IB P3 Early Modern Moral Philosophy1 - Lecture 1

Dr Robert Watt
Faculty of Philosophy
Early Modern
Moral Philosophy
Lecture 1: Voluntarism
§1. What is voluntarism?
Divine Voluntarism About Moral Reasons
All there is to the fact that we have a moral obligation to φ is the fact that God wishes
us to φ.
Regal Voluntarism About Moral Reasons
All there is to the fact that we have a moral obligation to φ is the fact that the Queen
wishes us to φ.
Voluntarism About Moral Reasons
All there is to the fact that we have a moral reason to φ is the fact that God (or the
Queen) wishes us to φ.
Voluntarism About Reasons
All there is to the fact that we have a reason to φ is the fact that God (or the Queen)
wishes us to φ.
Do we have to be theists to be voluntarists…?
P1 For any moral fact, all there is to it is a fact about what God wishes us to do.
P2 There is no God.
C There are no moral facts.
Another view…
If we have a moral obligation to φ, then this is because God (or the Queen) wishes us
to φ and we have a moral obligation to do whatever God (or the Queen) wishes us to
do.
§2. The authority of morality and ontological parsimony
Why should I do what I have a moral obligation to do…?
1
Dr Robert Watt
P1 If we don’t do what God (or the Queen) wishes us to do then we will be made
to suffer.
P2 We have a reason of self-interest not to do anything that will result in our
being made to suffer.
C We have a reason of self-interest to do what God (or the Queen) wishes us to
do.
P1 If we don’t do what God (or the Queen) wishes us to do then we are failing to
benefit someone who has benefited us.
P2 It is ungrateful to fail to benefit someone who has benefited us.
C It is ungrateful not to do what God (or the Queen) wishes us to do.
A Voluntarist About Reasons can’t subscribe to the first account; a Voluntarist About
Moral Reasons can’t subscribe to the second account.
Ontological parsimony
Voluntarism helps us to avoid postulating sui generis facts about moral

obligations/moral reasons/reasons…
…but what about God…?
§3. Descartes and Pufendorf
T1 ‘…it is impossible to imagine that anything is thought of in the divine intellect

as good or true, or worthy of belief or action or omission, prior to the decision
of the divine will to make it so… the supreme indifference to be found in God
is the supreme indication of his omnipotence.’
(René Descartes, Sixth Set of Replies, §6)
P1 God is omnipotent.
P2 If Divine Voluntarism is false, then God is not omnipotent.
C Divine Voluntarism is true.
T2 ‘…since honesty… and turpitude are affections of human deeds, arising from
their agreeableness or disagreeableness to a rule, or a law; and since a law is the
command of a superior, it does not appear how we can conceive any goodness
or turpitude before all law, and without the imposition of a superior.’
(Samuel Pufendorf, Law of Nature and Nations, Book 1, Chapter 2, §6)
P1 Moral obligations are legal obligations.

P2 Voluntarism About Legal Obligations is true.
C Voluntarism About Moral Obligations is true.
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Dr Robert Watt
Cf. the ‘jural view of ethics’ in Henry Sidwick’s Methods of Ethics (1874) and John
Austin’s ‘command’ theory of law in his Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832).
T3 ‘…it is not possible to have a [legal conception of ethics] unless you believe in
God as a law-giver… It is as if the notion “criminal” were to remain when
criminal law and criminal courts had been abolished and forgotten.’
(Elizabeth Anscombe, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, p.6)
§4. Clarke and Cudworth
T4 ‘…if there be no such thing as good and evil in the nature of things, antecedent
to all laws; then neither can any one law be better than another… but all laws
equally, will be either arbitrary and tyrannical, or frivolous and needless;
because the contrary might with equal reason have been established…’
(Samuel Clarke, Discourse of Natural Religion, R 228).
P1 If Divine Voluntarism is true then God’s wishes are arbitrary.

P2 God’s wishes are not arbitrary.
C Divine Voluntarism is false.
T5 ‘…to say… my will takes the place of reason, is the motto of a tyrant.’
(Gottfried Leibniz, Meditation on the Common Concept of Justice)
This works against Divine Voluntarism About Reasons, but it doesn’t work against
Divine Voluntarism About Moral Reasons…
T6 ‘Whence [i.e. from Divine Voluntarism] it follows unavoidably, that nothing

can be imagined so grossly wicked, or so foully unjust or dishonest, but if it
were supposed to be commanded by this omnipotent Deity, must needs upon
that hypothesis forthwith become holy, just and righteous.’
(Ralph Cudworth, Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, R

119)
P1 There is a possible world at which God wishes us to torture puppies.

P2 If Divine Voluntarism about Moral Obligations is true, then any possible world
at which God wishes us to torture puppies is a world at which we have a moral
obligation to torture puppies.
C1 If Divine Voluntarism about Moral Obligations is true, then there is a possible
world at which we have a moral obligation to torture puppies.
P3 There is no possible world at which we have a moral obligation to torture
puppies.
C2 Divine Voluntarism about Moral Obligations is false.
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Dr Robert Watt
Possible responses…
Bite the bullet, and reject P3.
Reject P1 on the grounds that there is no possible world at which God is not
benevolent, and at no possible world is it benevolent to wish puppies to be tortured.
P1 There is a possible world at which God wishes puppies to be tortured.

P2 If Divine Voluntarism About Goodness is true, any possible world at which
God wishes puppies to be tortured is a world at which it is benevolent to wish
puppies to be tortured.
C There is a possible world at which it is benevolent to wish puppies to be
tortured.
Cf. Brad Hooker, ‘Cudworth and Quinn’ (2001).
Appeal to Divine Voluntarism About Modality…
T7 ‘The… truths which you call eternal have been laid down by God and depend
on him… It will be said that if God had established these truths he could
change them… To this the answer is: Yes he can, if his will can change.’
(René Descartes, Letter to Mersenne)
God wishes there to be no possible world at which He wishes us to torture puppies, so

there is no possible world at which He wishes us to torture puppies…
Bibliography
- Anscombe, G.E.M. (1958) ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, Philosophy 33:124

(pp.1-19).
- Austin, J. (1832) The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, John Murray,
London.
- Cottingham, J., Stoothoff, R. and Murdoch, D. (1988) The Philosophical
Writings of Descartes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Hooker, B. ‘Cudworth and Quinn’, Analysis 61:4 (pp.333-335).
- Pufendorf, S. (1729) Of the Law of Nature and Nations…; Done into English by
Basil Kennett, […], London.
- Raphael, D.D. (1991) British Moralists 1650-1800: I. Hobbes-Gay, Hackett,
Indianapolis IN.
- Sidgwick, H. (1874) The Methods of Ethics, Macmillan and Co., London.

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Dr Robert Watt

§1. What is voluntarism?

Divine Voluntarism About Moral Reasons

Regal Voluntarism About Moral Reasons

Voluntarism About Moral Reasons

Voluntarism About Reasons

Do we have to be theists to be voluntarists…?

§2. The authority of morality and ontological parsimony

Why should I do what I have a moral obligation to do…?

Voluntarism helps us to avoid postulating sui generis facts about moral

…but what about God…?

§3. Descartes and Pufendorf

T1 ‘…it is impossible to imagine that anything is thought of in the divine intellect

(René Descartes, Sixth Set of Replies, §6)

(Samuel Pufendorf, Law of Nature and Nations, Book 1, Chapter 2, §6)

P1 Moral obligations are legal obligations.

(Elizabeth Anscombe, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, p.6)

§4. Clarke and Cudworth

(Samuel Clarke, Discourse of Natural Religion, R 228).

P1 If Divine Voluntarism is true then God’s wishes are arbitrary.

(Gottfried Leibniz, Meditation on the Common Concept of Justice)

T6 ‘Whence [i.e. from Divine Voluntarism] it follows unavoidably, that nothing

(Ralph Cudworth, Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, R

P1 There is a possible world at which God wishes us to torture puppies.

Bite the bullet, and reject P3.

P1 There is a possible world at which God wishes puppies to be tortured.

Cf. Brad Hooker, ‘Cudworth and Quinn’ (2001).

Appeal to Divine Voluntarism About Modality…

(René Descartes, Letter to Mersenne)

God wishes there to be no possible world at which He wishes us to torture puppies, so

- Anscombe, G.E.M. (1958) ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, Philosophy 33:124

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