GOMEZ v.

PALOMAR The case involves the constitutionality of what is familiarly known as the
GR No. L-23645, October 29, 1968 Presidential Primary Act of the Thirty-third Legislature, chapter 46, General
25 SCRA 827 Laws of 1913. The terms of the Act require the holding of precinct primary
elections in the counties of the State on the fourth Tuesday in May in
FACTS: Petitioner Benjamin Gomez mailed a letter at the post office in San presidential election years by the respective political parties of the State
Fernando, Pampanga. It did not bear the special anti-TB stamp required by polling as many as 50,000 votes for their respective candidates for Governor
the RA 1635. It was returned to the petitioner. Petitioner now assails the at the last preceding general election, — obedience to it being optional with
constitutionality of the statute claiming that RA 1635 otherwise known as parties so polling a less *Page 8 number of votes, — for the expression by
the Anti-TB Stamp law is violative of the equal protection clause because it their qualified electors of their preference of candidates for the party
constitutes mail users into a class for the purpose of the tax while leaving nomination to the offices of President and Vice President of the United
untaxed the rest of the population and that even among postal patrons the States and presidential electors, and likewise their choice of party
statute discriminatorily grants exemptions. The law in question requires an candidates for the places of delegates to the national conventions of such
additional 5 centavo stamp for every mail being posted, and no mail shall be parties.
delivered unless bearing the said stamp.
The expense of such primary election of a party whose candidate for
Governor at the last preceding general election received as many as 50,000
ISSUE: Is the Anti-TB Stamp Law unconstitutional, for being allegedly
votes, it is provided by the Act, shall be paid out of the county treasury of
violative of the equal protection clause?
each county, no provision being made for the expense of the primary
election of other parties, if held under the Act.
HELD: No. It is settled that the legislature has the inherent power to select
the subjects of taxation and to grant exemptions. This power has aptly been It is further provided that the votes cast at the election shall be counted,
described as "of wide range and flexibility." Indeed, it is said that in the canvassed and returned as required by the general primary law of the State
field of taxation, more than in other areas, the legislature possesses the in relation to party nominations for the offices of Governor and Lieutenant
greatest freedom in classification. The reason for this is that traditionally, Governor.
classification has been a device for fitting tax programs to local needs and
usages in order to achieve an equitable distribution of the tax burden. In respect to the number of presidential electors to be nominated in the
primary election, the Act is deficient. It provides only for the nomination of
The classification of mail users is based on the ability to pay, the enjoyment one elector from each congressional district, whereas the State is required to
of a privilege and on administrative convenience. Tax exemptions have never elect at the general election a number equal to its whole number of Senators
been thought of as raising revenues under the equal protection clause. and Representatives in Congress.
Under the agreed facts of the case, the operation of the Act at the present
Waples v. Marrast, 184 S.W. 180 (Tex. 1916) time is to require only the Democratic party to hold the primary election
provided for, since it is, at present, the only party in the State whose
Texas Supreme Court candidate for Governor at the last general election received as many as
50,000 votes. It is furthermore agreed that the cost of such a primary
Filed: March 22nd, 1916
election as the Act requires, will be not less than $300,000, and will
Precedential Status: Precedential
probably exceed that amount.
Citations: 184 S.W. 180, 108 Tex. 5
Docket Number: No. 2826. The requirement of the general primary law in respect to the time for the
Judges: MR. CHIEF JUSTICE PHILLIPS delivered the opinion of the canvassing by the State executive committee of the votes cast for candidates
court. for party nominations for Governor and Lieutenant Governor, is that it shall
be at a meeting held on the second Tuesday in August of the election year. strength of the parties. The selection of a voting strength of 50,000 votes as
The Democratic national convention, it appears from the statement of the the test does not create an unreasonable classification, and the Act is not,
agreed facts, has been appointed to meet on June 14, 1916. If the primary upon this account, to be overturned.
election should be held and the Act literally observed, the votes cast for
The only serious constitutional question involved by the Act is its
delegates could not be canvassed in time for that convention.
requirement that the expense of the primary election shall be borne out of
The suit was a mandamus proceeding by E.K. Marrast to require the the public treasury of the counties. This presents, nakedly, the question,
appellants, who compose the Democratic State executive committee, to hold whether it is within the power of the Legislature to devote the public
the primary election contemplated by the Act. In the trial court the writ of revenues of the State to the payment of the primary election expenses of
mandamus was awarded, the learned trial judge in an able written opinion political parties. The general primary law relating to the nomination of party
holding the Act valid against the attack made upon it by the respondents. An candidates for State, district and county offices imposes such expense upon
appeal was prosecuted to the honorable Court of Civil Appeals, which has the candidates. Article 3104. In the legislative history of the State this is the
certified to us the following questions: first effort, so far as we are aware, to make the expense of a party election a
charge upon the public revenue.
1. Is the Act, approved March 27, 1913, article 3175a, Vernon's Sayles'
Texas Civil Statutes, void upon the ground that it is in conflict with one or Section 3, article VIII of the Constitution, declares:
more of the provisions of the Constitution of this State or of the Union as is
"Taxes shall be levied and collected by general laws and for public purposes
claimed by appellants? *Page 9
only."
2. If not void, has the State Democratic executive committee authority to
By section 52, article III, it is provided:
disregard its requirements in so far as they are impracticable and to supply
such regulations as they may deem proper and necessary? "The Legislature shall have no power to authorize any county, city, town, or
other political corporation of the State to lend its credit or to grant public
We shall consider only the question of the constitutionality of the Act. That
money in aid of or to any individual, association or corporation
it is impracticable, unworkable if literally observed, and is de-ficient
whatsoever," etc.
because of the omission to provide for the nomination of the legal number
of presidential electors, are not matters which, if true, affect the power of The funds possessed by the counties of the State and available for the
the Legislature to enact the law. payment of the expense of the primary election provided for by this Act are
only those which are derived by taxation. If the payment of such expense is,
The authority of the Legislature to require the holding of a primary election
within the meaning of the Constitution, "a public *Page 10 purpose," the
by the political parties of the State for the purpose of enabling their
Act is valid in its provision that it shall be borne out of the public treasury
members to vote their choice for party nominees for elective offices,
of the counties; otherwise it is not.
whether State or national, and likewise express their preference in the
selection of party delegates to party conventions, is undoubted. The Taxes are burdens imposed for the support of the government. They are laid
legislative right in such an enactment to make, according to their numerical as a means of providing public revenues for public purposes. The sovereign
strength, a reasonable classification in respect to the political parties subject power of the State may be exercised in their levy and collection only upon
to the law, is equally clear. The Act is not invalid under the classification the condition that they shall be devoted to such purposes; and no lawful tax
adopted because it applies at the present time to only the Democratic party. can be laid for a different purpose. When ever they are imposed for private
It is not to be regarded as having been enacted for only the present day. It purposes, as was said in Broadhead v. Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 670, 88 Am.
was within the province of the Legislature to determine whether the Dec., 711, it ceases to be taxation and becomes plunder.
numerically weaker parties should be relieved from its compulsory It is not easy to state in exact terms what is "a public purpose" in the sense
observance; and, if so, to provide a classification according to the voting in which that term is employed as a limitation upon the State's power of
taxation. The framers of the Constitution were doubtless sensible of this State, by means of the public revenue, to maintain. Within this category fall
difficulty, for they did not attempt to define it. Many objects may be public the general instrumentalities of the government, the public schools, and
in the general sense that their attainment will confer a public benefit or other institutions of like nature. But the State is wholly without any power
promote the public convenience, but not be public in the sense that the to levy and appropriate taxes for the support of those things which, either by
taxing power of the State may be used to accomplish them. The powers of common usage or because they are in no proper sense the instruments of
the State as a sovereignty exist only for governmental purposes. They may government, it is the duty of the people to provide for themselves. It is not
be freely exerted in the discharge of all the governmental functions of the all things which answer a public need or fill a public want that it is within
State; but cannot be applied to uses, though public in aim and result, which the authority of the State to furnish for the people's use or support at the
are not governmental in their nature. As the means provided for the support public expense. Manufacturing industries, railroads, public enterprises of
of the government in its administrative duties and existing alone for that many kinds, private schools and private charitable institutions, all afford a
end, the taxing power may be employed for no purpose save that which in a service to the public, but the State is without any power to maintain them.
true and just sense is related to the performance by the State of its Religion is generally esteemed a helpful influence for public morality. But
governmental office. The appropriation of the public revenue is a legislative the Constitution expressly declares that no public money shall be granted in
power, and the Legislature must necessarily be allowed a large discretion in aid of any religious organization.
determining to what uses public moneys may be put. Subject to the General elections are essential to the public welfare and are distinctly
constitutional limitation that the public revenue shall be applied to only related to the discharge of an important governmental duty, because it is
public purposes, to the prudent husbandry of the Legislature as well as its only by their means that the organic law may be amended and in the
provident foresight has been committed the public trust of making such use elective offices public officials be supplied for the various administrative
of it as will afford the economical administration of the government which agencies of the State. But is it any duty of the State to provide the people
both the spirit and the letter of the Constitution enjoin. The term "public with nominees of political parties for the elective offices of the government?
purpose" as used in this relation is not, therefore, to be construed narrowly, Is it in any just sense a concern of the State that those offices be filled by
so as to deny authority to the Legislature to make such provision for the only the nominees of political parties? And is there any right in the State to
administration and support of the government in its several branches and devote the public revenue of the State derived by taxation from the people at
subdivisions as will faithfully subserve the present and future interests of large in aid of the purposes of such parties?
the people. The limitation imposed by the Constitution upon the power is,
A political party is nothing more or less than a body of men associated for
however, imperative. And it is essentially true that it does not permit
the purpose of furnishing and maintaining the prevalence of certain political
taxation for all purposes which in a broad and general sense may be
principles or beliefs in the public policies of the government. As rivals for
regarded as public, but expressly confines its exercise to only those public
popular favor they strive at the general elections for the control of the
purposes with which the State, as a government, invested with high and
agencies of the government as the means of providing a course for the
sovereign powers, but only as a grant from the people and, therefore, to be
government in accord with their political principles and the administration
solely used for the common benefit of all of them, and not as a paternal
of those agencies by their own adherents. According to the soundness of
institution, may justly concern *Page 11 itself, and to which, for that reason,
their principles and the wisdom of their policies they serve a great purpose
the public revenues may be rightfully devoted.
in the life of a government. But the fact remains that the objects of political
As to what is a public purpose within the meaning of section 3, article VIII organizations are intimate to those who compose them. They do not
of the Constitution, no better test can be presented than the inquiry: Is the concern *Page 12 the general public. They directly interest, both in their
thing to be furthered by the appropriation of the public revenue something conduct and in their success, only so much of the public as are comprised in
which it is the duty of the State, as a government, to provide? Loan their membership, and then only as members of the particular organization.
Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall., 655, 22 Law. Ed., 455; The People v. The They perform no governmental function. They constitute no governmental
Town of Salem, 20 Mich. 452, 4 Am. Rep., 400. Those things which it is agency. The purpose of their primary elections is merely to enable them to
the duty of the State to provide for the people it is equally the right of the furnish their nominees as candidates for the popular suffrage. In the interest
of fair methods and a fair expression by their members of their preference in concerns alone those parties that desire to make such nominations. It is
the selection of their nominees, the State may regulate such elections by alone their concern because they alone are interested in the success of their
proper laws, as it has done in our general primary law, and as it was nominees. The State, as a government, can not afford to concern itself in the
competent for the Legislature to do by a proper act of the character of the success of the nominees of any political party, or in the elective offices of
one here under review. But the payment of the expenses of purely party the people being filled only by those who are the nominees of some political
elections is a different matter. On principle, such expenses can not be party. Political parties are political instrumentalities. They are in no sense
differentiated from any other character of expense incurred in carrying out a governmental instrumentalities. The responsible duties of the State to all the
party object, since the attainment of a party purpose — the election of its people are to be performed and its high objects effected without reference to
nominees at the general elections through the unified vote of the party parties, and they have no part or place in the exercise by the State of its
membership, is necessarily the prime object of a party primary. great province in governing the people.
The great powers of the State, — and the taxing power is the one to be We have been pointed to but one authority holding that the public revenues
always the most carefully guarded, — can not be used, in our opinion, in aid may be used to pay the cost of the primary elections of political parties,
of any political party or to promote the purposes of all political parties. State v. Michel, 121 La. 374; but in that case the question received only a
They are no more to be made the objects of governmental bounty or favor casual consideration, and we do not feel at liberty to adopt the conclusion
than any other class of public organizations into which groups of citizens there announced.
may form themselves. Expenses incurred in the furtherance of their objects Holding an Act of the Legislature to be unconstitutional is never a welcome
can no more be defrayed out of the public treasury than the expenses of duty, and this court has never performed it except with reluctance. It is a
other associations of individuals. If it is constitutional to use the public duty, however, plain and unmistakable when upon mature consideration
revenues to pay the cost of their primary elections, it would likewise be such is the conviction of the court. The Constitution is the supreme law of
constitutional to pay the cost of their candidates' campaigns. If the the State, and no consideration should be suffered to stand in the way of its
constitutional barrier is removed in the one case, it can not be restored in the enforcement. Tested by legal principles which are clear and established, the
other; but it will have to be admitted that any and all kinds of expense of payment of the expenses of primary elections of political parties is not a
political parties may be lawfully imposed as a part of the public burden of public purpose for which public revenues may be used; and in our opinion
taxation. the Act in question is, therefore, unconstitutional and unenforceable.
For a stronger constitutional reason than would apply to other kinds of Judges: MR. CHIEF JUSTICE PHILLIPS delivered the opinion of the
public organizations is it the clear duty of the State to withhold the use of its court.
public revenues as an aid to political parties, and particularly as an aid in the I concur in the conclusion and also in the general course of reasoning upon
holding of their party elections? The object of such parties is the political which it has been reached, and in nearly all that our Chief Justice has said
control of the government; and we regard it as a fundamentally sound so well, above. However, I consider it proper for me to say this:
proposition that no power of the government can be constitutionally used in
Undoubtedly "common usage" is one very valuable test, or measure, by
furtherance or aid of the effort of any class or kind of organization, political
which the courts may determine whether a given expenditure of public
or otherwise, to obtain the control of the government.
funds is or is not for "a public purpose," and to that effect are the
To provide nominees of political parties for the people to vote upon in the authorities; but I do not regard it as the only test, in any instance.
general elections, is not the business of the State. It is not the business of the
The distinction between the maintenance and the regulation of primary
State because in the conduct of the government the State knows no parties
elections is drawn, and properly so, in said opinion, and that, indeed, is as
and can know none. If it is not the business of the State to see that such
far as it is necessary to go in answering the certified question; but, as this is
nominations are made, as it clearly is not, the public revenues can not be
a pioneer case of public importance, I wish, by way of making my own
employed in that connection. To *Page 13 furnish their nominees as
views clear, to emphasize, if possible, said distinction, and, in that
claimants for the popular favor in the general elections is a matter which
connection, to say that said opinion, as I understand it, does not question the Valentin Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board
power and authority of the Legislature to direct payment, out of public
funds raised by taxation, of any and all reasonable expenses which may be 151 SCRA 208 – Political Law – The Embrace of Only One Subject by a
incurred in the mere regulation *Page 14 — but not in the maintenance — Bill
of primary elections. DeWalt v. Bartley, 146 Pa. St., 529, 24 A. 185, 15 Delegation of Power – Delegation to Administrative Bodies
L.R.A., 771, 28 Am. St. Rep., 814.
In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the
Wenceslao Pascual vs Secretary of Public Works and Communications Videogram Regulatory Board” was enacted which gave broad powers to the
VRB to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The said law sought
110 Phil. 331 – Political Law – Appropriation For Private Use Not Allowed to minimize the economic effects of piracy. There was a need to regulate the
sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The
In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law appropriated
proliferation of videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being
P85,000.00 “for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and
acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if
improvement Pasig feeder road terminals”. Wenceslao Pascual, then
videograms are to be taxed. Section 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the
governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He claimed that the
gross receipts payable to the LGUs.
appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for the terminals
sought to be improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The said In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it is
Subdivision is owned by Senator Jose Zulueta who was a member of the unconstitutional on the following grounds:
same Senate that passed and approved the same RA. Pascual claimed that
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross receipts, is a rider
Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact that he owns those terminals
and is not germane to the subject matter of the law.
and that his property would be unlawfully enriched at the expense of the
taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld. Pascual then prayed that the 2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an
Secretary of Public Works and Communications be restrained from administrative body, because the law allowed the VRB to deputize, upon its
releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an discretion, other government agencies to assist the VRB in enforcing the said
afterthought, donated the said property to the City of Pasig. PD.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid. 3. Petitioner also submits that the thirty percent (30%) tax imposed is harsh
and oppressive, confiscatory, and in restraint of trade.
HELD: No, the appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a
private purpose. The subsequent donation of the property to the government ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tio’s arguments are correct.
to make the property public does not cure the constitutional defect. The fact
that the law was passed when the said property was still a private property HELD: No.
cannot be ignored. “In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must 1. The Constitutional requirement that “every bill shall embrace only one
be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof” is sufficiently complied
expanded only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose
individuals.” Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads which a statute seeks to achieve. In the case at bar, the questioned provision
were to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void. of, the general object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video industry
through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent
with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is
simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout
the PD.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB. VRB is not Caltex Philippines, Inc. v Commission on Audit GR No. 92585, May 8,
being tasked to legislate. What was conferred to the VRB was the authority 1992
or discretion to seek assistance in the execution, enforcement, and
implementation of the law. Besides, in the very language of the decree, the FACTS:
authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a “fixed and limited In 1989, COA sent a letter to Caltex, directing it to remit its collection to the
period” with the deputized agencies concerned being “subject to the direction Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF), excluding that unremitted for the years
and control of the [VRB].” 1986 and 1988, of the additional tax on petroleum products authorized
under the PD 1956. Pending such remittance, all of its claims for
3. The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but also a revenue
reimbursement from the OPSF shall be held in abeyance. The grant total of
measure prompted by the realization that earnings of videogram
its unremitted collections of the above tax is P1,287,668,820.
establishments of around P600 million per annum have not been subjected to
Caltex submitted a proposal to COA for the payment and the recovery of
tax, thereby depriving the Government of an additional source of revenue. It
claims. COA approved the proposal but prohibited Caltex from further
is an end-user tax, imposed on retailers for every videogram they make
offsetting remittances and reimbursements for the current and ensuing
available for public viewing. It is similar to the 30% amusement tax imposed
years. Caltex moved for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the present
or borne by the movie industry which the theater-owners pay to the
petition.
government, but which is passed on to the entire cost of the admission ticket,
thus shifting the tax burden on the buying or the viewing public. It is a tax
ISSUE:
that is imposed uniformly on all videogram operators.
Whether the amounts due from Caltex to the OPSF may be offsetted against
The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to Caltex’s outstanding claims from said funds
answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the
rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and RULING:
the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an No. Taxation is no longer envisioned as a measure merely to raise revenue
objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a to support the existence of government. Taxes may be levied with a
valid imposition. regulatory purpose to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization
of a threatened industry which is affected with public interest as to be within
The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which
the police power of the State.
impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one industry over
PD 1956, as amended by EO 137, explicitly provides that the source of
another.
OPSF is taxation. A taxpayer may not offset taxes due from the claims he
It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of may have against the government. Taxes cannot be subject of compensation
taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that "inequities which result from a because the government and taxpayer are not mutually creditors and debtors
singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no of each other and a claim for taxes is not such a debt, demand,, contract or
constitutional limitation". Taxation has been made the implement of the judgment as is allowed to be set-off.
state's police power. Hence, COA decision is affirmed except that Caltex’s claim for
reimbursement of under recovery arising from sales to the National Power
At bottom, the rate of tax is a matter better addressed to the taxing legislature. Corporation is allowed.
CITY OF BAGUIO vs. DE LEON Planters Product v. Fertiphil Corp.
25 SCRA 938 G.R. No. 166006 March 14, 2008
GR No. L-24756, October 31, 1968 REYES, R.T., J.

"There is no double taxation where one tax is imposed by the state and the Lessons Applicable: Bet. private and public suit, easier to file public suit,
other is imposed by the city." Apply real party in interest test for private suit and direct injury test for
public suit, Validity test varies depending on which inherent power
FACTS: The City of Baguio passed an ordinance imposing a license fee on
any person, entity or corporation doing business in the City. The ordinance Laws Applicable:
sourced its authority from RA No. 329, thereby amending the city charter
empowering it to fix the license fee and regulate businesses, trades and FACTS:
occupations as may be established or practiced in the City. De Leon was
assessed for P50 annual fee it being shown that he was engaged in property § President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued
rental and deriving income therefrom. The latter assailed the validity of the LOI No. 1465 which provided, among others, for the imposition of a
ordinance arguing that it is ultra vires for there is no statutory authority capital recovery component (CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades of
which expressly grants the City of Baguio to levy such tax, and that there it fertilizers which resulted in having Fertiphil paying P 10/bag sold to
imposed double taxation, and violates the requirement of uniformity. the Fertilizer and Perticide Authority (FPA).
§ FPA remits its collection to Far East Bank and Trust Company who
ISSUE: Are the contentions of the defendant-appellant tenable? applies to the payment of corporate debts of Planters Products Inc.
(PPI)
HELD: No. First, RA 329 was enacted amending Section 2553 of the § After the Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of
Revised Administrative Code empowering the City Council not only to the P10 levy. Upon return of democracy, Fertiphil demanded a refund
impose a license fee but to levy a tax for purposes of revenue, thus the but PPI refused. Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages
ordinance cannot be considered ultra vires for there is more than ample against FPA and PPI with the RTC on the ground that LOI No. 1465 is
statutory authority for the enactment thereof. unjust, unreaonable oppressive, invalid and unlawful resulting to denial
Second, an argument against double taxation may not be invoked where of due process of law.
one tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city, so that § FPA answered that it is a valid exercise of the police power of the state
where, as here, Congress has clearly expressed its intention, the statute must in ensuring the stability of the fertilizing industry in the country and
be sustained even though double taxation results. that Fertiphil did NOT sustain damages since the burden imposed fell
And third, violation of uniformity is out of place it being widely on the ultimate consumers.
recognized that there is nothing inherently obnoxious in the requirement § RTC and CA favored Fertiphil holding that it is an exercise of the
that license fees or taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation, power of taxation ad is as such because it is NOT for public purpose as
calling or activity by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof. PPI is a private corporation.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Fertiphil has locus standi
2. W/N LOI No. 1465 is an invalid exercise of the power of taxation rather
the police power

Held:
1. Yes. In private suits, locus standi requires a litigant to be a "real party in
interest" or party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in LUTZ v. ARANETA
the suit. In public suits, there is the right of the ordinary citizen to petition GR No. L-7859, December 22, 1955
the courts to be freed from unlawful government intrusion and illegal 98 PHIL 148
official action subject to the direct injury test or where there must be
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or FACTS: Plaintiff Walter Lutz, in his capacity as judicial administrator of the
will sustain direct injury as a result. Being a mere procedural technicality, it intestate estate of Antionio Ledesma,
has also been held that locus standi may be waived in the public interest sought to recover from the CIR the sum of P14,666.40 paid by the estate as
such as cases of transcendental importance or with far-reaching implications taxes, under section 3 of the CA
whether private or public suit, Fertiphil has locus standi. 567 or the Sugar Adjustment Act thereby assailing its constitutionality, for it
provided for an increase of the
2. As a seller, it bore the ultimate burden of paying the levy which made its existing tax on the manufacture of sugar, alleging that such enactment is not
products more expensive and harm its business. It is also of paramount being levied for a public purpose
public importance since it involves the constitutionality of a tax law and use but solely and exclusively for the aid and support of the sugar industry thus
of taxes for public purpose. making it void and unconstitutional.
The sugar industry situation at the time of the enactment was in an imminent
3. Yes. Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers of the threat of loss and needed to be
state but distinct and have different tests for validity. Police power is the stabilized by imposition of emergency measures.
power of the state to enact the legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty on property in order to promote general welfare. While, the power ISSUE: Is CA 567 constitutional, despite its being allegedly violative of the
of taxation is the power to levy taxes as to be used for public purpose. The equal protection clause, the purpose of
main purpose of police power is the regulation of a behavior or conduct, which is not for the benefit of the general public but for the rehabilitation only
while taxation is revenue generation. The lawful subjects and lawful means of the sugar industry?
tests are used to determine the validity of a law enacted under the police
power. The power of taxation, on the other hand, is circumscribed by HELD: Yes. The protection and promotion of the sugar industry is a matter
inherent and constitutional limitations. of public concern, it follows that the
Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary for its
In this case, it is for purpose of revenue. But it is a robbery for the State to protection and expedient for its
tax the citizen and use the funds generation for a private purpose. Public promotion. Here, the legislative discretion must be allowed to fully play,
purpose does NOT only pertain to those purpose which are traditionally subject only to the test of
viewed as essentially governmental function such as building roads and reasonableness; and it is not contended that the means provided in the law
delivery of basic services, but also includes those purposes designed to bear no relation to the objective
promote social justice. Thus, public money may now be used for the pursued or are oppressive in character. If objective and methods are alike
relocation of illegal settlers, low-cost housing and urban or agrarian reform. constitutionally valid, no reason is seen
why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and
attainment. Taxation may be made the
implement of the state's police power.
Case Digest: HON. RAMON BAGATSING, et al. vs. HON. PEDRO A. special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be
RAMIREZ and FEDERATION OF MANILA MARKET VENDORS, considered. However, the rule yields to a situation where the special statute
INC. refers to a subject in general which the general statute treats in
G.R. No. L-41631 17 December 1976 particular. This exactly is the circumstance in this case. The Revised Charter
MARTIN, J. of the City of Manila refers merely to “ordinances,” while the Local Tax Code
refers to “ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees and other charges” in
particular. Thus, in the realm of “ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees
FACTS: and other charges” the Local Tax Code governs. This is especially true since
the Local Tax Code was enacted later than the Charter
Sometime in 1974, the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
7522, “An Ordinance Regulating the Operation of Public Markets and
Prescribing Fees for the Rentals of Stalls and Providing Penalties for
Violation Thereof and for Other Purposes.” City Mayor Bagatsing approved
the ordinance 3 days later.

On 17 February 1975, respondent Federation of Manila Market Vendors, Inc.

commenced a civil case before the CFI of Manila seeking declaration of the
said ordinance mainly because the publication requirement under the Charter
of Manila has not been complied with. Judge Ramirez rendered its decision
declaring the nullity of the ordinance on the primary ground of non-
compliance with the requirement of publication under the City Charter, which
requires the ordinance to be published in two daily newspapers of general
circulation in the city before its enactment. Neither was it published after its
approval, although it was posed in the legislative hall and in all city public
markets and city public libraries.

For the petitioners’ part, they claim that only a post-publication is required
under the Local Tax Code.

ISSUE:
What law shall govern the publication of a tax ordinance enacted by the
Municipal Board of Manila, the Revised City Charter, which requires
publication of the ordinance before its enactment and after its approval, or the
Local Tax Code, which only demands publication after its approval?

HELD:

There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special
act, whereas the Local Tax Code is a general law because it applies
universally to all LGUs. The rule commonly said is that the fact that one is