#Cielo V NLRC
#Cielo V NLRC
#Cielo V NLRC
ZOSIMO CIELO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HENRY LEI
and/or HENRY LEI TRUCKING respondents.
FACTS: Private respondent Henry Lei and petitioner Zosimo Cielo entered into a contract wherein Henry Lei
hired Cielo as a truck driver. It was stated in their agreement that the term is for a period of six (6) months only from
and after the execution thereof, unless otherwise earlier terminated at the option of either party. It was also stated
therein that there is no employer/employee relationship between the parties, the nature of their agreement being
contractual.
The agreement was supposed to have commenced on June 30, 1984, and to end on December 31, 1984. On December
22, 1984, however, the petitioner was formally notified by the private respondent of the termination of his services on
the ground of expiration of their contract. Soon thereafter, on January 22, 1985, the petitioner filed his complaint with
the Ministry of Labor and Employment.
The petitioner claimed he started working for the private respondent on June 16, 1984, and having done so for more
than six months had acquired the status of a regular employee. As such, he could no longer be dismissed except for
lawful cause. He also contended that he had been removed because of his refusal to sign, as required by the private
respondent, an affidavit reading as follows:
AFFIDAVIT
That I, ZOSIMO CIELO, Filipino, of legal age, married/single and a resident of Agusan Canyon, Camp Philipps, after having
been duly sworn to in accordance with law, hereby depose and say:
That I am one of the drivers of the trucks of Mr. HENRY LEI whose hauling trucks are under contract with the Philippine
Packing Corporation;
That I have received my salary and allowances from Mr. HENRY LEI the sum of P1,421.10 for the month of October 1984.
That I have no more claim against the said Mr. Henry Lei.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that the labor laws are not applicable because the relations of the
parties are governed by their voluntary stipulations. The contract having expired, it was the prerogative of the trucking
company to renew it or not as it saw fit.
ISSUE: Whether the contract entered into by petitioner and respondent is valid
RULING: NO
The agreement specifically declared that there was no employer-employee relationship between the parties. Yet the
affidavit the private respondent prepared required the petitioner to acknowledge that "I have received my salary and
allowances from Mr. Henry Lei," suggesting an employment relationship. According to its position paper, the petitioner's
refusal to sign the affidavit constituted disrespect or insubordination, which had "some bearing on the renewal of
his contract of employment with the respondent."
It appears from the records that all the drivers of the private respondent have been hired on a fixed contract basis, as
evidenced by the mimeographed form of the agreement and of the affidavit. The private respondent merely filled in the
blanks with the corresponding data, such as the driver's name and address, the amount received by him, and the date
of the document. Each driver was paid through individual vouchers rather than a common payroll, as is usual in
companies with numerous employees.
The private respondent's intention is obvious. There is no question that the purpose behind these individual contracts
was to evade the application of the labor laws by making it appear that the drivers of the trucking company were not its
regular employees.
Under these arrangements, the private respondent hoped to be able to terminate the services of the drivers without the
inhibitions of the Labor Code. All it had to do was refuse to renew the agreements, which, significantly, were uniformly
limited to a six-month period. No cause had to be established because such renewal was subject to the discretion of
the parties. In fact, the private respondent did not even have to wait for the expiration of the contract as it was there
provided that it could be "earlier terminated at the option of either party."
By this clever scheme, the private respondent could also prevent the drivers from becoming regular employees and
thus be entitled to security of tenure and other benefits, such as a minimum wage, cost-of-living allowances, vacation
and sick leaves, holiday pay, and other statutory requirements. What was insidious about the document was the waiver
the affiant was unwarily making of the statutory rights due him as an employee of the trucking company.
The petitioner was a regular employee of the private respondent. The private respondent is engaged in the trucking
business as a hauler of cattle, crops and other cargo for the Philippine Packing Corporation. This business requires the
services of drivers, and continuously because the work is not seasonal, nor is it limited to a single undertaking or
operation. Even if ostensibly hired for a fixed period, the petitioner should be considered a regular employee of the
private respondent, conformably to Article 280 of the Labor Code.
Where from the circumstances it is apparent that periods have been imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security
by the employee, they should be struck down or disregarded as contrary to public policy, morals, etc. Such
circumstances have been sufficiently established in the case at bar and justify application of the following conclusions:
Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind the development of legislation culminating in the present Article 280
of the Labor Code clearly appears to have been to prevent circumvention of the employee's right to be secure in his
tenure, the clause in said article indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written or oral agreements conflicting with
the concept of regular employment as defined therein should be construed to refer to the substantive evil that the Code
itself has singled out: agreements entered into precisely to circumvent security of tenure.
The agreement in question had such a purpose and so was null and void ab initio.
There is no question that the petitioner was not engaged as an apprentice, being already an experienced truck driver
when he began working for the private respondent. Neither has it been shown that he was informed at the time of his
employment of the reasonable standards under which he could qualify as a regular employee. It is plain that the
petitioner was hired at the outset as a regular employee. At any rate, even assuming that the original employment was
probationary, the Labor Arbiter found that the petitioner had completed more than six month's service with the trucking
company and so had acquired the status of a regular employee at the time of his dismissal.
Even if it be assumed that the six-month period had not yet been completed, it is settled that the probationary employee
cannot be removed except also for cause as provided by law. It is not alleged that the petitioner was separated for poor
performance; in fact, it is suggested by the private respondent that he was dismissed for disrespect and insubordination,
more specifically his refusal to sign the affidavit as required by company policy. Hence, even as a probationer, or more
so as a regular employee, the petitioner could not be validly removed under Article 282 of the Labor Code.
In refusing to sign the affidavit as required by the private respondent, the petitioner was merely protecting his interests
against an unguarded waiver of the benefits due him under the Labor Code. Such willful disobedience should commend
rather than prejudice him for standing up to his rights, at great risk to his material security, against the very source of
his livelihood.
The Court looks with stern disapproval at the contract entered into by the private respondent with the petitioner (and
who knows with how many other drivers). The agreement was a clear attempt to exploit the unwitting employee and
deprive him of the protection of the Labor Code by making it appear that the stipulations of the parties were governed
by the Civil Code as in ordinary private transactions. They were not, to be sure. The agreement was in reality a contract
of employment into which were read the provisions of the Labor Code and the social justice policy mandated by the
Constitution. It was a deceitful agreement cloaked in the habiliments of legality to conceal the selfish desire of the
employer to reap undeserved profits at the expense of its employees. The fact that the drivers are on the whole
practically unlettered only makes the imposition more censurable and the avarice more execrable.