayuman,Manila,
from 10:00 p.m. of September 21, 2001 until 1:00 a.m. of the following day. He alleges to have slept
atthe place and went home at around 7:00 a.m. of September 22, 2001. According to appellant, he
did not depart from his friend’s house from the time they started drinking until he went home the
following morning.

Appellant’s alibi is unworthy of credence. Appellant himself testified that Villaruel is less than two
kilometers awayfrom Divisoria and that it would only take a few minutes to go toDivisoria from
Villaruel.33 Clearly, it was not impossible for appellant to be physicallypresent at the crime scene
during its commission. "For alibi to prosper, it muststrictly meet the requirements of time and place. It
is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but it
must also be demonstrated that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the crime scene
at the time the crime was committed."34

The fact that appellant presented witnesses to corroborate his alibi deserves scant consideration.
Their testimonies are viewed with skepticism due to the very nature of alibi the witnesses
affirm.35 Appellant can easily fabricate an alibi and ask relatives and friends to corroborate it.36

We have always ruled that alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must be brushed aside
when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the accused.
Moreover, it is only axiomatic thatpositive testimony prevails over negative testimony.37

The evidence was sufficient to establish the presence of abuse of superior strength.

Appellant argues that mere superiority in numbers does not indicate the presence of abuse of
superior strength. In the samemanner, appellant claims that the number of wounds inflicted on the
victim is not the criterion for the appreciation of this circumstance.

"There is abuse of superior strength when the offenders took advantage of their combined strength
in order to consummate the offense."38 Here, appellant and his four companions not only took
advantage of their numerical superiority, they were also armed with knives. Espino, on the other
hand, was unarmed and defenseless. While Ronnie was wrestling with Espino, appellant and his
coaccused simultaneously assaulted the latter. The unidentified companion locked his arm around
the neck of Espino while appellant and his co-accused stabbed and hacked him several times. While
Espino was lying defenseless on the ground, they divested him of all his valuables. Thereafter, they
immediately fled the scene of the crime.39 It is clear that they executed the criminal act by employing
physical superiorityover Espino.

The Proper Penalty

Nonetheless, the presence of abuse of superiorstrength should not result in qualifying the offense to
murder. When abuse of superior strength obtains in the special complex crime of robbery with
1âwphi 1
homicide, it is to be regarded as a generic circumstance, robbery withhomicide being a composite
crime with its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code. With the penalty of
reclusion perpetuato death imposed for committing robbery with homicide,40 "[t]he generic
aggravating circumstance of[abuse of superior strength] attending the killing of the victim qualifies
the imposition of the death penalty on [appellant]."41 In view, however, of Republic Act No. 9346,
entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines," the penalty that
must be imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.42

The Civil Liabilities

In robbery with homicide, civil indemnity and moral damages are awarded automatically without
need ofallegation and evidence other than the death of the victim owing to the commission of the
crime.43 Here, the RTC and CA granted civil indemnity and moral damages to Espino’s heirs in the
amount of ₱50,000.00 each. These courts were correct in granting the awards, but the awards
should have been ₱100,000.00 each.Recent jurisprudence44 declares that when the imposable
penalty is death, the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages shall be ₱100,000.00 each.

In granting compensatory damages, the prosecution must "prove the actual amount of loss with a
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and the best evidence obtainable to
the injured party."45‘"Receipts should support claims of actual damages.’ Thus, as correctly held by
the [RTC] and affirmed by the CA, the amount of [₱62,000.00] incurred as funeral expenses can be
sustained since these are expenditures supported by receipts."46 The existence of one aggravating
circumstance also merits the grant of exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code.
Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, we likewiseaward ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages to the
victim’s heirs.47 An interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on all awards of damages from the
finality of this judgment until fully paid should likewise be granted to the heirs of Espino.48

Lastly, the RTC did not err in refusing to award indemnity for loss of earning capacity of Espino
despite the testimony of his daughter that he earned ₱3,000.00 a day as a meat dealer. "Such
indemnity is not awarded in the absence of documentary evidence except where the victim was
either self-employed or was a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current
labor laws. Since it was neither alleged nor proved that the victim was either selfemployed or was a
daily wage earner, indemnity for loss of earning capacity cannot be awarded to the heirs of the
victim."49

WHEREFORE, the July 23, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02925
that affirmed with modifications the December 5, 2006 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 02-200171 is AFFIRMED with further MODIFICATIONS.
Appellant Bobby Torres@ Roberto Torres y Nava is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Jaime M.
Espino, ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱100,000.00 as moral damages, and Pl00,000.00 as
exemplary damages. The interest rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all damages awarded from
the finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO*
Associate Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.** ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Per Special Order No. 1778 dated September 16, 2014.

** Per Raffle dated September 8, 2014.

1
CA rollo, pp. 145-156; penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and concurred in
by Associate Justices Jose Catral Mendoza (now a Member of this Court) and Antonio L.
Villamor.

2
Records, pp. 256-262; penned by Judge Teresa P. Soriaso.

3
Id. at 55-56.

4
Id. at 55.

5
Id. at 64.

6
Id. at 71.

7
TSN, September 15, 2004, pp. 2-29; TSN, May 4, 2005,pp. 2-20; TSN, December 7, 2004,
pp. 3-15; TSN, March 29, 2005, pp. 2-5.

8
Records, p. 126.

9
TSN, December 6, 2005, pp. 2-12.

10
TSN, May 30, 2006, pp. 3-18.

11
TSN, September 5, 2006, pp. 4-15 and TSN, June 21, 2006, pp. 3-16.

12
TSN, June 13, 2006, pp. 2-51.

13
TSN, August 29, 2006, pp. 3-25.

14
Records, pp. 256-262.

15
Id. at 260.

16
Id. at 262.

17
Id. at 264-272.

18
Id. at 281-282.

See Notice of Appeal, id. at 290 and the RTC Order of July 30, 2007 which gave due
19

course to the said notice of appeal, id. at 291.

20
CA rollo, pp. 145-156.

21
Id. at 155.

22
Rollo, pp. 68-82.

23
Id. at 69.

24
Id. at 72.

25
Id. at 75.
26
People v. Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No. 186417, July 27, 2011, 654 SCRA 761, 774.

27
Id. at 775.

28
Crisostomo v. People, G.R. No. 171526, September 1, 2010, 629 SCRA 590, 598.

29
TSN, September 15, 2004, pp. 4-6; TSN, May 4, 2005, pp. 3-7.

30
People v. Dean, Jr., 314 Phil. 280, 292 (1995).

31
People v. Alas, G.R. Nos. 118335-36, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 310, 320.

32
Villarin v. People, G.R. No. 175289, August 31, 2011, 656 SCRA 500, 520-521.

33
TSN, May 30, 2006, p. 14.

34
People v. Ebet, G.R. No. 181635, November 15,2010, 634 SCRA 689, 706-707.

35
People v. Sumalinog, Jr., 466 Phil. 637, 650 (2004).

36
Id. at 651.

37
People v. Ebet, supra note 34 at 707.

38
People v. Lacbayan, 393 Phil. 800, 808 (2006).

39
Id.

40
REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 294, paragraph 1.

41
People v. Villanueva, Jr., 611 Phil. 152, 178 (2009).

42
Id.

43
Crisostomo v. People, supra note 28 at 603.

44
People v. Gambao, G. R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013.

45
Crisostomo v. People, supra note 28 at 604.

46
Id.

47
People v. Gambao, supra note 44.

48
People v. Jalbonian, G.R. No. 180281, July 1, 2013, 700 SCRA 280, 296.

49
People v. Obligado, 603 Phil. 371, 376 (2009).
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 198022 April 7, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
SONNY GATARIN y CABALLERO @ "JAY-R" and EDUARDO QUISAYAS, Accused,

EDUARDO QUISAYAS, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in this appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated February 23, 2011 in CA-G.R.
CR H.C. No. 03593 affirming the Regional Trial Court (RTC)2 Decision3 dated June 20, 2008 in
Criminal Case No. 13838 convicting appellant Eduardo Quisayas of Robbery with Homicide
committed against the victim Januario Castillo y Masangcay (Januario).

The facts of the case follow:

Appellant and accused Sonny Gatarin y Caballero were charged in an Information4 with Robbery
with Homicide committed as follows:

That on or about the 3rd day of November, 2004, at about 8:00 o’clock (sic) in the evening, at
Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of Mabini, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bladed weapon,
conspiring and confederating together, acting in common accord and mutually helping each other,
with intent to gain, without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof and with violence
against or intimidation of person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob, and
carry away cash money amounting to Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00), Philippine Currency,
belonging to Januario Castillo y Masangcay alias "Ka Maning," to the damage and prejudice of the
latter in the aforementioned amount and that on the occasion and by reason of said robbery, the said
accused with intent to kill and taking advantage of their superior strength, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon Januario Castillo y
Masangcay alias "Ka Maning," thereby inflicting upon the latter the stab wounds to [the] anterior
chest and right shoulder and right axilla, which directly caused his death.

Contrary to law.5

Appellant was arrested, while his co-accused remained at-large. When arraigned, he pleaded "Not
Guilty." Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.

The prosecution presented the testimonies of the following witnesses: (1) Maria Castillo, the victim’s
wife; (2) Howel Umali (Umali), who allegedly saw how the accused mauled the victim; (3) SPO3
Gregorio G. Mendoza (SPO3 Mendoza) of the Mabini Police Station, who saw the victim lying on the
floor and the accused running away from the crime scene, and testified on the dying declaration of
Januario; (4) Dr. Catalino Ike A. Rasa Jr. (Dr. Rasa), who attended to the victim when he was
brought to the hospital; and (5) PO1 Rogelio Dizon Coronel (PO1 Coronel), who saw the accused
running fast near the crime scene and who, likewise, testified on Januario’s ante mortem statement.

From the testimonies of the above-named witnesses, the prosecution established the following facts:

On November 3, 2004, at 8 o’clock in the evening, Umali was riding a bicycle on his way home when
he saw Januario being mauled by two persons opposite Dom’s Studio in Poblacion, Mabini,
Batangas. Upon seeing the incident, he stayed in front of the church until such time that the accused
ran away and were chased by policemen who alighted from the police patrol vehicle.6

On the same night, SPO3 Mendoza and PO1 Coronel were on board their patrol vehicle performing
their routine patrol duty when they met two men, later identified as the accused, who were running at
a fast speed. When asked why they were running, the accused did not answer prompting the
policemen to chase them. The policemen, however, were unsuccessful in catching them and when it
became evident that they could no longer find them, they continued patrolling the area. There they
saw Januario lying on the street in front of Dom’s studio. As he was severely injured, the policemen
immediately boarded Januario to the patrol vehicle and brought him to the Zigzag Hospital. While
inside the vehicle, SPO3 Mendoza asked Januario who hurt him. He answered that it was "Jay-R
and his uncle" who stabbed him. The uncle turned out to be the appellant herein, while Jay-R is his
co-accused who remains at-large.7

At the Zigzag Hospital, Januario was attended to by Dr. Rasa who found him in critical condition.
Three fatal wounds caused by a bladed weapon were found in Januario’s body which eventually
caused his death.8

Maria Castillo, for her part, testified on how she learned of what happened to her husband, the victim
herein, the amount allegedly stolen from her husband, as well as on the expenses and loss incurred
by reason of Januario’s death. She, further, quantified the sorrow and anxiety the family suffered by
reason of such death.9

In his defense, appellant denied the accusation against him. He claimed that he is from the Province
of Samar but has been residing in Cupang, Muntinlupa City since 1987. He denied knowing, much
more residing in, Mabini, Batangas, as he only heard about the province from his employer who
happens to be a resident therein. He claimed that he did not know Januario and that he was, in fact,
working in Muntinlupa City on the date and time the crime was allegedly committed.10

The prosecution’s rebuttal witness Mr. Bienvenido Caponpon, however, belied appellant’s claim and
insisted that appellant was renting a house in Mabini, Batangas and that he was seen there until the
day the crime was committed.11

On June 20, 2008, the RTC rendered a Decision against the appellant, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, the People having proven the guilt of accused Eduardo Quisayas beyond
reasonable doubt, he is hereby declared "GUILTY" of the offense as charged. Accordingly, he is
hereby sentenced to a prison term of Reclusion Perpetua.

Further, he is hereby ordered to pay herein offended party of the following:

(a) civil indemnity in the amount of Php50,000.00

(b) actual damages in the amount of Php20,000.00, plus Php35,310.00 (funeral and hospital
expenses), and

(c) moral damages in the amount of Php100,000.00

SO ORDERED.12

The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Maria Castillo not only as to the fact of taking
money from Januario but also the amount taken.13 The fact of death was, likewise, found by the court
to have been adequately proven by the testimony of Dr. Rasa.14 Though there was no evidence
whether the unlawful taking preceded the killing of Januario, the court held that there was direct and
intimate connection between the two acts.15

As to the identity of the perpetrators, the court considered the victim’s response to SPO3 Mendoza’s
question as to who committed the crime against him as part of the res gestae, which is an exception
to the hearsay rule.16 As to appellant’s defense of alibi, the court gave more weight to the
prosecution’s rebuttal evidence that indeed the former was an actual resident of Mabini, Batangas.17

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. Contrary, however, to the RTC’s conclusion, the
appellate court considered Januario’s statement to SPO3 Mendoza, that the accused were the ones
who stabbed him and took his wallet, not only as part of res gestae but also as a dying declaration.18

Hence, the appeal before the Court.

We find appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt not of robbery with homicide but of murder.

The trial court’s factual findings, including its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the
probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions drawn from the factual findings are
accorded great respect and even conclusive effect. We, nevertheless, fully scrutinize the records,
since the penalty of reclusion perpetua that the CA imposed on appellant demands no less than this
kind of careful and deliberate consideration.19

To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the following
elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the
use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery,
the crime of homicide, as used in the generic sense, was committed.20

First, in order to sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide, it is necessary that the
robbery itself be proven as conclusively as any other essential element of the crime.21 In order for the
crime of robbery with homicide to exist, it must be established that a robbery has actually taken
place and that, as a consequence or on the occasion of robbery, a homicide be committed.22

For there to be robbery, there must be taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent
to gain, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person or by using force upon on
things.23 Both the RTC and the CA concluded that robbery was committed based on the testimonies
of Maria Castillo, SPO3 Mendoza, and PO1 Coronel. A closer look at the testimonies of these
witnesses, however, failed to convince us that indeed robbery took place.

Maria Castillo’s testimony was offered by the prosecution to prove that her husband, the victim
herein, was a victim of robbery with homicide and that he is a businessman, and that she suffered
damages by reason of such death. The pertinent portion of her direct testimony is quoted below for a
closer scrutiny:

ATTY. MASANGYA:

Q The victim in this case Januario Castillo, how are you related to him?

WITNESS:

A My husband, sir.

Q On November 3, 2004, do you remember of any unusual incident that has occurred?

A Yes, sir.

Q And what is that event?

A At around 8:30 o’clock in the evening of November 3, 2004 while I was at home, policemen arrived
and informed me that my husband was wounded, sir.

Q Did these police officers inform you the location (sic) of where your husband was located?

A According to the policemen, my husband was at Zigzag Hospital, sir.

Q Did you go to Zigzag Hospital, Madam Witness?

A Yes, sir.

Q What happened, Madam Witness, when you arrived at the hospital?

A I was informed by the nurse there that my husband was already dead.

ATTY. MASANGYA:

Q Were you informed of the cause of the death of your husband?

WITNESS:

A According to them my husband was wounded, many wounds and he was robbed, sir.

Q Madam Witness, were you able to know who are the persons responsible for the death of your
husband?

ATTY. EBORA:

We will object. That will be misleading.

COURT:

If she is aware.
ATTY. EBORA:

We submit.

COURT:

You ask her if she is aware who the perpetrators are.

ATTY. MASANGYA:

Q Madam Witness, were you informed who are the perpetrators of the crime on your husband?

WITNESS:

A Not yet, sir. It was not told to me by the policemen because the policemen were in a hurry.

ATTY. MASANGYA:

Q After the policemen went to your house, was there [any] person who informed you who were the
perpetrators of the crime?

A Yes, sir. My niece.

Q And who is that niece of yours, Madam Witness?

A Josephine Borbon, sir.

Q Did Miss Borbon tell you about the identity of the perpetrators of the crime, Madam Witness?

A Yes, sir.

Q And who are the persons did Miss Borbon mention?

A My former helper Sonny Gatarin and his uncle Eduardo Quisayas, sir.

Q You were told that your husband was robbed, how much was taken from your husband, Madam
Witness?

A ₱20,000.00.

Q And can you tell, Madam Witness, why is your husband carrying that amount of money at the time
of his death?

A Yes, sir.

WITNESS:

A Those were the earnings for that day for he delivered merchandise and groceries, sir.

ATTY. MASANGYA:

Q Do you know, Madam Witness, if your husband is engaged in any business?

A Yes, sir.

Q And what is your proof in saying your husband is engaged in business?

A Our business was we delivered bottled goods and groceries, sir.

Q The business wherein your husband is engaged has an existing license with the appropriate local
government?

A Yes, sir.

Q If a copy will be shown to you, will you be able to identify the same?
A Yes, sir.

Q I am showing to you [a] certified copy of [the] Mayor’s permit previously marked as Exhibit "H"?

A This is it, sir.

Q If you know, Madam Witness, how much is your husband earning in his sari-sari or grocery
business?

WITNESS:

A Yes, sir.

ATTY. MASANGYA:

Q How much is he earning at the time?

A He earns ₱40,000.00.

Q In a month or year?

A ₱40,000.00 a month, sir.

Q How do you feel or confront the situation that your husband is already dead?

A We felt deep sorrow together with my three (3) children, sir. (Witness is crying)

x x x x24

From the above testimony, it can be inferred that Maria Castillo obviously was not at the scene of the
crime on that fateful night as she was only informed that the incident took place and that Januario
was brought to the Zigzag Hospital. It, likewise, appears that she had no personal knowledge that
Januario was robbed. While she claimed that ₱20,000.00 was illegally taken from him, no evidence
was presented to show that Januario indeed had that amount at that time and that the same was in
his possession. As Maria Castillo claimed that the said amount was allegedly received from their
clients in their grocery business, said fact could have been proven by receipts or testimonies of said
clients. The prosecution’s failure to present such evidence creates doubt as to the existence of the
money.

The trial and appellate courts likewise relied on the testimony of SPO3 Mendoza and PO1 Coronel
on the statement of Januario after the commission of the crime. While both policemen testified as to
the dying declaration of Januario pertaining to the cause and circumstances surrounding his death,
only PO1 Coronel testified during his direct examination that when asked who stabbed him, Januario
replied that it was "Jay-Ar and his uncle who stabbed him and took his wallet."25 In response to the
Presiding Judge’s clarificatory question, however, PO1 Coronel admitted that when he asked
Januario who stabbed him, he replied that it was Jay-Ar and his uncle. After which, no further
question was asked.26 On the other hand, nowhere in SPO3 Mendoza’s testimony did he talk about
the alleged taking of wallet. The pertinent portions of their testimonies read:

Direct Examination of PO1 Coronel:

xxxx

Q: What did you do next after boarding him inside your vehicle?

A We brought him at the Zigzag Hospital and we asked him who stabbed him.

Q What was his reply Mr. Witness?

A He told us that Jay-ar and his uncle stabbed him and took his wallet.

x x x x27

PO1 Coronel’s Answers to the questions propounded by the Presiding Judge:

THE COURT:
Alright, the Court will ask.

Q When did you talk with the victim?

A When we were inside the patrol car, your Honor.

Q What exactly did you ask from the victim?

A I asked him who stabbed him, your Honor.

Q Did you tell the victim his condition?

A No, your Honor.

Q You just asked the victim who stabbed him?

A Yes, your Honor.

Q What was the answer of the victim?

A That he was stabbed by Jay-ar and his uncle, your Honor.

Q And no other question did you ask him?

A None, your Honor.

x x x x28

Direct Testimony of SPO3 Mendoza:

xxxx

Q And when you saw Januario Castillo lying on the street, what did you do?

A We lifted him and boarded him in our vehicle then we brought him to the hospital.

Q While you were travelling, were you able to talk to the victim Januario Castillo?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was your conversation all about?

A I asked Ka Maning Castillo as to who stabbed him and he answered Jay-R and his uncle.

x x x x29

It is, therefore, clear from the foregoing that the evidence presented to prove the robbery aspect of
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, does not show that robbery actually took place.
The prosecution did not convincingly establish the corpus delicti of the crime of robbery.

Corpus delicti has been defined as the body or substance of the crime and, in its primary sense,
refers to the fact that a crime has actually been committed. As applied to a particular offense, it
means the actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged.30 In this case, the element
of taking, as well as the existence of the money alleged to have been lost and stolen by appellant,
was not adequately established.31 We find no sufficient evidence to show either the amount of money
stolen, or if any amount was in fact stolen from Januario. Even if we consider Januario’s dying
declaration, the same pertains only to the stabbing incident and not to the alleged robbery.

Moreover, assuming that robbery was indeed committed, the prosecution must establish with
certitude that the killing was a mere incident to the robbery, the latter being the perpetrator’s main
purpose and objective. It is not enough to suppose that the purpose of the author of the homicide
was to rob; a mere presumption of such fact is not sufficient.32 Stated in a different manner, a
conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose, and objective of the malefactor
and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of
human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.33 What is crucial for a
conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide is for the prosecution to firmly establish the
offender’s intent to take personal property before the killing, regardless of the time when the
homicide is actually carried out.34 In this case, there was no showing of the appellant’s intention,
determined by their acts prior to, contemporaneous with, and subsequent to the commission of the
crime, to commit robbery.35 No shred of evidence is on record that could support the conclusion that
appellant’s primary motive was to rob Januario and that he was able to accomplish it.36 Mere
speculation and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required in establishing the guilt of an
accused beyond reasonable doubt.37 Where the evidence does not conclusively prove the robbery,
the killing of Januario would be classified either as a simple homicide or murder, depending upon the
absence or presence of any qualifying circumstance, and not the crime of robbery with
homicide.38 To establish the fact that appellant and his co-accused killed the victim by stabbing him
with a bladed weapon, the prosecution presented Umali as an eyewitness to the mauling incident. It
was this same witness who identified the perpetrators. The trial and appellate courts also relied on
the statement of Januario as to the circumstances of his death, testified to by PO1 Coronel and
SPO3 Mendoza as dying declaration and as part of res gestae.

A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may
nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) the declaration concerns
the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) it is made when death
appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the
declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration
is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant's death.39

In the case at bar, it appears that not all the requisites of a dying declaration are present. From the
records, no questions relative to the second requisite was propounded to Januario. It does not
appear that the declarant was under the consciousness of his impending death when he made the
statements. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in
inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending death
and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders a dying declaration admissible.
The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as
certainly impending.40 Thus, the utterances made by Januario could not be considered as a dying
declaration.

However, even if Januario’s utterances could not be appreciated as a dying declaration, his
statements may still be appreciated as part of the res gestae. Res gestae refers to the
circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its
character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea
of deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is,
therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation, is so interwoven or connected with the
principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and
also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.41

The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein. When
Januario gave the identity of the assailants to SPO3 Mendoza, he was referring to a startling
occurrence which is the stabbing by appellant and his co-accused. At that time, Januario and the
witness were in the vehicle that would bring him to the hospital, and thus, had no time to contrive his
identification of the assailant. His utterance about appellant and his co-accused having stabbed him,
in answer to the question of SPO3 Mendoza, was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the
startling occurrence. Definitely, the statement is relevant because it identified the accused as the
authors of the crime. Verily, the killing of Januario, perpetrated by appellant, is adequately proven by
the prosecution.

From the evidence presented, we find that as alleged in the information, abuse of superior strength
attended the commission of the crime, and thus, qualifies the offense to murder. Abuse of superior
strength is considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor which the
latter selected or took advantage of in the commission of the crime.42

It is clear from the records of the case that Januario was then fifty-four (54) years old. Appellant, on
the other hand, was then forty (40) years old. Appellant committed the crime with his co-accused, his
nephew. Clearly, assailants are younger than the victim. These two accused were seen by Umali as
the persons who mauled Januario. Moreover, assailants were armed with a bladed weapon, while
Januario was unarmed. This same bladed weapon was used in repeatedly stabbing Januario, who
no longer showed any act of defense. Dr. Rasa, the medical doctor who attended to Januario when
he was brought to the hospital, also testified as to the nature and extent of the injury sustained by
Januario. He clearly stated that Januario sustained three fatal injuries which caused his death. The
pertinent portion of Dr. Rasa’s testimony reads:

ATTY. MASANGYA:

Q How many injuries were sustained by the victim, Mr. Witness?

A Three.

Q In what parts of the body was the victim injured?

A The victim sustained three injuries: one on the left side of the parasternal border the heart (sic)
and it penetrated, and then the second one was on the right side of the chest near the shoulder and
the third one was under the armpit also to the chest.

ATTY. MASANGYA:

Q Which of those injuries caused the death of the victim?

A All of them are fatal, because the one over the heart penetrated the heart and the aorta. The one
in the anterior chest near the right shoulder hit the blood vessels of the armpit and the wound under
the armpit apparently hit the lungs.

x x x x43

This same physician issued the Medical Certificate explaining the location of the stab wounds as
well as the cause of death of Januario, to wit:

Location of Stab Wounds:

1. Stab wound penetrating 2nd inter-costal space left para-sternal border, 6" deep
penetrating the heart chambers and aorta

2. Stab wound over the right anterior deltoid muscle, penetrating

3" into the right axilla space; injuring the axilla blood vessels.

3. Stab wound over the right axilla, penetrating to the right chest cavity.

CAUSES OF DEATH

Immediate Cause: Hypovolemic Shock

Antecedent Cause: Multiple stab wounds to the anterior chest, right

axilla, and right axilla penetrating the chest cavity.

x x x x44

From the testimony of the eyewitness and corroborated by the medical certificate of Dr. Rasa, it can
be inferred that indeed the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength attended the
commission of the crime. To be sure, with two assailants younger than the victim, armed with a
bladed weapon and inflicting multiple mortal wounds on the victim, there is definitely abuse of
superior strength deliberately taken advantage of by appellant and his co-accused in order to
consummate the offense.

Now on the penalty. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 248. Murder. – Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 246 shall kill another,
shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any
of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

x x x x45

There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, appellant shall be meted the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.

Finally, the award of damages. In murder, the grant of civil indemnity which has been fixed by
jurisprudence at ₱50,000.00 requires no proof other than the fact of death as a result of the crime
and proof of the accused’s responsibility therefor. Moral damages, on the other hand, which in this
case is also ₱50,000.00 are awarded in view of the violent death of the victim.46 Moreover, exemplary
damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00 should likewise be given, considering that the offense was
attended by an aggravating circumstance whether ordinary, or qualifying as in this case. As duly
proven by Maria Castillo, actual damages representing the hospital and funeral expenses, as
evidenced by receipts in the amount of ₱35,300.00, be awarded. Finally, in addition and in
conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for damages an interest at
the legal rate of six percent (6%) from date of finality of this decision until full payment.47

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we MODIFY the Court of Appeals Decision dated February 23,
2011 in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 03593, affirming the Regional Trial Court Decision dated June 20,
2008 in Criminal Case No. 13838, convicting appellant Eduardo Quisayas of Robbery with Homicide.
We find appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

We, likewise, ORDER appellant TO PAY the heirs of the victim Januario Castillo y Masangcay the
following: (1) ₱35,300.00 actual damages; (2) ₱50,000.00 civil indemnity; (3) ₱50,000.00 moral
damages; (4) ₱30,000.00 exemplary damages; plus (5) six percent (6%) interest on all damages
awarded from the date of the finality of this decision until full payment.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Penned by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz, with Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican
and Rodil V. Zalameda, concurring; rollo, pp. 2-14.

2
Branch 3, Pallocan West, Batangas City.

3
Penned by Judge Ruben A. Galvez, CA rollo, pp. 5-11.

4
Records, pp. 2-3.
5
Id.

6
TSN, February 20, 2006, pp. 5-7.

7
Rollo, p. 5.

8
Id.

9
CA rollo, p. 6.

10
TSN, November 27, 2007, pp. 1-13.

11
TSN, January 31, 2008, pp. 1-14.

12
Records, pp. 187-188.

13
Id. at 185-186.

14
Id. at 186.

15
Id.

16
Id.

17
Id. at 187.

18
Rollo, p. 8.

19
People v. Algarme, G.R. No. 175978, February 12, 2009, 578 SCRA 601, 613.

Id. at 621; People v. Latam, G.R. No. 192789, March 23, 2011, 646 SCRA 406, 410;
20

People v. Baron, G.R. No. 185209, June 28, 2010, 621 SCRA 646, 656.

21
People v. Orias, G.R. No. 186539, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 417, 430.

People v. Abundo, 402 Phil. 616, 635-636 (2001), citing People v. Pacala, 58 Phil. 370,
22

377-378 (1974); People v. Arondain, 418 Phil. 354, 367 (2001)

23
People v. Obedo, 451 Phil. 529, 538 (2003).

24
TSN, November 24, 2005, pp. 3-8.

25
TSN, July 10, 2007, p. 8.

26
Id. at 20.

27
Id. at 8.

28
Id. at 20.

29
TSN, May 30, 2006, pp. 6-7.

30
People v. Obedo, supra note 23, at 538-539.

31
Id. at 539.

32
People v. Algarme, supra note 19, at 625.

33
Id. at 621; People v. Latam, supra note 20, at 410;

34
People v. Canlas, 423 Phil. 665, 684 (2001).

35
See People v. Algarme, supra note 19, at 625-626.

36
People v. Canlas, supra note 34.
37
People v. Canlas, supra note 34, at 684-685.

38
People v. Orias, supra note 21.

People v. Rarugal, G.R. No. 188603, January 16, 2013, 688 SCRA 646, 654; People v.
39

Maglian, G.R. No. 189834, March 30, 2011, 646 SCRA 770, 778.

40
Belbis, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 181052, November 14, 2012, 685 SCRA 518, 530-531.

41
People v. Salafranca, G.R. No. 173476, February 22, 2012, 666 SCRA 501, 514.

42
People v. Calpito, 462 Phil. 172, 179 (2003).

43
TSN, May 24, 2007, pp. 5-6.

44
Records, p. 144.

45
Emphasis supplied.

46
People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 188602, February 4, 2010, 611 SCRA 633, 646-647.

People v. Camat, G.R. No. 188612, July 30, 2012, 677 SCRA 640, 672; People v.
47

Concillado, G.R. No. 181204, November 28, 2011, 661 SCRA 363, 384; People v. Rebucan,
G.R. No. 182551, July 27, 2011, 654 SCRA 726, 760.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 207949 July 23, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ARMANDO DIONALDO y EBRON, RENATO DIONALDO y EBRON, MARIANO GARIGUEZ, JR. y
RAMOS, and RODOLFO LARIDO y EBRON, Accused-Appellants.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision1 dated February 15, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02888 finding accused-appellants Armando Dionaldo y Ebron
(Armando), Renato Dionaldo y Ebron (Renato), Mariano Gariguez, Jr. y Ramos (Mariano), and
Rodolfo Larido y Ebron (Rodolfo) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention.

The Facts

At around 8 o'clock in the morning of May 16, 2003, Roderick Navarro (Roderick) dropped his
brother Edwin Navarro (Edwin) off at the Health Is Wealth Gym in Caloocan City. Thirty minutes
later, he received a text message from another brother who told him that Edwin had been
kidnapped.2 Records show that three (3) men, later identified as Armando, Renato, and Mariano,
forcibly dragged a bloodied Edwin down the stairway of the gym and pushed him inside a dark green
Toyota car with plate number UKF 194.3 Upon receiving the message, Roderick immediately
reported the incident to the police. At around 10 o’clock in the morning of the same day, he received
a phone call from Edwin‟s kidnappers who threatened to kill Edwin if he should report the matter to
the police.4

The following day, Roderick received another call from the kidnappers, who demanded the payment
of ransom money in the amount of ₱15,000,000.00. Roderick told them he had no such money, as
he only had ₱50,000.00. On May 19, 2003, after negotiations over the telephone, the kidnappers
agreed to release Edwin in exchange for the amount of ₱110,000.00. Roderick was then instructed
to bring the money to Batangas and wait for their next call.5

At around 7:30 in the evening of the same day, as Roderick was on his way to Batangas to deliver
the ransom money, the kidnappers called and instructed him to open all the windows of the car he
was driving and to turn on the hazard light when he reaches the designated place. After a while,
Roderick received another call directing him to exit in Bicutan instead and proceed to C-5 until he
arrives at the Centennial Village. He was told to park beside the Libingan ng mga Bayani. After
several hours, an orange Mitsubishi car with plate number DEH 498 pulled up in front of his vehicle
where four (4) men alighted. Roderick saw one of the men take a mobile phone and upon uttering
the word "alat," the men returned to their car and drove away.6

Meanwhile, a team had been organized to investigate the kidnapping of Edwin, headed by SPO3
Romeo Caballero (SPO3 Caballero) and PO3 Nestor Acebuche (PO3 Acebuche) of the Camp
Crame Police Anti-Crime Emergency Response (PACER). During the course of the investigation,
Rodolfo, an employee at the Health Is Wealth Gym, confessed to PO3 Acebuche that he was part of
the plan to kidnap Edwin, as in fact he was the one who tipped off Mariano, Renato, Armando and a
certain Virgilio7 Varona8 (Virgilio) on the condition that he will be given a share in the ransom money.
Rodolfo gave information on the whereabouts of his cohorts, leading to their arrest on June 12,
2003. In the early morning of the following day or on June 13, 2003, the PACER team found the
dead body of Edwin at Sitio Pugpugan Laurel, Batangas, which Roderick identified.9

Thus, accused-appellants as well as Virgilio were charged in an Information10 which reads:

That on or about the 16th day of May, 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one
another, being then private persons, did then and there by force and intimidation willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously with the use of motor vehicle and superior strength take, carry and deprive EDWIN
NAVARRO Y ONA, of his liberty against his will, for the purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a
demand of ₱15,000,000.00 was made as a condition of the victim’s release and on the occasion
thereof, the death of the victim resulted.
Contrary to law.

During arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty11 and interposed the defenses of denial
and alibi. Except for Rodolfo, they individually claimed that on said date and time, they were in their
respective houses when they were taken by men in police uniforms, then subsequently brought to
Camp Crame, and there allegedly tortured and detained. On the other hand, Rodolfo, for himself,
averred that at around 8 o’clock in the evening of June 12, 2003, while walking on his way home, he
noticed that a van had been following him. Suddenly, four (4) persons alighted from the vehicle,
boarded him inside, blindfolded him, and eventually tortured him. He likewise claimed that he was
made to sign an extrajudicial confession, purporting too that while a certain Atty. Nepomuceno had
been summoned to assist him, the latter failed to do so.12

During trial, the death of the victim, Edwin, was established through a Certificate of Death13 with
Registry No. 2003-050 (subject certificate of death) showing that he died on May 19, 2003 from a
gunshot wound on the head.

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision14 dated June 13, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 129 (RTC), in
Crim. Case No. C-68329, convicted accused-appellants of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention, sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

It gave credence to the positive and straightforward testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which
clearly established that it was the accusedappellants who forcibly dragged a bloodied Edwin into a
car and, consequently, deprived him of his liberty.15 In light thereof, it rejected accused-appellants‟
respective alibis and claims of torture, which were not substantiated. It also held that the crime of
Kidnapping had been committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, which is punishable by death.
However, in view of the suspended imposition of the death penalty pursuant to Republic Act No.
(RA) 9346,16 only the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed.17 Further, the RTC found that
conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, as the accused-appellants’ individual participation
was geared toward a joint purpose and criminal design.18

Notably, while the RTC found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses prove that the victim
Edwin was abducted, deprived of liberty, and eventually killed,19 a fact which is supported by the
subject certificate of death, it did not consider said death in its judgment. The CA Ruling

In a Decision20 dated February 15, 2013, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC’s conviction of accused-
appellants, finding that the prosecution was able to clearly establish all the elements of the crime of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, namely: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he
kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention
or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense, any of the following
circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is
committed simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a
minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.21 It likewise
sustained the finding that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, as
sufficiently proven by the testimony of the brother of the victim.22 Moreover, the CA affirmed that
conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, as the acts of accused-appellants emanated from
the same purpose or common design, and they were united in its execution.23

Separately, the CA found that accused-appellants’ claims of torture were never supported, and that
Rodolfo voluntarily signed the extrajudicial confession and was afforded competent and independent
counsel in its execution.24

Aggrieved by their conviction, accused-appellants filed the instant appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not accusedappellants are guilty of the
crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.

The Court’s Ruling

The appeal is devoid of merit.

Well-settled is the rule that the question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to
determine. Its assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, and it is
conclusive and binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight,
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not been considered. Absent any showing
that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
which would affect the result of the case, or that the judge acted arbitrarily, his assessment of the
credibility of witnesses deserves high respect by the appellate court.25

In this case, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, gave weight and credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, which they found to be straightforward and consistent. Through these
testimonies, it was clearly established that accused-appellants, who were all private individuals, took
the victim Edwin and deprived him of his liberty, which acts were illegal, and for the purpose of
extorting ransom.26 Thus, seeing no semblance of arbitrariness or misapprehension on the part of the
court a quo, the Court finds no compelling reason to disturb its factual findings on this score.
1âwphi1

Anent the finding that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, the Court likewise finds the
conclusion of the RTC in this regard, as affirmed by the CA, to be well-taken. Conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it, and when conspiracy is established, the responsibility of the conspirators is collective,
not individual, rendering all of them equally liable regardless of the extent of their respective
participations.27 In this relation, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy, as it can be
presumed from and proven by the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, design, concerted
action, and community of interests.28 Hence, as the factual circumstances in this case clearly show
that accused-appellants acted in concert at the time of the commission of the crime and that their
acts emanated from the same purpose or common design, showing unity in its execution,29 the CA,
affirming the trial court, correctly ruled that there was conspiracy among them.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court is, however, constrained to modify the ruling of the RTC
and the CA, as the crime the accusedappellants have committed does not, as the records obviously
bear, merely constitute Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, but that of the special complex
crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide. This is in view of the victim’s (i.e., Edwin’s) death,
which was (a) specifically charged in the Information,30and (b) clearly established during the trial of
this case. Notably, while this matter was not among the issues raised before the Court, the same
should nonetheless be considered in accordance with the settled rule that in a criminal case, an
appeal, as in this case, throws open the entire case wide open for review, and the appellate court
can correct errors, though unassigned, that may be found in the appealed judgment.31

After the amendment of the Revised Penal Code on December 31, 1993 by RA 7659, Article 267 of
the same Code now provides:

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain
another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of
the parents, female or a public officer;

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-
mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to
torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. (Emphases supplied)

The Court further elucidated in People v. Mercado:32

In People v. Ramos, the accused was found guilty of two separate heinous crimes of kidnapping for
ransom and murder committed on July 13, 1994 and sentenced to death. On appeal, this Court
modified the ruling and found the accused guilty of the "special complex crime" of kidnapping for
ransom with murder under the last paragraph of Article 267, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
This Court said:

x x x This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of „special complex crime‟ of
kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts
between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the
accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an
afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of
the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought,
the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as
separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art.
267, as amended by RA No. 7659.33 (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)

Thus, further taking into account the fact that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom, accused-appellants’ conviction must be modified from Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention to the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, which
carries the penalty of death. As earlier intimated, the enactment of RA 9346 had suspended the
imposition of the death penalty. This means that the accused-appellants could, as the CA and trial
court properly ruled, only be sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. To this, the Court adds
that the accused-appellants are not eligible for parole.34

On a final note, the Court observes that the RTC and the CA failed to award civil indemnity as well
as damages to the family of the kidnap victim. In People v. Quiachon,35 the Court explained that even
if the death penalty was not to be imposed on accused-appellants in view of the prohibition in RA
9346, the award of civil indemnity was nonetheless proper, not being dependent on the actual
imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the
imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the crime.36 In the present case,
considering that both the qualifying circumstances of ransom and the death of the victim during
captivity were duly alleged in the information and proven during trial, civil indemnity in the amount of
₱100,000.00 must therefore be awarded to the family of the victim, to conform with prevailing
jurisprudence.37

Similarly, the Court finds that the award of moral damages is warranted in this case. Under Article
2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock and similar injury, while Article 2219 of the same Code
provides that moral damages may be recovered in cases of illegal detention. It cannot be denied, in
this case, that the kidnap victim‟s family suffered mental anguish, fright, and serious anxiety over the
detention and eventually, the death of Edwin. As such, and in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence,38 moral damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00 must perforce be awarded to the
family of the victim.

Finally, exemplary damages must be awarded in this case, in view of the confluence of the aforesaid
qualifying circumstances and in order to deter others from committing the same atrocious acts. In
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,39 therefore, the Court awards exemplary damages in the
amount of ₱100,000.00 to the family of the kidnap victim.

In addition, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all damages
awarded from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.40

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 15, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02888 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that all the
accusedappellants herein are equally found GUILTY of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom with Homicide, and are sentenced to each suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility for parole, and to pay, jointly and severally, the family of the kidnap victim Edwin Navarro
the following amounts: (1) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages; and
(3) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
·from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo, pp. 2-25. Penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, with Associate Justices
Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., concurring.

2
Id. at 6-7.

3
See id. at 4-5.

4
Id. at 7.

5
Id.

6
Id. at 7-8.

7
"Virginio" in some parts of the records.

8
One of the original five (5) accused who died during trial, resulting in the dismissal of the
case against him. (See CA rollo, p. 37.)

9
See rollo, pp. 6 and 8-9.

10
Id. at 3.

11
Id. at 3 and 20.

12
See id. at 9-12.

13
Records, p. 300, including the dorsal portion thereof.

14
CA rollo, pp. 36-99. Penned by Presiding Judge Thelma Canlas Trinidad-Pe Aguirre.

15
See id. at 93-95.

Entitled "AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE

16

PHILIPPINES."

17
CA rollo, pp. 98-99.

18
Id. at 97.

19
Id. at 60.

20
Rollo, pp. 2-25.

21
Id. at 15-16.
22
Id. at 18-19.

23
See id. at 23-24.

24
See id. at 22-24.

People v. Mercado, 400 Phil. 37, 71 (2000). See also People v. Lamsen, G.R. No. 198338,
25

February 20, 2013, 691 SCRA 498, 505-506.

26
See CA Decision; rollo, pp. 16-19.

27
People v. Castro, 434 Phil. 206, 221 (2002).

28
People v. Buntag, 471 Phil. 82, 93 (2004).

29
Rollo, p. 23.

30
"[T]he above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, being
then private persons, did then and there by force and intimidation willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with the use of motor vehicle and superior strength take, carry and deprive
EDWIN NAVARRO Y ONA, of his liberty against his will, for the purpose of extorting ransom
as in fact a demand of ₱15,000,000.00 was made as a condition of the victim’s release and
on the occasion thereof, the death of the victim resulted." (Id. at 3; emphasis and
underscoring supplied).

People v. Quimzon, G.R. No. 133541, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 261, 281, citing People v.
31

Feliciano, 418 Phil. 88, 106 (2001).

32
Supra note 25.

33
Id. at 82-83.

34
Pursuant to Section 3 of RA 9346 which states that "[p]ersons convicted of offenses
punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua,
by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended." (See People v. Tadah, G.R. No. 186226,
February 1, 2012, 664 SCRA 744, 747; see also People v. Lalog, G.R. No. 196753, April 21,
2014.)

35
532 Phil. 414 (2006).

36
Id. at 428.

37
See People v. Gambao, G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013.

38
See People v. Reyes, 600 Phil. 738, 788 (2009).

39
See id. at 787.

40
Peop e v. Dumadag, G.R. No. 176740, June 22, 2011, 652 SCRA 535, 550, citing People
v. Galvez, G.R. No. 181827, February 2, 2011, 641SCRA472, 485.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 207950 September 22, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARK JASON CHAVEZ y BITANCOR alias "NOY", Accused-appellant.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Every conviction for any crime must be accompanied by the required moral certainty that the
accused has committed the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must prove
"the offender's intent to take personal property before the killing, regardless of the time when the
homicide [was] actually carried out"1 !n order to convict for the crime of robbery with homicide. The
accused may nevertheless be convi·cted of the separate crime of homicide once the prosecution
establishes beyond reasonable doubt the accused's culpability for the victim's death.

In the information dated November 8, 2006, Mark Jason Chavez y Bitancor (Chavez) was charged
with the crime of robbery with homicide:

That on or about October 28, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and means of force, violence and
intimidation upon the person of ELMER DUQUE y OROS, by then and there, with intent to kill,
stabbing the latter repeatedly with a kitchen knife, thereby inflicting upon him mortal stab wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter, and on the saidoccasion or by
reason thereof, accused took, robbed and carried away the following:

One (1) Unit Nokia Cellphone

One (1) Unit Motorola Cellphone

Six (6) pcs. Ladies Ring

Two (2) pcs. Necklace

One (1) pc. Bracelet All of undetermined value and undetermined amount of money, all belonging to
said ELMER DUQUE y OROS @ BARBIE to the damage and prejudice of the said owner/or his
heirs, in the said undetermined amount in Philippines currency.

Contrary to law.2

Chavez pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on December 4, 2006. The court proceeded to
trial. The prosecution presented Angelo Peñamante (Peñamante), P/Chief Inspector Sonia Cayrel
(PCI Cayrel), SPO3 Steve Casimiro (SPO3 Casimiro), Dr. Romeo T. Salen (Dr. Salen), and
Raymund Senofa as witnesses. On the other hand, the defense presented Chavez as its sole
witness.3

The facts as found by the lower court are as follows.

On October 28, 2006, Peñamante arrived home at around 2:45 a.m., coming from work as a janitor
in Eastwood City.4 When he was about to go inside his house at 1326 Tuazon Street, Sampaloc,
Manila, he saw a person wearing a black, long-sleeved shirt and black pants and holding something
while leaving the house/parlor of Elmer Duque (Barbie) at 1325 Tuazon Street, Sampaloc, Manila,
just six meters across Peñamante’s house.5

There was a light at the left side of the house/parlor of Barbie, his favorite haircutter, so Peñamante
stated that he was able to see the face of Chavez and the clothes he was wearing.6

Chavez could not close the door of Barbie’s house/parlor so he simply walked away. However, he
dropped something that he was holding and fell down when he stepped on it.7 He walked away after,
and Peñamante was not able to determine what Chavez was holding.8 Peñamante then entered his
house and went to bed.9
Sometime after 10:00 a.m., the Scene of the Crime Office (SOCO) team arrived, led by PCI Cayrel.
She was joined by PO3 Rex Maglansi (photographer), PO1 Joel Pelayo (sketcher), and a fingerprint
technician.10 They conducted an initial survey of the crime scene after coordinating with SPO3
Casimiro of the Manila Police District Homicide Section.11

The team noted that the lobby and the parlor were in disarray, and they found Barbie’s dead body
inside.12 They took photographs and collected fingerprints and other pieces of evidence such as the
155 pieces of hair strands found clutched in Barbie’s left hand.13 They documented the evidence then
turned them over to the Western Police District Chemistry Division. Dr. Salen was called to conduct
an autopsy on the body.14

At around 11:00 a.m., Peñamante’s landlady woke him up and told him that Barbie was found dead
at 9:00 a.m. He then informed his landlady that he saw Chavez leaving Barbie’s house at 2:45 a.m.15

At around 1:00 p.m., Dr. Salen conducted an autopsy on the body and found that the time of death
was approximately 12 hours prior to examination.16 There were 22 injuries on Barbie’s body — 21
were stab wounds in various parts of the body caused by a sharp bladed instrument, and one
incised wound was caused by a sharp object.17 Four (4) of the stab wounds were considered fatal.18

The next day, the police invited Peñamante to the Manila Police Station to give a statement.
Peñamante described to SPO3 Casimiro the physical appearance of the person he saw leaving
Barbie’s parlor.19

Accompanied by his mother, Chavez voluntarily surrendered on November 5, 2006 to SPO3

Casimiro at the police station.20 Chavez was then 22 years old.21 His mother told the police that she
wanted to help her son who might be involved in Barbie’s death.22

SPO3 Casimiro informed them ofthe consequences in executing a written statement without the
assistance of a lawyer. However, Chavez’s mother still gave her statement, subscribed by
Administrative Officer Alex Francisco.23She also surrendered two cellular phones owned by Barbie
and a baseball cap owned by Chavez.24

The next day, Peñamante was again summoned by SPO3 Casimiro to identify from a line-up the
person he saw leaving Barbie’s house/parlor that early morning of October 28, 2006.25 Peñamante
immediately pointed to and identified Chavez and thereafter executed his written statement.26 There
were no issues raised in relation to the line-up.

On the other hand, Chavez explained that he was athome on October 27, 2006, exchanging text
messages withBarbie on whether they could talk regarding their misunderstanding.27 According to
Chavez, Barbie suspected that he was having a relationship with Barbie’s boyfriend, Maki.28 When
Barbie did not reply to his text message, Chavez decided to go to Barbie’s house at around 1:00
a.m. of October 28, 2006.29 Barbie allowed him to enter the house, and he went home after.30

On August 19, 2011, the trial court31 found Chavez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery with homicide:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds accused MARK JASON CHAVEZ y
BITANCOR @ NOY GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicideand
hereby sentences him to suffer the penaltyof reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

Further, he is ordered to pay tothe heirs of the victim, Elmer Duque y Oros the sum of 75,000.00 as
death indemnity and another ₱75,000 for moral damages.

SO ORDERED.32

On February 27, 2013, the Court of Appeals33 affirmed the trial court’s decision.34 Chavez then filed a
notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 124, Section 13(c) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, elevating the case with this court.35

This court notified the parties tosimultaneously submit supplemental briefs if they so desire. Both
parties filed manifestationsthat they would merely adopt their briefs before the Court of Appeals.36

In his brief, Chavez raised presumption of innocence, considering that the trial court "overlooked and
misapplied some facts of substance that could have altered its verdict."37 He argued that since the
prosecution relied on purely circumstantial evidence, conviction must rest on a moral certainty of
guilt on the part of Chavez.38 In this case, even if Peñamante saw him leaving Barbie’s house,
Peñamante did not specify whether Chavez was acting suspiciously at that time.39
As regards his mother’s statement,Chavez argued its inadmissibility as evidence since his mother
was not presented before the court to give the defense an opportunity for cross-examination.40 He
added that affidavits are generally rejected as hearsay unless the affiant appears before the court
and testifies on it.41

Chavez argued that based on Dr. Salen’s findings, Barbie’s wounds were caused by two sharp
bladed instruments, thus, it was possible that there were two assailants.42 It was also possible that
the assailants committed the crime after Chavez had left Barbie’s house.43 Given that many possible
explanations fit the facts,that which is consistent with the innocence of Chavez should be favored.44

On the other hand, plaintiff-appellee argued that direct evidence is not indispensable when the
prosecution isestablishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt of Chavez.45 The circumstantial evidence
presented before the trial court laid down an unbroken chain of events leading to no other conclusion
than Chavez’s acts of killing and robbing Barbie.46

On the argument made by Chavez that his mother’s statement was inadmissible as hearsay,
plaintiff-appellee explained that the trial court did not rely on, and did not even refer to, any of the
statements made by Chavez’s mother.47

Finally, insofar as Chavez’s submission that Dr. Salen testified on the possibility that there weretwo
assailants, Dr. Salen equally testified on the possibility that there was only one.48 The sole issue now
before us iswhether Chavez is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide.

We reverse the decisions of the lower courts, but find Chavez guilty of the crime of homicide.

Chavez was found guilty of the specialcomplex crime of robbery with homicide under the Revised
Penal Code:

Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. – Any person guilty of
robberywith the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:

1) The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the
crime of homicide shall have been committed. . . .49

Chavez invokes his constitutional right to be presumed innocent, especially since the prosecution’s
evidence is purely circumstantial and a conviction must stand on a moral certainty of guilt.50

The Rules of Court expressly provides that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to establish
guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the conviction of an accused:

SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. – Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for

conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.51

The lower courts found that the circumstantial evidence laid down by the prosecution led to no other
conclusion than the commission by Chavez of the crime charged:

In the instant case, while there is no direct evidence showing that the accused robbed and fatally
stabbed the victim to death, nonetheless, the Court believes that the following circumstances form a
solid and unbroken chain of events that leads to the conclusion, beyond reasonable doubt, that
accused Mark Jason Chavez y Bitancor @ Noy committed the crime charged, vi[z]: first, it has been
duly established, as the accused himself admits, that he went to the parlor of the victim at around
1:00 o’clock in the morning of 28 October 2006 and the accused was allowed by the victim to get
inside his parlor as it serves as his residence too; second, the victim’s two (2) units of cellular
phones (one red Nokia with model 3310 and the other one is a black Motorola) without sim cards
and batteries, which were declared as partof the missing personal belongings of the victim, were
handled to SPO3 Steve Casimiro by the mother of the accused, Anjanette C. Tobias on 05
November 2006 when the accused voluntarily surrendered, accompanied by his mother, at the
police station: third, on 28 October 2006 at about 2:45 o’clock in the morning, witness Angelo
Peñamante, who arrived from his work, saw a person holding and/or carrying something and about
toget out of the door of the house of the victim located at 1325 G. Tuazon Street, Sampaloc, Manila,
and trying to close the door but the said person was not able to successfully do so. He later
positively identified the said person at the police station as MARK JASON CHAVEZ y BITANCOR @
NOY, the accused herein; and finally, the time when the accused decided on 27 October 2006 to
patch up things with the victim and the circumstances (Dr. Salen’s testimony that the body of the
victim was dead for more or less twelve (12) hours) when the latter was discovered fatally killed on
28 October 2006 is not a co-incidence.

The prosecution has equally established, based on the same circumstantial evidence, that the
accused had indeed killed the victim.52

Factual findings by the trial court on its appreciation of evidence presented by the parties, and even
its conclusions derived from the findings, are generally given great respect and conclusive effect by
this court, more so when these factual findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals.53

Nevertheless, this court has held that "[w]hat is imperative and essential for a conviction for the
crime of robbery with homicide is for the prosecution to establish the offender’s intent to take
personal property before the killing, regardless of the time when the homicide is actually carried
out."54 In cases when the prosecution failed to conclusively prove that homicide was committed for
the purpose of robbing the victim, no accused can be convicted of robbery with homicide.55

The circumstantial evidence relied on by the lower courts, as quoted previously, do not satisfactorily
establish an original criminal design by Chavez to commit robbery.

At most, the intent to take personal property was mentioned by Chavez’s mother in her statement as
follows:

Na si Noy na aking anak ay nagtapat sa akin tungkol sa kanyang kinalaman sa pagkamatay ni

Barbie at kasabay ang pagbigay sa akin ng dalawang (2) piraso ng cellular phones na pag/aari [sic]
ni Barbie na kanyang kinuha pagka/tapos [sic] ng insidente.

Na ipinagtapat din sa akin ni Noy na ang ginamit na panaksak na isang kutsilyo na gamit namin
sabahay ay inihulog niya sa manhole sa tapat ng aming bahay matapos ang insidente.

At ang isang piraso ng kwintas na kinuha rin nya mula kay Barbie ay naisanla niya sa isang
sanglaan sa Quezon City.

Na ang suot niyang tsinelas ay nag/iwan [sic] ng bakas sa pinangyarihan ng insidente. At sya rin ang
nakasugat sa kanyang sariling kamay ng [sic] maganap ang insidente.

Na sinabi niya sa akin na wala siyang intensyon na patayin [sic] si Barbie kundi ay pagnakawan
lamang.56(Emphasis supplied)

However, this statement is considered as hearsay, with no evidentiary value, since Chavez’s mother
was never presented as a witness during trial to testify on her statement.57

An original criminal design to take personal property is also inconsistent with the infliction of no less
than 21 stab wounds in various parts of Barbie’s body.58

The number of stab wounds inflicted on a victim has been used by this court in its determination of
the nature and circumstances of the crime committed.

This may show an intention to ensure the death of the victim. In a case where the victim sustained a
total of 36 stab wounds in his front and back, this court noted that "this number of stab wounds
inflicted on the victim is a strong indication that appellants made sure of the success of their effort to
kill the victim without risk to themselves."59

This court has also looked into the number and gravity of the wounds sustained by the victim as
indicative ofthe accused’s intention to kill the victim and not merely to defend himself or others.60

In the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, homicide is committed in order "(a) to
facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the
loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses to the
commission of the crime."61 21 stab wounds would be overkill for these purposes. The sheer number
of stab wounds inflicted on Barbie makes it difficult to conclude an original criminal intent of merely
taking Barbie’s personal property.
In People v. Sanchez,62 this court found accused-appellant liable for the separate crimes of homicide
and theft for failure of the prosecution to conclusively prove that homicide was committed for the
purpose of robbing the victim:

But from the record of this case, we find that the prosecution palpably failed to substantiate its
allegations of the presence of criminal design to commit robbery, independent ofthe intent to commit
homicide. There is no evidence showing that the death of the victim occurred by reason or on the
occasion of the robbery. The prosecution was silent on accused-appellant’s primary criminal intent.
Did he intend to kill the victim in order to steal the cash and the necklace? Or did he intend only to
kill the victim, the taking of the latter’s personal property being merely an afterthought? Where the
homicide is notconclusively shown to have been committed for the purpose of robbing the victim, or
where the robbery was not proven at all, there can be no conviction for robo con homicidio.63

II

This court finds that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Chavez for the
separate crime of homicide.

First, the alibi of Chavez still placeshim at the scene of the crime that early morning of October 28,
2006.

The victim, Elmer Duque, went by the nickname, Barbie, and he had a boyfriend named Maki.
Nevertheless, Chavez described his friendship with Barbie to be "[w]e’re like brothers."64 He testified
during cross-examination that he was a frequent visitor at Barbie’s parlor that he cannot recall how
many times he had been there.65 This speaks of a close relationship between Chavez and Barbie.

Chavez testified that he went to Barbie’s house at 1:00 in the morning of October 28, 2006 to settle
his misunderstanding with Barbie who suspected him of having a relationship with Barbie’s
boyfriend:

MARK JASON CHAVEZ was a friend to the victim, Barbie, for almost three (3) years and the two (2)
treated each other like brothers. The latter, however, suspected Mark Jason of having a relationship
with Maki Añover, Barbie’s boyfriend for six (6) months, which resulted in a misunderstanding
between them. Mark Jason tried to patch things up with Barbie so thru a text message he sent on
the evening of 27 October 2006, he asked if they could talk. When Barbie did not reply, he decided
to visit him at his parlor at around 1:00 o’clock in the morning. Barbie let him in and they tried to talk
about the situation between them. Their rift, however, was not fixed so he decided to gohome. Later
on, he learned that Barbie was already dead.66

This court has considered motive as one of the factors in determining the presence of an intent to
kill,67 and a confrontation with the victim immediately prior to the victim’sdeath has been considered
as circumstantial evidence for homicide.68

Second, the number of stab wounds inflicted on Barbie strengthens an intention to kill and ensures
his death.The prosecution proved that there was a total of 22 stab wounds found indifferent parts of
Barbie’s body and that a kitchen knife was found in a manhole near Chavez’s house at No. 536, 5th
Street, San Beda, San Miguel, Manila.69

The Court of Appeals’ recitation of facts quoted the statement of Chavez’s mother. This provides,
among others, her son’s confession for stabbing Barbie and throwing the knife used in a manhole
near their house:

Na si Noy na aking anak ay nagtapat sa akin tungkol sa kanyang kinalaman sa pagkamatay ni

Barbie at kasabay ang pagbigay sa akin ng dalawang (2) piraso ng cellular phones na pag/aari [sic]
ni Barbie na kanyang kinuha pagka/tapos [sic] ng insidente.

Na ipinagtapat din sa akin ni Noy na ang ginamit na panaksak na isang kutsilyo na gamit namin sa
bahay ay inihulog niya sa manhole sa tapat ng aming bahay matapos ang insidente.

At ang isang piraso ng kwintas nakinuha rin nya mula kay Barbie ay naisanla niya sa isang sanglaan
sa Quezon City.

Na ang suot niyang tsinelas ay nag/iwan [sic] ng bakas sa pinangyarihan ng insidente. At sya rin ang
nakasugat sa kanyang sariling kamay ng [sic] maganap ang insidente.

Na sinabi niya sa akin na wala siyang intensyon na patayin [sic] si Barbie kundi ay pagnakawan
lamang.70(Emphasis supplied)
Even if this statement was not taken into account for being hearsay, further investigation conducted
still led tothe unearthing of the kitchen knife with a hair strand from a manhole near Chavez’s
house.71

Third, no reason exists to disturb the lower court’s factual findings giving credence to 1)
Peñamante’s positive identification of Chavez as the person leaving Barbie’s house that early
morning of October 28, 200672 and 2) the medico-legal’s testimony establishing Barbie’s time of
death as 12 hours prior to autopsy at 1:00 p.m., thus, narrowing the time of death to approximately
1:00 a.m. of the same day, October 28, 2006.73

All these circumstances taken together establish Chavez’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of homicide.

III

There is a disputable presumption that "a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of
a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, thatthing which a person
possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him."74 Thus, when a person has
possession of a stolen property, hecan be disputably presumed as the author of the theft.75

Barbie’s missing cellular phones were turned over to the police by Chavez’s mother, and this was
never denied by the defense.76 Chavez failed to explain his possession of these cellular
phones.77 The Court of Appeals discussed that "a cellular phone has become a necessary
accessory, no person would part with the same for a long period of time, especially in this case as it
involves an expensive cellular phone unit, as testified by Barbie’s kababayan, witness Raymond
Seno[f]a."78

However, with Chavez and Barbie’s close relationship having been established, there is still a
possibilitythat these cellphones were lent to Chavez by Barbie.

The integrity of these cellphones was also compromised when SPO3 Casimiro testified during cross-
examination that the police made no markings on the cellphones, and their SIM cards were
removed.

Q: But you did not place any marking on the cellphone, Mr. witness?

A: No, sir.

Atty. Villanueva: No further questions, Your Honor.

Court: When you received the items,there were no markings also?

Witness: No, Your Honor.

Court: The cellular phones, were they complete with the sim cards and the batteries?

A: There’s no sim card, Your Honor.

Q; No sim card and batteries?

A; Yes, Your Honor.

Q: No markings when you receivedand you did not place markings when these were turned over to
the Public Prosecutor, no markings?

A: No markings, Your Honor.79

The other missing items were no longer found, and no evidence was presented to conclude that
these weretaken by Chavez. The statement of Chavez’s mother mentioned that her son pawned one
of Barbie’s necklaces ["At ang isang piraso ng kwintas na kinuha rin nya mula kay Barbie ay
naisanla niya sa isang sanglaan sa Quezon City"80 ], but, as earlier discussed, this statement is mere
hearsay.

In any case, the penalty for the crime of theft is based on the value of the stolen items.81 The lower
court made no factual findings on the value of the missing items enumerated in the information —
one Nokia cellphone unit, one Motorola cellphone unit, six pieces ladies ring, two pieces necklace,
and one bracelet.
At most, prosecution witness Raymund Senofa, a town mate of Barbie, testified that he could not
remember the model of the Motorola fliptype cellphone he saw used by Barbie but that he knew it
was worth 19,000.00 more or less.82 This amounts to hearsay as he has no personal knowledge on
how Barbie acquired the cellphone or for how much.

These circumstances create reasonable doubt on the allegation that Chavez stole the missing
personal properties of Barbie.

It is contrary to human nature for a mother to voluntarily surrender her own son and confess that her
son committed a heinous crime.

Chavez was 22 years old, no longer a minor, when he voluntarily went to the police station on
November 5, 2006 for investigation,83 and his mother accompanied him. SPO3 Casimiro testified that
the reason she surrendered Chavez was because "she wanted to help her son"84 and "perhaps the
accused felt that [the investigating police] are getting nearer to him."85 Nevertheless, during cross-
examination, SPO3 Casimiro testified:

Q: Regarding the mother, Mr. witness, did I get you right that when the mother brought her son,
according to you she tried to help her son, is that correct?

A: That is the word I remember, sir.

Q: Of course, said help you do notknow exactly what she meant by that?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: It could mean that she is trying to help her son to be cleared from this alleged crime, Mr. witness?

A: Maybe, sir.86

Chavez’s mother "turned-over (2) units of Cellular-phones and averred that her son Mark Jason told
her that said cellphones belong[ed] to victim Barbie. . . [that] NOY was wounded in the incident and
that the fatal weapon was put in a manhole infront[sic] of their residence."87 The records are silent on
whether Chavez objected to his mother’s statements. The records also do not show why the police
proceeded to get his mother’s testimony as opposed to getting Chavez’s testimony on his voluntary
surrender.

At most, the lower court found thatChavez’s mother was informed by the investigating officer at the
police station of the consequences in executing a written statement withoutthe assistance of a
lawyer.88 She proceeded to give her statement dated November 7, 2006 on her son’s confession of
the crime despite the warning.89 SPO3 Casimiro testified during his cross-examination:

Q: Do you remember if anybody assisted this Anjanette Tobias when she executed this Affidavit you
mentioned?

A: She was with some neighbors.

Atty. Villanueva

Q: How about a lawyer, Mr. Witness?

A: None, sir.

Q: So, in other words, no lawyer informed her of the consequence of her act of executing an
Affidavit?

A: We somehow informed her of what will be the consequences of that statement, sir.

Q: So, you and your police officer colleague at the time?

A: Yes, sir.90

The booking sheet and arrest report states that "when [the accused was] appraised [sic] of his
constitutional rights and nature of charges imputed against him, accused opted to remain
silent."91 This booking sheet and arrest report is also dated November 7, 2006, or two days after
Chavez, accompanied by his mother, had voluntarily gone to the police station.
The right to counsel upon being questioned for the commission of a crime is part of the Miranda
rights, which require that:

. . . (a) any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain silent; (b) anything he says
can and will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has the right totalk to an attorney before
being questioned and to have his counsel present when being questioned; and (d) if he cannot
afford an attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he so desires.92

The Miranda rightswere incorporated in our Constitution but were modified to include the statement
thatany waiver of the right to counsel must be made "in writing and in the presence of counsel."93

The invocation of these rights applies during custodial investigation, which begins "when the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun tofocus on a
particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds
questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements."94

It may appear that the Miranda rightsonly apply when one is "taken into custody by the police," such
as during an arrest. These rights are intended to protect ordinary citizens from the pressures of a
custodial setting:

The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or
trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the "inherently compelling pressures" "generated by
the custodial setting itself," "which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist," and as much as
possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact,
whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by in-
custody questioning of persons suspected of misdemeanours as they are by questioning of persons
suspected of felonies.95 (Emphasis supplied)

Republic Act No. 743896 expanded the definition of custodial investigation to "include the practice
ofissuing an ‘invitation’ to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected
to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the ‘inviting’ officer for any violation of law."97

This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police officer must be apprised of
their Miranda rights. For one, the same pressures of a custodial setting exist in this scenario. Chavez
is also being questioned by an investigating officer ina police station. As an additional pressure, he
may have been compelled to surrender by his mother who accompanied him to the police station.

This court, thus, finds that the circumstantial evidence sufficiently proves beyond reasonable doubt
that Chavez is guilty of the crime of homicide, and not the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide.

On the service of Chavez’s sentence, the trial court issued the order dated November 14, 2006 in
that "as prayed for, the said police officer is hereby ordered to immediately commit accused, Mark
Jason Chavez y Bitancor @ Noy to the Manila City Jail and shall be detained thereat pending trial of
this case and/or untilfurther orders from this court."98 The order of commitment dated September 28,
2011 was issued after his trial court conviction in the decision dated August 19, 2011.

Chavez has been under preventive detention since November 14, 2006, during the pendency of the
trial. This period may be credited in the service of his sentence pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised
1âwphi1

Penal Code, as amended:

ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment.– Offenders or
accused who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their
sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have undergone
preventive imprisonment if the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing after being informed of
the effects thereof and with the assistance of counsel to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:

1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any
crime; and

2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to
surrender voluntarily.

If the detention prisoner does notagree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon
convicted prisoners, he shall do so in writing with the assistance of a counsel and shall be credited in
the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has undergone preventive
imprisonment.
Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be deducted from thirty
(30) years.

Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to the possible
maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is not
yet terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the trial
thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review. Computation of preventive
imprisonment for purposes of immediate release under this paragraph shall be the actual period of
detention with good conduct time allowance: Provided, however, That if the accused is absent
without justifiable cause at any stage of the trial, the court may motu proprio order the rearrest of the
accused: Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and persons charged
with heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act. In case the maximum penalty to
which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of
preventive imprisonment.99

Finally, this court laments thatobject evidence retrieved from the scene of the crime were not
properly handled, and no results coming from the forensic examinations were presented to the court.
There was no examination of the fingerprints found on the kitchen knife retrieved from the manhole
near the house of Chavez.100 There were no results of the DNA examination done on the hair strands
found with the knife and those in the clutches of the victim. Neither was there a comparison made
between these strands of hair and Chavez’s. There was no report regarding any finding of traces of
blood on the kitchen knife recovered, and no matching with the blood of the victim or Chavez’s. The
results of this case would have been rendered with more confidence at the trial court level had all
these been done. In many cases, eyewitness testimony may not be as reliable — or would have
been belied — had object evidence been properly handled and presented.

We deal with the life of a personhere. Everyone’s life — whether it be the victim’s or the accused’s
— is valuable. The Constitution and our laws hold these lives in high esteem. Therefore,
investigations such as these should have been attended with greaterprofessionalism and more
dedicated attention to detail by our law enforcers. The quality of every conviction depends on the
evidence gathered, analyzed, and presented before the courts. The public’s confidence on our
criminal justice system depends on the quality of the convictions we promulgate against the
accused. All those who participate in our criminal justice system should realize this and take this to
heart.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Mark Jason Chavez
y Bitancor alias "Noy" is hereby declared GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt of the separate and
distinct crime of HOMICIDE. Inasmuch as the commission of the crime was not attended by any
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, accused-appellant Chavez is hereby SENTENCEDto suffer
an indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum,
to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

Accused-appellant Chavez's period of detention shall be deducted if consistent with Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A TI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
358 Phil. 527, 537 (1998) [Per J. Quisumbing, First Division].

2
Rollo, pp. 3 and 31.

3
CA rollo, p. 32.

4
Rollo, p. 4; CA rollo, p. 33.

5
Id.

6
CA rollo, p. 33.

7
Rollo, p. 4; CA rollo, p. 33.

8
Id.

9
CA rollo, p. 33.

10
Rollo, p. 4.

11
Id.

12
Id.

13
Id.

14
Id.

15
Rollo, p. 5; CA rollo, p. 33.

16
Rollo, p. 5.

17
Id.

18
Id.

19
Rollo, p. 6; CA rollo, p. 33.

20
Rollo, p. 5. CA rollo, pp. 33–34.

21
RTC records, p. 4.

22
Rollo, p. 6; CA rollo, p. 34.

23
Id.

24
Rollo, p. 7; CA rollo, p. 34.

25
Id.

26
Id.

27
Rollo, p. 9; CA rollo, p. 34.
28
Id.

29
Id.

30
Id.

CA rollo, pp. 31–48. The decision was penned by Presiding Judge Hon. Rosalyn D. Mislos-
31

Loja of the Regional Trial Court Branch 41, Manila.

32
Id. at 47–48.

Id. at 2–14. Court of Appeals Eighth (8th) Division, penned by Associate Justice Agnes
33

Reyes-Carpio and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente and

Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla.

34
Rollo, p. 13.

35
Id. at 15.

36
Id. at 24 and 27.

37
CA rollo, p. 71.

38
Id.

39
Id.

40
Id. at 72.

41
Id.

42
Id. at 72–73.

43
Id. at 73.

44
Id.

45
Id. at 115, citing People v. Labagala, G.R. No. 184603, August 2, 2010, 626 SCRA 267
[Per J. Perez, First Division].

46
Id. at 115–116.

47
Id. at 116–117.

48
Id. at 117–118.

49
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 294.

50
CA rollo, p. 71.

RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, sec. 4. See People v. Lamsen et al., G.R. No. 198338,
51

February 20, 2013, 691 SCRA 498, 507 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].

52
Rollo, p. 12; CA rollo, pp. 45–46.

53
People v. Musa, 609 Phil. 396, 410 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

54
People v. Sanchez, 358 Phil. 527, 537 (1998) [Per J. Quisumbing, First Division].

Id. at 538, citing People v. Salazar, 342 Phil. 745, 765 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third
55

Division], citing U.S. v. Baguiao, 4 Phil. 110, 112 (1905) [Per J. Torres, En Banc].

56
Rollo, pp. 6–7.

People v. Sorrel, 343 Phil. 890, 898 (1997) [Per J. Vitug, First Division], citing Osias v.
57

Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 107 (1996) [Per J. Hermosisima, Jr., En Banc], citing People v.
Santos, 224 Phil. 129 (1985) [Per J. Escolin, En Banc]; People v. Lavarias, 132 Phil. 766
(1968) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc]; People v. Carlos, 47 Phil. 626 (1925) [Per J. Ostrand, En
Banc].

58
Rollo, p. 5.

59
People v. Paragua, 326 Phil. 923, 930 (1996) [Per J. Hermosisima, Jr., First Division].

See People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 190340, July 24, 2013, 702 SCRA 204, 216 [Per J. Del
60

Castillo, Second Division], citing People v. Pateo, G.R. No. 156786, June 3, 2004, 430
SCRA 609, 617 [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division]; People v. Bracia, G.R. No. 174477,
October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 351, 370–371 [Per. J. Brion, Second Division]; Casitas v.
People, 466 Phil. 861, 870 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].

61
People v. Quemeggen, 611 Phil. 487 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division]. This was
cited in the prosecution’s memorandum with the trial court, RTC records, p. 348.

62
358 Phil. 527 (1998) [Per J. Quisumbing, First Division].

63
Id. at 538.

64
TSN, February 14, 2011, p. 6.

65
TSN, March 7, 2011, p. 9.

66
Brief for accused-appellant, CA rollo, pp. 69–70, citing TSN, February 14, 2011, pp. 4–9.

67
See Serrano v. People, G.R. No. 175023, July 5, 2010 [Per J. Brion, Third Division], citing
Rivera v. People, 515 Phil. 824, 832 (2006) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., First Division], citing People
v. Delim, 444 Phil. 430, 450 (2003) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc].

68
See People v. Sanchez, 358 Phil. 527, 535 (1998) [Per J. Quisumbing, First Division].

69
Rollo, pp. 5 and 7.

70
Id. at 6–7.

71
Id. at 7.

72
RTC records, p. 46, decision.

73
Rollo, p. 10.

74
REV. RULES ON EVIDENCE, rule 131, sec. 2(j).

See Lozano v. People, G.R. 165582, July 9, 2010, 624 SCRA 596, 603 [Per J. Mendoza,
75

Third Division].

76
Rollo, p. 10.

77
Id. at 10.

78
Id. at 10–11.

79
TSN, June 17, 2009, pp. 23–24.

80
Rollo, p. 5.

81
See REV. PENAL CODE, art. 309.

82
RTC records, p. 42.

83
TSN, February 14, 2011, p. 9.

84
TSN, June 17, 2009, p. 13.

85
Id.
86
Id. at 21.

87
RTC records, p. 9.

88
Rollo, p. 6.

89
Id.

90
TSN, November 5, 2008, pp. 19–20.

91
RTC records, p. 20.

92
People v. Mojello,468 Phil. 944, 952–953 (2004) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En Banc].

CONST., art. III, sec. 12; People v. Mojello, 468 Phil. 944, 953 (2004) [Per J. Ynares-
93

Santiago, En Banc].

94
People v. Lara, G.R. No. 199877, August 13, 2012, 678 SCRA 332, 348 [Per J. Reyes,
Second Division],citing People v. Amestuzo, 413 Phil. 500, 508–509 (2001) [Per J. Kapunan,
First Division].

Luz v. People, G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012, 667 SCRA 421, 433–434 [Per C.J.
95

Sereno, Second Division], citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).

96
Rep. Act No. 7438 (1992), An Act Defining Certain Rights of Person Arrested, Detained or
Under Custodial Investigation as well as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining, and
Investigating Officers, and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof.

97
Rep. Act No. 7438 (1992), sec. 2.

98
RTC records, p. 23.

99
REV. PENAL CODE, sec. 29, as amended by Rep. Act No. 10592 (2013).

TSN, June 17, 2009, pp. 10–11. SPO3 Casimiro testified that he, as well as Police
100

Inspector Ishmael Dela Cruz who turned over the knife to him, held the knife with their bare
hands.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 201565 October 13, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR., MAYOR REINARIO "REY" ESTONILO, EDELBRANDO
ESTONILO a.k.a. "EDEL EUTIQUIANO a.k.a. ESTONILO," ITCOBANES "NONONG NONOY
ITCOBANES," ESTONILO-at large, TITING GALI BOOC-at large, ITCOBANES-at ORLANDO
large, TAGALOG MATERDAM a.k.a. "NEGRO MATERDAM," and CALVIN DELA CRUZ a.k.a.
"BULLDOG DELA CRUZ," Accused,
vs.
EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR., MAYOR REINARIO "REY" ESTONILO, EDE LB RANDO
ESTONILO a.k.a. "EDEL ESTONILO," EUTIQUIANO ITCOBANES a.k.a. "NONONG
ITCOBANES," and CALVIN DELA CRUZ a.k.a. "BULLDOG DELA CRUZ," Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

In this appeal, accused-appellants Ex-Mayor Carlos Estonilo, Sr. (Carlos, Sr.), Mayor Reinario
Estonilo (Rey), Edelbrando Estonilo (Edel), Eutiquiano Itcobanes (Nonong), and Calvin Dela Cruz
(Bulldog) seek liberty from the judgment1 of conviction rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 45, Manila, which found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime ofMurder
with Direct Assault in Criminal Case No. 05-238607.

The above-named accused-appellants, along with four others, namely: Nonoy Estonilo
(Nonoy),2 Titing Booc (Titing),3 and Gali Itcobanes (Gali),4 and Orlando Tagalog Materdam
(Negro)5 were all charged in an Information dated July 30, 2004 that reads:

That on or about April 5, 2004 at 8:00 o’clock in the evening thereof, at Celera Elementary
School,6 Brgy. Villa Inocencio, Municipality of Placer, Province of Masbate, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, armed with
firearms, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with evident premeditation and
treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one
FLORO A. CASAS, while in the performance of his duty being the District Supervisor of public
schools, hitting the latter on the different parts of his body which caused his instantaneous death.7

On November 8, 2005, the prosecutor filed an Amended Information,8 which provides:

That on or about April 5, 2004, at Celera Elementary School, Brgy. Villa Inocencio, Municipality of
Placer, Province of Masbate, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court of
Masbate, the above-named accused EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR. and MAYOR
REINARIO "REY" ESTONILO, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, with
intent to kill, and with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously induce their co-accused, EDELBRANDO ESTONILO AL[I]AS "EDEL ESTONILO[,] "
EUTIQUIANO ITCOBANES AL[I]AS "NONONG ITCOBANES[,] " NONOY ESTONILO, TITING
BOOC, GALI ITCOBANES, ORLANDO MATERDAM Y TAGALOG ALIAS "NEGRO MATERDAM[,]"
[and] CALVIN DELA CRUZ AL[I]AS "BULLDOG DELA CRUZ[,]" who wereall armed with firearms, to
attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one FLORO A. CASAS, while in the
performance of his duty being a District Supervisor of public schools, by then and there shooting the
latter, hitting said FLORO A. CASAS on the differentparts of his body which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death thereafter.9 When they were arraigned on November 9, 2005, the
accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. On the same date, the RTC issued a
pre-trial order which stated, among others:

a) Upon request by the prosecution, the defense admitted the following:

1. The identities of the five (5) accused present;

2. As to the jurisdiction of this Court, there was an Order from the Honorable
Supreme Court asto the transfer of venue;

3. The fact of death of Floro A. Casas;

 4. That the victim Floro A. Casas at the time of his death was a District Supervisor of
the Department of Education.

b) However, upon request by the defense, the prosecution did not admit that Ex-Mayor
Carlos Estonilo, Sr. and Mayor Reinario Estonilo were not at the scene ofthe incident during
the incident.10

The prosecution presented nine witnesses, namely: Elsa Q. Casas (Elsa), the victim’s wife; Felix Q.
Casas (Felix), the victim’s son; Dr. Ulysses P. Francisco (Dr. Francisco), the Municipal Health
Officer, Placer, Masbate; Senior Police Officer 4 Restituto L. Lepatan, Sr. (SPO4 Lepatan), Placer
Police Station; Serapion M. Bedrijo (Serapion), employee of Municipal Councilor candidate Boy dela
Pisa; Carlo S. Antipolo (Antipolo), a resident of Placer, Masbate; Diego L.Casas (Diego), cousin of
the victim; Rosalinda V. Dahonan (Rosalinda), a resident of Placer, Masbate; and Servando P.
Rosales (Servando), former employee of Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr.11 The testimonies of the foregoing
witnesses consisted of the following:

Felix narrated that on April 4, 2005,the day before his father, Floro Casas (Floro), was gunned down,
he was with the latter and some teachers at the Celera Inocencio Elementary School, Placer,
Masbate; that they were working on the closing ceremonies to be held the following day; that one
Ranio Morales called on Floro and told him that Mayor Carlos, Sr. wanted to see him at his (Ranio)
house; that Floro and Felix went to see Mayor Carlos, Sr.; that when they saw Mayor Carlos, Sr., he
showed them (Floro and Felix) a program of a celebration of the Federation of 7th Day Adventist that
contained the names of the governor, the congressman, and Placer mayoralty candidate Vicente
Cotero (Cotero), as guests of the said activity; that Felix asked his father why Cotero’s picture was
so big while Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s name was not mentioned in the program; that Floro replied that he
cannot help it because Cotero paid for the program; that the answer angered Mayor Carlos, Sr. and
he scolded Floro; that Mayor Carlos, Sr. said "you are now for Cotero but you’re only Estonilo when
you ask for my signature to sign the voucher. This is up to now thatyou will be the supervisor of
Celera"; that Floro responded "when are you a superintendent when you don’t have any scholastic
standing. Just look if I will still vote for your son"; that Mayor Carlos, Sr. replied "let’s see if you can
still vote"; and that the following day, Floro was shot to death.12

But prior to the April 4, 2005 incident, Felix recounted that on December 10, 2003, upon invitation of
Nonoy, he joined the latter’s group for a drinking spree at a videoke bar; that they talked about the
death of one Titing Villester; that Nonoy told Felix that "brod, do not be afraid, because others are
supposed to be afraid [of] us because they believe that we were the ones who killed Titing Villester"
that afterwards Felix and the group were fetched at the videoke bar by Edel, a messenger of Mayor
Carlos, Sr.; that they were brought to the house of one Bobong Baldecir (a nephew of Mayor Carlos,
Sr.) in Daraga; that uponarriving thereat, Rey uttered "it’s good that Dodong (Felix’s nickname) is
with you; that Nonoy then said "who would not [be] otherwise, his father would be the next victim
after Titing Villester";13 that Rey then turned to Felix and said, "it’s very important that your father is
with us because a District Supervisor has a big [role] in the Comelec’s choice for those teachers who
would become members of the Board of Election Inspectors"; that Felix clarified that Rey was then
the 2004 mayoralty candidate for Placer, Masbate; and that Felix went along with him since he was
in Daraga, the bailiwick of the Estonilos.14

On cross examination, the counsel for the accused tried to discredit Felix by questioning him on why
it took him a long time to execute an affidavit relative to his father’s killing. Felix explained that he
went to Cebu to stay away from Placer, which isunder the Estonilo’s jurisdiction.15 The defense
confronted Felix of a criminal case against him for illegal use of prohibited drugs, for which he was
out on bail.16

On March 28, 2006, the prosecution presented two witnesses, Dr. Ulysses Francisco yPedrano and
SPO4 Restituto Lepatan, Sr. The prosecution and the defense entered into stipulation offacts
relative to their testimonies.

[Stipulation of Facts on Dr. Ulysses P. Francisco’s testimony:]

1. That Dr. Ulysses P. Francisco, a Municipal Health Officer of Placer, Masbate, is expert in
medicine;

2. That he was the one who conducted the Post-Mortem Examination on the dead body of
Floro Casas yBaronda on April 6, 2004 at Katipunan, Placer, Masbate;

3. That in connection with his examination, he prepared the Post Mortem Examination
Report, marked as Exhibit "F," the printed name and signature of Dr. Ulysses P. Francisco,
marked as Exhibit "F-1";
 4. That he also prepared the Certificate of Death, marked as Exhibit "G" and the Sketch of a
Human Body, marked as Exhibit "H";

5. The veracity and truthfulness of the Post-Mortem Findings indicated in the Post-Mortem
Examination Report; and

6. In the course of the examination of the victim, the said witness recovered three slugs: the
1 st slug was marked as Exhibit "I," the fragmented slug as Exhibit "I-1," and the metallic
object consisting of two pieces of Exhibit "I-2."

[Stipulation of Facts on SPO4 Restituto L. Lepatan, Sr.’s testimony:]

1. That there exists a Police Blotter in the Record/Blotter Book of the Placer, Masbate Police
Station relativeto the shooting incident that occurred on April 5, 2004 at Celera Elementary
School. Said Police Blotter was requested to be marked by the prosecution as Exhibit "J";

2. That said witness prepared the Police Report dated April 17, 2004 relative to the blotter
written on the Blotter Book. Said Police Report was requested to be marked as Exhibit "J-1"
and the signature of Sr. Police Officer IV Restituto L. Lepatan, Sr. as Exhibit "J-1-a";

3. The existence of the Police Blotter as appearing in the Blotter Book page number 325.
Said Police Blotter book page 325 was requested to be marked as Exh. "K" and the
bracketed portion thereof as Exh. "K-1."17

According to Dr. Francisco, Floro sustained gunshot wounds caused by more than one firearm
based on the sizes of the slugs recovered and that some of them were fired at close range. The
counsel for the accused waived his cross examination.18

Prosecution witness Serapion testified that while he was printing the name of Municipal Councilor
candidate Boy dela Pisa on the street facing the Celera Elementary School on the night of April 5,
2004, he heard gunshots coming from inside the compound of the school; that after two or three
minutes, he saw more or less six persons coming out of the school; that he was able to identify three
of themas present in the courtroom: Edel, Nonoy, and Nonong; that he saw the six men approach
Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s vehicle, which was parked near the school; that Mayor Carlos, Sr. and Rey came
out of a house nearby; that upon reaching the vehicle, Serapion heard Nonoy say to Mayor Carlos,
Sr. "mission accomplished, sir"; that Mayor Carlos, Sr. ordered Nonoy and his group to escape,
which they did using two motorbikes towards the direction of Cataingan; and thereafter, that Mayor
Carlos, Sr. and Rey drove towards the direction of Daraga.19

During his cross examination, the defense tried to discredit Serapion by confronting him with the fact
thathe has a pending criminal case for frustrated murder and that he was out on bail.20 Antipolo
testified that on April 5, 2004, he was riding his motorcycle and passing by the gate of the Celera
Elementary School when he heard gunshots and someone shouted that Floro was shot; that he
stopped, alighted from his motorcycle, went to the gate, and saw four persons holding short firearms;
that he identified Nonoy and Negro as the two who fired at Floro about seven times; that he
identifiedEdel and Nonong as the two other gun holders; that at that moment, Gali shouted "sir,
that’s enough, escape!"; that Gali was accompanied by someone named Ace, Titing and Bulldog;
that right after Gali shouted for them to escape, all of them hurriedly left the school compound; that
he saw Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s pick-up vehicle arrive soon thereafter; that Mayor Carlos, Sr., Rey and
Negro alighted from the vehicle and watched the proceedings; that he heard Mayor Carlos, Sr. say
"leave it because it’s already dead"; and that afterwards, the police officers arrived.21

In an attempt to discredit Antipolo, the defense counsel confronted him with a criminal case against
him for homicide of one Edgardo Estonilo (brother of accused-appellant Edel) that happened on
October 30, 2005.22

Elsa was presented to testify on the probable motive for the killing of Floro, the circumstances
surrounding the killing and its discovery, their family background, her husband’s line of work, how
she felt on their loss, and the expenses relative to his killing. She testified that she heard there were
people who were jealous of Floro’s position because he could bring voters to his side during election
time;that Placer mayoralty candidate Cotero donated medals for the 2003-2004 closing ceremony of
the entire district of public schools; that during the closing ceremony, the donor’s name was
announced, which angered then Mayor Carlos, Sr.;23 that when Floro was processing a voucher
worth ₱70,000.00, Mayor Carlos, Sr. refused to sign the same and even threw the voucher on the
floor saying "let this be signed by Vicente Cotero"; and that Floro’s cousin, Diego Casas, helped
Floro secure the Mayor’s signature by ensuring Mayor Carlos, Sr. that Floro was for him, and only
then did Mayor Carlos, Sr. agree to sign the voucher.24
Diego L. Casas corroborated Elsa’s testimony relative to the fact that he helped Floro secure Mayor
Carlos, Sr.’s signature on the voucher.25

Rosalinda testified that at 7:00 a.m. on April 10, 2004, Mayor Carlos, Sr. went to her house and told
her thathe would kill her husband following Floro; that she was shocked and scared, thus, she went
to the Placer Police Station and reported the incident; that she went to see her husband, who was
then campaigning for mayoralty candidateCotero, and informed him of what happened; and that she
went to Elsa’shouse and informed the latter of the threat.26

Servando attested that at about 7:00 a.m. on April 1, 2004, he was in the house of Mayor Carlos,Sr.
together with said Mayor, Nonong, Edgar Estonilo, the group of Bulldog, Negro, Alias "S" [Ace],
Rollie, Nonong, Edel, and Gali; that he witnessed Mayor Carlos, Sr. say "ipatumba si Floro Casas";
that Servando later learned thatthe mayor’s men were unsuccessful in their goal because Floro was
no longer in Barangay Taberna, where they intended to execute the mayor’s order;and that Mayor
Carlos, Sr. and his men again planned to kill Floro at Celera Elementary School on April 4, 2004.27

During cross examination, the defense confronted Servando with the latter’s Affidavit of Retraction,
which he executed on June 14, 2004. The affidavit contained a withdrawal of his Sinumpaang
Salaysaytaken on May 30, 2004 at the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) Camp Bonny Serrano, Masbate City relative to the criminal complaint
for direct assault with murder filed against Mayor Carlos, Sr. and his company. He was also asked
about two criminal charges filed against him in Cebu relative toviolation of Republic Act No. 9165,
illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs.28 On re-direct examination, Servando narrated
that Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s nephew, Bobong Baldecir, fetched him from his house and he was brought
to the house of Mayor Carlos, Sr. in Daraga; that from there, he was brought to Atty. Besario in
Cebu; that Atty. Besario informed him about the Affidavit of Retraction that he was supposed to sign,
which he did not understand as it was written in English; and that he clarified that the contents of the
affidavit was not his but those of Bobong.29

The defense on its part called to the witness stand Jesus Baldecir, Jr. (Jesus/Bobong), Quirino D.
Calipay (Quirino), and the five accused-appellants.

Jesus denied Servando’s allegation that he (Jesus) forced him to sign the Affidavit of Retraction.
Jesus narrated that Servando gave word that he (Servando) wanted to meet him (Jesus); that upon
their meeting, Servando told him that he wanted to retract his sworn statement because Mayor
Carlos, Sr. and his company did nothing wrong; that Jesus, Servando and Servando’s wife went to
Cebu to meet Atty. Besario; that while traveling, Servando told him that was evading the men of
Governor Go, Vicente Cotero and Casas because he feared for his life; that during the meeting Atty.
Besario prepared the affidavit and translated it to Cebuano dialect; that afterwards, Jesus, Servando
and Servando’s wife went to the Capitol so that Servando could sign it before the prosecutor; that
Jesus, Atty. Besario, Servado and his wife, and Dante Estonilo (another nephew of Mayor Carlos)
went to Manila to meet with the media; that the media asked Servando whether he was forced to
sign, or was given money or reward to sign the affidavit of retraction, Servando replied in the
negative; and that the purpose of the press meeting was to present Servando and show that he was
not kidnapped.30

But during his cross examination, Jesus admitted that his nickname was Bobong, and that Mayor
Carlos, Sr. ishis uncle; that he is one of the accused in the criminal case for the kidnapping of
Servando; and that it was Dante (Dante) Estonilo who arranged for the meeting with the media, and
who served as Servando’s and his wife’s companion, while he was with Atty. Besario.31 During his
turn, accused-appellant Mayor Carlos, Sr. testified that in the early evening of April 5, 2004 hewas in
a house near the Celera Elementary School attending a birthday party; that while thereat, he heard
successive gunshots and went out to ridehis vehicle so he could check the source of the gunshots;
that when he reached the school gate someone informed him that Floro was gunned down; that he
did not see the victim because according to the people it was boarded in a jeep and brought to the
hospital; and that he and his son, Rey, confirmed that they were at the school minutes after the
incident.32

During cross examination, Mayor Carlos said that he and Floro were close friends; that he learned
that he and his son were suspects in Floro’s killing five months after the incident; that he confirmed
that Rey and Calvin dela Cruz were with him while inquiring about the shooting at the school; and
that he denied having met Felix on April 4, 2004, seeing Rosalinda after April 5, 2004, or that
Servando was his bodyguard.33

Accused-appellant Rey testified that in the early evening of April 5, 2004 he was in his house and
was planning tocampaign at Barangay Matagantang, Placer, Masbate; that on his way to said
barangay, he passed by Celera Elementary School and noticed his father’s vehicle, and that there
were several people thereat; that he stopped and stayed in the school for a few minutes, and then
proceeded to meet his candidates for counselors at Ranio’s house; and that afterwards, they all went
to Barangay Matagantang.34
On cross examination, Rey expressed that this criminal case may be politically motivated because
his opponents could not attribute anything to him since he won as mayor.35

Quirino narrated that in the evening of April 5, 2004, he and his family were having supper at their
house located in front of Celera Elementary School’s guardhouse, when they heard gunshots; that
they immediately laid down, while Quirino ran across the road and took cover at the school fence;
that he peeped through the fence and saw three persons firing a gun; that he could not identify them
or their victim because it was a bit dark; that after 10 to 20 seconds, hewent back home; that a
certain Joel Alcantara and his companions went to him asking him to go with them inside the school,
once inside the school, they saw Floro lying face down; that he took the liberty to go to the police
headquarters located five minutes away; and that when he and the Placer Chief of Police arrived at
the school, he noticed Mayor Carlos, Sr. standing near the gate.36

For his part, accused-appellant Nonong testified that in the evening of April 5, 2004 he was engaged
in a drinking spree in Nining Berdida’s house at Barangay Pili, Placer, Masbate; and that he stayed
in her place until 11:00 p.m.37

During his cross examination, accused-appellant Nonong acknowledged that Mayor Carlos, Sr. is his
uncle and Rey is his second cousin; that he was not Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s bodyguard, but admitted
that he handled the latter’s fighting cocks; and admitted that Barangay Pili is 40 to 45 minutes away
from the poblacionof Placer.38

Edel related that in the evening of April 5, 2004, he was sleeping in his house when Rey called him
to go to Ranio’s house in Placer, Masbate for a meeting; that their group passed by Celera
Elementary School and saw that there were plenty of people, one of whom was Mayor Carlos, Sr.;
that their group stopped to inquire about what happened, and learned that Floro was gunned down;
and that he and his group stayed for about five minutes and left.39

Accused-appellant Bulldog was also presented in court and confirmed that he was with Mayor
Carlos, Sr. and his wife attending a birthday party near the Celera Elementary School; that they went
to the school to check on what happened and learned that Floro was shot; and that they did not stay
long and went home to Daraga.40

During cross examination, he deniedthat he was the bodyguard of Mayor Carlos, Sr.; and that he
was merely accompanying the latter to help in pushing his vehicle in case the starter failed to work.41

After trial, the RTC found the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. The fallo of its March 30, 2009 Decision provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused EX-MAYOR CARLOS
ESTONILO, SR., MAYOR REINARIO "REY" ESTONILO, EDELBRANDO ESTONILO alias "EDEL
ESTONILO," EUTIQUIANO ITCOBANES alias "NONONG ITCOBANES," and CALVIN DELA CRUZ
alias BULLDOG DELA CRUZ" GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Murder
with Direct Assault under Article 248 and Article 148 in relation to Article 48 all of the Revised Penal
Code and each of said accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua.

As civil liability pursuant to Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the aforesaid sentenced the
accused are all hereby ordered to solidarily indemnify the family of the victim Floro Casas in the
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00). Likewise, by way of moral damages, the said
accused are furthermore ordered to solidarily pay the said family the amount of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00).

The accused are, however, credited in the service of their sentence the full time during which they
have been denied.

Let this case be archivedas against the accused NONOY ESTONILO, TITING BOOC, and
GALIITCOBANES who have warrants of arrest issued against them but still remain at large, pending
their arrest/s.

As to the accused ORLANDO TAGALOG MATERDAM ALIAS "NEGRO MATERDAM," separate trial
isnecessary considering that he was only recently arrested when the trial of this case as to the other
accused was already about to end.42

The RTC gave credence to the eyewitness account of Antipolo and the corroborating testimony of
Serapion, who were both present at the school grounds during the shooting incident. The RTC
pronounced that the evidence on record showed unity of purpose in the furtherance of a common
criminal design, that was the killing of Floro. Accused-appellants Nonoy and Negro were the
gunmen, while accused-appellants Edel and Nonong served as backup gunmen. Accused-appellant
Bulldog, and accused Gali, Titing and one alias Ace served as lookouts.43

The RTC found accused-appellants Mayor Carlos, Sr. and Rey to have ordered their co-accused to
kill Floro based on the testimony of Servando, who was present when the group planned to kill Floro.
Thus, the RTC concluded that Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr. is a principal by inducement. And accused-
appellant Rey conspired with his father. In sum, the prosecution was able to establish conspiracy
and evident premeditation among all the accused-appellants.44

The accused-appellants’ defense of alibi and denial did not withstand the positive identification of the
prosecution witnesses. The accused appellants claimed that they were somewhere else in Placer,
Masbate when the shooting took place. However, they were not able to establish the physical
improbability of their being in the crime scene at the time of the shooting. The RTC was convinced
thatthe motive for the murder was due to Floro’s support for mayoral candidate Vicente Cotero.
Since the victim was a district supervisor of public schools, the RTC convicted the accused
appellants of the complex crime of murder with direct assault.45

All five accused-appellants appealed the foregoing RTC decision to the Court of Appeals alleging
that the RTC erred in concluding that motive was duly established, in appreciating the prosecution
evidence and disregarding the salient points of the defense evidence, and in convicting the
accused.46

In its May 12, 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the RTC decision.47 The
dispositive part thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the instant appealed is denied. The Decision dated 30
March 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 45 is hereby AFFIRMED with
modificationin that the penalty imposed upon accused-appellants shall simply be reclusion perpetua
with its accessory penalties and that the award of civil indemnity is increased to Seventy[-]Five
Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00).48

The Court of Appeals sustained the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the RTC considering
that the RTC had observed and monitored at close range the conduct, behavior and deportment of
the witnesses as they testified. The Court of Appeals corrected the penalty imposed, and explained
that reclusion perpetuais an indivisible penalty which should be imposed without specifying the
duration.

On June 29, 2011, the accused-appellants moved for reconsideration,49 which the Court of Appeals
denied in its November 8, 2011 Resolution.50 Unsatisfied, the accused-appellants appealed their
case before this Court.51

This Court’s Ruling

The accused-appellants pray for the reversal of the judgment of conviction in the criminal case on
the following assignment of errors: the RTC and the Court of Appeals erred in (1) giving credence
and weight to the prosecution evidence, (2) finding that there was conspiracy among the accused-
appellants, and (3) finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on the
prosecution evidence.

In essence, the defense disagrees with the disposition of the Court of Appeals affirming their
conviction for murder with direct assault on the ground that some of the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses constitute circumstantial evidence, and that the prosecution was not able to
prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The appeal fails.

After a review of the record of the case, this Court sustains the conviction of the accused-appellants
for murder with direct assault.

The age-old rule is that the task ofassigning values to the testimonies of witnesses on the witness
stand and weighing their credibility is best left to the trial court which forms its first-hand impressions
as a witness testifies before it. It is, thus, no surprise that findings and conclusions of trial courts on
the credibility of witnesses enjoy, asa rule, a badge of respect, for trial courts have the advantage of
observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify.52

This Court had nevertheless carefully scrutinized the records but found no indication that the trial
and the appellate courts overlooked or failed to appreciate facts that, if considered, would change
the outcome of this case. The trial court and the appellate court did not err in giving credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly of Antipolo who was an eyewitness to the
crime.

Antipolo’s testimony did not suffer from any serious and material inconsistency that could possibly
detract from his credibility. He identified the accused-appellant Nonoy and accused Negro as those
who fired at Floro about seven times, while accused-appellants Edel and Nonong were on standby
also holding their firearms. He also witnessed accused Gali shouting to the gunmen to stop and
escape. He narrated that after all the accused left, Mayor Carlos, Sr., Rey and Materdam arrived
aboard the mayor’s vehicle. He also heard Mayor Carlos said "leave it because it’s already dead."
From his direct and straightforward testimony, there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprits.

To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must be established:53 (1) that
a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of
the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) that the
killing is not parricide or infanticide.54

In this case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that (1) Floro was killed; (2) Ex-Mayor
Carlos, Sr., Rey, Edel, Nonong, and Calvin were five of the nine perpetrators who killed him; (3) the
killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation as testified to by
prosecution eyewitnesses, Servando and Antipolo, as well as treachery as below discussed; and (4)
the killing of Floro was neither parricide nor infanticide.

Of the four elements, the second and third elements are essentially contested by the defense. The
Court finds that the prosecution unquestionably established these two elements.

For the second element, the prosecution presented pieces of evidence which when joined together
point to the accused-appellants as the offenders. Foremost, there is motive to kill Floro. It was
Floro’s support for Vicente Cotero, who was Rey’s opponent for the position of mayor in Placer,
Masbate. Second, the prosecution was able to establish that the accused appellants planned to kill
Floro on two separate occasions. The prosecution witness, Servando, was present in Mayor Carlos,
Sr.’shouse when they were plotting to kill Floro. He also heard Mayor Carlos, Sr. say "ipatumba si
Floro Casas." Third, Antipolo was an eye witness to the killing. His testimony was corroborated by
another witness, Serapion, who testified having seen the accused-appellants leaving the school a
few minutes after he heard the gunshots. Serapion also recounted having heard one of them said
"mission accomplished sir," after which, Mayor Carlos, Sr. ordered them to leave.

Essentially, the prosecution evidence consists of both direct evidence and circumstantial evidence.
The testimony of the eyewitness Antipolo is direct evidence of the commission of the crime.

Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in
issue may be established by inference.55 It consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances
from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common
experience.56 Here, the circumstantial evidence consists of the testimonies of Servando and
Serapion. Servando was present when Mayor Carlos, Sr. ordered his men to kill Floro. Whether this
order was executed can be answered by relating it to Antipolo’s eyewitness account as well as
Serapion’s testimony.

As for the third element of qualifying circumstance, the prosecution witness, Servando, testified that
he was present on the two occasions when the accused-appellants were planning tokill Floro. His
categorical and straight forward narration proves the existence of evident premeditation.

Treachery also attended the killing of Floro. For treachery to be present, two elements must concur:
(1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused
consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by
him. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift
and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape. In this case, accused-appellant Nonoy and accused Negro successively fired at Floro about
seven times – and the victim sustained 13 gunshot wounds all found to have been inflicted at close
range giving the latter no chance at all to evade the attack and defend himself from the unexpected
onslaught. Accused-appellants Edel and Nonong were on standby also holding their firearms to
insure the success of their "mission" without risk to themselves; and three others served as lookouts.
Hence, there is no denying that their collective acts point to a clear case of treachery.

Defense of denial and alibi

The twin defenses of denial and alibi raised by the accused-appellants must fail in light of the
positive identification made by Antipolo and Serapion. Alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses
and must be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the
identity of the accused as in this case. It is also axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over
negative testimony.57 The accused-appellants’ alibis that they were at different places at the time of
the shooting are negative and self-serving and cannot be given more evidentiary value vis-à-vis the
affirmative testimony of credible witnesses. The accused-appellants, the victim, and the prosecution
witnesses reside in the same municipality and are, therefore, familiar with one another. More so, that
the two principal accused in this case are prominent political figures. Therefore, the prosecution
witnesses could not havebeen mistaken on the accused appellants’ identity including those who
remained at large.

Further, it has been held that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove the
following: (i) that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime; and (ii)
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime during its commission.
Physical impossibility involves the distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and
the location of the accused when the crime was committed; the accused must demonstrate that he
was so far away and could not have been physically present atthe crime scene and its immediate
vicinity when the crime was committed.58 Here, the accused-appellants utterly failed to satisfy the
above-quoted requirements. In fact, Mayor Carlos, Sr. and his other co-accused, except for Nonong,
admitted that they were near the school before the incident and at the school minutes after the killing
took place. Certainly, the distance was not too far as to preclude the presence of accused-appellants
at the school, and/or for them to slip away from where they were supposed to be, unnoticed.

Penalties

On the offense committed by accused-appellants, the RTC correctly concluded that they should be
held accountable for the complex crime of direct assault with murder. There are two modes of
committing atentados contra la autoridad o sus agentesunder Article 148 of the Revised Penal
Code. Accused-appellants committed the second form of assault, the elements of which are that
there must be an attack, use of force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority
or his agent; the assault was made when the said person was performing his duties or on the
occasion of such performance; and the accused knew that the victim is a person in authority or his
agent, that is, that the accused must have the intention to offend, injure or assault the offended party
as a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority.

In this case, Floro was the duly appointed District Supervisor of Public Schools, Placer, Masbate,
thus, was a person in authority. But contrary to the statement of the RTC that there was direct
assault just because Floro was a person in authority, this Court clarifies that the finding of direct
assault is based on the fact that the attack or assault on Floro was, in reality, made by reason of the
performance of his duty as the District Supervisor.

When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for that matter, there
arisesthe complex crime of direct assault with murder or homicide.

The offense is a complex crime, the penalty for which is that for the graver offense, to be imposed in
the maximum period. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the felony of murder; thus, the imposable
penalty should have been death. Plus the fact that there exists an aggravating circumstance,
pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty is death. But the
imposition of death penalty has been prohibited by Republic Act No. 9346, entitled "An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines"; thus, the RTC, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, properly imposed upon accused-appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The Proper Indemnities

As to the proper monetary awards imposable for the crime charged, modifications must be made
herein. The award of ₱100,000.00 each as civil indemnity and moral damages is proper to conform
1âwphi 1

with current jurisprudence.59

Further, when a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance either as qualifying or generic,
an award of exemplary damages is justified under Article 223060 of the New Civil Code. Thus,
conformably with the above, the legal heirs of the victim are also entitled to an award of exemplary
damages61 in the amount of ₱100,000.00.

Lastly, an interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all the damages
awarded, to earn from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid, in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.62

At this point, notice must be made that on January 28, 2014, the Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison
informed this Court of the death of accused-appellant Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr. on January 9, 2013. In
view thereof, the case against deceased Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr. is hereby ordered dismissed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 12, 2011 in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 04142, affirming the Decision dated March 30, 2009, promulgated by the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 45, in Criminal Case No. 05-238607, finding accused appellants
REINARIO "REY" ESTONILO, EDELBRANDO "EDEL" ESTONILO, EUTIQUIANO "NONONG"
ITCOBANES, and CAL VIN "BULLDOG" DELA CRUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder
with Direct Assault, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, the award of civil indemnity and
moral damages is increased to ₱100,000.00 each, in addition to ₱100,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and the imposition of 6% thereon as legal interest upon finality of this Court's Decision.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
CA rollo, pp. 42-63.

2
At large.

3
At large.

4
At large.

5
Although accused Negro was arrested on May 12, 2008, prior to the promulgation of the
trial court’s Decision, the latter ordered the conduct ofa separate trial for accused Negro
considering that the trial of the case was already at an end.

6
Sometimes referred to as Celera Inocencio Elementary School in some parts of the
records.

7
Records, p. 2.

8
In an Order dated October 5, 2005, the RTC granted the prosecution’s motion to amend the
original Information. The said Order reads:

"As moved by Public Prosecutor Antonio B. Valencia, Jr., without opposition from the
accused through counsel, in order that the participation of all the accused as well as their
real names be clearly reflected in the Information, he is given fifteen (15) days from today
within which to file an Amended Information.

Consequently, let today’s arraignment and pre-trial be reset to November 9, 2005 to be

called at 10:00 a.m. as requested." (Records, p. 145.)
9
Records, p. 152.

10
Id. at 160.

11
Id. at 523.

12
Id. at 24-25.

13
TSN, February 21, 2006, pp. 11-22.

14
Id. at 31-50.

15
TSN, February 22, 2006, p. 26.

16
Id. at 3.

17
Records, pp. 212-213; Order dated March 28, 2006.

18
TSN, March 28, 2006, pp. 11-14.

19
TSN, April 25, 2006, pp. 6-20.

20
TSN, April 26, 2006, pp. 10-11.

21
TSN, June 20, 2006, pp. 5-38.

22
TSN, July 12, 2006, pp. 3, 19-20.

23
TSN, January 31, 2006, pp. 8-21.

24
Id. at 32-37.

25
TSN, September 26, 2006, pp. 13-30.

26
TSN, November 14, 2006, pp. 6-15.

27
TSN, May 27, 2008, pp. 4-10.

28
Id. at 16-18; records, p. 14, Exhibit "8."

29
Id. at 22-25.

30
TSN, July 1, 2008, pp. 6-25, 35.

31
Id. at 27-37.

32
TSN, August 4, 2008, pp. 4-9.

33
Id. at 16-37.

34
TSN, August 5, 2008, pp. 4-8.

35
Id. at 11.

36
TSN, September 1, 2008, pp. 6-19.

37
TSN, September 2, 2008, pp. 3-4.

38
Id. at 6-13.

39
Id. at 17-20.

40
Id. at 27-31.

41
Id. at 32.
42
CA rollo, pp. 62-63.

43
Id. at 60.

44
Id. at 61.

45
Id. at 61-62.

46
Id. at 81.

47
Id. at 161-174.

48
Id. at 174.

49
Id. at 197-203.

50
Id. at 250-251.

51
Id. at 253.

52
People v. Malolot, G.R. No. 174063, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 676, 688.

53
Revised Penal Code, Article 248.

People v. Gabrino, G.R. No. 189981, March 9, 2011, 645 SCRA 187, 196, citing People v.
54

De la Cruz, G.R. No. 188353, February 16, 2010, 612 SCRA 738, 746.

55
People v. Uy, G.R. No. 174660, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 236, 251.

56
People v. Anticamara, G.R. No. 178771, June 8, 2011, 651 SCRA 489, 504.

57
People v. Lacaden, G.R. No. 187682, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 784, 802-803.

58
People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 190340, July 24, 2013, 702 SCRA 204, 217.

59
People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 188610, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 548, 569.

60
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such
damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.

61
People v. Cabungan, G.R. No. 189355, January 23, 2013, 689 SCRA 236, 249.

62
People v. Domingo, 599 Phil. 589, 611 (2009).
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 189644 July 2, 2014

NEIL E. SUYAN, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE CHIEF PROBATION AND PAROLE OFFICER,
DAGUPAN CITY,Respondents.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ.:

Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 27 March 2009,
which affirmed the Orders dated 31 March 20062 and 26 June 20063 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dagupan City. The RTC found that Neil E. Suyan (petitioner) had violated the conditions of
his probation and thus, ordered that his probation be revoked. The instant petition likewise assails
the Resolution dated 9 September 20094, which denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforementioned Decision dated 27 March 2009. The facts as found by the CA are summarized as
follows:

On 27 October 1995, an Information was filed against petlt10ner, charging him with violation of
Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425.5 During arraignment, he pleadedguilty to the
charge. The RTC thereafter proceeded with trial.

On 22 November 1995, petitioner was convicted of the crime, for which he was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional and to pay the costs. On even date, he filed his
application for probation.

On 16 February 1996, the RTC issued a Probation Order covering a period of six (6) years.6 While
on probation, petitioner was arrested on two occasions, more specifically on 2 September and 20
October 19997 for violating Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425. Two separateInformations were
filed against him, both of which were filed with the RTC of Dagupan City. One of these cases was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-03073-D before Branch 43 (Branch 43 case), and the other case
as Criminal Case No. 99-03129-D before Branch 41.

On 1 December 1999, Atty. SimplicioA. Navarro, Jr. (Atty. Navarro), then the Chief Probation and
Parole Officer of Dagupan City, filed a Motion to Revoke Probation (Motion to Revoke).8 Atty.
Navarro alleged that petitioner has been apprehended twice for drug possession while on probation.
The former further alleged that petitioner was considered a recidivist, whose commission of other
offenses while on probation was a serious violation of the terms thereof.Atty. Navarro also pointed
out that petitioner was no longer in a position to comply with the conditions of the latter’s probation,
in view of his incarceration.9

On 15 December 1999, the RTC issued an order revoking the probation of petitioner and directing
him to serve the sentence imposed upon him.10 It denied11 his Motion for Reconsideration.12

Aggrieved, on 6 April 2000 petitioner filed a Rule 65 Petition13 with the CA (first CA case),14 wherein
he assailed the revocation of his probation. He argued that he was denied due process as he was
not furnished with a copy of the Motion to Revoke; and whenthe motion was heard, he was not
represented by his counsel of record.15

On 2 January 2006, the CA in its Decision,16 granted the Rule 65 Petition by annulling and set aside
RTC’s revocation of petitioner’s probation. The CA ruled that the trial court had not complied with the
Probation Law and the procedural requisites for the revocation of probation under the Revised Rules
on Probation Methods and Procedures, enumerated as follows:17

1. No fact-finding investigation of the alleged violations was conducted by the Probation

Officer. 2. The Probation Office should havereported to respondent court the result of said
investigation, if any, upon its completion.

3. There was no Violation Report under P.A. Form No. 8, the contents of which are
enumerated under Section 38 of the Revised Rules on Probation Methods and Procedures.
 4. No warrant of arrest was issued by respondent court after considering the nature and
seriousness of the alleged violations based on the report, if any.

5. The petitioner should have been brought to respondent court for a hearing of the violations
charged, during which petitioner – with the right to counsel – should have been informed of
the violations charged and allowed to adduce evidence in his favor.

The CA ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings, for the purpose of
affording petitioner his right to due process pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 968, and the
Revised Rules on Probation Methods and Procedures.

In compliance with the CA Decision, the RTC conducted a hearing on the Motion to Revoke.18 On 17
February 2006, a Violation Report dated 13 February 200619 was filed by the Dagupan CityParole
and Probation Office recommending the revocation of probation.20 The Violation Report provides in
part:

D. CASE SUMMARY

At the outset of his probation period, probationer showed manifested negative attitude by incurring
absences and not attending rehabilitation activities despite constant follow-up by his supervising
officers. He continued with his illegal drug activities despite counselling and warning from this Office.

Obviously, probationer has failed to recognize the value of freedom and second chance accorded
him by the Honorable Court, his conduct and attitude bespeaks of his deviant character, hence he is
unworthy to continuously enjoy the privilege of probation.

On 22 March 2006, the prosecution submitted its Formal Offer of Evidence. A Certification dated
23January 2006 (Certification),21 issued by Manuel Z. de Guzman, was offered as evidence to prove
that petitioner had been convicted in the Branch 43 case (one of the two cases subsequently filed
against him, as stated earlier); and that he had served his sentence from 30 September 2000 until
his release, by reason of the expiration of his maximum sentence on 8 September 2003.Thereafter,
petitioner filed his Comment on the Formal Offer without disputing the Certification.22

On 31 March 2006, the RTC issued an Order23 revoking the probation. It ruled that it had granted
petitioner due process by affording him the full opportunity to contest the Motion to Revoke; but that
instead of rebutting the Violation Report, he merely questioned the absence of a violation report
when his probation was first revoked.24 The RTC further held that there was positive testimony and
documentary evidence showing that petitioner had indeed violated the conditions of his probation.
He never rebutted the fact of his commission of another offense and conviction therefor while on
probation.25 He filed a Motion for Reconsideration,26 but it was denied.27

Aggrieved, petitioner again filed an appeal with the CA.28 This time, he alleged that he had been
deprived of his constitutional right to due process when his probation was ordered revoked.29 He
further alleged that he had not been given ample opportunity to refute the alleged violations
committed by him while on probation. The probation officer did not conduct a fact-finding
investigation of the alleged violations, and, consequently, petitioner was not furnished any results.
After considering the nature and seriousness of the alleged violations, the RTC did not issue any
warrant for his arrest, as he had not been affordedan opportunity to adduce evidence in his favor
with the assistance of his counsel.30

With regard to the specific groundsfor revocation, petitioner claimed that the evidence adduced
against him did not refer to the grounds cited in the Motion to Revoke, but instead, the evidence
referred to alleged violations of Condition Nos. 3, 9 and 10 of the Probation Order.

The CA denied his appeal. With regard to the procedural issues discussed in the assailed Decision,
it ruled that petitioner was afforded due process. A full-blown trial was conducted precisely to allow
him to refute the allegations made in the Motion to Revoke. It held further that petitioner wasted this
opportunity when, instead of rebutting the allegations mentioned in the Violation Report, he merely
questioned the absence of such a report when his probation was first revoked. It added that the
procedural infirmities in the Motion to Revoke were cured when the RTC conducted a hearing in
accordance with the directive laiddown in the First CA Case.

With regard to the substantive issue of revocation, the CA ruled that, for having been apprehended
twice for the commission of two offenses similar in nature, petitioner violated oneof the conditions
prescribed in the Probation Order. He even admitted tohaving served out his sentence for those
offenses.

Aggrieved yet again, petitioner filed an appeal with this Court. On procedural grounds, he alleges
that there was no fact-finding investigation of the alleged violations conducted by the probation
officer, and thus no results were furnished him. Likewise, no warrantof arrest was issued by the
RTC. Neither was he affordedany opportunity to adduce evidence in his favor with the assistance of
counsel.

On substantive grounds, petitioner alleges that he already showed repentance after his conviction. In
his first case, he readily admitted his accountability by pleading guilty to the charge. Thus, he was
convicted and he subsequently applied for probation. He further alleges that, of the two cases filed
against him, one was ordered dismissed; he has already served his sentence for the other. Since
then, no derogatory information has been received either by the probation office orthe trial court.
Petitioner points out that he has already reformed his ways and is thus entitled to the grace of law.
He contends that the CA should have ordered him to resume his probation pursuant to the positivist
theory adopted in our criminal justice system.

ISSUE

The sole issue to be resolved inthe instant case is whether the probation was validly revoked. THE
COURT’S RULING

We rule that the probation ofpetitioner was validly revoked.

On the procedural grounds, we do notsubscribe to his contention that his right to due process was
violatedafter the RTC had already conducted a full-blown trial on the Motion to Revoke, in
compliance with the directive of the CA. Based on record, he had ample opportunity to refute the
allegations contained in the Violation Report.

The essence of due process is thata party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard in
support of his case; what the law abhors and prohibits is the absolute absence of the opportunity to
be heard.31 When the party seeking due process was in fact given several opportunities to be heard
and to air his side, but it was by his own fault or choice that he squandered these chances, then his
cry for due process must fail.32

We adopt the ruling of the CA inthat petitioner squandered his own opportunity when, instead of
rebutting the allegations mentioned in the Violation Report, he merely questioned the absence of any
such report when his probation was first revoked.

On substantive grounds, we believe that there was sufficient justification for the revocation of his
probation.

Petitioner does not deny the fact that he has been convicted, and that he has served out his
sentence for another offense while on probation. Consequently, his commission of another offense
1âwphi1

is a direct violation of Condition No. 9 of his Probation Order,33 and the effects are clearly outlined in
Section 11 of the Probation Law.

Section 11 of the Probation Law provides that the commission of another offense shall render the
probation order ineffective. Section 11 states:

Sec. 11. Effectivity of Probation Order. - A probation order shall take effect upon its issuance, at
which time the court shall inform the offender of the consequences thereof and explain that upon his
failure to comply with any of the conditions prescribed in the said order or his commission of another
offense, he shall serve the penalty imposed for the offense under which he was placed on probation.
(Emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing, the CA was correct in revoking the probation of petitioner and ordering him
to serve the penalty for the offense for which he was placed on probation.

As probation is a mere discretionary grant, petitioner was bound to observe full obedience to the
terms and conditions pertaining to the probation order or run the risk of revocation of this
privilege.34 Regrettably, petitioner wasted the opportunity granted him by the RTC to remain outside
prison bars, and must now suffer the consequences of his violation.35 The Court's discretion to grant
probation is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society and only incidentally for the
benefit of the accused.36 Having the power to grant probation, it follows that the trial court also has
the power to order its revocation in a proper case and under appropriate circumstances.37

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
27 March 2009 and Resolution dated 9 September 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 95426 are both
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice, Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION* MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin per raffle
dated 24 March 2014.

1
Rollo, pp. 43~52; Penned by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos, concurred in by
Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Ramon R. Garcia, in CA-G.R. SP No. 95426.

2
Id. at 106-107.

3
Id.at114.

4
Id. at 54-55; Penned by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos, concurred in by Associate
Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Ramon R. Garcia, in CA-G.R. SP No. 95426.

5
Sec. 16 of RepublicAct No. 6425 states:

Section 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs.The penalty of imprisonment

ranging from six months and one day to four years and a fine ranging from six
hundred to four thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall
possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription.

6
Rollo,p. 56.

7
Supra note 4.

8
Rollo, pp. 56-57.

9
Id. at 56.

10
Id. at 58-59.

11
Id. at 64.

12
Id. at 60-61.

13
Id. at 65-73.

Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 58406, entitled "Neil E. Suyan v. The Honorable Presiding
14

Judge, RTC, Branch 43, Dagupan City, The People of the Philippines and the Chief
Probation and Parole Officer, Dagupan City."
15
Rollo, p. 93.

16
Id. at 91-99.

17
Id. at 95, 97.

18
Id. at 106; Order dated 31 March 2006.

19
CA rollo, pp. 65-67.

20
Id. at 66.

21
Rollo, p. 246.

22
Id. at 47.

23
Id. at 106-107.

24
Id. at 107.

25
Id.

26
Id. at 108-113.

27
Id. at 114.

28
Id. at 115-129.

29
Id. at 120.

30
Id. at 121.

31
Yuchengco v. Sandiganbayan,479 SCRA 1 (2006).

32
Heirs of Bugarin v. Republic, G.R. No. 174431, 6 August 2012.

33
Rollo,p. 45.

34
See Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 193237 & 193536, 9 October 2012.

35
Soriano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123936, 4 March 1999.

36
Tolentino v. Alconcel, 206 Phil. 79 (1983).

37
Supra note 32.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 206832 January 21, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ALFREDO MORALES Y LAM, Accused-Appellant.

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court is an Appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Alfredo Morales y Lam (Morales) assailing
the Decision2of the Court of Appeals dated 14 August 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04287.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals is an affirmance of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76 in Criminal Case Nos. 7534-7535, finding the accused
Morales guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165 entitled "An Act Instituting the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

In the Criminal Case No. 7534, Morales was charged with illegal sale of shabu as follows:

That on or about the 14th day of April 2004, in the Municipality or Rodriguez, Province of Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to another person one (1)
heat scaled transparent plastic sachet containing 0.02 gram of white crystalline substance, which
gave positive result to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as shabu, a
dangerous drug, in violation orthc above-cited law.3

In the Criminal Case No. 7535, Morales was charged with illegal possession of shabu as follows:

That on or about the 14th day of April 2004, in the Municipality of Rodriguez, Province of Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession, direct custody and control three
(3) heat-scaled transparent sachets each containing 0.02 gram of white crystalline substance, which
gave positive results to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as shabu, a
dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.4

When arraigned, the accused pleaded not guilty of the crimes charged.5

The RTC held that the prosecution successfully discharged the burden of proof in the cases of illegal
sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The trial court relied on the categorical statements
of the prosecution witnesses as against the bare denials of the accused. The presumption or
regularity of performance of duties was upheld in the absence of any improper motive on their part to
testify falsely against the accused. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 7534, finding the accused Alfredo Morales y Lam GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime or Sale or Dangerous Drug (Violation of Section 5, 1st par.,
Article II, R.A. 9165) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment and a fine
of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500, 000.00).

(2) In Criminal Case No. 7535, finding the accused Alfredo Morales y Lam GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of POSSESSION of DANGEROUS DRUG (Violation of
Section 11, 2nct par., No. 3, Article II, R.A. 9165) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of Twelve Years (12) years and one (1) day to Twenty (20) years and a fine of
Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00).6

Upon appeal, the appellate court affirmed the findings of the trial court. It upheld the presence of all
the elements of the offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of drugs, and preservation of the
corpus delicti of the crime from the time they were seized and presented in court. The procedural
steps required by Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 were liberally construed in favor of the
prosecution in view of the preservation of integrity and identity of the corpus delicti. Conformably, the
finding on the presumption of regularity of performance of duties was affirmed in the absence of ill-
motive on the part of the police officers.

On 29 August 2012, a Notice of Appeal7 was filed by Morales through counsel before the Supreme
Court.

While this case is pending appeal, the Inmate Documents and Processing Division Officer-in-Charge
Emerenciana M. Divina8 informed the Court that accused-appellant Morales died while committed at
the Bureau of Corrections on 2 November 2013 as evidenced by a copy of Death Report9 signed by
New Bilibid Prison Hospital's Medical Officer Ursicio D. Cenas. The death of accused-appellant
Morales pending appeal of his conviction, extinguishes his civil and criminal liabilities.

Under Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code:

Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. x x x x

Ordinarily, both the civil and criminal liabilities are extinguished upon the death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction by the lower courts.

However, a violation of Republic Act No. 9165 does not entail any civil liability. No civil liability
1âw phi1

needs extinguishment.

WHEREFORE, in view of his death on 2 November 2013, the appeal of accused-appellant Alfredo
Morales y Lam from the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 14 August 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 04287 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76 in
Criminal Case Nos. 7534-7535 convicting him of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165 is hereby declared MOOT and ACADEMIC.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo, p. 109.

2
Id. at 2-17.

3
RTC Decision, CA rollo. p. 11.
4
Id. at 11-12.

5
Records. p. 22.

6
CA rollo, p. 16.

7
Id. at 108.

8
Rollo, p. 33.

9
Id. at 36.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 191240 July 30, 2014

CRISTINA B. CASTILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
PHILLIP R. SALVADOR, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which assails the Decision1 dated February 11, 2010 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30151 with respect only to the civil aspect of the case
as respondent Phillip R. Salvador had been acquitted of the crime of estafa. Respondent Phillip
Salvador and his brother Ramon Salvador were charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2
(a) of the Revised Penal Code in an Information2 which reads:

That during the period from March 2001 up to May 2002, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to gain
and by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the
complainant CRISTINA B. CASTILLO, in the amount of US$100,000.00 in the following manner, to
wit: Respondents convinced the complainant to invest into the remittance business in the name of
accused PHILLIP R. SALVADOR in Hongkong, representing to her that they will personally take
charge of the operations and marketing of the said business, assuring her with huge profits because
of the popularity of accused PHILLIP R. SALVADOR, knowing very well that the said
manifestations/representations and fraudulent manifestations were false and were intended only to
exact money from the Complainant, and by reason of the said false representations made by both
accused, the Complainant gave and entrusted to the accused the amount of US$100,000.00 as
seed money to start the operations of the business and the said accused, once in the possession of
the said amount of money, misappropriated, misapplied and/or converted the same to their own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the Complainant in the aforementioned
amount of US$100,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Upon their arraignment, respondentand his brother Ramon pleaded not guilty4 to the offense
charged.

Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.

Petitioner Cristina B. Castillo testified that she is engaged in real estate business, educational
institution, boutique, and trading business.5 She met respondent through a common friend in
December 2000 and became close since then. Respondent had told her that his friends, Jinggoy
Estrada and Rudy Fernandez, were engaged in the freight and remittance business and that Jinggoy
even brought him toHong Kong and Singapore to promote the former's business.6 Petitioner
eventually met respondent’s brother and manager, Ramon Salvador, to whom she volunteered to
financially help respondent in his bid for the Vice-Mayoralty race in Mandaluyong.7 It was also in the
same meeting that they talked about the matter of engaging in a freight and remittance
business.8 Respondent enticed petitioner to go to Hong Kong to see for herself the viability of such
business and Ramon suggested to use respondent’s name to attract the overseas contract workers.9

In March 2001, petitioner and her husband, together with respondent and a certain Virgilio
Calubaquib wentto Hong Kong and they witnessed respondent’s popularity among the Filipino
domestic helpers.10 In April 2001, the same group, with Ramon this time, went to Bangkok where
respondent’s popularity was again shown among the overseas Filipinos.11 In both instances,
respondent promoted their prospective business. In both trips, petitioner paid for all the
travelexpenses and even gave respondent US$10,000.00 as pocket money for the Hong Kong trip
and another US$10,000.00 for the Bangkok trip.12 Her accountant introduced her to a certain Roy
Singun who is into the freight and money remittance business.13 In August 2001, respondent initiated
a trip to Palau, to observe Singun’s business thereat to which petitioner acceded.14 Petitioner paid for
the travel expenses and even gaverespondent US$20,000.00.15 In October 2001, she and
respondent had a training at Western Union at First World Center in Makati City.16
As petitioner had deeply fallen in love with respondent and since she trusted him very much as
heeven acted as a father to her children when her annulment was ongoing, she agreed to embark on
the remittance business. In December 2001, she, accompanied by her mother, Zenaida G. Bondoc
(Zenaida), and Ramon, went to Hong Kong and had the Phillip Salvador Freight and Remittance
International Limited registered on December 27, 2001.17 A Memorandum of Articles of Incorporation
and a Certificate of Incorporation were issued.18 They also rented an office space in Tsimshatsui,
Kowloon, Hong Kong which they registered as their office address as a requirement for opening a
business in Hong Kong, thus, a Notification of Situation of Registered Office was also issued.19 She
agreed with respondent and Ramon that any profit derived from the business would be equally
divided among them and thatrespondent would be in charge of promotion and marketing in Hong
Kong,while Ramon would take charge of the operations of business in the Philippines and she would
be financing the business.20

The business has not operated yet as petitioner was still raising the amount of US$100,000.00 as
capital for the actual operation.21 When petitioner already had the money, she handed the same to
respondent in May 2002 at her mother’s house in Las Piñas City, which was witnessed by her
disabled half-brother Enrico B. Tan (Enrico).22 She also gave respondent ₱100,000.00 in cash to
begiven to Charlie Chau, who is a resident of Hong Kong, as payment for the heart-shaped earrings
she bought from him while she was there. Respondent and Ramon went to Hong Kong in May 2002.
However, the proposed business never operated as respondent only stayed in Hong Kongfor three
days. When she asked respondent about the money and the business, the latter told her that the
money was deposited in a bank.23 However, upon further query, respondent confessed that he used
the money to pay for his other obligations.24 Since then, the US$100,000.00 was not returned at all.

On cross-examination, petitioner testified that she fell deeply in love with respondent and was
convinced thathe truly loved her and intended to marry her once there would beno more legal
impediment;25 that she helped in financing respondent’s campaign in the May 2001 elections.26 As
she loved respondent so much, she gave him monthly allowances amounting to hundreds of
thousands of pesos because he had no work back then.27 She filed the annulment case against her
husband on November 21, 2001 and respondent promised her marriage.28 She claimed that
respondent and Ramon lured her with sweet words in going into the freight and remittance business,
which never operated despite the money she had given respondent.29 She raised the US$100,000.00
by means of selling and pawning her pieces of diamond jewelry.30

Petitioner admitted being blinded by her love for respondent which made her follow all the advice
given by him and his brother Ramon, i.e., to save money for her and respondent’s future because
after the annulment, they would get married and to give the capital for the remittance business in
cash so as not to jeopardize her annulment case.31She did not ask for a receipt for the
US$100,000.00 she gave to respondent as it was for the operational expenses of a business which
will be for their future, as all they needed to do was to get married.32 She further testified that after the
US$100,000.00 was not returned, she still deposited the amount of ₱500,000.00 in respondent’s
UCPB bank account33 and also to Ramon’s bank accounts.34 And while respondent was in the United
States in August 2003, she still gave him US$2,000.00as evidenced by a Prudential Telegraphic
Transfer Application35 dated August 27, 2003.

Petitioner’s mother, Zenaida, corroborated her daughter’s testimony that she was with her and
Ramon when they went to Hong Kong in December 2001 to register the freight and remittance
business.36 She heard Charlie Chau, her daughter's friend, that a part of his office building will be
used for the said remittance business.37 Enrico Tan, also corroborated her sister's claim that she
handed the money to respondent in his presence.38

Respondent testified that he and petitioner became close friends and eventually fell in love and had
an affair.39 They traveled to Hong Kong and Bangkok where petitioner saw how popular he was
among the Filipino domestic helpers,40 which led her to suggest a remittance business. Although
hesitant, he has friends with such business.41He denied that petitioner gave him US$10,000.00
whenhe went to Hong Kong and Bangkok.42 In July 2001, after he came back from the United States,
petitioner had asked him and his brother Ramon for a meeting.43 During the meeting, petitioner
brought up the money remittance business, but Ramon told her that they should make a study of it
first.44 He was introduced to Roy Singun, owner of a money remittance business in Pasay
City.45 Upon the advise of Roy, respondent and petitioner, her husband and Ramon went to Palau in
August 2001.46 He denied receiving US$20,000.00 from petitioner but admitted that it was petitioner
who paid for the plane tickets.47 After their Palau trip, they went into training at Western Union at the
First World Center in Makati City.48 It was only in December 2001 that Ramon, petitioner and her
mother went to Hong Kong to register the business, while he took care of petitioner’s children
here.49 In May 2002, he and Ramon went back to Hong Kong but deniedhaving received the amount
of US$100,000.00 from petitioner but then admitted receipt of the amount of ₱100,000.00 which
petitioner asked him to give to Charlie Chau as payment for the pieces of diamond jewelry she got
from him,50 which Chau had duly acknowledged.51 He denied Enrico’s testimony that petitioner gave
him the amount of US$100,000.00 in his mother’s house.52 He claimed that no remittance business
was started in Hong Kong as they had no license, equipment, personnel and money to operate the
same.53 Upon his return to the Philippines, petitioner never asked him about the business as she
never gave him such amount.54 In October 2002, he intimated that he and petitioner even went to
Hong Kong again to buy some goods for the latter’s boutique.55 He admitted that he loved petitioner
and her children very much as there was a time when petitioner’s finances were short, he gave her
₱600,000.00 for the enrollment of her children in very expensive schools.56 It is also not true that he
and Ramon initiated the Hong Kong and Bangkok trips.57

Ramon testified that it was his brother respondent who introduced petitioner to him.58 He learned of
petitioner’s plan of a remittance business in July 2001 and even told her that they should study it
first.59 He was introduced to Roy Singun who operates a remittancebusiness in Pasay and who
suggested that their group observehis remittance business in Palau. After their Palau trip, petitioner
decided to put up a similar business in Hong Kong and it was him who suggested to use
respondent’s name because of name recall.60 It was decided thathe would manage the operation in
Manila and respondent would be in charge of promotion and marketing in Hong Kong, while
petitioner would be in charge of all the business finances.61 He admitted that he wentto Hong Kong
with petitioner and her mother to register said business and also to buy goods for petitioner’s
boutique.62 He said that it was also impossible for Chau to offer a part of his office building for the
remittance business because there was no more space to accommodate it.63 He and respondent
went to Hong Kong in May 2002 to examine the office recommended by Chau and the warehouse of
Rudy Fernandez thereatwho also offered to help.64 He then told Chau that the remittance office
should be in Central Park, Kowloon, because majority of the Filipinos in Hong Kong live there.65 He
concluded that it was impossible for the business to operate immediately because they had no
office, no personnel and no license permit.66 He further claimed that petitioner never mentioned to
him about the US$100,000.00 she gave to respondent,67 and that he even traveled again with
petitioner to Bangkok in October 2002, and in August 2003.68 He denied Enrico’s allegation that he
saw him at his mother’s house as he only saw Enrico for the first time in court.69

On April 21, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision,70 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, accused PHILLIP SALVADOR is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime ofEstafa under Article 315, par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate sentence of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prisyon (sic)
correctional (sic)maximum as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximumas
maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
DOLLARS (US$100,000.00) or its equivalent in Philippine currency. With respect to accused
RAMON SALVADOR, he is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence. SO ORDERED.71

Respondent appealed his conviction to the CA. The parties filed their respective pleadings, after
which, the case was submitted for decision.

On February 11, 2010, the CA rendered its Decision reversing the decision of the RTC, the decretal
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision of Branch 202 of the RTC of Las Piñas
City, dated April 21, 2006, is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and accused appellant PHILLIP
R. SALVADOR is ACQUITTED of the crime of Estafa.72

Petitioner files the instant petition onthe civil aspect of the case alleging that:

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN CONVICTING THE RESPONDENT SO THAT EVEN IF
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED TO ACQUIT HIM IT SHOULD HAVE AT LEAST RETAINED
THE AWARD OF DAMAGES TO THE PETITIONER.73

We find no merit in the petition.

To begin with, in Manantan v. CA,74 we discussed the consequences of an acquittal on the civil
liability of the accused as follows:

Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused.
First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the actor omission
complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be
not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act
oromission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delictois out of the question, and the civil action, if
any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is
the situation contemplated in Rule III of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal
based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused
has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code,
where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." x x x.75
A reading of the CA decision would show that respondent was acquitted because the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Said the CA:

The evidence for the prosecution being insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the crime
as charged had been committed by appellant, the general presumption, "that a person is innocent of
the crime or wrong, stands in his favor. The prosecution failed to prove that all the elements of estafa
are present in this case as would overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of appellant. For
in fact, the prosecution's primary witness herself could not even establish clearly and precisely how
appellant committed the alleged fraud. She failed to convince us that she was deceived through
misrepresentations and/or insidious actions, in venturing into a remittance business. Quite the
contrary, the obtaining circumstance inthis case indicate the weakness of her submissions.76

Thus, since the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, respondent is not exempt from civil liability
which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. In Encinas v. National Bookstore,
Inc.,77 we explained the concept of preponderance of evidence as follows:

x x x Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either
side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or
"greater weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last
analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.78

The issue of whether petitioner gave respondent the amount of US$100,000.00 is factual. While we
are not a trier of facts, there are instances, however, when we are called upon to re-examine the
factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and weigh, after considering the records of
the case, which of the conflicting findings is more in accord with law and justice.79 Such is the case
before us.

In discrediting petitioner’s allegation that she gave respondent US$100,000.00 in May 2002, the CA
found that: (1) petitioner failed to show how she was able to raise the money in such a short period
of time and even gave conflicting versions on the source of the same; (2) petitioner failed to require
respondent to sign a receipt so she could have a record of the transaction and offered no plausible
reason why the money was allegedly hand-carried toHong Kong; (3) petitioner’s claim of trust as
reason for not requiring respondent to sign a receipt was inconsistent with the way she conducted
her previous transactions with him; and (4) petitioner’s behavior after the alleged fraud perpetrated
against her was inconsistent with the actuation ofsomeone who had been swindled.

We find no reversible error committed by the CA in its findings.

Petitioner failed to prove on how she raised the money allegedly given to respondent. She testified
that from December 2001 to May 2002, she was raising the amount of US$100,000.00 as the capital
for the actual operation of the Phillip Salvador Freight and Remittance International Limited in Hong
Kong,80 and that she was ableto raise the same in May 2002.81 She did so by selling82 or pawning83 her
pieces of diamond jewelry. However, there was no documentary evidence showing those
transactions within the period mentioned. Upon further questioning on cross-examination on where
she got the money, she then said that she had plenty of dollars as she is a frequent traveler to Hong
Kong and Bangkok to shop for her boutique in Glorietta and Star Mall.84 Such testimony contradicts
her claim that she was still raising the money for 5 months and that she was only able to formally
raise the money in May 2002.

There was also no receipt that indeed US$100,000.00 was given by petitioner to
respondent. Petitioner in her testimony, both in the direct and cross examinations, said that the
1âwphi1

US$100,000.00 given to respondent was for the actual expenses for setting up the office and the
operation of the business in Hong Kong.85 She claimed that she treated the freight and remittance
business like any of her businesses;86 that she, respondent, and the latter’s brother even agreed to
divide whatever profits they would have from the business;87 and that giving US$100,000.00 to
respondent was purely business to her.88 She also said that she kept records of all her business,
such that, if there are no records, there are no funds entrusted89 . Since petitioner admitted that
giving the money to respondent was for business, there must be some records ofsuch transaction as
what she did in her other businesses.

In fact, it was not unusual for petitioner to ask respondent for some documents evidencing the
latter's receipt of money for the purpose of business as this was done in her previous business
dealings with respondent. She had asked respondent to execute a real estate mortgage on his
condominium unit90 for the ₱5 million she loaned him in August 2001. Also, when petitioner gave
respondent an additional loan of ₱10 million in December 2001, for the latter to redeem the title to
his condominium unit from the bank, she had asked him to sign an acknowledgment receipt for the
total amount of ₱15 million he got from her.91 She had done all these despite her testimony that she
trusted respondent from the day they met in December 2000 until the day he ran away from her in
August 2003.92
Petitioner insists that she did not ask for any acknowledgment receipt from respondent, because the
latter told her not to have traces that she was giving money to him as it might jeopardize her then
ongoing annulment proceedings. However, petitioner's testimony would belie such claim of
respondent being cautious of the annulment proceedings. She declared that when she and her
husband separated, respondent stood as a father to her children.93 Respondent attended school
programs of her children,94 and fetched them from school whenever the driver was not around.95 In
fact, at the time the annulment case was already pending, petitioner registered the freight and
remittance business under respondent’s name and the local branch office of the business would be
in petitioner's condominium unit in Makati.96 Also, when petitioner went with her mother and Ramon
to Hong Kong to register the business, it was respondent who tookcare of her children. She
intimated that it was respondent who was insistent in going to their house.

Worthy to mention is that petitioner deposited the amount of ₱500,000.00 to respondent's account
with United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) in July 2003.97 Also, when respondent was in New York
in August 2003, petitioner sent him the amount of US$2,000.00 by telegraphic transfer.98 Petitioner's
act ofdepositing money to respondent's account contradicted her claim that there should be no
traces that she was giving money to respondent during the pendency of the annulment case.

Petitioner conceded that she could have either bought a manager's check in US dollars from the
bank orsend the money by bank transfer, but she did not do so on the claim that there might be
traces of the transaction.99 However, the alleged US$100,000.00was supposed to be given to
respondent because of the freight and remittance business; thus, there is nothing wrong to have a
record of the same, specially since respondent had to account for the valid expenseshe incurred with
the money.100

The testimony of Enrico, petitioner's brother, declaring that he was present when petitioner gave
respondent the US$100,000.00 did not help. Enrico testified that when petitioner filed the instant
case in September 2004, another case was also filed by petitioner against respondent and his
brother Ramon in the same City Prosecutor's office in Las Piñas where Enrico had submitted his
affidavit. Enrico did not submit an affidavit in this case even when he allegedly witnessed the giving
of the money to respondent as petitioner told him that he could just testify for the other case.
However, when the other case was dismissed, it was then that petitioner told him to be a witness in
this case. Enrico should have been considered at the first opportunity if he indeed had personal
knowledge of the alleged giving of money to respondent. Thus, presenting Enrico as a witness only
after the other case was dismissed would create doubt as to the veracity of his testimony.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated February 11, 2010, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30151, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION* MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.**

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, per Raffle
dated August 23, 2013.

** Designated Acting Member, per Special Order No. 1691 dated May 22, 2014, in view of
the vacancy in the Third Division.

1
Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon, with Associate Justices Mario L. Guarifia
III and Franchito N. Diamante, concurring; rollo, pp. 62-90.

2
Records, pp. 1-2.

3
Id.

4
Id. at 196 and 183, respectively.

5
TSN, August 1, 2005, pp. 6-7.

6
Id. at 20-21.

7
Id.at 21-22.

8
Id. at 23-24.

9
Id. at 25.

10
Id. at 28-29.

11
Id. at 29, 32.

12
Id. at 27-28; 30-31.

13
Id. at 36.

14
Id. at 32-33.

15
Id. at 34.

16
Id. at 37.

17
Id. at 43-44.

18
Id.

19
Id. at 48-49.

20
Id. at 51-52.

21
Id. at 52.

22
Id. at 53-54.

23
TSN, August 1, 2005, p. 61.

24
Id.
25
TSN, September 7, 2005, p. 19.

26
Id. at 13.

27
Id.at 14.

28
Id.at 19.

29
Id. at 20.

30
TSN, September 21, 2005, pp. 35-36.

31
Id. at 67.

32
Id. at 42.

33
Id.at 4-6.

34
Id. at 6-8.

35
Id. at 9.

36
TSN, September 28, 2005, p. 6.

37
Id. at 12-13.

38
TSN, October 7, 2005, pp. 12-18.

39
TSN, January 20, 2006, p. 22.

40
Id. at 24-25; 28.

41
Id. at 26-27.

42
Id.

43
Id. at 34-35.

44
Id. at 36.

45
Id. at 37.

46
Id. at 39.

47
Id. at 40.

48
Id.at 41-42.

49
Id. at 44-46.

50
Id. at 47-48.

51
Id. at 49.

52
Id. at 50.

53
Id. at 59.

54
Id. at 60.

55
Id. at 61.

56
Id. at 62-63.

57
Id. at 64.
58
Id. at 125.

59
Id. at 130-131.

60
Id. at 133-134.

61
Id. at 135-136.

62
Id.at 137-138.

63
Id. at 139-140.

64
Id. at 141.

65
Id. at 143.

66
Id. at 145.

67
Id.

68
Id. at 146-147.

69
Id. at 147.

70
Rollo, pp. 91-114; Per Judge Elizabeth Yu-Guray.

71
Id.at 113-114.

72
Id. at 90.

73
Id. at 33-34.

74
403 Phil. 298 (2001).

75
Id. at 308-309. (Citations omitted)

76
Rollo, p. 86.

77
485 Phil. 683 (2004).

78
Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc., supra, at 695. (Citations omitted)

First Metro Investment Corporation v. Este del Sol Mountain Reserve, Inc., 420 Phil. 902,
79

914 (2001).

80
TSN, August 1, 2005, p. 52.

81
Id. at 53.

82
TSN, September 7, 2005, p. 67.

83
TSN, September 21, 2005, p. 28.

84
Id. at 37.

85
TSN, September 7, 2005, p. 28.

86
Id. at 29.

87
TSN, August 1, 2005, p. 189.

88
Id.

89
Id. at 34.

90
Id.at 37-38.
91
Id. at 40-41.

92
Id. at 37.

93
TSN, August 1, 2005, p. 39.

94
Id.

95
Id. at 34.

96
TSN, September 21, 2005, p. 46.

97
Id. at 4-5.

98
Id. at 9.

99
Id. at 35-36.

100
TSN, September 7, 2005, p. 34.