KOIKE VS KOIKE

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1are the Decision2 dated July 31, 2014 and the Resolution3 dated November 28, 2014, of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106 (RTC), in Sp. Proc. No. Q-13-72692, denying petitioner's petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code.

The Facts

Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were married on
June 14, 2005 in Quezon City, Philippines.4 Their union bore two children, Masato Koike, who was born on January 23, 2006, and Fuka Koike who
was born on April 4, 2007.5

On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for divorce 6 before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture,
Japan. They were divorced on even date as appearing in the Divorce Certificate7 and the same was duly recorded in the Official Family Register
ofMichiyuki Koike.8

Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of Marriage 9 on file with the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen
filed on February 7, 2013 a petition10 for judicial recognition of ioreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code11 before the RTC, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-13-72692.

At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition. 12 On the other hand, Doreen presented several foreign documents, namely, "Certificate of
Receiving/ Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce"13 and "Family Register of Michiyuki Koike"14 both issued by the Mayor of Ichinomiya City and
duly authenticated by the Consul of the Republic of the Philippines for Osaka, Japan. She also presented a certified machine copy of a document
entitled "Divorce Certificate" issued by the Consul for the Ambassador of Japan in Manila that was authenticated by the Department of the Foreign
Affairs, as well as a Certification15 issued by the City Civil Registry Office in Manila that the original of said divorce certificate was filed and
recorded in the said Office. In addition, photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and their corresponding English translation, as well as two (2) books
entitled "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" 16 and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009" 17 were likewise submitted as proof of the existence of Japan's law
on divorce.18

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision19 dated July 31, 2014, the RTC denied Doreen's petition, ruling that in an action for recognition of foreign divorce decree pursuant to
Article 26 of the Family Code, the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce must
be proven in accordance with Sections 2420 and 2521 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The RTC ruled that while the divorce
documents presented by Doreen were successfully proven to be public or official records of Japan, she nonetheless fell short of proving the national
law of her husband, particularly the existence of the law on divorce. The RTC observed that the "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" and "The Civil
Code of Japan 2009," presented were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan as required by Sections 24 and 25 of the said Rules,
adding too that the testimony of Doreen relative to the applicable provisions found therein and its effect on the matrimonial relations was insufficient
since she was not presented as a qualified expert witness nor was shown to have, at the very least, a working knowledge of the laws of Japan,
particularly those on family relations and divorce. It likewise did not consider the said books as learned treatises pursuant to Section 46,22Rule 130
of the Revised Rules on Evidence, since no expert witness on the subject matter was presented and considering further that Philippine courts cannot
take judicial notice of foreignjudgments and law.23

Doreen's motion for reconsideration24 was denied in a Resolution25 dated November 28, 2014; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce.1âwphi1

The Court's Ruling

At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of
the Family Code - which addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner - allows a Filipino spouse to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The provision reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis
supplied)

Under the above-highlighted paragraph, the law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino
spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. 26

In Corpuz v. Sta. Tomas,27the Court had the occasion to rule that:

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws.1âwphi1 Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment
rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules
on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The
recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an
integral aspect of his claim or defense.28 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citation omitted)
Thus, in Garcia v. Recio,29 it was pointed out that in order for a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse to be recognized in our jurisdiction, it
must be shown that the divorce decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law
of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. 30 Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on
evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.31

Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter
are essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a
question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review.

Well entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose findings on
these matters are received with respect and are in fact binding subject to certain exceptions. 32 In this regard, it is settled that appeals taken from
judgments or final orders rendered by RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law
should be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) in accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. 33

Nonetheless, despite the procedural restrictions on Rule 45 appeals as above-adverted, the Court may refer the case to the CA under paragraph 2,
Section 6 of Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. -x x x

An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court submitting issues of fact may be referred to the Court of Appeals
for decision or appropriate action. The determination of the Supreme Court on whether or not issues of fact are involved shall be final.

This, notwithstanding the express provision under Section 5 (f) thereof that an appeal likewise "may" be dismissed when there is error irr the choice
or mode of appeal.34

Since the said Rules denote discretion on the part of the Court to either dismiss the appeal or refer the case to the CA, the question of fact involved in
the instant appeal and substantial ends of justice warrant that the case be referred to the CA for further appropriate proceedings. It bears to stress that
procedural rules were intended to ensure proper administration of law and justice. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice. A deviation from its rigid enforcement may thus be allowed to
attain its prime objective, for after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of the courts. 35

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the case is hereby REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
action including the reception of evidence to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the pertinent factual issues in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
NINAL VS BANDAYOG

YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?

Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by
Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog
got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died
in a car accident. After their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the
said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage
would affect petitioners successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not
among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is
"rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:

(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of
their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G.
Nial is already dead;

(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio;

(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their
fathers death.[1]

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their fathers marriage to respondent before his death,
applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of
marriage.[2] Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law. Scnc m

This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the
verification failed to state the basis of petitioners averment that the allegations in the petition are true and correct." It was thus treated as an unsigned
pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. [3] However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered
the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review.[4]

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their
validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. [5] A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under
Article 53 of the Civil Code,[6] the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)[7] in relation to Article 58.[8] The
requirement and issuance of marriage license is the States demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance
of which the general public is interested.[9] This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution." [10]Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an
"inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. [11] This is why the Family Code considers
marriage as "a special contract of permanent union"[12] and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment."[13]

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in
Article 76,[14] referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing
the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from
legitimizing their status.[15] To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of
gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement. Sdaa
miso

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they
executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years, and that we now desire to marry each other."[16] The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is
contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or
should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year
continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared
or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-
year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of
marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately
before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to
whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging
parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a
special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not
comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There
should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted
that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has
knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.[17] The Civil Code provides:

Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice the local
civil registrar thereof. x x x."

Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an
investigation, examining persons under oath. x x x" Sdaad
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:

Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to
advise the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."

Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall
note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. x x x."

This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during
the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void,[18]subject only to the
exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the
contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and
adultery.[19] The law sanctions monogamy.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least
five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about
twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started
living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with
each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance
of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and
wife". Scs daad

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is
void ab initiobecause of the absence of such element.

The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their fathers marriage void after his death?

Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code[20] cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at
any time before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not
a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void
marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is
considered as having never to have taken place[21]and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free
cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding
while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left
as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.[22] That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the
action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages
have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through
actual joint contribution,[23] and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as
well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal
partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate. Sup rema

Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion
is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their
marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.[24] "A void marriage does
not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be
absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the
marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction."[25] "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a
void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being
good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or
collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon
mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage
which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the
marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.[26] But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage [27] and such absolute nullity can be
based only on a final judgment to that effect.[28] For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage imprescriptible.[29] Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same
cannot be considered imprescriptible. Juris

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as
but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment
of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case
No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concur. Sc juris

Pardo, J., on official business abroad.

MANZANO VS SANCHEZ

The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior existing marriage is the bone of contention of the
instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia
Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator on 12 May 1999.

Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel
Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.[1] Four children were born out of that marriage.[2] On 22 March 1993, however, her husband
contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. [3] When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or
ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated.

Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not
know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already
without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.[4]According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would
have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed
for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.

After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more
severely.

On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.

For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint and setting aside his earlier
Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits [5] of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly
unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they
were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels,
they had both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of
those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.

We find merit in the complaint.

Article 34 of the Family Code provides:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without
any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law
to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no
legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to
marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found
no legal impediment to their marriage.[6]
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993
and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing
marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were separated.

Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent
marriage null and void.[7] In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him
from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the
same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.

The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the
Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage
bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds
true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.

Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been
cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does
not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally
capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to
solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim ignorance
of the law excuses no one has special application to judges,[8]who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles. [9] And when the
law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. [10]

ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with theMODIFICATION that the amount of fine
to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.

SO ORDERED.
DE CASTRO VS DE CASTRO

TINGA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No. 69166,2 declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is
the legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2) that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent
court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.

Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office
of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in
sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push
through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective
homes and did not live together as husband and wife.

On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the child’s birth, respondent has been the one
supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and from her private practice.

On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (trial court.3 In her
complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has "reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support
her "as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child."4

Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit;
and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible administrative
prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents before he got married. He also averred that
they never lived together as husband and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.

In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,5 the trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was
solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis of mere
belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the child when the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child.

The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has
been made, the appellate court declared that the child was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties’ marriage. In addition, the Court of
Appeals frowned upon petitioner’s refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty
the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that petitioner’s "forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his
obligation and reward him of his being irresponsible."6Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner,
wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child.

The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial court to declare the marriage of petitioner and
respondent as null and void in the very same case. There was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that
there is no collusion between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to
show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant
proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should have been limited to the obligation of petitioner to support the child and his wife on the
basis of the marriage apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and respondent. 7 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, National Capital
Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as
the legitimate child of the appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring the marriage on 13 March 1995 between the appellant and the
appellee valid until properly annulled by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose. Costs against the appellant.8

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of Appeals. 9 Hence this petition.

Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with respondent because as shown by the evidence and admissions
of the parties, the marriage was celebrated without a marriage license. He stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage license,
contained a false narration of facts, the truth being that he and respondent never lived together as husband and wife. The false affidavit should never
be allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the absence of a marriage license. 10Petitioner additionally argues that there was no need for the
appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an ordinary action for support and not an action for annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage. In any case, petitioner argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of their marriage since it
was validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the instant action for support. Citing several authorities, 11petitioner claims that a void marriage can
be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus, there is no necessity to institute another independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage between the parties. The refiling of another case for declaration of nullity where the same evidence and parties would be presented would
entail enormous expenses and anxieties, would be time-consuming for the parties, and would increase the burden of the courts. 12Finally, petitioner
claims that in view of the nullity of his marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial of the child’s paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals
gravely erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child.

In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file their respective
comments on the petition.13

In her Comment,14 respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Echoing the findings and rulings of the appellate court, she argues that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked collaterally, but can only
be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. With regard to the filiation of her child, she pointed out that
compared to her candid and straightforward testimony, petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about their sexual encounters.
Moreover, she adds that despite the challenge from her and from the trial court, petitioner strongly objected to being subjected to DNA testing to
prove paternity and filiation.15

For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was improper for the trial court to declare null and void the marriage of
petitioner and respondent in the action for support. Citing the case of Niñal v. Bayadog,16 it states that courts may pass upon the validity of a
marriage in an action for support, since the right to support from petitioner hinges on the existence of a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence
presented during the proceedings in the trial court showed that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage
license, and that their affidavit (of a man and woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for at least five
years) was false. Thus, it concludes the trial court correctly held that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid.17 In addition, the
OSG agrees with the findings of the trial court that the child is an illegitimate child of petitioner and thus entitled to support.18

Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner
and respondent in an action for support and second, whether the child is the daughter of petitioner.

Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent.
The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. 19 Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, we held:

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on
the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment
need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.20

Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,21 the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of two marriages
despite the main case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Niñal, we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a
suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. However, evidence must
be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity. 22

Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of
the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable.23 In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent
did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for
more than five years.24However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination,
thus—

ATTY. CARPIO:

Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as husband and wife for the last five years on or before March 13,
1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.25

The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage
license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name
for a marriage license.26 In the instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false
affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of
paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage
void ab initio.

Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner’s illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to support.

Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.27 Thus, one can prove
illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. 28

The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in
favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the child, thus stating:

1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born on November 3, 1995 at Better Living, Parañaque,
Metro Manila;30

We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:

That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not only by the testimony of the latter, but also by
respondent’s own admission in the course of his testimony wherein he conceded that petitioner was his former girlfriend. While they were
sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner at the latter’s house or clinic. At times, they would go to a motel to have sex. As a result of their
sexual dalliances, petitioner became pregnant which ultimately led to their marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled. While respondent
claims that he was merely forced to undergo the marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. "B," "B-1,"
to "B-3," "C," "C-1" and "C-2," "D," "D-1" and "D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and "G-2" and "H," "H-1"
to "H-3"). In one of the pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1" and "D-2"), defendant is seen putting the wedding ring on petitioner’s finger and in
another picture (Exhs. "E," "E-1" and "E-2") respondent is seen in the act of kissing the petitioner. 31

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET
ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
DAYOT VS DAYOT

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision [1] of the Court
of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.

The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall.The marriage was solemnized by
Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.[2] In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit, [3] also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that
both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.

On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint[4] for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Bian, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that
he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the
marriage was secured through fraud.

In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in
1986.Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisas house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested
him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At
the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose
needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him
that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and
gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged
that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisas house.When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his
marriage contract with Felisa.When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.

In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended the validity of their marriage. She declared that they had
maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage
with him on account of their age difference.[5] In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter
contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against
Jose.Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both
employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. [6] The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral
conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year without emolument. [7]

On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision[8]dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:

WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both parties, this Court finds and so holds that the
[C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against
[Jose].[9]

The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November
1986 was valid. It dismissed Joses version of the story as implausible, and rationalized that:

Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a blank sheet of
paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package
for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect
suggestion that could have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill
them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to discover that the pieces of paper that he
signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be
taken in for a ride by [Felisa.]

[Joses] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his
wife when he wrote [Felisas] name in the duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one
year after he discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote
the name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not believe that the only reason why her
name was written in his company I.D. was because he was residing there then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he really
considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister.

When [Joses] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a
witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the
signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage
contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she
believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes. The testimony of his sister all the more belied his
claim that his consent was procured through fraud.[10]

Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses action had prescribed. It cited Article 87[11] of the New Civil Code which
requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:

That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and
machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the time
when he discovered the alleged sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the
earliest instance. x x x.[12]

Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court
of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.[13]

The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code. The appellate court observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 86 [14] of
the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud
was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Joses appeal in the following manner:
 Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage, the
action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed.Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be
commenced by said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force
or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then he had only until
February, 1991 within which to file an action for annulment of marriage.However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the
complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa.[15]

Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It
ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article 76 [16]of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit
of marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the
falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the
validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals
gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on the
dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Joses argument
that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 56 [17] of
the Civil Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing officers church or religious
sect. The prescription was established only in Article 7 [18] of the Family Code which does not govern the parties marriage.

Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition was that the
requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case
at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.

The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7
November 2006, the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one entered declaring the
marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.

Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City. [19]

In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Nial v. Bayadog,[20] and reasoned that:

In Nial v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage license on the basis of
their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years
and that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:

x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period
should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law
relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special
relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed.The presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not
be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived
escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the
public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment
to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initiobecause of the absence of a marriage license.[21]

Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court rendered a Resolution[22] dated 10 May 2007,
denying Felisas motion.

Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this
Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit,
and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No.
179474, similarly assailing the appellate courts Amended Decision.On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the
interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution.[23]

The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:

RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.

II

RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO
PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.

III
 RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE
LICEN[S]E.[24]

Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Nial.[25] She differentiates the case at bar from Nial by
reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally,
Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed
against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.

For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle
the related arguments vented by petitioners Republicof the Philippines and Felisa.

The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose
and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Courts ruling
in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.[26] To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November
1986, attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the
Republics position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites
were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic
opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be
invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five
years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code.
It also bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition,
the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Joses notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisas
name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose
and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Joses company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisas name as
his wife.

The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A
survey of the prevailing rules is in order.

It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:

ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.(Emphasis ours.)

Article 58[27] makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those
under Article 75.[28] Article 80(3)[29] of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void,
this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract.[30] This is in
stark contrast to the old Marriage Law,[31]whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the
compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the
proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage. [32]

Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these
marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular
marriages,[33] (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6)
mixed marriages.[34]

The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who,
being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest
or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

The reason for the law,[35] as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such
persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.[36]

It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an
affidavit declaring that they have attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other. [37] One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of
an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the
marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.

We answer in the affirmative.

Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage
license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly[38] but reasonably construed.[39] They extend only
so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception.[40]Where a
general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication.[41] For the exception in
Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
 A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The
exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire
to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of
the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in
the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law
not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the
contracting parties shall state the requisite facts[42] in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest
or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and
contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the
celebration of their marriage.[43] The Court of Appeals also noted Felisas testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel,
sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution.[44] The appellate court also cited Felisas own testimony that it was only in June
1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house.[45]

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A question of
fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. [46] Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject
to this Courts review.[47] It is already well-settled that:

The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this
rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory findings.
However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body
disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the
record or based on substantial evidence.[48]

Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a
marriage license, is beyond question.

We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties affidavit will not affect the validity of
marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit.Patently, it cannot be denied that the
marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit
legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the
requirement of a marriage license.

Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when
we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.[49] Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. [50] The present case does not involve an
apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of
marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which
spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.

In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code[51] that every intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage will not
salvage the parties marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without
the requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a
marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent
and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.[52] The
protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as
well.[53] To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the
fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the
license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five
years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of
one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas
cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for
it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the
sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.

In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief because he
perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no
room for application where there is a law.[54] There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76
of the Civil Code.Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage is without prejudice to their
criminal liability.[55]

The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack
of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage to Rufina
Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.[56] Jose and Felisas marriage was celebrated sans a marriage
license.No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and
may be raised any time.

Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means
a five-year period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage.[57] It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at
any time within the five years - and continuity that is unbroken.[58]

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability,
if any. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
CARLOS VS SANDOVAL

REYES, R.T., J.:

ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during the effectivity of the Family Code, except
cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary
judgment, or confession of judgment.
We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed and set aside the
summary judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child, recovery of property,
reconveyance, sum of money, and damages.

The Facts
The events that led to the institution of the instant suit are unveiled as follows:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos
and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly described as follows:
Parcel No. 1

Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of the Court of Land Registration.

Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically reserved.

Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.

Parcel No. 2

A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo. of
Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x containing an area of Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty
One (13,441) square meters.

Parcel No. 3

A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a non-subd. project), being a portion
of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by
Lot 155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to
2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the subd. plan, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS,
more or less.

PARCEL No. 4

A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No.
6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27,
Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River; and on the West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of
the subd. plan x x x containing an area of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.

PARCEL No. 5

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con
la parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el plano,
el cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de
Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial de
CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.

PARCEL No. 6

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 50; por el NE,
con la parcela 37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el
plano, el cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad
de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una extension superficial de
CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.[3]

During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid the payment of
inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.

Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo.These three (3) lots are now covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by the Registry of Deeds
of Makati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No. 160401 issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Makati City.

On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon
Teofilos death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II.The said two (2) parcels of land
are covered by TCTNos. 219877 and 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.

In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the
said case, the parties submitted and caused the approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under the compromise, the parties acknowledged their
respective shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land. This includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said
land.
 On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining land of the first parcel between them.

Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,[4] 2,331 square meters of the second parcel of land were adjudicated in favor of
plaintiffs Rillo.The remaining 10,000-square meter portion was later divided between petitioner and respondents.

The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on August 17, 1994, with respect to Civil Case No. 94-
1964. The parties submitted the supplemental compromise agreement, which was approved accordingly.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts, the parties equally divided between them
the third and fourth parcels of land.

In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against respondents before the court a quo with the
following causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of
money and damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.

In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of
the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of
respondent Teofilo Carlos II.

Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent Felicidad with respect to the subject real
properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He argued that the properties covered by
such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.

Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs
of suit.

On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material averments of petitioners complaint. Respondents
contended that the dearth of details regarding the requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidads marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared
thatTeofilo II was the illegitimate child of the deceasedTeofilo Carlos with another woman.

On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case
before the trial court. They also asked that their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees, be granted.

But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary judgment.Attached to the motion was the affidavit
of the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage. Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the
certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.

On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground of irregularity of the contract evidencing the
marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his own motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil
Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.

Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony of respondent Felicidad in another
case. Saidtestimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384, entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Pias. In her testimony,
respondent Felicidad narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.[5]

Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its report and manifestation, discounting the
possibility of collusion between the parties.

RTC and CA Dispositions

On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants (respondents) Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiff as follows:

1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite
on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate submittedin this case, null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite
marriage license;

2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of
the late Teofilo E. Carlos;
3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum of P18,924,800.00 together with the interest
thereon at the legal rate from date of filing of the instant complaint until fully paid;

4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land, less the portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said Register of Deeds
to cancel said title and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;

5. Declaring the Contract, Annex K of complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void, and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCTNo. 139058 in the name of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title
in the sole name of plaintiff herein;

6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void;

7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S.
Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the exclusive name of plaintiff herein;

8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of defendant Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo S.
Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein.
 Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiffs evidence on his claim for moral damages, exemplary
damages, attorneys fees, appearance fees, and litigation expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that the trial court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate
child of Teofilo, Sr.

On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new
one is entered REMANDING the case to the court of origin for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.[7]

The CA opined:

We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the court a quo contrary to law and public policy as
ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it was appellants who first sought summary judgment from the trial court,
did not justify the grant thereof in favor of appellee. Not being an action to recover upon a claim or to obtain a declaratory relief,
the rule on summary judgment apply (sic) to an action to annul a marriage. The mere fact that no genuine issue was presented
and the desire to expedite the disposition of the case cannot justify a misinterpretation of the rule. The first paragraph of Article
88 and 101 of the Civil Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or
a confession of judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically amount to these methods
explicitly proscribed by the law.

We are not unmindful of appellees argument that the foregoing safeguards have traditionally been applied to prevent
collusion of spouses in the matter of dissolution of marriages and that the death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had
effectively dissolved the marriage herein impugned. The fact, however, that appellees own brother and appellant Felicidad
Sandoval lived together as husband and wife for thirty years and that the annulment of their marriage is the very means by which
the latter is sought to be deprived of her participation in the estate left by the former call for a closer and more thorough inquiry
into the circumstances surrounding the case. Rather that the summary nature by which the court a quo resolved the issues in the
case, the rule is to the effect that the material facts alleged in the complaint for annulment of marriage should always be proved.
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings.Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise

admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material
facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. (Underscoring supplied)

Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our
perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. While it may be readily
conceded that a valid marriage license is among the formal requisites of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage
void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the failure to reflect the serial number of the
marriage license on the marriage contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval,
although irregular, is not as fatal as appellee represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the contrary, appellant
Felicidad Sandovals affirmation of the existence of said marriage license is corroborated by the following statement in the
affidavit executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:

That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14,
1962 as basis of the said marriage contract executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but the
number of said marriage license was inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for the reason that it
was the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the Marriage Contract who in turn, may have overlooked
the same.

Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of the considered view that the veracity and
credibility of the foregoing statement as well as the motivations underlying the same should be properly threshed out in a trial of
the case on the merits.

If the non-presentation of the marriage contract the primary evidence of marriage is not proof that a marriage did not
take place, neither should appellants non-presentation of the subject marriage license be taken as proof that the same was not
procured. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage, it must be emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes the legitimacy of a particular party, the same
may be said of the trial courts rejection of the relationship between appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father on the
basis of the inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandovals statements. Although it had effectively disavowed appellants prior
claims regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son of
appellees brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the possibility of the said appellants illegitimate filiation, his right to
prove the same or, for that matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as such.

Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find appellees bare allegation that appellant Teofilo
Carlos II was merely purchased from an indigent couple by appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support
what could well be a minors total forfeiture of the rights arising from his putative filiation. Inconsistent though it may be to her
previous statements, appellant Felicidad Sandovals declaration regarding the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more
 credible when considered in the light of the fact that, during the last eight years of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said appellant
the use of his name and the shelter of his household. The least that the trial court could have done in the premises was to conduct
a trial on the merits in order to be able to thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to the filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos II. [8]

On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of the ponente, Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The

CA denied the twin motions.

Issues
In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:

1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under the Decision, Annex A hereof, and in denying
petitioners Motion for reconsideration under the Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect to the nullity of the impugned
marriage, petitioner respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a grave reversible error in applying Articles 88
and 101 of the Civil Code, despite the fact that the circumstances of this case are different from that contemplated and intended
by law, or has otherwise decided a question of substance not theretofore decided by the Supreme Court, or has decided it in a
manner probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;

2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to
the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a serious
reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules of Court providing for judgment on the
pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing Summary Judgments;

3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case
to the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion, disregarded judicial admissions, made findings on ground of speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or
otherwise committed misapplications of the laws and misapprehension of the facts.[9] (Underscoring supplied)

Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through a judgment on the pleadings or a summary
judgment and without the benefit of a trial. But there are other procedural issues, including the capacity of one who is not a spouse in bringing the
action for nullity of marriage.

Our Ruling

I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary
judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed.

Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 19 [10] of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:

SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse partys pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading.But in
actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.

He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the
pleadings.

Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of the Rule on judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with
the trial court, the CA likewise considered the provisions on summary judgments, to wit:

Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our
perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. x x x[11]

But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the
trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
and even in annulment of marriage.

With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, the question on the application of summary judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage
has been stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which took effect on March 15, 2003[12] is found in Section
17, viz.:

SEC. 17. Trial. (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No delegation of evidence to a
commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving property relations of the spouses.

(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved. No judgment on the
pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring supplied)

Likewise instructive is the Courts pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.[13] In that case, We excluded actions for nullity or annulment of
marriage from the application of summary judgments.

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal
separation, summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of actions. [14] (Underscoring supplied)

By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and duty to intervene in the case. The
participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The State should
have been given the opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered. [15]
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this
stage when the public prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of evidence, the
public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down before the court is not fabricated.

To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of
the public prosecutor, viz.:

SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. (a) x x x

(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the
merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence.(Underscoring supplied)
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure that the interest of the State is represented and
protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression of evidence. [16]

II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1)
Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of
the Civil Code.

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife.(Underscoring supplied)

Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The
Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition.Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate
rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the
death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other
hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.[17](Underscoring supplied)

The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only
ones who candecide when and how to build the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their marital life. They are
simultaneously the directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can and should decide when to take a cut, but only in
accordance with the grounds allowed by law.

The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and
those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect
on August 3, 1988.[18]

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the
deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate
heirs of their successional rights.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect
their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for
declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts.[19]

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage
involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003[20] is prospective in its
application. Thus, the Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,[21]viz.:

As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is
prospective in its application.[22] (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated
on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place. [23]

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law
in effect at the time of its celebration.[24] But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage
void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?

We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any person to institute a
nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.[25] Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law that every action must
be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.[26]

Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case,
as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of
lack of cause of action.[27]

Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,[28] where the Court held:
 True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or even in the
Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only aparty
who can demonstrate proper interest can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial v.
Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their
deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.

xxxx

In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the
absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of
additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign
law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same
did not allow respondent Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents marriage as bigamous and void ab
initio but reduced the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00
to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then
the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-
Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same.[29] (Underscoring supplied)

III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to seek the declaration of nullity
of the marriage in controversy.

In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only surviving compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and
their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on succession, successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory
heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.[30]

Upon Teofilos death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory
heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child, respectively.

Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.[31]

Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a collateral relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the
ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code provide:

ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled
to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sistersor their children to the other half.

ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives
shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. (Underscoring supplied)

Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes collateral relatives from succeeding to the estate of
the decedent. The presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the deceased precludes succession by collateral
relatives.[32] Conversely, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to
the entire estate of the decedent.[33]

If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would
then have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that collateral
relatives, like a brother and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the decedent dies without issue and without ascendants in the direct
line.

The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found
and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to theother half of the estate of his brother, the first half
being allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner
succeeds to the entire estate.

It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage case is contingent upon the final
declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.

If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then petitioner has no legal personality to ask for
the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no successional right to be
protected, hence, does not have proper interest. For although the marriage in controversy may be found to be void from the beginning, still,
petitioner would not inherit. This is because the presence of descendant, illegitimate,[34] or even an adopted child[35]excludes the collateral relatives
from inheriting from the decedent.

Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the validity or nullity of the subject marriage is called
for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that
Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.

IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II is proper and in order. There is a need to vacate
the disposition of the trial court as to the other causes of action before it.
Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand of the case concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo
II.This notwithstanding, We should not leave the matter hanging in limbo.

This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their consideration is necessary
in arriving at a just resolution of the case.[36]

We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, petitioners bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was
adopted from an indigent couple is insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation. However, We are not inclined
to support its pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more credible. For
the guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of respondent Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty
provided by Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:

ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)

It is stressed that Felicidads declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family
Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child
born or conceived within a valid marriage.[37]

Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action concerning reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of money
must be vacated. This has to be so, as said disposition was made on the basis of its finding that the marriage in controversy was null and void ab
initio.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIEDas follows:

1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on the status and filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II
and the validity or nullity of marriage between respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;

2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted son of the late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is
strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity of marriage for lack of cause of action;

3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.

The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to give this case priority in its calendar.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
SANTIAGO VS PEOPLE

SERENO, C.J.:

We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566.1 The CA affirmed the Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No.
72322 convicting her of bigamy.

THE FACTS

Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, 3 Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information 4 for
bigamy. Petitioner pleaded �not guilty,� while her putative husband escaped the criminal suit.5redarclaw

The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2 June 1974, 6 asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner,
who was a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she wanted to
remarry, she should choose someone who was �without responsibility.�7redarclaw

Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the crime of bigamy, because she had been under the
belief that Santos was still single when they got married. She also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her
should be proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license.

Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the prosecution. She alleged that she had met
petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on which occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this
allegation and averred that she met Galang only in August and September 1997, or after she had already married Santos.

THE RTC RULING

The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the subsistence of his marriage to Galang. Based on the more credible
account of Galang that she had already introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the affirmative
defense of petitioner that she had not known of the first marriage. It also held that it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to be easily
duped by a person like Santos.8redarclaw

The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, �her marriage was celebrated without a need for a marriage license in accordance
with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is an admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the celebration of their marriage.�9 Thus, the
trial court convicted petitioner as follows:10redarclaw

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy,
defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and imposes against her the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1)
day of Prision Correctional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab initio for having been celebrated without complying
with Article 34 of the Family Code, which provides an exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the parties have actually lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years prior to the celebration of their marriage. In her case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had
not lived together as husband and wife for five years prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a marriage license effectively
rendered their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy.

The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus:11redarclaw

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and void as it was celebrated without a valid marriage license x x x. In
advancing that theory, accused wants this court to pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to accused Santos, something this court can not do.
The best support to her argument would have been the submission of a judicial decree of annulment of their marriage. Absent such proof, this court
cannot declare their marriage null and void in these proceedings.

THE CA RULING

On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof beyond reasonable doubt. She attacked the credibility of
Galang and insisted that the former had not known of the previous marriage of Santos.

Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses� narration. It likewise disbelieved the testimony of Santos. Anent the
lack of a marriage license, the appellate court simply stated that the claim was a vain attempt to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in
question. Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for bigamy. 12redarclaw

THE ISSUES
Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case, because she was not aware of Santos�s previous marriage.
But in the main, she argues that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt.

Citing People v. De Lara,13 she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the absence of a marriage license. She elaborates that their
marriage does not fall under any of those marriages exempt from a marriage license, because they have not previously lived together exclusively as
husband and wife for at least five years. She alleges that it is extant in the records that she married Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met
him in 1993. Without completing the five-year requirement, she posits that their marriage without a license is void.

In the Comment14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent advances the argument that the instant Rule 45 petition should be
denied for raising factual issues as regards her husband�s subsequent marriage. As regards petitioner�s denial of any knowledge of Santos�s first
marriage, respondent reiterates that credible testimonial evidence supports the conclusion of the courts a quo that petitioner knew about the
subsisting marriage.

The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.

In Monta�ez v. Cipriano,15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he
contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second
marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis supplied)

For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v. Nepomuceno, Jr.16 instructs that she should have had knowledge of the
previous subsisting marriage. People v. Archilla17 likewise states that the knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouse�s existing prior
marriage constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which makes her responsible as an accomplice.

The Ruling of the Court

The penalty for bigamy and petitioner�s

knowledge of Santos�s first marriage

The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each other while the previous marriage of one of them is
valid and subsisting. As explained in Nepomuceno:18redarclaw

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the circumstances, as when the second spouse
married the accused without being aware of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of
the accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner�s knowledge of Santos�s marriage to Galang. Both courts consistently found that she
knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of the following circumstances: 19 (1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the
house of her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know of his true
civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible witness compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies,
straightforwardly testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of Santos.

After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual findings of the RTC, less so in the present case in which its
findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the trial court�s assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect, since it had the
important opportunity to observe firsthand the expression and demeanor of the witnesses during the trial. 20redarclaw

Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she was validly charged with bigamy. However, we disagree
with the lower courts� imposition of the principal penalty on her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed, meted out to her the penalty within
the range of prision correccional as minimum to prision mayor as maximum.

Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla21 holds that the second spouse, if indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an
accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that �a person, whether man or woman, who
knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in the crime of
bigamy.�22Therefore, her conviction should only be that for an accomplice to the crime.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration
of six years and one day to twelve years. Since the criminal participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the
penalty next lower in degree,23prision correccional, which has a duration of six months and one day to six years. There being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall be imposed in its medium period consisting of two years, four months and one day to four years and two
months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 24 petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty
next lower in degree, arresto mayor,which has a duration of one month and one day to six months imprisonment.
The criminal liability of petitioner
resulting from her marriage to
Santos

Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential
requisites for validity.25 If the accused wants to raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation of
evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case.26 In this case, petitioner has consistently27 questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos
on the ground that marriages celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio.28redarclaw

Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it could not pass judgment on the validity of the marriage. The
CA held that the attempt of petitioner to attack her union with Santos was in vain.

On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and facts, 29 and given that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole
case open for review,30 this Court now resolves to correct the error of the courts a quo.

After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took place without a marriage license. The absence of this
requirement is purportedly explained in their Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family
Code. The provision reads as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years
and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting
parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage.

Therefore, the marriage of petitioner and Santos would have been exempted from a marriage license had they cohabited exclusively as husband and
wife for at least five years before their marriage.31redarclaw

Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February 1996 32 and that after six months of courtship,33 she married
him on 29 July 1997. Without any objection from the prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited her in Castellano, Nueva
Ecija, prior to their marriage. However, he never cohabited with her, as she was residing in the house of her in-laws,34 and her children from her
previous marriage disliked him.35 On cross-examination, respondent did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime in 1993, she first met
Santos as an agent who sold her piglets.36redarclaw

All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for only less than four years. Thus, it follows that the
two of them could not have cohabited for at least five years prior to their marriage.

Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although the records do not show that they submitted an
affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and
misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at least five years before they married each other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the
issuance of the Certificate of Marriage,37 in which the solemnizing officer stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the
marriage was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.

The legal effects in a criminal case

of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the
marriage

The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract
marriage without a license. We thus face an anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of
(1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2)
falsely making claims in no less than her marriage contract.

We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal
laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an individual�s deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond
between spouses.38 In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,39 we had the occasion to emphasize that the State�s penal laws on bigamy should not be
rendered nugatory by allowing individuals �to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.�

Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner�s illegal acts of feigning a marriage and, in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the
crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery of the sanctity of marriage.40redarclaw

Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will �lend its aid to x x x one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an
illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded.�41 If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a transgression
of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts. 42As a result, litigants shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 43redarclaw

Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for
having been secured without a marriage license. But as elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by
misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license requirement based on their fabricated claim that they had already cohabited as husband
and wife for at least five years prior their marriage. In violation of our law against illegal marriages, 44 petitioner married Santos while knowing fully
well that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code. Consequently, it will be the
height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.

The applicability of People v. De Lara

Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on the ground that the second marriage lacked the requisite
marriage license. In that case, the Court found that when Domingo de Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the local
Civil Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since the marriage was celebrated one day before the issuance of the
marriage license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy.

Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to contract a second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and
Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage, and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking her exculpation.
Therefore, unlike our treatment of the accused in De Lara, this Court cannot regard petitioner herein as innocent of the crime.

No less than the present Constitution provides that �marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.�45 It must be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. 46|||In keeping therefore with this
fundamental policy, this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto
mayor as minimum to four years of prision correccional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary