THE REHABILITION OF PREJUDICE

The phrase ‘Prejudice against prejudice,’ so far as my knowledge originates from

Gadamer. ‘Prejudice against prejudice’ is indeed, on a deeper level, a prejudice
against authority itself as such. The peculiarity of the Enlightenment rationalist
prejudice, is that true knowledge can be had only by freeing ourselves from all
inherited beliefs and opinions (the ‘authority of the tradition’) so as to create a
tabula rasa on which genuinely ‘objective’ knowledge can be erected. What
Gadamer objects here, is the quite arbitrary way in which Enlightenment
rationalism equates authority with blind obedience and domination; as there can be
‘legitimate prejudices’1 In order to obtain an objective knowledge of the world we
must somehow shed our prejudices since truth is the opposite to prejudice.2 ‘PAP’
assumes that the only thing that gives a judgment dignity is its having a basis, a
methodological justification (and not the fact that it may actually be correct) – that
prejudice becomes a purely negative term.3 In his battle against “the
Enlightenment prejudice against prejudice,” Gadamer- at times- slips into his own
prejudice against the Enlightenment. For the Enlightenment cannot be identified
with a naïve belief in abstract universality and reason. At times, Gadamer fails to
acknowledge that the Enlightenment legacy itself constitutes a living tradition.
Furthermore, this legacy contains a truth that ought to be acknowledged a
appropriated- the demand for universal emancipation and freedom’.4 The
Enlightenment ideal of objective knowledge involves the notion of eradicating all
subjective prejudgments in favour of ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’ approach, detached
from emotional, affective and personal biases, through the skilful use of the faculty
of reason and a sound methodology.5 PAP is only an expression of Enlightenment
phobia of anything that precedes the conscious assent of the all sovereign cogito.6
According to Gadamer, the criticism of Descartes on ‘prejudices’ which ultimately
in Kant and Enlightenment gave rise to the prejudice against prejudice.7 Mill
excludes prejudices, Gadamer charges that such a restraint on knowledge distorts
the objects of research and is the result of a deep – seated bias, a bias against the
inescapable influence of prejudices. In other words, the purveyors of scientific
method rail against prejudices while disgusting their own prejudice for the
inductive method as an unquestioned prerequisite to knowledge. They succeed
only in a pretension to objectivity. Thus the tradition of Mill is said to nurture a
‘prejudice against prejudices.’8 We need to overcome our ‘prejudice against

1
prejudice’ – our innate suspicion of the inherited assumptions and conventions of
the past.9 Gadamer mentions Edmund Burke as an Enlightenment Philosopher who
escaped its prejudice against prejudice.10 The more general doctrine of prejudice in
thought and action is greatly realized from Edmund Burke to Gadamer.11 Burke
takes one of the central concepts of the vocabulary of Enlightenment, namely the
word ‘prejudice’ as pejoratively understood, and raised it on a flag of contempt for
the age’s complacency. 12 Burke conceived of the act of knowing as a quasi-
intuitive application of prejudice.13 It is necessary, in all matters of public
complaint, where men frequently feel right and argue wrong, to separate prejudice
from reason; and to be very pure, in attempting the redress of a grievance, that we
hit upon its real seat, and its true nature.14 What is Jacobinism? It is an attempt
(hitherto but too successful) to eradicate prejudice out of the minds of men, for the
purpose of putting all power authority into the hands of the persons capable of
occasionally enlightening the minds of the people. For this purpose the Jacobins
have resolved to destroy the whole frame and fabric of the old societies of the
world, and to generate them after their fashion.15 Burke’s aim is not to laud every
prejudice an individual or society expresses; indeed, he has no difficulty speaking
disparagingly of “vulgar,” “false,” and “antiquated prejudices.” His intention rather
is to defend the “latent wisdom” of those prejudices that seem to him crucial for
holding together an ordered society.16 By prejudice he does not mean quite what
we would usually mean. While we both use the term to refer to the presence of a
sort of ‘prejudgment’, and we might regard this as indicative of a close-minded and
unreasonable attitude, Burke regards prejudices more positively as a considered
judgment of experience that relieves us of the burden of making (possibly
mistaken) judgments of our own. Prejudice is an institutional and psychological
compass that can guide us in our decision- making. He cites an example of the
French revolutionary. By ignoring the historical experience, it has to do away with
prejudice and depend heavily on the impugnable philosophical reason of a few
individuals, i.e., the Englishmen.17 In the Reflections Burke attempted a densely
comprehensive explanation of British political culture since the revolution of 1688
and he repeatedly described its traditions and institutions in terms of “prejudice”:
“instead of casting away all our prejudices, we cherish them up to a very
considerable degree … and the longer they have lasted, the more we cherish
them.18 He maintains that prejudice should not be extirpated in order to
appropriately understand the human situations; but truly the bases of
2
understanding. Burke disputes the French revolutionaries who are always at war
with prejudice; in searching for a scientific certainty in the political sphere.
Political sphere is neither a physical entity nor a set of facts to obtain any scientific
certainties. On the other hand, political life is a moral justification that primarily
rests in the constitution of values. Such a moral setting is never achieved a
scientific claim of certainty, but rather claim upon the ethical confidence. Prejudice
according to Burke is the source of this confidence; though it is not sufficiently
justified, it is necessary to have this attitude in moral judgment. In this sense,
prejudice is the basis of our everydayness, the moral know – how. It is not
irrational but possessed a cognitive dimension. Burke defended as he put it, ‘not a
prejudice destitute of reason, but involving in it profound and extensive wisdom.’19
By embracing prejudice, it does not mean that we are non - rational as reason is
fundamental to it. He observes the French revolutionaries by against prejudice;
they destroy the foundation of morality in search of objective certainties. In effect,
this lead to a methodical attempt ‘to vitiate our primary morals’ 20 Moreover, Burke
perceives men of speculation in the enlightened age applied reason, but when it
fails them, “They think more wise to continue the prejudice, with the reason
involved, than to cast away the coat of prejudice, and to leave nothing but the
naked reason; because prejudice, with its reason, has a motive to give action to that
reason.”21 More recent versions of this line of criticism may be found in …
Gadamer's … critique of the Enlightenment's "prejudice against prejudice."22
Reason in itself is naked, empty and meaningless. In other words, ‘reason becomes
reason’ or ‘reason is reason’ when mingle together with something else. Though
prejudice is not unreasonable, but this does not mean that reason is perfect and
claim universality. Reason is not the foundation of an ideal society; reason is used
by the revolutionaries merely to withstand prejudice. In doing so, Burke argues
they are at war with nature.23 He asserts that ‘prejudice is reason’; but does not
accord an absolute position. In his exposition on reason and the presence of higher
guidance of reason, but this does not mean men must accept all prejudices. It does
mean that they must take them seriously.24 Prejudice is the essence of human
entity, ‘We are creatures of prejudice; we neither can nor ought to eradicate it; we
must only regulate it by reason, which regulation by reason is indeed little more
than obliging the letter, the local and temporary prejudices, to give way to those
which are more durable and lasting.’25 We see that prejudice is more preferable to
reason in the work of Edmund Burke, because it keep fast what reason tends to
3
uproot.26 Kenneth Baynes in dealing with the problem of relativism argues, One is
not able to escape oneself from some particular point of view (prejudice in Burke),
he asserts, there is after all no mode of thought, inquiry, or practice that is not from
some particular point of view, and whose judgments do not therefore take place on
the basis of what Edmund Burke called prejudices, prejudgments.27

Burke prejudice has a close affinity to reason. This perhaps the challenge to his
own age, the Enlightenment Age, that attempt to dichotomize and completely
remove prejudice as unreasonable. H.B. Acton remarks – so Francis Canavan
points out – how striking was Burke’s choosing to defend tradition, under the name
of prejudice.28 Burke does not distinguish these notions such as parallel line or the
East and the West. But, he sees the link and inter – play of these two notions in
knowledge. Tradition constitutes reverence of the unbroken prejudices of the
past.29 Furthermore, the British attachment to venerable institutions is perceived by
Burke as a kind of prejudice in favor of tradition. Prejudice enhances reason
because it is accumulated wisdom of the nation that is bound to overweight the
individual prejudice.30 Burke argued enlightened thinkers denied the latent wisdom
in tradition because they tried to cast off all prejudices, not realizing that prejudice
itself has value.31 Schmidt, What is Enlightenment? A Question, Its Context, and
Some Consequences, 17. In the twentieth century this argument was followed up
by Hans-Georg Gadamer, who argued despite the Enlightenments opposition to
prejudice, reason itself rested on a fundamental prejudice...[the] prejudice against
prejudice itself. (p. 18-20)32 Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France.
Criticizing French “literary men and politicians" as having "no respect for the
wisdom of others,"33

REAPETITION OF EDMUND BURKE DEFENSE ON PREJUDICE

Why Burke, there is a good reason to look at him he is a philosopher that has dealt
at length on prejudice and a philosopher that Gadamer has mentioned in his
magnum opus.

Gadamer is rehearsing here the essential arguments of the first great response to
the French Revolution: Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France.34
Burke’s and Gadamer’s horrified response to Enlightenment “separation” is,
however, prefigured in the Enlightenment itself. They are both correct to identify

4
the core of the Enlightenment project as the theoretical or analytical “separation,”
against which modern historicism still maintains its desperate struggle.35 Thinkers
from Edmund Burke to Hans-Georg Gadamer have argued that the enlightenment '
s attack on prejudices was itself a prejudice, and have called for a greater deference
toward tradition.36 It is … surprising to notice that the concept of Gadamerian
‘prejudice’ is, to some extent, similar to that of eighteenth century conservative
thinker Edmund Burke.37

GADAMER PREJUDICE

Prejudice is another member of ‘Gadamer’s trinity’ in his philosophical discourse.

Like tradition and authority, the usual meaning of prejudice distorts in the hand of
the Enlightenment. Like tradition, it constitutes both the positive and the negative
implications. While the Enlightenment underscores the negative element and
likewise, overlooks the positive implication.38 The word prejudice etymologically
decompounds into ‘pre – judice’ and ‘pre – judgment,’ which means Judgment, is
possible only with the attachment of prefix ‘pre’ in the process of judging. All
judgment is condition by pre – judgment. Gadamer wants to exhibit the difference
between the older usage of the word and the post- Enlightenment period merely in
terms of unreflective judgment and overhasty reasoning. Judgment is made
possible not only by the use of reason but likewise the role of pre – reflective
involvement with the world that stands behind judgment and make it possible. The
being of prejudice is the reflective and evaluative judgments of the world; and
without a proper consideration of prejudgments there are no judgment at all.39 He
criticizes the Enlightenment antithesis between knowledge and prejudice rooted in
Descartes’ rationalism. In order to support this claim, it is important to remind
ourselves his methodical doubt. It is this method, ‘Do not accept anything as
certain without a prior examination’ – restricts prejudice in the Enlightenment.
Prejudice suffers a lot under the requisition, as prejudice implies clearly the event
prior to the real or actual examination. Descartes asserts, ‘to have knowledge one
must overcome all prejudices.’40 Contrarily, prejudice is a point of deviation to
understand the difference neither positive nor negative connotations. 41 Raman
Selden states prejudice is forming a judgment about something beforehand.42 The
Latin word ‘prae’ (“before”) and ‘judicuim’ (“judgment”), which mean that people
may be biased for or against member of other groups even before they have had
any contact with them.43 The ‘praejudicium’ or pre – judgment is characterized as a
5
more or less value – neutral and a cognitive – reflective that may or not may be
disadvantage. The ‘praejudicata opinio’ (preconceived opinion or prepossession) of
the ancient Roman courts allow the judge to preconceive the dialogue without
certainty afterward either conviction or acquittal. There is a possibility that the
‘praejudicum’ shakes – up reversely, while the ‘onus probandi’ rested on the party
that opposed it. ‘So too “prejudice”: it is a trial judgment or hypothesis, made
perhaps without much deliberation, but still essential as fodder for all future
deliberations.’44 Rudolf A. Makkreel says, the concept of prejudice can be seen in
its double dimensions – explicit and implicit. Explicit prejudgment denotes an
explicit premature judgment, whereas an implicit prejudice denotes an implicit
understanding that informs other judgments. He is of the opinion that when
Gadamer uses the word prejudice he has the concept of implicit prejudice in
mind.45 History informs that the word Prejudice carries the present negative
connotation since the Enlightenment. In fact, it is either good or bad; and does not
necessarily mean illegitimate judgment. Prior to the Enlightenment, the word
prejudice (das vorurteil) simply means “provisional legal verdict”46 Prejudgment
might be a dirty word these days, but it is in fact crucial for our brains to function.
Prejudice enables us to start our guessing … and predictions through which our
model of the world becomes more and more accurate. We are innately predisposed
to be prejudiced.47 As a predisposition, we are inclined in advance to place certain
wishes, yearnings, expectations, and preferences onto worldhood around us.48
Gadamer uses the term prejudice clearly in terms of pre – judgment, but not a miss
– judgment. This commonly informs us that many pre – judgments we have, are
generally of a positive nature.49

Allport defines prejudice using a unipolar (negative) component, as in “thinking ill

of others without sufficient warrant,” or incorporating a bipolar (negative and
positive) component, as in “a feeling, favorable or unfavorable, toward a person or
thing, prior to, or not based on actual experience.” Both of these definitions include
an “attitude” component and a “belief” component. The attitude is either negative
or positive and is tied to an overgeneralized or erroneous “belief.”50

We are accepting the fact that prejudice associates with various negative
phenomena. But we should not neglect that there are certainly different types of
positive prejudices; i.e., - constitutes what we are. All prejudices are not the same
simply because they are temporal phenomena that occupy particular intrapsychic,
6
socio – cultural, and historical contexts … prejudices should not be treated as the
same phenomena precisely because they never appear as the same, for each type of
prejudice is merely one appearance among many appearances.51 The finite mind is
limited by space and time to reflect all prejudices, and incapable too in doing so.
The incapability misleads one to jump into a priori negative conclusion. Everyone
is prejudiced, since we all voice and act on opinions which we have not properly
tested: life is too short to test all our opinions, even if we accept weakfish tests.
Indeed our very perceptions may sometimes be prejudices: the well known Ames
demonstration shows that input we ordinarily accept as implying one thing can
mean something very different.52

It is easier to split an atom… than to break a prejudice, Albert Einstein53 This

implies very clear that it is impossible to do away prejudice in the life world. I

(Suppose two people visits our house, the first one is Ram and another is Sita. My
question is who is a woman? The answer is truly prejudiced, but propitious in
many ways for our appropriate preparation).

Suppose we want to construct a house, we approach an architect or an engineer

instead of physician. This is prejudice, if prejudice is always wrong, then, our
approach in this case too is wrong. The guesses and predictions might not always
correct, but somehow, they are good when they are correct.

Another example of positive bias is found in the world of media, media could not
avoid bias, not in the sense of regular usage. Stuart Young, the chairman of the
BBC states, ‘Of course we are biased. We are biased in favour of the truth. We are
biased in favour of the rule of law. And we are biased in favour of parliamentary
democracy – because without that parliamentary democracy there would be no
BBC … We are biased against those who use violence to further their aims and we
are biased against racism’54

Social Psychology

The study about prejudice is important in the Social Psychology. Social

psychologists use the term prejudice to refer to pre – judgment. It is not illogically
to pre – judge a group or person or meaning before the actual judgment takes
place. But social psychologists associate it with the unreasonable negative reason.

7
In this sense, prejudiced person is the one who has pre –judged the matter at hand.
They perceived it, as a resistance to change and always lead one to error.55 In
social psychology prejudice is connected with racial discrimination. Though, in
fact this is partially true, but it is wrong to limit its connection only to the racial
discrimination. The way prejudice is defined eliminates the original meaning of the
word. Actually, race – based prejudice does not exist in the pre – Christian era (10,
000 – 2000 BCE). Many historical records point to Christian era as the beginning
of the modern day racial prejudice. In Greco – Roman societies, blacks are viewed
positively. Herodotus, the Greek historian states, “The Ethiopians (i.e., “Negroes”)
… are said to be the tallest and most attractive people in the world” 56 If prejudice
has nothing to do with racial discrimination in the beginning, it is logically sound
to assume that the race – based prejudice is not the over – all interpretation of
prejudice. A more precise definition limits prejudice specifically to an
unfavourable (or favourable) attitude towards a group which may, or may no, lead
to overt hostile (or friendly) action, e.g. ‘… prejudice is an attitude that predisposes
a person to think, perceive, feel and act in favourable or unfavourable ways
towards a group or its individual members.’ There is no simple, direct connection
between prejudiced attitude and prejudiced act, and examining their relationship is
only one segment of the broader problem of the relation of attitudes to actions in
general.57 There are various cases in which pre – judgment is an inevitable step to
find out the actual judgment. For example, the police department does not always
find out on the spot the actual offender, what they have to do, is to make use the
pre – judgment evidences; by arresting some people suspected to involve in the
event. Sometimes by doing so, the actual offender is found. Pre – judgment in this
case is not unreasonable, but a judgment full of reason that pushes on toward the
actual judgment.

BIAS AND PREJUDICE

Gadamer positive prejudice seems to be often conflated with bias. Though, they
are distinct from one another.58 The term bias like prejudice is hardly applied in a
positive and affirmative way. He wants to rescue the term ‘bias’ from its negative
undertones. Instead of seeking to eliminate bias, he would embrace it.59 In the
general lexicon, the word bias refers to a bent, drift, leaning, or inclination that
inhibits impartial judgment, and the word ‘fairness’ means free of favoritism or
bias, just to all parties, or equitable. Thus in common language the terms bias and
8
fairness are closely connected. Indeed, some dictionaries list the word unbiased as
a synonym for fair, and biased as an antonym for fair. However, among most
specialists in testing – who are sometimes called “Psychometricians” – bias means
something quite different from unfairness. In Bias in Mental Testing, for example,
Jensen writes that “bias is clearly distinguished from the concept of unfairness.”60
Bias does not necessarily mean negative such as unfairness. In simple way, bias
such as helping the poor for a better life is very positive. I am bias for bias not
because it is bias – but the way of psychological generalizing. Bias may be
understood in a variety of ways, but to define it simply as free of those activities
and dispositions which act to conceal the truth is of course tautological. What have
to be identified are those dispositions … which lead untruthful accounts
emerging.61 In ordinary perception, impartial judgment positively is a professional
norm in various spheres of life, especially to those who have power to govern. It is
the primary condition of every field in order to bring fair – decision to the matter at
hand. In another direction, it is informed that human is not an objective entity. So,
human is not able to elude from societal obligations like norms and values to
which one belong.62 Bias is the ground that one understands other cultures better.
There is no way to understand other cultures, if one does not deeply involve and
understand its own.63 It is here that one envisages the risk of overlooking bias, and
capable of seeing the positive term bias. It has to do with deep loyalties in the
sense of belongingness, unattainable through one’s own rational exercise.64 The
positive term bias already implies the existence of negative bias. Gadamer in his
projection of hermeneutics circle reveals the important of distinguishing the
positive from negative bias. The only way for the possibility of distinguishing is by
bringing biases into play.65 In play, bias is openness toward others – encounter
with other biases. The encounter indeed challenges one’s initial narrow bias, which
necessitates one to come out from convenience horizon. Gadamer writes, “The
mere presence of other before whom we stand helps us to break up our own bias
and narrowness, even before he opens his mouth to make a reply. That which
becomes a dialogical experience for us here is not limited to the sphere of
arguments and counterarguments the exchange and unification of which may be
the end of meaning of every confrontation.”66 For example, we are loyal and love
(though we don’t hate others) more of our own children, parent, family, group
where we belong, tribe, race, and nation. Though we never acknowledge, but
constitute our essence of being human. Bias of this sort is little says Allport
9
because love and loyalty themselves create no social problems. The perspectivism
of human cognitions and behaviors stems from the differences of culture, language,
background, etc. The perspectivism philosophers Johan Gottfried Von Herder and
Friedrich Nietzsche repudiate the claim of universalism and objectivism. They
insist on the significance of differences and particularities as the limitations of
human entity. Both did not spontaneously devalue and denounce to what happened
something other than one’s own possession. But insist on the origin of this starting
point to further develop its possibility.67 Bias under this consideration is in fact a
way of understanding oneself and the other. I do not intent otherwise that bias in
another sense also positive; however, I did not disagree that bias is negative too. I
feel the problem of bias is not in biasness, but in negative bias that attribute
failures and denounce others who are external to one’s own sphere or favoritism to
one who belongs to the same category. It points human towards their essence of
being. By nature human does not stand on the neutral ground. However, they are
shaped by culture, language, race, history, time, class, origin. Whether they belief
it or not, they are defined themselves by the particular existence. Gadamer
professes against Locke’s notion; tabula rasa,68 human is not born to an empty or
blank world. No human life begins at an absolutely zero,69 but the product of
earlier historical periods. It helps not simply to familiar with one’s own particular
cultural legacy, but has also to work on this principle in rewriting to advance its
possibility. Undoubtedly, human is the partisan of one’s own culture, race, belief,
tribe, language, nation and origin. Human, the partisan of one’s own possession
has to conform to the norms and values in a partisan manner. 70 Kenneth Womack
perceives human nature is essentially partisan, self-deceptive, and sympathetic, no
perceptions are free from bias.71 I don’t see bias in this way to bear any negative
components. Edwin Carl Smith affirms, ‘we cannot be simply tourists in our life
and world.’ It is important to recognize bias in our allegiance to culture, belief,
worldview, tradition and personal identity. If we are to solve the problems we face,
we must evolve beyond our limited view of what is real and true. 72 John Elliott
recognizes the role of bias in hermeneutical prospect. Hermeneutical approach is
not a bias – free study but a prerequisite. He resolves that all interpretations are
shaped and formed by practical culture, i.e., the norms and values of human are
conditioned by practical concerns. The truth of hermeneutics exposition lies in
‘changeable bias’ that always modify one’s initial bias rather than eliminating or
detachment from it.73 Bias always changing, they are permanently challenged, each
10
time anew each time differently.74 It opens to revision and elaboration as it
continues to interact with other biases in the process of interpretation.75

Bias is inherently in all research and is not necessarily negative. The investigators
should state at the start what we believe in and value. In research the beliefs and
values are less important than our being open and straightforward 76 with the
purpose of the study. Generally all research is biased in the sense that all research
is integrally political. Bias particularly in hermeneutical research cannot be
avoided, because it does not recognize ‘one true, unbiased’ as a correct procedure
of interpretation. A more productive way in dealing with the claim of bias is that
research always represents a particular political interests and theoretical influences.
Researchers have to recognize bias, if it is intended to be heard by the audience. If
researchers ignore bias, then, the research has no way to constructively influencing
future theory, polity and practice.77 Researchers are striving to eliminate bias from
their research; however, in principle they are as Evert Gummesson affirms that bias
is prevalent at all levels of the research process.78 For example, in philosophy, is
there any possibility for a researcher to do research without bias? I feel a
researcher is in no way able to do without any bias in his/her research. One might
take Plato, another Husserl and others Hume, Kant, Locke, and Derrida so on.
This is a matter of choice, why there is a choice? When there is no exact yardstick
to tell us, ‘X is the brilliant philosopher.’ Is this not a bias emanates from the self –
interests and growing influence of particular philosopher? Bertrand Russell argues
every philosopher will agree that many other philosophers have been actuated by
bias.79 If one set asides bias, the research is not justifiable because the so – called
research work requires limitation in pursuance. William H. Dray warns against
any idea, such as obliterating, or reducing bias at any rate, because it will be in
itself just another bias.80 In Gadamer’s hermeneutics, the interpreters require to
incorporate bias in every interpretation. To escape from bias, amounts to an escape
from one’s situation in the world.81

The crucial function that prejudices perform in Gadamer’s analysis of

understanding is closely related to Michael Polanyi’s use of tacit knowledge.82
Polanyi characterizes it as “that which we know but cannot tell,” but it underpins
and shapes many subsequent learning processes.83

11
 1. By Jerome Arthur Stone, The minimalist vision of transcendence: a
naturalist philosophy of religion
2. Beyond Prejudice: Extending the Social Psychology of Conflict, Inequality
...
3. By Georgia Warnke, Legitimate differences: interpretation in the abortion
controversy and other ...p.179…

Handbook of Prejudice
1. By Anton Pelinka, Karin Bischof, Karin Stögner,p.7 poliyani

GADAMER AND PREJUDICE

Prejudice is one of the most controversial notions of philosophical hermeneutics, if

one confine with the usual, ordinary and contemporary usage of the term. The term
is simultaneously linked with negative social issues. But Gadamer uses the term
differently from the previous conception. In contrary, he uses in hermeneutical
theory as the necessary condition for understanding to take place. His claim is not
unjustifiable because the rehabilitation is based by going back deeper towards the
pre – Enlightenment usages or the original meaning. I feel his critics are uneasy
with this notion, owing to the partial knowledge or the ignorance of his whole
hermeneutical construal. Prejudice is not the ends in itself rather the means in the
process of understanding. I do not intend to deal at length with the ‘means – ends,’
the famous ethical phenomenon. But just to show the important of the phenomenon
to comprehend Gadamer’s concept of understanding. If one regards prejudice as an
ends to understand something, it is doubtful to be able to rehabilitate in a positive
sense. The assumptions that prejudice is an ends, is misleading because in turn it
will be an over - all determining agent towards understanding. There are no
references in his hermeneutical theory that justifies the claim of one absolute
determining agent. The potential of prejudice lies in the fact, to consider it as the
means that makes understanding possible. Prejudice as the means, is the starting
point of understanding and there is no understanding without prejudice, it is
inevitable. For example, in a research work, a student will not be able to conduct a
research without pre – understanding on the subject he plans to undertake. When
the research work begins, the pre – understanding or pre – judgment that a student
might believe to be correct is brought to a test. As a result, sometimes it is
challenged but not all the time. The challenged pre – understanding in this sense

12
leads to an unstable, but it is, allows one to understand the subject better. He
affirms that pre – judgment is not always correct; but sometimes wrong too, and
possible to change. The problem of Gadamer’s critics to bring prejudice into play
in the event certainly stems from treating it simply as ends of understanding. Such
a limited prejudice, I agree with his critics that it has really nothing to do with
understanding. But I do not agree too, because Gadamer notion of prejudice is not
defined in this limited sense of the term. The result of treating prejudice as the
ends, leads to the impossibility of exclusion to achieve understanding. In other
words, it requires including those illegitimate prejudices found in the test.
Prejudicial test plays an important role in hermeneutics exposition; it determines
the legitimate and illegitimate prejudices. Gadamer does not emphasize the
important of whether one ‘include’ or ‘exclude’ it; but what he is striving to
exhibit, the inescapable starting point in every act of understanding. The ends in
this situation, does not guarantee to justify the means. As the interpreter opens its
own pre – understanding (means) to put to test through a proper inquiry. The
interpreter can reject, accept and reform prejudice in the process. But the point is
that in principle; the interpreter is inconsistent to avoid it, which helps to proceed
further in understanding the matter at hand. The specific concern is not to retain or
eliminate prejudices; the emphasizing aim of the portion is to see prejudice is a
starting point. Prejudice constitutes “the initial directedness of our whole ability to
experience … They are simply conditions whereby we experience something –
whereby we encounter says something to us.”84 Purushottama Bilimoria and
Andrew B. Irvine write that prejudice is the positive starting point in any
interpretation or understanding.85

It is important to note also that Gadamer’s use of prejudice is not very clear, yet
somehow dilemmatic in nature. His usages of prejudice as the important condition
of understanding have in fact given space to strong criticisms from his critics.
Perhaps the distinction between the legitimate and illegitimate prejudices is
fundamental towards the dilemma. Gadamer’s critics are right to forecast the
problem and predict the ambiguity of understanding. If by prejudice, he means a
fore-projections or fore-meanings that orient one towards understanding a text or
text analogue, object or event, then the distinction become obscure. It persuades his
critics to think, how is it possible to achieve understanding of something, if
prejudices are eliminated? Can illegitimacy of prejudices be part of understanding

13
itself? Illegitimate prejudices required to be eliminated in order to understand the
meaning of a text. Gadamer seems to contradict himself in his hermeneutical
theory. First, he provides a space for prejudices to be eliminated, such that of
illegitimate prejudices. Second, every understanding is necessarily prejudiced,
because without it, understanding is not possible. If prejudices are conditioned of
every understanding, then why he gives space to remove it? Once we remove
condition, definitely understanding is absurd. The projection that orients one in
trying to understand a text, culture, action, tribal are not always appropriate. What
orient, provides some expectations and anticipations of something that one is
trying to understand. There is also a possibility that anticipations are contradicted
in progress to what one is trying to understand. Certainly, such anticipations call
for elimination to have meaning to what is trying to understand. Similarly,
anticipations or prejudices play an important role; it allows one to push on towards
the journey of understanding. It provides a curiosity to understanding, though
understand otherwise.

Another problem, Gadamer presumes the separation between legitimate and

illegitimate prejudices begin prior to the starting point. He insists that our
prejudices must be subjected to critical examination from the start in order to
separate the legitimate from the illegitimate. When separation is done from the
beginning, illegitimate prejudices are already eliminated and will not be
accommodated in the anticipations or prejudices that orient us toward
understanding. Illegitimacy of prejudices in this matter are meaningless to speak,
however, for Gadamer it is meaningful. But, is it possible to separate legitimate
from illegitimate prejudices prior to the start? If so, does one can still consider it as
prejudice, after a critical examination? We are prejudiced of something, and this
‘something’ that has undergone a critical examination, is no more prejudice in the
true sense of the term, but an understanding itself, which is impossible. What
makes prejudice a Prejudice is a character that orient, direct and provide us
assumptions to what we are trying to understand. Once a critical examination is
exercised, one is able to partially, though not fully understanding the meaning of a
text or culture or object. The partial knowledge is a part of understanding itself,
rather than that precedes understanding or merely orientation.

The central problem of Gadamer’s prejudice is how to distinguish legitimate from

illegitimate prejudices. It is the same question that Habermas raises against
14
Gadamer.86 Gadamer at various points in his book equates legitimate prejudices
with productive that leads to understanding and illegitimate with hindrance that
leads to misunderstanding. By refusing to differentiate various types of prejudices
lead one to assume that he himself is perplexed on the issue of prejudice.87 Ingrid
Scheibler argues that Gadamer does not deny the presence, but not fully underline
the criterion that he invokes in distinguishing between the legitimate and
illegitimate prejudices.88 Georgia Warnke suggests that Gadamer provides a
criterion for eliminating illegitimate prejudices, the one he borrowed from
Schleiermacher hermeneutics, i.e., hermeneutic circle. Understanding is a circular
issue; it is provisional and unending by developing it from the old hermeneutic
principle of the whole and parts.89 Circular understanding indicates the relationship
between the whole and parts. Part is not independently understood except by
placing them within the whole, the larger context. On the other hand, the whole
does not come into being without a prior understanding of parts. Consequently,
understanding is a dynamic process in which parts move to the whole, then, the
whole moves to part.

Georgia Warnke assumes hermeneutical circle is an enabling procedure, it admits

the unity of part and whole to occur in understanding. The interpreter of a text,
culture, social issue, tribal must presupposed understanding as a unified whole.
Contrary to this, it is difficult to draw a line of demarcation to split-up between the
legitimate and illegitimate prejudices. Presupposition qualifies a person to examine
the consistency of prejudice. Unity of part and whole is a fundamental criterion to
uncover illegitimate prejudices. Parts that are not unified with the whole are
ineffectual and incapable of comprising in the so-called understanding. She
supplies two important steps to extricate illegitimate prejudices. First, prejudice
becomes illegitimate when they do not possess a unity within the whole. Second,
prejudice becomes illegitimate also, when they do not allow themselves to open
towards what other says or the otherness, for achieving a unified whole. She argues
that Gadamer though accept this criterion to spot illegitimate prejudices, but he
does reject it as a criterion to tract legitimate prejudices. It is not clear, what is
there in prejudice itself after we have spot the illegitimate prejudices? It is not
practicable to say, what remains there are legitimate prejudices, because according
to Warnke, this is not a criterion for legitimacy. She maintains, “A legitimate
prejudice cannot be simply defined as one that leads to or allows for a unity of part

15
and whole.”90 Nonetheless, the harmony between part and whole identifies
exclusively the illegitimate prejudices. But on the other hand, logically speaking
there is also a possibility to infer from the known cases to the unknown cases. In
this context, illegitimate prejudices are the known cases and legitimate prejudices
are the unknown cases. Therefore, we can infer the existence of legitimate
prejudices. Yet, for Warnke, these prejudices lead not to a legitimate understanding
not because of non-existence, but the fact is that she ignores the logical inference,
i.e., the existence of legitimate prejudices.

In emphasizing her position, she posits the possibility of constructing a wrong or

misunderstanding even though the event of understanding harmonizes all the
details with the whole. She gives an example to justify her assertion. Suppose a
man presumes woman pretend not to want sex when they really want it. For this
man, it implies, when a woman says “no” she really means “yes.” when a woman
protests against his sexual advances, her verbal denial and her action of struggling
indicate an acceptance of sexual encounter. It confirms his presumption derived
from custom that woman pretend not to want sex when they really want it, ‘in
order to make their ultimate surrender more romantic.’ But, suppose in actual
encounter, when a woman says “no,” she really means “no” as a mark of denial
and rejection for a sexual encounter. In this case, a man misconstrued woman’s
meaning or at least failed to understand the way she understood, despite following
all the hermeneutical procedure of fitting part into whole.

Georgia Warnke fails to analyze properly Gadamer’s hermeneutical procedure.

First, a man in this context has not applied a hermeneutical procedure, but
lingering within the prejudice evolved from the custom of a particular society.
Although a woman says “no” that fits well with his prejudice, but the meaning is
still an egocentric exposition of a man. Gadamer does not use the term prejudice
by itself to mean understanding. Prejudice is the essence of every understanding,
rather than the end of understanding itself. Second, in actual encounter, when a
woman says “no” a man would have noticed the way she behaved and reacted
against his sexual advances. A woman might say “no,” but this “no” perhaps have
different connotations – it gives us knowledge through her physical reactions. Her
reactions in fact communicate him whether the “no” means “no” such as “shouted
no” or the “no” means “yes” such as “whispered no.” A man who is blindly
allegiant towards his own prejudice, he is unwillingly to open to what other says,
16
cannot be said to have followed the hermeneutical procedure. Gadamer’s prejudice
necessitates to be challenged by what others say and ready to open one’s own
prejudice. Moreover, he must realize and overcome the prejudice derived from a
particular custom should not be generalized. If he is attuned towards the
hermeneutical procedure, when she says “no” she really means “no.” He would
risk his own prejudice. And have attained new knowledge emerges out of
hermeneutical practice. Third, I agree with Warnke that man misconstrued woman
meaning or failed to understand the way she understood, but I do not agree that he
has followed all the hermeneutical procedure of fitting part into whole. The way he
constructs the meaning is totally partial, which denies the basic hermeneutical
circle – what Gadamer call the anticipation of completeness. The encounter
between a man and a woman is viewed as the part-whole relationship of the
hermeneutical circle; I feel the meaning of the whole is not clear, it requires
another definition. Furthermore, verbal expression becomes the center of attraction
rather than action. She overlooks human action which Gadamer and his followers
regard it not less than a hermeneutical text. Is verbal locution enough to consider as
hermeneutical procedure? Why Georgia Warnke ignores action of a woman, which
she herself considered it as a hermeneutical text elsewhere?

Every understanding is prejudiced, but every prejudice is not understanding.

Georgia Warnke while talking on legitimate prejudices, she is unable to see it as
something opposite from the illegitimate prejudices. As that which provides ways
for understanding to happen? She jumps to a legitimate understanding rather than
the legitimate prejudices itself.

We must, Gadamer asserts, be able to distinguish between blind prejudices that

thwart understanding and those that illuminate – between false and true
prejudices… In T&M he asks: “What distinguishes legitimate prejudices from all
the countless ones which it is the undeniable task of critical reason to overcome?”
Although it is clear that Gadamer sees his task as making this distinction, he also
cautions that there is no easy formula by which this is accomplished.91

Gadamer identifies these prejudices with the necessity of bringing them to light…
If we have been able to follow Gadamer (if we have followed him far enough, but
not too far), that a prejudice – to be legitimate – should not be capable of being
brought to light.92

17
Gadamer suggests temporal distance (borrowing from Heidegger’s concept of
time) as the only solution to the critical question of hermeneutical studies, i.e., the
distinction between the true prejudices that leads to understanding and the false
prejudices that leads to misunderstanding.93 He notes the early hermeneutics idea
of transposing oneself “within the spirit of the age” views time as “a gulf to be
bridged,” and the temporal distance as “something that must be overcome.” But
contrarily to this, Gadamer views it as the important condition of understanding.94
He says, temporal distance has a certain hermeneutical productivity in distinguish
between true and false presuppositions. Gadamer explains temporal distance can
the specifically critical task of hermeneutics be resolved, that is, of knowing how
to distinguish between blind prejudices and those which illuminate, between false
prejudices and true prejudices.”95 If temporal distance is put-on as the necessary
condition of bringing out legitimate prejudices, then, it confronts with multifarious
questions. What about several circumstances in which historical distance is absent
in textual interpretation?96 But at the same time we must recall Gadamer assertion
that the horizon of the present cannot be formed without the past. Moreover, “The
prejudices and fore-meanings that occupy the interpreter’s consciousness are not at
his free disposal. He cannot separate in advance the productive prejudices that
enable understanding from the prejudices that hinder it and lead to
misunderstandings.”97 How can one expound contemporary social issues,
philosophical works, theological expositions, literature, and the like? Perhaps these
questions are identical to the maximalist theory proposed by Quentin Smith –
emphasizing on “the present, which has zero temporal distance from the present”98

The answer towards these questions certainly rest first upon his revision of
temporal distance, which allow to think differently: He defended in 1960 the strong
thesis that “it is only temporal distance that can solve the critical question of
hermeneutics … It is interesting to note that Gadamer himself came to recognize
the one-sidedness of his strong thesis of 1960. In what amounts to a nonneglible
revision of one of its central tenets, Gadamer modified the text of Truth and
Method when it was published in his Complete Works edition in 1986 and, instead
of “it is only temporal distance,” he now prudently writes: “Often temporal
distance can solve the critical question of hermeneutics”99 It is practicable to say,
when we encounter the text that lacks historical distance, we have to find out other
factors of distinction. There are many cases that temporal distance cannot dying

18
away and identify prejudices. Therefore, a lot of works requires to be done in order
to discern illegitimate prejudices.100 Secondly, it lies upon Gadamer’s expansion of
the notion of distance itself from merely temporal distance. Fuyuki Kurasawa
argues that hermeneutics is primarily oriented towards historical distance between
the past and the present. Afterwhile, he expresses Gadamer broaden the notion of
distance from the historical realm which enables one to incorporate the cultural
distance101and others. Gadamer asserts ‘I have here softened the original text (It is
temporal distance that can solve …): ‘it is distance, not only temporal distance that
makes this hermeneutic problem solvable.’102 Furthermore, his various ways of
comparison between interpretation and translation exhibits his interest in
intercultural thinking.103

Before we look at the possible answers, we will try to put some questions to the
question itself. Is there an event that lacks temporal distance? Do contemporary
issues have no temporal distance from the contemporary interpreter? If temporal
distance does not exist in such cases, I feel the need to come out with a clear
definition of temporal distance. Thommy Eriksson observes distance is inevitable –
‘there is distance, even when you are inside your own mind, listening to your own
thoughts. I claim that the distance never disappears, not even when I study myself
… There is always a distance between me as a researcher, and the rest of my
viewpoints and roles.’104
Temporal distance obviously … lets the true meaning of the object emerge fully.
But the discovery of the true meaning of a text or a work of art is never finished; it is in
fact an infinite process. Not only are fresh sources of error constantly excluded, so that all
kinds of things are filtered out that obscure the true meaning; but new sources of
understanding are continually emerging that reveal unsuspected elements of meaning.
The temporal distance that performs the filtering process … brought about by temporal
distance there is also the positive side, namely the value it has for understanding. It not
only lets local and limited prejudices die away, but allows those that bring about genuine
understanding to emerge clearly as such105

The fundamental task of temporal distance lies in the filtering system. The content
that survives or remains through the act of filtering is considered as classic. We
experience the role of certain prejudices, becomes the universal statements are not
the outcome from stupidity, intellectual laziness and blind obedience to the
authority of tradition. However, it derives from the appropriateness of prejudices

19
that has been repeatedly judged to be correct. Contemporary works do not
emanate from the void, instead the result of tradition itself.106 How can we filter
out these prejudices, and ensure we do not replace them with prejudices of our
own?107

The isolation of prejudices will not occur while it is constantly operating

unnoticed, but only when it is, so to speak, provoked. The provocation is possible
when there is a renewed encounter with the traditional text that already has its own
separate validity. Understanding begins when the tradition addresses us108 Das
erste, womit das Verstehens beginnt, ist, ．．．, daßetwas uns anspricht). What is
capable of stirring up the prejudice is precisely the movement with the tradition in
which something addresses us, asserting itself in its separate validity, which in turn
requires the suspension of our own prejudice.109 One is not able to suspend one’s
own prejudices unless he puts them at risk. The encounter with the traditional text
enlightens something strange or alien, in which the meaning is completely
unintelligible, as a result one sincerely feel that prejudices are at risk. The
interpreter sticks with the own polluted prejudices without admitting the presence
of truth to what is strange or alien.110 To be sure the suspension of unproductive
prejudice does not amount to the methodological disposition of Descartes that
searches of the purity of subjectivity and guarantee absolute truth and certainty.111
But all suspension of judgments and hence, a fortiori, of prejudices, has the logical
structure of a question.112 The essence of the question is to open up possibilities
and keep them open. When one’s own prejudices are challenged and questioned, it
does not mean that it is simply accepting what other says or other texts and
replaced it. It is the act of questioning that helps an interpreter to suspend one’s
own prejudice. Rather, historical objectivism shows its naiveté in accepting this
disregarding of ourselves as what actually happens. In fact our own prejudice is
properly brought into play by being put at risk. Only by being given full play is it
able to experience the other’s claim to truth and make it possible for him to have
full play himself.113 One may ask, is questioning sufficient to have a correct
understanding? Yes, because questioning is the essence in every act of
investigation or critical analysis.

Temporal distance which is literally implies the passage of time, in fact provides a
space to the interpreter to distinguishing productive from unproductive prejudices.

20
It is impracticable to deny that time enable one to incorporate or leave behind some
of prejudices. Gadamer provides an example of the work of art; it is through time
that one is capable of valuing art from those that are passing.114
“Time is not measured by the passing of years but by what one does, what one
feels, and what one achieves” Jaharwallal Nehru

According to Gadamer the deficiency of the traditional or classical hermeneutics

lie in the absent of acknowledgement to the significant of temporal distance. The
traditional interpreters step from their own present horizon by employing the
imaginative projection of a subjective state into the historical object so that the
object appears to be infused with it. On the other hand, Gadamer aims differently,
to maintain a historical distance so that the present is rooted in its own115

Jean Grondin and others have documented: “Tradition can obviously play a very
negative role in the transmission of meaning by prescribing a systematically
distorted interpretation of a written work or even of a historical event.”
Consequently, temporal distance as a criterion is too general. Gadamer leaves the
epistemological problem of distinguishing between the true and false prejudices in
confusion,116 so to open the task to the interpreters. Grondin admits that Gadamer’s
revision is nicely illustrates a distinctive characteristic of hermeneutics, namely,
that it remains continually ready to alter its opinion when better insight comes
along.117

Gadamer argues that the kind of sensitivity he has in mind "involves neither … nor
the extinction of one's self.” Understanding is possible when one’s own prejudiced
is sub – summed in the larger whole of a text, text – analogue, object or event. If
opposite, then the event of understanding is problematic, and no understanding at
all. As we have seen above, there are prejudices possible to be illegitimacy.
Suppose the prejudices that orient to what one is trying to understand are
illegitimate and has nothing to do with the larger whole of a text. What happen to
these prejudices? If we eliminate them, a text is unprejudiced and understanding is
distorted. Moreover, if understanding is not possible without prejudice, then we
have to integrate by force in the larger whole and as a result a text is
misunderstanding rather than understanding. Francis J. Mootz III and George H.
Taylor assert appropriate prejudices (from authority) produce truth and lets us
understand; inappropriate prejudices (from-hastiness) produce

21
misunderstanding.118 For instance, if one presumes Heidegger as an Irish
philosopher, but through a detailed study on him, he finds that Heidegger is not an
Irish philosopher. What we will say? If we say that Heidegger is a German
philosopher, we are wrong, because we have to bring our own prejudice that
Heidegger is an Irish philosopher in our understanding. It will be correct according
to Gadamer to say, Heidegger is an Irish – German philosopher. Does it make
sense in this context, if one is trying to enquire Heidegger’s birth country?

When one is trying to understand a text, text-analogue, object, or issue, he will be

able to spot illegitimacy of one’s own prejudices somewhere in progression of
understanding, but not in the beginning. I mean a stage in which he has not
consulted a text or informed by others on the matter at issue. In every
understanding, prejudice in the beginning is essential because prejudices at this
stage are undifferentiated, as it has not undergone the required test. It is the test
that enables Gadamer himself, the researcher or the interpreter to differentiate
between the legitimate and illegitimate prejudices. Once the interpreter is aware
about the situation, he should not blindly accept the prejudices that he might
believe to be correct in the prior event. At this stage, the interpreter can revise the
illegitimate prejudices by opening up and willing to embrace new meanings. He
suggests that we can revise our prejudices in dialogue with others and with texts,
and thereby access knowledge.119 Gadamer in his hermeneutical theory paves way
for an interpreter to change, transform, convert, translate and expand one’s own
earlier convictions. In doing so, it seems that these prejudices deserve to be
rejected, because they are not harmonized with the unity of understanding.
Contrarily, rejecting one’s own prejudices to understanding amounts to no
understanding for Gadamer. If illegitimate prejudices merit to be thrown out, he
would have avoided terms such as change, transform, expansion from prejudice.
Whereas these terms usually signifies new things, but sometimes not completely
new. For example, when a person wants to expand knowledge, he is not required to
eliminate his prior knowledge.

Doing away or rejecting prejudices from hermeneutical theory, I find

understanding is difficult to make sense. In other words, prejudice is fundamental
to understanding in hermeneutical reflection. I see that there is a possibility to
reclaim its important. One can take Gadamer prejudices in two ways. First, if
prejudice coheres with the progress of understanding, then prejudice comprises
understanding. Second, if prejudice does not cohere with the progress, then
prejudice is not to be put-on as that comprises understanding, but that advance and
make understanding possible. One might argue that incoherent always detach itself

22
from ongoing progression, these prejudices require to be rejected. By common
sense, yes, we have to reject incoherent prejudices, but not to a hermeneutically
trained consciousness. Do we justify Heidegger as an Irish – German philosopher?
No, the answer towards this question hides in prejudice itself. If we are cautious
enough to see his notion of prejudice, I think we might have projected differently
rather than a straight forward rejection.

Gadamer’s notion of prejudice does not emerge from empty spaces that have no
substance at all. He writes “that is why the prejudices of the individual, far more
than his judgments, constitute the historical reality of his being.”120 Prejudice is
rooted in historical situation, culture to which we belongs, everyday experience
that we are aware and familiar with. It is the familiar, close, acquainted, habitual,
frequent, that supplies the resources for us to anticipate and expect something. We
cannot bring our expectations as something of a text, person or anything that is
completely stranger from us. Gadamer shifts himself from the objective knowledge
that pretends to have no use of prior meanings. He rejects Cartesian conceptions of
an unconditioned or objective knowledge that allegedly requires no pre-orientation
toward its subject-matter.121 In understanding a text, event, culture, we understand
it as something through our historical experiences, cultures and locate it within the
familiar context and bring certain assumptions and expectations. She further
affirms “Gadamer’s use of the term prejudice is meant to underline the degree to
which all our anticipations and expectations of meaning are grounded in the
expectations we acquire from our history, from the views, concerns, interests, and
assumptions of past generations, from our training and education, and from the
categorial frameworks we inherit from the cultures and traditions to which we
belong.”122 Bringing back one’s prejudice like ‘Heidegger is an Irish philosopher’
is simply misunderstanding. Surely, he is not trained or received education that
makes him unfamiliar to the situation. One is not familiar with the history of
philosophy, if he is; such an unprejudiced assumption will not come into being. If
one is really aware the context, he would have known, there are no philosophers
who have ever said so. He must have issued this as a task; he is trying to
understand rather than jumping to a conclusion. This is clearly what Gadamer calls
a prejudice against prejudice that prevents historical influences or a prejudice
emerges out of empty spaces.

1
By Richard Kearney, Twentieth-century Continental philosophy,p.303
2
By Kemal Ataman, Understanding other religions: al-Biruni's and Gadamer's "fusion of horizons",p.41
3
Monica Vilhauer, Gadamer's ethics of play: hermeneutics and the other, p.51-52

23
4
Anindita Niyogi Balslev, Cross-cultural conversation: initiation. P.39-40
5
Richard King, Orientalism and Religion: Post-Colonial Theory, India and "The Mystic East", p.73
6
E. Joseph Sharkey, Idling the Engine: Linguistic Skepticism in And Around Cortazar, Kafka, And ...,p.28
7
Manjulika Ghosh, University of North Bengal, University of North Bengal. Dept. of Philosophy, Indian Council
of Philosophical Research, Language and interpretation: hermeneutics from East-West perspective,p.20
8
Patrick Rogers Horn, Gadamer and Wittgenstein on the unity of language: reality and discourse ...,p.6-7
9
Jeremy Begbie, Voicing creation's praise: towards a theology of the arts, p.200
10
Timothy Dykstal, The luxury of skepticism: politics, philosophy, and dialogue in the English ....p.197
11
Richard E. Flathman Willful liberalism: voluntarism and individuality in political theory and ...,p.109
12
By Dennis O'Keeffe, John Meadowcroft, Edmund Burke, p.115
13
Dietmar Schloss, Culture and criticism in Henry James,p.35
14
Edmund Burke, Works, Volume 2, p.224
15
Edmund Burke, The Writings & Speeches of Edmund Burke: Fourth Letter on the Proposals for ...,p. 367
16
Stephen K. White, Edmund Burke: modernity, politics and aesthetics, p. 62
17
Peri Roberts, Peter Sutch, An introduction to political thought: a conceptual toolkit,p.247
18
By Susan Manning, Peter France, Enlightenment and emancipation, p.58
19
By David Dwan, Keough-Naughton Institute for Irish Studies, The great community: culture and nationalism in
Ireland, P.27-28
20
By David Dwan, Keough-Naughton Institute for Irish Studies, The great community: culture and nationalism in
Ireland, P.27-28
21
By Edmund Burke, J. C. D. Clark, Reflections on the Revolution in France, p.251
22
JAMES SCHMIDT, Civility, Enlightenment, and Society: Conceptual Confusions and Kantian Remedies, in
American Political Science Review Vol. 92, No. 2 June 1998,pp.419-427
23
By Ghislaine McDayter, Byromania and the birth of celebrity culture, p.200
24
By Dennis O'Keeffe, John Meadowcroft, Edmund Burke, p.115
25
Edmund Burke, Dodsley's annual register, p.155

26
Utah Humanities Research Foundation, University of Utah. Dept. of English, The Western humanities review
Volume 39, p.117

27
By Kenneth Baynes, After philosophy: end or transformation?,p.405-6
28
By Dennis O'Keeffe, John Meadowcroft, Edmund Burke, p.115
29
By George W. Stocking, Colonial situations: essays on the contextualization of ethnographic knowledge, p. 317
30
By Guyora Binder, Robert Weisberg, Literary criticisms of law, p. 347
31
By Joshua Luke Yoder, THE CASE OF HUMAN PLURALITY: HANNAH ARENDT’S CRITIQUE OF
INDIVIDUALISM IN ENLIGHTENMENT AND ROMANTIC THINKING A Thesis,p.13
32
By Joshua Luke Yoder, THE CASE OF HUMAN PLURALITY: HANNAH ARENDT’S CRITIQUE OF
INDIVIDUALISM IN ENLIGHTENMENT AND ROMANTIC THINKING A Thesis,p.13
33
JAMES SCHMIDT, Civility, Enlightenment, and Society: Conceptual Confusions and Kantian Remedies, in
American Political Science Review Vol. 92, No. 2 June 1998,pp.419-427
34
By Hugh Roberts. Shelley and Chaos of History, p. 31
35
By Hugh Roberts. Shelley and Chaos of History, p. 33
36
BYJAMES SCHMIDT, Language, Mythology, and Enlightenment: Historical Notes on Horkheimer and Adorno's
Dialectic of Enlightenment, in SOCIAL RESEARCH, Vol. 65, No.4 (Wmter 1998),pp. 807-838

24
37
Donghyun Kim, (2011) Reason, tradition, and authority: a comparative study of Habermas and Gadamer. PhD
thesis.p.60-61
38
By Chris Lawn, Gadamer: a guide for the perplexed,p. 38
39
By Chris Lawn, Gadamer: a guide for the perplexed,p. 38
40
By Michael Haugh, Bethan Davies, Andrew John Merrison, Situated Politeness,p.152
41
By Maribel Blasco, Jan Gustafsson, Intercultural alternatives: critical perspectives on intercultural ...,p.37
42
By Raman Selden, The Cambridge history of literary criticism, Volume 7,p.268
43
By Diana Kendall, Sociology in Our Times,p. 283
44
By Thomas K. Carr, Newman and Gadamer: toward a hermeneutics of religious knowledge, pp.51-53
45
Rudolf A. Makkreel, “Gadamer and the problem of How to relate Kant and Hegel to Hermeneutics” in Laval
theologique er philosophique, 53,1 (February1997).160
46
By Cass Fisher, Contemplative Nation: A Philosophical Account of Jewish Theological Language,p.29
47
By Christopher D. Frith, Making up the Mind: how the Brain creates our Mental World, p. 167
48
Jon Mills, Janusz A. Polanowski Ontology of Prejudice, p. 19
49
By Barry Sudiker, Born Evil Or Born Genius: The Leading Cause of Crime & Turmoil in Today's World, p.35
50
Preventing prejudice: a guide for counselors, educators, and parents
By Joseph G. Ponterotto, Shawn O. Utsey, Paul Pedersen
51
By Jon Mills, Janusz A. Polanowski, Ontology of Prejudice, p.14
52
By Douglas W. Bethlehem, A social psychology of prejudice, p. 136-37
53
By André Klein A Mindful Guide to Online Living, p.56
54
By Martin Harrison, TV news, whose bias?: a casebook analysis of strikes, television and media, p. 24-25
55
By Adam Kuper, Jessica Kuper, The Social Science Encyclopedia,p. 1138-10
56
By Joseph G. Ponterotto, Shawn O. Utsey, Paul Pedersen, Preventing prejudice: a guide for counselors, educators,
and parents, p.20-35
57
By Geoffrey Duncan Mitchell, A new dictionary of the social sciences, p.146
58
By Anton Pelinka, Karin Bischof, Karin Stögner, Handbook of Prejudice, p.7
59
By David Scott, Realism and educational research: new perspectives and possibilities, p.18
60
By Lois Weis, Michelle Fine, Beyond silenced voices: class, race, and gender in United States schools,p. 56
61
By David Scott, Realism and educational research: new perspectives and possibilities, 16-18
62
Anton Pelinka, Karin Bischof, Karin Stögner, Handbook of Prejudice, p.5-7
63
Human Kinetics, Inclusive Recreation, p.52-53
64
Anton Pelinka, Karin Bischof, Karin Stögner, Handbook of Prejudice, p.5-7
65
Kelly Bulkeley, The wilderness of dreams: exploring the religious meanings of dreams in ..., p.114-16
66
Francis J. Mootz, Law, Hermeneutics and Rhetoric, 187-88
67
Anton Pelinka, Karin Bischof, Karin Stögner, Handbook of Prejudice, p.5-7
68
Anton Pelinka, Karin Bischof, Karin Stögner, Handbook of Prejudice, p.5-7
69
Herbert Vorgrimler, Sacramental theology, p.115-118
70
Anton Pelinka, Karin Bischof, Karin Stögner, Handbook of Prejudice, p.5-7
71
Kenneth Womack, A companion to the Victorian novel, p. 132-33
72
Edwin Carl Smith, Relentless Love: The Power of Transformative Life, p.15-17
73
John Elliott, John Elliott, Reconstructing teacher education: teacher development, p.16-20
74
Aucke Forsten, Between certainty and finitude: a study of Laṅkāvatārasūtra chapter two, p. 232-233
75
Lynn Kapitan, An Introduction to Art Therapy Research,p.152
76
Douglas Ezzy, Qualitative Analysis: Practice and Innovation, p. 68
77
Douglas Ezzy, Qualitative Analysis: Practice and Innovation, p. 57-58
78
Evert Gummesson, Qualitative Methods in Management Research, p.181
79
Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, p.708-9
80
William H. Dray, On History and Philosophers of History, p. 58-59

25
81
Donn Welton, Hugh J. Silverman, Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, Critical and dialectical
phenomenology, p. 65
82
Don Lavoie, Economics and Hermeneutics, 214
83
Zvi Bekerman, Nicholas C. Burbules, Diana Silberman-Keller, Learning in places: the informal education
reader,p.167
84
Leslie Paul Thiele, The Heart of Judgment: Practical Wisdom, Neuroscience, And Narrative, p. 42-45
85
Purushottama Bilimoria, Andrew B. Irvine, Postcolonial Philosophy of Religion, p. 108-110
86
By George E. McCarthy, Romancing antiquity: German critique of the Enlightenment from Weber to
Habermas,255
87
The Cambridge history of literary criticism, Volume 7
By Raman Selden, 267-8
88
By Ingrid Scheibler, Gadamer: between Heidegger and Habermas, p.18
89
Truth and Method
90
91
By Lorraine Code, Feminist Interpretations of Hans-Georg Gadamer, p.194
92
By Diane P. Michelfelder, Richard E. Palmer, Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter,p.
138
93
By Kathleen Wright, Festivals of Interpretation: Essays on Hans-Georg Gadamer's Work,p.56
94
The Contest Over Meaning: Hermeneutics as an InterpretiveMethodology for Understanding Texts
ANSHUMAN PRASAD, Organizational Research Methods, Vol. 5 No. 1, January 2002 12-33
95
By Paul Rabinow, William M. Sullivan, Interpretive Social Science: A Reader,p.156
96
By Kevin J. Vanhoozer, James K. A. Smith, Bruce Ellis Benson, Hermeneutics at the Crossroads, p. 68
97
Truth and Method, p.295
98
Being Amongst Others Phenomenological Reflections on the Life-world
Edited by
Eric Chelstrom,p16
99
By Robert J. Dostal, The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer,p.46
100
By Kalle Puolakka, Relativism and Intentionalism in Interpretation: Davidson, Hermeneutics, and ...,p.108

101
Fuyuki Kurasawa, The Ethnological Counter-Current in Sociology, International Sociology F March 2000 F Vol
15(1): 11–31 SAGE (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)
102
Truth and method, p.376
103
Fuyuki Kurasawa, The Ethnological Counter-Current in Sociology, International Sociology F March 2000 F Vol
15(1): 11–31 SAGE (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)
104
Thommy Eriksson, Being native – distance, closeness and doing auto/self-ethnography
105
Truth and Method, p.298
106
Manfred Oeming, Contemporary Biblical Hermeneutics: An Introduction,p.22-24
107
Hermeneutics in literature http://www.textetc.com/theory/hermeneutics.html accessed on 01 May 2012
108
Truth and Method,p.298
109
By James Risser, Hermeneutics and the Voice of the Other: Re-Reading Gadamer's Philosophical ...,p.77
110
http://repository.kulib.kyoto-u.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/2433/59222/1/jk23-hayashi.pdf 27/04/2012
111
The Contest Over Meaning: Hermeneutics as an InterpretiveMethodology for Understanding Texts
ANSHUMAN PRASAD, Organizational Research Methods, Vol. 5 No. 1, January 2002 12-33
112
Truth and Method, p.298
113
Truth and Method, p.298
114
Understanding of understanding.
115
TORCH TRINITY JOURNAL 7 (2004) UNDERSTANDING AS APPLICATION IN GADAMER’S
PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS,pp.76-105, Graudate university library Seoul
Clive S. Chin

26
116
By Kevin J. Vanhoozer, James K. A. Smith, Bruce Ellis Benson, Hermeneutics at the Crossroads, p. 68
117
Kalle Puolakka, Relativism and Intentionalism in Interpretation: Davidson, Hermeneutics, and ...,p.108
By Kalle Puolakka
118
By Francis J. Mootz III, George H. Taylor, Gadamer and Ricoeur: Critical Horizons for Contemporary
Hermeneutics ,p.230
119
Jack Martin, Jeff H. Sugarman, Sarah Hickinbottom, Persons: Understanding Psychological Selfhood and
Agency, p.128-31
120
Truth and method,p.278
121
By Robert L. Arrington, A companion to the philosophers, p. 261
122

27