Evidence Based Medicine
Evidence Based Medicine
Evidence Based Medicine
Introduction
EBM claimed that when evaluating a body of evidence seek out data
generated from RCTs as it is the most scientifically valid and unbiased form of
evidence1. Implicit to this philosophy was the idea that if two studies, with varying
study designs, gave conflicting results place more faith in the outcome of the RCT.
There is no doubt that the EBM movement had noble intentions. It sought to bring
a new air of certainty to clinical medicine, transform the education practices for the
next generation of physicians and to increase the quality of medicine delivered to
patients1. Although it has transformed the educational practices for a generation of
physicians, it has done so to the detriment of the quality of medicine delivered to
patients. Corporate interests have hijacked EBM and have coopted it as a part of
their marketing branch2. Spielmans and Parry have coined this hostile take over as
marketing-based medicine (MBM)2. Through internal documents of the
pharmaceutical industry they make it clear that, at least for the pharmaceutical
industry, the purpose of generating and publishing data from clinical research is to
support, directly or indirectly, the marketing of their products 2.
Since the inceptions of the EBM movement in 1992 the generation of medical
knowledge has become increasingly centralized and clinicians have become overly
reliant on and unduly faithful to the outcomes of RCTs. It is around this time we
saw the exodus of clinical research from large academic centers to the marketing
department of the pharmaceutic industry3. To get a grasp of this issue It is
important to understand the incentive structure for clinical researcher as it has,
unfortunately been weaponized by the pharmaceutical industry. The game is cyclic
and very simple. Acquire research funding, generate impactful research, get
published in the most prestigious medical journals and apply for more funding. It is
a simple merit based system. Ideally, those that produce meaningful research tend
to get published in the most prestigious journals and with that comes academic
prowess and advancement in one’s career. Indeed, academic institutions and
universities frequently use the number of publications credited to researcher’s name
as a measure of competency and a criterium during their recruitment process5.
Academic researchers are under immense pressure to publish, the phrase “publish
or perish” initially coined by Archibald Cary Coolidge has become mode of existence
for many academic researchers5. The pharmaceutical industry, has exploited and
weaponized this process to the detriment of the integrity of clinical researchers and
institutions alike.
The zeal of the EBM movement has shifted clinical decision making away
from clinical expertise and pathophysiological reasoning to the reliance on data
generated from RCTs. This has unwittingly centralized evidential authority that
has subsequently been exploited by the pharmaceutical industry for their
marketing needs. As Spielman’s and Parry point out, data generated from
sponsored clinical trials belongs to the sponsor and the purpose of the data is to
support marketing goals of their product and not primarily to expand the existing
knowledge base, as you would expect to be the goals of medical research2. MBM, at
least when it comes to pharmaceutical interventions, is the main driving factor of
publication bias. If publication of clinical results only serves to advance marketing
goals, then why would industry publish trials with negative outcomes? Indeed, the
rate of publishing negative outcomes is far lower in industry sponsored research
than non-industry sponsored research12. Recently Turner et al obtained reviews
from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for studies of 12 antidepressants
agents, identified matching publications in literature and then compared the
published outcomes and reported effects sizes with those retrieved from the FDA
dataset13. Of the published studies 94% of the trial outcomes were positive13. By
contrast, the FDA analysis showed that only 51% had positive outcomes13. They also
found that one third of the studies that the FDA considered as negative or
questionable were published in a way that conveyed positive outcomes. Spinning
negative or dubious results is a common and unethical strategy used by the
industry2. In addition, Turner et al noted that the published studies had inflated
effects sizes that overexaggerated the true therapeutic value of the drugs. If the
hypothetical resident from the landmark EBM article had done her literature
search today to determine if antidepressants were an effective treatment for her
patient’s depression she would have come to a confident, but an erroneous
conclusion.
Purposed Solutions
An effective solution for addressing publication bias must address the three
pillars that support the MBM apparatus. It must address the pressure of publishing
for academic researchers, the financial conflict of interest in medical journals and
decoupling industry marketing aims from clinical research. Several proposals exist
in the literature that address different elements of this issue. What ties these
various viewpoints together is the call for transparency, increasing accessibility of
research data and attempting to minimize the influence of industry on clinical
research. Speilmans and Parry outline several changes to increase transparency of
clinical research. They suggest that editors and peer reviewers, should check online
clinical trial registry entries to verify whether the data in a published clinical trial
matched the results and protocol in the registry2. One tactic used by the
pharmaceutical industry to spin negative trial outcomes is to publish positive
secondary outcomes as if they were the primary endpoints of interest for the
study.2,13 In theory this tactic would hold pharmaceutical companies accountable
and limit deceptive publishing practises. They also call for public access to
regulatory agency reports, trial protocols and results to increase transparency of
clinical research2. Regulatory agency reports present an honest and unbiased
analysis of clinical data that is free from spin. These outcomes can be directly
compared to the primary endpoints outlined by the trial protocols and allows
readers and independent researcher to hold the pharmaceutical companies
accountable.
Richard Smith, the former editor of the British Medical Journal, who has
called medical journals an “extension of the marketing arm of pharmaceutical
companies”, believes medical journals should cease publishing clinical trials
altogether16. Similar to Spielman’s and Parry, he calls for greater transparency of
clinical trial data. He suggests that protocols and clinical trial data should be
publicly available and accessible through a regulated website. All three authors
suggest that the data generated from clinical trials should viewed as a common
public good, instead of proprietary information of the pharmaceutical companies.
This would go a long way for rebuilding the public trust in the pharmaceutical
industry and allow for a true free market system to flourish. He also recommends
that medical journals should stop publishing trials and instead concentrate on
critically describing them. Although this sounds like a promising idea, it is far to
easy to exploit. It is not hard to imagine pharmaceutical companies contracting out
analyst to generate favorable critiques of their trial data and then have them
submitted for publication. In addition, he calls for an increase in public funding of
trials, particularly of large head-to-head trials, to evaluate the efficacy of all
existing treatments16.
Sismondo has offered some suggestion to address this issue. As many of the
publishing firms contracted by industry deal directly with the publishing journals
themselves, Sismondo suggest that journals should take a strong stance and refuse
to deal directly with publication planners. In addition, journals could adopt a “film
credit model” of authorship, in which authors rigidly and closely specify their roles
in the research process. Of course, violations of these rules should be met with swift
penalties to discourage academic researchers for taking part in such dishonest
activities. He also calls for universities and academic health centers to prohibit
contracts that allow for sponsor to draft, edit or facilitate publications as well as
prohibiting sponsors from keeping raw data from the academic researchers. Angell
takes a more aggressive approach and insists academic institutes adopt stronger
conflict of interest guideline and certain financial ties be inhibited altogether. She
focuses on the social interactions between academic researchers and industry. She
states that although most researchers would insist that they can remain objective
and not be influenced by industry, close collaboration with industry creates a sense
of good will on part of the researchers and may influence their judgment20. She
takes a strict stance on the degree of social interaction between industry and
researchers and suggests academic institutes place firm restrictions on researchers
receiving sponsored trips, gifts, symposiums, consulting fees and honorariums20.
Although limiting social interaction with industry may improve the objectivity of
the academic researchers, it fails to address some of the more pressing issues such
as such as the overreliance on industry for research funding, ghost writing and
concerns relating to the ownership of data generated from sponsored studies.
Unlike Smith I do not call for the outright ban of journals publishing clinical
trials. I believe the method that I have laid out above will maximize transparency
and honesty of publications and bring to the awareness of the readers which
publications have been sponsored by industry, involved CROs and/or publishing
firms. In agreement with Speilmans, Parry and Smith I also think raw data from
clinical trials should be made public for independent analysis. The USNLM should
require all registrants of Clinicaltrials.gov to also submit raw data in a
standardized format no later than two weeks after the completion of the study. This
data should be organized and kept in an online national archive that is easily
accessible to the public. The USNLM, on the same website, should also publish the
independent analysis of clinical trials conducted by the FDA. Medical journals
should be mandated to provide a link to the raw data at the tail end of each
published article, so readers can access the data and FDA reports directly. If these
conditions are met, it will resolve many of the concerns outlined by Spielmans,
Parry, Smith and Sismodo, without having to go the extreme step of completely
separating industry from clinical research. I think my approach is more feasible as
it allows industry to continue funding expensive research endeavors and authors
from academic institutes to continue receiving research funding from industry. At
the same time this approach will hold the industry accountable for negative trial
data, increase transparency of ghost management and possibly discourage authors
from using their academic credibility as a veil of independence for industry. In
addition, this will allow researchers to continue bolstering their resume with
publications while letting consumers of these publications know the degree of the
authors involvement in the research process. This creates a self-regulating system
whereby an academic researcher would have to weigh the benefit of publication
with potential loss of credibility.
Industry advertisement in medical journals is a difficult web to unweave. I
am in full agreement with Lexchin and Light who suggestion that; journals should
publish information about their sources of income, for editors to disclose their own
relevant conflicts of interest to readers, editorial staff, managers and owner and
perhaps consider not allowing editors to have any direct financial ties to any
healthcare business that advertises in the journal they edit. I think this is a step
towards the right direction, but is insufficient as it does not fully address the
reliance of medical journals on industry advertisement revenue. Orentlicher and
Hehir II have suggested that medical journals should only sell advertising space to
non-medical commercial interest, while Fugh-Berman et al have taken a more
conservative approach and suggested that medical journals should at least make
available advertisement space for non-medical commercial interest. As I have
mentioned above the pharmaceutical industry makes a sizeable return on
investment(ROI) for advertising in medical journals and thus could afford to pay the
exorbitant fees. I highly doubt that luxury products would make a similar ROI and
be able to afford the hefty price tag for advertising in these journals. I think the
medical journal publications are in the same unfortunate situation as many
newspapers and magazines. More people are going online for information and less
are relying on print. Publishing is an expensive process and because of this shift to
online platforms many median companies have ceased printing hardcopies of their
products and have moved online23. The upside of moving to online is that it is far
less costly to publish articles and thus medical journals would not require as much
advertisement revenue to keep their business operational. This can allow these
journals to expand their pool of potential advertisers, especially if they make
publications free and open to the public. Decreasing their reliance on industry
advertisements may free up the journals to publish articles critical of the industry.
Indeed, this has been tried and successfully implemented by the Public Library of
Science (PLOS) a non-profit publisher which declared that it would no be a part of
“the cycle of dependency that has formed between journals and the pharmaceutical
industry”24. This publishing firm has made a valiant effort to separate itself from
industry. The online journal does not accept any advertisements for drugs or
devices, does not benefit from exclusive reprint sales to drug companies and decline
to publish studies aimed purely at increasing a drug’s market share24. PLOS is a
perfect example of how my approach could be implemented effectively.
What is missing from all of the approaches outlined by the authors above is
the failure to recognize the importance of prestige and credibility for all three key
players; the pharmaceutical industry, the publishing journal and the publishing
authors (clinical researchers). The changes that I and others have purposed can be
catalyzed if the proper social pressures are applied. According to the 2016 GALLUP
the pharmaceutical industry is the second worse publicly rated U.S business
sector25. Public trust in the medical profession has also seen a decline. A large
international survey conducted by the Robert Wood Johnson foundation and the
National Institute of Mental Health found that in 1966 73% of Americans said they
had great confidence in the leader of the medical profession. In 2012 only 34% of
Americans shared the same sentiment26. In the same study the authors found that
only 23% of the public have a great deal of confidence in the U.S health care
system26. What is clear is that there is a growing mistrust in both the medical
community and the pharmaceutical industry. I doubt that the public is aware of the
rampant issue of MBM and publication bias, although, judging form the public
opinion polls they would not be surprised to hear this information. We can’t ask the
industry to change, we must make them want to change. The key stakeholder to
target would be the medical journals, academic authors and clinicians. The
campaign, implemented through social media and online publications, would bring
to public awareness the insidious relationship between industry and clinical
research. It’s primary aim would be to expose the issues I have highlighted above
and target the credibility of clinical researchers and publishing journals. The
campaign would arm citizens with credible publications, that dispute the
therapeutic claims of pharmaceutic drugs, and would ask them to present these
publications to their physicians and demand an explanation as to why they are
being prescribed medications with questionable efficacy. Ideally this would be to
create unrest in the medical community and have them question the reliability of
the medical journals that have published biased industry studies. This tactic is not
to dissimilar with the ongoing “fake news” campaign in the United States that is
demanding greater objectivity of media organizations. The social milieu is ripe for
what I would call a “fake medicine” campaign that would demand greater
objectivity in clinical research. This in turn would place the needed pressure on
medical journals to change their publishing practises or risk losing their credibility
and subscribers. Although this strategy sounds nefarious, it could result in a rapid
shift in publishing practises and bring to the forefront the need for more
transparency in, and public funding of, clinical research. Publication bias and MBM
as been discussed in literature and policies have been proposed, but have not been
implemented to the extent needed to curb the issue. If we truly want this issue to be
resolved, we must devise a political strategy in conjunction with effective policy
proposals and use social pressure to catalyze the changes we desire.
References