Default Risk, Asset Pricing and Debt Control: Working Paper No. 72
Default Risk, Asset Pricing and Debt Control: Working Paper No. 72
Default Risk, Asset Pricing and Debt Control: Working Paper No. 72
72
by
University of Bielefeld
Department of Economics
Center for Empirical Macroeconomics
P.O. Box 100 131
33501 Bielefeld, Germany
Default Risk, Asset Pricing and Equity
Premium∗
Lars Grüne†and Willi Semmler‡
February, 2004, revised September 2004
Abstract
The evaluation and control of an agent‘s debt has become a major
issue in economics. In this paper we focus on firms and study credit
risk, debt control and asset valuation of firms. We demonstrate that
firm specific credit constraints and endogenous risk premia, based on
collateralized borrowing, affect the asset value of the firm and, in turn,
the collateral value of the firm. In order to explore the interdependence
of debt finance and asset pricing of firms we endogenize default premia
and borrowing constraints in a production based asset pricing model.
In this context then the dynamic decision problem of maximizing the
present value of the firm faces an additional constraint giving rise to
the debt dependent firm value. We solve for the asset value of the firm
with debt finance by the use of numerical dynamic programming. This
allows us to solve the debt control problem and to compute sustainable
debt as well as firm value. We also discuss results from stochastic
version of our model as well as the implications of our study for the
equity premium puzzle.
∗
We want to thank John Donaldson, Martin Lettau, Buz Brock and Harald Uhlig for
helpful comments on a previous version of the paper. We also want to thank participants
in a workshop at the University of Technology, Vienna, the Macroeconomic Workshop at
Columbia University, and the SCE conferences at Yale University, June 2001 and Aix-en-
Provence, July 2002, and participants of the workshop on Economic Dynamics in Leiden,
June 2002 and the CFS workshop on New Directions in Financial Risk Management,
November 2003. An abridged version is forthcoming at the Journal of Financial Econo-
metrics.
†
Mathematical Institute, University of Bayreuth, Germany, e-mail:Lars.Gruene@uni-
bayreuth.de
‡
Center for Empirical Macroeconomics, Bielefeld and New School University, New York,
e-mail:[email protected]
1
1 Introduction
Most economic agents (households, firms, banks, governments and countries)
extensively borrow to finance economic activity. With external finance there
is credit risk. Risk management is concerned with the evaluation and control
of credit risk. In this paper we focus on credit risk of firms and the evaluation
of the firms capital assets in the context of a production oriented asset pricing
model.1
Evaluating credit risk of firms amounts to evaluating creditworthiness by
solving a debt control problem in the context of a dynamic decision problem.
The solution of the dynamic decision problem - in our context of a firm - gives
us the firm’s asset value. The usual approach is to derive security prices, such
as the prices for stocks and bonds from the firm’s asset value.2 We show that
the asset value of the firm is not independent of the default risk of the firm
and of the firm‘s borrowing constraints. Our results of interdependence of
the credit risk and the asset value of the firm has implications for at least
three strands of literature on firm value.
The first strand of literature goes back to Modigliani and Miller (1958),
Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) where it is presumed that the
asset value of the firm is exogenously given by a Brownian motion when the
firm’s debt is priced. This is usually done by using the adding up theorem,
namely V = S + B where V is the asset value, S the value of stocks and B
the value of bonds. Furthermore, when short-term interest rates are given
and two different firms are presumed to undertake the same investment one
can derive the risk structure of interest rates.3
The second important strand of literature builds on Tobin’s q theory.
Here the asset value of the firm is related to a pay-off of the firm and a
discount factor. For a firm the present value of its activity is the discounted
pay-off with the discount factor determined by the ex-ante rate of return on
capital. In Tobin’s q theory it is the marginal cash flow, the marginal profit,
arising from an increase in a unit of investment, that is priced through a
discount rate. The present value of the future marginal cash flow gives us
1
Some preliminary thoughts on the relationship of credit and firms’ capital asset can
be found in Keynes (1967, ch. 12).
2
In the finance literature it is well recognized that the value of equity may not be
independent of the valuation of the firm’s debt, see Hanke (2003, ch. 2) where this is
shown using option pricing with endogenous stock price process.
3
For details see Merton (1974).
2
Tobin’s q.4
A third strand of literature arises from the application of dynamic general
equilibrium (DGE) models (known as Real Business Cycle Models) to asset
pricing.5 Here then too, the asset value of a firm represents an unlevered
claim to the stock of capital and thus default risk and claims arising from
bonds do not impact the asset value of the firm. In the context of the DGE
model one of the main issues has become the equity premium puzzle.
We will show that the key to the impact of credit risk on the firm’s asset
value is its impact on credit cost and the sequence of the firm’s investment
decisions. Firm behavior under finance constraints has been studied starting
with Gaskins (1971) and Judd and Petersen (1986) and then recently in
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and further literature cited below. In this paper
we study how finance constraints impact investment and firm value. We
presume that, although all firms pursue dynamic investment decisions, they
may be valued differently since they face different credit conditions in capital
markets and thus may exhibit a different sequence of investments.
The above mentioned three strands of literature on asset pricing of firms
have not sufficiently considered the implication of the impact of finance pre-
mia and borrowing constraints on the value of firms’ assets. Usually it is
assumed that a firm can undertake investment by borrowing from the capi-
tal market at an ex-ante capital cost up to the point where the discounted
pay-off is equal to the present value of the firm. Taking this as a benchmark
case, we consider the pricing of firms’ assets in the case when firms face bor-
rowing constraints or when firms face an external finance premium due to
collateralized borrowing. The external finance premium is, in this literature,
often interpreted as default premium reflecting firm specific default risk. It
is the firm specific default risk that will give rise to a risk-caused endogenous
credit cost and thus an endogenously determined risk structure of interest
rates in the sense of Merton (1974). In this context we also want to discuss
the relation of the default premium and the equity premium.
In this paper we want to argue that the problem of the firm’s creditwor-
thiness is essentially a problem of the optimal control of firms’ debt. Through
this, the dynamics of its capital stock and its asset value is determined. De-
fault risk and default premia, in contrast to many other recent theories, will
be endogenized and thus will be made state dependent. Yet by allowing to
do so this may give rise to the fact that for firms with slightly different char-
acteristics different domains of attraction of the capital stock and asset value
4
Empirical studies on Tobin’s q and investment can be found in Abel and Blanchard
(1986), Cochrane (1991), Abel and Eberly (1994) and Lettau and Ludvigson (2002).
5
See Rouwenhorst(1995).
3
may exist.
An important issue in computing the asset value of the firm is the opti-
mization problem of the firm. The consumption based asset pricing theory
would argue that the objective of the firm is to deliver a stream of dividends
for the equity holder. The optimization problem of the firm would then be
to maximize the present value of dividends to the share holders, whereby
the growth rate of marginal utilities serves as a discount factor6 to price the
dividend stream.
Yet, we would like to argue that in an environment with credit financed
investment of the firm one should be interested in the asset value of the firm
and not solely in the equity value of the firm relevant for the share holders.
The work on pricing of corporate liability has taken this line of research
since Merton (1974) and numerous empirical approaches have been pursued
to infer from time series data on equity value the asset value of the firm.7
We also want to note that if we take the maximization of the equity
value for the share holders as optimization problem it is then obvious – since
endogenous credit cost reduce net income of the firm before dividends are
paid – that the equity value of the firm will be affected by state dependent
default premia.
What is, however, important in our formulation of the optimization prob-
lem, is that the asset value of the firm will be affected by the sequence of
optimal investment decisions of a firm facing credit market constraints (id-
iosyncratic default premia or borrowing constraints). Thus, in our case, it is
this constraint on investment decisions that affects firm value. We are deal-
ing with a complicated constrained optimization problem for the solution of
which we need advanced numerical methods.
Another important issue is of how to treat consumption in a production
oriented asset pricing model. This issue has been taken up in Grüne, Semm-
ler and Sieveking (2004) where we show that a separation theorem can be
applied according to which the computation of the asset value of the firm can
be separated from consumption, i.e. the sequence of consumption by which
the asset value is eventually consumed. In that paper it is shown that any
sequence of consumption decisions, based on some preferences of the con-
sumer, is consistent with our model of asset pricing as long as the asset value
6
For asset pricing with all equity finance of firms, see Grüne and Semmler (2003). As
has been argued since long, in the case of an all equity financed firm the optimization
problem of the firm and the one from the consumption based asset pricing theory should
give the same results.
7
See, for example, Duan, Gauthier, Simonato and Zaanoun (2002). There a survey of
empirical methods is given of how to estimate the asset value of the firm from time series
of its equity value.
4
remains a constraint to the consumption sequence.
As to our solution method we want to note that those rather complex
models cannot be solved analytically. We will make use of a dynamic pro-
gramming algorithm with adaptively refined grids and a set oriented algo-
rithm to solve the different model variants. Those methods are well suited
to study problems when firms face imperfect capital markets and when the
risk premia need to be endogenized.8
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses
the relevant literature. Section 3 introduces the basic dynamic asset pricing
model. Section 4 sets up the numerical procedures. Sections 5 reports the
detailed results from our numerical study on the different variants of the
model. Section 6 pursues an extension to the stochastic case. Section 7 spells
out the implications for the equity premium puzzle. Section 8 concludes the
paper. The appendix provides some technical derivation on the numerical
methods that are used to study different variants of the dynamic model.
5
F (V, T ) = min(V, B̄)
In terms of a Brownian motion one can write a change of the value of
debt as
dB = (αB B − CB )dt + δB Bt dz
with αB , δB and CB constants. Since B = F (V, t), and given a Brownian
motion for the value of the underlying asset, V, by
dV = (αV V − CV )dt + δV V dz
a solution of the stochastic equation for the debt, B, depending on the
stochastic process for V, can be obtained by using Ito’s lemma (see Merton,
1974). Below, in the context of a dynamic model, it will be shown that if
there are no risk premia and the firm issues debt at a risk free interest rate the
debt value of the firm is equal to its creditworthiness and the latter is equal
to the firm’s asset value. Thus we have as maximum debt capacity B ∗ = V .
This will, however be different for endogenous risk premium where the risk
premia may depend on the extent to which the firm is levered. Then, as
shown below, we will have B ∗ = F (V (B ∗ )) which is a more difficult problem
to solve.
In the second strand of literature, in the literature on Tobin’s q, invest-
ment is an increasing function of the ratio of the market value of the firm to
the replacement cost of the firm’s capital.10 More properly, it can be shown
that the optimal investment is the rate that equates the marginal value of
installed capital with its marginal adjustment cost.11 Here too, a stochastic
version may allow for a random variable that could represent randomness of
technology, in input and output prices or in demand facing the firm. Given
a stochastic process and a capital stock state equation firms are presumed
to maximize an expected profit flow, π(k, j), less adjustment cost of capital,
φ(k, j), subject to a random process and a capital accumulation equation. A
version of this type can be found in Abel and Eberly (1994), which can be
written, by disregarding the randomness, as the following Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) equation. Using the notation f (k, j) = π(k, j) − φ(k, j) we
can write
10
See Tobin (1969).
11
Hayashi (1982) presents conditions under which average and marginal q are equal.
6
where θ is the discount rate, k, capital stock, j, investment and σ, capital
depreciation. Tobin’s q in the above HJB-equation represents the derivative
of the value function, with respect to k. For later use we may write q =
V 0 (k). Abel and Eberly (1994) show that only under the assumption that
the adjustment cost of capital φ(k, j), is linear homogeneous in j and k
Tobin’s q equals the average value of capital. From V (k) = qk then one
obtains V k(k) = q. Here then too default risk and default premia does not
affect firm’s asset value and thus asset value represents an unlevered claim
to the capital stock.12
The same presumption of firm value representing an unlevered claim to
the capital stock is also made in recent attempts to employ DGE models
(RBC models) to spell out asset price implications. Numerous variants of
intertemporal equilibrium models have attempted to match asset price pre-
dictions with the financial statistics obtained from financial time series data,
yet most of them presume that the return on equity and thus the equity pre-
mium is not affected by debt finance. Rouwenhorst summarizes the tradition
in asset pricing theory by writing that an “...unrealistic aspect of the equity
definition is that it represents an unlevered claim to the stock of capital,
whereas many firms rely in part on debt to finance productive investments.
Because the economy is one in which the Modigliani and Miller propositions
hold, there is, strictly speaking, no role for debt financing. By the same token,
however, because capital structure does not alter the equilibrium allocations,
we can simply assume a particular financial structure and use the complete
markets framework to study two sets of contingent claims, corporate debt,
and levered equity, that add up in value to the capital stock” (Rouwenhorst,
1995:304). Here again, as stated in this citation, the adding up theorem is
assumed to hold, whereby the asset value, V , is independently given.
On the other hand, as above noted, recently there has been much work
on imperfect capital markets and firm’s investment. Many dynamic models
have been proposed where the firm operates in an environment of imperfect
capital markets. Here the firm may face an idiosyncratic default risk and
default premium as well as borrowing constraints, affecting the firm’s optimal
12
Numerous tests on investment and the average and marginal q have been undertaken.
See, for example, Abel and Blanchard (1986) and recently Lettau and Ludvigson (2002)
and the discussion of the recent empirical literature therein. In consumption based asset
pricing models the price of an asset purchases a dividend stream for consumption whereby
the discount factor is derived from a long term objective of the asset holder, namely the
subjective discount factor times the growth rate of the marginal utility in consumption,
for a theoretical analysis see Cochrane (2001), ch. 1 and for a numerical study, see Grüne
and Semmler (2003, 2004b).
7
investment.13
There are two ways to formalize the impact of credit market conditions
on investment and firm value. First, very often borrowing ceilings are as-
sumed which are supposed to prevent agents from borrowing an unlimited
amount. There could be various provisions and restrictions for firms’ debt
issuance. One important way to restrict borrowing is to require that agent’s
assets serve as collateral. A convenient way to define the debt ceiling is then
to assume that the debt ceiling is a fraction of the agents’ wealth. Second, it
is frequently posited that borrowers face a risk dependent interest rate which
is assumed to be composed by a market interest rate (for example, risk-free
interest rate) and an idiosyncratic component determined by the individual
risk of premium for the borrower. Recently the theory of asymmetric infor-
mation and costly state verification has been employed, (see Bernanke et al.
(1999), for example), where a risk premium is made endogenous by making
the default risk dependent on net worth of the borrower, as collateral for
borrowing. This gives rise to risk premia that firms have to pay contingent
on their net worth. In this paper the impact of both the credit constraint as
well as endogenous risk premia on the firm’s optimal investment and asset
value will be explored.
As to the more specifics of our different model variants we draw on
the literature on asymmetric information and costly state verification14 in
which lenders must pay a cost in order to observe the borrower’s realized
returns.15 This motivates the use of collaterals in credit market models. Un-
collateralized borrowing is assumed to pay a larger premium than collater-
alized borrowing or self-financing. The premium arises from the threat of
bankruptcy namely by the cost constituted by auditing, accounting, legal
cost, as well as loss of assets arising from asset liquidation.
In terms of observable variables the premium the firm has to pay is in-
13
Investment models with credit market borrowing from imperfect capital markets can
be found in Townsend (1979), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1999) and Miller and Stiglitz (1999). In these models the impact of imperfect credit mar-
ket borrowing and debt dynamics on economic activity is studied. See also Flaschel, Franke
and Semmler (1997, ch. 12) for the impact of finance constraints on investment. Yet in
those models the implications of debt financing on firms’ asset pricing and creditworthiness
has not been sufficiently explored.
14
This literature originates in the seminal work by Townsend (1979).
15
In order to simplify matters, we do not employ a stochastic version but rather employ
a deterministic framework. A stochastic version is discussed in Sieveking and Semmler
(1999) and Grüne and Semmler (2003, 2004b). Section 6 provides some insight for a
stochastic version. Recent work has been undertaken by nesting credit market imperfec-
tions and endogenous borrowing cost more formally in intertemporal models, see Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997), Cooley and Quadrini (1998) and Krieger (1999).
8
terpreted as default premium arising from default risk.16 Such a premium
drives a wedge between the expected return of the borrower and the risk-free
interest rate whereby the premium is positively related to the default cost
and inversely related to the borrowers net worth. Net worth is defined as the
firm’s collateral value of the (illiquid) capital stock less the agent’s outstand-
ing obligations. Following Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) we measure
the inverse relationship between the risk premium (default premium) and net
worth in a function such as
α1
H (k(t), B(t)) = µ θB(t) (1)
N (t)
α2 + k(t)
with H (k(t), B(t)) the credit cost depending on net worth, N (t) = k(t) −
B(t), with k((t) as capital stock and B(t) as debt. The parameters are
α1 , α2 , µ > 0 and θ is the risk-free interest rate. In the analytical and nu-
merical study of the model below we presume that the risk premium will be
zero for N (t) = k(t) and thus, in the limit, for B(t) = 0, the borrowing rate
is the risk-free rate. Borrowing at a risk-free rate will be considered here as
a benchmark case.17
Figure 1 depicts the equ. (1) with the external finance premium which
arises if N (t) < k(t), yet note that different firms could face a different slope
of such a default premium cost function, see sect. 4.2.18
16
As Gomes et al (2002) show for a large class of models one can expect the external
finance premium indeed to be equal to the premium necesssary to compensate lenders for
the default risk. Gomes et al (2002) measure the default risk by the spread of corporate
bonds and T-bills. Another proxy is the relative size of external finance to capital, see
Gomes et al (2002).
17
Another way to state the risk premium, and thus the risk structure of interest rates
if there is debt with different maturity, is R(τ ) − θ with R(τ ) the yield to maturity τ ,
see Merton (1974). Hereby R(τ ) is then implicitly defined as e−R(τ )τ = F (V,τ
B̄
)
, see also
section 7.
18
Note also that for each firm bonds with different maturity could have different risk
premia which we will, however, disregard here.
9
Figures
H(k,B)
B
Note also that even if the default premium is endogenized in the way we
have indicated in figure 1 we might want to define constraints for the firm
which, in our model, will be given by an upper bound of a debt-capital stock
ratio. As we will show both the default risk creating an endogenous credit
cost as well as upper borrowing constraints can affect the value of the firm
so that the net worth will also become endogenous. Such a case is studied
below through the use of a modified HJB-equation and our new numerical
methods. Moreover, we want to note that the risk-free rate does not need to
be a constant, it could be stochastic and vary over time.19
10
permits us to separate the present value problem from the consumption prob-
lem. In our model, as in Cochrane (1991, 1996), in his production based asset
pricing model, asset pricing can be studied without reference to utility the-
ory and a discount factor obtained from the growth rate of marginal utilities.
In Grüne, Semmler and Sieveking (2003) an analytical treatment is given of
why and under what conditions the subsequent dynamic decision problem of
a firm can be separated from the consumption problem.
We focus on the firm’s intertemporal optimal investment where debt can
be continuously issued and retired. In each period the firm does not have to
pay attention to the maturity structure of its debt and it does not face one pe-
riod borrowing constraints. Yet, there can be intertemporal debt constraints
that affect the present value of the activity of the firm.
Employing the above theory on default risk and risk premia as formu-
lated in equ. (1), we first study the following deterministic dynamic decision
problem of a firm20
Z ∞
V (k) = M ax e−θt f (k(t), j(t)) dt (2)
j 0
f (k, j) = ak α − j − j β k −γ (5)
is generated from capital stock, through a production function, Ak α , and
investment, j, is undertaken so as to maximize the present value of net income
of (5) given the adjustment cost of capital ϕ(k, j) = j β k −γ . Note that σ >
0, α > 0, β > 1, γ > 0, are constants. Equ. (3) represents the equation for
capital accumulation and equ. (4) the evolution of debt of the firm. Since
net income in (5) can be negative the temporary budget constraint requires
further borrowing from credit markets and if there is positive net income
debt can be retired.21
20
Note that in order to recover the usual optimization problem for linear credit cost, we
state our optimization problem in a way so as to include the limit case when there is a
linear credit cost. Yet our numerical procedure (as briefly summarized in appendix 2) can
solve the difficult problem when there are state dependent default premia.
21
The model can also be interpreted as written in efficiency labor, therefore σ can
represent the sum of the capital depreciation rate, and rate of exogenous technical change.
Note that in (4) a consumption stream could be included. In the study by Grüne, Semmler
and Sieveking (2004) such a consumption stream is treated.
11
As above shown, we assume that the risk premium in our credit cost
function H (k, B) may be state dependent, depending on the capital stock,
k, and the level of debt B with Hk < 0 and HB > 0. Note, however, that if
we assume that the default risk depends inversely on net worth, as in equ.
(1), we get a special case of our model when only the risk-free interest rate
determines the credit cost. We then have a linear model with constant credit
cost, θ, and a state equation for the evolution of debt such as
In this case, which we consider our benchmark case, we would only have to
consider the transversality condition lim e−θt B(t) = 0, as the non-explosiveness
t→∞
condition for debt, to close the model and (2)-(3) would give us the firm’s
asset value.
In our more general model (2)-(4) representing a decision problem of a
firm facing a risk premium we define the limit of B(t) equal to V (k(t)) which
now represents the creditworthiness, the present value borrowing constraint.
The problem to be solved in this paper is how to compute V (k).
If the interest rate θ = H(k,B)
B
is constant22 , and we have the benchmark
case, then as is easy to see, V (k) is in fact the present value of k
Z ∞
V (k) = M ax e−θt f (k(t), j(t)) dt (7)
j 0
12
We can study the difference of models (2)-(4) and (7)-(9) by using the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. The HJB equation for equs. (7)-
(9), leaving aside the time subscripts, corresponds to the above mentioned
case of the B ∗ = V in sect. 2 and the above first strand of literature. Here
we have
dV (k)
θV = max f (k, j) + (j − σk) (10)
j dk
In the appendix 1 the HJB-equation (10) is solved for steady state values
and below we use dynamic programming which allows us to study the value
of the firm and local and global dynamics of its capital stock. Note that dVdk(k)
represents Tobin’s q, as in the second strand of literature see appendix 1 and
Abel and Eberly (1994).23
In the general case of equ. (2)-(4) with firm specific default risk and
external finance premium as stated in equ. (1) and shown in Figure 1, we
have the following modified HJB-equation instead.
dB ∗ (k)
∗
H(k, B (k)) = max f (k, j) + (j − σk) (11)
j dk
Note that in the limit case, where there is no borrowing and N = k, and
thus the constant discount rate θ holds we obtain the HJB-equation (10).
The HJB-equation (11) can be written as
dB ∗ (k)
∗ −1
B (k) = max H f (k, j) + (j − σk) (12)
j dk
which is a standard dynamic form of a HJB-equation. Next, for the
purpose of an example, let us specify H(k, B) = B κ θ where, with κ > 1 the
interest payment is solely convex in B. We then have
κ1
dB ∗
1
∗
B (k) = max f (k, j) + (j − σk) θ− κ (13)
j dk
In the appendix 1 the equilibria of the HJB-equation (13) with κ > 1
are shown and it is demonstrated that for κ = 1 in (13) the same equilibria
emerge as for (10). The algorithm to study the more general problem of equ.
(11) is described in appendix 3.
23
Note, however, that in the first two strands of literature mentioned in sect. 2 there
is usually a stochastic version used where in the HJB equation then, using Ito’s lemma,
also the derivatives of V with respect to the random disturbance would appear in the HJB
equation.
13
Note that B ∗ (k) in (13) for the case of κ > 1 will be smaller than V (k) in
(10). There is an additional default cost to be paid which is not present in
equ. (10), the integral of which will drive a wedge between the present value
V (k) and B ∗ (k). So that B ∗ (k) < V (k) will hold.
Employing our general form of a default premium24 H(k, B) ≥ θB the
creditworthiness B ∗ (k) relates to the asset value of the firm for B(t) ≤
B ∗ (k(t)) as follows. Consider the equation
Z T Z T
−θt −θT
e f (k, j)dt = B(0) − e B(T ) + e−θt (H − θB)dt.
0 0
Let us define the present value of the external finance premium - with
initial value (k, B) - by
Z ∞
e−θt (H − θB)dt = VH (k, B).
0
where we use the optimal investment rate j. Then for T → ∞ we find
1. Compute B ∗ (k), thereby find the optimal path (k(t), B(t)) which sat-
isfies B(t) = B ∗ (k(t)).
24
For more details of the subsequent derivations, see Grüne, Semmler and Sieveking
(2002).
25
Note that in practise the discount rate θ is often approximated by taking a weighted
average cost of capital (WACC) composed of the weighted average of equity return and
bond return, see Benninga (2000, ch. 2), see also Abel and Blanchard (1986).
14
2. Compute
Z ∞
VH (k, B) = e−θt (H(k(t), B(t)) − θB(t))dt
0
3. Compute
15
4 Numerical Solution Methods
A dynamic programming (DP) algorithm28 can be applied to solve the dis-
counted infinite horizon optimal control problem of type (7)–(9). This is
applicable when no restriction on the dynamics is present. For our model,
this applies when the the model is linear, i.e., H(k, B) = θB as in (9) and
if in addition the constraint on B is given by inf j supt≥0 B(t) < ∞, since in
this case it follows from (7) that B ∗ (k) is easily obtained from V (k) in (2),
namely from
Z ∞
V (k) = M ax e−θt f (k(t), j(t)) dt
j 0
We will briefly describe the algorithm which goes back to Capuzzo Dol-
cetta (1983), Falcone (1987) and Grüne (1997). For details and for a math-
ematically rigorous convergence analysis we refer to the work by Bardi and
Capuzzo Dolcetta (1997) and to Grüne, Metscher and Ohlberger (1999).
In the first step, the continuous time optimal control problem is replaced
by a first order discrete time approximation given by
∞
X
Vh (k) = M axJh (k, j), Jh (k, j) = h (1 − θh)i f (kh (i), ji ) (15)
j
i=0
and h > 0 is the discretization time step. Note that j = (ji )i∈N0 here denotes
a discrete control sequence.
The optimal value function is the unique solution of the discrete Hamilton–
Jacobi–Bellman equation
where kh (1) denotes the discrete solution corresponding to the control j and
initial value k after one time step h. Abbreviating
the second step of the algorithm now approximates the solution on a grid Γ
covering a compact subset of the state space, i.e., a compact interval [0, K]
28
For a further discussion of the dynamic programming algorithm and more detailed
applications in economics, see Grüne and Semmler (2002).
16
in our setup. Denoting the nodes of Γ by k i , i = 1, . . . , P , we are now looking
for an approximation VhΓ satisfying
VhΓ (k i ) = Th (VhΓ )(k i ) (19)
for each node k i of the grid, where the value of VhΓ for points k which are not
grid points (these are needed for the evaluation of Th ) is determined by linear
interpolation. We refer to the work cited above for the description of iterative
methods. Note that an approximately optimal control law (in feedback form
for the discrete dynamics) can be obtained from this approximation by taking
the value j ∗ (k) = j for j realizing the maximum in (A10), where Vh is replaced
by VhΓ . This procedure in particular allows the numerical computation of
approximately optimal trajectories.
In order to distribute the nodes of the grid efficiently, we make use of a
posteriori error estimation. For each cell Cl of the grid Γ we compute
ηl := M ax|Th (VhΓ )(k) − VhΓ (k)|
k∈Cl
(more precisely we approximate this value by evaluating the right hand side
in a number of test points). It can be shown that the error estimators ηl
give upper and lower bounds for the real error (i.e., the difference between
Vh and VhΓ ) and hence serve as an indicator for a possible local refinement
of the grid Γ. It should be noted that this adaptive refinement of the grid is
very effective29 for detecting thresholds, because the optimal value function
typically fails to be differentiable in these points, resulting in large local errors
and consequently in a fine grid.
For the more general model, i.e., if there is a default premium as defined
by H(k, B) in (1) and/or restrictions of the type B/k ≤ c, the above DP-
algorithm unfortunately is not applicable. Even though in certain cases a
HJB-equation for a discrete time version of the problem is available, it is
not clear whether the full discretization procedure described above leads to a
valid and convergent approximation of the asset price and the present value
borrowing constraint.
Hence we propose a different approach for the solution of this problem,
based on a set oriented method for the computation of domains of attrac-
tion. The method relies on the following observation: For a given compact
interval 30 [0, K] for the capital stock k one sees that there exists a constant
29
Actually, for the one–dimensional problem at hand it is possible to compute rather
accurate approximations vhΓ also with equidistributed grid points. In higher dimensions
the computational advantage of adaptive gridding is much more obvious, see, e.g., the
examples in Grüne (1997) or Grüne et al. (1999).
30
In any numerical method we must restrict ourselves to a compact computational do-
main, hence this restriction is natural in this context.
17
c∗ > 0 such that B ∗ (k) ≤ c∗ for all k ∈ [0, K]. We here denote B ∗ (k) as
the borrowing constraint of the firm. Hence, for k ∈ [0, K] the condition
supt≥0 B(t) < ∞ can be replaced by
Hence both this constraint and the constraint B(t) ≤ ck(t) can be expressed
as
B(t) ≤ d(k(t)) for all t ≥ 0
for some suitable function d. In other words, the set of all initial values
(k0 , B0 ) for which this constraint is violated is given by
there exists T > 0 such that B(t(j)) ≥ d(k(t(j)))
D = (k0 , B0 )
for all j and some t(j) ∈ [0, T ]
and the curve B ∗ (k) is exactly the lower boundary of D. For details of how
the domains of attraction are computed, see appendix 2. Equipped with
the above two algorithms the firm’s asset value and thus the maximum debt
capacity B ∗ can be computed.
18
grid consisted of 130 nodes. The range of control values was discretized using
101 equidistributed values. For the algorithm of appendix 2 that computes
domains of attraction we used the time step h = 0.5, in order to generate the
discrete time model Ψ we used a highly accurate extrapolation method. For
this algorithm the range of control values was discretized using 51 equidis-
tributed values. The domain covered by the grid was chosen to be [0, 2]×[0, 3]
where the upper value B = 3 coincides with the value c∗ = 3 used in order
to implement the restriction supt≥0 B(t) < ∞. The initial grid was chosen
with 1024 cells, while the final adapted grids consisted of about 100000 up
to 500000 cells, depending on the example. For this algorithm the figures
below always show the set EΓ which approximates the present value curve
V (k). Recall that the width of this set gives an estimate for the spatial
discretization error.
19
2.523
1.998
1.474
Bj value
function
0.949
investment
threshold
0.425
-0.100
k*=0
0.000 0.400 0.800 1.200 1.600 2.000 k
s k**=0.996
20
hood of the threshold for the given initial capital stock. There is a disconti-
nuity and thus a jump in the investment strategy of the firms, which is clearly
observable. Investment of a firm to the left of k + is lower than σk and makes
the capital stock shrinking whereas investment of a firm to the right of k +
is larger than σk and let the capital stock increase. At k + investment of the
firm then jumps.34
For the model (2)-(4) with a risk premium included in the firms’ borrow-
ing cost it is not possible to transform the model into a standard infinite
horizon optimal control problem of a firm since debt, or net worth, is now
an additional constraint on the optimization problem. Hence we will use
the algorithm for the computation of domains of attractions from appendix
2 and undertake experiments for different shapes of the credit cost function
representing different alternative functions for the risk premium. An impor-
tant class of functions for risk premia is defined by the steepness of the slope
defined by the parameter α2 .35
For the above risk premium function we specify µ = 2. Taking into
account that we want θ to be the risk–free interest rate, we obtain the con-
dition α1 /(α2 + 1)2 = 1 and thus α1 = (α2 + 1)2 . Note that for α2 → ∞
and 0 ≤ B ≤ k one obtains H(k, B) = θB, i.e., the model from the previous
section. 36
∗
Figure 3 shows the respective present value curves V (k) = B√ (k) +
VH (k, B) under the condition supt≥0 B(t) < ∞ for α2 = 100, 10, 1 , 2 − 1
(from top to bottom) and the corresponding α1 = (α2 + 1)2 .
34
In either case debt is controllable for V − B ≥ 0. As mentioned in section 4, in our
DP algorithm the grid about the threshold point, is particularly refined where the value
function at this point, results in a non–differentiable value function and hence in large
local errors.
35
As we will show, when presenting our numerical results, the parameter α 2 generates
only moderate steepness of the credit cost curve.
36
For small values of α2 it turns out that the present value curve satisfies V (k) < k,
hence this change of the formula has no effect on V (k) .
21
3
2.5
a2=100
2
a2=10 k*=0
1.5
B
V(k**) a2=1
1 a2= 2-1
threshold
0.5
0
k*=0 0 s=0.32 0.5 k**=0.99 1 1.5 2
k
For α2 = 100 firm’s asset value and the trajectories on the curve V (k)
show almost the same behavior as the ones in the previous section: There
exists a threshold (now at k + = 0.32) and two stable domains of attraction
at k ∗ = 0 for all initial capital sizes and we have k ∗∗ = 0.99. For this as well
as the other trajectories hold that the value function and thus the asset value
of the firm is smaller the larger the default risk resulting from low net worth.
Thus, a state dependent default risk has the same effect on firm value as a
higher discount rate in a standard q-theory of investment. The debt capacity
curve, B ∗ , moves down due to higher credit cost (higher default risk) and if
the debt rises such that the debt constraint curve B ∗ (k) is reached the net
income of the firm shrinks to zero so that V − B = 0 and no equity value
claim on the net income stream of the firm can be supported.
From the figure 3 one can observe that, as our study in sect. 3 predicts,
the constraint on the maximum debt claim to the firm B ∗ (k) = V (k) curve
moves down with a steeper slope of the risk premium function, equ. (1),
which gives rise to a larger loss VH (k, B ∗ ) in equ. (14).
In order to evaluate the extent to which a value loss occurs, due to the risk
premium of equ. (1), we computed the component parts of V (k) for different
slopes of the risk premium function H(k, B). Note again that hereby the
lower α2 represents a higher risk premium. In table 1, the values are given
22
√
α2 100 10 2−1
∗
VH (k, B (k)) 0.041 0.274 1.140
B ∗ (k) 2.477 2.214 1.273
V (k) 2.518 2.488 2.410
V (k) for θB 2.523 2.523 2.523
Table 1: Optimal values
for k0 = 2. The last row represents the benchmark case where we have
computed the V (k) for linear function θB, the other rows represent the case
H(k, B).
In Figure 4 the value V (k), left figure, and the value√loss VH (k), right
figure, for different initial values and α2 = 100 and α2 = 2 − 1 are shown.
In the left figure, for reasons of comparison, the benchmark case for the lin-
ear function θB is also shown, which, however, is almost undistinguishable
from the curve for α2 = 100. As observable from our two figures the value
V (k) slightly decreases with rising risk premium (falling α2 ), left figure, and
the value loss, VH (k, B), substantially increases (the debt capacity, B ∗ (k),
substantially decreases), right figure. The results clearly show the nonlinear
effect of the risk premium on firm’s asset value and maximum debt value
B ∗ (k). Of course, for any actual B(k) here too it holds again that the value
of stocks is S(k) = V (k) − B(k). The reduction of firm‘s asset value through
the debt issuance comes from the fact that firms now face a constrained opti-
mization problem, through which, since their sequence of optimal investment
strategy is constrained, asset value is reduced.37
37
Note that this effect could not be seen in Merton (1974) and Modigliani and Miller
(1958) and since the firm’s asset value in their studies, is exogenously given.
23
3 1.2
alpha2=sqrt(2)-1 alpha2=sqrt(2)-1
alpha2=100 alpha2=100
theta B
2.5 1
2 0.8
1.5 0.6
1 0.4
0.5 0.2
0 0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 0 0.5 1 1.5 2
Figure 4: Value V (k) (left) and Value loss VH (k) (right) for Different
Endogenous Credit Cost
The next figure, figure 5, shows of how the choice of α2 affects the value
V (k) and the maximum debt capacity B ∗ (k), evaluated at k = 2. The
parameter α2 determines how much the credit cost grows when the debt-
capital ratio B/k grows. In the limit for α2 → ∞ we obtain the linear credit
cost θB while for decreasing α2 the risk premium becomes higher, hence
H(k, B) becomes steeper for fixed B and growing ratio B/k.
Figure 5 shows that, as expected, the maximum debt capacity B ∗ (k)
decreases monotonically as α2 becomes smaller. The same happens for the
value V (k), however, for larger values of α2 this decrease of the firm’s value is
almost neglegible, i.e., if the credit cost is close to the risk free rate it needs
a substantial increase of the credit cost in order to reduce the maximum
capacity B ∗ (k) and the asset value of the firm V (k).
2.5
2.54
2.4
2.52
2.3 2.5
2.48
2.2
2.46
B*
2.1 2.44
2.42
2
2.4
1.9
2.38
1.8 2.36
0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100
α α2
2
24
Yet, note that the dependence between all these values is highly nonlinear.
It is rather difficult to visualize the relationship between credit cost and
present value in general. In order to give an intuition about the relationship
between these quantities, for selected values of α2 and k = 2 in the following
table we show the increase of the interest rate at the point (k, B ∗ (k)), i.e., the
relation H(k, B)/(θB) and the decrease of the value V (k), both in percent.
25
small α2 it is no longer optimal for the firm – with any size of the capital
stock – to borrow large amounts and to increase the capital stock for a given
initial size of the firm, instead it is optimal to shrink the capital stock and
to reduce the stock of debt B(t) to 0. Thus, with small α2 and steep risk
premia, it is for any firm size, i.e. for any initial capital stock, optimal to
shrink the capital stock.
2.5
threshold
2
1.5
B
V(k**)
threshold
0.5
0
k*=0 0 0.5 1 k 1.5 2
s1=0.32 k**=0.99 s2=1.54
26
For c = 0.6 the firm asset value curve V (k) coincides with the “restriction
curve” B(k) = ck; in this case the curve (k, V (k)) is no longer invariant for
the dynamics,38 i.e., each trajectory B(t) with B(t) ≤ V (k(t)) leaves the
curve (k, V (k)) and eventually B(t) tends to −∞. For c = 1.2 39 the curves
B ∗ (k) and B = ck coincide only for capital stock size k ≥ 1.46. Overall, the
solution of the debt control problem by imposing debt ceilings is that the
debt becomes controllable and can be steered to zero with low debt ceilings
but the firm’s asset value, V (k) also shrinks.
As concerns the threshold and the jump in investment here one observes
the same steady stock equilibria k ∗ and k ∗∗ and threshold k + as for the sup–
restriction (see sect. 5.2), however, in addition to these here a new threshold
appears at k ++ = 1.54. For initial values of capital stock (k, V (k)) with
k + < k < k ++ the firm expands and tends to the stable domain of attraction
k ∗∗ , while for firms with initial capital stock k > k ++ the behavior is the
same as for c = 0.6, i.e., the corresponding trajectories leave the curve V (k)
and eventually B(t) tends to zero.40
In sum we can observe that introducing low enough debt ceilings may, as
in the case of c = 0.6, decrease the default risk, keeping the solvency of the
firm, but the present value and thus the asset price of the firm will decrease
too.
27
ministic dynamics (3)-(4). The problem of asset and debt valuation as well
as the controllability problem then becomes to steer the system (20)-(21)
to the set B ≤ 0. We use again our standard parameters of section 5, but
α2 = 100, α1 = (α2 + 1)2 and µ = 2. Details of the numerical procedure are
given in appendix 3.
1 1 1
0.8 0.8 0.8
0.6 0.6 0.6
0.4 0.4 0.4
0.2 0.2 0.2
0 0 0
3 3 3
2.5 2 2.5 2 2.5 2
2 2 2
1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
1 1 1 1 1 1
0.5 0.5 0.5
0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.5
-0.5 0 -0.5 0 -0.5 0
Figure 7 shows the numerical results for δk = 0, 0.1 and 0.5. The case
δk = 0 corresponds to our deterministic version (3)-(4), where the probability
of no controllability and thus bankruptcy is just 0 or 1, and the line in the
[3, −0.5] × [0, 2] plane is just our maximum debt capacity B ∗ = V . As can be
observed from the stochastic cases δk = 0.1 and δk = 0.5 the line of critical
debt B ∗ = V moves down. Thus the maximum debt capacity without going
bankrupt shrinks and a non-zero probability of going bankrupt arises earlier.
Overall, the stochastic model (20)-(21) demonstrates the economic intuition
that in a stochastic environment the likelihood of bankruptcy is rising due to
unexpected income shocks and the creditworthiness is shrinking. As shown
in the appendix 3, PA (x) is the probability for steering the debt B to 0. The
probability 1 − PA (x) is shown in the above figures and it can be interpreted
as the “bankruptcy probability” for the agent.
28
Semmler (2004b), employing stochastic dynamic programming,41 an account
is given to what extent the equity premium puzzle of the DGE model can
be solved by moving from preferences such as power utility to more general
preferences such as habit formation.
Our model of asset pricing and debt valuation of the current paper has
important implications for the discussion on the equity premium puzzle. Our
conjecture here is that a significant fraction of the equity premium might be
explained by the default premium. According to the line of research, starting
with Merton (1974), on the pricing of firms’ debt, the default premia arise
from two factors. In a debt model with bonds of fixed maturity one factor is
the ratio of the discounted promised payments, B̄, at the date of maturity,
and the other is the volatility of the asset, δA . Let be τ , the time to maturity,
we thus have according to this literature
with d = B̄e−θτ /V . Summarizing in one term, R(τ )τ , the yield of the bond,
given on the righthand side of (22), we can write
and
−ln(B(V, τ )/B̄)
R(τ )τ = . (24)
T −τ
Eq. (23) and (24) show42 the inverse relation of the value of the bond and
the bond premium.
In analogy with the above bond pricing model our deterministic model
(3)-(4) as well as the stochastic version (20)-(21) of asset and debt valuation
suggests the conjecture that there is a considerable default premium com-
ponent in the equity premium. Although in general it holds that the equity
holders are residual claimants with no promises return on equity, default risk
can have a potential important effect on equity returns. In technical terms,
we may say that, as in the above Merton model, that the ratio of the debt
to the value of the firm and the properties of the stochastic process, the σk
of equ. (20), enter in our solutions of equs. (20)-(21) and thus determining
the asset value, the probability of bankruptcy and the volatility of the asset
value. Correspondingly, the economic conjecture is that in the trading of
stocks and bonds of firms the default risk will affect both the bond return
41
For details of the algorithm, see Grüne and Semmler (2004a, 2004b).
42
For details, see Merton (1974) and the empirical application in Duan et al. (2004)
where usually a fixed interest rate, θ, is used
29
as well as the equity return. This problem has empirically been addressed
in a thorough study by Vassalou and Xing (2003). They show that previous
empirical studies of the effect of default risk on equity returns were not con-
clusive.43 Their new study computes default likelihood indicators measuring
default probabilities and relate those to equity returns. Although in general,
as one would expect, the relationship needs to be conditioned on firm size
and book to market value ratios, their study shows that default risk indeed
has a quantitatively important effect on equity returns.44
8 Conclusions
In the paper we study the firm’s asset value in the context of a dynamic deci-
sion problem where firms can borrow from the credit market for investment
and where there is a risk premium which may be state dependent and firms
may face debt ceilings. Firms may be heterogeneous with respect to certain
characteristics relevant for the credit market. Building on a production ori-
ented asset pricing model we can show that those characteristics impact the
firm’s risk premia, the firm’s sequence of investment decision as well as the
firm’s asset value. If risk premia, debt capacity (creditworthiness)45 and asset
value are endogenous resulting from a constrained investment strategy then
the asset value of firms cannot be taken as exogenously when firms securities
such as stocks and bonds are priced. We use modern computational methods
to solve the intertemporal decision problem and to compute the asset value
of firms with endogenous risk premia. We also explore the impact of differ-
ent shapes of the risk premium function and debt ceilings on the investment
strategy, which may be discontinuous, and on the firm’s asset value. If mul-
tiple domains of attraction exist we compute thresholds separating different
domains of attraction of the capital stock and the corresponding asset price
movements. We employ numerical dynamic programming and a set oriented
algorithm to solve the complicated optimization problems and the dynamics
of the asset value of the firm. We also extend the model to a stochastic
version where we show that the probability of bankruptcy steadily increases
when the firm moves closer to its borrowing capacity which itself moves down
43
Previous studies have correlated default spreads over AAA treasury bonds and equity
returns, or have used accounting models, with book value of debt and market value of the
firm, or study directly the relationship of up-and down-grading of firms‘s debt and equity
returns. For an extensive survey of literature on this issue, see Vassalou and Xing (2003).
44
Other studies find a strong relationship between firm level volatility and cross-sectional
variation in bond yield, see Campbell and Taksler (2003).
45
Our above analytical study of the debt control problem and suggests some methods
of how to empirically evaluate sustainable debt, see Semmler (2003, ch. 4).
30
in the stochastic case. Finally, our study suggests to reconsider the issue of
the equity premium from the perspective of the default premium.
31
9 Appendix
In this appendix we present the solution technique of how to find the equilib-
ria of the HJB-equations (10) and (11). Moreover, we describe an algorithm
which enable us to compute the asset price of the firm for the HJB equation of
a type such as (13) which will give us the present value borrowing constraint,
the discontinuities in the decision variable and thresholds separating different
domains of attraction for initial capital stocks. While the DP-algorithm as
proposed in sect. 4 and the one proposed below are of quite different nature,
a common feature of both is the adaptive discretization of the state space
which leads to high numerical accuracy with moderate use of memory.
We can compute the steady state equilibria and the rough shape of value
function and thresholds in three steps
f (k, j)
V (k) = (A2)
θ
∂
0 f 0 (k, j) ∂k
(k α − σk − σ 2 k 2−γ )
V (k) = = (A3)
θ θ
Using the information of (A2)-(A3) in (A1) gives, after taking the deriva-
tives of (A1) with respect to j, the steady states for the stationary HJB
equation:
32
0
Next, we derive differential equation V by taking
∂θV
= 0;
∂j
We obtain
−1 − 2jk −γ + V 0 (k) = 0
Note that V 0 (k) represents Tobin’s q. So we have q − 1 = 2jk −γ or
γ
j = (q−1)k
2
which is familiar from Tobin’s investment theory. Yet, note that
out of the steady state equilibria we do not have any information on V 0 (k).
Solving for the optimal j and using the optimal j in (A1) we get
q
0
V = 1 + 2σk 1−α
± (1 + 2σk 1−α )2 + 4δk −α V + k γ−α − 6 (A5)
To solve (A5) we could start the iteration with steady states as initial
conditions. For e, a steady state, we get as initial value for the solution of
the differential equation (A3):
Z ∞
V0 = e−δt f (e, j)dt
0
1
V0 = f (e, j)
δ
Step 3: Compute the global value function by taking
V (k) = max Vi
i
33
9.2 Computing Domains of Attraction
The set D in sect. 4 is what is called a robust domain of attraction of the
set A = {(k, B) ∈ R2 | B ≥ d(k)} and we will here give a brief description of
an algorithm for the computation of such sets, for details we refer to Grüne
(2001) and Chapter 7 of Grüne (2002).
We we consider a first order discrete time approximate model, now both
for k and B given by the Euler discretization46
and abbreviate the right hand side by Ψ(k, B, j). Just as above, for the space
discretization we use a grid Γ, now covering a two–dimensional rectangular
domain [0, K] × [0, B]. For each cell Cl , l = 1, . . . , Q of the grid we use a
collection of test points xil = (kli , Bli ), i = 1, . . . , N in order to compute the
set image
[
Φ(Cl , ̄) = Cm for all m ∈ {1, . . . , Q} with Ψ(kli , Bli , j i ) ∈ Cm
m
34
While the convergence analysis in the general case is rather complicated
and depends on certain properties of D, for our problem we can use the
fact that the boundary ∂D is given by the curve B ∗ (k) which is monotone
increasing in k. Hence, if we use a rectangular grid, and choose the test
points in each cell to be the 4 corners of this rectangular cell, we obtain that
if a cell Cm intersects both D and D c , then there exist test points xkm1 and
xkm2 in this set such that xkm1 ∈ D and xkm2 6∈ D. Consequently, the iterated
cell image Φi cannot be contained in A for all (̄i ) (implying that Cm 6⊆ DΓ )
but it intersects A for each (̄i ) (implying that Cm 6⊆ BΓ ). Thus, if a cell
Cm intersects both D and D c then we obtain that Cm ⊆ EΓ which finally
yields that the set EΓ always covers the boundary ∂D and hence gives an
approximation of the curve B ∗ (k) whose accuracy is equal to the width of
the set EΓ .47
Since the problem which is solved by this algorithm is not a classical
optimal control problem (though it can be interpreted as an optimal control
problem for the set valued dynamics) it is not possible to obtain optimal
trajectories with respect to some given functional. However, it is not too
difficult to prove that the boundary of a domain of attraction D is weakly
invariant (i.e., for an initial value on the boundary ∂D we can always find
trajectories that remain on ∂D for all future times), provided it is a “proper”
domain of attraction, i.e., its boundary does not intersect with the boundary
of A. Due to this fact, for each initial value (k, B) ∈ BΓ (recall that this
set forms our numerical approximation of the set {(k, B)|B ≤ B ∗ (k)} of
subcritical initial values) we can compute a control sequence ji realizing a
(discrete time) trajectory for which Bh (i) remains bounded for all times i ≥ 0
and for initial values on the upper part of the boundary ∂BΓ we can even
expect to find trajectories that stay on this upper part of ∂BΓ for all future
times, i.e., they are (up to the numerical error) of the form (k(t), B ∗ (k(t)).
The limiting behavior of these trajectories can then be used for the detection
of the thresholds, separating different domains of attraction, and it turns out
that this procedure yields very good results.
35
ences stochastic control systems of the form
dX(t) = b(X(t), u(t)) dt + σ(X(t), u(t)) dW (t)
(25)
X(0) = x
PA (x) := P [X(t, x) → A as t → ∞]
PA (x) = 1 − v0 (x)
with
v0 (x) = lim vδ (x)
δ→0
and vδ , δ > 0, being the optimal value function of the stochastic optimal
control problem
Z ∞
− 0t δg(X(s),u(s))ds
R
vδ (x) = inf E δg(X(t), u(t))e dt
u 0
with g being a cost function satisfying g(x, u) = 0 for x ∈ A and g(x, u) > 0
elsewhere. This approach generalized a method developed by V.I. Zubov in
the 1960s and is consequently called Zubov’s method, the associated Hamilton–
Jacobi–Bellman equation is called Zubov’s equation.
Using numerical dynamic programming as described in Section 4 we have
computed vδ for δ = 10−4 and g((k, B), u) = B 2 for the stochastic model
dk(t) = j(t) − σk(t) dt + σk k(t)dW (t)
dB(t) = H (k(t), B(t)) − (f (k(t), j(t))) dt
36
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