What Is Abstract About The Art of Music - K. L. Walton (1988)
What Is Abstract About The Art of Music - K. L. Walton (1988)
What Is Abstract About The Art of Music - K. L. Walton (1988)
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are-while the most serious mainstreampaint- ing apart from their sources more easily than
ers have worked avidly on developing and sights are, as objects of perception on their
refining realistic perspective and modelling own, independent of the bells or trains or
techniques. There are, to be sure, programmatic speech which might be heardby means of them.
elements in "serious" music (Haydn's bird- A sight is nearlyalways a sight of something, in
calls, the tone-paintingin Beethoven's Pastoral our experience;a sound can be just a sound. In
Symphony), but they are typically considered any case, since "absolute" music is so well
irrelevant to its value as music, incidentals established and highly regarded, and also tries
which the listener can safely ignore while con- so hardto keep its distancefrom representation,
centratingon the "musical" significance of the we will do well to focus our attention on it.
sounds.4 Ultimately of course we would like to under-
Music does have a respectable function in stand abstractionin all of the arts, and indeed
illustratingverbal texts and assisting, reinforc- abstractelements in even the most representa-
ing, representationin other media, as in song, tional works.
opera, dance, and film. Palestrinaillustratesthe What is "abstract" about (absolute) music,
words "descendit de coelis" with descending and how does it differ from the obviously
melodic lines.5 Trumpetslaugh in Bach's Can- representational ("figurative," "objective")
tataDer Himmel lacht, die Erdejubilieret. Flies arts?I will explore threelines of thought:a) that
buzz in Handel's Israel and Egypt. But music music lacks meaning or semantic content, b)
with words or music in the service of a story is that its semantic content is more general than
considered by purists to be something less than that of figurative painting, literature,etc., and
the pinnacle to which music can aspire, music c) that music is somehow not perceptual, or is
in its highest form occurring in, for example, less so than painting and literatureare. Only
the classical string quartet literature. Eduard partof the answer, if even that, is to be found in
Hanslick claims that "the rigor with which any of these directions. But considerations
music is subordinatedto words is generally in raised in exploring all three will combine to
an inverse ratio to the independentbeautyof the suggest a way of understandingmusic that not
former."6 only clarifies its "abstract" character,but also
Much abstract visual art is parasitic on the promises to facilitate the daunting task of un-
representational.Perhapssome works are about covering the secret of its power.
representationality;at least their point some-
times consists partlyin their departurefrom the II.
representationalnorm. Viewers are expected to
notice the absence of representationalcontent. Do music and other abstract arts lack a
But "absolute" music is not thus beholden to semantic dimension- "meanings," "subject
representationalmusic. It stands on its own. matter," "propositionalcontent' -that is to be
I suspect that this difference, the fact that in found in the representationalarts?The works of
music abstractionis so often considerednormal Dickens, Vermeer, and Shakespeare refer to
and representationrequiresjustification, while things outside of themselves, they are of or
in paintingthe reverse is true, has something to about other things, they "say" things about the
do with two significant disanalogies between world, they make "statements," it would seem,
vision and hearing:In the first place, vision is whereasBach's Art of the Fugue, the TajMajal,
frequently more effective than hearing as a and Mondriancompositions are "just objects"
means of identifying particulars,as a source of -they just sit there. The trouble with this
de re ratherthan mere de dicto knowledge. (By negative characterizationof abstraction, by it-
listening, the pedestrianabout to cross a street self anyway, is that it exacerbates the mystery
can tell thatone or more cars are coming, but he of the value of the abstractarts.
may not be able, without looking, to identify Questions about what abstractionis need to
any particularcar, or even to determinewhether be approachedwith "why" questions at least in
or not there is more than one. If he looks, he is the backs of our minds: Why is there such a
unlikely not to notice at least one particular thing as abstractart?Why and how do abstract
car.)7 Secondly, sounds are thoughtof as stand- works appealto us? Why do we listen to music?
It is not easy to explain the interest and appeal Huxley has one of his characters in Point
of any of the arts. But the values of abstraction CounterPoint contend that the slow movement
seem particularlyproblematic,especially so if it of Beethoven's String Quartet opus 132, the
is understoodas the absence of semantic prop- Heiliger Dankgesang, is a proof of the exist-
erties. To be sure, there is a puzzle about why ence of God.
people seem to care about Anna Kareninaand We may detect a grainof truthin such claims.
Willy Loman, realizing that they are merely If we were forced to choose between consider-
fictional, and why people find the portrayalof ing the Heiliger Dankgesang a statement(let's
such charactersintriguingor entrancingor mov- not say a proof) that God exists, or a statement
ing. But it is obvious that Anna Karenina, thatGod does not exist, I would expect us to opt
Death of a Salesman, and many other represen- unhesitatingly for the former. But many will
tational works are significantly concerned with reject the choice. Many of us find many or most
topics of great interestto us, even if they do not attributionsof statements to "abstract" works
speak of particularreal people and situations.8 of art crude and gratuitousprojectionsof one's
They are, in some sense or other, "about" own preoccupationsor hangups onto works of
love, or life, or war and peace, or success and artthatare unableto resist only because they are
failure, or ambition, or defeat. This by itself mute. And these attributionsare likely to strike
shows where to look for a plausible explanation us as having little to do with what is moving or
of the values of representationalart. But if the satisfying or marvelous about the works. (Does
abstractarts are not aboutanything, if they have one have to take the Heiliger Dankgesang to
no subject matter, it is hard to see even how to have anythingat all to do with theism, in order
begin going aboutaccountingfor theirpower. If to appreciate it fully?) Claims that the Bel-
Bach fugues and Mondrian compositions are vedere is a "speculation concerning political
just things, patternsof notes or shapes pointing power" or that the Heiliger Dankgesang states
to nothingbeyond themselves, why in the world that God exists are ripe targets for a good
should they interest us at all, let alone send satire.10
shivers up our spines? Thereare less crudeways of finding semantic
It is not surprising that some have tried to content in music, of course. Its expressiveness
find semantic properties in music and other is sometimes explained in semantic terms.'
(so-called) abstract art. Assimilating them to What music expresses is usually held to include
the obviously representationalarts might seem humanemotions, and humanemotions certainly
the only way of making explanations of their are importantto us. If music is, in some sense
value possible. These attemptshave taken var- or other, "about" them, that people listen to
ious forms. The horizontal and vertical ele- music should be no more mysterious or surpris-
ments of Mondrian'spaintings have been asso- ing than that they read novels or look at
ciated with horizons and cathedrals.Some have figurative paintings, however much remains to
explicitly attributed"statements" to the most be done to spell out the natureof the interest.
seemingly abstractworks. It is easy to point to examples of expressive
music. Much of the vocabularyof human emo-
Like all masterpieces of architecture, [the Rector's tions is readily applied to music; we speak
palace in Dubrovnik] expresses an opinion about the
activities which are going to be carried on under its
easily of musical passages being joyful, or
roof. Chartes is a speculationconcerning the natureof tense, or anguished, or exuberant. What is
God and of holiness. The Belvedere in Vienna is a meant when we speak this way? A familiarfirst
speculation concerning political power. With its bal- stab is to suggest that music is expressive by
anced treatment of its masses and the suggestion of virtue of mimicking the behavior by which
fecundity in its springing arches and proliferating
capitals, the Rector's palace puts forwardan ideal of an people express their emotions. There are
ordered and creative society.9 Agitato movements, lilting melodies, driving
rhythms, nervousness and calmness, etc. But
Many have claimed abstractworks to be infor- some qualities of music importantto its expres-
mative or illuminating, often assuming implic- sive characterhave no obvious connection with
itly that the illuminationis effected by virtue of human expressive behavior. Although the ma-
"meanings" or semantic content. Aldous jor mode is not invariably happy or the minor
invariably sad, mode is by no means expres- means) may be undeniable. But how important
sively inert. Just try changing a melody from its expressiveness is, how much it has to do
major to minor or vice versa and see what with the power of music and why we listen to it,
happens. (There are also the more elaborate is quite anotherquestion. Hanslick's The Beau-
medieval church modes, and Indian ragas.) If tiful in Music is a tract for the resistance.
the major mode makes a particular melody
In the pure act of listening we enjoy the music alone
cheerier than it would be otherwise, it is not and do not think of importing into it any extraneous
easy to argue that it does this by somehow matter.14
resemblingor recallingcheery behavior. People To the question: What is to be expressed with . . .
don't change from major to minor or from [euphony, rhythm,melody, harmony,etc.]? the answer
will be: "Musical ideas." Now, a musical idea . . . is
Phrygianto Lydian when their moods change. . . . an end in itself, and not a means for representing
Cats express contentment by purring and feelings and thoughts.'
dogs show joy by wagging their tails, though
neitherbehaviorbears any evident similarityto That there is something to such purist atti-
the ways you and I express these feelings. Justtudes is suggested by this comparison: Chess
as there are specifically feline and canine ex-moves and chess games can be marvelous,
pressions of feelings, there may be specifically
beautiful, elegant. So can proofs in logic and
musical ones. It may take some experience with mathematics;so can scientific theories. But it
a musical traditionto understandits mannersof seems strained, to say the least, to attribute
expression, as it takes familiaritywith animalsthese aesthetic qualities to "expressiveness,"
to detect theirs. But once the connection is and downrightimplausibleto suppose that they
learned, the detection of the emotion, the read-
consist in the expression of humanemotions. A
ing of the expression is as immediate and chess game or a proof is not beautifulbecause it
automaticas it is in the case of fellow humans.12
expresses joy or anguish or determinationor
We might worry now that the assimilationof resignation, nor because it is in some sense
abstractart (insofar as it is expressive, anyway)
"about" love or ambitionor the human condi-
to representationalart will be too successful. tion, let alone because it represents, say "fate
Does expressive music simply "represent" oc- knockingon the door." If this is so there would
currences of emotions, by "representing" be- seem to be a kind of aestheticvalue which is not
havioral expressions? That is just what repre- to be explained in terms of subject matter, one
sentationalpaintings and novels so often do. I which might be importantin music. When a
doubt that we are preparedto obliterate com- surprising but elegant modulation or the en-
pletely the difference between representationaltrance of a fugue subject sends shivers up our
works and abstractbut expressive ones, or to spines, we needn't assume that the shivers arise
take expression to be simply one variety of because joy or futility or whatever is somehow
representation.13 expressed, let alone because anything is repre-
Some hope may be gleaned from the fact that sented. (For that matter, the appeal of Italian
the expressive range of music, in contrast to cuisine seems hardly to lie in its "expres-
literatureand (figurative) painting, appears tosiveness" any more than in the "statements" it
be severely limited in certaindirections. Musicmakes. But this appeal would seem to be more
can apparentlyexpress anguishor ecstasy, but itlike that of sounds appreciatedin the spirit of
is hard to imagine its expressing envy or guiltJohn Cage than that of Bach's The Art of the
(without the help of text or title or program Fugue.)
notes). Music can be sad or joyful, but hardly Hanslick's purism is not pure. He allows
embarrassedor jealous. metaphoricaldescriptions of music ("flight,"
"reapproach," "increasing and diminishing
III. strength'p16), which arguablypoint to important
links between music and the outside world.
Attempts to find connections between music Metaphorscan easily occupy a great deal of our
and the outside world have met strong resis- discourseaboutmusic, if we let them. We speak
tance from some quarters,even derision. That of "ascending" and "descending" motives,
much music is expressive (whateverexactly this "thick" and "thin" textures, "strain" and
"repose," "conflict" and "concord," "move- What I should like to write is a book about nothing, a
ment," "return," "destinations," "renewal," book dependentupon nothingexternal, which would be
held togetherby the internalstrengthof its style, just as
"soaring" and "whispering" melodies, "throb- the earth, suspendedin the void, depends upon nothing
bing" rhythms, etc. This will be of little con- external for its support: a book which would have
sequence if the metaphors are no more than almost no subject, or at least in which the subject would
ways of speaking, colorful means of describing be invisible, if such a thing is possible.22
music's formal or acoustic properties.17 But It is as though the very remoteness from our
they may well be essential,'8 immortal. Whatis lives of abstractelements in works of art, which
said when one speaks of ascent or descent or is what makes their power so hardto explain, is
movement or destinations in music may neces- at the same time the source of their power!23
sarily involve reference to spatial phenomena. It is too soon to conclude that music and other
If it does, this fact will be welcomed by those abstractarts lack significant links to mattersof
who hope to find a subject matterfor music. nonmusical import, however. Music may con-
More than a few recent music theorists at- nect with our lives in ways which, though
tempt to do Hanslick one better and avoid even profoundly important, are less direct and less
metaphors. Heinrich Schenker tended to shun obvious than the examples of representational
words entirely in his musical analyses, prefer- painting and literature and even straightfor-
ring diagrams that combine musical notation wardly expressive works lead us to expect. The
and his own symbols.'9 The most pure concep- evident futility, even the foolishness of attempts
tion of music has it consisting of nothing but to say what a piece like The Art of the Fugue
sounds and relations among them: musical mo- "means" or what it is "about" does not close
tives and their elaborations, suspensions, inver- the door on the idea that it does have meanings
sions, strettos, modulations, recapitulations, or a subject matter, and that they contribute
Ursdtze, tone rows, etc.-all of this existing for significantly to its beauty. Could it just be that
its own sake and appreciatedwithout reference there is no saying, that language is simply
to anything else. inadequateto convey music's semantic proper-
Purists tend to have a deep reverence for ties or how it relates to our lives?24 This of
music. Their feeling seems to be thatto attribute course is the familiar idea that music is
programs or emotional qualities or thoughts "ineffable."25
(except "purely musical" ones) to music is to Substantiatingthis thoughtis a dauntingtask.
trivialize it, to cheapen it, to insult it. Semantic How are we to establish that music does have
content doesn't do justice to the exceptional meanings (or whatever)if we can't specify what
profundity of musical values. But in rejecting they are? And why should we be unable to
semantic content they are rejecting what can express them verbally? Satisfactory answers to
easily seem the most promising, even the only these questions are a long way off, but I will
promising route to an explanation of musical venture a start on the second one. If we can
value. understandhow it might be that musical mean-
The deepest values in painting and even ings are inexpressible in language we will have
literature,as well as music, are sometimes held deflected the challenge to come up with them.
to be those which have least to do with repre- And we will have boosted the credibility of the
sentationalcontentor other semanticproperties. idea that our halting attemptsto say, by the use
This may be the point of Pater's claim that all of metaphors,for instance, what musical works
arts aspire after the condition of music. Paint- mean might sometimes point at least in the right
ing, though it may be more naturallyrepresen- general direction, notwithstandingtheir evident
tational than music has had its purists: Clive inadequacy and the apparent impossibility of
Bell held that representationalelements in the doing better.
visual arts are irrelevantaesthetically, that only The ineffability of musical meanings, if it
"significant form" matters.2"Similar sugges- can be made out, will do much to accommodate
tions have been made even about literature, the intuition that there are none and to explain
which can scarcely avoid representationality. how music is "abstract," while the presence in
[T]he genuine writer has nothing to say. He has music of meanings at all, however ineffable,
only a way of speaking.21 takes the edge off the mystery of our interest in
it. But notions of "abstraction"other than that or a text or program notes), or between piety
of lacking or appearingto lack semanticcontent and eroticism,30but it may express more gen-
come into play as well, ones which will turnout eral "ideas" from which cognitive elements
to be importantlyrelated to ineffability. Let's have been abstracted.31
look at what else might be meant by calling Music may be unable even to differentiate
music "abstract." emotions from physical events. There may be
no telling whether a given musical passage
IV.
expresses fury or a forest fire.32Nonetheless, if
Abstraction, in one sense, is generality. it expresses (represents, portrays, depicts)
Rather than lacking semantic content, perhaps something of which both are-instances, it does
abstract works of art have content that is in apparently have semantic content, a subject
some way especially general. There are two matter-a very general one at least.
possibilities here. It may be that musical works The resistance many of us feel to claims that
are like predicates ("house," "building") that a piece of music is about this or that weakens
apply to many different things, whereas paint- the more abstract, the more general the pur-
ing and literatureare analogousto propernames ported semantic content is. It may be gratu-
denoting individuals (or to statements contain- itous, presumptuous, "unmusical" to suggest
ing proper names). Or music may be merely that a sonata (apart from title or text) is about
more general than the obviously representa- the Trojan war, or even about warfare. But it
tional arts are, in the way that "building" is seems less so to suggest that it is about struggle
more general than "house." We will consider in general, struggle in a sense that includes
the second alternativefirst. political as well as military struggles, legal
Hanslick urges that music cannot portray battles and business competition, personality
definite (specific) emotions, but allows that it clashes, struggles against poverty and for dig-
can express "indefinite" ones. His point, elab- nity, struggles between one's own desires and
orated a little, seems to be that emotions have one's betterjudgment, and so on as far as the
two aspects. They have a cognitive component: imagination can see. (Even if this judgment
thoughts or judgments or evaluations or beliefs about the subject matter of the sonata is not
or attitudes. "The feeling of hope [for instance] rejectedas automaticallyas a more specific one
is inseparablefrom the conception of a happier would be, however, it is hard to see how one
state which is to come. "26 They also involve a might demonstratethat it is true or plausible,
"dynamic element," "psychical motion,"27 and even how one might become convinced of
what we might call feelings or sensations (un- it oneself. Part of the problem may be that we
derstoodnot to have intentionalobjects). Music have a very weak grasp of the relevant broad
is incapable of capturing the cognitive ele- notion of struggle.) It may be silly to read into
ments, but it can portray the "psychical a recapitulationthe thought of someone's re-
motion"; it can express "intensity, waxing and turningto the home of his parents, but less silly
diminishing, hastening and lingering."28 to regardit as expressing a very general notion
Different emotions can have the same of returning, of which not only returnsto one's
"psychical motions." Anger and fear might (in home but also returnsto health, to the scene of
one sense of the term) "feel" alike; what a crime, to one's former convictions, and who
distinguishes them is their cognitive content: knows what else are instances.
anger involves a desire to harm something and The point here is not that music and other
perhapsthe thoughtthat one has been wronged, "abstract" arts are concerned with such gener-
whereas fear involves the thoughtthat one is in alities whereas the representationalarts are not.
danger.29 So music can't distinguish between Novels and figurative paintings may ultimately
them. It can't express anger, specifically, as treat notions of equal generality.33The differ-
contrasted to fear. But it might portray what ence presumably is that they present them by
fear and anger have in common, a less specific illustratingthem, by representinginstances of
state of feeling of which both are instances. them. A novel may present the abstractnotion
Similarly, music can't distinguishbetween love, of struggle by portrayingNapoleon's struggles,
longing, and religious fervor (not without a title whereas music may present that notion more
directly.34But in some cases music or a passage Here is a story of great generality, one which
in music may presenta very general concept by abstractsfrom an enormous number of specif-
being, not representing, an instance of it. A ics:
recapitulationmay itself be one example of the
Once upon a time there was a person.
general notion of returning.The recapitulation, The End.
a "purely musical" event, may on the surface
at least appear to be the main focus of the It is "about" personhood, I suppose. All of us
listener's interest, as Napoleon's invasion of have a considerableinterestin people, in certain
Russia may appearthe main focus of Warand people and in certainparticularaspects of them;
Peace. This may be the element of truth in no doubtthis is trueof everyone in every culture
Hanslick's claim that the ideas expressed by and every age since the beginning of time. But
music are "purely musical" whereas the ideas the story I just recited is notable for its excru-
expressed by language are thoughts "distinct ciating lack of interest. It is vapid. It doesn't
from its medium."35 speak to our specific concerns with particular
The generality of the semantic content of people at all; it doesn't connect with our lives.
music and other arts might at first seem a great It is guaranteedto flunk the test of time (unless
virtue, allowing a work to speak to many the Guinness Book of Records immortalizes it
different interests and concerns. One person as the dullest story ever told). We want to hear
might be interested in Napoleon's military more. We want details. "Once upon a time
struggles, anotherwho doesn't care beans about there was a person who..
that may be immersed in family power strug- Or consider a theatricalevent which abstracts
gles, a third may be preoccupied with the from the "cognitive" aspects of its characters'
conflict between his desire to succeed and his emotions, their thoughts (broadly speaking),
naturallaziness, someone else may have on his and represents only the "dynamic element,"
mind the tensions aroused by someone who "psychic motions"; so no "definite" emotions
both attractsand repels him. A piece of music are portrayed. The actors laugh and cry, they
which is "about" struggle in general, which scream, moan, and giggle, frown and smile,
abstractsfrom what is unique to any particular stiffen and relax. But there is no indication of
struggle, would seem to have something to say the characters'thoughts, no hint of their beliefs
to each of them. One might expect such a piece or desires or hopes or expectations. The audi-
to get high marks on the test of time for ence can only speculate about why they laugh
aesthetic greatness. It ought to appeal to differ- and cry and frown and smile. I don't dare say
ent ages, different cultures, people with differ- that such an event would be of no interest; if I
ent interestsand preoccupations,to anyone who did someone would stage it and somehow make
is concerned with "struggles" of any sort. It it interesting (perhapsas an instance of theater
ought to outlive works dealing specifically with of the absurd?). But the idea is hardly promis-
one kind of struggle, which will likely be ing. (And it is almost certain that such theater
forgotten when circumstances or interests would not be interestingor thrilling or satisfy-
change. Do we now have the key to understand- ing in anything like the way Bach's Art of the
ing the special aesthetic profunditysome find in Fugue is.) Again, we want details; we want to
abstraction? see the emotions in context, to understandwhat
If we do, we are a long way from opening the they are about and why they are felt.36
lock with it. If struggles of a certain sort are Is it even true that musical portrayals are
important to me, or a particular instance of especially general? Certainly music and other
returning is, it is not clear why I should be nonrepresentationalworks have no monopoly
interestedin the notion of struggle or of return- on generality. A stick figure of a person drawn
ing in general. Probably I already realize per- in black ink probably abstracts from anorexia
fectly well that the object of my immediate and obesity, from color, race, sex, mood, type
interestis a struggle, or a return.What I want to of clothing, etc. The person in the picture may
understand, probably, is its particularnature, be sitting or standing, or running, but if the
the specific kind of struggleor returnit is. Isn't sketch is sufficiently stylized it may abstract
generalityjust vacuity? from any particular manner of running or
sitting. It may be almost as unspecific as the "struggle" or "return" even in its extended
phrase, "a sitting person." Much of the serious sense may correspond only approximately to
representationalart we think of as (partially) the propertiesexpressed by a piece or passage
"abstract" is general in this way, if not to this of music.) One writer finds the apparentcon-
extent. (A cubist portraitin which a rectangular tradiction"gay melancholy" the best he can do
shape represents the sitter's head doesn't in describing the characterof the alla tedesca
therebydepict the sitter as having a rectangular movement of Beethoven's B-flat Quartet.
head; it is simply very unspecific about the "Both elements are present, not as contrasting,
shape of his head.) but strangelyunified in one hauntingphrase."38
I will suggest later that music does present So music organizes things differently from
cognitive elements of the emotions it expresses how language does; its categories cut across
(thoughin a mannervery differentfrom those in those of English. This supportsthe claims of the
which painting and literature most obviously ineffability of music, of the impossibility of
do, and though the cognitive elements it capturingwhat it expresses in words.39But it is
presents may be importantly different). But only a small part of the story, as we will see.
even if it doesn't, the difference between music
V.
and the representationalarts is hardly one of
degree of generality. Music may well express "Abstract" things are sometimes contrasted
the "dynamics" of emotions with extreme to objects of perception;we see and hearwhat is
specificity, in much more detail than can be "concrete," but we conceive or apprehend
done easily or at all in painting or literature. "with the mind" what is "abstract." Music
Music may not be able to distinguish between and painting are usually thought of as percep-
fury and fear, but it may portrayveryprecisely tual arts, one aural and the other visual, in
the natureof certain(nonintentional)feelings or contrastto literature(and, for that matter,to the
sensations one might have when one is either "conceptual" art of the 1960s and 1970s). But
furious or afraid. Perhapsa particularrecapitu- there is a sense in which music is less an aural
lation capturesa specific mannerof returningin art than (figurative) painting is a visual one.
great detail, one which might characterize a This comes out most obviously in the fact that
return to Athens and a return to health and a when music is representationalor illustrativeit
return to earlier convictions.'3 The difference often does not represent sounds, whereas rep-
between music and the representationalarts resentationalpaintingseems always to represent
may lie less in the degree of generality of their sights.40 Patience, which Handel illustrates in
semantic properties than in the respects in Belshazzar by means of long notes, is not an
which they are generaland the respectsin which aural phenomenon, nor are instances of pa-
they are specific. tience. Bach illustrates the words "I follow
It seems also that the propertieswhich music Christ" with a canon in his Cantata12, Weinen,
is able to portay are often ones for which we Klagen, Sorgen Zagen, one voice imitating
have no words. The English languagegroupsall another. Ascents and descents are often por-
of the various sorts of "anger" together, and trayed in the obvious way.
separates them from cases of fear and from Picturescan representnonvisual phenomena,
forest fires. It less easily expresses sensations of course. Rudolf Arnheim pointed out that in
which some cases of fear and some cases of Sternberg'ssilent film, TheDocks of New York,
anger may have in common, especially very the reportof a revolver is indicatedby the rising
specific ones ("agitated" or "upset" might of a flock of birds.4' Odors can be represented
express unspecific ones), and less easily still by depicting wrinklednoses. But it is by means
captures what they share with forest fires. of depicting sights in these cases, the looks of
"Struggle" and "return" may strike one as things, that sounds and smells are portrayed.It
puns when applied as broadly as I have sug- is because we see the birds suddenly take flight
gested. Music might serve to show us what that we know the sound of a shot has occurred.
certain instances of returningfrom a trip, re- But musical portrayalsneedn't involve the por-
turningto health, returningto previous convic- trayalof sounds at all. It is not by representing
tions, etc., have in common. (And of course any sounds that long notes indicate patience, or
an ascending melodic line someone's rising into Even the sketchiest stick figure drawing is in
heaven. one sense a picture of a particular person, an
I believe that this difference is tremendously individual.4' Viewers imagine themselves see-
important. When we look at a picture we ing and identifying some one individualperson,
imagine ourselves taking in the sights that it even if the picture indicates very little about
depicts. On viewing a painting of a wheat field how he or she differs from other people. It may
one imagines seeing a wheat field. One also be that, when music does not induce imagina-
imagines, I claim, that looking at the picture, is tive perception, it presentsonly concepts, prop-
an instanceof seeing a wheat field.42 Represen- erties, universals (even if not very general
tational music frequently involves no such ones), not particularthings. Music may portray
imagined perceiving. I don't imagine myself the notion of patience, or ascent, or struggle, or
hearing patience or anyone's being patient or return, but not particular instances of some-
anything else, when I hear the long notes of one's being patient or ascending or struggling
Belshazzar and understand them to portray or returning.
patience. Still less do I imagine of my hearing It may seem puzzling, however, how a mu-
of the music that it is a case of hearinganything sical passage can get connected to the notion of
having to do with patience. To listen to music, patience or struggle or whatever in the abstract,
even representationalmusic, is not, in general, without somehow portrayinga particular(pos-
to be perceptuallyinvolved with what is repre- sibly fictitious) instance. I will suggest shortly
sented. In paintings and other visual represen- how this can be.
tations there are fictional worlds to which we
have perceptualaccess. Sometimes we are in- VI.
cluded in the world in a special way, as when
Caravaggio's Bacchus offers the viewer a glass I propose that, although music does not in
of wine, or a character in a play asks the generalcall for imaginativehearingor imagina-
audience's advice. Insofar as music is not tive perceiving, it often does call for imagina-
perceptual, we don't have this access to a tive introspecting.We mentionedthe possibility
fictional world, and we can't expect to be that music is expressive by virtue of imitating
included in that special way. The listener's behavioral expressions of feeling. Sometimes
relation to what is represented or portrayed this is so, and sometimes a passage imitates or
would seem often to be fundamentally non- portraysvocal expressions of feelings. When it
perceptual, in this sense, and thus fundamen- does, listeners probablyimagine (not necessar-
tally differentfrom the viewer's relationto what ily consciously, and certainly not deliberately)
a picture depicts. In fact, this nonperceptual themselves hearing someone's vocal expres-
character of musical portrayals may connect sions.45 But in other cases they may, instead,
with what is meantby those who describe music imagine themselves introspecting, being aware
as "ethereal," "incorporeal," "disembodied" of their own feelings. Hearing sounds may
(or "unembodied"?), and with suggestions that differ too much from introspectingfor us com-
music (music like Bach's Art of the Fugue, fortably to imagine of our hearing the music
anyway) is "introspective," "cerebral," that it is an experience of being aware of our
"conceptual." states of mind. My suggestion is that we imag-
It goes nicely, also, with the idea that music ine this of our actual introspectiveawarenessof
involves generality in a way that painting does auditorysensations.46If so, the music probably
not, if we put it togetherwith the suggestion by can be said to "portrayparticulars"in the sense
several recent philosophers that all identifica- that figurative paintings do, ratherthan simply
tion of individual things is at bottom demon- propertiesor concepts. Presumablythe listener
strative, indexical, and hence(?) perceptual43- imagines experiencing and identifying particu-
the idea is not that music is more general than lar stabs of pain, particular feelings of ecstasy,
painting, but that it is general in something like particular sensations of well-being, etc., as in
the way all predicates are, whereas painting, viewing a painting one imagines seeing partic-
like propernames, involve something more like ular things. But introspection is different
reference to particulars. enough from "external" perception to make
music, understood in this way, differ very sion is what he says it is-metaphorical exem-
substantiallyfrom painting. For a start, there is plification;49virtually any property might be
the important fact that one introspects one's metaphoricallyexemplified. But it seems to me
own psychological states, while one sees and that music does not express color or fragility or
hears the expression of the psychological states angularityor weight in the same direct way that
of other people. There is also the fact that the it expresses anguish or joy or elation or despair
results of introspection seem immune from (or anyway the "dynamic elements" of some
error in ways in which the results of external such feelings). (This point is obscured by pred-
perceptionare not. We have here a starttoward icates such as "strength," "struggle," and
developing the thought, expressed aphoristi- "heavy," which metaphorically characterize
cally by Carroll Pratt, that "music sounds as psychological states though their primaryappli-
feelings feel."" cation is elsewhere. The fact that a work can
We may also have stumbled upon some express "strength" or "heaviness" need not
insight into evocation theories of expression. conflict with the idea that expression is preem-
There is a persistenttendency to regardexpres- inently or even exclusively of psychological
sive works of art (musical or otherwise) as ones states.)
which arouse in appreciators feelings of the Even if expression (in one sense) is a matter
kind expressed. A lot of argument has been of imaginativeself- awareness, however, music
directed against this thesis, but it dies hard. On may present, let us say (express indirectly,or in
the present suggestion expressive works don't a differentsense?), nonpsychologicalproperties
actually arouse feelings but they do induce the or concepts-ones akin to that of returningor a
appreciator to imagine himself experiencing certain manner of returning, or struggling, or
them. That is close enough to cause confusion, power, or achievement. Whatthe listener imag-
and to explain the appeal of evocation theories. ines being introspectively aware of may be an
Notice that there is hardly any temptation to impression of or a feeling about (the relevant
understandthe representation of emotions in variety of something like) returningor strug-
terms of evocation. If anything counts as rep- gling or power, a phenomenological response
resenting anguish it is, I presume, representing or reaction to it, a way of experiencing or
a character(in a picture, or a novel, or what- understandingit. He is thus imaginativelyaware
ever) as being anguished. That involves induc- not just of "psychical motions," the "dynamic
ing the appreciatorto imagine thatsomeone else elements" of emotions, but of "cognitive
feels anguish (perhaps, but not necessarily, by elements" as well, objects toward which the
inducing the appreciatorto imagine seeing an feelings are directed. These objects are not
anguished expression on his face, or hearing presented independently of the feelings about
him express his anguish verbally, or hearing a them, however. My suggestion is not that the
third person describe his anguish). Imagining music portrays an objective event or circum-
that can hardly be confused with feeling an- stance, and then induces the listener to imagine
guish oneself.48 This gives us a sharp contrast responding to it in a certain manner; it just
between the representationand the expression induces the listenerto imagine the experienceof
of emotions. responding to an object of a certain sort. We
To the extent that expression consists in might say that the music conveys "subjective
inducing imaginative awareness of one's feel- aspects" of objective phenomena.
ings, we also have an explanation of the fact Does one imagine knowing about and re-
that feelings (emotions, moods, "inner" states sponding to a specific (possibly fictitious) in-
of one sort or another)are so often taken to be stance of struggling or returning?Perhaps. If
the sole or the primary objects of expression. so, this need not involve imagining anything
Goodman is an exception. He speaks of the about how one knows about it. The listener is
expression of color, sounds, weight, fragility, likely not to imagine hearing or perceiving a
movement, and being a glue factory no less struggle, for example, or being told of one, or
readily than of the expression of feelings; for having perceived or been told about one previ-
him there is nothing especially psychological ously. The world of his imaginationis likely to
aboutexpression. Certainlyhe is rightif expres- be indeterminatewith respect to the means by
with about what music "means" seem, so Drawing an Object," in On Art and the Mind [Harvard
often, to be ludicrously inadequate.And if one University Press, 1974], ??24, 25). "Representational"as
understoodhere can be taken to be an approximateequiv-
cannot come even close to saying what the alent of his "figurative."
semantic content of a musical passage is, we 2 Frank Stella, Working Space (Harvard University
thinking. To the extent that what we "think in" and mundanelandscapes are, however.
I Rebecca West, Black Lamb and Golden Falcon
music is unthinkable otherwise, the listener (London, 1967), p. 235.
feels in a different realm, a different world- 10 Such as this review of an Italian restaurantin the
one that is "purely musical" in the sense that it New Yorker:
is accessible to him only throughmusic.
Pasta as an expression of ItalianNeo-Realistic starchis
But only in this sense, if music does make well understood by Mario Spinelli, the chef at
reference to extra-musical realities-to (dare Fabrizio's.... His fettuccine, thoughwry and puckish
we try to say?) unnamable feelings or the in an almost mischievous way, owes a lot to Barzino,
"dynamics" of emotions, or awarenesses of, whose use of fettuccine as an instrument of social
change is known to us all .... I began my meal with an
indeterminately,one's own or another'sreturn, antipasto, which at first appeared aimless, but as I
or something vaguely like the propertyof being focussed more on the anchovies the point of it became
a conflict, or something which is either that clearer. Was Spinelli trying to say that all life was
propertyor an instance of it. Such references, representedhere in this antipasto,with the black olives
however indescribable, may be part of the an unbearablereminderof mortality?If so, where was
the celery? Was the omission deliberate?At Jacobelli's,
secret of the power music has over us. It may be the antipastoconsists solely of celery. But Jacobelli is
impossible to say which matters of interest a an extremist. He wants to call our attention to the
particularpassage or piece is "about" and what absurdity of life.
it "says" about them. Perhapswe cannot hope Who can forget his scampi:four garlic-drenchedshrimp
arrangedin a way that says more aboutour involvement
to explain specifically how and why a particular in Vietnam than countless books on the subject? . . .
passage or piece is powerful. But now that we One lovely touch at Fabrizio's is Spinelli's Boneless
understandbetter how it might be that music ChickenParmigiana.The title is ironic, for he has filled
treatsof things that matterto us in ways that are the chicken with extra bones, as if to say life must not
beyond description, the fact that music affects be ingested too quickly or without caution. The con-
stant removal of bones from the mouth and the depos-
us deeply while seeming so remote from our iting of them on the plate give the meal an eerie sound.
lives should be less a mystery. Much remainsto One is remindedat once of Webern,who seems to crop
be done in explaining music's power, of course. up all the time in Spinelli's cooking. . . For desert,
But if these suggestions are on the right track we had tortoni, and I was reminded of Leibniz's
remarkable pronouncement: "The Monads have no
we needn't be any more astonishedby its power windows." How apropos!
than by that of the obviously representational
arts. We now know where to look for an (Woody Allen, "Fabrizio's: Criticism and Response,"
The New Yorker,5 February1979.)
explanation. 11 Deryck Cooke in The Language of Music (Oxford
I Richard Wollheim considers virtually all visual art University Press, 1959) attempts to discover a vocabulary
"representational," but distinguishes that which is of musical elements, each with its own expressive meaning.
"figurative" from that which is not (Wollheim, "On In Chapter 2 of Languages of Art (Indianapolis, 1968)
Nelson Goodman holds that expressive works refer to Revolution is. ... It is about love, loyalty, and self-
properties(or ratherpredicates). sacrifice among human beings pungently observed, . . .
12 A more radical suggestion is that there are specifi- [T]he more a novel's main interest is in the time and place
cally feline, canine, and musical emotions, not just ways of it's about, the less likely it is to be a significant work of
expressing them, and that "contentment" in cats and literaturein its own right . ." (Barth, pp. 188, 190).
"cheerfulness" in music are not the same properties that 3 Cf. Schopenhauer I, Book 3, ?52. I resist the
these terms describe in people. But if this is so, why are we temptation to proclaim Schopenhauer a precursor of the
interestedin musical cheerfulness; what does it have to do proposals about music I will sketch, even though one can
with us? divine in a careful selection of his remarks a certain
13 The phrase "'abstractexpressionism" suggests that similarityof spirit. The vagueness of the selected passages
expressiveness (of one sort anyway) is sharplydistinct from allows for construals significantly incompatible with my
representation.Beethoven spoke of expression in contrastto suggestions, and I have little sympathy for the metaphysics
sound-painting ("mehr Ausdruck der Empfindung als in which Schopenhauer'sviews on music are embedded. I
Malerei") in his note to the PastoralSymphony. (Quoted in can accept the support of the fact that his views seem to
Tovey, p. 169.) derive from initial intuitions similar to those that motivate
14 Hanslick, pp. 11-12. mine, but nothing more.
'5 Ibid, p. 48. See also EdmundGurney, The Power of 3 Hanslick, p. 23. Cf. also p. 67.
Sound (London, 1880). 36 Hanslick doesn't think that the "indefinite" emo-
16 Hanslick, pp. 47, 48. tions that music expresses are responsible for its power.
17 Ibid, p. 53. "These abstractnotions . . . are by no means the subject
18 Cf. Roger Scruton, "UnderstandingMusic," in The matterof the picturesor the musical compositions . . ." (p.
Aesthetic Understanding(London, 1983), p. 85. 23). "The function of art consists in individualizing, in
19 "Music as expounded by Schenker is . . . con- evolving the definite out of the indefinite, the particularout
cerned . . . only with the internal relationshipof musical of the general" (p. 38). I do think that generality is
elements. Music is structure. Musical discourse must be important,however, in ways which tie up with the prefer-
purely musical" (Joseph Kerman, "Analysis, Theory, and ence for elegance and simplicity in scientific theories.
New Music," in ContemplatingMusic [HarvardUniversity 37 Mendelssohn claimed that music has more definite
4' In Film as Art (University of California Press, 48 Although some might argue that to the extent that
1966), p. 34. the appreciatorempathizes with the character, some of the
42 Cf. Kendall Walton, "Pictures and Make-Believe," anguish will rub off on him.
in William Kennick, Art and Philosophy, 2nd ed. (New 49 Goodman, Chap. 2.
York, 1979), pp. 287-315; and Walton, "Looking at Pic- 50 Cf. my "Points of View in Narrativeand Depictive
tures and Looking at Things," forthcoming in Philosophy Representation,"Nous (March 1976): 49-61.
and the Visual Arts, ed. Andrew Harrison (Dordrecht, 5' R. K. Elliott distinguishes between experiencing
Holland). music as one's own expression of an emotion and experi-
43 Saul Kripke, John Perry, Hilary Putnam, etc. encing it as that of another person, but he does not
4 This isn't to be taken literally. There may be no recognize the possibility of an experience which is indeter-
actual person whom the drawing depicts, and I deny that minate between these alternatives.Such indeterminacyis as
there are any such things as purely fictional individuals, important to theories linking music to the expression of
"the man in the picture," for instance. But it is to be taken emotions as the similarindeterminancywill turnout to be to
seriously. Understoodin an appropriatenonliteralmanner, mine; it is an importantpartof what might be said to make
"the stick figure drawingis a pictureof a particularperson" music "abstract," despite its being, in one sense or
is true. another, "expressive" of human emotions (Cf. Elliott,
45 In "Pictures and Make-Believe" I proposed that "Aesthetic Theory and the Experience of Art," in Harold
(for example) "anguished" music is music which, make- Osborne, Aesthetics [Oxford Univesity Press, 1972], pp.
believedly, is an expression of someone's anguish (p. 298). 145-57; and Budd, Chapter7).
Malcolm Budd examines this proposal in Music and the 52 It is possible thathe actually has such an impression
Emotions, concentratingon the idea that expressive music or conception, as he listens. This must not be considered
is, make-believedly, someone's (perhaps the appreciator's incompatiblewith his imagining having one.
own) vocal expression of the emotions in question, and that 53 One's impressions may be of a sort which are not
the listener imagines hearing these vocal sounds. My even ostensibly impressions of particulars,in the way that
present suggestion makes use of the notions of imagination visual images seem to be.
and make-believe in a very different way, centering as it 54 The mere fact that music elicits imaginings does not
does on the idea of introspective awareness of one's of course justify speaking of musical meanings or even of
emotions ratherthan on thatof someone's expressing them, semantic content, though what else is needed is a matterof
vocally or otherwise. But I do think thatmusic is sometimes dispute. What follows is to be understoodas an account of
imaginedto be somone's expression of feelings. (Imagining what sort of meanings music has, on the assumption that
this is not incompatible with being imaginatively aware of what it has is meanings and not just capacities to induce
the feelings in question.) Budd is quite right to observe that imaginings.
"the mere fact that a set of sounds is for someone 55 If it does not, it is surely indeterminatewhetherwhat
make-believedly the vocal expression of an emotion is . . . is portrayed is present or past or future, and this is
not sufficient to endow it with artistic value for him" (p. something we are unlikely to be unsure of.
133; cf. also p. 141); much more does indeed need to be 56 One can avoid reference to a struggleror a returnee
said. But as grounds for summarydismissal of this fact as entirely by using the passive voice ("A struggle was
playing a significant role in musical value it is clearly engaged in"). But if one does refer to the person in question
inadequate.Sadness is importantin our lives. A significant one must use either a first- or a third-person(or second-
connection between a musical work and sadness is a person) personal pronoun, or a name or description which
promising step toward an explanationof why the work also indicates a third-personperspective.
is importantto us. The same goes for the very different 57 One may have a visual impression as of a particular
connection I am now proposing between expressive music thing, for instance, without knowing whether or not it is
and human emotions. veridical. But it purportsto be of a particularin a way in
46 I should add that it is in afirst-person manner, not which the impressions of "struggle" that listeners may be
a third-personone, thatone imagines oneself to be awareof imaginatively aware of may not be. What I suspect we
his states of mind. The distinction is familiar, but I will not sometimes do while listening to music, and not when we
try to explicate it here. think verbally, is to imagine having an impression of
47 Pratt, The Meaning of Music (New York, 1931), p. "struggle," without imagining either that it does or that it
203. does not purportto be of a particular.