Third Division (G.R. No. 165969, November 27, 2008)

592 Phil.
451
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 165969, November 27, 2008 ]
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HEIRS
OF NOBLE CASIONAN, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another
person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.[11] On the other hand,
contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls
below the standard which he is required to conform for his own
protection.[12] There is contributory negligence when the party's act showed lack
of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in
danger.[13] It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part
of the person injured which, concurring with the defendant's negligence, is the
proximate cause of the injury.[14]
The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly

responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but
must bear the consequences of his own negligence.[15] If indeed there was
contributory negligence on the part of the victim, then it is proper to reduce the
award for damages. This is in consonance with the Civil Code provision that liability
will be mitigated in consideration of the contributory negligence of the injured
party. Article 2179 of the Civil Code is explicit on this score:
When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due
care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages
to be awarded.
In Ma-ao Sugar Central, it was held that to hold a person as having contributed to
his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his
injuries in disregard of warnings or signs on an impending danger to health and
body. This Court held then that the victim was not guilty of contributory negligence
as there was no showing that the caboose where he was riding was a dangerous
place and that he recklessly dared to stay there despite warnings or signs of
impending danger.[16]
In this case, the trail where Noble was electrocuted was regularly used by members
of the community. There were no warning signs to inform passersby of the
impending danger to their lives should they accidentally touch the high tension
wires. Also, the trail was the only viable way from Dalicon to Itogon. Hence, Noble
should not be faulted for simply doing what was ordinary routine to other workers
in the area.
Petitioner further faults the victim in engaging in pocket mining, which is prohibited
by the DENR in the area.
Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts apply in this case, viz:
Article 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts
shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation.
McKee v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68102, July 16, 1992, 211 SCRA
517.
Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case, Aquilino's act of
crossing Katipunan Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it
was prohibited by law. Moreover, it was the proximate cause of the accident, and
thus precludes any recovery for any damages suffered by respondent from the
accident.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous

sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury
as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of
his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.[11]

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Third Division (G.R. No. 165969, November 27, 2008)

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592 Phil.

The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly

Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous

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