Republic of the Philippines issuance of petitioner’s W-2 tax form for 1999 and the non-payment of the

SUPREME COURT following benefits: (1) cash equivalent of petitioner’s leave credits in the
Manila amount of ₱55,467.60; (2) proportionate 13th month pay for the year 1999;
(3) reimbursement claims in the amount of ₱19,012.00; and (4) lump sum
SECOND DIVISION pay for the fiscal year 1999 in the amount of ₱674,756.70. Petitioner also
sought moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Respondent
G.R. No. 168654 March 25, 2009 Mario T. Managhaya was also impleaded in his official capacity as
respondent firm’s managing partner.6
ZAYBER JOHN B. PROTACIO, Petitioner,
vs. In his complaint,7 petitioner averred, inter alia, that when he was promoted
LAYA MANANGHAYA & CO. and/or MARIO T. to the position of Tax Principal in October 1997, his compensation package
MANANGHAYA, Respondents. had consisted of a monthly gross compensation of ₱60,000.00, a 13th
month pay and a lump sum payment for the year 1997 in the amount of
₱240,000.00 that was paid to him on 08 February 1998.
DECISION
According to petitioner, beginning 01 October 1998, his compensation
TINGA, J.:
package was revised as follows: (a) monthly gross compensation of
₱95,000.00, inclusive of nontaxable allowance; (b) 13th month pay; and
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the (c) a lump sum amount in addition to the aggregate monthly gross
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the decision2 and resolution3 of compensation. On 12 April 1999, petitioner received the lump sum amount
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85038. The Court of Appeals’ of ₱573,000.00 for the fiscal year ending 1998.8
decision reduced the monetary award granted to petitioner by the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) while the resolution denied
Respondent firm denied it had intentionally delayed the processing of
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
petitioner’s claims but alleged that the abrupt departure of petitioner and
three other members of the firm’s Tax Division had created problems in the
The following factual antecedents are matters of record. determination of petitioner’s various accountabilities, which could be
finished only by going over voluminous documents. Respondents further
Respondent KPMG Laya Mananghaya & Co. (respondent firm) is a general averred that they had been taken aback upon learning about the labor case
professional partnership duly organized under the laws of the Philippines. filed by petitioner when all along they had done their best to facilitate the
Respondent firm hired petitioner Zayber John B. Protacio as Tax Manager processing of his claims.9
on 01 April 1996. He was subsequently promoted to the position of Senior
Tax Manager. On 01 October 1997, petitioner was again promoted to the During the pendency of the case before the Labor Arbiter, respondent firm
position of Tax Principal.4 on three occasions sent check payments to petitioner in the following
amounts: (1) ₱71,250.00, representing petitioner’s 13th month pay; (2)
However, on 30 August 1999, petitioner tendered his resignation effective ₱54,824.18, as payments for the cash equivalent of petitioner’s leave
30 September 1999. Then, on 01 December 1999, petitioner sent a letter credits and reimbursement claims; and (3) ₱10,762.57, for the refund of
to respondent firm demanding the immediate payment of his 13th month petitioner’s taxes withheld on his vacation leave credits. Petitioner’s copies
pay, the cash commutation of his leave credits and the issuance of his of his withholding tax certificates were sent to him along with the check
1999 Certificate of Income Tax Withheld on Compensation. Petitioner sent payments.10 Petitioner acknowledged the receipt of the 13th month pay but
to respondent firm two more demand letters for the payment of his disputed the computation of the cash value of his vacation leave credits
reimbursement claims under pain of the legal action.5 and reimbursement claims.11

Respondent firm failed to act upon the demand letters. Thus, on 15

December 1999, petitioner filed before the NLRC a complaint for the non-
On 07 June 2002, Labor Arbiter Eduardo J. Carpio rendered a Aggrieved, respondent firm appealed to the NLRC. On 21 August 2003,
decision,12 the dispositive portion of which reads: the NLRC rendered a modified judgment,17the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents to
jointly and solidarily pay complainant the following: WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 7, 2002 is hereby Affirmed with
the modification that the complainant is only entitled to receive ₱2,301.00
₱12,681.00 - representing the reimbursement claims of as reimbursement claims. The award of ₱12,681.00 representing the
complainant; reimbursement claims of complainant is set aside for lack of basis.

₱28,407.08 - representing the underpayment of the cash SO ORDERED.18

equivalent of the unused leave credits of complainant;
From the amount of ₱12,681.00 awarded by the Labor Arbiter as payment
₱573,000.00 - representing complainant’s 1999 year-end lump for the reimbursement claims, the NLRC lowered the same to ₱2,301.00
sum payment; and representing the amount which remained unpaid.19 As regards the issues
on the lump sum payments and cash equivalent of the leave credits, the
10% of the total judgment awards way of attorney’s fees. NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter.

SO ORDERED.13 Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration20 but the NLRC denied the
motion for lack of merit.21 Hence, respondents elevated the matter to the
Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari.22
The Labor Arbiter awarded petitioner’s reimbursement claims on the
ground that respondent firm’s refusal to grant the same was not so much
because the claim was baseless but because petitioner had failed to file In the assailed Decision dated 19 April 2005, the Court of Appeals further
the requisite reimbursement forms. He held that the formal defect was reduced the total money award to petitioner, to wit:
cured when petitioner filed several demand letters as well as the case
before him.14 WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the assailed resolution of public
respondent NLRC dated August 21, 2003 in NLRC NCR Case No. 30-12-
The Labor Arbiter held that petitioner was not fully paid of the cash 00927-99 (CA No. 032304-02) is hereby MODIFIED, ordering petitioner
equivalent of the leave credits due him because respondent firm had firm to pay private respondent the following:
erroneously based the computation on a basic pay of ₱61,000.00. He held
that the evidence showed that petitioner’s monthly basic salary was (1) ₱2,301.00 representing private respondent’s reimbursement
₱95,000.00 inclusive of the other benefits that were deemed included and claims;
integrated in the basic salary and that respondent firm had computed
petitioner’s 13th month pay based on a monthly basic pay of ₱95,000.00; (2) ₱9,802.83 representing the underpayment of the cash
thus, the cash commutation of the leave credits should also be based on equivalent of private respondent’s unused leave credits;
this figure.15
(3) ₱10,000.00 attorney’s fees.
The Labor Arbiter also ruled that petitioner was entitled to a year-end
payment of ₱573,000.00 on the basis of the company policy of granting SO ORDERED.23
yearly lump sum payments to petitioner during all the years of service and
that respondent firm had failed to give petitioner the same benefit for the Petitioner sought reconsideration. In the assailed Resolution dated 27
year 1999 without any explanation.16 June 2005, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition, raising the following issues: No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the
court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis
I. therefor.

WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS’ SUMMARY Obviously, the assailed resolution is not a "decision" within the meaning of
DENIAL OF PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION the Constitutional requirement. This mandate is applicable only in cases
VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT THAT COURT "submitted for decision," i.e., given due course and after filing of briefs or
DECISIONS MUST STATE THE LEGAL AND FACTUAL BASIS memoranda and/or other pleadings, as the case may be.25 The
[THEREOF]. requirement is not applicable to a resolution denying a motion for
reconsideration of the decision. What is applicable is the second paragraph
II of the above-quoted Constitutional provision referring to "motion for
reconsideration of a decision of the court." The assailed resolution
complied with the requirement therein that a resolution denying a motion
WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
for reconsideration should state the legal basis of the denial. It sufficiently
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND ACTED IN WANTON EXCESS
explained that after reading the pleadings filed by the parties, the appellate
OF JURISDICTION IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF [RESPONDENTS]
court did not find any cogent reason to reverse itself.
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WHEN THE RESOLUTION THEREOF
HINGES ON MERE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE.
Next, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in giving due course
to the petition for certiorari when the resolution thereof hinged on mere
III.
evaluation of evidence. Petitioner opines that respondents failed to make
its case in showing that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had exercised
WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS WANTONLY their discretion in an arbitrary and despotic manner.
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN EMPLOYING A LARGER DIVISOR TO
COMPUTE PETITIONER’S DAILY SALARY RATE THEREBY
As a general rule, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of
DIMINISHING HIS BENEFITS, IN [VIOLATION] OF THE LABOR CODE.
Court, the appellate court does not assess and weigh the sufficiency of
evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their
IV. conclusion. The query in this proceeding is limited to the determination of
whether or not the NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or
WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS with grave abuse of discretion in rendering its decision. However, as an
CAPRICIOUSLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE exception, the appellate court may examine and measure the factual
[CONCURRING] FINDINGS OF BOTH LABOR ARBITER AND NLRC ON findings of the NLRC if the same are not supported by substantial
THE COMPENSABLE NATURE OF PETITIONER’S YEAR END [LUMP] evidence.26 The Court has not hesitated to affirm the appellate court’s
SUM PLAY [sic] CLAIM.24 reversals of the decisions of labor tribunals if they are not supported by
substantial evidence.27
Before delving into the merits of the petition, the issues raised by petitioner
adverting to the Constitution must be addressed. Petitioner contends that The Court is not unaware that the appellate court had reexamined and
the Court of Appeals’ resolution which denied his motion for weighed the evidence on record in modifying the monetary award of the
reconsideration violated Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution, which NLRC. The Court of Appeals held that the amount of the year-end lump
states: sum compensation was not fully justified and supported by the evidence
on record. The Court fully agrees that the lump sum award of ₱573,000.00
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing to petitioner seemed to have been plucked out of thin air. Noteworthy is
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. the fact that in his position paper, petitioner claimed that he was entitled to
the amount of ₱674,756.70.28 The variance between the claim and the
amount awarded, with the record bereft of any proof to support either
amount only shows that the appellate court was correct in holding that the hence, the same was payable only after the firm’s annual net income and
award was a mere speculation devoid of any factual basis. In the cash position were determined.
exceptional circumstance as in the instant case, the Court finds no error in
the appellate court’s review of the evidence on record. By definition, a "bonus" is a gratuity or act of liberality of the giver. It is
something given in addition to what is ordinarily received by or strictly due
After an assessment of the evidence on record, the Court of Appeals the recipient.35 A bonus is granted and paid to an employee for his industry
reversed the findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter with respect to the and loyalty which contributed to the success of the employer’s business
award of the year-end lump sum pay and the cash value of petitioner’s and made possible the realization of profits.36Generally, a bonus is not a
leave credits. The appellate court held that while the lump sum payment demandable and enforceable obligation. It is so only when it is made part
was in the nature of a proportionate share in the firm’s annual income to of the wage or salary or compensation. When considered as part of the
which petitioner was entitled, the payment thereof was contingent upon the compensation and therefore demandable and enforceable, the amount is
financial position of the firm. According to the Court of Appeals, since no usually fixed. If the amount would be a contingent one dependent upon the
evidence was adduced showing the net income of the firm for fiscal year realization of the profits, the bonus is also not demandable and
ending 1999 as well as petitioner’s corresponding share therein, the enforceable.37
amount awarded by the labor tribunals was a baseless speculation and as
such must be deleted.29 In the instant case, petitioner’s claim that the year-end lump sum
represented the balance of his total compensation package is incorrect.
On the other hand, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s award of the The fact remains that the amounts paid to petitioner on the two occasions
lump sum payment in the amount of ₱573,000.00 on the basis that the varied and were always dependent upon the firm’s financial position.
payment thereof had become a company policy which could not be
withdrawn arbitrarily. Furthermore, the NLRC held that respondent firm had Moreover, in Philippine Duplicators, Inc. v. NLRC,38 the Court held that if
failed to controvert petitioner’s claim that he was responsible for generating the bonus is paid only if profits are realized or a certain amount of
some ₱7,365,044.47 in cash revenue during the fiscal year ending 1999. productivity achieved, it cannot be considered part of wages. If the desired
goal of production is not obtained, of the amount of actual work
The evidence on record establishes that aside from the basic monthly accomplished, the bonus does not accrue.39 Only when the employer
compensation,30 petitioner received a yearly lump sum amount during the promises and agrees to give without any conditions imposed for its
first two years31 of his employment, with the payments made to him after payment, such as success of business or greater production or output,
the annual net incomes of the firm had been determined. Thus, the does the bonus become part of the wage.40
amounts thereof varied and were dependent on the firm’s cash position
and financial performance.32 In one of the letters of respondent Petitioner’s assertion that he was responsible for generating revenues
Mananghaya to petitioner, the amount was referred to as petitioner’s amounting to more than ₱7 million remains a mere allegation in his
"share in the incentive compensation program."33 pleadings. The records are absolutely bereft of any supporting evidence to
substantiate the allegation.
While the amount was drawn from the annual net income of the firm, the
distribution thereof to non-partners or employees of the firm was not, The granting of a bonus is basically a management prerogative which
strictly speaking, a profit-sharing arrangement between petitioner and cannot be forced upon the employer who may not be obliged to assume
respondent firm contrary to the Court of Appeals’ finding. The payment the onerous burden of granting bonuses or other benefits aside from the
thereof to non-partners of the firm like herein petitioner was discretionary employees’ basic salaries or wages.41 Respondents had consistently
on the part of the chairman and managing partner coming from their maintained from the start that petitioner was not entitled to the bonus as a
authority to fix the compensation of any employee based on a share in the matter of right. The payment of the year-end lump sum bonus based upon
partnership’s net income.34 The distribution being merely discretionary, the the firm’s productivity or the individual performance of its employees was
year-end lump sum payment may properly be considered as a year-end well within respondent firm’s prerogative. Thus, respondent firm was also
bonus or incentive. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the granting of the year-
end lump sum amount was precisely dependent on the firm’s net income;
justified in declining to give the bonus to petitioner on account of the latter’s The Court of Appeals, Labor Arbiter and NLRC used a 30-working day
unsatisfactory performance. divisor instead of 26 days which petitioner insists. The Court of Appeals
relied on Section 2, Rule IV, Book III42 of the implementing rules of the
Petitioner failed to present evidence refuting respondents’ allegation and Labor Code in using the 30-working day divisor. The provision essentially
proof that they received a number of complaints from clients about states that monthly-paid employees are presumed to be paid for all days
petitioner’s "poor services." For purposes of determining whether or not in the month whether worked or not.
petitioner was entitled to the year-end lump sum bonus, respondents were
not legally obliged to raise the issue of substandard performance with The provision has long been nullified in Insular Bank of Asia and American
petitioner, unlike what the Labor Arbiter had suggested. Of course, if what Employees’ Union (IBAAEU) v. Hon. Inciong, etc., et al.,43 where the Court
was in question was petitioner’s continued employment vis-à-vis the ruled that the provision amended the Labor Code’s provisions on holiday
allegations of unsatisfactory performance, then respondent firm was pay by enlarging the scope of their exclusion.44 In any case, the provision
required under the law to give petitioner due process to explain his side is inapplicable to the instant case because it referred to the computation of
before instituting any disciplinary measure. However, in the instant case, holiday pay for monthly-paid employees.
the granting of the year-end lump sum bonus was discretionary and
conditional, thus, petitioner may not question the basis for the granting of Petitioner’s claim that respondent firm used a 26-working day divisor is
a mere privilege. 1avvph!1

supported by the evidence on record. In a letter addressed to

With regard to the computation of the cash equivalent of petitioner’s leave petitioner,45 respondents’ counsel expressly admitted that respondent
credits, the Court of Appeals used a base figure of ₱71,250.00 used a 26-working day divisor. The Court is perplexed why the tribunals
representing petitioner’s monthly salary as opposed to ₱95,000.00 used below used a 30-day divisor when there was an express admission on
by the Labor Arbiter and NLRC. Meanwhile, respondents insist on a base respondents’ part that they used a 26-day divisor in the cash commutation
figure of only ₱61,000.00, which excludes the advance incentive pay of of leave credits. Thus, with a monthly compensation of ₱95,000.00 and
₱15,000.00, transportation allowance of ₱15,000.00 and representation using a 26-working day divisor, petitioner’s daily rate is ₱3,653.85.46 Based
allowance of ₱4,000.00, which petitioner regularly received every month. on this rate, petitioner’s cash equivalent of his leave credits of 23.5 is
Because of a lower base figure (representing the monthly salary) used by ₱85,865.48.47 Since petitioner has already received the amount
the appellate court, the cash equivalent of petitioner’s leave credits was ₱46,009.67, a balance of ₱39,855.80 remains payable to petitioner.
lowered from ₱28,407.08 to ₱9,802.83. lawphil.net

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is PARTLY

The monthly compensation of ₱71,250.00 used as base figure by the Court GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
of Appeals is totally without basis. As correctly held by the Labor Arbiter 85038 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that respondents are liable
and the NLRC, the evidence on record reveals that petitioner was receiving for the underpayment of the cash equivalent of petitioner’s leave credits in
a monthly compensation of ₱95,000.00 consisting of a basic salary of the amount of ₱39,855.80.
₱61,000.00, advance incentive pay of ₱15,000.00, transportation
allowance of ₱15,000.00 and representation allowance of ₱4,000.00. SO ORDERED.
These amounts totaling ₱95,000.00 are all deemed part of petitioner’s
monthly compensation package and, therefore, should be the basis in the
DANTE O. TINGA
cash commutation of the petitioner’s leave credits. These allowances were
Associate Justice
customarily furnished by respondent firm and regularly received by
petitioner on top of the basic monthly pay of ₱61,000.00. Moreover, the
Labor Arbiter noted that respondent firm’s act of paying petitioner a 13th
month-pay at the rate of ₱95,000.00 was an admission on its part that
petitioner’s basic monthly salary was ₱95,000.00