Abayon V.

HRET (2009)
FACTS:
In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-
list organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections.
Respondents filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against petitioner Abayon.
They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of
Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors since
she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an
incumbent congressional district representative.
It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon
who was just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon,
were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.
In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list
group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives.
Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of
Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels,
Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards.
Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was
actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the
House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee. Consequently,
any question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such
question must be brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
HELD:
Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization
that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution,5 identifies who the “members” of that House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are “elected members” of the
House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has
jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district
representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed
and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications
ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.10
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed
the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its
jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

Atong Paglaum V. COMELEC

Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in
the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as
representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse
of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the
said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC
as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles
established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether
major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system.
The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or
lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized
and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined
political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented”
sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations
that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The
nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,”
either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be
bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice,
from participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional prohibition
nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the party-list system
provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.”

Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The
Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list
elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT
case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of the
framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list
system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the
“marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political
constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based and
cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common
denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike major
political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the
needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself
unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to
include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are
economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941
includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals,
which are not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as “marginalized,
underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies” as they are
ideologically marginalized.

Reyes Vs. Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

Facts:
Reyes filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the lone
district of Marinduque. Tan, the private respondent and a registered voter and resident of the
Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the cancellation of
Reyes’s COC. On October 31, 2012, Tan filed the amended petition claiming that Reyes’s COC
contained material misrepresentations regarding the her marital status, residency, date of birth
and citizenship. Tan alleged that Reyes is an American citizen and filed in February 8, 2013 a
manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered evidence and amended last exhibit.
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling the Reyes’s
COC on the basis that she is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply
with the requirements of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.
Reyes filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But on May 14, 2013 the COMELEC
en banc promulgated a Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
On May 18, 2013, Reyes was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 elections and on June 5,
2013 took her oath of office before the Speaker of House of Representatives. She has yet to
assume office at noon of June 30, 2013.
On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the May 14,
2013 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc final and executory.
Reyes then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order.
According to Reyes, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed
because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET has the exclusive
jurisdiction to be the "sole judge of all contests... relating to the election, returns and
qualifications" of the Members of the House of Representatives.
Issues:
Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner who is a duly proclaimed
winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of member of the House of
Representative.
Held:
Contrary to Reyes's claim, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction for the following reasons:
First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of Reyes's qualifications, as well as
over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with said tribunal.
Reyes has not averred that she has filed such action.
Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of
the House of Representatives. The HRET does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who is not
a member of the House of Representatives. Since Reyes in not yet a member of the House of
Representatives, the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the issue raised.
Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction
begins.
From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid
proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.
Here, Reyes cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because,
primarily, she has not yet assumed office.
In her attempt to comply with the second requirement, Reyes attached a purported Oath Of
Office taken before Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 5 June 2013. However, this is not the oath of
office which confers membership to the House of Representatives.
Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House of Representatives provides:
Oath or Affirmation of Members. Members shall take their oath or affirmation either collectively
or individually before the Speaker in open session.
Consequently, before there is a valid or official taking of the oath it must be made (1) before the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she made
the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during plenary or in
open session and, thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of office was indeed
complied with.

TAÑADA v. COMELEC
SHORT SUMMARY: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court filed by petitioner Wigberto R. Tañada assailing the COMELEC En Banc
Resolution dated April 25, 2013 (declaring that Alvin John S. Tañada was not a nuisance
candidate as defined under Section 69, OEC). Consequently, he seeks that the votes cast in
favor of Alvin John S. Tañada be credited to him and that he be declared the winning candidate
for the congressional post instead of Angelina D. Tan. The SC dismissed the petition
considering that respondent Angelina D. Tan had already been proclaimed as Member of the
House of Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province, taken her oath and assumed
office. The SC is now without jurisdiction to resolve the case at bar. The issues concerning the
conduct of the canvass and the resulting proclamation of Angelina D. Tan are matters properly
fall under the HRET’s sole jurisdiction.
FACTS:
Petitioner Wigberto R. Tañada, Jr. or Wigberto, Angelina D. Tan or Angelina (National People’s
Coalition) and Alvin John S. Tañada or Alvin John (Lapiang Manggagawa) were contenders for
the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province
in the May 13, 2013 National Elections.
Wigberto filed before the COMELEC separate petitions: 1st petition – to cancel Alvin John’s
CoC; 2nd petition – to declare Alvin John as a nuisance candidate.
COMELEC 1st Division dismissed both petitions for lack of merit. However, for the1st Petition,
COMELEC En Banc granted the Motion for Reconsideration and canceled Alvin John’s CoC for
having committed false material representations concerning his residency.
For the 2nd Petition, COMELEC En Banc upheld the 1st Division’s ruling that Alvin John was
not a nuisance candidate as defined under Sec. 69 of the OEC.
Despite the cancellation of Alvin John’s CoC, his name was not deleted from the ballot,
prompting Wigberto to file a motion with the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Quezon Province
(PBOC) asking that the votes cast in the name of Alvin John be credited to him instead in
accordance with the Court’s ruling in Dela Cruz v. COMELEC. The PBOC denied Wigberto’s
motion because the cancellation of the Alvin John’s CoC was on the basis of his material
misrepresentations under Sec. 78 of the OEC and not on being a nuisance candidate under
Sec. 69 of the same law.
Aftee the election, PBOC proclaimed Angelina as the winning candidate.
It appears, however, that Wigberto had already filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Annul the
Proclamation of Angelina asserting that had the PBOC followed pertinent rulings, the votes cast
for Alvin John would have been counted in his favor which could have resulted in his victory.
While the Petition to Annul was still pending resolution, Wigberto initiated the instant certiorari
case against the COMELEC En Banc Resolution declaring Alvin John not a nuisance candidate.
Wigberto filed a Manifestation informing the SC that he had caused the filing of an Election
Protest Ad Cautelam (Wigberto R. Tañada, Jr. v. Angelina ‘Helen’ D. Tan) before the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). He prayed that he be declared the winner in the
2013 congressional race in the 4th District of Quezon Province.
ISSUE:
W/N the issues concerning the conduct of the canvass and the resulting proclamation of
respondent Angelina D. Tan fall under the HRET’s sole jurisdiction.

HELD:
YES. The issues raised fall under the HRET jurisdiction.
Considering that respondent Angelina D. Tan had already been proclaimed as Member of the
House of Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province on May 16, 2013, as she has
in fact taken her oath and assumed office past noon time of June 30, 2013, the SC is now
without jurisdiction to resolve the case at bar. The issues concerning the conduct of the canvass
and the resulting proclamation of Angelina D. Tan are matters, which fall under the scope of the
terms “election” and “returns” and hence, properly fall under the HRET’s sole jurisdiction.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that the HRET is the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its respective
members.
Case law states that the proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election
divests the COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the proclaimed representative in favor of the HRET.

LICO Vs. COMELEC

FACTS:
Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization.
On 30 November 2009, Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List
System of Representation for the 10 May 2010 Elections. On 6 March 2010, it filed with the
COMELEC the list of its nominees, with petitioner Lico as first nominee and Roberto Mascarina
as second nominee.
On 8 December 2010, COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning party-list
groups. Petitioner Lico subsequently took his oath of office on 9 December 2010 before the
Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, and thereafter assumed office.
Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning party-list organizations, Ating
Koop issued a resolution, which incorporated a term-sharing agreement signed by its nominees.
Under the agreement, petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-list Representative for the first year
of the three-year term.
Almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed office, the Interim Central Committee
expelled him from Ating Koop for disloyalty. The petition filed to the COMELEC prayed that
petitioner Lico be ordered to vacate the office of Ating Koop in the House of Representatives,
and for the succession of the second nominee, Roberto Mascarina as Ating Koop's
representative in the House.
Ating Koop had expelled Congressman Lico for acts inimical to the party-list group, such as
malversation, graft and corruption.
Issues:
W/N COMELEC has jurisdiction over the expulsion of a Member of the House of
Representatives from his party-list organization.
Ruling:
The COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the pettion. The SC finds that while the COMELEC
correctly the Petition to expel petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives for being
beyond its jurisdiction.
The COMELEC notably characterized the Petition for expulsion of petitioner Lico from the
House of Representatives and for the succession of the second nominee as party-list
representative as a disqualification case. For this reaso exn, the COMELEC dismissed the
petition for lack of jurisdiction, insofar as it relates to the question of unseating petitioner Lico
from the House of Representatives.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve
questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list
representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon proclamation
of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as member of the
House of Representatives.
In this case, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico
took his oath; and he assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and
not the COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case.

Velasco v. Belmonte
Facts:
Before the court is a petition for mandamus filed under rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco (Velasco) against Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr. ( Speaker
Belmonte Jr.), Speaker House of Representatives.
Velasco contended that he must be proclaimed because COMELEC resolution that Reyes COC
is null and void and thus he must be proclaimed to be the winner of the congressional district of
Marinduque. He has a well-defined and clear legal right and basis to warrant the grant of the
writ of mandamus. He insists that the final and executory decisions of the COMELEC in SPA
No. 13-053 (DC), and this Court in G.R. No. 207264, as well as the nullification of respondent
Reyes's proclamation and his subsequent proclamation as the duly elected Representative of
the Lone District of Marinduque, collectively give him the legal right to claim the congressional
seat.
Velasco also posits that the "continued usurpation and unlawful holding of such position by
respondent Reyes has worked injustice and serious prejudice to him in that she has already
received the salaries, allowances, bonuses and emoluments that pertain to the position of
Marinduque Representative since June 30, 2013 up to the present in the amount of around
several hundreds of thousands of pesos.
On the other hand, Reyes contended that a petition for quo warranto must file before the HRET
to settle the dispute who among them should be the representative of Congressional district of
Marinduque and determine the qualification of Reyes. In her Comment, Reyes contends that the
petition is actually one for quo warranto and not mandamus given that it essentially seeks a
declaration that she usurped the subject office; and the installation of Velasco in her place by
Speaker Belmonte, Jr. when the latter administers his oath of office and enters his name in the
Roll of Members. She argues that, being a collateral attack on a title to public office, the petition
must be dismissed. Reyes questions the jurisdiction of the Court over Quo Warranto cases
involving Members of the House of Representatives. She posits that "even if the Petition for
Mandamus be treated as one of Quo Warranto, it is still dismissible for lack of jurisdiction and
absence of a clear legal right on the part of Velasco.
ISSUE: Whether or not HRET has jurisdiction over the case.

Held: The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of
the House of Representatives. And to be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid
proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office
At the time of Reyes's proclamation, her COC was already cancelled by the COMELEC En
Banc in its final finding in its resolution dated May 14, 2013, the effectivity of which was not
enjoined by this Court, as Reyes did not avail of the prescribed remedy which is to seek a
restraining order within a period of five (5) days as required by Section 13(b), Rule 18 of
COMELEC Rules. Since no restraining order was forthcoming, the PBOC should have refrained
from proclaiming Reyes.
As a consequence of the above events, the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 cancelled
respondent Reyes's proclamation and, in turn, proclaimed Velasco as the duly elected Member
of the House of Representatives in representation of the Lone District of the Province of
Marinduque. The said proclamation has not been challenged or questioned by Reyes in any
proceeding.
When Reyes took her oath of office before respondent Speaker Belmonte, Jr. in open session,
Reyes had NO valid COC NOR a valid proclamation.
Thus, to consider Reyes' s proclamation and treating it as a material fact in deciding this case
will paradoxically alter the well-established legal milieu between her and Velasco.
In view of the foregoing, Reyes HAS ABSOLUTELY NO LEGAL BASIS to serve as a Member of
the House of Representatives for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque, and therefore,
she HAS NO LEGAL PERSONALITY to be recognized as a party-respondent at a quo warranto
proceeding before the HRET.

Ty-Delgado vs HRET
Facts:
September 2008, SC convicted Pichay of four counts of libel. October 2012, Pichay filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of member of house of representatives for the 1st district
of Surigao del Sur for the May 2013 elections.
February 2013, Ty-Delgado filed a petition for disqualification against Pichay before COMELEC
on the ground of the libel conviction, a crime of moral turpitude; and that the 5-year period
barring him to be a candidate had yet to lapse.
Pichay answered that the petition for disqualification was filed out of time and argued that libel
does not necessarily involve moral turpitude because his conviction was based only on his
presumed responsibility as the president of the publishing company.
May 2013, Pichay was proclaimed as duly elected member of the HR. Ty-Delgado then filed an
ad cautelam petition for quo warranto before HRET reiterating that Pichay is ineligible.
COMELEC dismissed the petition for disqualification for lack of jurisdiction. HRET ruled that that
it had jurisdiction over the present quo warranto petition but concluded that Pichay's libel
conviction did not involve moral turpitude.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of
jurisdiction when it failed to disqualify Pichay for his conviction for libel, a crime involving moral
turpitude.
RULING:
The Supreme Court Find that HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
or excess of jurisdiction when it failed to disqualify Pichay for his conviction for libel, a crime
involving moral turpitude.
In the present case, Pichay misrepresented his eligibility in his certificate of candidacy because
he knew that he had been convicted by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.
Thus, his representation that he was eligible for elective public office constitutes false material
representation as to his qualification or eligibility for the office.
A person whose certificate of candidacy had been denied due course and/or cancelled under
Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all, because his certificate of candidacy is
considered void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily to valid
votes. The court found that since the certificate of candidacy of the candidate with the highest
number of votes was void ab initio, he was never a candidate at all, and all his votes were
considered stray votes.
Since Pichay's ineligibility existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy and he was
never a valid candidate for the position of Member of the House of Representatives, the votes
cast for him were considered stray votes. Thus, the qualified candidate for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur in
2013 elections who received the highest number of valid votes shall be declared the winner.
Based on the Provincial Canvass Report, the qualified candidate for the position of Member of
the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur in the 2013
elections who received the highest number of valid votes is petitioner Mary Elizabeth Ty-
Delgado.
Fundamental is the rule that grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal
patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. While it is well-recognized
that the HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives, the Court maintains jurisdiction over it to check "whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. In
other words, when the HRET utterly disregards the law and settled precedents on the matter
before it, it commits grave abuse of discretion.

TAÑADA Vs. HRET

Petitioner Wigberto R. Tañada, Jr.,and Angelina D. Tan and Alvin John S. Tañada were
contenders for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the 4th District of
Quezon Province in the 2013 National Elections.
On October 10, 2012, Wigberto filed before the COMELEC two separate petitions: first, to
cancel Alvin John’s CoC; and, second, to declare him as a nuisance candidate.

COMELEC First Division dismissed both petitions for lack of merit. Wigberto Tañada filed a
motion for reconsideration but the COMELEC En Banc upheld ruling of the COMELEC First
Division that Alvin John was not a nuisance candidate as defined under Section 6910 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 881, as amended, otherwise known as the "Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines" (OEC). However, COMELEC En Banc granted the motion for reconsideration for
the cancellation Alvin John’s CoC for having committed false material representations
concerning his residency in accordance with Section 7812 of the OEC.
Despite the cancellation of Alvin John Tañada’s CoC due to his material misrepresentations
therein, his name was not deleted from – and thus, remained printed on – the ballot, prompting
Wigberto Tañada to file a motion with the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Quezon Province
(PBOC) asking that the votes cast in the name of Alvin John be credited to him instead in
accordance with the Court’s ruling in Dela Cruz v. COMELEC. The PBOC, however, denied
Wigberto’s motion, holding that the votes of Alvin John could not be counted in favor of
Wigberto because the cancellation of the former’s CoC was on the basis of his material
misrepresentations under Section 78 of the OEC and not on being a nuisance candidate under
Section 69 of the same law.
Wigberto Tañada filed with the HRET an election protest against Alvin John Tañada.
The HRET ruled that it has no jurisdiction to declare that Alvin John was a nuisance candidate.
The HRET relied on Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 15 of the 2011
HRET Rules to declare that its power to judge election contests is limited to Members of the
House of Representatives. Alvin John, admittedly, is not a Member of the House of
Representatives.
ISSUE:
W/N HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring that it has no jurisdiction to
determine whether Alvin John was a nuisance candidate.
RULING:
The HRET did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in declaring that it has no jurisdiction to
determine whether Alvin John was a nuisance candidate. If Wigberto timely filed a petition
before this Court within the period allotted for special actions and questioned Alvin John’s
nuisance candidacy, then it is proper for this Court to assume jurisdiction and rule on the matter.
As things stand, the COMELEC En Bane’s ruling on Alvin John’s nuisance candidacy had long
become final and executory.

MARTINEZ Vs. HRET

Facts: In the May 14, 2007 elections, petitioner Martinez and private respondent Salimbangon
were among the candidates for Representative in the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu
Province. On March 29, 2007, Edilito C. Martinez, a resident of Barangay Tambongon, Daan-
Bantayan, Cebu, filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position.
On April 3, 2007, Martinez filed a petition to declare Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate.
However, the Commission on Elections Second Division issued its Resolution declaring Edilito
C. Martinez a nuisance candidate only on June 12, 2007 or almost one (1) month after the
elections.

On July 9, 2007, Salimbangon was proclaimed winner in the congressional elections for the
Fourth Legislative District of Cebu on the basis of official results showing that he garnered sixty-
seven thousand two hundred seventy-seven (67,277) votes as against Martinez who garnered
sixty-seven thousand one h ytundred seventy-three (67,173) votes, or a difference of one
hundred four (104) votes.
Martinez filed an election protest before the HRET based on the 300 ballots more or less with
only “MARTINEZ” or “C. MARTINEZ” written on the line for Representative which the Board of
Election Inspectors did not count for Martinez on the ground that there was another
congressional candidate (Edilito C. Martinez) who had the same surname. In its decision dated
May 28, 2009, the HRET sustained the BEI in considering the ballots as stray in accordance
with Sec. 211 (1) of the Omnibus Election Code. Since the name of Edilito C. Martinez was still
included in the official list of candidates on election day (May 14, 2007), the HRET held that five
thousand four hundred one (5,401) ballots with "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" only written on
the line for Representative were properly denied on the ground that there was no way of
determining the real intention of the voter. The HRET dismissed the election protest, affirmed
the proclamation of Salimbangon and declared him to be the duly elected Representative of the
Fourth Legislative District of Cebu, having won by a plurality margin of 453 votes. Martinez
moved for reconsideration of the Decision, but the HRET denied it by Resolution dated July 30,
2009. Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to nullify the decision of
HRET dismissing the election protest declaring private respondent as the duly elected
Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu, and the Resolution dated July 30,
2009 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof.
ISSUE:
W/N HRET gravely abused its discretion in affirming the proclamation of respondent
Salimbangon.
RULING:
HRET gravely abused its discretion in affirming the proclamation of respondent Salimbangon as
the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu despite the final
outcome of revision showing 5,401 ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. "MARTINEZ" written on
the line for Representative, votes which should have been properly counted in favor of petitioner
and not nullified as stray votes, after considering all relevant circumstances clearly establishing
that such votes could not have been intended for "Edilito C. Martinez" who was declared a
nuisance candidate in a final judgment.
The court held in several cases that the judgments of the Electoral Tribunals are beyond judicial
interference, unless rendered without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. The power of judicial review may be invoked in exceptional cases upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a clear
denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error,
manifestly constituting such grave abuse of direction that there has to be a remedy for such
abuse. Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion
or personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
Ensconced in our jurisprudence is the well-founded rule that laws and statutes governing
election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that
the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical
infirmities. An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the need to dispel
uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative. The prohibition against
nuisance candidates is aimed precisely at preventing uncertainty and confusion in ascertaining
the true will of the electorate. Thus, in certain situations as in the case at bar, final judgments
declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by
such candidate as of election day. Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates will continue to put
the electoral process into mockery by filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute and
delaying resolution of any petition to declare them as nuisance candidates until elections are
held and the votes counted and canvassed.
The court therefore hold that ballots indicating only the similar surname of two (2) candidates for
the same position may, in appropriate cases, be counted in favor of the bona fide candidate and
not considered stray, even if the other candidate was declared a nuisance candidate by final
judgment after the elections. Accordingly, the 5,401 votes for "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ"
should be credited to petitioner giving him a total of 72,056 votes as against 67,108 total votes
of private respondent. Petitioner thus garnered more votes than private respondent with a
winning margin of 4,948 votes.

NAZARETH Vs. VILLAR

FACTS:
Congress enacted R.A. No. 8439 to address the policy of the State to provide a program for
human resources development in science and technology in order to achieve and maintain the
necessary reservoir of talent and manpower that would sustain the drive for total science and
technology mastery. Section 7 of R.A. No. 8439 grants the following additional allowances and
benefits (Magna Carta benefits) to the covered officials and employees of the DOST. Under
R.A. No. 8439, the funds for the payment of the Magna Carta benefits are to be appropriated by
the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of the year following the enactment of R.A. No. 8439. The
DOST Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City released the Magna Carta benefits to the
covered officials and employees commencing in CY 1998 despite the absence of specific
appropriation for the purpose in the GAA.
Subsequently, following the post-audit conducted by COA State Auditor Ramon E. Vargas,
several NDs were issued disapproving the payment of the Magna Carta benefits. The
disallowance by the COA prompted then DOST Secretary Dr. Filemon Uriarte, Jr. to request the
Office of the President (OP) through his Memorandum for the authority to utilize the DOST’s
savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, acting by
authority of the President, approved the request of Secretary Uriarte, Jr. Petitioner, in her
capacity as the DOST Regional Director in Region IX, lodged an appeal with COA Regional
Cluster Director Ellen Sescon, urging the lifting of the disallowance of the Magna Carta benefits.
ISSUE: W/N COA commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing their report.
RULING: No. The authority granted to the President was subject to two essential requisites in
order that a transfer of appropriation from the agency’s savings would be validly effected. The
first required that there must be savings from the authorized appropriation of the agency. The
second demanded that there must be an existing item, project, activity, purpose or object of
expenditure with an appropriation to which the savings would be transferred for augmentation
purposes only.
Clearly and indubitably, the prohibition against the transfer of appropriations is the general rule.
Consequently, the payment of the Magna Carta benefits for CY 2001 without a specific item or
provision in the GAA and without due authority from the President to utilize the DOST’s savings
in other items for the purpose was repugnant to R.A. No. 8439, the Constitution, and the re-
enacted GAA for 2001.
The COA is endowed with sufficient latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow the irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It
has the power to ascertain whether public funds were utilized for the purposes for which they
had been intended by law. The Court has accorded not only respect but also finality to their
findings especially when their decisions are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that
would amount to grave abuse of discretion.
Only when the COA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may the Court entertain and grant a
petition for certiorari brought to assail its actions. Section 1 of Rule 65, Rules of Court, demands
that the petitioner must show that, one, the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and, two, there is neither an appeal nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of amending or
nullifying the proceeding. Inasmuch as the sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of
errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner should establish that the COA gravely abused its discretion.
Nonetheless, the Court opines that the DOST officials who caused the payment of the Magna
Carta benefits to the covered officials and employees acted in good faith in the honest belief
that there was a firm legal basis for the payment of the benefits. Evincing their good faith even
after receiving the NDs from the COA was their taking the initiative of earnestly requesting the
OP for the authorization to use the DOST’s savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits. On their
part, the DOST covered officials and employees received the benefits because they considered
themselves rightfully deserving of the benefits under the long-awaited law. The Court declares
and holds that the disallowed benefits received in good faith need not be reimbursed to the
Government.

Belgica vs Ochoa
FACTS:
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork
Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the
Congress. It underwent several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest
“Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated
in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million for “hard
projects” (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft
projects” (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100
million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100
million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet
members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the
request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called
presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the
Malampaya Gas Project – this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social
Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013,
six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in
the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping
lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-government
organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit
existing projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the
Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the
Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it
violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the
purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which
the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel
system, what’s happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators
themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act of
implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in
the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or
the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only
recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get
the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does
grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative
are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot
delegate further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local
matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits,
and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to
which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative
power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses
comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the
exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of
Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items
in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined
because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to
which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the
appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA –
again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the
constitutionally-given power of the President useless.”
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their
Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies
concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the
house of representatives, what’s happening is that a congressman can either bypass or
duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the
national government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of the
local government – and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local
autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the
PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is
unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.

Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya
and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as
well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for
the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-
related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to
further finance energy resource development and for other purposes which the President may
direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall
be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in
government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution.
The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can
be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.
Maria Carolina Araullo vs Benigno Aquino III
FACTS:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of
the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget
Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables
the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting
for next year’s appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government
project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will
be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the
Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did
work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such
growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act
(GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and
other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the
impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was
taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a controversy as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds
within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a
few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro
National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators
each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and
several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the
validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President
to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend
expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
ISSUES:
Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
HELD:
No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a
program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for
prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in
Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the
Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which
were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.