CRITIQUE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PHILIPPINE ANTI-GRAFT AND

CORRUPTION LAWS: BASIS FOR ADOPTION OF QUI TAM ACTIONS

March 9, 2010

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree: MASTER OF LAWS, Judge
MACAUNDAS M. HADJIRASUL of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Cebu City, presented a
THESIS, entitled: A CRITIQUE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PHILIPPINE ANTI-GRAFT
AND CORRUPTION LAWS: BASIS FOR ADOPTION OF QUI TAM ACTIONS, to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of the University of Southern Philippines Foundation, Cebu City (of which he is a
College of Law Faculty Member). One of the items enumerated in the Program of Adoption of Qui Tam
actions appended thereto as Table 2 is a lobby for the passage of the legislation recommended in the
Thesis. This page will serve as a venue for those who support the passage of Qui Tam law/s in the
Philippines. The Thesis is available at the University of Southern Philippines Foundation, Cebu City. It
can also be accessed via Blogspot, but the following is an ABSTRACT thereof:
 ABSTRACT

Graft and corruption remains rampant in this Country, and its cost to the government is
astronomical. 45 percent of the Countryside Development Fund is pocketed by members of the Congress.
Kickbacks from public work projects make up, on average, 30 percent of project cost. In the purchase of
medicines, books, magazines and other instructional materials, the kickbacks are distributed at 40 percent
to supplier, 5 percent to congressional aide, 10 percent to the head of the implementing agency, and 45
percent to legislators. In public works projects, the kickbacks that go to project implementation are 64
percent: 16 percent to the legislator; 10 percent to the provincial, city or municipal engineer; 7 percent to
the mayor; and 3 percent to the Barangay Captain. At least 12 to 20 percent of the funds allotted for
building artesian wells, bridges and roads are given to congressmen. Commissions on public works ran up
to an average of 30 percent of the project cost. Even the Medicare and education are not spared. The
National Health Insurance Program continues to lose as much as P300 million a year to fraudulent claims,
including those involving ghost patients, which is 4 percent of the P6.8 billion payments for Medicare
claims in 2000. About 65 percent of textbook funds are reserved as bribe money. The range of bribery
runs from 20 percent to 65 percent.

The Commission on Audit reported in 1998 that corruption costs the Government about 2 billion
pesos every year. Corruption cuts government revenue by 30 percent. The World Bank (2000) and the
Ombudsman (1997) said that the Philippine Government was losing $2 billion a year or a whopping $48
billion in the last twenty years due to corruption. Batalla (2000) computed the losses to corruption from
the period 1995-2000 and found that the average national loss due to corruption is 3.8 percent of the GNP,
amounting to 74 billion pesos in 1995 to a ballooning 130 billion pesos in 2000, or a total for the six (6)
year period of P609 billion. 20 to 30 percent of the Philippines’ national budget is lost to graft and
corruption each year (Batalla, 2000; Asiaweek, 2002). The Philippine Daily Inquirer reported on July 10,
1999 that the Government lost P1.4 trillion and continued to lose P100 million daily since the Office of
the Ombudsman began investigating corruption in 1988.
 But experts opine that if the level of corruption in the Philippines were related to the number of
remedial measures the Country have, it would be one of the least corrupt places on earth. The fact that it
is not suggests that that there are serious problems with the way anti-corruption measures are
implemented.

Indeed, the Philippines have more than enough anti-graft and corruption laws: preventive,
punitive and remedial, to prevent, check and punish the commission of graft and corruption. We have the
1987 Constitution (on Accountability of Public Officers and Employees); the Revised Penal Code (on
crimes committed by public officers/employees); R.A. No. 3456 (Internal Audit Services Act); P.D. 46
(Prohibition on gifts to public officers/employees); R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act);
R.A. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officers/employees); R.A. 9184
(Government Procurement Act); R.A. 9485 (Anti-Red Tape Act); R.A. 7080 (Plunder Act); R.A. 1379
(Ill-gotten/Unexplained Wealth Act); P.D. 749 (Immunity of witnesses to bribery, etc.); R.A. 6770
(Ombudsman Act); R.A. 9160 (Anti-Money Laundering Act); Republic Act No. 6028 (Citizen’s
Counselor Act); R.A. 6538 (Liability of Government Employees in Anti-Carnapping Act); P.D. 1759
(Penalizing Contractors for Violating Public Works Contracts); and R.A. 7659 (Death Penalty for Certain
Crimes Committed by Public Officers). There are also anti-corruption provisions contained in P.D. 807,
as amended (Administrative Code); R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code); P.D. 1464 (Tariff and Customs
Code); R.A. 8424 (Revised Internal Revenue Code) and other laws.

R.A. 1379 even provides that wealth acquired by a public officer or employee which is manifestly
out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income is presumed to have been unlawfully acquired and
is subject to forfeiture proceedings.

But there is a serious gap in the legal implementation of our anti-graft laws. The prevention,
investigation and prosecution of acts of corruption, and even the recovery of the proceeds thereof,
including the recovery of ill-gotten/unexplained wealth of public officers and employees, lie primarily
upon the Office of the Ombudsman and other government agencies. Even when an individual is a victim
of the corrupt act, he must depend on the Ombudsman to file the necessary charges and prosecute the case
in court, or to initiate administrative proceedings. But the efforts of the Ombudsman, and the Government
as a whole, in curbing corruption is stymied by several factors, such as lack of credibility, insufficiency of
human, material and financial resources, as well as the culture of corruption that has taken root in the
bureaucracy. Hence, the Government is widely seen as a failure in the fight against corruption and very
few use formal channels in filing complaints.

The public is not unaware of the gravity and pervasiveness of corruption in this Country. In fact,
corruption is widely regarded as the most important issue that must be tackled by the present
administration and the next. It is just that they do not feel empowered to speak out against corruption and
they do not see the existing complaint mechanisms as effective.

The only legal action that would give the public authority to take a direct hand, thus empower
them, in the campaign against corruption is a Qui Tam action – a civil remedy adopted in England and the
United States of America allowing citizens to sue in Court for the recovery of penalties, forfeitures, public
funds and properties, on behalf of the government and be paid a percentage of the recovered amount. It
would strengthen the laws already existing to punish the corrupt and prevent him from enjoying the
proceeds of his crime.

Qui Tam actions would give an informer authority to intervene in the prosecution of even those
corruption offenses which are hitherto considered victimless crimes, and serve as a check on the
performance of the public prosecutor. Moreover, the quantum of proof required in civil cases, which
would include a Qui Tam action, is only preponderance of evidence.

It would place a very important aspect in the fight against corruption directly in the hands of the people and
the judiciary, the branch of government which continues to enjoy the people’s confidence. It would breed an anti-
corruption culture among our people to counter the existing culture of corruption in the Government.

The legislation of Qui Tam actions would not violate the Constitution because it would fall within
the power of the legislature to determine to whom a penalty imposed or forfeiture, or damages arising
from a false claim presented to the government, shall be paid. The legislature may lawfully make such
disposition as will, in its discretion, best sub-serve the purpose of the enactment. There would be no issue
of locus standi because once legislated, it would give rise to a legally demandable and enforceable right.
On the contrary, it would give a deeper significance to the Constitutional precept that public officers and
employees are at all times accountable to the people.

This researcher, therefore, recommends that Qui Tam actions be adopted in this Country by
legislation, authorizing individuals, groups and entities to sue in court, in behalf of the State, for the
recovery of proceeds of corruption, including tax frauds, as well as ill-gotten/unexplained wealth of
public officers/employees, and be entitled to a percentage (30%) of the recovered amount.21

_________________________

21 Critique On The Implementation Of The Philippine Anti-Graft And Corruption Laws: Basis For Adoption Of Qui
Tam Actions by Judge Macaundas M. Hadjirasul, March 9,2010 (http/notes/qui-tam-laws-vs-corruption/critique-on-
the-implementation-of-the-philippine-anti-graft-and-corruption-laws-/378658371513/)