Handbook Analogy2015 PDF
Handbook Analogy2015 PDF
Handbook Analogy2015 PDF
HANDBOOK
Edited by
Katarzyna Gan-Krzywoszyńska
Małgorzata Leśniewska
Przemysław Krzywoszyński
Piotr Leśniewski
HANDBOOK OF THE
FIRST WORLD CONGRESS ON ANALOGY
www.uni-log.org/analogy2015
Handbook of the First World Congress on Analogy
EDITED BY
Katarzyna Gan-Krzywoszyńska, Małgorzata Leśniewska,
Przemysław Krzywoszyński, Piotr Leśniewski
COPYRIGHT BY
Katarzyna Gan-Krzywoszyńska, Małgorzata Leśniewska,
©
Przemysław Krzywoszyński, Piotr Leśniewski, 2015
Publishing House KONTEKST, Poland, 2015
ISBN 978-83-65275-01-1
www.uni-log.org/analogy2015
Printed in Poland
POZNAŃ – POLAND
[email protected]
www.wkn.com.pl
Contents
Notes ...................................................................................................................... 69
If two things are analogous, they are different but in some way similar. What
kind of similarity is it and what is its value? How can analogy be used to develop
knowledge and understanding? These are the sort of questions that will be addressed
in the First Congress of Analogy. Well, there is another issue. The following passage is
in (Hofstadter & Sander 2013):
Yes, analogies manipulate us, and yes, we are enchained by them. This
is a fact that we simply must recognize. Not only are we prisoners of the
known and the familiar, but we are serving a life term. But luckily for us, we
have the power to enlarge our prison over and over again, indeed without
any limits . Only the known can free us from the known. 3
So the question arises: are we really enslaved by analogies? Or maybe the situation
is completely different, and the processes of analogy-making should be considered
rather as ways of liberating human minds, and our culture in consequence? After all,
1
(Bonowicz 2010: 5)
2
(Ortega y Gasset 1963: 38)
3
(Hofstadter & Sander 2013: 315)
Bibliography
Bonowicz, W. (2010). Kapelusz na wodzie. Gawędy o księdzu Tischnerze. Kraków: Znak.
Hofstadter, D., Sander, E. (2013). Surfaces and Essences. Analogy as The Fuel and Fire of
Thinking. New York: Basic Books.
Ortega y Gasset J. (1914), Meditaciones del Quijote, Madrid: Publicaciones de la Residencia de
Estudiantes.
Chair
Juan Manuel CAMPOS BENÍTEZ (Meritorious Autonomous University of Puebla)
Co-Chair
Katarzyna GAN-KRZYWOSZYŃSKA (Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland)
Mauricio Beuchot
We go on, using the idea of Robert Blanché, by extending this square into
a hexagon where analogy is defined as different but similar, in the same way that
optional is defined as allowed but not obligatory in the deontic hexagon.
ἐν ἑνὶ γάρ...
τὰ ὄντα πάντα καὶ προέχει,
Dionysius the Areopagite
Deus in se praehabet
omnes perfectiones creaturarum
Thomas Aquinas
Edith Stein (1891-1942), a member of the early circle around Edmund Husserl,
worked out her own phenomenological view of the analogia entis in the context of
doctrines of St. Thomas Aquinas and the commentaries of the Neo-Thomist scholar
Joseph Gredt. Her study of analogy, contained in her major work, Endliches und
ewiges Sein (finite and eternal being), is an example of her dual purpose to “search
for the meaning of being” and to “fuse Medieval thought with the lively thought
of today”. I believe Stein’s original insights have a contribution to make to current
discussions of analogy (of which this Congress is a notable example).
Analogy received its classical statement in the Middle Ages from Aquinas and
John Duns Scotus, and was later “commented on” by Cajetan (Thomas de Vio) and
others in Renaissance Scholasticism and more recently by Neo-Scholastics like Gredt--
and Edith Stein herself. The basic question is how --or whether-- we may validly use
the same names of both God and creatures. The approach is then linguistic (about
words), but also noetic (about concepts) and ontological (about the analogy of being).
7 Dionysius, “for in one all beings are pre-had”, De divinis nominibus, c.5; Aquinas, “God pre-
has all the perfections of creatures in Himself”, Summa Theologiae 1:13:2; Stein, “everything finite
--both what it is and its being-- must be pre-patterned in God”, Endliches und ewiges Sein, 290.
Commenting on Heidegger’s work, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, Stein
asks whether, as he claims, we must renounce the “arrogance” of wishing to speak
of the “being-in-itself”. By recognizing our very “being-but-something”, she answers,
we break through to the “everything”; but “analogically”: as magis ignotum quam
notum. She quotes John of the Cross:
Pavel Arazim
Kant offered an overall model of our cognitive faculties in which geometry and
logic were given quite a special place. And not only his view of geometry and logic are
analogous but also their subsequent development. A development which was very
surprising from the Kantian point of view.
Geometry, according to Kant, describes the essential structural features of our
intuition which make perception as a kind of cognition possible at all. Similarly logic
describes the essential features of our conceptual cognition. Both are thus given a
very prominent status, they in an important sense precede all the other disciplines.
Indeed, they form the very foundations of our knowledge. It thus appears to be as
good as impossible to somehow radically change them on the basis of needs of a
different discipline. As they are the sources of the very possibility of knowledge, it
can hardly happen that any other discipline could exercise any authority over them.
In addition to that, geometry and logic are concerned with two radically different
cognitive spheres, the sensory and the conceptual one and therefore they cannot
interfere.
Bibliography
Anzaldúa, Gloria, Borderlands/La Frontera (Aunt Lute: San Francisco, 1987).
Frye, Marilyn, The Politics of Reality (The Crossing Press: Trumansburg, NY, 1983).
Kaplan, Caren, “The politics of location as transnational feminist cultural practice”, Scattered
Hegemonies: Postmodernity and Transnational Feminist Practices, edited by Inderpaul Grewal
and Caren Kaplan (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1994), pp. 137-152.
Lugones, María, “On Borderlands/La Frontera: An interpretive essay”, Hypatia 7:4 (1992),
pp. 31-37.
Lugones, María, Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes; Theorizing Coalition Against Multiple Oppressions
(Rowman & Littlefield: Oxford, 2003).
Lugones, María, “Playfulness, ‘world’-travelling, and loving perception”, Hypatia 2:2 (1987),
pp. 3-19.
Ortega, Mariana, “Being lovingly, knowingly ignorant: White feminism and women of
color”, Hypatia 21:3 (2006), pp. 56-74.
So far we are talking about things, but analogy also refers to terms. Indeed, we say
that terms may be analogous, equivocal or univocal terms. The square of terms is this
Univocal Equivocal
Non-equivocal Non-univocal
Which can be extended into a hexagon, as we have seen. Analogy is out of the
square, at the bottom, and implies the “particular” corners. Universal corners imply
the contradictory of analogy, at the top of the square.
Notice that we have three term-negations in these squares (“dissimilarity”, “non-
equivocal” and “non-univocal”) and this could bring about some problems for we
Bibliography
Jean-Yves Béziau, (2012),“The Power of the Hexagon”, in Logica Universalis, Vol. 6, No. 1-2,
1-43.
Tomás de Mercado (1571), Comentarii lucidisimi in textum Petri Hispani, Sevilla
Alonso de la Veracruz (1572), Recognitio summularum, Salamanca
If some analogical arguments are true and contentful, what must be the case?
This paper argues that in order for analogical arguments (in the form of simple similes
such as “He is like a bulldozer,” simple similarity claims such as, “The rose is like the
carnation,” to more complex forms such as, “A fish is to a school like a tree is to a
forest,” or, “The Theban war on their neighbors, the Phocians, was evil; so, too, would
an Athenian War on the Thebans be evil”), a number of presuppositions are required.
These presuppositions are:
Any satisfactory account of similarity claims must also be able to give an account
of these six conditions. The implication is that when one invokes analogical reasoning,
one is assuming a metaphysical and epistemological system in which all six conditions
hold.
Reflecting on Satosi Wanatabe's work on the so called “Ugly Duckling Theorem,”
this paper argues given that analogical arguments operate outside a purely formal
space, and given predication we can make well-formed and informative analogical
claims. In his work with Boolean lattices, Wanatabe demonstrates that within this
formal space all objects will share an identical number of similarities with all other
objects. Hence, not only is everything similar to everything else, but it is as similar
to the same magnitude. We do not find that to be the case in our experience of the
world in which we do find a non-biased inferential basis of discrimination girding our
ability to make true and informative similarity claims. The implication is that similarity
is then not a formal property, but instead a instead a cognitive, cultural, linguistic or
My proposal is for a work about life and love based on an analogy between two
texts. The first is a letter written by the French writer George Sand to her ex-lover,
another French writer, Alfred Musset. The second is a poem, “L’évadé (The Escapee)”,
written by the French poet Boris Vian.
Both texts present a way of life, but each is based on a special conception of
love. In these two texts, love is the most important value in the model of a good life.
However, behind the obvious common points between them, many differences are
hidden.
I begin my work with a definition of “analogy” and a short presentation of the texts
and their authors. Next, the similarities and differences between them are discussed.
Lastly, I explain how these differences enlighten us about the special message of each
text.
[…] L'amour est un temple que bâtit […] Love is a temple a lover builds to
celui qui aime à un objet plus ou moins whomsoever is worthy of his or her
digne de son culte, et ce qu'il y a de worship to some degree or another,
plus beau dans cela, ce n'est pas tant le and the beauty of it lies not so much
dieu que l'autel. Pourquoi craindrais-tu in the god but in the altar. Why would
de te risquer ? Que l'idole reste debout you shrink away from it? Whether the
longtemps ou qu'elle se brise bientôt, idol stands for a long while or is soon
tu n'en auras pas moins bâti un beau broken, you will have built a beautiful
temple. Ton âme l'aura habité, elle temple. Your soul will have inhabited
l'aura rempli d'un encens divin, et une this temple and filled it with divine
âme comme la tienne doit produire incense, and a soul like yours must
de grandes œuvres. Le dieu changera create great works. The god may
peut-être, le temple durera autant que change, but the temple will last as long
toi. Ce sera un lieu de refuge sublime as you live. It will be a sublime refuge
où tu iras retremper ton cœur à la where the eternal flame will ignite your
flamme éternelle, et ce cœur sera assez heart anew – a heart that will be as rich
riche, assez puissant pour renouveler and powerful as to find a new divinity
la divinité, si la divinité déserte son when its predecessor has been toppled
piédestal. Crois-tu qu'un amour ou from its pedestal. Do you think one or
Lettre de George Sand à Alfred Musset George Sand, letter to Alfred de Musset
Venise, le 15 juin 1834 Venice, 15th June 1834
Les canons d'acier bleu crachaient The steel blue guns spitting
De courtes flammes de feu sec Rapid bursts of fire
Pourvu qu'ils me laissent le temps If they could just give me time
Il est arrivé près de l'eau He reached the water’s edge
Il avait eu le temps de voir He'd had the time to fill his eyes
Le temps de boire à ce ruisseau Time to drink from the creek
Le temps de porter à sa bouche Time to bring to his lips
Deux feuilles gorgées de soleil Two sun-soaked leaves
Vian Boris, 2004: «L’évadé» in Textes et chansons, textes choisis, mis en forme et annotés
par Noël Arnaud, Paris, Christian Bourgois éditeur, pp. 133-134.
English translation: Aimée Orsini – independent translator, Nancy, France
After taking into account some logical attributes of diagrammatic reasoning, and
with the previous mapping in mind, we suggest some logical attributes of analogical
reasoning: i) that analogical reasoning provides a heuristic; ii) that analogical
reasoning supports a variety of visual inferences; and iii) that it grants the possibility
of applying operational constraints by providing algorithmicity.
Finally, we give some examples of how the above attributes of diagrammatic
reasoning can be used to understand analogy in philosophy (hermeneutics), artificial
intelligence (machine learning), linguistics (pictographic Esperanto), electronics
(hardware design), software design (programming), mathematics (category theory),
logic (diagrammatic reasoning), problem-solving (mechanical reasoning), liberal arts
(music and labanotation), and board games (chess).
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
8 Author acknowledges the support of the Spanish Ministry for Economy and Innovation and
the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF/FEDER) under grant TIN2014-56633-C3-1-R.
Reference: http://remuemeninges.chez.com/scalef.htm
Jean-Yves Béziau has put forward a number of arguments for the following claim
(cf. [2-5]):
Axiomatic Emptiness: A logical structure can be defined without appealing to any
axioms
which is one of the central features of his version of Universal Logic. In this talk
I will focus only on one of those arguments, which is analogical:
(P1) A logical structure is similar to an algebraic structure.
(P2) An algebraic structure can be defined without appealing to any axioms.
(C) Therefore, a logical structure can be defined without appealing to any axioms.
It can be, and has been, contested whether the similarity between logical
structures and algebraic structures is strong enough to warrant even claims less
controversial than Axiomatic Emptiness (cf. [1], [7], [8]), and this undermines the
overall plausibility (cf. [9]) of the argument.
Béziau himself seems to strengthen his argument by the following methodological
principle:
Jump into Abstraction: If a more abstract notion of the x’s allows a more general,
unified theory about the x’s, then that more abstract notion should be adopted.
Thus, a more abstract notion of logical structure, sufficiently similar to that of
algebraic structure, will allow a more general and unified theory of logics, that is,
Universal Logic, just like a more abstract notion of algebraic structure allowed a more
general and unified theory of algebras, that is, Universal Algebra. The problem is that
if this is the defense of Jump into Abstraction for the case of logic, it rests again on an
analogical argument which depends on a still unwarranted analogy between logical
structures and algebraic structures.
I will argue that Axiomatic Emptiness could be defended on better grounds, either
by a direct argument or through an argument from Jump into Abstraction to the
principle
Subject-Matter Emptiness: A logical structure is just a mathematical structure, not
a model, nor a codification of a kind of reasoning.
This could serve to justify better (P1), or at least to block all the usual misgivings
about it. But in the presence of either the direct argument for Axiomatic Emptiness
or Subject-Matter Emptiness, no analogical argument invoking algebra is needed to
Bibliography:
[1] Beall, JC and G. Restall (2006): Logical Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[2] Béziau, J.-Y. (1994): “Universal logic”, in T. Childers and O. Majer (Eds.), Logica ’94 –
Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium. Prague: Czech Academy of Sciences, pp. 73-
93.
[3] Béziau, J.-Y. (2005): “From consequence operator to universal logic: A survey of general
abstract logics”, in J.-Y. Béziau (Ed.), Logica Universalis. Towards a General Theory of Logic.
Germany: Birkhäuser Verlag, pp. 3-17.
[4] Béziau, J.-Y. (2006): “13 questions about Universal Logic”, Bulletin of the Section of Logic,
35(2-3): 133-150.
[5] Béziau, J.-Y. (2010a): “What is a logic? – Towards axiomatic emptiness”, Logical
Investigations 16: 272-279.
[6] Béziau, J.-Y. (2010b): “Logic is not logic”, Abstracta 6(1): 73-102.
[7] Dummett, M. (1998): “Truth from the constructive standpoint”, Theoria 64(2-3): 122-
138.
[8] Quine, W. V. (1970): Philosophy of Logic. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
[9] Woods, J., A. Irvine and D. Walton (2004): Argument: Critical Thinking, Logic and the
Fallacies, second edition, Toronto: Prentice-Hall.
Fig. 1.
The model of a compassionate individual – a model referred to here as Homo compassibilis
– results in the following hexagon (Fig. 2):
Fig. 2.
The question posed by Littell in Les Bienveillantes – following the guidelines by Theodor Adorno, Giorgio
Agamben, Zygmunt Bauman, and Tadeusz Borowski – should be then considered as a measure of the
issue of cultural responsibility and/or responsibility in culture.
On Analogies in Zoology
Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
In (Prade and Richard, 2009) a restricted study of analogy was developed through
the notion of analogical proportions, i.e. sequences of inferences of the form a is
to b as c is to d. They define three kinds of analogical proportions: analogy, reverse
analogy, and paralogy. In (Prade and Richard, 2013) and (Prade and Richard, 2014)
four kinds of analogy are defined: analogy, paralogy, reverse analogy and reverse
paralogy. In all of these works analogy are analyzed in a Boolean sense taking an
account of analogy in a logical terms.
Our hypothesis is that if we take the restricted notion of analogy in the sense
of the mentioned works, analogy could be seem as a modal operator. We proceed
as follows. First we define a modal propositional language with four basic modal
operators. In the second place we define a model based on a relational structure with
four types of relations defined as the four heterogeneous analogies. Our technique is
to interpret the analogical proportions as fourfold relations between temporal points.
In this sense, the formulas related by the analogical temporal operators are truth in
points that hold some analogical proportion.
One of the main results of this approach is that we could dualize the analogical
proportions and define a strong notions of analogy, paralogy, reverse analogy, and
reverse paralogy, respectively; that means that there could be not only four analogical
proportions but eight. Another result is given by the properties of the four analogical
proportions. We analyze it in terms of modal formulas and to conclude we present
the graphic interpretation of them based on the relations of temporal points.
Bibliography:
H. Prade, G. Richard. 2009. “Analogy, Paralogy and Reverse Analogy: Postulates and
Inferences”, in B. Mertsching, M. Hund, and Z. Aziz (Eds.): LNAI 5803. Springer-Verlag Berlin
Heidelberg. 306 - 314.
H. Prade, G. Richard, 2013. “From Analogical Proportion to Logical Proportions”, in Logica
Universalis 7, J.-Y. Beziau (Ed.). Springer Basel. 441_505.
H. Prade, G. Richard, 2014. “From Analogical Proportion to Logical Proportions: A Survey”,
in H. Prade and G. Richard (Eds.), Computational Approaches to Analogical 1 Reasoning: Current
Trends, Studies in Computational Intelligence 548. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. 217-240.
In this paper, we discuss the relationship between analogy and metaphor in light
of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Wittgenstein bequeathed to us the methodological
concepts of “language-games”, “family resemblance” and “forms of life”. We will use
these concepts to explore the notions of analogy and metaphor and the relationship
between them. With help of Wittgenstein, we will clarify their meaning, as well as
the meaning of words and propositions that depend on their use in specific contexts.
We examine selected examples of the use of analogy and metaphor in poetry, a genre
where they are often found.
In Part II, Section XI of his Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein
asserts that a proper grasp of the concept of perception can elucidate issues related to
understanding the meaning of words. The concept of “seeing as” plays an important
role in achieving this objective. “Seeing as” will help us establish the rules that govern
“language-games” and the meanings we give to the words which are used in them.
When the reader of a poem finds a metaphor, an analogy, or both, his perception is
altered; the meaning is not literal. “Seeing as” is the modification of meaning and
perception. It involves seeing something in a way other than expected: “seeing as”
involves the aspect of chance. That is, the experience of “seeing as” is an aspect of
perception. It is a new perception that allows for the interpretation, perception and
meaning of metaphor and analogy.
In “seeing continuously” there is no chance for perception. “Seeing continuously”
maintains the meaning of analogy and of metaphor as nonsense. “Seeing as” figurates
the word, the thing. It modifies our (personal) experience.
Finally, we conclude that the clarification of analogy and metaphor allows us
to appreciate the importance they have in poetic language and natural language.
Analogy and metaphor expand the semantic meaning of words, and modify our
perception, interpretation and experience of them.
From the distinction made by Theology between Nature and Person we can
understand human realization as starting from a dynamism with goes beyond potency
and act. This is about that potentiality to grow into being in virtue of an energeia
which comes from the divine reality that transforms the person raising up her to an
unprecedented state and disproportionate to her nature. The knowledge of this new
reality requires methodological criterion that allows the person, through a leap (as
Kierkegaard pointed out), be separated from a certain qualitative sphere to enter a
new one. This way, which we might call "katalogical", assumes that the truth of the
person is accessible in a movement which goes from top to bottom.
Despite the importance of the katalogical way to recognize the qualitative
difference and irreducibleness of different ontological orders, the one-sidedness of
this approach could prevent recognition of their possible relationships, marginalizing
them to the realm of the irrational and nonsense. To the extent that reality is a unit
and polar configured, it should be thought in such a way that its various areas be
integrated into the unit. Thus emerges as a methodological requirement to apply the
katalogical via alongside with the analogical way.
Bibliography
Massimo Serretti, (2008), L’uomo è persona. Roma.
Romano Guardini (1994), Unterscheidung des Christlichen. Gesammelte Studien. 1923-
1963, Bd. I, Mainz-Paderborn.
The different theories of argumentation created along the twenty Century, have
as a fundament the idea of the human agreements can be resolved without arrived in
to the violence. In effect, Perelman (1989), Toulmin (2007) and Van Eemeren (2006)
pretend that their theorical-methodological proposals being a practical support for
the solution of the human conflicts. However, these models of argumentation are
not the first into the history that began from the same fundament. In fact, in the
born of the dialectic, and the rhetoric, and logic, in the fourth Century B.C., Plato and
Aristotle created one argumentative model with the same intention: the solution of
human conflicts. One common element in all this subjects is the analogy.
One of the processes who are present in any conception of the argumentation
is the refutation. The refutation is presented in all the theories of argumentation
because it consist in a rational attack to the arguments of somebody who proposes
to support his conclusion. And, the first in theorizing about this topic was Aristotle in
his Sophistic Elenchus. But Aristole does not began to think about the refutation from
nothing. He founded inspiration in the writings of his master, Plato. In this context,
we ask: are the theories of argumentation are complitly originals or they take up
theorical elements of Aristotle’s dialectics?
In this paper, we maintain that: the idea of refutation, in the news theories of
argumentation, is focused in new ways; and its conceptualization is original. Besides,
we try to set up a relation between refutation and analogy in Perelman theory.
The aim of the talk is to analyze some basic analogies between institutions of
direct democracy in Latin America and Europe. In accordance with contemporary
theories of democracy, elections constitute fundamental factor in the functioning of
the system, while referenda are regarded generally only as a complementary and
supporting element of representative government. However, the referendum, as the
most common institution of direct democracy, can express the people’s decisions,
opinions (means of consultation) and/or support, and also helps to distinguish and
characterize the main types of contemporary democratic systems.
In the first part of the talk, we will present several analogies between political
systems based on possible uses of referenda, as well as the problems connected
with voting in general. Alongside the problem of turnout and threshold within direct
democracy, we will place special emphasis on a formal analysis of questions and
answers concerning of referendum.
In the second part, we will briefly introduce the historical context of modern
democracy, especially the heritage of the French Revolution the independence
process in Latin America, and the mutual influences between the two. Subsequently,
we will analyse some examples of European and Latin American referenda, from late
the 1980s the present time, i.e.: in Poland (1987), France, Netherlands, Spain (2005),
Crimea, Scotland, Catalonia (2014), Argentina (1984), Chile (1988), Bolivia (2009) and
the Falklands (2013). Some analogies can be observed both in the applications and
results of these referenda, which were used to support new acts (e.g. constitution),
governments, independence movements or declarations of autonomy, protest against
the government or regime, and the rights of minorities; nonetheless, they also served
in some cases to underpin non-democratic systems.
Bibliography
Lobovikov, Vladimir (2007). Mathematical Ethics, Metaphysics, and the Natural Law
(Algebra of Metaphysics as Algebra of Formal Axiology). Yekaterinburg: Institute of Philosophy
and Law of the Ural Branch of the Academy of Sciences, 408 p.
Newton, Isaac, Sir (1994). “Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy.” In: Mortimer
J. Adler (Ed.). Great Books of the Western World. V. 32: Newton. Huygens. Auckland; London;
Madrid; Manila; Paris; Rome; Seoul; Sydney; Tokyo; Toronto: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. P.
1-372.
Schopenhauer, Arthur (2000). Parerga and Paralipomena. Vol. 2: Short Philosophical
Essays. Translated and edited by E. F. J. Payne. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 720 p.
Three squares are presented, though not of main interest, in the paper “The
Theory of Quaternality”. They are the propositional square, the quantificational
square and the square for modalities. Interestingly enough, they are sketched in
order to illustrate the structure of a deeper square called square of quaternality “of
which the classical squares of opposition are special cases”. All of them satisfy the
contradual, dual and negational rules. However, in spite of that the propositional
square do not present immediate problems, applied to the square of predicates the
rules are broken in virtue of the conjunction presented in the down edges. That is,
the original formula that has an operation of entailment do not have their dual in
the square. That can be proven since a tableaux for the sentential calculus by the
transpose rule.
Having said that, I will argue that this particular difference can give rise to a
comparison between those squares and for that they only can be said analogical
in some aspects. Moreover, adding a explicit quantifier and applying the rules of
quaternals, we can get an unusual square (disparatae) found in Buridan that do not
have the classical relations except the contradiction. The same is hold in the square
for modalities with a further operator though it preserves the rules of quaternals.
Bibliography
Gottschalk, W. H. “The Theory of Quaternality”. The Journal of Symbolic Logic 18:(3), 193-
196, 1953.
Campos J. M. “El octágono medieval de Oposición para oraciones con predicados
cuantificados”. Tópicos. 44, 177-205, 2013.
Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz (1648-1695) was one of the most gifted New Spain
intellectual and literary giants, although she lived the greater part of her life as a
cloistered nun in Mexico City. She was self-taught but her literary works show that
her writings were influenced by profound and scholarly readings that followed
three philosophical lines of thought. The “official” New Spain intellectual trend was
Thomistic Scholasticism which is clearly seen in First Dream with a marked tendency
towards Aristotelianism. Humanistic Renaissance thought was represented in an
eclectic mix of Hermetic Philosophy and certain Neo-Platonic Hellenistic doctrines.
Because of her close friendships with other Colonial Mexican intellectuals such as
Carlos de Sigüenza y Góngora, she also had knowledge of Cartesian Rationalism. First
Dream is Sor Juana’s most personal work which many call a philosophical, spiritual,
verse autobiography.
The Melancholy caused by absence or of thwarted efforts to reach the Divine
is a constant theme in Early Modern Art and Literature. For example, Panofsky’s
study of Dürer’s Melancholia 1, reveals the woeful striving of winged Melancholia
to glimpse and take in Saturn’s rays which are both the cause of sickness and the
cure for the genius’s “divine frenzy”. In First Dream, the poetic subject struggles to
overcome her intellectual and human limitations so as to gaze into the eyes of the
Supreme. In the first section of the 975 verse silva, the subject’s inner eye is detained
at the edge of the concave sub-lunar world and must devise a way to intellectually
pierce that ontological membrane so as to reach the convex spiritual sphere where
the unintelligible divine territory begins.
The first part of the poem is developed through a series of analogies between
the macrocosm and the microcosm. The attempt to override the material word and
use Aristotelian universals as a means to fathom the unfathomable is also another
example Sor Juana’s use of a methodology based on analogies. The endeavor to gaze
into the face of the First Cause cannot be achieved through analogies and the poem
ends with the failure of human analogic cognition.
In this presentation I aim to show that the classic concept of “analogy” can be
interpreted in topological terms. The vagueness of how “alike” two objects are, can
be tackled by a consideration of their topological and group properties. That is, two
objects can be put in a relationship of mapping, and the likeness would depend on
which properties are preserved through the morphism, including their local and/
global character.
The concept of analogy, as it is well known, plays a key role in Aristotle and
scholastic philosophy. In the former, being is structured by relationships of genus and
species in a vertical tree-like structure. Analogy, however, allows a sort of horizontal
linking of beings. Originally, analogy meant so much as proportion, like in the case A is
to B as C is to D. Or, in its abbreviated form, as in the so-called golden-ratio: A is to B as
B is to AB. But there is in Plato and later in Aristotle´s Rhetoric and Prior Analytics an
“extension” from a pure quantitative to a qualitative use of analogy. Aristotle speaks
of two types of analogy: paradeigma and homoiotes, both capable of being used in
deductive arguments.
But we should not interpret analogy in a pure linguistic way. In Aristotle, categories
are necessarily both linguistic and ontological. In medieval thought it is clear that
some words are univocal and some are equivocal. But there is a third term, again,
between pure difference and identity: analogy. As in Aristotle, analogy allows to link
beings in a semi-proper manner. There will be different orders of analogy, types and
uses. But beside the more or less reasonable similarities, analogy resembles many
types what we could call a metaphor. Now metaphor lacks of scientific rigor. Not
because science cannot resort to analogies between realms, but because metaphors
cannot be evaluated. There are no objective degrees of likeness or at least criteria to
evaluate how adequate or inadequate a metaphor is.
It is in the Renaissance philosophy however, where analogy gains a radically
new significance, as it is linked to mathematical structures. Indeed, there was surely
an indiscriminate use of vague similarities between the farthest regions of being,
especially between the macro- and the micro-world, between cosmos and man,
where nature would show correspondences in all scales and places. But at the same
time, such resemblances were more and more expressed in terms of mathematics.
It was not only proportion or metaphor, but a more general term which emerged
As pre-scientifical cognitive tool, the analogy is very important during the Middle
Ages and the Renaissance. Although it underlies the metaphor in rhetorics, the
analogy as similitudo comes under dialectics, in its theorization of the Renaissance
(by Rudolf Agricola or Ramus). This « locus » of dialectical invention allows to build
up semantical nets with surprizing extension according to the historical moment. This
contribution proposes to study this major theme in its historical changes from the
Middle Ages to the Renaissance in the erudite literature, like the Roman de la Rose or
Placides et Timeo, first doxographical dialogue in vernacular language, then in various
dialogues of the XVIth century (for example, Pontus de Tyard for the Pléiade or Pierre
Viret for the Reformation, among others ; the last author using in his Dialogues of the
desorder (1545) the mirror of animals for the socratical quest of the self). At least,
it shows how this instrument for cognition and for discursive cornucopia binds man
with cosmos in various beautiful proportions.
Catherine Chantilly
The Self-Portrait
Catherine Chantilly is a French artist. She lives between Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and
Vichy, France, but she is presently in California for 2015 with her fiancé, a researcher
in logic. They travel around the world, with her making exhibitions during their
journeys in Brazil, Chile, Portugal, France, Poland, Canada, Turkey, and Mexico.
She graduated in fine Art from Ecole des Beaux-Arts de Bourges in France. She
also has a master of civilization and literature from the University of Nice. She has
organized multidisciplinary workshops on art and creation, in castles in Auvergne, with
artists, philosophers, choreographers, writers and musicians.
Catherine Chantilly's paintings are inspired by love. For her – colour – is light, and
light is love. She likes to discover new places and feel the atmosphere. Brazil was one
There is a very old account to the problem of beauty - according to Aquinas beauty
includes three conditions, namely (1) integrity (perfection) [Latin integritas sive
perfectio], (2) proportion (harmony) [proportio sive consonantia], and (3) brightness
(clarity) [claritas]. [See Summa Theologiae I, q. 39, a. 8.] It seems to us that the very
last word is a perfect, although only one of the possible keywords, crucial for the
interpretation and the understanding of Catherine Chantilly's painting. It should be
added that this article of Summa Theologica is a part of inquiries in relations between
three divine persons.
* The motto of our sketch, which states that all religious rituals are attributable to
children’s games is the reverse of Giorgio Agamben's view, expressed in an interview given by
him to René Aguigah and Jutta Person. It was published in the Literaturen journal on 28 October
2009 and titled Der Papst ist ein weltlicher Priester.