29/06/2018 G.R. No.

155450

FIRST DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 155450

represented by the Regional
Executive Director, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Present:
Regional Office No. 2,
Petitioner, PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,*
- versus - CORONA, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

COURT OF APPEALS,
HEIRS OF ANTONIO CARAG AND
VICTORIA TURINGAN,
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
CAGAYAN, and the COURT OF Promulgated:
FIRST INSTANCE OF CAGAYAN,
Respondents. August 6, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S IO N

CARPIO, J.:
The Case

[1] [2] [3]

This is a petition for review of the 21 May 2001 and 25 September 2002 Resolutions of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47965. The
21 May 2001 Resolution dismissed petitioner Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) amended
complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles.
The 25 September 2002 Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

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The Facts

On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan (trial court) issued Decree No.
[4]
381928 in favor of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (spouses Carag),
predecessors-in-interest of private respondents Heirs of Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan
(private respondents), covering a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2472, Cad. 151, containing
an area of 7,047,673 square meters (subject property), situated in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. On 19
July 1938, pursuant to said Decree, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan issued Original Certificate
[5]
of Title No. 11585 (OCT No. 11585) in the name of spouses Carag.

On 2 July 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to discharge the encumbrance expressly stated in
Decree No. 381928. Two transfer certificates of title were issued: Transfer Certificate of Title
[6]
No. T-1277, issued in the name of the Province of Cagayan, covering Lot 2472-B consisting
[7]
of 100,000 square meters and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1278, issued in the name of
the private respondents, covering Lot 2472-A consisting of 6,997,921 square meters.

On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with the Regional Office
No. 2 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Tuguegarao, Cagayan,
a letter-petition requesting the DENR to initiate the filing of an action for the annulment of
Decree No. 381928 on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a
portion of the subject property which was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of
the issuance of Decree No. 381928.

The Regional Executive Director of the DENR created an investigating team to conduct ground
verification and ocular inspection of the subject property.

The investigating team reported that:

A) The portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 as shown in the Plan prepared for spouses Carag, and
covered under LC Project 3-L of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, was found to be still within the
timberland area at the time of the issuance of the Decree and O.C.T. of the spouses Antonio Carag
and Victoria Turingan, and the same was only released as alienable and disposable on February
22, 1982, as certified by USEC Jose G. Solis of the NAMRIA on 27 May 1994.

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B) Petitioner Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others have possessed and occupied by
themselves and thru their predecessors-in-interest the portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151, covered by
[8]
LC Project 3-L of LC Map 2999, since time immemorial.

Thus, the investigating team claimed that a portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 was only released as
alienable and disposable on 22 February 1982.

In a Memorandum dated 9 September 1996, the Legal Division of the Land Management Bureau
recommended to the Director of Lands that an action for the cancellation of OCT No. 11585, as
well as its derivative titles, be filed with the proper court. The Director of Lands approved the
recommendation.

On 10 June 1998, or 68 years after the issuance of Decree No. 381928, petitioner filed with
the Court of Appeals a complaint for annulment of judgment, cancellation and declaration of
[9]
nullity of titles on the ground that in 1930 the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a
portion of the subject property, which portion consists of 2,640,000 square meters (disputed
portion). The disputed portion was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of issuance
of Decree No. 381928 and, therefore, was not alienable and disposable until 22 February 1982
when the disputed portion was classified as alienable and disposable.

[10]
On 19 October 1998, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss. Private respondents
alleged that petitioner failed to comply with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court because the real
ground for the complaint was mistake, not lack of jurisdiction, and that petitioner, as a party in
the original proceedings, could have availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies but failed to do so. Private respondents added
that petitioner did not attach to the complaint a certified true copy of the decision sought to be
annulled. Private respondents also maintained that the complaint was barred by the doctrines of
[11]
res judicata and law of the case and by Section 38 of Act No. 496. Private respondents also
stated that not all the heirs of spouses Carag were brought before the Court of Appeals for an
effective resolution of the case. Finally, private respondents claimed that the real party in interest
was not petitioner but a certain Alfonso Bassig, who had an ax to grind against private
[12]
respondents.
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On 3 March 1999, petitioner filed an amended complaint for reversion, annulment of decree,
[13]
cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On 21 May 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case. The Court of Appeals declared:

The rule is clear that such judgments, final orders and resolutions in civil actions which this court
may annul are those which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available. The Amended Complaint contains no such
allegations which are jurisdictional neither can such circumstances be divined from its
allegations. Furthermore, such actions for Annulment may be based only on two (2) grounds:
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Neither ground is alleged in the Amended Complaint
which is for Reversion/Annulment of Decree, Cancellation and Declaration of Nullity of Titles. It
merely alleges that around 2,640,000 square meters of timberland area within Lot 2472 Cad. 151,
had been erroneously included in the title of the Spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan
under Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 issued on June 2, 1930 and July 19, 1938,
respectively; that hence, such adjudication and/or Decree and Title covering a timberland area is
null and void ab initio under the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

Finally, it is clear that the issues raised in the Amended Complaint as well as those in the Motion
to dismiss are factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper trial court in accordance
[14]
with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. (Citations omitted)

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 25 September 2002 Resolution, the Court of
Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

1. Whether the allegations of the complaint clearly stated that the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other appropriate remedies are no longer
available;
2. Whether the amended complaint clearly alleged the ground of lack of jurisdiction;

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3. Whether the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the amended
complaint and in the motion to dismiss;
4. Whether the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan had jurisdiction to adjudicate a
tract of timberland in favor of respondent spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria
Turingan;
5. Whether the fact that the Director of Lands was a party to the original proceedings
changed the nature of the land and granted jurisdiction to the then Court of First
Instance over the land;
6. Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies in this case; and
7. Whether Section 38 of Act No. 496 is applicable in this case.

The Ruling of the Court

While the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on procedural grounds, we will
still deny the petition because the complaint for annulment of decree has no merit.

Petitioner Complied with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court

First, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to allege either of the grounds of extrinsic
[15]
fraud or lack of jurisdiction in the complaint for annulment of decree.

We find otherwise. In its complaint and amended complaint, petitioner stated:

11. In view of the fact that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the Government had
the authority and power to declassify or reclassify land of the public domain, the Court did not,
therefore, have the power and authority to adjudicate in favor of the spouses Antonio
Carag and Victoria Turingan the said tract of timberland, portion of the Lot 2472 Cad-151,
at the time of the issuance of the Decree and the Original Certificate of Title of the said
spouses; and such adjudication and/or Decree and Title issued covering the timberland area is
null and void ab initio considering the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Philippine
constitution.

xxxx

15. The issuance of Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 in the name of spouses Antonio
Carag and Victoria Turingan, and all the derivative titles thereto in the name of the Heirs and said
spouses, specifically with respect to the inclusion thereto of timberland area, by the then Court of
First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), and the Register of Deeds of Cagayan is patently
illegal and erroneous for the reason that said Court and/or the Register of Deeds of Cagayan
did not have any authority or jurisdiction to decree or adjudicate the said timberland area
of Lot 2472 Cad-151, consequently, the same are null and void ab initio, and of no force and
[16]
effect whatsoever. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

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Petitioner clearly alleged in the complaint and amended complaint that it was seeking to annul
Decree No. 381928 on the ground of the trial courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject land,
specifically over the disputed portion, which petitioner maintained was classified as timber land
and was not alienable and disposable.

Second, the Court of Appeals also dismissed the complaint on the ground of petitioners failure
to allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available.

[17]
In Ancheta v. Ancheta, we ruled:
In a case where a petition for annulment of judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule
47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in
the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment
or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her own. This is so because a
judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may
be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final
[18]
order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches.

Since petitioners complaint is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the subject of the action,
petitioner need not allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner.

Third, the Court of Appeals ruled that the issues raised in petitioners complaint were factual in
nature and should be threshed out in the proper trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the
[19]
Public Land Act.

Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 6. Procedure. - The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be observed. Should a trial be
necessary, the reception of evidence may be referred to a member of the court or a judge of a
Regional Trial Court.

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Therefore, the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the complaint for the
complete and proper determination of the case.

However, instead of remanding the complaint to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings,
we shall decide the case on the merits.

Complaint for Annulment of Decree Has No Merit

Petitioner contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate to spouses Carag the
disputed portion of the subject property. Petitioner claims that the disputed portion was still
classified as timber land, and thus not alienable and disposable, when Decree No. 381928 was
issued in 1930. In effect, petitioner admits that the adjacent 4,407,673 square meters of the
subject property, outside of the disputed portion, were alienable and disposable in 1930.
Petitioner argues that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the Government, not the
trial courts, had the power to declassify or reclassify lands of the public domain.

Lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of judgment, refers to either lack of jurisdiction
[20]
over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim. Jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the statute in force at the time
[21]
of the filing of the action.

Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable. In Aldecoa v. Insular
[22]
Government, we ruled:
From the language of the foregoing provisions of law, it is deduced that, with the exception of
those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by the State or by the
sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable and, provided they are not
destined to the use of the public in general or reserved by the Government in accordance with
[23]
law, they may be acquired by any private or juridical person x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by the State for some
public purpose in accordance with law, all Crown lands were deemed alienable.

In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been declared as mineral or
forest zone, or reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law, during the Spanish

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[24]
regime or thereafter. The land classification maps petitioner attached to the complaint also
do not show that in 1930 the disputed portion was part of the forest zone or reserved for some
public purpose. The certification of the National Mapping and Resources Information Authority,
dated 27 May 1994, contained no statement that the disputed portion was declared and classified
[25]
as timber land.
[26]
The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930 was Act No. 2874, which
provides:

SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture

and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into -
(a) Alienable or disposable
(b) Timber and
(c) Mineral lands
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the
purposes of their government and disposition.

Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared the disputed portion of the
subject property timber or mineral land pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 2874.

It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only those lands which have been
declared alienable or disposable. Section 8 provides:

SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have
been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been
reserved for public or quasi-public uses, not appropriated by the Government, nor in any
manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and
recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved
or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the Governor-General may, for reasons of public
interest, declare lands of the public domain open to disposition before the same have had their
boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reasons, suspend their concession
or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the Legislature. (Emphasis supplied)

However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as well as lands on
which a private claim may be made under any law, are not covered by the classification
requirement in Section 8 for purposes of disposition. This exclusion in Section 8 recognizes that
during the Spanish regime, Crown lands were per se alienable unless falling under timber or
mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law.

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Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirement in Section 8, trial
courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to private parties. Petitioner has not alleged that
the disputed portion had not become private property prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874.
Neither has petitioner alleged that the disputed portion was not land on which a private right
may be claimed under any existing law at that time.

[27]
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the Republic sought to annul the
judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, sitting as a land registration court,
because when the application for land registration was filed in 1927 the land was alleged to be
unclassified forest land. The Republic also alleged that the CFI of Rizal had no jurisdiction to
determine whether the land applied for was forest or agricultural land since the authority to
[28]
classify lands was then vested in the Director of Lands as provided in Act Nos. 926 and
2874. The Court ruled:
We are inclined to agree with the respondent that it is legally doubtful if the authority of the
Governor General to declare lands as alienable and disposable would apply to lands that have
become private property or lands that have been impressed with a private right authorized and
recognized by Act 2874 or any valid law. By express declaration of Section 45 (b) of Act 2874
which is quoted above, those who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership since July 26, 1894 may file an application with the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and these
applicants shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title. When the land registration court
issued a decision for the issuance of a decree which was the basis of an original certificate of
title to the land, the court had already made a determination that the land was agricultural
and that the applicant had proven that he was in open and exclusive possession of the
subject land for the prescribed number of years. It was the land registration court which
had the jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was agricultural, forest or
timber taking into account the proof or evidence in each particular case. (Emphasis supplied)

As with this case, when the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of Decree No. 381928
in 1930, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine whether the subject property, including the
disputed portion, applied for was agricultural, timber or mineral land. The trial court determined
that the land was agricultural and that spouses Carag proved that they were entitled to the decree
and a certificate of title. The government, which was a party in the original proceedings in the
trial court as required by law, did not appeal the decision of the trial court declaring the subject
land as agricultural. Since the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, its
decision rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final and beyond review.
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The finality of the trial courts decision is further recognized in Section 1, Article XII of the 1935
Constitution which provides:

SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources
of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right,
grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established
under this Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of
the public domain belong to the State, it recognized that these lands were subject to any
existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
[29]
established under this Constitution. When the Commonwealth Government was
established under the 1935 Constitution, spouses Carag had already an existing right to the
subject land, including the disputed portion, pursuant to Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930 by
the trial court.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We DISMISS petitioner Republic of the Philippines
complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

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MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

* As replacement of Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna who is on official leave per Special Order No. 510.
[1]
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 40-45. Penned by Associate Justice Portia Alio-Hormachuelos with Associate Justices Fermin A. Martin, Jr. and
Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, concurring.
[3]
Id. at 46-47. Penned by Associate Justice Portia Alio-Hormachuelos with Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner and Mercedes
Gozo-Dadole, concurring.
[4]
CA rollo, p. 8. The case was docketed as Cadastral Case No. 8, G.L.R.O. Record No. 437.
[5]
Id. at 9.
[6]
Id. at 10-11.
[7]
Id. at 12-13.
[8]
Rollo, p. 52.
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[9]
Id. at 48-54.
[10]
Id. at 55-65.
[11]
Section 38, Act No. 496 provides:
SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse
claim and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered. Every decree of registration shall
bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon
and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the
application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description To whom it may concern. Such decree shall not be
opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any
court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or
interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review
within one year after the entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Upon the
expiration of said term of one year, every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this section shall be
incontrovertible. If there is any such purchaser, the decree of registration shall not be opened, but shall remain in full force and
effect forever, subject only to the right of appeal hereinbefore provided: Provided, however, That no decree or certificate of
title issued to persons not parties to the appeal shall be cancelled or annulled. But any person aggrieved by such decree in any
case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other person for fraud in procuring the decree.
Whenever the phrase innocent purchaser for value or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Act, it shall be deemed to include an
innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrance for value.
[12]
The certification from the National Mapping and Resources Information Authority, attached by petitioner as Annex F, stated that it
was issued upon the request of Atty. Janette B. Chua. LC Map 2465, attached by petitioner as Annex G-1, also stated that it was issued
at the request of Atty. Janette Bassig Chua of Tuguegarao, Cagayan. Private respondents maintained that Atty. Chua is the daughter of
Alfonso Bassig.
[13]
Rollo, pp. 66-72. Petitioner only changed the title of the complaint from annulment of judgment, cancellation and declaration of
nullity of titles to reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles.

[14]
Id. at 44-45.
[15]
RULES OF COURT, Section 2, Rule 47.
[16]
Rollo, pp. 51-53, 69-71.
[17]
468 Phil. 900 (2004).
[18]
Id. at 911.

[19]
Section 101 of the Public Land Act provides:
SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the government of lands of the public domain, or improvements thereon shall be instituted by
the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper court, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
[20]
Republic v. G Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 141241, 22 November 2005, 475 SCRA 608.
[21]
Erectors, Inc. v. NLRC, 326 Phil. 640 (1996).
[22]
13 Phil. 159 (1909).
[23]
Id. at 165-166.
[24]
CA rollo, pp. 16-18. Petitioner attached LC Map 2465 dated 22 June 1961 and LC Map 2999 dated 22 February 1982.
[25]
Id. at 14. The certification from the National Mapping and Resources Information Authority signed by USEC Jose G. Solis stated:
a. Area enclosed in red and marked 1 falls within Alienable or Disposable Block-I, LC Project No. 13 of the Provinces of Cagayan,
Isabela and Mt. Province certified on February 27, 1923 per Map LC No. 30-C; and

b. Area enclosed in red and marked 2 falls within Alienable or Disposable Block, LC Project No. 3-L of Tuguegarao, Cagayan certified
on February 22, 1982 per Map LC-2999.

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[26]
Entitled An Act to Amend and Compile the Laws Relative to Lands of the Public Domain, and for Other Purposes which took
effect on 1 July 1919. Also known as The Public Land Act.
[27]
G.R. No. 127245, En Banc Resolution dated 30 January 2001.
[28]
Entitled An Act Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Homesteading, Selling, and Leasing of Portions of the Public
Domain of the Philippine Islands, Prescribing Terms and Conditions to Enable Persons to Perfect their Titles to Public Lands in said
Islands, Providing for the Issuance of Patents Without Compensation to Certain Native Settlers upon the Public Lands, Providing for
the Establishment of Town Sites and Sale of Lots therein, and Providing for the Determination by the Philippine Courts of Land
Registration of all Proceedings for Completion of Imperfect Titles and for the Cancellation or Confirmation of Spanish Concessions
and Grants in said Islands, as Authorized by Sections 13, 14, 15 and 62 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, Entitled An Act
Temporarily to Provide for the Administration of the Affairs of Civil Government in the Philippine Islands, and for Other Purposes
which took effect on 7 October 1903. Also known as The Public Land Act.
[29]
CONSTITUTION (1935), Article XIII, Sec. 1.

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