THE “ABUSE OF RIGHT” IN EU COMPANY LAW AND EU TAX LAW: A

RE-READING OF THE ECJ CASE-LAW AND THE QUEST FOR A

UNITARY NOTION
By Luca Cerioni
Law Lecturer, Brunel University

Introduction

The existence of a concept of “abuse of rights” in the case-law of the ECJ

concerning different areas – provision of services; common agricultural policy;
company law, tax legislation - has been attracting, since the 1990s, much attention
and debate in the scholarly literature all over Europe1.
In effect, the circumstance that the ECJ, in a number of rulings in these different
areas, has been using not only the words “abuse” or “abusive purpose” but also the
words “fraud” and “circumvention”, provides scope for debate about these concepts
(e.g., as to whether “circumvention” can arise without “abuse”)2, and as to whether
the concept of “abuse” emerging in one area of EU law coincides with or is different
from the concept of “abuse” emerging in other areas of EU law3. In trying to deal with
these two fundamental issues, the academic debate has been focusing on several
questions (the responses to which affect the solution to these two fundamental issues):
whether it is possible to assert the existence of an anti-abuse principle in EU law;
whether such a principle would be a general principle or merely a principle of
interpretation; the scope of its application; the consequences of its introduction both in
the EU and in Member States' legal systems4 .
The present paper aims at contributing to the debate on these points and thus at
contributing to extrapolate a response to the two ultimate issues highlighted above, by

1
Among the numerous contributions: L.Brown, Is there a general principle of abuse of rights
in European Community Law? In Heukel and Curtin (Eds.), Institutional Dynamics of European
Integration, Vol. II (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994), pp. 511-525, at 513-515; A. Kjllgren, „On the
Border of Abuse-The Jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice on circumvention, fraud and other
misuses of Community Law‟ (2000), European Business Law Review, 179-194; K.Sorensen, „Abuse of
Rights in Community Law: A Principle of Substance or Merely Rhetoric?‟ (2006) 43 Common Market
Law Review 423; P. Schammo, „Arbitrage and Abuse of Rights in EC Legal System‟, (2008) 14
European Law Journal 3, 351-376; R.de la Feria, „PROHIBITION OF ABUSE OF (COMMUNITY)
LAW: THE CREATION OF A NEW GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF EC LAW THROUGH TAX‟, in
(2008) 45 Common Market Law Review 395
2
E.g., P. Schammo, „Arbitrage and Abuse of Rights in EC Legal System‟, cit., 358-359; R.de la
Feria, „„PROHIBITION OF ABUSE OF (COMMUNITY) LAW: THE CREATION OF A NEW
GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF EC LAW THROUGH TAX‟, cit., 458-459.
3
Although the ECJ, in the rulings analysed in the subsequent parts of this article, made
reference to EC law, in the introduction, in the general discussion and in the conclusive reflections
reference will be made to “EU law” to reflect the fact that the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force
on 1 December 2009, replaced the name “European Community” with the name “European Union” and
changed the name of the EC Treaty into “Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union” (TFEU).
In the text, reference will be made to “the Treaty” to indicate the TFEU, and the Treaty Articles‟
numbers will refer to the Articles as they are numbered in the TFEU with indication, in footnote, of the
original number of the same Articles in the EC Treaty (and, where relevant, in the EEC Treaty ante-
1992).
4
P. Piantavigna, „Conference Report: Prohibition of Abuse of Law: A New General Principle of EU
Law?3-4 October 2008, Oxford (UK)‟, in (2009) Intertax 37, 166-175, reporting a debate which took
place at a symposium organised in Oxford.
focusing, in particular, on two areas which, in the literature, seems to have provided
scope for much controversy: the areas of EU company law and of EU tax law.
Through a re-reading of the case-law, it is argued that, ultimately, a conceptual
distinction emerges between “abuse” and “circumvention” and that, despite a partially
different terminology, it is possible to reconcile the ECJ rulings issued in different
areas – and particularly in two areas of company law and tax law - and, at the current
stage of EU law, to identify a unitary notion of abuse of rights. It is furthermore
argued that the unifying factor lies in the prejudice of the conduct at stake in the
concrete cases for the interest of third parties.
For these purposes, par. 1 provides a general overview of the developments of the
ECJ case-law concerning the abuse of right, whereas par. 2, 3 and 4 concentrate on
ECJ‟s rulings which have been providing scope for much academic debate as regards
their (in)consistency with one another, namely the ECJ‟s company law rulings
concerning the freedom of establishment and on the ECJ‟s tax law rulings. Par. 5
assesses whether the concept of abuse of rights emerging from these rulings on their
whole can be seen as a unitary one, and Par. 6 discusses whether it can be regarded as
a general principle. The conclusion follows in Par. 7.

1. The “entry” of the concept of “abuse of rights” in EU law

As it was observed, “the case-law on abuse of rights now cuts across the entire
spectrum of EC law”5. The developments of the ECJ case-law which eventually
resulted in the “entry” of the concept of abuse into EU law started with the 1974 Van
Binsbergen6 ruling, concerning the freedom to provide services. In the situation at
stake, a Dutch lawyer, after having been entrusted to act as legal representative before
Courts in the Netherlands for a local party, had transferred its residence from
Netherlands to Belgium during the course of the proceedings, losing its capacity to
represent the party in question due to a Dutch requirement that legal representatives
be permanently established in the Netherlands. The ECJ thus had to rule on the issue
whether this requirement could be reconciled with the prohibition of all restrictions on
freedom to provide services within the Community. After recognising in general
terms that a requirement, whereby the person providing the service must be habitually
resident within the State where the service is to be provided, may - according to the
circumstances - deprive Art. 56 of the Treaty7 of all useful effect8, the ECJ took into
consideration the particular nature of the services. In this respect, it stated that specific
requirements imposed on persons providing the services cannot be considered to be
incompatible with the Treaty if they aim at applying professional rules of conduct
where the person providing the service would escape the application of these rules by
establishing himself in another Member State9. The rules at stake were justified by the
general good (organisations, qualifications, professional ethics, supervision, liability),
and were binding on all persons established in the State concerned. Consequently, the
ECJ found that a Member State is entitled to take measures to prevent the exercise by
a services provider whose activity is entirely or principally directed towards its

5
P. Schammo, „Arbitrage and Abuse of Rights in EC Legal System‟, cit., p. 359.
6
Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen, ECR 1299
7
Which was numbered Art. 59 of the EEC Treaty at the time of the ECJ‟s ruling.
8
Ibid, para. 11
9
Ibid, para. 12
territory of the freedom guaranteed by Art. 56 for the purpose of avoiding the
professional rules of conduct which would be applicable to him if he were established
within that State10.
Although the ECJ did not yet expressly use the word “abuse”, a first type of
conduct was thus at stake: the resort to fundamental freedoms for a purpose – in the
concrete case, that of avoiding professional rules of conduct – which is different from
the purpose pursued by the Treaty articles granting the fundamental freedoms
themselves. The specific situation was a kind of “U transaction” – i.e., establishment
of its residence in another Member State by a national of a Member State whose
activity is directed toward this Member State - which was regarded as aimed at
escaping national rules of conduct which would be otherwise applicable. Because the
ECJ decision in this case made specific reference to the nature of the service involved
and to the rules of conduct concerned, without statements of general character, this
decision – whilst clarifying that Member States are entitled to take measures to
prevent the conduct at stake – raised three interconnected key questions.
First, whether Member States would be entitled to take measures to prevent the
circumvention of any type of national rules in whatever area. Second, and in
consequence, whether any conduct aimed at escaping national rules by using
fundamental freedoms could be prevented by Member States. Third, and as an
ultimate question, whether the key element in this conduct ought to be identified in
the intention of escaping national rules or in the achievement of the concrete result of
doing so with prejudice for third parties.
The Van Binsbergen case was followed not only by other rulings in the area of free
movement of services, which reiterated its findings11, but also by a number of rulings
in other areas, namely the free movement of goods12, the free movement of workers13
and the freedom of establishment14. These rulings made it clear that Member States
are allowed to take measures to prevent situations of circumvention of national rules
similar to that at stake in Van Binsbergen15 or to prevent other situations of use of
rights conferred by the Treaty for improperly gaining benefits16. In these subsequent
rulings the ECJ expressly started using the word “abuse” to indicate these situations17,

10
Ibid, paras. 12 – 13.
11
As it occurred in three rulings concerning broadcasting services: Case C- 148/91, Veronica
Omroep Organisatie v. Commissariat voor de Media [1993] ECR I-487, para. 12-13; Case C-211/91,
Commission v. Belgium, [1992] ECR I-6773, para. 12; Case C- 23/93, TV10 v. Commissariat voor de
Media [1994] ECR I-4795, para. 21.
12
Case 229/83, Leclerc v. Au ble vert [1985] ECR 1, para. 27
13
E.g. Case 39/86, Lair v. Universitat Hannover [1988] ECR 3161, para. 4
14
E.g. Case 115/78, Knoors v. Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken [1979] ECR 399, para. 25;
Case C-370/90, The Queen v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh [1992] ECR I-4265,
para. 24
15
Case 229/83, Leclerc v. Au ble vert, para. 27; Case 115/78, Knoors v. Staatssecretaris van
Economische Zaken [1979] ECR 399, para. 25; Case C-370/90, The Queen v. Immigration Appeal
Tribunal and Surinder Singh [1992], para. 24.
16
Case 39/86, Lair v. Universitat Hannover [1988] ECR 3161, para. 43
17
E.g., Case 39/86, Lair v. Universitat Hannover, cit. para. 43; Case C-370/90, The Queen v.
Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh, cit., para. 24: “..the facilities created by the Treaty
cannot have the effect of allowing the persons who benefit from them to evade the application of
national law and of prohibiting Member States from taking the measures necessary to prevent such
abuse”.
thereby implying that Member States are entitled to prevent the circumvention of any
area of law when the circumvention amounts to abuse. Nonetheless, the key question
whether any circumvention of national laws via the resort to rights granted by EU law
(and in general, whether any improper use of rights granted by EU law) would
amount to abuse, did not yet find the response. This response would have requested a
test for identifying - in all its constituent elements – the notion of abuse applicable to
the instances of avoidance of national law via the recourse to fundamental freedoms
and to other situations of improper reliance on rights conferred by the Treaty.
Other rulings which involved not circumvention of national laws, but reliance on
rights conferred by EU law provisions, provided the occasion for a further
development of the ECJ case-law concerning the abuse of rights. In fact, in part of
these cases – which involved preliminary references brought by Greek courts
regarding alleged instances of abuse of provisions of Second Company Law
Directive18 – the ECJ, in deciding whether the conduct at stake amounted to abuse,
had regard to any inconsistency between the objectives of the Directive‟s provisions
of which the parties involved aimed at benefiting and the conduct of the parties
concerned19. Interestingly, in these cases the ECJ, whilst accepting the right of
national courts to apply domestic anti-abuse rules, even where the rights of which the
parties seek to benefit were granted by EU law provisions, made it evident that this
right of national courts were subject to specific conditions: the national anti-abuse
rules must not detract from the full effect and uniform application of EU law20, they
must not alter the scope of the EU law provisions under consideration21, and they
must not compromise the objective pursued by EU law provisions22. Through this
insistence on the purpose pursued by the EU provision concerned, the ECJ adopted
the teleological reasoning which – eventually – would contribute to its elaboration of
overall test for identifying the concept of abuse.
In fact, it was eventually in the 2000 Emsland-Starke ruling23, in the area of
common agricultural policy, that the ECJ for the first time laid down a twofold test –
a subjective test and an objective test - for identifying the concept of abuse of rights.
In the situation concerned, a German company, Emsland-Starke, had exported to
Switzerland several consignments of potato-based products and had been granted the
export refund provided for by Art. 10(1) of the EEC Regulation n. 2730/7924.
Although the products had been released for home use in Switzerland, enquiries
conducted by the German customs investigation services revealed that, immediately

18
Case C-441/93, Panagis Pafitis, [1996] ECR I-1347, Case C-367/96, Kefalas and Others v.Greece
[1988] ECR I-2843, and Case C-373/97, Dionysio Diamantis v.Elliniko Dimosio [2000] ECR I-01705,
concerning the application of the Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976 (“on the
coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are
required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the second para. of Art. 58 of the
Treaty, in respect of the formation of public limited companies and the maintenance and alteration of
their capital, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent”, known as “Second Company Law
Directive”), in OJ 1977, L 26/1.
19
Case C-441/93, Panagis Pafitis, cit.,, para. 67 to 70; Case C-367/96, Kefalas and Others v.Greece
cit., para. 21 to 23; Case C-373/97, Dionysio Diamantis v.Elliniko Dimosio, cit., para. 33 and 34.
20
Case C-441/93, Panagis Pafitis, cit.,, para. 68
21
Case C-367/96, Kefalas and Others v.Greece cit., para. 23
22
Case C-373/97, Dionysio Diamantis v.Elliniko Dimosio, cit., para. 34
23
Case C-110/99, Emsland-Starke [2000] ECR I-1569
24
Commission Regulation (EEC) 2730/79 of 29 November 1979 on the application of the system of
export refunds on agricultural products, O.J. 1979, L 317/1.
after the release for home use in Switzerland, the products had been transported back
to Germany unaltered and by the same means of transport, which prompted the
relevant German authority to revoke the decisions granting the export refund and to
demand repayment. The Commission, which had intervened in the proceedings
brought by the company against the decisions to revoke the export refund, had
submitted that, whilst Regulation 2730/79 does not constitute a legal bases for
demanding repayment of export refunds, the abuse of rights aspect had to be
examined. In this respect, the Commission cited Council Regulation 2988/95 on the
protection of EC financial interests, whereby “acts which are established to have as
their purpose to obtaining of an advantage contrary to the objectives of Community
law applicable in the case by artificially creating the conditions required for obtaining
that advantage shall result, as the case shall be, either in the failure to obtain the
advantage or in its withdrawal”25.
The Commission argued that this Regulation, whilst not applicable at the material
time, expresses a general principle of “abuse of rights” already in force in the
Community legal order26. The ECJ – after referring to previous rulings in the field of
common agricultural policy, in which, without thoroughly defining the concept of
abuse, it had held that the scope of EC Regulations must in no cases be extended to
cover abusive practices27 - specified the elements that must exist in order for an abuse
to be found. The ECJ stated: “A finding of abuse requires, first, a combination of
objective circumstances in which, despite formal observance of the conditions laid
down by the Community rules, the purpose of those rules has not been achieved. It
requires, second, a subjective element consisting in the intention to obtain an
advantage from the Community rules by creating artificially the conditions laid down
for obtaining it..”28. In light of these elements, the ECJ clarified, in the case at stake,
that the company‟s obligation to repay the export refund was “not a penalty for which
a clear and unambiguous legal basis would be necessary, but simply the consequence
of a finding that the conditions required to obtain the advantage derived from the
Community rules were created artificially, thereby rendering the refunds granted
undue payments and thus justifying the obligation to repay them”29.
The Emsland-Starke ruling marked a decisive step in the development of the ECJ
case-law on abuse of rights, from a dual viewpoint. Firstly, it laid down a complete
test for identifying the concept of abuse with regard to a conduct – namely, the access
to rights (in the specific case, financial benefits) granted directly by EU law
provisions – which does not involve the exercise of fundamental freedoms within the
internal market, and which represents, therefore, a type of conduct additional to the U-
transactions in the exercise of fundamental freedoms (at stake in Van Binsbergern).
In so doing, it went further than previous case-law30, by highlighting that a key
requirement in order for this second type of conduct to amount to abusive practice lies
in the artificial creation of conditions required to obtain a (financial) benefit granted

25
Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 2988/95 of 18 December 1995, on the protection of the European
Communities financial interests, O.J. 1995, L 312/1.
26
Case C-110/99, Emsland-Starke, cit., para. 36 to 38.
27
Case C-125/76, Cremer v.BALM 1977 ECR 1593; Case C-8/92, General Milk Products v.
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [1993] ECR I-779
28
Case C-110/99, Emsland-Starke, cit., para. 52 and 53
29
Ibid, para. 56
30
Such as the cases indicated above, in fn 17 and 18.
directly by EU law. Secondly, regarding this type of conduct the Emsland-Starke
ruling, by clearly showing that the subjective element is necessary but not sufficient,
evidenced the importance of the link between the subjective element and the objective
result. Specifically it highlighted that this link ultimately creates a dissociation
between the form of a given behaviour – which form (objectively) fulfils the
conditions for obtaining a benefit – and the substance of the behaviour itself, which
substance (due to the artificiality of the behaviour, and to the underlying intention)
does not meet the purpose of the EU provisions granting the benefit. The ruling
further emphasized that this dissociation between form and substance would create a
prejudice to the financial interests of the Community (as shown by the arguments put
forward by the Commission) and of Member States, which prejudice needs to be
prevented.
It can well be noted that the ECJ used the adverb “artificially” with reference to this
second type of conduct (access to benefits granted directly by EU provisions),
whereas, as regards the first type of conduct (i.e., the U-transactions characterised by
the resort to a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty, for the purpose of
escaping national rules), it generally used (as in Van Binsbergern) the verbs “to
avoid”, “to escape” or “to evade”31. Despite this difference in the language, it could
be argued that using the exercise of fundamental freedoms, such as the freedom to
provide services or the freedom of establishment, for a purpose (escaping national
rules) which is different in substance from the purpose of the Treaty provisions
granting the fundamental freedoms themselves, amounts to an “artificial” use of those
freedoms. In other words, the “artificiality” can be regarded as a common element of
both types of conduct.
However, whilst Van Binsbergen showed that the artificial use of these freedoms
could be prevented by Member States when the outcome was the circumvention of
national rules intended to protect the general interests – and thus, impliedly, indicated
that, in these cases, “circumvention” could be regarded as synonymous of “abuse” – a
fundamental question remains unanswered by the ECJ case-law examined until this
point: whether and, if so, in which cases, there can be “circumvention” without “abuse
of rights” in the exercise of fundamental freedoms involving U-transactions.
The response – and the possibility of identifying a unitary notion of abuse – can be
drawn, in the author‟s view, from the ECJ rulings in the company law area concerning
the freedom of establishment of companies, and from rulings in the tax law area,
which latter can also strengthen the relevance of the test laid down in Emsland Starke.
.

2. “Abuse of rights” in the company law rulings of the ECJ concerning

companies’ freedom of establishment…

“U-transactions” similar to those at stake in Van Binsbergern came to the attention

of the ECJ in the company law field too, with regard to the exercise of the freedom of
establishment. Four landmark rulings – specifically, the 1987 Segers ruling32, the
1999 Centros ruling33, the 2003 Inspire Art ruling34, the 2006 Cadbury Schweppes

31
E.g., Case 115/78, Knoors v. Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken , cit., para. 25.
32
Case 79/85, Segers, [1986] ECR 2375
33
Case C-212/97, Centros [1999] ECR I-1459
34
Case C-167/01, Inspire Art [2003] ECR I-10195
ruling35 - give the clear indication that, whilst an “abuse” always presupposes a
circumvention of the applicable national provisions, vice-versa a circumvention of the
applicable national provisions does not necessarily result in an abuse.
In the situation at stake in the 1987 Segers ruling, a Dutch national, Mr. Segers, had
set up a private limited company in the UK, of which he was the sole shareholder and
director. This company did not carry out any business activity in the UK – where it
had its registered office – and all the business activity was carried on by a subsidiary
established in the Netherland. The relevant Dutch authority had rejected Mr. Segers’s
application of a sickness insurance scheme which, according to Dutch legislation, was
reserved to directors of companies established in the Netherland. Interestingly,
against the Dutch authority‟s arguments according to which Mr. Segers intended to
circumvent Dutch national rules, the ECJ found that the fact that the company did not
carry out any business activity in the Netherland was immaterial on the ground that
the company, having its registered office in the UK, met one of the conditions
established by Art. 5436 for enjoying the right of establishment37. However, as regards
the relevant Dutch authority‟s arguments, the ECJ - by using both the word “abuse”
and the word “fraud”, and by concluding that “the need to combat fraud may....justify
a difference of treatment in certain circumstances…”38 but “the refusal to accord a
sickness benefit….cannot constitute an appropriate measure in that respect”39 -
indirectly suggested that there could be, in certain circumstances, cases of
circumvention amounting to abuse or to fraud and which could be contrasted through
appropriate measures.
Whereas the Segers ruling did not offer a reply to the question as to what would be
the “certain circumstances” and the “appropriate measures”, the subsequent Centros
and Inspire Arts rulings showed “U-transactions” which the ECJ regarded as
representing circumventions without abuse of rights and offered indications as regards
the circumstances when the circumvention would amount to abuse. In Centros,
Danish nationals had set up again a private company in the UK and this company had
opened a branch in Denmark, where all business activity was deemed to be carried
out. Although the relevant Danish authority had refused to register the branch on the
ground that the Danish founders of the UK company had circumvented provisions of
Danish company law requiring a minimum share capital for the purpose of protecting
creditors, the ECJ rejected this position. The ECJ found that the refusal to register the
branch would prevent the company established in the UK by the Danish nationals
from exercising its freedom of establishment guaranteed by the Treaty40, but – in its
reasoning leading to this conclusion – it highlighted two decisive points. First, the
ECJ, on the basis of its previous case-law concerning both the exercise of
fundamental freedoms and the access to rights granted by EU law, specified that
Member States “are entitled to take measures designed to prevent some of their
nationals from attempting, under cover of the rights created by the Treaty, improperly
to circumvent national legislation or to prevent individuals from improperly or

35
Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes [2006] ECR I-7995
36
Which was numbered Art. 58 (of the EEC Treaty) at the time of the ECJ ruling.
37
Case 79/85, Segers, cit., para 16.
38
Ibid., para. 17
39
Ibid.
40
Case C-212/97, Centros, cit. para. 21
fraudulently taking advantage of provisions of Community law”41. The wording
“improperly to circumvent” indirectly suggests that, in addition to cases of improper
circumvention of national rules – which Member States are entitled to contrast and
which, arguably, indicate cases of abuse – there may be cases of “proper” (intended
as not abusive ) circumvention of national rules via the fundamental freedoms. As a
result, it could also suggest that individual Member States should not contrast these
cases without contravening the purpose of the Treaty‟s provisions granting the
fundamental freedoms themselves. In fact, in this respect, the ECJ held that national
courts, whilst able to take account of the abuse or fraudulent conduct on the part of
the persons concerned to deny them the benefit the EU law provisions on which they
seek to relay, must assess such conduct in light of the purpose pursued by the EU law
provisions at stake42. Second, the ECJ took into consideration the fact that the rules
which the parties sough to avoid were rules concerning the formation of companies
and not rules concerning the carrying on of certain trades, professions or businesses
and had regard to the specific purpose of the Treaty‟s provisions granting the right of
establishment. On these grounds, it held that the fact that a national of a Member State
wishing to set up a company chooses to form it in a Member State whose rules of
company law seem to him the least restrictive and to set up branches in other Member
State cannot, in itself, constitute an abuse of the right of establishment43. Moreover,
by restating a conclusion of the Segers ruling, the ECJ also found that the fact that a
company does not conduct any business in the Member State in which it had its
registered office but only in the Member State where the branch is established is not
sufficient to prove the existence of abuse or fraudulent conduct which would entitle
the latter Member State to deny the company the benefit of the right of
establishment44. Lastly, in light of the need to protect creditors which had been
invoked by the Danish authorities as justification, the ECJ noted that the Danish
measure did not meet the proportionality requirements which are necessary in order
for any measure restricting the right of establishment to be legitimate45. The ECJ took
this position for two reasons. On the one hand, it stressed that the refusal to register a
branch was not such as to attain the objective of protecting creditors46. It could be
noted that, in highlighting this aspect, the ECJ seemed to indicate that, without
negative effects for the protection of creditors, there can be no abusive conduct,
despite the choice of a less restrictive company law regime for setting up the company
that would then carry out all activity through a branch in another Member State. On
the other hand, the ECJ pointed out that creditors were able to know that the company
was governed by the law of a Member State other than Denmark and were able to
refer to certain rules of EU law protecting them47, such as the Fourth and the Eleventh
Company Law Directives48.

41
Ibid, para. 24
42
Ibid, para. 25.
43
Ibid, para. 27
44
Ibid, para. 29
45
Ibid, para. 34-35
46
Ibid, para. 35
47
Ibid, para. 36
48
Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 on annual accounts of certain types of
companies, in OJ 1978 L 222, p. 11, and Eleventh Council Directive 89/666/EEC of 21 December
1989 concerning disclosure requirements in respect of branches opened in a Member State by certain
types of companies governed by the law of another State, in OJ 1989 L 395, p. 36
 The ECJ concluded by remarking again that the fact that a Member State may not
refuse to register a branch of a company established in another Member State does not
preclude the first Member States from adopting other measures for combating fraud,
either in relation to the company itself or in relation to its members, where it has been
established that they are attempting, by establishing a company in another Member
States, to evade their obligations towards public or private creditors in the territory of
a Member State concerned49.
If the Centros ruling – a case of circumvention (i.e., “U-transaction”) - without a
finding of abuse - is read together with Van Binsbergen50, it appears that the ECJ has
drawn a distinction based on two elements: a) the type of national rules that were
being circumvented; b) the ultimate outcome of the circumvention, i.e. the effect of
generating a prejudice for third parties‟ interests.
Arguably, the ECJ has been ready to state that the circumvention can be prevented
by Member States – and seems thus to have impliedly equated circumvention with
abuse – where the rules being circumvention were rules assumed to protect the
general public interest (Van Binsbergen) whereas it has not regarded the
circumvention as sufficient to prove abuse where the rules being circumvented, via
the exercise of the right of establishment, were national rules concerning the
formation of a company and assumed to protect the specific interests of creditors. By
taking Van Binsbergen together with Segers and Centros, it emerges therefore – as
regards the ultimate outcome of the circumvention – that in the former case the ECJ
impliedly took for granted the prejudice for the general interests, whereas in the two
latter cases the ECJ requires that the prejudice for the specific interest of the
concerned third party be proved. The evasion of the obligations towards public or
private creditors – the reason, highlighted by the ECJ, which would allow Member
States to adopt measures to combat fraud51 – would, by definition, compromise the
interests of creditors. By analysing the ECJ overall reasoning in Centros, and in
particular by noting that the ECJ referred to “abuse or fraudulent conduct”52, attention
can be paid to the fact that the ECJ would seem to have expressly focused on the
attempt to evade the obligations towards public and private creditors only when
referring to fraud53. Accordingly, it can be inferred that a subtle distinction can be
drawn in the ECJ's reasoning, between “abuse” and “fraud” and that, whereas in cases
of “abuse” the prejudice to the interests of creditors is the effect, in cases of “fraud” it
is the searched purpose.
It follows that, without a prejudice for third parties‟ protection (either supposed to
exist or to be proved, according to the kind of rules which are being circumvented),
there can be “circumvention” with neither “abuse” nor “fraud”, and that an
“innocuous” circumvention is the case where preventing the circumvention on its own
would imply preventing the resort to the freedom of establishment and thus defeating
the very purpose of Arts. 49 and 54 of the Treaty54.

49
Ibid, para. 38
50
Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen, cit., retro part 1.
51
Case C-212/97, Centros, cit. para. 38
52
Ibid, para. 29
53
Ibid, para. 38.
54
Which were numbered as Art. 52 and 58 of the EEC Treaty at the time the case was brought before
the ECJ, and which were referred to as such in the ECJ ruling.
 Whereas in the subsequent Inspire Art ruling the ECJ confirmed and strengthened
the findings in Centros, in Cadbury Scwheppes it took a position which part of the
literature found difficult to reconcile with the one in Centros.
In Inspire Art, the ECJ had to examine again the case of a Dutch national who had
set up a company in the UK, which company carried out all its business activity
through a branch in the Netherlands. Unlike the Danish authorities in Centros, the
Dutch authorities in Inspire Art did not refuse to register the branch of the UK
company, but required it to comply with some substantive measures of Dutch
company law, amongst which the minimum capital requirement. The justifications put
forward by the Dutch Government were the protection of creditors, the need to
combat improper recourse to freedom of establishment, the protection of effective tax
inspections and fairness in commercial dealings. The ECJ found again that, as regards
the protection of creditors, this purpose could be sufficiently achieved because the
company involved held itself out as a company governed by English law, thus giving
creditors sufficient notice that it was governed by a legislation other than that of the
Netherland and offering them the protection of the Fourth and Eleventh Company
Law Directives55. As for the improper use of the right of establishment, the ECJ, by
recalling its Centros findings, regarded the company‟s incorporation in another
Member State offering a less restrictive regulation as inherent in the right of
establishment, and thus considered its carrying out of business activity only through a
branch in the Member State of “secondary” establishment as insufficient on its own to
prove abuse or fraud56. In turn, the Dutch justifications based on the fairness of
business dealings and efficiency of tax inspections were rejected on the ground that
no evidence had been produced to prove that the Dutch provisions met the required
criteria of efficacy, proportionality and non discrimination57. In conclusion, the ECJ
clearly found that abuse must be established on a case-by-case basis and that, where
abuse is so established, Member States are free to take measures to prevent it58.
Overall, the Inspire Art ruling thus confirmed that circumvention of national rules
via the freedom of establishment does not in itself amount to abuse when the
protection of third parties’ interests are not at stake, and that – only where Member
States prove that this protection is being compromised – they can take measures to
prevent the circumvention/abuse by restricting the freedom of establishment if no
other less restrictive measure can be considered.

3….and in a ruling concerning both company law and tax law: the Cadbury
Schweppes ruling

The Cadbury Schweppes ruling owes its importance, in the context of the
development of the concept of abuse of law, on the one hand to the fact that it is at the
same time a company law ruling and a tax law ruling, and on the other hand – from
the company law viewpoint - to the fact that the ECJ specified the ultimate purpose of
the Treaty‟s provisions on the freedom of establishment. In the situation at stake, a
UK company had set up a subsidiary in Ireland for the purpose, inter alia, of having
the subsidiary‟s profits taxed at the Irish corporate tax rate, which was substantially

55
Case C-167/01, Inspire Art, cit., para. 135
56
Ibid, paras 138-139
57
Ibid, para. 140
58
Ibid, para. 143
lower than the applicable UK corporate tax rate. Whilst the UK tax authority,
according to UK law, had applied its national CFC legislation (by attributing to the
UK parent company the profits accrued to the Irish subsidiary), the ECJ – in assessing
the incompatibility of UK CFC tax legislation with EU law – stated that Arts. 49 and
54 of the Treaty59, by granting the right of establishment, have the ultimate purpose of
assisting economic and social interpenetration within the internal market through a
genuine economic activity in the host State, i.e. in the State of the secondary
establishment60. This purpose could not be achieved – the ECJ specified - in the case
of a “letter-box” or “front” subsidiary, which does not carry out any economic activity
in the host State61. On these grounds, the ECJ reached the conclusion that the CFC
legislation was incompatible with Arts. 49 and 54 of the Treaty and could thus not be
applied, unless that application serves only to prevent wholly artificial arrangements
intended to escape the national tax normally payable62. Consistently with its overall
reasoning, the ECJ specified that CFC legislation must not be applied where, on the
basis of objective factors which the interested company must be allowed to
demonstrate, and which must be ascertainable by third parties, it is proven that,
despite tax motives, the subsidiary is actually established in the host Stage and carries
out a genuine economic activity63. The objective factors which must be demonstrated
relate to the existence of the subsidiary in terms of premises, staff and equipment64.
Whilst the importance of Cadbury Schweppes from the company law perspective
lies in the fact that the ECJ clearly specified that “letter-box” or “front” subsidiaries
are not covered by the Treaty provisions on the right of establishment, its importance
from the tax law viewpoint lies in the circumstance that – by making reference to this
case of subsidiaries not carrying on genuine economic activities – the ECJ explained
the meaning of the expression “wholly artificial arrangements”, that it had already
used in several previous tax law rulings65. By applying the test laid down in Emsland-
Starke66, the ECJ stressed in fact that, for a wholly artificial arrangement to exist,
“there must be, in addition to a subjective element consisting in the intention to obtain
a tax advantage, objective circumstances showing that, despite formal observance of
the conditions laid down by Community law, the objective pursued by the freedom of
establishment …” (i.e., assisting economic and social interpenetration within the EU
through a genuine economic activity in the host State) “..has not been achieved”67.
Cadbury Schweppes thus showed the application of the same test (including the
subjective and the objective elements) for identifying the abusive practices from one
area of EU law to another, and clarified that, in the field of tax law, wholly artificial
arrangements – such as the setting up in other Member States of subsidiaries not
carrying on genuine economic activities - are synonymous of abuse. Consequently,

59
Which were numbered, respectively, Art. 43 and Art. 48 of the EC Treaty at the time of the ECJ
ruling.
60
Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes, cit., para. 53
61
Ibid, para. 68
62
Ibid., para. 75
63
Ibid., para. 65-66
64
Ibid, para. 67
65
E.g., Case C-264/96, ICI [1998] ECR I-4695, para. 26; Case C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst [2002]
ECR I-11779, para. 37; Case C-9/02, De Lasteyrie du Saillant [2004] ECR I-2409, para. 49; Case C-
446/03, Marks & Spencer [2005] ECR I-10837, para. 57.
66
Case C-110/99, Emsland-Starke, cit., para. 52 and 53, retro, part 1
67
Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes, cit., para. 64.
from Cadbury Schweppes it is also possible to deduce that a “U-transaction” - such as
the creation of a subsidiary, by a national of Member State A, in Member State B for
tax savings reason, and the fact that the activity of the subsidiary is mainly directed
towards Member State A - amounts to circumvention which is not “wholly artificial”,
i.e., which is not abuse, if the subsidiary carries on some genuine activity in Member
State B.
Nonetheless, the fact that, in Cadbury Schweppes, the ECJ considered in principle
he case of “letter-box” and “front-subsidiaries” as falling within the “wholly artificial
arrangements” that Member States can combat – and thus, impliedly, within the
concept of abuse – gives rise to the question whether and how Cadbury Schweppes
can be reconciled with the Centros findings. Taking into consideration the fact that,
in Centros, the (parent) company in the UK had only the registered office there and
was arguably the kind of “letter-box” or “front” company that, according to Cadbury
Schweppes, a subsidiary could not be, part of the literature has found it difficult to
reconcile the two rulings and has thus seen a change in the ECJ-case-law68. However,
in the author‟s view, it is possible to reconcile the two rulings by having regard to the
consequences of the arrangements at stake in the concrete cases for third parties‟
interests. This perspective shows, in fact, the similarity of the concept of abuse in the
company law field and in the tax law field, despite a different terminology: the choice
of a more favourable company law legislation (“forum-shopping”), via an “U-
transaction”, is not on its own sufficient to prove abuse without a proven prejudice to
the protection of specific third parties‟ interests (such as creditors, in Centros) to the
same extent as the choice to exercise the freedom of establishment in a Member State
with a more favourable tax legislation than the Member State of origin is not
sufficient to prove abuse (i.e., to prove a “wholly artificial arrangement”), but can
become so if the absence of a genuine economic activity in the host Member State
shows that the only objective (and outcome) consists of a prejudice to the financial
interest of the Member State of origin (Cadbury Schweppes). In addition, the two
rulings could not be seen as inconsistent with each other if considering that, in
Centros, the secondary establishment in Denmark used to carry on a genuine
economic activity, and would have thus met the requirement of not being a “letter-
box” or “front-subsidiary” (branch) which the ECJ set out in Cadbury Schweppes to
identify the cases when the use of the freedom to set up secondary establishments is
protected by the Treaty due to its not being an “abusive practices”.
The concept of abuse as wholly artificial arrangement resulting in a prejudice to the
financial interest of a Member State was confirmed, and specified in greater detail, in
the Lammers69 ruling. Belgian tax authority, by applying a national anti-abuse
provision, had reclassified interest paid by a Belgian subsidiary on funds lent by the
parent company established in another Member State as taxable dividends as these
interest payments exceeded specific limits. The Belgian tax legislation thus
introduced a difference in treatment between resident subsidiaries according to
whether or not their parent companies has its seat in Belgium, and the ECJ –
consistently with its previous case-law – regarded this differential treatment as
creating a restriction to the freedom of establishment on the ground that it made less
attractive for companies based in other Member States to create a subsidiary in
68
R.de la Feria, PROHIBITION OF ABUSE OF (COMMUNITY) LAW: THE CREATION OF
A NEW GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF EC LAW THROUGH TAX, cit., p. 428-429
69
Case C-105/07, Lammer&Van Cleeffs, [2008] ECR I-173
Belgium. Although a national measure creating this restriction to the freedom of
establishment could be justified – the ECJ explained – when targeting wholly
artificial arrangements designed to circumvent national legislation of the Member
States concerned, “in order for a restriction on the freedom of establishment to be
justified on the ground of prevention of abusive practices, the specific objective of
such a restriction must be to prevent conduct involving the creation of wholly
artificial arrangements which do not reflect economic reality, with a view to escaping
the tax normally due on the profits generated by activities carried out on national
territory”70.
This statement on the one hand confirm that in the ECJ tax case-law abusive
practices coincide with wholly artificial arrangements, on the other hand makes even
more explicit than in Cadbury Schweppes the outcome of prejudicing the financial
interests of Member States which, without a corresponding economic activity, makes
an arrangement abusive. Consequently, in the author‟s view, it is possible to reconcile
Centros and Inspire Art on the one hand with Cadbury Schweppes and Lammers on
the other hand, by noting that the ECJ has simply been expressing the distinction
between mere circumvention and abuse with a different approach. On the one hand, in
Centros and Inspire Art71, it has done so with a “positive” language, by indicating, in
essence, when a circumvention is allowed and by specifying that it is allowed when it
does not cause a prejudice to third parties‟ protection. On the other hand, in Cadbury
Schweppes and Lammers, it has done so with a “negative” language by indicating,
ultimately, when a circumvention – “wholly artificial arrangement” – is not allowed
and by clarifying that it is not allowed when it only causes a prejudice to the financial
interests (tax revenues) of the Member State of origin, which is the case in the
absence of a genuine economic activity in the host State.
Other ECJ tax law rulings show the concept of abuse which emerges as regards the
first typology of conduct too, i.e. as regards the attempt to create artificially the
conditions required for obtaining benefits granted directly by EU tax law provisions.

4. Abuse of right in other tax law rulings of the ECJ

The definition of abuse put forward in Emsland-Starke72 was used again by the ECJ
in the 2004 Leusden ruling73, concerning a case of interpretation of the Sixth Value
Added Tax (VAT) Directive (hereinafter: VAT Directive)74. In a situation in which an
amendment to the implementing national legislation had withdrawn the right to opt
for taxation of lettings of immovable property, which would have allowed him to
enjoy a tax advantage due to the deduction of input tax, the concerned taxpayer had
argued that the repeal of legislation from which he had derived an advantage in
paying less tax constituted a breach of legitimate expectation. The ECJ, in finding that
the repeal of this legislation from which a taxpayer had derived this advantage,
without there being an abuse, cannot breach a legitimate expectation based on EU

70
Case C-105/07, Lammers&Van Cleeff , cit. para. 28.
71
Retro, part 2.
72
Case C-110/99, Emsland-Starke, cit., para. 52 and 53, retro, part 1
73
Case C-487/01 Leusden [2004] ECR I-5337
74
Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the
Member States relating to turnover taxes – Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of
assessment, OJ 1977 L 145 p.1
law, recalled the concept of abuse and, in so doing, it literally repeated the subjective
element and the objective element already indicated in Emsland-Starke75. Moreover,
in stating that “as regards tax avoidance… under the law of a Member State, a
taxpayer cannot be censured for taxing advantage of a provision or a lacuna in the
legislation which, without constituting an abuse, has allowed him to pay less tax…”76,
the ECJ arguably accepted the conceptual difference between abuse and elusion with
regard to cases in which the issue at stake is the access to tax advantages granted
directly by the EU or by the national legislator, without the exercise of fundamental
freedoms. Emsland-Starke was thus deemed to provide the framework also for all
cases in which the conduct under examination is the access to tax advantages granted
directly by the legislator.
In fact, in the 2006 Halifax ruling, concerning again the VAT Directive77, the ECJ
spelt out for the first time78 the definition of the concept of abuse in the taxation field.
A British banking company, who was able to recover less than 5% of its input VAT,
needed to construct call centres in different sites. Following the advice of its tax
advisers, the company had entered into an overall set of agreements involving several
transactions as between companies belonging to its own group. As a result of these
arrangements, it had managed to entirely deduct the VAT paid on invoices received
from its suppliers for construction works. The ECJ was essentially asked two
questions, closely interconnected with each other: a) whether transactions carried out
by each participator with the intention solely of obtaining a tax advantage and which
have no independent business purpose qualify for VAT purposes as supplies made by
or to the participants in the course of their economic activities; b) whether the doctrine
of abuse of rights as developed by the ECJ case-law prevented the company from
recovering the input VAT.
The ECJ, in light of the wording of the VAT Directive and of its previous case-law
– in which, by analysing the definitions of “taxable person” and “economic
activities”, it had found that these terms are objective in nature and apply without
regard to the purpose or results of the transactions concerned – gave a positive
response to the first question. Specifically, it stated that the transactions at issue
constituted supplies of goods and an economic activity within the meaning of the
VAT Directive, provided they satisfy the objective criteria on which those concepts
are based. This applies – the ECJ specified – even if they are carried out with the sole
aim of obtaining a tax advantage, without any other economic objective79.
Nonetheless, the fact that the transactions may constitute supplies under the terms
of the VAT Directive even if they are carried out with the sole aim of obtaining a tax
advantage does not mean – as the ECJ specified in answering the second question –
that EU legislation can cover abusive practices. In particular, the ECJ, after recalling
its settled case-law whereby the application of EU legislation cannot be extended to
cover abusive practices, i.e. to transactions carried out not in the context of normal

75
Ibid, para. 78
76
Ibid, para. 79
77
Case C-255/02 Halifax [2006] ECR I-1609,
78
As this ruling preceded Cadbury Schweppes (retro, part 3) and was referred to by the ECJ in
Cadbury Schweppes, together with Emsland-Starke, when specifying the subjective and objective
elements that must exist for a wholly artificial arrangement to be found: Case C-196/04, Cadbury
Schweppes, cit., para. 64.
79
Case C-255/02 Halifax, cit.., para. 60
commercial transactions but only for the purpose of wrongfully obtaining advantages
provided for by EU law80, found that the principle of prohibiting abusive practices
also applies to the sphere of VAT81.
With this premise, the ECJ moved from its previous case-law in the VAT area,
according to which a traders‟ choice between exempt transactions and taxable
transactions may be based on a range of factors, including tax considerations, to agree
with the A.G. that taxpayers may choose to structure their business so as to limit their
tax liability82. However, the ECJ followed this line of reasoning for highlighting the
difference between an acceptable limitation of tax liabilities and an abusive practice,
and for identifying, on the basis of Emsland-Starke, the concept of abuse applicable in
the VAT field too. In this respect, the ECJ specified that two conditions must exist for
the abuse to be found: a) first, the transactions concerned, despite formal application
of the conditions laid down by the relevant provisions of the VAT Directive and its
national implementing legislation, result in the accrual of a tax advantage the grant of
which would be contrary to the purpose of those provisions; b) second, objective
factors must show that the essential aim of the transactions concerned is to obtain a
tax advantage83. Whereas the element sub a) impliedly presupposes the subjective
element, i.e. the intention of obtaining the tax advantage, the element sub b) is the
objective factor that was already pointed out, in a different wording, in Emsland-
Starke (“despite formal observance,…..the purpose has not been achieved)84.
However, by comparing Emsland-Starke with Halifax, it can be easily noted that,
whereas in Emsland-Starke the ECJ did not specify whether the purpose of obtaining
the advantage ought to be exclusive or essential and thus, impliedly, appeared to
suggest that this ought to be the exclusive purpose, in Halifax – by specifying that the
obtaining of a tax advantage ought to be the essential aim – it admitted that a
transaction could still constitute an abuse if the aim of obtaining the advantage is not
the only one but is the most important one. The doubts as to whether the obtaining of
the tax advantage ought to be the sole purpose or the essential purpose, and as to
whether it could be possible to talk of a “general EU principle of prohibition of
abuse” in the direct tax area too, as such binding on Member States, could well be
raised after the 2007 Kofoed ruling85, concerning the application of Directive 90/434
(“Merger Directive”) which provides for tax exemption for restructuring operations
within the EU86. In a situation in which income tax was charged on an exchange of
shares with particular features and in which national legislature had not enacted
specific measures to transpose Art. 11(a) of the Merger Directive, which contains an
anti-abuse clause87, the ECJ had to decide whether such an exchange of shares

80
Ibid, para. 69
81
Ibid, para. 70
82
Ibid, para. 73
83
Ibid, para. 74 and 75
84
Case C-110/99, Emsland-Starke, cit., para. 52 and 53
85
Case C- 321/05, Kofoed [2007] ECR I-5795
86
Council Directive 90/434/EEC of 23 July 1990 “on the common system of taxation applicable
to mergers, divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges of shares concerning companies of different
Member States”, in OJ L 225, p.1
87
Merger Directive, Art. 11(a), according to which a Member State may refuse to apply or
withdraw tax exemptions provided by all or part of the Merger Directive where it appears that the
restructuring operations “has as its principal objective or as one of its principal objectives tax evasion
or tax avoidance”, and according to which the fact that one of the restructuring operations “is not
constitutes exchange of shares within the meaning of the Merger Directive, and
whether the tax authorities could react to possible abuse of rights, by taxing the
transaction, despite the lack of implementation of the Directive‟s anti-abuse clause.
After having analysed the operation and found that the exchange of shares in
question was covered by the Merger Directive and thus could not, in principle, be
taxed, the ECJ – by making reference to its previous case-law regarding both the
exercise of fundamental freedoms (such as Centros and Cadbury Schweppes) and the
access to rights conferred by EU law provisions (such as Halifax) - stated: “Art. 11(a)
of Directive 90/434 reflects the general Community law principle that abuse of rights
is prohibited. Individuals must not improperly or fraudulently take advantage of
provisions of Community law. The application of Community legislation cannot be
extended to cover abusive practices, that is to say, transactions carried out not in the
context of normal commercial operations, but solely for the purpose of wrongfully
obtaining advantages provided for by Community law”88. In one of its previous
rulings on the Merger Directive, the Leur-Bloem ruling89, the ECJ had already
emphasized that Member States may set a presumption of tax evasion or avoidance,
and may apply this anti-abuse clause of the Merger Directive (by denying the
application of the tax relief provided for by the Directive), when the restructuring
operations are not carried out for valid commercial reasons90. Arguably, the fact that
the ECJ in Kofoed has stated that a provision, such as the anti-abuse clause of the
Merger Directive, which expressly aims at contrasting “tax evasion” or “tax
avoidance”, reflects the general principles of prohibition of abuse of rights, seems to
make a conceptual distinction between abuse, evasion and avoidance irrelevant from
the practical viewpoint. In fact, it suggests that any form of wrongful (i.e. undue)
access to tax benefits – whether the purpose is to obtain them via illegal devices91 or
via operations which conform to the letter but not to the goals of the provisions92 -
can be prevented by Member States.
Nonetheless, the wording used by the ECJ in Kofoed, “solely for the purpose of
wrongfully obtaining advantages”, could certainly raise the question whether it was to
be read together with the fact that the sole purpose of obtaining tax advantages had
been highlighted by the Member State concerned or whether it expressed the general
principle, and, in this second case, it could raise the doubt whether/how it could be
read together with the “essential purpose” of obtaining tax advantages as stressed in
Halifax. Moreover, in Kofoed the ECJ indicated, as regards the second issue (whether
tax authorities could react to possible abuse of rights in the absence of implementation
of the anti-abuse clause of the Directive), that it is for national courts to ascertain
whether there is in national law a provision or general principle prohibiting abuse of
rights or other provisions on tax evasion or tax avoidance which might be interpreted

carried out for valid commercial reasons such as the restructuring or rationalization of the activities of
the companies participating in the operation may constitute a presumption that the operation has tax
evasion or tax avoidance as its principal objective or as one of its principal objectives”.
88
Case C- 321/05, Kofoed, cit., para 38, where the ECJ made reference to its previous rulings in
Centros, Halifax and Cadbury Schweppes.
89
Case C-28/95, Leur-Bloem [1997] ECR I-04161
90
Ibid, para. 40.
91
In which case there would be “tax evasion” from the conceptual viewpoint.
92
In which case there would be either “tax avoidance” or “abuse” where, according to the author,
the difference between the two situations, in the fields of both direct taxation and indirect taxation, lies
in the artificiality of the transactions, as indicated below in the text.
in accordance with the anti-abuse clause of the Merger Directive and therefore justify
its application93. In so doing, the ECJ indirectly found that the EU law principle of
abuse of rights cannot be directly applied in the absence of a domestic anti-abuse
provision, thus raising the further question as to whether a distinction needs to be
drawn, regarding the relevance of this principle, between indirect taxation (Halifax)
and direct taxation (Kofoed) .
In a subsequent ruling, Part Service94, the ECJ had to the clarify the relation
between the essentiality of the purpose of obtaining the tax advantage as condition set
out in Halifax and the exclusivity of this purpose, as highlighted in Kofoed and other
rulings.
In the case at issue, related parties, which were involved together in leasing
arrangement transactions, had decided to conclude separated contracts with the
clients, thus dividing the supply in a number of parts, rather than concluding an
ordinary leasing contract. This division of the contracts had the effect of reducing the
VAT burden to a lesser amount than that resulting from an ordinary leasing contract,
as some of the resulting transactions felt under the scope of the exemption from VAT
provided for in the Italian legislation implementing the VAT Directive. The Italian
Supreme Court, before which the national tax authority had submitted its argument
that the leasing arrangement had been artificially dividend to reduce the VAT burden,
had thus identified the key issue in the question as to whether the division of
transactions regarded in economic practice and in national case-law as essential parts
of a leasing contract can constitute an abuse. Consequently, it had raised before the
ECJ two interconnected questions: a) whether in the VAT Directive the concept of
abuse of rights defined in Halifax as transactions the essential aim of which is to
obtain a tax advantage correspond to the definition of transactions carried out for no
commercial reasons other than a tax advantage or is broader or more restrictive than
that definition, and b) whether, for the purposes of VAT, the transactions at issue
could be considered to be an abusive practice.
The ECJ, after noting that, in connection with the exemptions from VAT, the VAT
Directive requires Member States to prevent “any possible evasion, avoidance or
abuse”, explained that, in its Halifax ruling, it had only indicated the essentiality of
the purpose of obtaining a tax advantage as the minimum thresholds for classifying a
practice as abusive, which minimum threshold is thus passed in cases of transactions
having the sole purpose of obtaining the advantage95. It therefore replied to the first
question by stating (again) that the VAT Directive must be interpreted as meaning
that there can be an abusive practice where the accrual of the tax advantage
constitutes the principal aim of the transaction at stake, and it replied to the second
question by leaving the determination of the existence of an abusive practice to
national courts in light of criteria that the ECJ provided in Part Service itself96.
In fact the ECJ, after repeating its general statement (already formulated in Halifax)
whereby taxpayers may choose to structure their business so as to limit their tax
liability, found that, where a transaction involves a number of services, the key
question is whether it should be considered as a single transaction or as several

93
Case C- 321/05, Kofoed, cit, para. 46.
94
Case C-425/06,Part Service [2008] ECR I-897.
95
Ibid, para. 44
96
Ibid, para. 45 and 63
individual and independent supplies of services97. In this respect, it specified that in
certain circumstances several formally distinct services must be considered to be a
single transaction where they are not independent from each other, i.e. when they
form, objectively, a single indivisible economic supply which would be artificial to
split98. The ECJ clarified that, once established that this is the case, the national courts
– in order to identify an abusive practice - must verify, first, whether the result sought
is a tax advantage which would be contrary to one or more objectives of the VAT
Directive and, second, whether that constitutes the principal aim of the approach
adopted by the parties99.
Part Service thus confirmed the borderline between elusion and abuse in the VAT
field100: whereas the minimisation of tax liability via the use of alternative
possibilities or the exploitation of gaps left by the legislator can be regarded as an
acceptable elusion of one of the provisions at stake, the artificiality of the transactions
and the contrariety of the tax advantage sough as main purpose to one of the expressly
stated objectives of the provisions constitute the elements of abuse. Arguably, the
concept of elusion that can be referred to the legitimate minimisation of the tax
burden is thus different from the concept of “avoidance” that under the VAT
Directive Member States must prevent, together with the “abuse”, when granting
exemptions.
The case-law does not appear to identify this concept of “avoidance”, but, having
regard to the constituent elements of the abuse concept, in the author‟s view it may be
inferred that a subtle distinction between “avoidance” and “abuse” (both forbidden)
can be drawn based on the existence or not of an artificial transactions, which
artificiality must exist in the abuse and is not necessary in the avoidance. The
contrariety of the tax advantage to the objective of the VAT Directive provisions on
exemptions or on particular operations must arguably, by definition, exist in both
cases, because this element can, on its own, negatively affect the EU (and Member
States) financial resources. On the other hand, if accepting that the contrariety of the
tax advantage to the objectives of the Directive characterises the avoidance which the
Directive requires Member States to prevent, the distinction also emerges between
this concept of “avoidance” and the concept of “elusion/circumvention” which can
simply be referred to the exploitation by the taxpayers of lacunae left by the legislator
and to the minimisation of tax liability via the resort to different possibilities allowed
by the legislator.
Although this distinction might be called into question on the ground that a
prejudice to the financial interest of Member States as a main element exists both in
the “avoidance” and in the “elusion/circumvention”, it could well be argued that, in
this second case, unlike in the “avoidance” situation, leaving the taxpayers the
possibility of reducing its own tax burden is ultimately the result of legislator's own
choices. This can certainly explain why the “elusion/circumvention” situation cannot
be properly regarded as a “prejudice” to revenue interests and thus as illegal and
subject to prohibition.

5. Different concepts or unitary concept?

97
Ibid, para. 48
98
Ibid, para. 50-52
99
Ibid, para. 58
100
Borderline which can already be deduced from Leusden and Halifax (supra, in the text).
 If the concept of abuse or abusive practice used by the ECJ in the cases concerning
the recourse to fundamental freedoms, namely to the freedom of establishment, is read
together with the cases of access to tax benefits granted by EU law provisions, it may
appear questionable whether or not the overriding concern underlying the ECJ‟s
reasoning coincide or is different in the two types of situations.
It might in fact be submitted that, on the one hand, the concept of abuse which was
spelt out in Emsland Starke, Halifax and Part Services finds its roots in the protection
of the financial interests of the EU, to the same extent as the so-called anti-abuse
clause of the Merger Directive101 and of other tax directives102 find their roots in the
protection of the financial interests of Member States, whereas on the other hand the
concept spelt out in Cadbury Schweppes and in other cases concerning the exercise of
fundamental freedoms would appear to be implied in the notion itself, e.g., of freedom
of establishment. Following this line of reasoning, the purpose of the applicable rules
would be the decisive factor for reconciling these rulings103. As the purpose of the
freedom of establishment is to make it possible a genuine economic interpenetration
within the internal market, a wholly artificial arrangement which does not lead to this
integration cannot benefit from the freedom of establishment. In other words, it might
be argued that in the first range of situations (access to tax advantages, which affect
the EU‟s financial resources or the Member States‟ financial resources) an
autonomous principle of abuse of rights exists in EU law, whereas in the second range
of situations there is no such principle but there is simply a consequence – the lack of
protection under EU law for wholly artificial arrangements - deriving from the
purpose itself of fundamental freedoms. From this viewpoint, it might well be
submitted that, when the exercise of fundamental freedoms is at stake, there is simply
an application of the “rule of reason test” which has been elaborated by the ECJ case-
law in the landmark Cassis de Dijon ruling104 in the area of free movement of goods:
specifically, this tests consists of recognising that there are overriding reasons of
public interest which can justify restricting the use of fundamental freedoms, and a
“rule of reason” test would be used, for this purpose, to protect the financial interest
of Member States in cases of wholly artificial arrangements, by regarding these
arrangements as abusive105. To put it differently, in this second range of cases the
abuse would be not a principle, but an inevitable way of interpreting the use of the
fundamental freedoms for reasons other than achieving their own purpose (which
would not affect the EU financial resources). In a still different terminology which has

101
Council Directive 90/434/EEC, cit., retro part 4
102
Namely: Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation
applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States (“Parent-
Subsidiary Directive”), in OJ L 225 , p. 6, Art. 1(2), under which the Directive “does not preclude the
application of domestic or agreement- based provisions required for the prevention of fraud and abuse”,
and Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 on a common system of taxation applicable to
interest and royalty payments made between associated companies of different Member States, in OJ L
157, p. 49, Art. 5 (“fraud and abuse”, which, in its first paragraph, repeats the anti-abuse clause of the
Parent-Subsidiary Directive).
103
B. Kiebebeld, Anti-Abuse in the Field of Taxation: Is There One Overall Concept? Editorial,
(2009) EC tax review 4, at 144-145
104
Case 120/78, Cassis de Dijon [1979] ECR 649.
105
G.Bizioli, „Il processo di integrazione dei principi tributari nel rapporto fra ordinamento
costituzionale, comunitario e diritto internazionale‟, 2008, Cedam, p. 181-182
been used by in scholarly debate, whereas in the case of access to financial or tax
benefits granted by EU law there would be a “general principle of abuse”, in the case
of resort to fundamental freedoms the prohibition of abuse would only be a “principle
of interpretation”106.
However well grounded these arguments may be from the viewpoint of the
overriding concern underlying the lack of protection under EU law for the two
categories of conducts at stake, two realisations seem to be inevitable.
First, the ECJ has expressly used the wording “abusive practices” for both
typologies of conducts alike, and an adverse effect for the financial interest of a
Member State inevitably arises both in case of undue access to tax advantages granted
by EU law such as by the tax directives and in cases of wholly artificial arrangements
intended to circumvent (thus to escape) the otherwise applicable national tax law of
that Member State through the resort to the freedom of establishment. From this
perspective, the fact that the ECJ, in its case-law concerning the access to tax benefits
granted directly by EU law provisions, has made reference to previous rulings
concerning the freedom of establishment too107, and vice-versa108, certainly appears to
be unsurprising.
Second, if the two typologies of conduct are considered not from the perspective of
the underlying concern but from the perspective of the behaviour of economic agents,
it can easily be realised that the elements of the behaviour which is regarded as
abusive practice tend to coincide109. In fact these elements are in any case,
irrespective of whether the agent aims at obtaining a tax advantage or at benefiting
from a fundamental freedom: a) the artificiality of the operation, which formally
satisfies the required conditions for accessing the benefit but substantially does not; b)
the purpose of obtaining of the benefit, whether tax advantage or access to
fundamental freedoms; c) as a unique result deriving from obtaining the benefit, the
prejudice to the interest of either the third parties or the tax revenues; and in
consequence d) the contrariety of this outcome to the purpose of the provisions
granting the advantage or to the fundamental freedoms provisions. The lack of one of
these elements would make it impossible to classify the practice as abusive practice.
E.g, the element c) was lacking in Centros and in Cadbury Scwheppes, for in Centros,
the ECJ was not ready to uphold the Danish legislation restricting the freedom of
establishment in the absence of a proven prejudice to the interest of the third parties
involved (creditors) to the same extent as in Cadbury Schweppes it was not ready to
uphold the UK CFC legislation without a demonstration that the only outcome of the
establishment of the subsidiary in Ireland had been the prejudice to the UK revenues
interests. On the contrary, element c) was supposed to be present in Halifax as it could

106
The terms of this debate are summarised in Piantavigna, „Conference Report: Prohibition of Abuse
of Law: A New General Principle of EU Law?3-4 October 2008, Oxford (UK)‟, cit.
107
E.g., in Case C- 321/05, Kofoed, cit., para 38 (retro, part 4), the ECJ made reference not only to
Halifax (concerning, like Kofoed, a tax benefit granted by EU law), but also to Centros and Cadbury
Schweppes (concerning the resort to the freedom of establishment).
108
E.g., in Cadbury Schweppes the ECJ made reference to Halifax, retro, part 3, fn 73.
109
This observation seems, in essence, to be shared by F.Vanistendael, „Halifax and Cadbury
Schweppes: one single European theory of abuse in tax law?‟ 2006 EC tax review, 192-195, where the
Author, after comparing in depth the Halifax and Cadbury Schweppes decisions, concludes that both
decisions have ultimately paid attention to the economic reality of the transaction (which reality cannot
but depend on the behaviour of economic agents).
be noted from the ECJ‟s guidelines110, although the ECJ left to national courts the task
to ascertain the abusive practice.
On a first reading, whilst these constituent elements characterise an abusive
practice as regards both the access to tax (or other financial) advantages granted
directly by EU law and the use of the fundamental freedoms, a difference between
these two situations may be identified. Specifically, this difference may be seen in the
fact that the ECJ, in Halifax and Part Services, has clarified that, in case of access to
tax advantages granted by EU law provisions (the VAT Directive in those cases), the
minimum thresholds for regarding a practice as abusive lies in the essentiality of the
purpose of obtaining the tax advantage, whereas the rulings concerning the access to
fundamental freedoms, in identifying wholly artificial arrangements as abusive
practices, it has been referring to “wholly artificial arrangements which do not reflect
economic reality, with a view to escaping the tax normally due on profits generated
by activities carried out on national territory”111. It might be argued that, in so doing,
the ECJ has left it unclear whether, in order for a wholly artificial arrangement to
exist, the purpose of escaping the normally applicable tax needs to be exclusive or can
only be essential.
Nonetheless, in the authors‟ view, it is possible to infer that, even in these cases,
there are indications that the essentiality of the purpose of escaping the normally
applicable tax is sufficient for a “wholly” artificial arrangement to exist. This can be
inferred from the fact that, in Cadbury Schweppes, the ECJ ruled that the CFC
legislation was inapplicable, in case of genuine economic activity in the host State,
despite the existence of tax motives for the secondary establishment there, and from
the recognition, in Lammers, of the possibility for Member States to verify the
objective element “..in order to determine whether the transaction….represents, in
whole or in part, a purely artificial arrangement, the essential purpose of which is to
circumvent the tax legislation of that Member State..”112. Taking the two statements
together, it can be easily argued that an arrangement is not abusive as long as tax
motives, however existing, do not constitute the essential reason (as the essential
reasons lies in the carrying out of a genuine economic activity). By contrast, when
tax-savings motives become the essential reason the arrangements no longer
correspond to primarily economic integration related reasons and becomes “wholly
artificial”.
Consequently, irrespective of whether the notion of abuse is to be regarded as a
concept in the case of access to benefits granted directly by EU law provisions
(including the right to deduction of input tax granted by the VAT Directive in the
field of indirect taxation) or as an implication of the rules themselves in the case of
exercise of fundamental freedoms (involving the assessment of the legitimacy of
national direct taxation rules when hindering this exercise), an overall argument can
be submitted. Specifically, it is possible to argue that the notion is a unitary one from

110
Case C-255/02 Halifax, cit.., para. 81: “..it must be borne in mind that it is the responsibility of
national court to determine the real substance and significance of the transactions concerned. In so
doing, it may take account of the purely artificial nature of those transactions and the links of a legal,
economic and/or personal nature between the operators involved in the scheme for the reduction of the
tax burden..”.
111
Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes, cit., para. 55; Case C-105/07, Lammers &Van Cleeffs
cit.,. para. 28.
112
Case C-105/07, Lammers & Van Cleeffs, cit., para. 30.
the viewpoint of the behaviour of the economic agents (behaviour which contradicts
the purpose of the provision from which the operator seek to benefit) which attracts
consequences which are unfavourable to the agents themselves (the impossibility of
accessing the financial/tax benefits granted by EU law provisions, or of resorting to
the fundamental freedoms). As a result, to search the difference between the two
situations, and between one area and another, it is necessary to pay attention to the
way of ascertaining whether a conduct is abusive, i.e. on how to establish the
existence of an abusive conduct.
In this respect, taking into consideration the statements of the ECJ concerning the
proof that there is or that there is not an abusive conduct on the one hand in Halifax
and on the other hand in Cadbury Schweppes, it can be noted that, whereas in the
former case the ECJ limited itself to pointing out that national courts must assess
whether there is abuse113, in the latter case the ECJ stressed that the company
concerned must be given the opportunity to produce evidence that the activity in the
host State is a genuine one, and thus that there is no wholly artificial arrangements
intended to circumvent the applicable national tax legislation114.
In other words, it would appear that, regarding the taxation field, a difference might
be found between the access to benefits granted by EU tax provisions and the exercise
of fundamental freedoms. In the former situation, the burden of proving the abuse lies
on national tax authorities, whereas in case of exercise of fundamental freedoms, the
ECJ wording in Cadbury Schweppes suggests that it is for companies to prove that
their case deserves to escape the application of anti-abuse provisions, at least when
those provisions are of a nature (such as CFC legislation) that they would
automatically be applied if the company does not demonstrate that the situation at
issue does not fall within the notion of abuse. On the contrary, the Centros and Inspire
Arts rulings suggest that, regarding the company law area, in case of exercise of the
fundamental freedoms the burden of proof of abusive practice lies on Member States
which must demonstrate the existence of abuse on a case-by-case basis115.

6. A unitary general principle, or a principle of interpretation?

The above analysis, which has ultimately argued the existence of a unitary
notion of abuse of rights, has been carried out from the perspective of the two possible
kinds of situations involved, namely the access to (financial or tax) benefits granted
directly by EU law provisions on the one hand, and the use of fundamental freedoms
on the other. These possible situations, corresponding to the two types of conducts
that have been considered, apply “horizontally”, i.e. to several areas and specifically:
 the access to benefits applies both in the field of indirect taxation (Halifax,
Part Services) and in the field of direct taxation (Leur Bloem, Kofoed), and it
also applies in the common agricultural products field (Emsland-Starke);
 the recourse to fundamental freedoms applies in the field of direct taxation
(Cadbury Schweppes, Lammers), of company law (Centros, Inspire Art) and
of other free movement provisions, such as the provision of services116.

113
Case C-255/02 Halifax, cit.., para. 81
114
Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes, cit., para. 70
115
Retro, part 2.
116
Retro, part 1.
 The question thus remains open as to whether a unitary notion, to be described
either in terms of general principle, or of principle of interpretation, or with a sui
generis definition, can be also deduced from the perspective of individual areas, i.e.
through a “vertical” analysis by distinguishing an area from another. It appears to be
generally accepted that a “general principle” of EU law can be elaborated by the ECJ
when it applies in most, even if not in all, Member States117 and that the
distinguishing features of general principles of EU law lies in the fact that, in addition
to having a role as interpretative aids and “fillers of gap” in the legislation, they can
also act as overriding rules of law118, as reflecting underlying overriding concerns.
Accordingly, a “general EU principle of prohibition of abuse of right” would not
need, unlike a mere principle of interpretation, national anti-abuse provisions or
principles.
In the area of indirect taxation, Halifax and Part Services undoubtedly show that,
in the cases when the criteria for identifying abuse indicated by the ECJ are met –
which cases must be identified by the national courts – access to tax benefits provided
for by the VAT Directive must be denied, without the need for individual Member
States to set specific anti-abuse clauses. In this area, the prohibition of abuse of rights
can thus be already regarded as a (directly applicable) general principle alongside
other principles such as equality and legal certainty. In turn, the distinguishing feature
of the VAT area lies in the fact that the financial interests of the EU are directly
affected and that the provisions which are aimed at taking into account these financial
interests are EU law provisions, exactly as it also occurs in the common agricultural
policy field (Emsland-Starke).
In the area of direct taxation, on a first reading the ECJ wording in Kofoed –
according to which it is for national courts to verify if there is in individual Member
States a principle or a provision prohibiting the abuse of rights, and it is up to Member
States to set national anti-abuse provisions119 – would seem to have a clear
implication. In fact, as the ECJ appeared to imply that EU law principle of abuse of
rights cannot be directly applied in the absence of a domestic anti-abuse provision,
and it was dealing with the application of the Merger Directive, it would seem to be
inevitable to infer that the prohibition of abuse of right does not have, in the field of
direct taxation, the same relevance of general principle as it has in the field of indirect
taxation, even where the situation involves the access to tax reliefs granted directly by
EU law. This would be so, despite the fact that the ECJ itself in Kofoed referred to
the prohibition of abuse of rights as a general principle.
Nonetheless, this interpretation of Kofoed can no longer be supported if the
reasoning of the ECJ in Kofoed is considered in its entirety and is taken together with
the purpose underlying the anti-abuse clause of the Merger Directive. In fact, in
Kofoed the ECJ assessed what is sufficient in order for a Directive to be introduced in
a national legal system and, in so doing, stated that an express reproduction of the
Directive wording in national provisions is not necessary for a Directive to be

117
Lorenz, „General Principles of Law: Their Elaboration in the Court of Justice of the European
Communities‟ (1964) American Journal of Comparative Law, 1-29, pp.7-9
118
Nergelius, „General Principles of Community Law in the Future: Some General Remarks on
their Scope, Applicability and Legitimacy‟, in Bernitz and Nergelius (Eds), General Principles of
European Community Law (2000), 223-234, p. 223, where the Author cites a speech by the President
of the ECJ, Rodriguez Iglesis, held on 26 April 1999 before the Danish Parliament.
119
Retro, part. 4
regarded as implemented120. Moving from this premise and with regard to the anti-
abuse clause of the Merger Directive, the ECJ could not but conclude that it is for
national courts to verify if in the national system there is either a provision or a
general principle prohibiting abuse121, by which, ultimately, the ECJ meant that it is
(obviously) for national courts to verify if the anti-abuse clause of the Directive has
been implemented. Consequently, where the anti-abuse clause has not been
implemented, either through the reproduction of relevant Directive‟s provision or
through any other device, the impossibility for tax authorities to react to situations of
abuse is the result of a choice of national legislators: the wording of the anti-abuse
clause of the Merger Directive clarify that Member States may - rather than must –
withdraw the benefits of the Directive in cases of operations carried out without valid
commercial reasons122. Moreover, this option (rather than the obligation) for Member
States to set a presumption of tax evasion or avoidance, and to apply the abuse-abuse
clause of the Merger Directive (by denying the application of the tax relief provided
for by the Directive) when the restructuring operations are not carried out for valid
commercial reasons, was emphasized by the ECJ wording in Leur-Bloem123.
Accordingly, the ECJ position in Kofoed appears to be consistent with the one in
Leur-Bloem, i.e., in essence it appears to be a consequence of the fact that the anti-
abuse clause of the Merger Directive (and of the other tax directives) does not impose
Member States to withdraw the application of the benefits of the Directive, which
depends on the fact that this anti-abuse clause was set to protect the financial interests
of Member States.
It can therefore be argued that the ECJ's reference in Kofoed to the general
principle of abuse of rights as expressed in the anti-abuse clause124 is not inconsistent
with the fact that a national anti-abuse provision is needed, simply because, in the
case of the Merger Directive, the financial interests to be directly safeguarded are the
interests of Member States, rather than the interests of the EU. The final choice as to
whether/how to safeguard their own financial interests is thus left to Member States,
who can decide whether the introduction of national anti-abuse provisions is the
appropriate means to protect these interests.
It is thus possible to explain the ECJ‟s description of the prohibition of abuse of
rights in Kofoed in terms of a general principle, and, in so doing, to reconcile the
rulings concerning indirect taxation and access to financial benefit125 with the ruling
concerning direct taxation regarding access to direct tax reliefs126, by asserting that
the prohibition of abuse of rights can be characterised as “a general principle of EU
with a sui generis aspect”. Whereas it can be regarded as having the features of a
general principle from the viewpoints of its being common to most Member States127
and of the underlying, overriding concern of preventing improper use of rights, the sui
generis aspect would seem to lie in the fact that it has been developed by the ECJ, and
has “entered” EU law, to protect a range of different interests, and that this affects its
120
Case C- 321/05 Kofoed, cit., para. 44
121
Ibid, para. 45
122
Art. 11(a) of the Merger Directive: retro, part
123
Case C-28/95, Leur-Bloem, cit., para. 40
124
Case C- 321/05, Kofoed, cit., para 38, retro, see part 4
125
Thus, rulings such as Halifax and Emsland-Starke.
126
Such as Leur-Bloem and Kofoed
127
I.e., to mailand Europe EU Member States, whose legal systems are based on civil law, which
appear to have been affected by an initial elaboration of this principle in French law.
applicability. Specifically, its applicability is a direct one when the interests that the
principle aims to protect are the EU financial interests (indirect taxation and access to
financial benefits granted by EU law provision), whereas it is left to Member States
when the principle (as expressed in the tax Directives anti-abuse clauses) serves to
protect Member States' financial interests, and thus to avoid that a prejudice to
Member States' revenues be the only outcome of the operations at stake. The same
interpretation proves to be valid for direct taxation in relation to the exercise of
fundamental freedoms: when the only/main outcome of the exercise of the freedoms
(due to the lack of genuine economic activity) is the prejudice to the financial interests
of Member States they can restrict the freedom by setting anti-abuse clauses such as
CFC. This reading is not contradicted by several previous tax rulings concerning both
companies and individuals, in which the ECJ had stated that the loss of tax revenues is
not one of the grounds listed in Art. 52 of the Treaty128 and cannot be regarded as an
overriding reason in the public interest that Member States can use to justify a less
advantageous treatment for cross-border situations than for domestic ones129: in fact,
these rulings can be easily reconciled with Cadbury Schweppes by arguing that the
ECJ statement under consideration applies to situations of genuine economic activity
in the host State.
In turn, as indicated above the outcome of the exercise of the fundamental freedoms in
cases of circumvention of national rules – in terms of existence or not existence of a
prejudice for the interests of third parties as a sole outcome of the exercise of the
freedom – is also the decisive element in the company law area: only where such a
prejudice is proved on a case-by-case basis (Centros, Inspire Art) and no less
restrictive means to prevent the prejudice is available, the Member State concerned
can restrict the right of establishment. In this regard, the circumstance that, in Inspire
Arts and in a previous company law ruling concerning companies‟ right of
establishment via the transfer of the head office from one Member State to another,
the 2002 Uberseering ruling130, the ECJ mentioned, amongst the interests whose
protection could justify a restriction to the freedom of establishment, the effectiveness
of fiscal supervision131 and even more specifically the interests of taxation
authorities132, appears to be significant. In fact, the fact that the interests of the
taxation authorities have been mentioned in a company law ruling suggests once more
that the abuse concept (and the prohibition of abuse principle) applying in the
company law area and in the broad tax law area is a unitary one – and that it comes
into play when a prejudice needs to be avoided - even from the viewpoint of an area-
by-area analysis.
Ultimately, if accepting that the reason behind the elaboration of the prohibition of
abuse of rights in the EU legal order lies in the need to strike the balance between the
prejudice to the public interest (including revenues interests) or to specific interests
(e.g. creditors‟ interests) and the integration goals of the Treaty, and consequently that
it lies in the necessity to prevent the prejudice to the interests involved when this

128
Previously, Art. 46 of the EC Treaty.
129
E.g.: Case C-264/96, ICI [1998] ECR I-4711; Case C-307/97 St-Gobain [1999] ECR I-6163;
Case C-35/98, Verkooijen [2000] ECR I-4073; C-410/98, Metallgesellschaft and Hoechst [2001] ECR
I-1727; Case C-422/01, Skandia [2003] ECR I-6817
130
Case C-208/2000, Uberseering [2002] ECR I-9919
131
Case C-167/01, Inspire Art, cit., para. 140
132
Case C-208/2000, Uberseering, cit., para. 92
prejudice emerges as the main (or the sole) element, a final question can be raised
and answered. Specifically, it can be discussed whether the prohibition of abuse of
rights emerging from the ECJ case-law tends to show a parallelism with the abuse of
rights provision laid down in Art. 54 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, under
which “Nothing…shall be interpreted as implying any right to engage in any activity
or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms
recognised in this Charter or at their limitation to a greater extent then is provided for
herein”. As this provision refers to the rights enshrined by the Charter itself and is
addressed to EU institutions, to bodies, offices and agencies of the EU and of Member
States when implementing EU law (as made clear by Art. 51 of the Charter), it would
appear on a first reading to have a different significance and scope from the abuse of
right concept emerging from the ECJ case-law and discussed in this paper, which
latter concept refers to the conduct of the right holder when he aims at accessing a
benefit granted by EU provisions or at exercising a fundamental freedom. The
difference between the abuse of rights prohibition enshrined in Art. 54 of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights and the abuse of rights concept that has been analysed would
thus seem to lie both in the addressees and in the scope. Nevertheless, the entry into
force of the Lisbon Treaty133 has given the Charter of Fundamental Rights the same
legal force as the Treaty on the European Union and as the EC Treaty, renamed
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
For this reason, in the author‟s view a teleological interpretation of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights and of the TFEU in light of each other appears to be appropriate
for consistency of the EU legal order. Adopting such an interpretation, Art. 54 of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights could be regarded as prohibiting rights from being
abused, due to the abuse causing a prejudice to the victim of the conduct at stake134. It
could also be noted that such prejudice needs to be regarded as unacceptable, at least
when emerging as the main or sole outcome of a specific conduct, in light of the very
objectives of social cohesion135, that are listed amongst the ultimate goals of the EU
exactly by the Treaty which provides the legal basis for EU provisions directly
granting benefits as well as for the fundamental freedoms.
Ultimately, it can thus be submitted that the prejudice to other parties‟ interests is
the feature which shows the parallelism between the principle of abuse of rights
developed by the ECJ case-law and the prohibition of abuse of rights concept set out
by Art. 54 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

7. Conclusion

The arguments put forward in the analysis carried out in the parts 2 to 5 can be
ultimately summarised, at the current state of EU law, in the following table:

Areas of law Types of conduct

133
On 1 December 2009.
134
G. Palombella, The Abuse of Rights and the Rule of Law, at p. 10, in A.Sajo (ed), Abuse, the dark
side of fundamental rights, 2006 Eleventh International Publishing,
135
Art. 4 and 14 of the Treaty.
 Direct access to benefits Exercise of a fundamental
provided by EU law freedom
Indirect tax area Prejudice to the EU
financial interests (VAT
Directive): prohibition of
abuse of rights as directly
applicable general
principle

Direct tax area Prejudice to the Member Prejudice to the Member

States financial interests States financial interests:
(direct tax directives): prohibition of abuse of
prohibition of abuse of rights as justification for
rights applicable to the restrictions of the freedom
discretion of Member of establishment if no
States (via national anti- genuine economic activity
abuse clauses) is carried out, which needs
to be proved (“rule of
reason approach”)
Company law area Prejudice to the specific
interests of third parties:
prohibition of abuse of
rights as justification for
restrictions of the freedom
of establishment if
prejudice is proved on a
case-by-case basis in
situations of circumvention
of national rules protecting
specific interests

Common agricultural Prejudice to the EU

policy financial interests:
prohibition of abuse of
rights as directly applicable
general principle
Provision of services Prejudice to the general
public interest: abuse of
rights as directly applicable
general principle as
prejudice is presumed in
cases of circumvention of
national rules of conduct
set to protect the public
interest
 In the present work, it has therefore been stressed that the existence of the
prejudice (to either Member States' financial interests or the general public interest or
to specific interests) makes it possible to find a unitary notion from both the
perspective of the types of conduct involved and the perspective of the different areas,
and that this aspect is bound to be the ultimate outcome in cases of artificial conduct
(i.e., of creation of the formal conditions for obtaining benefits without the underlying
required economic substance or resort to freedoms without genuine economic
integration).
As a result, taking the concept of abuse of rights developed by the ECJ case-law,
and capable of being regarded as a general principle (with a sui generis aspect), which
has been here analysed with particular regard to the areas of company law and tax
law, together with the concept embodied in Art. 54 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights136, a conclusion seems to be inevitable. Specifically, it can be concluded that
the two concepts137 – due to the fact that they differ from each other not in the
substance, but only from the viewpoint of the scope of rights embraced and from the
viewpoint of the actors of the conduct under consideration – are complementary to
one other in ensuring that, within the framework of the EU legal order on its whole,
rights of whatever nature can be abused by neither public bodies nor right holders.

136
Retro, part. 6.
137
Or, perhaps more accurately, the two sphere of application of the same concept.