Leouel Santos vs Court of Appeals

Note: This was the first case where the term “psychological incapacity” was discussed by the
Supreme Court.
Leouel Santos, a member of the Army, met Julia Rosario Bedia in Iloilo City. In September 1986,
they got married. The couple latter lived with Julia’s parents. Julia gave birth to their son in 1987.
Their marriage, however, was marred by the frequent interference of Julia’s parents, as averred
by Leouel. The couple also occasionally quarreled about as to, among other things, when should
they start living independently from Julia’s parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a
nurse despite Leouel’s opposition. 7 months later, she and Leouel got to talk and she promised
to return home in 1989. She never went home that year. In 1990, Leouel got the chance to be in
the US due to a military training. During his stay, he desperately tried to locate his wife but to no
avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have his wife come home, filed a petition to nullify their
marriage due to Julia’s alleged psychological incapacity. Leouel asserted that due to Julia’s failure
to return home or at least communicate with him even with all his effort constitutes
psychological incapacity. Julia filed an opposition; she said that it is Leouel who is incompetent.
The prosecutor ascertained that there is no collusion between the two. Leouel’s petition is
however denied by the lower and appellate court.
ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the case at bar.
HELD: No. Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code did not define the term
“psychological incapacity”, which is adopted from the Catholic Canon Law. But basing it on the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, the provision in PI, adopted with less
specificity than expected, has been designed to allow some resiliency in its application. The FCRC
did not give any examples of PI for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability
of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the FCRC would like the judge to
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not
binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from
Canon Law. The term “psychological incapacity” defies any precise definition since psychological
causes can be of an infinite variety.
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. PI should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which (Art. 68), include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of PI to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The SC also notes that PI must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must
be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable
or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because the
alleged PI of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings presented. The factual settings
do not come close to to the standard required to decree a nullity of marriage.

Case Digest LEOUEL SANTOS vs CA

By Jay R. Bautista

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner, vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIASANTOS, respondents

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

Facts:

Leouel Santos, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia.
The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the
two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed,
shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter’s parents at the J.
Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was
christened Leouel Santos, Jr. Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia’s
parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a
“quarrel” over a number of other things, like when and where the couple should start living
independently from Julia’s parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel’s
spending a few days with his own parents.

On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite
Leouel’s pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia
called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon
the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the
United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to
somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.

Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of
Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for “Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family
Code” (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation in Negros Oriental.

Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with
him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:

(T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario BediaSantos
failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her
husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically
incapacitated.

Issue:

Whether or not the failed to communicate and inform her husband about her whereabouts for
a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.

Held:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the
most serious cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated.

The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can
always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem. WHEREFORE, the petition is
DENIED.
Sunday, July 9, 2017

Psychological Incapacity: Republic of the Philippines vs CA and

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs Court of Appeals and Roridel Olaviano Molina

G.R. No. 108763, Feb. 13, 1997

This is a petition for review on certiorari by the Solicitor General assailing the January 25, 1993
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 34858 which affirmed the May 14, 1991 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, declaring the respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina
and Reynaldo Molina’s marriage as void ab initio, on the ground of “psychological incapacity” under
Article 36 of the Family Code.

FACTS:

Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a
year after. Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” on the early stages of the
marriage, observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with
them, from his dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances.
Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In March
1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their
child a week later. The couple is separated-in-fact for more than three years.

On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a
social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not
present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial
court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision. Hence, the
present recourse.

ISSUE: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity

HELD:
The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize the
application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity
as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or
she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or
her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage; where said
conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it
defeats the very objectives of marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage.

The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is
celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In
the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity; but appears to be more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting
personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.

The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36
of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world:
(1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be
medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly
explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of
marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness
must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the
Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents
and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels
for the State.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision; concluding
that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.