CIR v. CA

2/3/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 261
*
G.R. No. 119761. August 29, 1996.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,

vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. COURT OF TAX
APPEALS and FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION,
respondents.
Taxation; The CIR may not disregard legal requirements or

applicable principles in the exercise of its quasi-legislative powers.
—Petitioner stresses on the wide and ample authority of the BIR
in the issuance of rulings for the effective implementation of the
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Let it be made
clear that such authority of the Commissioner is not here
doubted. Like any other government agency, however, the CIR
may not disregard legal requirements or applicable principles in
the exercise of its quasi-legislative powers.
Same; RMC 37–93 cannot be viewed simply as a corrective
measure or merely as construing Section 142(c)(1) of the NIRC.—A
reading of RMC 37–93, particularly considering the circumstances
under which it has been issued, convinces us that the circular
cannot be viewed simply as a corrective measure (revoking in the
process the previous holdings of past Commissioners) or merely as
construing Section 142(c)(1) of the NIRC, as amended, but has, in
fact and most importantly, been made in order to place “Hope
Luxury,” “Premium More” and “Champion” within the
classification of locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign
brands and to thereby have them covered by RA 7654.
Specifically, the new law would have its amendatory provisions
applied to locally manufactured cigarettes which at the time of its
effectivity were not so classified as bearing foreign brands. Prior to
the issuance of the questioned circular, “Hope Luxury,” “Premium
More,” and “Champion” cigarettes were in the category of locally
manufactured cigarettes not bearing foreign brand subject to 45%
ad valorem tax. Hence, without RMC 37–93, the enactment of RA
7654, would have had no new tax rate consequence on private
respondent’s products.
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000161595bdca4be62f97c003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/44
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VOL. 261, AUGUST 29, 1996 237
Commissioner of lnternal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals
Same; RMC 37–93 might have infringed on uniformity of

taxation.—Not insignificantly, RMC 37–93 might have likewise
infringed on uniformity of taxation.
Same; Uniformity requires that all subjects or objects of
taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike or put on equal
footing both in privileges and liabilities.—Article VI, Section 28,
paragraph 1, of the 1987 Constitution mandates taxation to be
uniform and equitable. Uniformity requires that all subjects or
objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike or
put on equal footing both in privileges and liabilities. Thus, all
taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class must be
taxed at the same rate and the tax must operate with the same
force and effect in every place where the subject may be found.
Same; Court is convinced that the hastily promulgated RMC
37–93 has fallen short of a valid and effective administrative
issuance.—All taken, the Court is convinced that the hastily
promulgated RMC 37–93 has fallen short of a valid and effective
administrative issuance.
BELLOSILLO, J., Separate Opinion:
Taxation; In issuing RMC 37–93 petitioner Commissioner of

lnternal Revenue was exercising her quasi-judicial or
administrative adjudicatory power, consequently prior notice and
hearing are required.—It is evident from the foregoing that in
issuing RMC 37–93 petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue
was exercising her quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory
power. She cited and interpreted the law, made a factual finding,
applied the law to her given set of facts, arrived at a conclusion,
and issued a ruling aimed at a specific individual. Consequently
prior notice and hearing are required. It must be emphasized that
even the text alone of RMC 37–93 implies that reception of
evidence during a hearing is appropriate if not necessary since it
invokes BIR Ruling No. 410–88, dated August 24, 1988, which
provides that “in cases where it cannot be established or there is
dearth of evidence as to whether a brand is foreign or not.
238
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J., Dissenting Opinion:
Taxation; Petitioner was acting well within her prerogatives

when she issued the questioned Circular.—Statutorily empowered
to issue rulings or opinions embodying the proper determination
in respect to classifying articles, including cigarettes, for purposes
of tax assessment and collection, petitioner was acting well within
her prerogatives when she issued the questioned Circular. And in
the exercise of such prerogatives under the law, she has in her
favor the presumption of regular performance of official duty
which must be overcome by clearly persuasive evidence of stark
error and grave abuse of discretion in order to be overturned and
disregarded.
Same; Petitioner was well within her prerogatives in the
exercise of her rule-making power to classify articles for taxation
purposes, to interpret the laws which she is mandated to
administer.—The petitioner was well within her prerogatives, in
the exercise of her rule-making power, to classify articles for
taxation purposes, to interpret the laws which she is mandated to
administer. In interpreting the same, petitioner must, in general,
be guided by the principles underlying taxation, i.e., taxes are the
lifeblood of Government, and revenue laws ought to be interpreted
in favor of the Government, for Government can not survive
without the funds to underwrite its varied operational expenses in
pursuit of the welfare of the society which it serves and protects.
Same; Private respondent will not be shielded by any vested
rights for there are no vested rights to speak of respecting a wrong
construction of the law by administrative officials and such wrong
interpretation does not place the Government in estoppel to correct
or overrule the same.—Private respondent claims that its business
will be destroyed by the imposition of additional ad valorem taxes
as a result of the effectivity of the questioned Circular. It claims
that under the vested rights theory, it cannot now be made to pay
higher taxes after having been assessed for less in the past. Of
course private respondent will trumpet its losses, its interests,
after all, being its sole concern. What private respondent fails to
see is the loss of revenue by the Government which, because of
erroneous determinations made by its past revenue
commissioners, collected lesser taxes than what it was entitled to
in the first place. It is every citizen’s duty to pay the correct
amount of taxes. Private respondent will not be shielded by any
vested rights, for there are no vested rights to
239
VOL. 261, AUGUST 29, 1996 239
speak of respecting a wrong construction of the law by

administrative officials, and such wrong interpretation does not
place the Government in estoppel to correct or overrule the same.
Same; It is now settled that only legislative regulations and
not interpretative rulings must have the benefit of public hearing.
—Private respondent concedes that under general rules of
administrative law, “a ruling which is merely ‘interpretative’ in
character may not require prior notice to affected parties before
its issuance as well as a hearing” and “for this reason, in most
instances, interpretative regulations are not given the force of
law.” Indeed, “interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature x x x need not be published.” And it is now
settled that only legislative regulations and not interpretative
rulings must have the benefit of public hearing.
PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Estelito P. Mendoza, Pio de Roda & Associates Law
Office and Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for
private respondent.
VITUG, J.:
"“The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (“CIR") disputes

the decision,
1
dated 31 March 1995, of respondent Court of
Appeals affirming the 10th August 1994 decision and the2
11th October 1994 resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals
(“CTA") in C.T.A. Case No. 5015, entitled “Fortune Tobacco
Corporation vs. Liwayway Vinzons-Chato in her capacity
as Commissioner of Internal Revenue.”
The facts, by and large, are not in dispute.
_______________
1 Through Associate Justices Justo P. Torres, Jr. (ponente), Corona

Ibay-Somera and Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (members).
2 Penned by Presiding Judge Ernesto D. Acosta and concurred in by
Associate Judges Ramon O. De Veyra and Manuel K. Gruba.
240

Fortune Tobacco Corporation (“Fortune Tobacco”) is

engaged in the manufacture of different brands of
cigarettes.
On various dates, the Philippine Patent Office issued to
the corporation separate certificates of trademark
registration over “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More”
cigarettes. In a letter, dated 06 January 1987, of then
Commissioner of Internal Revenue Bienvenido A. Tan, Jr.,
to Deputy Minister Ramon Diaz of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government, “the initial position of
the Commission was to classify ‘Champion,’ ‘Hope,’ and
‘More’ as foreign brands since they were listed in the World
Tobacco Directory as belonging to foreign companies.
However, Fortune Tobacco changed the names of ‘Hope’ to
‘Hope Luxury’ and ‘More’ to ‘Premium More,’ thereby
removing the said brands from the foreign brand category.
Proof was also submitted to the Bureau (of Internal
Revenue [‘BIR']) that ‘Champion’ was an original Fortune3
Tobacco Corporation register and therefore a local brand."
4
Ad Valorem taxes were imposed on these brands, at the
following rates:
“BRAND AD VALOREM TAX RATE

E.O.22 and E.O. 273 RA 6956
06–23–86 07–25–87 06–18–90
07–01–86 01–01–88 07–05–90
Hope Luxury M. 100’s
Sec. 142, (c), (2) 40% 45%
Hope Luxury M. King
Sec. 142, (c), (2) 40% 45%
More Premium M. 100’s
Sec. 142, (c), (2) 40% 45%
More Premium International
Sec. 142, (c), (2) 40% 45%
Champion Int’l. M. 100’s
Sec. 142, (c), (2) 40% 45%
_______________
3 Underscoring supplied. Rollo, pp. 55–56.

4 Since the institution of Executive Order No. 22 on 23 June 1986.
241
VOL. 261, AUGUST 29, 1996 241

Champion M. 100’s
Sec. 142, (c), (2) 40% 45%
Champion M. King
Sec. 142, (c), last par. 15% 20%
Champion Lights
5
Sec. 142, (c), last par. 15% 20%"
6
A bill, which later became Republic Act (“RA") No. 7654,
was enacted, on 10 June 1993, by the legislature and
signed into law, on 14 June 1993, by the President of the
Philippines. The new law became effective on 03 July 1993.
It amended Section 142(c)(1) of the National Internal
Revenue Code (“NIRC") to read, as follows:
“SEC. 142. Cigars and Cigarettes.—

“x x x x x x x x x.
"(c) Cigarettes packed by machine.—There shall be levied,
assessed and collected on cigarettes packed by machine a tax at
the rates prescribed below based on the constructive
manufacturer’s wholesale price or the actual manufacturer’s
wholesale price, whichever is higher:
"(1) On locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently

classified and taxed at fifty-five percent (55%) or the
exportation of which is not authorized by contract or
otherwise, fifty-five (55%) provided that the minimum tax
shall not be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack.
"(2) On other locally manufactured cigarettes, forty-five percent
(45%) provided that the minimum tax shall not be less
than Three Pesos (P3.00) per pack.
“When the registered manufacturer’s wholesale price or the
actual manufacturer’s wholesale price whichever is higher of
existing
_______________
5 Rollo, p. 56.
6 An Act Revising The Excise Tax Base, Allocating a Portion Of The
Incremental Revenue Collected For The Emergency Employment Program For
Certain Workers Amending For The Purpose Section 142 Of The National Internal
Revenue Code, As Amended, And For Other Purposes.
242

brands of cigarettes, including the amounts intended to cover the

taxes, of cigarettes packed in twenties does not exceed Four Pesos
and eighty centavos
7
(P4.80) per pack, the rate shall be twenty
percent (20%)." (Italics supplied.)
About a month after the enactment and two (2) days before
the effectivity of RA 7654, Revenue Memorandum Circular
No. 37–93 (“RMC 37–93"), was issued by the BIR the full
text of which expressed:
“REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS
KAGAWARAN NG PANANALAPI
KAWANIHAN NG RENTAS INTERNAS
July 1, 1993
REVENUE MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 37–93
SUBJECT: Reclassification of Cigarettes Subject to Excise Tax

TO : All Internal Revenue Officers and Others Concerned
“In view of the issues raised on whether ‘HOPE/ ‘MORE' and

‘CHAMPION' cigarettes which are locally manufactured are
appropriately considered as locally manufactured cigarettes
bearing a foreign brand, this Office is compelled to review the
previous rulings on the matter.
“Section 142(c)(1) National Internal Revenue Code, as amended
by RA. No. 6956, provides:
‘On locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand, fifty-five

percent (55%): Provided, That this rate shall apply regardless of whether
or not the right to use or title to the foreign brand was sold or transferred
by its owner to the local manufacturer. Whenever it has to be determined
whether or not a cigarette bears a foreign brand, the listing of brands
manufactured in foreign countries appearing in the current World
Tobacco Directory shall govern.’
“Under the foregoing, the test for imposition of the 55% ad

valorem tax on cigarettes is that the locally manufactured
cigarettes
_______________
7 Official Gazette, Vol. 89., No. 32, 09 August 1993, p. 4476.
243
VOL. 261, AUGUST 29, 1996 243

bear a foreign brand regardless of whether or not the right to use

or title to the foreign brand was sold or transferred by its owner to
the local manufacturer. The brand must be originally owned by a
foreign manufacturer or producer. If ownership of the cigarette
brand is, however, not definitely determinable, ‘x x x the listing of
brands manufactured in foreign countries appearing in the
current World Tobacco Directory shall govern. x x x’
“‘HOPE' is listed in the World Tobacco Directory as being
manufactured by (a) Japan Tobacco, Japan, and (b) Fortune
Tobacco, Philippines. ‘MORE' is listed in the said directory as
being manufactured by: (a) Fills de Julia Reig, Andorra; (b)
Rothmans, Australia; (c) RJR-Macdonald, Canada; (d) Rettig-
Strenberg, Finland; (e) Karellas, Greece; (f) R.J. Reynolds,
Malaysia; (g) Rothmans, New Zealand; (h) Fortune Tobacco,
Philippines; (i) R.J. Reynolds, Puerto Rico; (j) R.J. Reynolds,
Spain; (k) Tabacalera, Spain; (I) R.J. Reynolds, Switzerland; and
(m) R.J. Reynolds, USA. ‘Champion’ is registered in the said
directory as being manufactured by (a) Commonwealth
Bangladesh; (b) Sudan, Brazil; (c) Japan Tobacco, Japan; (d)
Fortune Tobacco, Philippines; (e) Haggar, Sudan; and (f) Tabac
Reunies, Switzerland.
“Since there is no showing who among the above-listed
manufacturers of the cigarettes bearing the said brands are the
real owner/s thereof, then it follows that the same shall be
considered foreign brand for purposes of determining the ad
valorem tax pursuant to Section 142 of the National Internal
Revenue Code. As held in BIR Ruling No. 410–88, dated August
24, 1988, ‘in cases where it cannot be established or there is
dearth of evidence as to whether a brand is foreign or not, resort
to the World Tobacco Directory should be made.’
“In view of the foregoing, the aforesaid brands of cigarettes, viz:
‘HOPE,' ‘MORE' and ‘CHAMPION' being manufactured by
Fortune Tobacco Corporation are hereby considered locally
manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the
55% ad valorem tax on cigarettes.
“Any ruling inconsistent herewith is revoked or modified
accordingly.
(SGD.) LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO
Commissioner”
244

On 02 July 1993, at about 17:50 hours, BIR Deputy

Commissioner Victor A. Deoferio, Jr., sent via telefax a copy
of RMC 37–93 to Fortune Tobacco but it was addressed to
no one in particular. On 15 July 1993, Fortune Tobacco
received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC
37–93.
In a letter, dated 19 July 1993, addressed to the
appellate division of the BIR, Fortune Tobacco requested
for a review, reconsideration and recall of RMC 37–93. The
request was denied on 29 July 1993. The following day, or
on 30 July 1993, the CIR assessed Fortune Tobacco for ad
valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00.
On 03 August 1993, 8
Fortune Tobacco filed a petition for
review with the CTA.
On 10 August 1994, the CTA upheld the position of
Fortune Tobacco and adjudged:
“WHEREFORE, Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37–93

reclassifying the brands of cigarettes, viz: ‘HOPE,' ‘MORE' and
‘CHAMPION' being manufactured by Fortune Tobacco
Corporation as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign
brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax on cigarettes is found to
be defective, invalid and unenforceable, such that when R.A. No.
7654 took effect on July 3, 1993, the brands in question were not
CURRENTLY CLASSIFIED AND TAXED at 55% pursuant to
Section 1142(c)(1) of the Tax Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7654
and were therefore still classified as other locally manufactured
cigarettes and taxed at 45% or 20% as the case may be.
“Accordingly, the deficiency ad valorem tax assessment issued
on petitioner Fortune Tobacco Corporation in the amount of
P9,598,334.00, exclusive of surcharge and interest, is hereby
canceled for lack of legal basis.
“Respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue is hereby
enjoined from collecting the deficiency tax assessment made and
issued on petitioner in relation to the implementation of RMC No.
37–93. 9
“SO ORDERED."
_______________
8 The petition was subsequently amended on 12 August 1993.

9 Rollo, pp. 115–116.
245
VOL. 261, AUGUST 29, 1996 245
In its resolution, dated 11 October 1994, the CTA dismissed

for lack of merit the motion for reconsideration.
The CIR forthwith filed a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals, questioning the CTA’s 10th August 1994
decision and 11th October 1994 resolution. On 31 March
1995, the appellate court’s Special Thirteenth Division
affirmed in all respects the assailed decision and
resolution.
In the instant petition, the Solicitor General argues:
That—
“I. RMC 37–93 IS A RULING OR OPINION OF THE

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
INTERPRETING THE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX
CODE.
“II. BEING AN INTERPRETATIVE RULING OR
OPINION, THE PUBLICATION OF RMC 37–93,
FILING OF COPIES THEREOF WITH THE UP
LAW CENTER AND PRIOR HEARING ARE NOT
NECESSARY TO ITS VALIDITY, EFFECTIVITY
AND ENFORCEABILITY.
“III. PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS DEEMED TO HAVE
BEEN NOTIFIED OF RMC 37–93 ON JULY 2,
1993. “IV. RMC 37–93 IS NOT DISCRIMINATORY
SINCE IT APPLIES TO ALL LOCALLY
MANUFACTURED CIGARETTES SIMILARLY
SITUATED AS ‘HOPE,' ‘MORE' AND ‘CHAMPION'
CIGARETTES.
“V. PETITIONER WAS NOT LEGALLY PROSCRIBED
FROM RECLASSIFYING ‘HOPE,' ‘MORE' AND
‘CHAMPION' CIGARETTES BEFORE THE
EFFECTIVITY OF R.A. NO. 7654. “VI. SINCE
RMC 37–93 IS AN INTERPRETATIVE RULE,
THE INQUIRY IS NOT INTO ITS VALIDITY,
EFFECTIVITY OR ENFORCEABILITY BUT INTO
ITS CORRECTNESS
10
OR PROPRIETY; RMC 37–93
IS CORRECT."
In fine, petitioner opines that RMC 37–93 is merely an

interpretative ruling of the BIR which can thus become
effective without any prior need for notice and hearing, nor
publication, and that its issuance is not discriminatory
since it would
_______________
10 Rollo, pp. 21–22.
246

apply under similar circumstances to all locally

manufactured cigarettes.
The Court must sustain both the appellate court and the
tax court.
Petitioner stresses on the wide and ample authority of
the BIR in the issuance of rulings for the effective
implementation of the provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code. Let it be made clear that such authority of
the Commissioner is not here doubted. Like any other
government agency, however, the CIR may not disregard
legal requirements or applicable principles in the exercise
of its quasi-legislative powers.
Let us first distinguish between two kinds of
administrative issuances—a legislative rule and an
interpretative rule.
In Misamis Oriental Association
11
of Coco Traders, Inc. vs.
Department of Finance Secretary, the Court expressed:
“x x x a legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation,

designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the
details thereof. In the same way that laws must have the benefit of
public hearing, it is generally required that before a legislative rule
is adopted there must be hearing. In this connection, the
Administrative Code of 1987 provides:
“Public Participation.—If not otherwise required by law, an
agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of
proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to
submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.
"(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid

unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a
newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks
before the first hearing thereon.
"(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be
observed.
“In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand,

interpretative rules are designed to provide guidelines to 12the law
which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing."
_______________
11 238 SCRA 63.

12 Italics supplied. At p. 69.
247
VOL. 261, AUGUST 29, 1996 247

It should be understandable that when an administrative

rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability
needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no
real consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed. When, upon the other hand, the administrative
rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can
facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation
of the law but substantially adds to or increases the burden
of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least
to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and
thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is
given the force and effect of law.
A reading of RMC 37–93, particularly considering the
circumstances under which it has been issued, convinces us
that the circular cannot be viewed simply as a corrective
measure (revoking in the process the previous holdings of
past Commissioners) or merely as construing Section 142(c)
(1) of the NIRC, as amended, but has, in fact and most
importantly, been made in order to place “Hope Luxury,”
“Premium More” and “Champion” within the classification
of locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brands
and to thereby have them covered by RA 7654. Specifically,
the new law would have its amendatory provisions applied
to locally manufactured cigarettes which at the time of its
effectivity were not so classified as bearing foreign brands.
Prior to the issuance of the questioned circular, “Hope
Luxury,” “Premium More,” and “Champion” cigarettes were
in the category of locally manufactured cigarettes not
bearing foreign brand subject to 45% ad valorem tax.
Hence, without RMC 37–93, the enactment of RA 7654,
would have had no new tax rate consequence on private
respondent’s products. Evidently, in order to place “Hope
Luxury,” “Premium More,” and “Champion” cigarettes
within the scope of the amendatory law and subject them to
an increased tax rate, the now disputed RMC 37–93 had to
be issued. In so doing, the BIR not simply interpreted the
law; verily, it legislated under its quasi-legislative
authority. The due observance of the requirements of
notice, of hearing, and of publication should not have been
then ignored.
248

Indeed, the BIR itself, in its RMC 10–86, has observed and
provided:
“RMC NO. 10–86

Effectivity of Internal Revenue Rules and Regulations
“It has been observed that one of the problem areas bearing on
compliance with Internal Revenue Tax rules and regulations is
lack or insufficiency of due notice to the tax paying public. Unless
there is due notice, due compliance therewith may not be
reasonably expected. And most importantly, their strict
enforcement could possibly suffer from legal infirmity in the light
of the constitutional provision on ‘due process of law’ and the
essence of the Civil Code provision concerning effectivity of laws,
whereby due notice is a basic requirement (Sec. 1, Art. IV,
Constitution; Art. 2, New Civil Code).
“In order that there shall be a just enforcement of rules and
regulations, in conformity with the basic element of due process,
the following procedures are hereby prescribed for the drafting,
issuance and implementation of the said Revenue Tax Issuances:
"(1). This Circular shall apply only to (a) Revenue Regulations; (b)
Revenue Audit Memorandum Orders; and (c) Revenue
Memorandum Circulars and Revenue Memorandum Orders
bearing on internal revenue tax rules and regulations.
"(2). Except when the law otherwise expressly provides, the aforesaid
internal revenue tax issuances shall not begin to be operative
until after due notice thereof may be fairly presumed.
“Due notice of the said issuances may be fairly presumed only after the
following procedures have been taken:
“x x x x x x x x x
13
"(5) Strict compliance with the foregoing procedures is enjoined."
Nothing on record could tell us that it was either

impossible or impracticable for the BIR to observe and
comply with the above requirements before giving effect to
its questioned circular.
_______________
13 Rollo, pp. 65–66.
249
VOL. 261, AUGUST 29, 1996 249

Not insignificantly, RMC 37–93 might have likewise

infringed on uniformity of taxation.
Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 1, of the 1987
Constitution mandates taxation to be uniform and
equitable. Uniformity requires that all subjects or objects of
taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike
14
or put
on equal footing both in privileges and liabilities. Thus, all
taxable articles or kinds of15property of the same class must
be taxed at the same rate and the tax must operate with
the same force and effect in every place where the subject
may be found.
Apparently, RMC 37–93 would only apply to “Hope
Luxury,” “Premium More” and “Champion” cigarettes and,
unless petitioner would be willing to concede to the
submission of private respondent that the circular should,
as in fact my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Bellosillo so
expresses in his separate opinion, be considered
adjudicatory in nature and 16
thus violative of due process
following the Ang Tibay doctrine, the measure suffers
from lack of uniformity of taxation. In its decision, the CTA
has keenly noted that other cigarettes bearing foreign
brands have not been similarly included within the scope of
the circular, such as—
“1. Locally manufactured by ALHAMBRA

INDUSTRIES, INC.
(a) ‘PALM TREE' is listed as manufactured by office of

Monopoly, Korea (Exhibit ‘R')
“2. Locally manufactured by LA SUERTE CIGAR and

CIGARETTE COMPANY
(a) ‘GOLDEN KEY is listed being manufactured by

United Tobacco, Pakistan (Exhibit ‘S')
(b) ‘CANNON' is listed as being manufactured by
Alpha Tobacco, Bangladesh (Exhibit ‘T')
“3. Locally manufactured by LA PERLA INDUSTRIES,

INC.
_______________
14 See Juan Luna Subdivision vs. Sarmiento, 91 Phil. 371.

15 City of Baguio vs. De Leon, 25 SCRA 938.
16 Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635.
250

(a) ‘WHITE HORSE' is listed as being manufactured

by Rothman’s, Malaysia (Exhibit ‘U')
(b) ‘RIGHT' is listed as being manufactured by
SVENSKA, Tobaks, Sweden (Exhibit ‘V-1')
“4. Locally manufactured by MIGHTY

CORPORATION
(a) ‘WHITE HORSE' is listed as being manufactured

by Rothman’s, Malaysia (Exhibit ‘U-1')
“5. Locally manufactured by STERLING TOBACCO

CORPORATION
(a) Union’ is listed as being manufactured by Sumatra

Tobacco, Indonesia and Brown and Williamson,
USA (Exhibit ‘U-3')
(b) WINNER' is listed as being manufactured by Alpha
Tobacco, Bangladesh; Nanyang, Hongkong; Joo
Lan, Malaysia; Pakistan Tobacco Co., Pakistan;
Premier Tobacco, 17
Pakistan and Haggar, Sudan
(Exhibit ‘U-4')."
The court quoted at length from the transcript of the

hearing conducted on 10 August 1993 by the Committee on
Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, viz:
“THE CHAIRMAN. So you have specific information on Fortune

Tobacco alone. You don’t have specific information on other
tobacco manufacturers. Now, there are other brands which are
similarly situated. They are locally manufactured bearing foreign
brands. And may I enumerate to you all these brands, which are
also listed in the World Tobacco Directory x x x. Why were these
brands not reclassified at 55 if you want to give a level playing
field to foreign manufacturers?
“MS. CHATO. Mr. Chairman, in fact, we have already prepared
a Revenue Memorandum Circular that was supposed to come after
RMC No. 37–93 which have really named specifically the list of
locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand for excise
tax purposes and includes all these brands that you mentioned at
55 percent except that at that time, when we had to come up with
this, we were forced to study the brands of Hope, More and
Champion because we were given documents that would indicate
that these
_______________
17 Rollo, pp. 97–98.
251
VOL. 261, AUGUST 29, 1996 251

brands were actually being claimed or patented in other countries

because we went by Revenue Memorandum Circular 1488 and we
wanted to give some rationality as to how it came about but we
couldn’t find the rationale there. And we really found based on
our own interpretation that the only test that is given by that
existing law would be registration in the World Tobacco Directory.
So we came out with this proposed revenue memorandum circular
which we forwarded to the Secretary of Finance except that at
that point in time, we went by the Republic Act 7654 in Section 1
which amended Section 142, C-1, it said, that on locally
manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed
at 55 percent. So we were saying that when this law took effect in
July 3 and if we are going to come up with this revenue circular
thereafter, then I think our action would really be subject to
question but we feel that. . . Memorandum Circular Number 37–
93 would really cover even similarly situated brands. And in fact,
it was really because of the study, the short time that we were
given to study the matter that we could not include all the rest of
the other brands that would have been really classified as foreign
brand if we went by the law itself. I am sure that by the reading of
the law, you would without that ruling by Commissioner Tan they
would really have been included in the definition or in the
classification of foregoing brands. These brands that you referred
to or just read to us and in fact just for your information, we really
came out with a proposed revenue memorandum circular for those
brands. (Italics supplied)
“Exhibit ‘FF-2-C,' pp. V-5 TO V-6, VI-1 to VI-3).
“MS. CHATO. x x x But I do agree with you now that it cannot
and in fact that is why I felt that we . . . / wanted to come up with
a more extensive coverage and precisely why I asked that reve-nue
memorandum circular that would cover all those similarly
situated would be prepared but because of the lack of time and I
came out with a study of RA 7654, it would not have been possible
to really come up with the reclassification or the proper
classification of all brands that are listed there. x x x’ (italics
supplied) (Exhibit ‘FF-2d,’ page IX-1)
“HON. DIAZ. But did you not consider that there are similarly
situated?
252

“MS. CHATO. That is precisely why, Sir, after we have come up

with this Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37–93, the other
brands came about that would have also clarified RMC 37–93 but
I was saying really because of the fact that I was just recently
appointed and the lack of time, the period that was allotted to us
to come up with the right actions on the matter, we were really
caught by the July 3 deadline. But in fact, we have already
prepared a revenue memorandum circular clarifying with the
other . . . does not yet, would have been a list of locally
manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand for excise tax
purposes which would include all the other brands that were
mentioned by the Honorable Chairman
18
(Italics supplied)
(Exhibit ‘FF-2-d,’ par. IX-4)."
All taken, the Court is convinced that the hastily

promulgated RMC 37–93 has fallen short of a valid and
effective administrative issuance.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals,
sustaining that of the Court of Tax Appeals, is AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Kapunan, J., concur.

Padilla (Chairman), J., I join Mr. Justice
Hermosisima, Jr. in his dissenting opinion.
Bellosillo, J., See separate opinion.
Hermosisima, Jr., J., I dissent. See dissenting
opinion.
SEPARATE OPINION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
RA 7654 was enacted by Congress on 10 June 1993, signed

into law by the President on 14 June 1993, and took effect
3 July 1993. It amended partly Sec. 142, par. (c), of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) to read—
_______________
18 Rollo, pp. 98–100.
253
VOL. 261, AUGUST 29, 1996 253

SEC. 142. Cigar and cigarettes.—x x x x (c) Cigarettes packed by

machine.—There shall be levied, assessed and collected on
cigarettes packed by machine a tax at the rates prescribed below
based on the constructive manufacturer’s wholesale price or the
actual manufacturer’s wholesale price, whichever is higher:
(1) On locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently

classified and taxed at fifty-five percent (55%) or the
exportation of which is not authorized by contract or
otherwise, fifty-five percent (55%) provided that the
minimum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per
pack (underscoring supplied).
(2) On other locally manufactured cigarettes, forty-five per
cent (45%) provided that the minimum tax shall not be
less than Three Pesos (P3.00) per pack.
Prior to the effectivity of RA 7654, cigarette brands Hope

Luxury, Premium More and Champion were considered
local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate of
20–45%. However, on 1 July 1993 or two (2) days before RA
7654 took effect, petitioner Commissioner of Internal
Revenue issued RMC 37–93 reclassifying “Hope, More and
Champion being manufactured by Fortune Tobacco
Corporation x x x x (as) locally manufactured cigarettes
bearing a foreign
1
brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax
on cigarettes." RMC 37–93 in effect subjected Hope
Luxury, Premium More and Champion “cigarettes to the
provisions of Sec. 142, par. (c), subpar. (1), NIRC, as
amended by RA 7654, imposing upon these cigarette
brands an ad valorem tax of “fifty-five percent (55%)
provided that the minimum tax shall not be less than Five
Pesos (P5.00) per pack.”
On 2 July 1993, Friday, at about five-fifty in the
afternoon, or a few hours before the effectivity of RA 7654,
a copy of RMC 37–93 with a cover letter signed by Deputy

Commissioner Victor A. Deoferio of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue was sent by facsimile to the factory of respondent
corporation in Parang, Marikina, Metro Manila. It appears
that the letter together with a copy of RMC 37–93 did not
immediately come
_______________
1 See penultimate paragraph of RMC 37–93.
254

to the knowledge of private respondent as it was addressed

to no one in particular. It was only when the
reclassification of respondent corporation’s cigarette brands
was reported in the column of Fil C. Sionil in Business
Bulletin on 4 July 1993 that the president of respondent
corporation learned of the matter, prompting him to
inquire into its veracity and to request from petitioner a
copy of RMC 37–93. On 15 July 1993 respondent
corporation received by ordinary mail a certified machine
copy of RMC-37–93.
Respondent corporation sought a review, reconsideration
and recall of RMC 37–93 but was forthwith denied by the
Appellate Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. As a
consequence, on 30 July 1993 private respondent was
assessed an ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to
P9,598,334.00. Respondent corporation went to the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA) on a petition for review.
On 10 August 1994, after due hearing, the CTA found
the petition meritorious and ruled—
Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37–93 reclassifying the

brands of cigarettes, viz: Hope, More, and Champion being
manufactured by Fortune Tobacco Corporation as locally
manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the
55% ad valorem tax on “cigarettes is found to be defective, invalid
and unenforceable x x x x Accordingly, the deficiency ad valorem
tax assessment issued on petitioner Fortune Tobacco Corporation
in the amount of P9,598,334,00, exclusive of 2surcharge and
interest, is hereby cancelled for lack of legal basis."
The CTA held that petitioner Commissioner of Internal

Revenue failed to observe due process of law in issuing RMC
37–93 as there was no prior notice and hearing, and that

RMC 37–93 was in itself discriminatory. The motion to
reconsider its decision was denied by the CTA for lack of
merit. On 31 March
______________
2 Decision penned by Presiding Judge Ernesto D. Acosta, concurred in

by Associate Judges Manuel K. Gruba and Ramon O. De Veyra.
255
VOL. 261, AUGUST 29, 1996 255

Commissioner of lnternal Revenue us. Court of Appeals
1995 respondent Court3

of Appeals affirmed in toto the
decision of the CTA. Hence, the instant petition for review.
Petitioner now submits through the Solicitor General
that RMC 37–93 reclassifying Hope Luxury, Premium More
and Champion as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing
foreign brands is merely an interpretative ruling which
needs no prior notice and hearing as held in Misamis
Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v. Department of
Finance Secretary.4 It maintains that neither is the assailed
revenue memorandum circular discriminatory as it merely
“lays down the test in determining whether or not a locally
manufactured cigarette bears a foreign brand using (only)
the cigarette
5
brands Hope, More and Champion as specific
examples."
Respondent corporation on the other hand contends that
RMC 37–93 is not a mere interpretative ruling but is
adjudicatory in nature where prior notice and hearing are
mandatory, and that Misamis Oriental Association of Coco
Traders, Inc. v. Department of Finance Secretary on which
the Solicitor General relies heavily is not applicable.
Respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation also argues that
RMC 37–93 discriminates against its cigarette brands since
those of its competitors which are similarly situated have
not been reclassified.
The main issues before us are (a) whether RMC 37–93 is
“merely an interpretative rule the issuance of which needs
no prior notice and hearing, or an adjudicatory ruling
which calls for the twin requirements of prior notice and
hearing, and, (b) whether RMC 37–93 is discriminatory in
nature.
A brief discourse on the powers and functions of
administrative bodies may be instructive.
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule

making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative
adjudica-
______________
3 Special Thirteenth Division; Decision penned by Associate Justice

Justo P. Torres as Chairman, concurred in by Associate Justices Corona
Ibay-Somera and Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. .
4 G.R. No. 108524, 10 November 1994; 238 SCRA 63.
5 Petition for Review, p. 28; Rollo, p. 38.
256

tory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule making power is the

power to make rules and regulations which results in
delegated legislation that is within the confines of the
granting statute and the doctrine of nondelegability and
separability of powers.
Interpretative rule, one of the three (3) types of
quasilegislative or rule making powers of an administrative
agency (the other two being supplementary or detailed
legislation, and contingent legislation), is promulgated by
the administrative agency to interpret, clarify or explain
statutory regulations under which the administrative body
operates. The purpose or objective of an interpretative rule
is merely to construe the statute being administered. It
purports to do no more than interpret the statute. Simply,
the rule tries to say what the statute means. Generally, it
refers to no single person or party in particular but
concerns all those belonging to the same class which may
be covered by the said interpretative rule. It need not be
published and neither is a hearing required since it is
issued by the administrative body as an incident of its
power to enforce the law and is intended merely to clarify
statutory provisions for proper observance by the people. In
Tañada v. Tuvera,6 this Court expressly said that "
[i]nterpretative regulations x x x x need not be published.”
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on
the other hand is the power of the administrative agency to
adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to
hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance
with the standards laid down by 7the law itself in enforcing
and administering the same law. The administrative body
exercises its quasijudicial power when it performs in a

judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive
or administrative nature, where the power to act in such
manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the
performance of the executive or ad-
_______________
6 No. L-63915, 29 December 1986, 146 SCRA 446.

7 Hormed v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552; Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505;
Gudmindson v. Cardollo, 126 F 2d. 521.
257
VOL. 261, AUGUST 29, 1996 257

8
ministrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their
quasijudicial functions the administrative officers or bodies
are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence
of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw
conclusions from them as basis for their official action and
exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of
specific persons are affected it is elementary that in the
proper exercise of quasijudicial power due process must be
observed in the conduct of the proceedings.
The importance of due process cannot be
underestimated. Too basic is the rule that no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law. Thus when an administrative proceeding is quasi-
judicial in character, notice and fair open hearing are
essential to the validity of the proceeding. The right to
reasonable prior notice and hearing embraces not only the
right to present evidence but also the opportunity to know
the claims of the opposing party and to meet them. The
right to submit arguments implies that opportunity
otherwise the right may as well be considered impotent.
And those who are brought into contest with government in
a quasi-judicial proceeding aimed at the control of their
activities are entitled to be fairly advised of what the
government proposes and to be heard upon its proposal
before it is-sues its final command.
There are cardinal primary rights which must be
respected in administrative proceedings. The landmark
case of Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations9
enumerated these rights: (1) the right to a hearing, which
includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence

presented; (3) the decision must have something to support
itself; (4) the evidence must be substantial; (5) the decision
must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing,
or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected; (6) the tribunal or any of its
______________
8 Collins v. Selectmen of Brookline, 91 N.E. 2d, 747.

9 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
258

judges must act on its or his own independent

consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and
not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at
a decision; and, (7) the tribunal should in all controversial
questions render its decision in such manner that the
parties to the proceeding may know the various issues
involved and the reasons for the decision rendered.
In determining whether RMC No. 37–93 is merely an
interpretative rule which requires no prior notice and
hearing, or an adjudicatory rule which demands the
observance of due process, a close examination of RMC 37–
93 is in order. Noticeably, petitioner Commissioner of
Internal Revenue at first interprets Sec. 142, par. (c),
subpar. (1), of the NIRC, as amended, by citing the law and
clarifying or explaining what it means—
Section 142(c)(1), National Internal Revenue Code, as amended by

R.A. No. 6956, provides: On locally manufactured cigarettes
bearing a foreign brand, fifty-five percent (55%) Provided, That
this rate shall apply regardless of whether or not the right to use
or title to the foreign brand was sold or transferred by its owner to
the local manufacturer. Whenever it has to be determined
whether or not a cigarette bears a foreign brand, the listing of
brands manufactured in foreign countries appearing in the
current World Tobacco Directory shall govern.
Under the foregoing, the test for imposition of the 55% ad
valorem tax on cigarettes is that the locally manufactured
cigarettes bear a foreign brand regardless of whether or not the
right to use or title to the foreign brand was sold or transferred by
its owner to the local manufacturer. The brand must be originally
owned by a foreign manufacturer or producer. If ownership of the
cigarette brand is, however, not definitely determinable, “x x x x

the listing of brands manufactured in foreign countries appearing
in the current World Tobacco Directory shall govern x x x”
Then petitioner makes a factual finding by declaring that

Hope (Luxury), (Premium) More and Champion are
manufactured by other foreign manufacturers—
259
VOL. 261, AUGUST 29, 1996 259

Hope is listed in the World Tobacco Directory as being

manufactured by (a) Japan Tobacco, Japan and (b) Fortune
Tobacco, Philippines. More is listed in the said directory as being
manufactured by: (a) Fills de Julia Reig, Andorra; (b) Rothmans,
Australia; (c) RJR-MacDonald, Canada; (d) Rettig-Strenberg,
Finland; (e) Karellas, Greece; (f) R.J. Reynolds, Malaysia; (g)
Rothmans, New Zealand; (h) Fortune Tobacco, Philippines; (i) R.J.
Reynolds, Puerto Rico; (j) R.J. Reynolds, Spain; (k) Tabacalera,
Spain; (1) R.J. Reynolds, Switzerland; and (m) R.J. Reynolds,
USA. “Champion” is registered in the said directory as being
manufactured by: (a) Commonwealth Bangladesh; (b) Sudan,
Brazil; (c) Japan Tobacco, Japan; (d) Fortune Tobacco,
Philippines; (e) Haggar, Sudan; and (f) Tabac Reunies,
Switzerland.
From this finding, petitioner thereafter formulates an

inference that since it cannot be determined who among
the manufacturers are the real owners of the brands in
question, then these cigarette brands ‘should be considered
foreign brands—
Since there is no showing who among the above-listed

manufacturers of the cigarettes bearing the said brands are the
real owner/s thereof, then it follows that the same shall be
considered foreign brand for purposes of determining the ad
valorem tax pursuant to Section 142 of the National Internal
Revenue Code. As held in BIR Ruling No. 410–88, dated August
24, 1988, “in cases where it cannot be established or there is
dearth of evidence as to whether a brand is foreign or not, resort
to the World Tobacco Directory should be made.”
Finally, petitioner caps RMC 37–93 with a disposition

specifically directed at respondent corporation reclassifying
its cigarette brands as locally manufactured bearing
foreign brands—
In view of the foregoing, the aforesaid brands of cigarettes, viz:

Hope, More and Champion being manufactured by Fortune
Tobacco Corporation are hereby considered locally manufactured
cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem
tax on cigarettes.
Any ruling inconsistent herewith is revoked or modified
accordingly.
260

It is evident from the foregoing that in issuing RMC 37–93

petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue was
exercising her quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory
power. She cited and interpreted the law, made a factual
finding, applied the law to her given set of facts, arrived at
a conclusion, and issued a ruling aimed at a specific
individual. Consequently prior notice and hearing are
required. It must be emphasized that even the text alone of
RMC 37–93 implies that reception of evidence during a
hearing is appropriate if not necessary since it invokes BIR
Ruling No. 410–88, dated August 24, 1988, which provides
that “in cases where it cannot be established or there is
dearth of evidence as to whether a brand is foreign or not x
x x x” Indeed, it is difficult to determine whether a brand is
foreign or not if it is not established by, or there is dearth
of, evidence because no hearing has been called and
conducted for the reception of such evidence. In fine, by no
stretch of the imagination can RMC 37–93 be considered
purely as an interpretative rule—requiring no previous
notice and hearing and simply interpreting, construing,
clarifying or explaining statutory regulations being
administered by or under which the Bureau of Internal
Revenue operates.
It is true that both RMC 47–91 in Misamis Oriental
Association of Coco Traders v. Department of Finance
Secretary, , and RMC 37–93 in the instant case reclassify
certain products for purposes of taxation. But the similarity
between the two revenue memorandum circulars ends
there. For in properly determining whether a revenue
memorandum circular is merely an interpretative rule or
an adjudicatory rule, its very tenor and text, and the
circumstances surrounding its issuance will have to be
considered.
We quote RMC 47–91 promulgated 11 June 1991—
Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 47–91
SUBJECT: Taxability of Copra

TO : All Revenue Officials and Employees and Others
Concerned
For the information and guidance of all officials and employees

and others concerned, quoted hereunder in its entirety is VAT
Ruling No. 190–90 dated August 17, 1990:
261
VOL. 261, AUGUST 29, 1996 261

COCOFED MARKETING RESEARCH CORPORATION

6th Floor Cocofed Building
144 Amorsolo Street
Legaspi Village, Makati
Metro Manila
Attention: Ms. Esmyrna E. Reyes

Vice President-Finance
Sirs:
This has reference to your letter dated January 16, 1990 wherein
you represented that in spite of your VAT registration of your
copra trading company, you are supposed to be exempt from VAT
on the basis of BIR Ruling dated January 8, 1988 which
considered copra as an agricultural food product in its original
state. In this connection, you request for a confirmation of your
opinion as aforestated.
In reply, please be informed that copra, being an agricultural
non-food product, is exempt from VAT only if sale is made by the
primary producer pursuant to Section 103(a) of the Tax Code, as
amended. Thus as a trading company and a subsequent seller,
your sale of copra is already subject to VAT pursuant to Section
9(b)(1) of Revenue Regulations 5–27.
This revokes VAT Ruling Nos. 009–88 and 279–88.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) JOSE U. ONG
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
As a clarification, this is the present and official stand of this
Office unless sooner revoked or amended. All revenue officials and
employees are enjoined to give this Circular as wide a publicity as
possible.
(SGD.) JOSE U. ONG
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Quite obviously, the very text of RMC 47–91 itself shows

that it is merely an interpretative rule as it simply quotes a
VAT Ruling and reminds those concerned that the ruling is
the present and official stand of the Bureau of Internal
Reve-
262

Commissioner of lnternal Revenue us. Court of Appeals
nue. Unlike in RMC 37–93 where petitioner Commissioner

manifestly exercised her quasi-judicial or administrative
adjudicatory power, in RMC 47–91 there were no factual
findings, no application of laws to a given set of facts, no
conclusions of law, and no dispositive portion directed at
any particular party.
Another difference is that in the instant case, the
issuance of the assailed revenue memorandum circular
operated to subject the taxpayer to the new law which was
yet to take effect, while in Misamis, the disputed revenue
memorandum circular was issued simply to restate and
then clarify the prevailing position and ruling of the
administrative agency, and no new law yet to take effect
was involved. It merely interpreted an existing law which
had already been in effect for some time and which was not
set to be amended. RMC 37–93 is thus prejudicial to
private respondent alone.
A third difference, and this likewise resolves the issue of
discrimination, is that RMC 37–93 was ostensibly issued to
subject the cigarette brands of respondent corporation to a
new law as it was promulgated two days before the
expiration of the old law and a few hours before the
effectivity of the new law. That RMC 37–93 is particularly
aimed only at respondent corporation and its three (3)
cigarette brands can be seen from the dispositive portion of
the assailed revenue memorandum circular—
In view of the foregoing, the aforesaid brands of cigarettes, viz:

Hope, More, and Champion being manufactured by Fortune
Tobacco Corporation are hereby considered locally manufactured
cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem
tax on cigarettes.
Any ruling inconsistent herewith is revoked or modified
accordingly.
Thus the argument of the Solicitor General that RMC 37–

93 is not discriminatory as "[i]t merely lays down the test
in determining whether or not a locally manufactured

cigarette bears a foreign brand using the cigarette brands
Hope, More and Champion as specific examples,” cannot be
accepted,
263
VOL. 261, AUGUST 29, 1996 263

much less sustained. Without doubt, RMC 37–93 has a

tremendous effect on respondent corporation—and solely
on respondent corporation—as its deficiency ad valorem
tax assessment on its removals of Hope Luxury, Premium
More, and Champion cigarettes for six (6) hours alone, i.e.,
from six o’clock in the evening of 2 July 1993 which is
presumably the time respondent corporation was supposed
to have received the facsimile message sent by Deputy
Commissioner Victor A. Deoferio, until twelve o’clock
midnight upon the effectivity of the new law, was already
P9,598,334.00. On the other hand, RMC 47–91 was issued
with no purpose except to state and declare what has been
the official stand of the administrative agency on the
specific subject matter, and was indiscriminately directed
to all copra traders with no particular individual in mind.
That petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue is an
expert in her field is not attempted to be disputed; hence,
we do not question the wisdom of her act in reclassifying
the cigarettes. Neither do we deny her the exercise of her
quasilegislative or quasi-judicial powers. But most
certainly, by constitutional mandate, the Court must check
the exercise of these powers and ascertain whether
petitioner has gone beyond the legitimate bounds of her
authority.
In the final analysis, the issue before us is not the
expertise, the authority to promulgate rules, or the wisdom
of petitioner as Commissioner of Internal Revenue in
reclassifying the cigarettes of private respondents. It is
simply the faithful observance by government of the basic
constitutional right of a taxpayer to due process of law and
the equal protection of the laws. This is what distresses me
no end—the manner and the circumstances under which
the cigarettes of private respondent were reclassified and
correspondingly taxed under RMC 37–93, an adjudicatory
rule which therefore requires reasonable notice and
hearing before its issuance. It should not be confused with
RMC 47–91, which is a mere interpretative rule.
In the earlier case of G.R. No. 119322, which practically

involved the same opposing interests, I also voted to uphold
the
264

constitutional right of the taxpayer concerned to due

process and equal protection of the laws. By a vote of 3–2,
that view prevailed. In sequela, we in the First Division
who constituted the majority found ourselves unjustly
drawn into the vortex of a nightmarish episode. The strong
ripples whipped up by my opinion expressed therein—and
of the majority—have yet to vanish when we are again in
the imbroglio of a similar dilemma. The unpleasant
experience should be reason enough to simply steer clear of
this controversy and surf on a pretended loss of judicial
objectivity. Such would have been an easy way out, a
gracious exit, so to speak, albeit lame. But to camouflage
my leave with a sham excuse would be to turn away from a
professional vow I keep at all times; I would not be true to
myself, and to the people I am committed to serve. Thus, as
I have earlier expressed, if placed under similar
circumstances in some future time, I shall have to brave
again the prospect of another vilification and a tarnished
image if only to show proudly to the whole world that under
the present dispensation judicial independence in our
country is a true component of our democracy.
In fine, I am greatly perturbed by the manner RMC No.
37–93 was issued as well as the effect of such issuance. For
it cannot be denied that the circumstances clearly
demonstrate that it was hastily issued—without prior
notice and hearing, and singling out private respondent
alone—when two days before a new tax law was to take
effect petitioner reclassified and taxed the cigarette brands
of private respondent at a higher rate. Obviously, this was
to make it appear that even before the anticipated date of
effectivity of the statute—which was undeniably priorly
known to petitioner—these brands were already currently
classified and taxed a fifty-five percent (55%), thus shoving
them into the purview of the law that was to take effect two
days after!
For sure, private respondent was not properly informed
before the issuance of the questioned memorandum
circular that its cigarette brands Hope Luxury, Premium
More and Champion were being reclassified and subjected
to a higher tax rate. Naturally, the result would be to lose

financially because
265
VOL. 261, AUGUST 29, 1996 265

private respondent was still selling its cigarettes at a price

based on the old, lower tax rate. Had there been previous
notice and hearing, as claimed by private respondent, it
could have very well presented its side, either by opposing
the reclassification, or by acquiescing thereto but
increasing the price of its cigarettes to adjust to the higher
tax rate. The reclassification and the ensuing imposition of
a tax rate increase therefore could not be anything but
confiscatory if we are also to consider the claim of private
respondent that the new tax is even higher than the cost of
its cigarettes.
Accordingly, I vote to deny the petition.
DISSENTING OPINION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Private respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation in the

instant case disputes its liability for deficiency ad valorem
excise taxes on its removals of “Hope,” “More,” and
“Champion” cigarettes from 6:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight of
July 2, 1993, in the total amount of P9,598,334.00. It
claims that the circular, upon which the assessment was
based and made, is defective, invalid and unenforceable for
having been issued without no.-tice and hearing and in
violation of the equal protection clause guaranteed by the
Constitution.
The majority upholds these claims of private
respondent, convinced that the Circular in question, in the
first place, did not give prior notice and hearing, and so, it
could not have been valid and effective. It proceeds to
affirm the factual findings of the Court of Tax Appeals,
which findings were considered correct by respondent
Court of Appeals, to the effect that the petitioner
Commissioner of Internal Revenue had indeed blatantly
failed to comply with the said twin requirements of notice
and hearing, thereby rendering the issuance of the
questioned Circular to be in violation of the due process
clause of the Constitution. It is also its dominant opinion
that the questioned Circular discriminates against private

respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation insofar as it
266

seems to affect only is “Hope,” “More,” and “Champion”

cigarettes, to the exclusion of other cigarettes apparently of
the same kind or classification as these cigarettes are
manufactured by private respondent.
With all due respect, I disagree with the majority in its
disquisition of the issues and its resulting conclusions.
Section 245 of the National Internal Revenue Code,

as amended, empowers the Commissioner of Inter
nal Revenue to issue the questioned Circular
Section 245 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended, provides:
“Sec. 245. Authority of Secretary of Finance to promulgate rules

and regulations.—The Secretary of Finance, upon
recommendation of the Commissioner, shall promulgate all
needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the
provisions of this Code x x x without prejudice to the power of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to make rulings or opinions in
connection with the implementation of the provisions of internal
revenue laws, including rulings on the classification of articles for
sales tax and similar purposes.”
The subject of the questioned Circular is the

reclassification of cigarettes subject to excise taxes. It was
issued in connection with Section 142(c)(1) of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as amended, which imposes ad
valorem excise taxes on locally manufactured cigarettes
bearing a foreign brand. The same provision prescribes the
ultimate criterion that determines which cigarettes are to
be considered “locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a
foreign brand.” It provides:
“x x x Whenever it has to be determined whether or not a

cigarette bears a foreign brand, the listing of brands
manufactured in foreign countries appearing in the current World
Tobacco Directory shall govern.”
There is only one World Tobacco Directory for a given

current year, and the same is mandated by law to be the
BIR Com-
267
VOL. 261, AUGUST 29, 1996 267

missioner’s controlling basis for determining whether or

not a particular locally manufactured cigarette is one
bearing a foreign brand. In so making a determination,
petitioner should inquire into the entries in the World
Tobacco Directory for the given current year and shall be
held bound by such entries therein. She is not required to
subject the results of her inquiries to feedback from the
concerned cigarette manufacturers, and it is doubtlessly
not desirable nor managerially sound to court dispute
thereon when the law does not, in the first place, require
debate or hearing thereon. Petitioner may make such a
determination because she is the Chief Executive Officer of
the administrative agency that is the Bureau of Internal
Revenue in which are vested quasi-legislative powers
entrusted to it by the legislature in recognition of its more
encompassing and unequalled expertise in the field of
taxation.
“The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in

administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and
oppressive. It has been necessitated by ‘the growing complexity of
the modern society (Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72,
79). More and more administrative bodies are necessary to help in
the regulation of society’s ramified activities. ‘Specialized in the
particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the problems
thereof with more expertise and dispatch than 1 can be expected
from the legislature or the courts of justice’ x x x"
Statutorily empowered to issue rulings or opinions

embodying the proper determination in respect to
classifying articles, including cigarettes, for purposes of tax
assessment and collection, petitioner was acting well
within her prerogatives when she issued the questioned
Circular. And in the exercise of such prerogatives under the
law, she has in her favor the presumption of regular
performance of official duty which must be overcome by
clearly persuasive evidence of stark error and grave abuse
of discretion in order to be overturned and disregarded.
______________
1 Phil. Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres, 212 SCRA 304.
268

It is irrelevant that the Court of Tax Appeals makes much2

of the effect of the passing of Republic Act No. 7654 on
petitioner’s power to classify cigarettes. Although the
decisions assailed and sought to be reviewed, as well as the
pleadings of private respondent, are replete with alleged
admissions of our legislators to the effect that the said Act
was intended to freeze the current classification of
cigarettes and make the same an integral part of the said
Act, certainly the repeal, if any, of petitioner’s power to
classify cigarettes must be reckoned from the effectivity of
the said Act and not before. Suffice it to say that
indisputable is the plain fact that the questioned Circular
was issued on July 1, 1993, while the said Act took effect on
July 3, 1993.
The contents of the questioned circular have not

been proven to be erroneous or illegal as to render
issuance thereof an act of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of petitioner Commissioner
Prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 7654, Section 142(c)(1) of
the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, levies
the following ad valorem taxes on cigarettes in accordance
with their predetermined classifications as established by
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue:
“x x x based on the manufacturer’s registered wholesale price:

(1) On locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand,
fifty-five percent (55%) Provided, That this rate shall apply
regardless of whether or not the right to use or title to the foreign
brand was sold or transferred by its owner to the local
manufacturer. Whenever it has to be determined whether or not a
cigarette bears a foreign brand, the listing of brands
manufactured in foreign
______________
2 Entitled, “An Act Revising the Excise Tax Base, Allocating a Portion
of the Incremental Revenue Collected for the Emergency Employment
Program for Certain Workers Amending for the Purpose Section 142 of the
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and for Other Purposes,” 89
O.G. 4475–4480, August 9, 1993.
269
VOL. 261, AUGUST 29, 1996 269

countries appearing in the current World Tobacco Directory shall

govern.
(2) Other locally manufactured cigarettes, forty five percent
(45%).
x x x”
Prior to the issuance of the questioned Circular, assessed

against and paid by private respondent as ad valorem
excise taxes on their removals of “Hope,” “More,” and
“Champion” cigarettes were amounts based on paragraph
(2) above, i.e., the tax rate made applicable on the said
cigarettes was 45% at the most. The reason for this is that
apparently, petitioner’s predecessors have all made
determinations to the effect that the said cigarettes were to
be considered “other locally manufactured cigarettes” and
not “locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign
brand.” Even petitioner, until her issuance of the
questioned Circular, adhered to her predecessors’
determination as to the proper classification of the
abovementioned cigarettes for purposes of ad valorem
excise taxes. Apparently, the past determination that the
said cigarettes were to be classified as “other locally
manufactured cigarettes” was based on private
respondent’s convenient move of changing the names of
“Hope” to “Hope Luxury” and “More” to ."Premium More.”
It also submitted proof that “Champion” was an original
Fortune Tobacco Corporation register and, therefore, a
local brand. Having registered these brands with the
Philippine Patent Office and with corresponding evidence
to that effect, private respondent paid ad valorem excise
taxes computed at the rate of not more than 45% which is
the rate applicable to cigarettes considered as locally
manufactured brands.
How these past determinations pervaded
notwithstanding their erroneous basis is only tempered by
their innate quality of being merely errors in interpretative
rulings, the formulation of which does not bind the
government. Advantage over such errors may precipitously
be withdrawn from those who have been benefiting from
them once the same have been discovered and rectified.
270

Petitioner correctly emphasizes that:
“x x x the registration of said brands in the name of private

respondent is proof only that it is the exclusive owner thereof in
the Philippines; it does not necessarily follow, however, that it is
the exclusive owner thereof in the whole world. Assuming
arguendo that private respondent is the exclusive owner of said
brands in the Philippines, it does not mean that they are local.
Otherwise, they would not have been listed in the WTD as
international brands manufactured by different entities in
different countries. Moreover, it cannot be said that the brands
registered in the names of private respondent are not the same
brands listed in the WTD because private respondent
3
is one of the
manufacturers of said brands listed in the WTD."
Private respondent attempts to cast doubt on the

determination made by petitioner in the questioned
Circular that Japan is a manufacturer of “Hope” cigarettes.
Private respondent’s own inquiry into the World Tobacco
Directory reveals that Japan is not a manufacturer of
“Hope” cigarettes. In pointing this out, private respondent
concludes that the entire Circular is erroneous and makes
such error the principal proof of its claim that the nature of
the determination embodied in the questioned Circular
requires a hearing on the facts and a debate on the
applicable law. Such a determination is adjudicatory in
nature and, therefore, requires notice and hearing. Private
respondent is, however, apparently only eager to show
error on the part of petitioner for acting with grave abuse
of discretion. Private respondent conveniently forgets that
petitioner, equipped with the expertise in taxation,
recognized in that expertise by the legislature that vested
in her the power to make rules respecting classification of
articles for taxation purposes, and presumed to have
regularly exercised her prerogatives within the scope of her
statutory power to issue determinations specifically under
Section 142 (c) (1) in relation to Section 245 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as amended, simply followed the
law as she
______________
3 Petition for Review dated May 9, 1995, p. 38, Rollo, p. 48.
271
VOL. 261, AUGUST 29, 1996 271

understood it. Her task was to determine which cigarette

brands were foreign, and she was directed by the law to
look into the World Tobacco Directory. Foreign cigarette
brands were legislated to be taxed at higher rates because
of their more extensive public exposure and international
reputation; their competitive edge against local brands may
easily be checked by imposition of higher tax rates. Private
respondent makes a mountain of the mole hill
circumstance that “Hope” is listed, not as being
“manufactured” by Japan but as being “used” by Japan.
Whether manufactured or used by Japan, however, “Hope”
remains a cigarette brand that can not be said to be limited
to local manufacture in the Philippines. The undeniable
fact is that it is a foreign brand the sales in the Philippines
of which are greatly boosted by its international exposure
and reputation. The petitioner was well within her
prerogatives, in the exercise of her rule-making power, to
classify articles for taxation purposes, to interpret the laws
which she is mandated to administer. In interpreting the
same, petitioner must, in general, be guided by the
principles underlying taxation, i.e., taxes are the lifeblood
of Government, and revenue laws ought to be interpreted
in favor of the Government, for Government can not
survive without the funds to underwrite its varied
operational expenses in pursuit of the welfare of the society
which it serves and protects.
Private respondent claims that its business will be
destroyed by the imposition of additional ad valorem taxes
as a result of the effectivity of the questioned Circular. It
claims that under the vested rights theory, it cannot now
be made to pay higher taxes after having been assessed for
less in the past. Of course private respondent will trumpet
its losses, its interests, after all, being its sole concern.
What private respondent fails to see is the loss of revenue
by the Government which, because of erroneous
determinations made by its past revenue commissioners,
collected lesser taxes than what it was entitled to in the
first place. It is every citizen’s duty to pay the correct
amount of taxes. Private respondent will not be shielded by
any vested rights, for there are no vested rights to speak of
respecting a wrong construction of the law by ad-
272

ministrative officials, and such wrong interpretation does

not place 4the Government in estoppel to correct or overrule
the same.
The questioned Circular embodies an interpretative

ruling of petitioner Commissioner which as such
does not require notice and hearing
As one of the public offices of the Government, the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, through its Commissioner, has grown
to be a typical administrative agency vested with a fusion
of different governmental powers: the power to investigate,
initiate action and control the range of investigation, the
power to promulgate rules and regulations to better carry
out statutory policies, and the power to adjudicate 5
controversies within the scope of their activities. In the
realm of administrative law, we understand that such an
empowerment of administrative agencies was evolved in
response to the needs of a changing society. This
development arose as the need for broad social control over
complex conditions and activities became more and more
pressing, and such complexity could no longer be dealt with
effectively and directly by the legislature or the judiciary.
The theory which underlies the empowerment of
administrative agencies like the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, is that the issues with which such agencies deal
ought to be decided by experts, and not by a judge, at least
not in the first6 instance or until the facts have been sifted
and arranged.
One of the powers of administrative agencies like the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, is the power to make rules.
The necessity for vesting administrative agencies with this
power stems from the impracticability of the lawmakers
providing general regulations for various 7
and varying
details pertinent to a particular legislation.
______________
4 Tan Guan vs. Court of Appeals, 19 SCRA 903; Compania General de

Tabacos de Filipinas vs. City of Manila, 8 SCRA 367.
5 1 Am. Jur. 2d., p. 816.
6 73 C.J.S. pp. 295–296.
7 1 Am. Jur. 2d., p. 890.
273
VOL. 261, AUGUST 29, 1996 273

The rules that administrative agencies may promulgate

may either be legislative or interpretative. The former is a
form of subordinate legislation whereby the administrative
agency is acting in a legislative capacity, supplementing
the statute, filling in the details,
8
pursuant to a specific
delegation of legislative power.
Interpretative rules, on the other hand, are “those which
purport to do no more than interpret 9
the statute being
administered, to say what it means."
“There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an

administrative rule or regulation and an administrative
interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an
administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates
rules and regulations, it ‘makes’ a new law with the force and
effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a
statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law
(Parker, Administrative Law, p. 197; Davis, Administrative Law,
p. 194). Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of
the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative
agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance
therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the
law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in general
terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies
and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the
manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the
administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this
sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product
of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions
that have the effect of law. (Davis, op. cit. p. 194.)
A rule is binding on the courts as long as the procedure fixed
for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the
statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts
are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate
wisdom (Davis, op. cit. pp. 195–197). On the other hand,
administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely
advisory,10
for it is the courts that finally determine what the law
means."
______________
8 1 Am. Jur. 2d., p. 892.

9 De Leon, Hector, Administrative Law, 1989 ed., p. 67.
10 Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil.
558.
274

“Whether a given statutory delegation authorizes

legislative or interpretative regulations depends upon
whether the statute places specific ‘sanctions’ behind the
regulations authorized, as for example, by making it a
criminal offense to disobey them, or by making conformity
with their 11provisions a condition of the exercise of legal
privileges." This is because interpretative regulations are
by nature simply statutory interpretations, which have
behind them no statutory sanction. Such regulations,
whether so expressly authorized by statute or issued only
as an incident of statutory administration, merely embody
administrative findings of law which are always subject to
judicial determination as to whether they are erroneous or
not, even when their issuance is authorized by statute.
The questioned Circular has undisputedly been issued
by petitioner in pursuance of her rule-making powers
under Section 245 of the National Internal Revenue Code,
as amended. Exercising such powers, petitioner re-
classified “Hope,” “More” and “Champion” cigarettes as
locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brands.
The re-classification, as previously explained, is the correct
interpretation of Section 142(c)(1) of the said Code. The
said legal provision is not accompanied by any penal
sanction, and no detail had to be filled in by petitioner. The
basis for the classification of cigarettes has been provided
for by the legislature, and all petitioner has to do, on behalf
of the government agency she heads, is to proceed to make
the proper determination using the criterion stipulated by
the lawmaking body. In making the proper determination,
petitioner gave it a liberal construction consistent with the
rule that revenue laws are to be construed in favor of the
Government whose survival depends on the contributions
that taxpayers give to the public coffers that finance public
services and other governmental operations.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue which petitioner heads,
is the government agency charged with the enforcement of
the laws pertinent to this case and so, the opinion of the
Commis-
______________
11 De Leon, supra, p. 69.
275
VOL. 261, AUGUST 29, 1996 275

sioner of Internal Revenue, in the absence of a clear

showing that it is plainly wrong, is entitled to great weight.
Private respondent claims that its rights under previous
interpretations of Section 142(c)(1) may not abruptly be cut
by a new interpretation of the said section, but precisely
the said section is subject to various and changing
construction, and hence, any ruling issued by petitioner
thereon is necessarily interpretative and not legislative.
Private respondent insists that the questioned circular is
adjudicatory in nature because it determined the rights of
private respondent in a controversy involving his tax
liability. It also asseverates that the questioned circular
involved administrative action that is particular and
immediate, thereby rendering it subject to the
requirements of notice and hearing in compliance with the
due process clause of the Constitution.
We find private respondent’s arguments to be rather
strained.
Petitioner made a determination as to the classification
of cigarettes as mandated by the aforecited provisions in
the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended. Such
determination was an interpretation by petitioner of the
said legal provisions. If in the course of making that
interpretation and embodying the same in the questioned
circular which the petitioner subsequently issued after
making such a determination, private respondent’s
cigarette products, by their very nature of being foreign
brands as evidenced by their enlistment in the World
Tobacco Directory, which is the controlling basis for the
proper classification of cigarettes as stipulated by the law
itself, have come to be classified as locally manufactured
cigarettes bearing foreign brands and as such subject to a
tax rate higher than what was previously imposed
thereupon based on past rulings of other revenue
commissioners, such a situation is simply a consequence of
the performance by petitioner of her duties under the law.
No adjudication took place, much less was there any
controversy ripe for adjudication. The natural consequences
of making a classification in accordance with law may not
be used by private respondent in arguing that the
questioned circular is in fact adjudicatory
276

in nature. Such an exercise in driving home a point is

illogical as it is fallacious and misplaced.
Private respondent concedes that under general rules of
administrative law, “a ruling which is merely
‘interpretative’ in character may not require prior notice to
affected parties before its issuance as well as a hearing”
and “for this reason, in most instances, interpretative
12
regulations are not given the force of law." Indeed,
“interpretative regulations and those 13
merely internal in
nature x x x need not be published." And it is now settled
that only legislative regulations and not interpretative
14
rulings must have the benefit of public hearing.
Because (1) the questioned circular merely embodied an
interpretation or a way of reading and giving meaning to
Section 142(c)(1) of the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended; (2) petitioner did not fill in any details in the
aforecited section but only classified cigarettes on the basis
of the World Tobacco Directory in the light of the
paramount principle of construing revenue laws in favor of
the Government to the end that Government collects as
much tax money as it is entitled to in order to fulfill its
public purposes for the general good of its citizens; (3) no
penal sanction is provided in the aforecited section that
was construed by petitioner in the questioned circular; and
(4) a similar circular declassifying copra from being an
agricultural food to non-food product for purposes of the
value added tax laws, resulting in the revocation of an
exemption previously enjoyed by copra traders, has been
ruled by us to be merely an interpretative ruling and not a
legislative, much less, an adjudicatory,
15
action on the part of
the revenue commissioner, this Court must not be blind to
the fact that the questioned Circular is indeed an
interpretative ruling not subject to notice and hearing.
______________
12 Comment of Fortune Tobacco Corporation, p. 52; Rollo, p. 199.

13 Tañada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 454.
14 Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. vs. Department of
Finance Secretary, 238 SCRA 63.
15 Ibid.
277
VOL. 261, AUGUST 29, 1996 277

Neither is the questioned Circular tainted by a vio

lation of the equal protection clause under the Con
stitution
Private respondent anchors its claim of violation of its
equal protection rights upon the too obvious fact that only
its cigarette brands, i.e., “Hope,” “More” and “Champion,”
are mentioned in the questioned circular. Because only the
cigarettes that they manufacture are enumerated in the
questioned circular, private respondent proceeded to attack
the same as being discriminatory against it. On the
surface, private respondent seems to have a point there. A
scrutiny of the questioned Circular, however, will show
that it is undisputedly one of general application for all
cigarettes that are similarly situated as private
respondent’s brands. The new interpretation of Section
142(1)(c) has been well illustrated in its application upon
private respondent’s brands, which illustration is properly
a subject of the questioned Circular. Significantly,
indicated as the subject of the questioned circular is the
“reclassification of cigarettes subject to excise taxes.” The
reclassification resulted in the foregrounding of private
respondent’s cigarette brands, which incidentally is largely
due to the controversy spawned no less by private
respondent’s own action of conveniently changing its brand
names to avoid falling under a classification that would
subject it to higher ad valorem tax rates. This caused then
Commissioner Bienvenido Tan to depart from his initial
determination that private respondent’s cigarette brands
are foreign brands. The consequent specific mention of such
brands in the questioned Circular, does not change the fact
that the questioned Circular has always been intended for
and did cover, all cigarettes similarly situated as “Hope,”
“More” and “Champion.” Petitioner is thus correct in
stating that:
“x x x RMC 37–93 is not discriminatory. It lays down the test in

determining whether or not a locally manufactured cigarette
bears a foreign brand using the cigarette brands ‘Hope/ ‘More’ and
‘Champion’ as specific examples. Such test applies to all locally
manufactured cigarette brands similarly situated as the cigarette
brands aforementioned. While it is true that only ‘Hope,’ ‘More’
and ‘Cham
278

pion’ cigarettes are actually determined as locally manufactured

cigarettes bearing a foreign brand, RMC 37–93 does not state that
ONLY cigarettes fall under such classification to the exclusion of
other cigarettes similarly situated. Otherwise stated, RMC 37–93
does not exclude the coverage of other cigarettes similarly
situated as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a 16 foreign
brand. Hence, in itself, RMC 37–93 is not discriminatory."
Both the respondent Court of Appeals and the Court of Tax

Appeals held that the questioned Circular reclassifying
“Hope,” “More” and “Champion” cigarettes, is defective,
invalid and unenforceable and has rendered the
assessment against private respondent of deficiency ad
valorem excise taxes to be without legal basis. The majority
agrees with private respondent and respondent Courts. As
the foregoing opinion chronicles the fatal flaws in private
respondent’s arguments, it becomes more apparent that the
questioned Circular is in fact a valid and subsisting
interpretative ruling that the petitioner had power to
promulgate and enforce.
WHEREFORE, I vote to grant the petition and set aside
the decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and the Court of
Appeals, respectively, and to reinstate the decision of
petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue denying
private respondent’s request for a review, reconsideration
and recall of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37–93
dated July 1, 1993.
Judgment affirmed.
Note.—Uniformity of taxation merely requires that all

the subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated are to
be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities. (Tan vs.
Del Rosario, Jr., 237 SCRA 324 [1994])
——o0o——
______________
16 Petition for Review dated May 9, 1995, pp. 28–29, Rollo, pp. 38–39.
279
VOL. 261, AUGUST 30, 1996 279

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2/3/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 261

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,

Taxation; The CIR may not disregard legal requirements or

VOL. 261, AUGUST 29, 1996 237

Commissioner of lnternal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals

Same; RMC 37–93 might have infringed on uniformity of

BELLOSILLO, J., Separate Opinion:

Taxation; In issuing RMC 37–93 petitioner Commissioner of

238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J., Dissenting Opinion:

Taxation; Petitioner was acting well within her prerogatives

VOL. 261, AUGUST 29, 1996 239

Commissioner of lnternal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals

speak of respecting a wrong construction of the law by

PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

"“The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (“CIR") disputes

1 Through Associate Justices Justo P. Torres, Jr. (ponente), Corona

240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Fortune Tobacco Corporation (“Fortune Tobacco”) is

“BRAND AD VALOREM TAX RATE

3 Underscoring supplied. Rollo, pp. 55–56.

VOL. 261, AUGUST 29, 1996 241

“SEC. 142. Cigars and Cigarettes.—

"(1) On locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently

242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

brands of cigarettes, including the amounts intended to cover the

REVENUE MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 37–93

SUBJECT: Reclassification of Cigarettes Subject to Excise Tax

“In view of the issues raised on whether ‘HOPE/ ‘MORE' and

‘On locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand, fifty-five

“Under the foregoing, the test for imposition of the 55% ad

7 Official Gazette, Vol. 89., No. 32, 09 August 1993, p. 4476.

VOL. 261, AUGUST 29, 1996 243

bear a foreign brand regardless of whether or not the right to use

244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Commissioner of lnternal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals

On 02 July 1993, at about 17:50 hours, BIR Deputy

“WHEREFORE, Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37–93

8 The petition was subsequently amended on 12 August 1993.

VOL. 261, AUGUST 29, 1996 245

Commissioner of lnternal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals

In its resolution, dated 11 October 1994, the CTA dismissed

“I. RMC 37–93 IS A RULING OR OPINION OF THE

In fine, petitioner opines that RMC 37–93 is merely an

10 Rollo, pp. 21–22.

246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

apply under similar circumstances to all locally

“x x x a legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation,

"(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid

“In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand,

11 238 SCRA 63.

VOL. 261, AUGUST 29, 1996 247

It should be understandable that when an administrative

248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“RMC NO. 10–86

"(5) Strict compliance with the foregoing procedures is enjoined."

Nothing on record could tell us that it was either

13 Rollo, pp. 65–66.

VOL. 261, AUGUST 29, 1996 249