OSG Memorandum On Quo Warranto Petition

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
En Banc
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY
SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE
C. CALIDA,
Petitioner,
- versus - G.R. No. 237428

For: Quo Warranto
MARIA LOURDES P.A.
SERENO,
Respondent.
x------------------------------x
MEMORANDUM
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor

General Jose C. Calida, respectfully submits this
Memorandum.
PREFATORY STATEMENT
The 1987 Constitution requires that an appointee to the

judiciary be of proven integrity. To comply with this rule, the
Judicial and Bar Council directed all applicants for the position
of Chief Justice in 2012 to submit all previous SALNs.
Respondent Sereno furnished the JBC with only three SALNs,
although she had been a professor at the UP College of Law
for twenty years before becoming an Associate Justice of the
Court. The report to the JBC nevertheless contained the entry
“completed requirements” opposite her name. The JBC was
not aware that she did not file her SALNs every year. It would
turn out later that she filed only nine SALNs with UP during
her two decades of teaching. If these were known to the JBC,
she would not have been shortlisted: under Section 9 of R.A.
No. 3019, the failure to file a SALN is punishable with
dismissal from the service. There would have been no reason
MEMORANDUM
Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor
General Jose C. Calida v. Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno
G.R. No. 237428
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to shortlist an applicant whose dismissal appeared certain

because of a violation of the law.
The public was also kept in the dark about Respondent’s

ineligibility. No one – not even the Solicitor General – knew
that she did not comply with the requirement of filing a SALN
every year. It was only during the impeachment proceedings
at the House of Representatives that Respondent’s ineligibility
became known. Within a year after getting the information of
Sereno’s failure to comply with the SALN requirement, the
Solicitor General filed the present quo warranto action.
THE RELEVANT PROCEEDINGS1
1. On March 5, 2018, Petitioner Republic of the

Philippines instituted before the Court this petition for quo
warranto under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, in relation to Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, to
assail the validity of Respondent’s appointment as Chief
Justice on the ground that she does not possess the
qualification of proven integrity under Section 7(3), Article
VIII of the Constitution.
2. On the same date, Petitioner filed a Very Urgent

Omnibus Motion asking the Court to set the case for oral
arguments.
3. On March 6, 2018, the Court in a Resolution

required Respondent to comment on the Petition. Respondent
complied by submitting a Comment Ad Cautelam dated March
16, 2018. On March 20, 2018, the Court directed Petitioner to
respond to the Comment. Petitioner filed its Reply dated
March 27, 2018.
4. On April 2, 2018, Respondent filed an Ad Cautelam

Motion to Set for Oral Argument.
1
Pursuant to undertaking in the Petition dated March 2, 2018 and Manifestation dated March 16, 2018,
certified true copies of Annexes “A,” “F,” “F-1,” and “J” are attached to this Memorandum.
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5. In a Resolution dated April 3, 2018, the Court

granted Respondent’s Ad Cautelam Motion to Set for Oral
Argument and issued an Advisory (Governing Special Oral
Argument) for the parties.
6. In the Advisory, the Court required the parties to

submit on April 6, 2018 written copies of opening statements,
tables of authorities, copies of documents to be presented,
and slide presentations.
7. In compliance with the Advisory, Petitioner

submitted the required documents on April 6, 2018.
Respondent, on the other hand, belatedly submitted her
compliance with the Advisory only on the day of the oral
argument on April 20, 2018.
8. During the oral argument on April 10, 2018,

Respondent submitted a SALN.2 She invoked the Doblada
doctrine and alleged that she submitted all her SALNs in
accordance with the law.3
9. After the oral argument, the Court directed the

“parties to submit their Memorandum ... and the petition is
deemed submitted after that”.4
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
10. Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno began

teaching at the University of the Philippines College of Law in
1986.5 She continued teaching in Malcolm Hall until June 1,
2006.6
11. While a professor at the College of Law, Respondent

submitted to UP her SALNs only for the following years:
2
Transcript of Stenographic Notes, p. 120; Annex “26,” Respondent’s Ad Cautelam
Manifestation/Submission dated April 10, 2018.
3
TSN, p. 27.
4
TSN, pp. 237-238.
5
Annex “A” of the Petition dated March 2, 2018, Personal Data Sheet dated July 2, 2012.
6
Annex “B” of the Petition, Certification dated December 8, 2017 of Angela D. Escoto, Director of Human
Resources Development Office, UP, attaching SALN of Respondent as of December 31, 2002.
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Year/ Period Covered Signed/Notarized On

As of December 31, 19857 October 22, 1986
As of December 31, 19908 April 13, 1991
As of December 31, 19919 March 3, 1992
As of December 31, 199310 April 14, 1994
As of December 31, 199411 November 16, 1995
As of December 31, 199512 May 16, 1996
As of December 31, 199613 June 29, 1998
As of December 31, 199714 June 29, 1998
As of December 31, 200215 ---
12. Respondent also appears to have submitted a SALN

for 1998 with the Office of the Ombudsman in 2003.16
13. To explore other opportunities,17 Respondent took

a leave of absence from UP during the following periods:
1. June 1, 2000 – May 31, 2001

2. June 1, 2001 – May 31, 2002
3. November 1, 2003 – May 31, 2004
4. June 1, 2004 – February 10, 2005
5. February 11, 2005 – October 31, 2005
6. November 15, 2005 – May 31, 200618
14. While she was employed at UP, Respondent also

held the following positions in various government and private
offices: (a) President of AccessLaw, Inc. from April 2000 to
August 15, 2010; (b) consultant for Judicial Reform of the
7
Annex “O-1” of the Reply, Respondent’s 1985 SALN.
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Annex “O-8” of the Reply, Respondent’s 1997 SALN; Annex “P,” Certification dated April 17, 2018 of
the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, signed by Gregorio C. Tallud, Clerk
Court VII/Ex-Officio Sheriff, showing that Respondent’s 1997 SALN was notarized by Atty. Eugenia A.
Borlas on August 21, 2003.
15
Annex “B” of the Petition; See Annex “P,” showing that Respondent’s 2002 SALN was was notarized by
Atty. Eugenia A. Borlas on August 21, 2003.
16
Annex “C” of the Petition, Certification dated December 4, 2017 of Julie Ann Garcia of the Office of the
Ombudsman, attaching Respondent’s 1998 SALN, which was submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman on
December 16, 2003.
17
TSN, p. 78.
18
Annex “D” of the Petition, Letter dated December 8, 2017 from Angela D. Escoto, Director of Human
Resources Development Office, UP.
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United Nations Development Program, Word Bank, US Agency

for International Development (USAID) from 1995 to 2002;
c) legal counsel for various government agencies – Office of
the President, Office of the Solicitor General, Manila
International Airport Authority, Department of Agriculture,
Department of Trade and Industry, WTO-AFTA Commission,
Philippine Coconut Authority—from 1994 to 2008; (d)
Commissioner and Chairman of the Steering Committee of the
Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform from
August 1999 to December 1999; (e) Counsellor of the World
Trade Organization Appellate Body (Geneva) from July 1998
to October 1999; and (f) Deputy Commissioner of the
Commission on Human Rights.19
15. On June 1, 2006, Respondent resigned from the UP

College of Law.20
16. In July 2010, Respondent applied for the position of

Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.21 In support of her
application for appointment, she submitted her SALN for
2006.22 She was later appointed as an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court on August 16, 2010.23
17. After the position of Chief Justice became vacant in

2012, the Judicial and Bar Council issued an Announcement
for the opening of the position. In the Announcement, the JBC
directed that candidates submit the following requirements,
in addition to the usual documentary requirements:
1. Sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and

Networth (SALN)
a. for those in the government: all previous

SALNs (up to 31 December 2011)
b. for those from the private sector: SALN as of
31 December 2011
19
Annex “A” of the Petition: TSN, p. 162.
20
Annex “D” of the Petition.
21
Annex “E” of the Petition, Letter dated December 18, 2017 of Atty. Socorro D’ Marie T. Inting, Chief of
the Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination of the JBC to Cong. Reynaldo Umali. The letter
attached the SALNs of Respondent for the years 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011 and the Explanation Letter of
Respondent dated July 23, 2012.
22
Annex “E” of the Petition; Respondent claimed that this was her 2010 SALN, See TSN, pp. 34-35.
23
Annex “F” of the Petition, Oath of Office of Respondent dated August 16, 2010. See also Certificate of
Appointment dated August 13, 2010 (Annex “F-1”).
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2. Waiver in favor of the JBC of the confidentiality

of local and foreign bank accounts under the
Bank Secrecy Law and Foreign Currency
Deposits Act.24
18. On June 5, 2012, the JBC issued another

Announcement for vacancies in several positions, including
that of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. In this
Announcement, the JBC iterated that applicants to the
position of Chief Justice must meet the following
Constitutional qualifications:
A member of the Supreme Court must:
a. be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines

b. be at least forty (40) years of age but not
seventy years old or more
c. have been for fifteen (15) years or more a judge
of a lower court or engaged in the practice of
law in the Philippines; and
d. be of proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence.25
19. The announcement stated that candidates for the

Chief Justice post must submit “all previous SALNs (up to 31
December 2011) for those in the government or SALN as of
31 December 2011 for those from the private sector.” The JBC
reminded applicants that those with “incomplete or out of
date documentary requirements will not be interviewed or
considered for nomination.”26
20. It was not divulged to the public that in her

application for the Chief Justice post, Respondent submitted
to the JBC her SALNs only for the years 2009, 2010, and
2011. In a Letter dated July 23, 2012, she explained that “my
government records in the academe are more than fifteen
years old, [; thus,] it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to
retrieve all of those files.” For this reason, she requested that
the requirements she submitted “be viewed as that from a
private sector [sic], before [her] appointment to the
24
Annex “G” of the Petition, JBC Announcement dated June 4, 2012.
25
Annex “H” of the Petition, JBC Announcement dated June 5, 2012.
26
Annex “H” of the Petition.
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Government again in 2010 as Associate Justice of the

Supreme Court.”27 It does not, however, appear that
Respondent’s request was ever approved by the JBC.28
21. Despite her failure to file all her SALNs, the Report
to the JBC contained the notation “completed requirements”
beside Respondent’s name. She was thereafter nominated to
the position of Chief Justice. On July 2, 2012, Respondent
accepted her nomination for the position of Chief Justice.29 On
August 24, 2012, Respondent was appointed as the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court.30
22. Five years later, that is, on August 30, 2017, Atty.
Larry Gadon filed against Respondent an impeachment
complaint. He claimed that she committed the offenses of
culpable violation of the Constitution, corruption, high crimes,
and betrayal of public trust. He alleged, among other things,
that Respondent failed to truthfully declare her SALNs.31 He
also claimed that Respondent failed to disclose "exorbitant
lawyer's fees in the amount of SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE
THOUSAND U.S. DOLLARS ($745,000.00) or THIRTY-SEVEN
MILLION PESOS (₱37,000,000.00), which she received from
the Philippine government."32
23. The complaint was endorsed by twenty-five

congressmen.33 Finding the complaint sufficient in form and
substance, the House of Representatives’ Committee on
Justice conducted hearings on the complaint. During the
proceedings, the invalidity of Respondent’s appointment as
Chief Justice was exposed in view of her failure to submit her
SALNs for several years from 1986 to 2006 when she was a
professor at the UP College of Law.
27
Annex “E” of the Petition.
28
Annex “I” of the Petition, Excerpts of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes taken on February 7, 2018
(MLMR/VI-3), House of Representatives’ Committee on Justice hearings on Respondent’s impeachment.
29
Annex “J” of the Petition, Letter of Respondent dated July 2, 2012 addressed to Senior Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio.
30
Annex “K” of the Petition, Certificate of Appointment dated August 24, 2012. See also
http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/index.php/about-the-jbc/jbc-members/58; last accessed on April 16, 2018.
31
Verified Complaint for Impeachment dated August 2, 2017, par. 3.1.6.
32
Id. at 4.6.2.
33
Annex “L” of the Petition, A.M. No. 17-11-12 dated February 20, 2018.
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24. On November 23, 2017, the House of

Representatives issued a subpoena duces tecum to UP, JBC,
OMB relative to the allegations raised in the Letter of Atty.
Larry Gadon.34
25. In the course of the impeachment proceedings at

the House, Bureau of Internal Revenue Deputy Commissioner
Arnel SD. Guballa presented a Summary Report to the House
of Representatives’ Committee on Justice reflecting
Respondent’s under declaration of her Quarterly Value-Added
Tax Returns.35
26. According to Guballa, Respondent failed to pay all

the appropriate taxes. Based on the Letter dated February 26,
2018 of the BIR, Respondent’s Quarterly VAT Returns from
the 4th Quarter of 2005 to the 1st Quarter of 2009 are as
follows:36
PERIOD GROSS SALES OUTPUT TAX TAX PAID

2005
Q4 667,333.33 80,080.00 80,080.00
2006
Q1 469,375.00 56,325.00 56,325.00
Q2 1,416,664.25 169,999.71 169,999.71
Q3 - - -
Q4 1,246,992.00 149,639.04 149,639.04
2007
Q1 2,620,340.17 314,440.82 314,440.82
Q2 - - -
Q3 2,183,529.33 262,023.52 262,023.52
Q4 - - -
2008
Q1 2,650,440.00 318,052.80 318,052.80
Q2 - - -
Q3 508,032.00 60,963.84 60,963.84
Q4 1,045,262.67 125,431.52 125,431.52
2009
Q1 301,552.00 36,186.24 36,186.24
34
On December 4, 8, and 18, 2017, the OMB, UPHRDO, and JBC respectively submitted their compliance. 34
35
Annex “Q,” Letter of Bureau of Internal Revenue Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay dated April 17, 2018
attaching a certified copy of the Letter of Deputy Commissioner Arnel SD. Guballa dated February 26, 2018
with attached Summary Report and powerpoint presentation during the public hearing of the Committee of
Justice of the House of Representatives on February 27, 2018; Annex “Q-1,” OSG’s letter-request dated
April 11, 2018.
36
Id.
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27. The Summary Report revealed that Respondent

earned income from the Philippine Government, thru the
Office of the Solicitor General, in connection with the
Philippine International Airport Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO)
case:37
TAXABLE
YEAR Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2004 1,099,561.14 2,489,806.86 1,161,130.43 2,375,981.58
2005 2,438,990.52 827,685.00 1,398,807.50 7,234,455.44
2006 - - 1,539,546.28 1,387,292.12
2007 - - 4,379,198.29 633,670.58
2008 - - - 5,184,435.85
2009 344,243.65 - - -
28. After comparing Respondent’s Quarterly VAT

Returns and her income in connection with the PIATCO case,
Guballa reported that Respondent underdeclared her returns,
viz.:38
OSG
VAT
PERIOD QUARTERLY OVER(UNDER)
Declaration
INCOME
2005
Q3 1,398,807.50 - (1,398,807.50)
Q4 7,234,455.44 667,333.33 (6,567,122.11)
2006
Q1 - 469,375.00 469,375.00
Q2 - 1,416,664.25 1,416,664.25
Q3 1,539,546.28 - (1,539,546.28)
Q4 1,387,292.12 1,246,992.00 (140,300.12)
2007
Q1 - 2,620,340.17 2,620,340.17
Q2 - - -
Q3 4,379,198.29 2,183,529.33 (2,195,668.96)
Q4 633,670.58 - (633,670.58)
2008
Q1 - 2,650,440.00 2,650,440.00
Q2 - - -
Q3 - 508,032.00 508,032.00
Q4 5,184,435.85 1,045,262.67 (4,139,173.19)
2009
Q1 344,243.65 301,552.00 (42,691.65)
37
Id.
38
Id.
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29. Thereafter, the Solicitor General received a letter

dated February 21, 2018 from Atty. Eligio Mallari requesting
the filing of quo warranto proceedings against Respondent.39
ISSUES
30. The issues, as identified by the Court in its Advisory

dated April 3, 2018, are as follows:
a. Whether … the Court can assume

jurisdiction and give due course to the instant
petition for quo warranto against respondent who
is an impeachable officer and against whom an
impeachment complaint has already been filed with
the House of Representatives;
b. Whether … the petition may be dismissed

outright on the ground of prescription;
c. Whether … the respondent cab be

granted relief by this Court’s jurisdiction;
d. Whether … the respondent filed her SALN

as required by the Constitution, law, implementing
regulations, and the JBC Rules in relation to her
application for the position of Chief Justice;
e. Whether … the failure to file the SALN will

invalidate her appointment as Chief Justice;
f. Whether … the Certification issued by the

University of the Philippines Human Resources
Development Office dated December 8, 2017,
stating that its records contain only respondent’s
SALN for the year 2002; and the Certification issued
by the Office of the Ombudsman dated December
4, 2017, stating that there is no SALN filed by the
respondent except for her SALN ending December
1998, are false;
39
Annex “M” of the Petition, Letter of Atty. Eligio Mallari dated February 21, 2018.
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g. Whether … the petition for quo warranto

should be granted;
h. Whether … the submission of the

Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth
(SALN) carries the same weight as the
requirements for the judiciary enumerated in
Section 7, Article VIII of the Constitution;
i. Whether … the SALN is the only way of

determining if respondent is a person of proven
integrity;
j. Whether … the Judicial and Bar Council’s

(JBC) determination if a person is of proven
integrity is a political question beyond this Court’s
power of judicial review;
k. Whether … the Court, in the exercise of

its supervisory power over the JBC, can void the
JBC’s act of including respondent in the short list
for the position of Chief Justice; and
l. Whether … the JBC acted with grave

abuse of discretion when it included respondent in
the short list for Chief Justice despite her disclosure
of her failure to attach all her past SALNs to her
application.
31. These issues will be discussed in the following

arguments:
ARGUMENTS
A. PROCEDURAL
THE JURISDICTION OF THIS

HONORABLE COURT OVER THE
PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO IS
BASED ON THE CONSTITUTION.
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II
QUO WARRANTO IS AN
APPROPRIATE REMEDY TO OUST AN
INELIGIBLE IMPEACHABLE
OFFICIAL FROM PUBLIC OFFICE.
III
THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT

EXCLUDE QUO WARRANTO AS A
REMEDY TO OUST RESPONDENT AS
CHIEF JUSTICE BECAUSE OF HER
INELIGIBILITY.
a. The Constitution allows the

ouster of an impeachable official through
quo warranto.
b. A quo warranto petition is a

remedy separate and distinct from
impeachment proceedings.
c. Quo warranto is distinct from

other special civil actions under the Rules
of Court.
IV
THE PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO

WAS FILED SEASONABLY.
a. Extinctive prescription does

not apply against the State.
b. The one-year prescriptive

period under Section 11, Rule 66 of the
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Rules of Court applies only to a private

petitioner in a quo warranto proceeding
who is claiming a right to the public office
and not to the State which has an
interest to ensure that only a qualified
individual occupies the highest position in
the Judiciary.
c. Even assuming arguendo that

a State-initiated action of quo warranto
is subject to prescription, the period has
not yet tolled against the State.
THE JBC’S DETERMINATION OF

WHETHER RESPONDENT IS A
PERSON OF “PROVEN INTEGRITY”
DURING HER APPLICATION FOR
CHIEF JUSTICE IS NOT A POLITICAL
QUESTION.
B. SUBSTANTIVE
VI
RESPONDENT IS NOT A PERSON OF

PROVEN INTEGRITY.
VII
RESPONDENT FAILED TO FILE HER

SALNs AS REQUIRED BY LAW.
a. Petitioner discharged its

burden of proof through presenting
credible evidence to prove Respondent’s
ineligibility.
b. Respondent’s reliance on the

case of Doblada is misplaced.
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c. Respondent’s demeanor,
marked by belligerence and evasiveness,
established that she is not a credible
witness.
VIII
RESPONDENT COMMITTED A
MISREPRESENTATION TO BE
SHORTLISTED BY THE JUDICIAL AND
BAR COUNCIL.
IX
RESPONDENT COMMITTED A LITANY

OF FALSEHOODS.
RESPONDENT DID NOT FILE HER

SALNs FOR 2005 AND 2006 TO
CONCEAL HER TRUE INCOME AS
LEGAL COUNSEL FOR THE
GOVERNMENT IN THE PIATCO CASE.
DISCUSSION
A. PROCEDURAL
I. THE JURISDICTION OF THIS

HONORABLE COURT OVER THE
PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO
IS BASED ON THE
CONSTITUTION.
32. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Court over the

present petition for quo warranto is based on Section 5 (1),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.40
40
See Conjuangco, et al. v. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 120640, August 8, 1996 citing Garcia,
Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 114135, October 7, 1994.
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33. Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution

provides:
ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the

following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases

affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.41
34. The Court has traversed this path before: it has not
shied away from exercising its constitutional mandate to rule
on quo warranto petitions even against impeachable officers.
Thus, in Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court exercised
jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition against the President
of the Republic. It resolved the issue of whether Arroyo was
unlawfully holding office.42 Again, in Lawyers League v.
Aquino, the Court entertained a petition questioning the
legitimacy of a sitting President.43
35. Even the 2010 Rules of the Presidential Electoral

Tribunal, promulgated on May 4, 2010, shows the
unmistakable bent of the Court. It provides that an election
contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest44 or a
petition for quo warranto45 against the President or Vice-
President.46 By analogy, if the writ of quo warranto is available
against the President and the Vice President who are
impeachable officers, Respondent may also be a proper
subject of quo warranto proceedings.
41
Underscoring and emphasis supplied.
42
Estrada v. Desierto and Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 146710-15 & G.R. No. 146738, March 2,
2001.
43
G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986.
44
A.M. No. 10-4-29-SC, dated May 4, 2010.
45
A.M. No. 10-4-29-SC, RULE 16. Quo warranto. – A verified petition for quo warranto contesting the
election of the President or Vice- President on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines may be filed by any registered voter who has voted in the election concerned within ten days
after the proclamation of the winner. (R16).
46
A.M. No. 10-4-29-SC, RULE 14. How initiated. – An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An election protest shall not
include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest. (R13).
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36. There is also an almost unanimous recognition that

impeachment is not the only mode to remove impeachable
officers. Following the May 2016 elections, the challenge
posed by Senator Ferdinand Marcos, Jr against Vice President
Leni Robredo continues before the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal. No claim has been raised that she could only be
ousted through the impeachment process.
37. It is therefore unseemly for Respondent to select a

part of the Constitution that favors her cause and feign
ignorance of another part that does not. One of the linguistic
canons is that every part of the statute is to be given effect.
This is no less applicable to the fundamental law of the land.
The precedents cited above are also difficult to miss. They
form part of the law of the land under Article 8 of the Civil
Code. The PET rules, in turn, have the force and effect of law.
The rules disprove Respondent’s assertion that an
impeachable officer can only be removed through the
impeachment process.
II. QUO WARRANTO IS AN

APPROPRIATE REMEDY TO
OUST AN INELIGIBLE
IMPEACHABLE OFFICIAL FROM
PUBLIC OFFICE.
38. Quo warranto is the proper remedy to question

Respondent’s eligibility as Chief Justice and oust her from
office.
39. The Latin term quo warranto, which literally means

“by what authority,” is recognized as an extraordinary legal
remedy whereby the State challenges a person or an entity to
show by what authority he holds a public office or exercises a
public franchise.
40. Quo warranto was originally used as a writ filed by

monarchs to challenge claims of royal subjects to an office or
franchise supposedly granted by the crown. The ancient writ
of quo warranto was a high prerogative writ in the nature of
a writ of right by the King against anyone who usurped or
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claimed any office, franchise, or liberty of the crown, to

inquire by what authority the usurper supported his claim …
to determine the right.47
41. In the Philippines, quo warranto was formalized into

law with the passage of the Code of Civil Procedure in August
7, 1901.48 Section 197 of the Code of Civil Procedure
provided:
Usurpation for Office or Franchise, etc.
SECTION 197. Usurpation of an Office or

Franchise. — A civil action may be brought in the name of
the Government of the Philippine Islands:
1. Against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or

unlawfully holds or exercises a public civil office or a
franchise within the Philippine Islands, or an office in a
corporation created by the authority of the Government of
the Philippine Islands;
2. Against a public civil officer who does or suffers an

act which, by the provisions of law, works a forfeiture of his
office;
3. Against an association of persons who act as a

corporation within the Philippine Islands, without being
legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act.49
42. The action was incorporated in the 1940 Rules of

Court under Rule 68 which expounded on the procedure. The
action was retained in the 1964 Rules of Court under Rule 66.
It has been carried over in Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
43. Section 1 of Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure lays down the grounds for the issuance of the writ
of quo warranto:
RULE 66
Quo Warranto
47
Agcaoili v. Suguitan, G.R. No. L-24806, February 13, 1926.
48
Act No. 190.
49
Section 197 of Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, as amended, August 7, 1901.
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Section 1. Action by Government against individuals.

— An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or
franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully

holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which,

by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the
forfeiture of his office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within

the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without
lawful authority so to act.50
44. In turn, Section 2 of the same Rule provides the

authority of the Solicitor General to file a quo warranto
petition:
Section 2. When Solicitor General or public

prosecutor must commence action. — The Solicitor General
or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the
Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he
has good reason to believe that any case specified in
the preceding section can be established by proof,
must commence such action.51
45. Pursuant to the above-quoted provisions, the

Solicitor General on his own can institute the proceedings if
he has good reason to believe that he can establish by
proof that (a) a person is usurping, intruding into, or
unlawfully holding or exercising a public office, position or
franchise, (b) a public officer did an act which, by the
provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his
office, or (c) an association is acting as a corporation within
the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without
lawful authority so to act.
46. After the invalidity of Respondent’s appointment as

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court was exposed during the
hearings of the House of Representatives’ Committee on
50
Emphasis supplied.
51
Emphasis supplied.
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Justice on Atty. Gadon’s impeachment complaint, the Solicitor

General received a letter dated February 21, 2018 from Atty.
Mallari requesting the filing of quo warranto proceedings
against Respondent
47. The Solicitor General therefore acted properly in

instituting the quo warranto proceedings against Respondent.
III. THE CONSTITUTION DOES

NOT EXCLUDE QUO WARRANTO
AS A REMEDY TO OUST
RESPONDENT AS CHIEF
JUSTICE BECAUSE OF HER
INELIGIBILITY.
III.a. The Constitution allows

the ouster through quo
warranto of an ineligible
impeachable official.
48. It is absurd for Respondent to argue that

impeachment is the sole mode to remove an impeachable
officer,52 and that the framers of the 1987 Constitution
“considered it a given” that impeachment is the only mode to
remove her based on the rule on common law where the
concept was derived.53
49. A review of the provisions on impeachment in the

1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions controverts her claims.
50. Admittedly, Section 1, Article IX of the 1935

Constitution provided:
Section 1. The President, the Vice-President, the

Justices of the Supreme Court, and the Auditor General,
shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, or other high crimes.54
52
Annex “A” (Opening Statement of Atty. Alexander J. Poblador) of Respondent’s Ad Cautelam
Manifestation/Submission dated April 10, 2018, pp. 2-3.
53
Id., p. 2.
54
Emphasis supplied.
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51. Section 1, Article X of the 1935 Constitution

likewise stated:
Section 1…. The Chairman and the other Members of

the Commission on Elections may be removed from office
only by impeachment in the manner provided in this
Constitution.55
52. Subsequently, Section 2 of Article XIII of the 1973

Constitution read:
Section 2. The President, the Members of the

Supreme Court, and the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions shall be removed from office on impeachment
for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, other high crimes, or graft and
corruption.56
53. In contrast, Section 2, Article XI of the 1987

Constitution now states:
Section 2. The President, Vice-President, the Members

of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commission, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from
office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.57
54. Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions used the

words shall and only; on the other hand, the 1987
Constitution uses the word may to qualify the modes of
removal of such impeachable officials. The use of the word
may in the provision is construed as permissive and operating
to confer discretion. It cannot be construed as having a
mandatory effect.58
55
Emphasis supplied.
56
Emphasis supplied.
57
Emphasis supplied.
58
Bayan Muna v. Romulo, G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011.
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55. Plainly stated, the 1987 Constitution does not state

that impeachment is the sole method of removing an
impeachable officer. The primary source from which to
ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of
the constitution itself.59 The presumption is that the words in
which the constitutional provisions are couched to express the
objective sought to be attained.60
56. Applying the verba legis principle, the Court can

readily discern that Section 2, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution does not prohibit quo warranto to remove
impeachable officers. When the issue of ineligibility of an
impeachable public officer arises, the Court can rule that a
quo warranto petition is proper.
57. This argument finds support in legislative history.

In the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
Commissioner Rodrigo stated that members of the Judiciary
may not be removed except by impeachment or some very
difficult process:
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, may I ask a question for

clarification? The section says, "The Congress shall establish
an independent central monetary authority." My question
has reference to the word "independent." How is
independence of this authority supported by the
Constitution?
In the case of the judiciary, the Members are

independent because they have a fixed term and they
may not be removed except by impeachment or some
very difficult process. This applies to the different
constitutional commissions. But in the case of this central
monetary authority which we call "independent", how is this
independence maintained?61
59
Padilla et al. v. Congress of the Philippines et al., G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017.
60
J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No. 21064, February 18, 1970.
61
See III Records, Constitutional Commission 611 (22 August 1986), cited in Gonzales III v. Office of the
President, G.R. No. 196231, September 4, 2012 (Concurring Opinion, Mr. Justice Carpio).
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58. Nonetheless, Respondent has put a spin to the

modal “may.” Supposedly, the word may qualifies only the
penalty that may be imposed after the impeachment trial.62
59. Following Respondent’s proposition to its logical

end, the Senate sitting as an impeachment court can – after
finding an official guilty of an impeachable offense – impose
a penalty lower than removal from office, like suspension or
reprimand. This is absurd.
60. The penalties that the Senate may impose in an

impeachment case are limited to removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the
Philippines.63 Since the grounds for impeachment are serious
offenses, the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, in case
of conviction, is left with no other option but to order the
official’s removal from office and disqualification to hold any
public office. Conversely, if the Senate finds the official not
guilty of any of the offenses contained in the Articles of
Impeachment, although the subject acts comparatively may
constitute some lesser offenses, it must acquit the official. It
cannot impose a lesser penalty. Otherwise, there might be a
situation where the Senate would impose upon an impeached
President the penalty of suspension, say, for two years. This
could not have been contemplated by the framers of the
Constitution because a vacancy in the office of the President
occurs only in case of death, permanent disability, removal
from office, or resignation of the President, in which event the
Vice-President shall become the President to serve the
unexpired term.64
61. Tersely put, it is unthinkable that culpable violation

of the Constitution can be punished with suspension; treason
with censure; betrayal of the public trust with reprimand.
Under the verba legis rule, the Senate if it convicts an
impeachable official can only impose the penalty of removal
and disqualification from public office.
62
Annex “A” (Opening Statement of Atty. Alexander J. Poblador) of Respondent’s Ad Cautelam
Manifestation/Submission dated April 10, 2018, pp. 2-3.
63
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 2009
ed., p. 1156; see also Vicente G. Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 11th (1962) ed., p. 377.
64
See Section 8, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
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62. Respondent, not content with putting a twist to the

modal “may,” props up her thesis that she can only be
removed through the impeachment process by arguing that
the Court has no disciplinary authority over incumbent
members of the Supreme Court.65 She is mistaken.
63. Section 13 of A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC dated May 4,

2010 provides for the creation of a permanent Committee on
Ethics and Ethical Standards (“Ethics Committee”), which
shall have the task of preliminarily investigating against all
complaints involving graft and corruption and violations of
ethical standards filed against members of the Supreme
Court.66 The provision states:
Section 13. Ethics Committee. – In addition to the

above, a permanent Committee on Ethics and Ethical
Standards shall be established and chaired by the Chief
Justice, with the following membership:
(a) a working Vice-Chair appointed by the Chief

Justice;
(b) three (3) members chosen among themselves

by the en banc by secret vote; and
(c) a retired Supreme Court Justice chosen by the

Chief Justice as a non-voting observer-
consultant.
The Vice-Chair, the Members and the retired Supreme

Court Justice shall serve for a term of one (1) year, with the
election in the case of elected Members to be held at the call
of the Chief Justice. The Committee shall have the task of
preliminarily investigating all complaints involving graft and
corruption and violations of ethical standards, including
anonymous complaints, filed against Members of the Court,
and of submitting findings and recommendations to the en
banc. All proceedings shall be completely confidential. The
Committee shall also monitor and report to the Court the
progress of the investigation of similar complaints against
Supreme Court officials and employees, and handle the
annual update of the Court’s ethical rules and standards for
submission to the en banc.
65
Comment, pp. 19-20, par. 2.8, p. 16, par. 2.13.
66
The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court.
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64. In In Re: Undated Letter of Mr. Luis C.

Biraogo,67 the Court investigated Justice Ruben T. Reyes,
among other persons, for the leakage of confidential
documents from the Supreme Court en banc. The decision of
the Supreme Court finding Justice Reyes liable for the leakage
was rendered moot in view of the retirement of Justice Ruben
T. Reyes. The case nevertheless showed that the Court can
exercise jurisdiction over a disciplinary case against one of its
members.
III.b. A quo warranto petition

is a remedy separate and
distinct from impeachment
proceedings.
65. A petition for quo warranto is a “prerogative writ by

which the Government can call upon any person to show by
what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public
franchise.”68 It is a proceeding to determine the right of a
person to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to
oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-
founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege.69
66. Impeachment, on the other hand, refers to the

power of Congress to remove a public official for serious
crimes or misconduct as provided in the Constitution. A
mechanism designed to check abuse of power, impeachment
has its roots in Athens and was adopted in the United States
through the influence of English common law on the framers
of the US constitution.70 It is a method of national inquest to
protect the State. It does not intend to prosecute; it is not
intended for its retributory or restitutory effects. Rather, it is
in the nature of an exemplary act by which the State infuses
the highest sense of responsibility to public service.71
67. These proceedings are different in many respects.
67
A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC, February 24, 2009.
68
Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Hon. Mendez, G.R. No. 103702, December 6, 1994.
69
Velasco v. Belmonte, G.R. No. 211140, January 12, 2016.
70
Corona v. Senate, G.R. No. 200242, July 17, 2012.
71
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 354, July 28, 1986.
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68. Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution provides

that impeachable officials may be removed from office on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft, and corruption, other
high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. In the same breath,
Section 5(1), Article VIII of the same Constitution grants the
Honorable Court the original jurisdiction to issue the writ of
quo warranto to remove officials without distinction.
69. Put simply, quo warranto ousts a public officer for

ineligibility, or failing to meet the qualifications for such public
office at the time of appointment, while impeachment can
result in the removal of a validly-appointed or elected
impeachable officer for the commission of any of the
impeachable offenses while in office.
70. An impeachment case against a Supreme Court

Justice for an impeachable offense presupposes a valid
appointment of that Justice. In contrast, a quo warranto
petition asserts that the appointment of Respondent is void
ab initio.
71. In the present petition, what is assailed is

Respondent’s unlawful occupation of the position of Chief
Justice. She failed to fulfill the general qualification for
members of the judiciary that an applicant must be a person
of proven integrity. This petition does not involve issues or
matters relating to impeachable offenses that Respondent
may have committed, nor does it accuse her of committing
such offenses, which fall squarely within the ambit of
impeachment proceedings pending before the House of
Representatives.
72. Indeed, as established during the interpellation by

Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam, the power to ascertain
whether a public officer is eligible to a public office is
essentially judicial in character, viz.:
JUSTICE TIJAM:
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... when it refers to testing the qualification of a public

officer, it's always judicial in character, correct? Quo
warranto is judicial in character. You go to the HRET, for
example, the qualification of a Member of Congress, you
have the HRET and it is elevated to the Supreme Court.
ATTY. POBLADOR:
Yes, but ...
JUSTICE TIJAM:
Now, the Senate, the SET, Senate Electoral Tribunal,
also on the qualifications, it is also elevated to the Supreme
Court. So, the determination, the jurisdiction, the power to
ascertain qualifications of public officials is really
judicial in character, and you know pretty well that
the Senate is not judicial, it's political in character.72
73. Respondent, however, repeatedly invokes Cuenco

v. Fernan,73 In re: Gonzales,74 Jarque v. Desierto,75
Marcoleta v. Borra,76 and In re: Vizconde.77 These cases
unwittingly give the impression that impeachable officers may
only be removed from office through impeachment. Actually,
the Court held in these cases that public officers who are
required under the Constitution to be members of the Bar and
who may be removed from office by impeachment cannot be
charged with disbarment during their incumbency. This is
because to disbar the public officer would effectively strip off
a condition precedent and a continuing requirement
warranting their appointment and continued assumption in
office.
74. In other words, the cases relied upon by

Respondent presuppose a valid appointment of an
impeachable officer who has purportedly committed an
impeachable offense. The validity of the appointees’
qualifications in the adverted cases was not even at issue.
72
TSN, pp. 153-54; Emphasis supplied.
73
A.C. No. 3135, February 17, 1988.
74
A.M. No. 88-4-5433, April 15, 1988.
75
A.C. No. 4509, December 5, 1995.
76
A.C. No. 7732, March 30, 2009.
77
A.M. No. 12-8-4-SC, August 10, 2012.
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III.c. Quo warranto is distinct

from other special civil actions
under the Rules of Court.
75. A quo warranto proceeding is distinct from the

other special civil actions under the Rules of Court.
76. It is the precise remedy to oust a usurper: someone

who is appointed to public office despite his or her ineligibility.
The action does not require other parties to be impleaded in
order for the suit to prosper, as Section 1 of Rule 66 states.
The action may be brought in the name of the Republic
against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into or

unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or
franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which,
by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the
forfeiture of his office;
(c) An association which acts as a corporation
within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or
without lawful authority so to act.
77. On the other hand, a remedy like a petition for

certiorari under Rule 65 is directed against a judge or court,
quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or
person, and against private respondents interested in
sustaining the proceedings.78
78. Simply stated, the Court can grant Petitioner

complete relief although the JBC was not impleaded. Rule 66
is clear: it merely requires that the public officer unlawfully
occupying an office be impleaded.
IV. THE PETITION FOR QUO

WARRANTO WAS FILED
SEASONABLY.
78
Sec. 5, Rule 65, Rules of Court.
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IV.a. Extinctive prescription does

not apply against the State.
79. The Latin maxim nullum tempus occurrit regi or

nullum tempus occurrit reipublicae (time does not run against
the crown or the state) is embodied in Article 1108(4) of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides that extinctive
prescription does not run against the State:
Art. 1108. Prescription, both acquisitive and

extinctive, runs against: …
(4) Juridical persons, except the State and its

subdivisions.79
80. In Republic v. Grijaldo,80 the Court ruled that the

statute of limitations does not run against the right of action
of the Government of the Philippines:
Firstly, it should be considered that the complaint in

the present case was brought by the Republic of the
Philippines not as a nominal party but in the exercise of
its sovereign functions, to protect the interests of the
State over a public property. Under paragraph 4 of
Article 1108 of the Civil Code prescription, both acquisitive
and extinctive, does not run against the State. This Court
has held that the statute of limitations does not run
against the right of action of the Government of the
Philippines.81
81. Thus, when the State is acting in the exercise of its

sovereign functions to protect its interests over public
property, extinctive prescription does not run against the
State. Such is the case here.
82. Government funds are property of the State. Ergo,

the Court had ruled that the salary of a government officer or
employee, while still in the hands of the government, is
government property:
79
Emphasis supplied.
80
SCRA 687 (1965); Citation omitted; Emphasis supplied.
81
Emphasis supplied.
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The salary check of a government officer or employee

such as a teacher does not belong to him before it is
physically delivered to him. Until that time the check
belongs to the government….82
83. In this quo warranto petition, the Republic, through

the Solicitor General, is simply exercising its sovereign
function to protect its public coffers from wasteful spending in
favor of an unlawful holder of a public office.
84. This stance does not run afoul of the policy behind
the one-year prescriptive period, as Court had enunciated:
[T]he Government must be immediately

informed or advised if any person who claims to be
entitled to an office or a position in the civil service as
against another actually holding it, so that the
Government may not be faced with the predicament
of having to pay two salaries, one, for, the person
actually holding the office, although illegally, and another,
for one not actually rendering service although entitled to
do so.83
85. The one-year prescriptive period was instituted to

protect Government’s fiscal interests. To apply the
prescriptive period against the Government, and thus to
dismiss the quo warranto petition filed by the Solicitor General
on the ground of prescription, is to force the Government to
accord benefits to, and spend its resources for a person who
is illegally holding public office.
86. Logically, if the right of the State to protect its

interests over public property is imprescriptible, so is the right
of the State to defend itself from usurpers and unlawful
holders of office who receive public funds as compensation.
87. Besides, as correctly observed by Associate Justice

Noel Tijam, the issue of integrity, or the lack thereof, is not
subject to prescription:
82
Aurelio Tiro v. Honorable Agapito Hontanosas, G.R. No. L-32312, November 25, 1983.
83
Saturnino LL. Villegas v. Victoriano De La Cruz, 15 SCRA 722 (1965); Emphasis supplied.
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JUSTICE TIJAM:
No, what I'm saying, Chief Justice, is this, the lack of
integrity being cited by the Republic is the non-filing of the
SALN on one hand and the non-submission of the SALN to the
JBC, that's what they're saying. Now, you are saying, and we
have records that you did not file all of the SALN as required.
The records proved it but you are saying you could not locate
it ...
CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO:

Ganito...
JUSTICE TIJAM:
... that's what you're saying.

... the filing, the records has never been accepted in
SALN cases as conclusive proof of non-filing, that's
jurisprudence, that's the rules, that's the procedural
requirement.
JUSTICE TIJAM:
Integrity, Chief Justice, is not founded on
jurisprudence. It is founded on honesty, probity, truthfulness,
made by a person, that's integrity.

Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE TIJAM:
Integrity cannot be legislated, it cannot be decreed or
decided by the Court. That's integrity. Now, you're talking of
prescription, lack of integrity is not subject to prescription,
correct?

Your Honor, the finding of integrity is lodged with the
Judicial and Bar Council. The moment that they submit a
shortlist, that is a certification that the mem---people that are
listed in the shortlist are people of integrity ...
JUSTICE TIJAM:
If this Court ...

… competence, probity …
JUSTICE TIJAM:
.. if this court ...
CHTEF JUSTICE SERENO:
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.... and integrity.
JUSTICE TIJAM:
Your Honor, Chief, if this Court will sustain your
position that integrity can be waived in the case of the JBC, if
integrity, if integrity can be excused because of extenuating
circumstance like failing to locate something which is
essential to be submitted ...84
IV.b. The one-year prescriptive

period under Section 11, Rule 66 of
the Rules of Court applies only to a
private petitioner in a quo
warranto proceeding who is
claiming a right to the public office
and not to the State which has an
interest to ensure that only a
qualified individual occupies the
highest position in the Judiciary.
88. Section 216 of Act 190, the progenitor of the

present rules on quo warranto, reads:
Nor shall an action be brought against an officer to be

ousted from his office unless within one year after the cause
of such ouster, or the right to hold the office arose.
89. Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court contains

a similar prescriptive period:
SEC. 11. Limitations. — Nothing contained in this Rule

shall be construed to authorize an action against a public
officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the
same be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of
such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office
or position, arose ….
90. The Court had interpreted Section 216 of Act 190

to pertain to two criteria from which the one-year prescriptive
period is to be reckoned:
84
TSN, pp. 140-141.
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This provision states two criteria by reference to which

we are supposed to discover the date from which the period
of prescription is to be reckoned. One is the ouster, or
unlawful exclusion, of the right claimant from the
office; the other is the right of the lawful claimant to
hold the office.85
91. There is no gainsaying that the second criterion

(i.e. the right of the lawful claimant to hold the office)
contemplates a claimant who has a clear right to the
contested office. As to the first criterion, eminent author and
former Chief Justice Manuel Moran opined:
As to ouster from office, the one year begins to run

from the date when the petitioner might lawfully have
assumed office, and not from the date the incumbent
began to discharge the duties of the office.86
92. Both reckoning points contemplate a party claiming

interest and right to a public office. The Republic, however,
cannot be considered to have the same interest and claim to
public office. When the Solicitor General commences an action
for quo warranto on behalf of the Republic, as in this case, he
does not assert an interest and claim a right to public office.
Instead, the Solicitor General is enforcing a public right.
Hence, the one-year prescriptive period does not apply when
the action is commenced by the Solicitor General.
93. This interpretation is consistent with the policy

being enforced by this one-year prescriptive period:
[I]n actions of quo warranto involving right to an

office, the action must be instituted within the period of one
year. This has been the law in the island since 1901, the
period having been originally fixed in Section 216 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190). We find this provision
to be an expression of policy on the part of the State that
persons claiming a right to an office of which they are
illegally dispossessed should immediately take steps
to recover said office and that if they do not do so
85
Bautista v. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 626 (1918); Emphasis supplied.
86
Manuel Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court 178 (2 ND ed. 1947).
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within a period of one year, they shall be considered

as having lost their right thereto by abandonment.87
94. The one-year period undoubtedly serves as a

reckoning point from which to declare a party’s right to a
public office abandoned. The Rules therefore require the filing
of the quo warranto action within one year as they
presupposes that the party possesses an interest and asserts
title to a public office. The Solicitor General cannot be charged
with the same presumption as, it bears stressing, his interest
is not that of a private party’s but pursuant to his solemn duty
to defend the public’s interests.
IV.c. Even assuming arguendo

that a State-initiated action of quo
warranto is subject to
prescription, the period has not
yet tolled against the State.
95. Respondent mistakenly contends that “[e]ven

assuming that the one-year prescriptive period may be
counted from the petitioner’s ‘discovery’ of the
disqualification, the Petition would still be time-barred.”88
Allegedly, if she failed to file her SALNs for several years,
Petitioner “through U.P. which is a State University” would
have known about it already when she was appointed Chief
Justice on August 24, 2012.89 In support of her argument, she
cites Presidential Commission on Good Government v.
Carpio-Morales90 as authority for the statement that
“prescription cannot be counted from discovery of the offense
when ‘the necessary information, data, or records based on
which the crime could be discovered is readily available to the
public.”91
96. She may have forgotten that the present petition is

one for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. It
is a special civil action and not a criminal action. As she herself
admits, PCGG is about “determining the reckoning point for
87
Saturnino LL. Villegas v. Victoriano De La Cruz, 15 SCRA 721 (1965); Citations omitted; Emphasis
supplied.
88
Comment, p. 44, par. 2.39.
89
Id. at par. 2.39.2.
90
G.R. No. 206357, November 12, 2014.
91
Id. at 44-45, par. 2.39.3; Italics in the original.
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prescription of criminal offenses under Act No. 3326.”92 On

this score alone, PCGG obviously does not apply to the
present case. PCGG applies only to cases that require the
determination of the reckoning point for the prescription
period of violations of special acts, such as R.A. No. 3019,93
i.e., criminal offenses, pursuant to Section 2 of Act No.
3326.94
97. Actually, PCGG was an occasion for the Court to

carve out an exception through the “blameless ignorance”
doctrine:
Similarly, in the 2011 Desierto case, We ruled that the

“blameless ignorance” doctrine applies considering that the
plaintiff therein had no reasonable means of knowing the
existence of a cause of action. In this particular instance,
We pinned the running of the prescriptive period to the
completion by the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee of an exhaustive investigation on the loans. We
elucidated that the first mode under Section 2 of Act No.
3326 would not apply since during the Marcos regime, no
person would have dared to question the legality of these
transactions.
Prior to the 2011 Desierto case came Our 2006

Resolution in Romualdez v. Marcelo, which involved a
violation of Section 7 of RA 3019. In resolving the issue of
whether or not the offenses charged in the said cases have
already prescribed, We applied the same principle
enunciated in Duque and ruled that the prescriptive period
for the offenses therein committed began to run from the
discovery thereof on the day former Solicitor General
Francisco I. Chavez filed the complaint with the PCGG.
This was reiterated in Disini v. Sandiganbayan where

We counted the running of the prescriptive period in said
case from the date of discovery of the violation after the
PCGG’s exhaustive investigation despite the highly
publicized and well-known nature of the Philippine Nuclear
Power Plant Project therein involved, recognizing the fact
that the discovery of the crime necessitated the prior
92
Id. at 44, par. 2.39.3; Emphasis supplied.
93
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
94
An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run. Section 2 thereof provides: “Sec. 2.
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be
not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its
investigation and punishment. xxx.”
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exhaustive investigation and completion thereof by the

PCGG.95
98. Equally flawed is her averment that Petitioner

“cannot reasonably assert that it was only in December 2017
that it discovered that (she) had not submitted her SALNs to
the JBC or that she had allegedly failed to file her SALNs when
she was a Professor at the U.P. College of Law.”96 Supposedly,
Petitioner could and should be deemed to have known about
the matter of her SALNs as early as July 20, 2012 when the
JBC En Banc met to deliberate on the applicants to include in
the short list for the position of Chief Justice.97 This is
because, according to her, “[b]oth the JBC and U.P.—to whom
the SALNs were to be submitted—are instrumentalities of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines.”98
99. While it is true that a quo warranto petition is

“brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines,”99 it
is the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor who is
specifically directed to commence the action.100 The Solicitor
General is not synonymous with the Republic of the
Philippines. Even if the two are considered as one and the
same for purposes of the present case, Respondent engages
in oversimplification when she argues that knowledge of or
notice to the JBC and the UP, they being “instrumentalities of
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,” is
tantamount to knowledge of or notice to Petitioner.
100. Section 2, Rule 66 presupposes that the Solicitor

General had: (1) actual notice through a complaint or
otherwise; and (2) had opportunity to investigate the matter
so as to be able to form good reasons to believe that a case
must be filed. Thus, the Solicitor General himself (and no
other) must have had both factual and legal bases before
the prescriptive period runs. Unless the Solicitor General has
actual knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the
unlawful holding of a public office, it is well-nigh impossible
for him to form a “good reason to believe” that the filing of a
95
Citations omitted.
96
Comment, p. 47, par. 2.39.6.
97
Id. at 45-47.
98
Id. at 47, par. 2.39.6.
99
Rules of Court, Rule 66, Sec. 1.
100
Id. at Sections 2 and 3.
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quo warranto petition is warranted. Apropos, knowledge of or

notice to the JBC and to UP cannot be considered as
tantamount to notice to the Solicitor General.
101. The powers and functions conferred on the OSG

under Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of Executive
Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code
of 1987,101 do not include the monitoring of the compliance in
SALN submissions of other government agencies. In a similar
vein, Section 7 of R.A. No. 3019 and Section 8 of R.A. No.
6713, which contain an exhaustive listing where the SALNs
should be submitted, do not require other government
agencies to furnish the OSG with copies of the SALNs filed by
their employees.
102. Even if these SALNs are public documents as they

are notarized, these SALNs are not published. Hence, there is
no feasible way for the Solicitor General to take cognizance of
Respondent's submission or non-submission of the required
SALNs.
103. To stress, there is no law requiring the Solicitor

General to monitor the SALNs of government officials and
employees. The Solicitor General, as head of office, is only
tasked to monitor the SALNs submitted by the employees of
the OSG, not those from other agencies.
104. Appropriately, Section 31 of the Civil Service

Commission Resolution No. 060231 states:
Sec. 3. Ministerial Duty of the Head of Office to issue

Compliance Order.—Immediately upon receipt of the
aforementioned list and recommendation, it shall be the
ministerial duty of the Head of Office to issue an order
requiring those who have incomplete data in their SALN to
correct/supply the desired information and those who did
not file/submit their SALNs to comply within a non-
extendible period of three (3) days from receipt of said
order.102
101
Dated 25 July 1987.
102
Annex “R,” certified true copy of CSC Resolution No. 060231.
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105. Respondent’s non-filing of her SALNs during the

periods that she was required to do so while in government
service, as well as her submission of deficient SALNs in
relation to her application for the position of Chief Justice, was
only brought to the attention of the Solicitor General during
the hearings conducted by the House of Representatives'
Committee on Justice in February 2018. It is only from that
time that the prescriptive period of one year should be
counted from, assuming that the Republic is subject to
prescription.
106. This stance is not without precedent. In Frivaldo

v. Comelec,103 a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo’s
election and proclamation was filed with COMELEC by the
League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter. Frivaldo filed a
Petition for Certiorari with prayer for a Temporary Restraining
Order to keep the COMELEC from conducting a hearing on the
petition, partly on the ground that the ten-day period for quo
warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code had
expired. The Court ruled:
The argument that the petition filed with the

Commission on Elections should be dismissed for
tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private
respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from continuing
to discharge his office of governor because he is disqualified
from doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for public
office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or
election or assumption of office but during the
officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.
If, say, a female legislator were to marry a foreigner during
her term and by her act or omission acquires his nationality,
would she have a right to remain in office simply because
the challenge to her title may no longer be made within ten
days from her proclamation? It has been established, and
not even denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo's
naturalization was discovered only eight months after his
proclamation and his title was challenged shortly thereafter.
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a

person sitting as provincial governor in this country
while owing exclusive allegiance to another country.
The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does
103
G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989.
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not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting

public office and employment only to the citizens of this
country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office
cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the
people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice
of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in
this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this
rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of
citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country
only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any
other state.
107. In any event, the Court on numerous occasions

disregarded technicalities to render just and equitable
relief.104 Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided
on the merits and not on technicalities.105 Thus, in the League
of Cities v. COMELEC106 cases, the Court decided the cases
on the merits despite entry of judgment. In Estipona v.
Lobrigo,107 the Court disregarded technical defenses
particularly the failure to implead an indispensable party,
failure to file a declaratory relief petition in the proper court,
and the collateral attack to the constitutionality of a penal law,
and decided the merits of the case in view of the importance
of the issues involved.
V. THE JBC’S DETERMINATION

OF WHETHER RESPONDENT IS A
PERSON OF “PROVEN
INTEGRITY” DURING HER
APPLICATION FOR CHIEF
JUSTICE IS NOT A POLITICAL
QUESTION.
108. The issue of whether Respondent is a person of

proven integrity is not political question that is beyond the
Court’s power to resolve.
104
League of Cities v. COMELEC, citing Manotok IV v. Heirs of Barque, G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605,
December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 468; Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, and
183962, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402; Manalo v. Calderon, G.R. No. 178920, October 15, 2007, 536
SCRA 290; David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160; and Province of
Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 736.
105
Heirs of Zaulda v. Zaulda, G.R. No. 201234, March 17, 2014.
106
G.R. No. 176951, G.R. No. 177499, G.R. No. 178056, 21 December 2009 Resolution.
107
G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017.
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109. The Constitution vests the Court with judicial power

– the power and duty to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.108 The
“limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and
controversies” carries the assurance that “the courts will not
intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government.”109
110. Considering that Justices of the Court are not

elected by the people, the framers of the Constitution did not
see it fit to give the courts dominion over matters of policy.
As expressed by Justice Arturo Brion in Ocampo v.
Enriquez110, “[w]ith respect to matters of policy, we have no
right to substitute our wisdom over that of duly elected
political branches. They carry the mandate of the popular will
- we do not.”
111. Equally instructive is the discussion by

Willoughby 111
on political questions, to wit:
Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-

established principle is considered that it is not within the
province of the courts to pass judgment upon the
policy of legislative or executive action. Where,
therefore, discretionary powers are granted by the
Constitution or by statute, the manner in which those
powers are exercised is not subject to judicial review. The
courts, therefore, concern themselves only with the
question as to the existence and extent of these
discretionary powers.
As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and
executive departments are spoken of as the political
departments of government because in very many cases
their action is necessarily dictated by considerations of
108
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
109
Francisco, Jr. v. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. Nos. 166910, 169917, 173630, and 183599, October 19,
2010, 633 SCRA 470.
110
Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Arturo D. Brion in Ocampo et al v. Enriquez et al, G.R. No.
225973.
111
Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326 cited in Tañada v. Cuenco, G.R. No.
L-10520, February 28, 1957; Emphasis supplied.
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public or political policy. These considerations of public or

political policy of course will not permit the legislature to
violate constitutional provisions, or the executive to exercise
authority not granted him by the Constitution or by, statute,
but, within these limits, they do permit the departments,
separately or together, to recognize that a certain set of
facts exists or that a given status exists, and these
determinations, together with the consequences that flow
therefrom, may not be traversed in the courts.112
112. In re McConaughy113 characterized a political

question thus:
What is generally meant, when it is said that a

question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter
which is to be exercised by the people in their primary
political capacity, or that it has been specifically
delegated to some other department or particular
officer of the government, with discretionary power
to act.114
113. The political question bar essentially rests on the

separation of powers doctrine enshrined in the
Constitution.115
As the Court explained in Javellana v.
Executive Secretary:116
One of the principal bases of the non-justiciability of

so-called political questions is the principle of separation of
powers — characteristic of the presidential system of
government — the functions of which are classified or
divided, by reason of their nature, into three (3) categories,
namely, 1) those involving the making of laws, which are
allocated to the legislative department; 2) those concerning
mainly with the enforcement of such laws and of judicial
decisions applying and/or interpreting the same, which
belong to the executive department; and 3) those dealing
with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts
involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally
demandable and enforceable, which are apportioned to
courts of justice. Within its own sphere — but only
112
Id.
113
119 N.W. 408 cited in Tañada v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1957; Emphasis supplied.
114
See State v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 497, 51 L. R. A. 561; In Re Gunn, 50 Kan. 155; 32 Pac. 470, 948, 19
L. R. A. 519; Green v. Mills, 69 Fed. 852, 16, C. C. A. 516, 30 L. R. A. 90; Fletcher v. Tuttle, 151 Ill. 41, 37
N. E. 683, 25 L. R. A. 143, 42 Am. St. Rep. 220.
115
Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 602 Phil. 64, 73-77 (2009).
116
50 SCRA 30, 84, 87, March 31, 1973.
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within such sphere — each department is supreme

and independent of the others, and each is devoid of
authority not only to encroach upon the powers or
field of action assigned to any of the other
departments, but also to inquire into or pass upon the
advisability or wisdom of the acts performed,
measures taken or decisions made by the other
departments — provided that such acts, measures or
decisions are within the area allocated thereto by the
Constitution.117
114. In Vera v. Avelino,118 the Court cleared the air by

expounding on whether a question is political or justiciable:
It is a well-settled doctrine that political questions are

not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent
that power to deal with such questions has been conferred
on the courts by express constitutional or statutory
provisions. It is not so easy, however, to define the phrase
political question, nor to determine what matters fall within
its scope. It is frequently used to designate all questions
that is outside the scope of the judicial power. More
properly, however, it means those questions which,
under the constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the legislative or executive branch of the
government.119
115. In Tañada v. Cuenco,120 the Court also stated:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal

parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus
Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.121
117
Emphasis supplied.
118
77 Phil. 192, 223 [1946].
119
Emphasis supplied.
120
103 Phil 1051 [1957].
121
Emphasis supplied.
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116. Thus, for a political question to exist, there must be

in the Constitution a power vested exclusively in the President
or Congress, the exercise of which the court should not
examine or prohibit.122
117. Even Respondent adheres to this test. In her

Dissenting Opinion in the recent case of Ocampo v.
Enriquez,123 Respondent stated that the threshold test which
must be satisfied is “whether indeed the question is one
addressed to purely political exercises internal to the workings
of the legislature;124 or whether, on the part of the President,
there are no legal standards against which his particular
action can be evaluated.125”
118. Interestingly, in the same Dissenting Opinion,

Respondent admitted that “[t]here was a time when the
Honorable Court hid under the "political question" doctrine
and evaded constitutional and moral responsibility for the
long period of suppression of the people's basic rights.”
119. This time, Respondent argues that the

determination of her integrity is a political question.
Respondent cannot now be allowed to hide beneath the cloak
of the political question doctrine merely because it is
expedient.
120. The question of whether Respondent is of proven

integrity is not political; it is not incumbent upon the people
of the Republic to decide whether she had proven her integrity
before the JBC to become the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of the Philippines. At the same time, the determination
of whether Respondent is a person of proven integrity is not
left to the discretion of the executive or legislative branch of
the government. It is the JBC that is mandated to nominate
appointments to the Judiciary, including the post of the Chief
Justice.
122
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Gutierrez Jr. in Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989.
123
G.R. No. 225973, November 8, 2016.
124
Arroyo v. De Venecia, 343 Phil. 42 (1997).
125
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705 (2006); Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil.
618 (2000); Llamas v. Orbos, 279 Phil. 920 (1991).
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121. The issue of whether Respondent is a person of

proven integrity had not been committed under the
Constitution to a coordinate political department – either the
executive or legislative department. The JBC is not under the
executive or legislative department of the government. The
Legislative Department is composed of the Senate and the
House of Representatives upon which legislative power is
vested.126 On the other hand, the executive power is vested
in the President of the Philippines.127
122. The principal issue – whether Respondent is a

person of “proven integrity” when she applied for Chief Justice
– in this case may be resolved through a proper application
of the provisions in the Constitution, Canons of Judicial Ethics,
pertinent JBC rules, and other laws. These are the
discoverable and manageable standards that can aid the
Court in resolving the case.
V.a. The JBC need not be

impleaded.
123. In Aguinaldo v. Aquino,128 the Court explained

that a case which puts under scrutiny the qualifications of a
person holding a public office is properly the subject of a
petition for quo warranto. Applying Topacio v. Ong,129 the
Court held that a quo warranto petition “is brought against
the person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or
unlawfully held or exercised the public office.”
124. Inasmuch as the present Petition only disputes the

eligibility of Respondent to become Chief Justice, and not the
acts of either the President or the JBC, the Solicitor General
correctly instituted a petition for quo warranto and impleaded
only Sereno as respondent pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 66.
126
Section 1, Article VI, 1987 Constitution.
127
Section 1, Article VII, 1987 Constitution.
128
G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016.
129
G.R. No. 179895, December 18, 2008.
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B. SUBSTANTIVE
VI. RESPONDENT IS NOT A

PERSON OF PROVEN
INTEGRITY.
125. Respondent failed to prove her integrity before the

JBC as required by Section 7(3), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.
126. Section 7(3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution

prescribes, among others, that a person seeking a judicial
post must be a person of proven integrity. The unambiguous
language of the Constitution shows that Respondent must be
a person of proven integrity as an indispensable condition for
her appointment as Chief Justice.
127. During the oral arguments, however, much of the

discussion revolved on the question of whether non-
compliance with the SALN requirement as prescribed by the
JBC pursuant to the Constitution and relevant laws amounts
to lack of integrity. The answer is in the affirmative.
128. The JBC is empowered to operationalize the so-

called moral qualifications under Section 7(3), Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution. The Court settled the matter in the
2015 case of Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council.130
129. In Villanueva, Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge

Ferdinand Villanueva applied for the vacant position of
Presiding Judge in several Regional Trial Courts just barely a
year after he was appointed as MCTC Judge. He was not
included in the JBC’s shortlist because of the JBC's long-
standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to
second-level courts to, among others, incumbent judges who
have served in their current position for at least five years.
Since Villanueva had been a judge only for more than a year,
he was excluded from the list.
130
G.R. No. 211833, April 07, 2015.
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130. Assailing the JBC’s act of excluding him from the

shortlist, Villanueva argued that the Constitution already
prescribed the qualifications of an RTC judge, and the JBC
could add no more. The Court disagreed. It ruled that:
While the 1987 Constitution has provided the

qualifications of members of the judiciary, this does not
preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and
procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its
mandate.
131. In the case at bar, the JBC required in its

Announcement on June 5, 2012 that all applicants to the
position of Chief Justice, among whom was Respondent, must
submit their SALNs. The JBC warned that “[a]pplicants with
incomplete or out of date documentary requirements will not
be interviewed or considered for nomination.”
132. The function of the SALNs as a measure of a

person’s integrity cannot be downplayed. As declared by the
Court in Jardeleza v. Sereno,131 one facet of integrity is
“fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards.” If an applicant
proves that she has performed her duty to file SALNs in
accordance with the manner and frequency required by law,
the JBC can use this to determine whether she possessed the
integrity required of members of the Judiciary.
133. If an applicant, like Respondent, were unable to file

her SALNs in compliance with constitutional and statutory
requirements, such failure to comply would mean that the
applicant is not of proven integrity.
134. Nonplussed, Respondent harps on her supposed

substantial compliance with the JBC’s requirement to submit
all of her SALNs when she explained that she could not
retrieve all of her files due to the passage of time. Yet, as
shown by the Certifications132 from the UPHRDO, she filed her
SALNs only for the years 1985, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994,
1995, 1996, 1997, and 2002 only.133 Inasmuch as she did not
131
G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014.
132
See Annex “B” and “C” of Petition; See Annex “O” of Reply.
133
Annex “O” to “O-8” of Reply.
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file her SALNs annually with the UPHRDO, she cannot claim
that she is of proven integrity. Under Section 9 of R.A. No.
3019, the failure to file a SALN is a ground for dismissal of the
erring public officer. If it was apparent that Respondent could
be dismissed on this ground, there was no reason for the JBC
to nominate her.
135. In Office of the Court Administrator v.

Estacion,134 the Court held that “it behooves every
prospective appointee to the judiciary to apprise the
appointing authority of every matter bearing on his fitness for
judicial office, including such circumstances as may reflect on
his integrity and probity. These are qualifications specifically
required of appointees to the judiciary by Sec. 7(3), Article
VIII of the Constitution.”
136. Pursuant to Estacion, Respondent had the legal

obligation to disclose to the JBC that she failed to file her
SALNs at least eleven times. Had she informed the JBC of this
fact, she would not have been included in the shortlist in the
first place.
137. Considering that the submission of correct SALNs is

imposed by the Constitution, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019), and Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (R.A. No.
6713), compliance with such legal obligation is an
indispensable measure of the constitutional qualification of
integrity under Section 7(3), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution. Put differently, even without the JBC’s
requirement to submit SALNs as part of her application as
Chief Justice, Respondent had the positive legal obligation to
religiously file her SALNs and her failure to do so marred her
integrity, rendering her unqualified for appointment in the
Judiciary.
138. Oblivious to the preceding laws, Respondent

blames others for her incomplete SALNs. Citing Navarro v.
Ombudsman,135 she claims that the Review and Compliance
Committee of UP should have informed her that she had no
134
A.M. No. RTJ-87-104, January 11, 1990.
135
G.R. No. 210128, August 17, 2016.
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SALNs on file. Without such notice to file her SALNs, she is

presumed to have filed her SALNs in accordance with law.
Respondent likewise avers that UP had already cleared her of
all academic and administrative responsibilities, money and
property accountabilities, and from administrative charges in
the University as of June 1, 2006.136 To her mind, “this
clearance can be taken as an assurance that [her] previous
government employer considered the SALN requirement to
have been met.”137 Her profession of good faith will not save
the day for her.
139. Acts punished under a special law are malum

prohibitum.138 “An act which is declared malum prohibitum,
malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.”139 In acts
mala prohibita, the inquiry is limited to whether the law has
been violated. When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender
is immaterial.140 It is enough that the prohibited act is done
freely and consciously.141 A person may not have consciously
intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an
act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime
itself.142 When the doing of an act is prohibited by law, it is
considered injurious to public welfare, and the doing of the
prohibited act is the crime itself.143
140. Inarguably, R.A. No. 3019 and R.A. No. 6713 are
special laws. These laws were enacted by the Congress to
repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike
which constitute graft or corrupt practices, or which may lead
thereto144 and to promote a high standard of ethics in public
service.145 Thus, unless clearly provided in the laws, offenses
involving failure to file SALNs should be considered malum
136
See Annex “B” of the Petition.
137
Id.
138
See Ho Wai Pang v. People, G.R. No. 176229, October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 624, 640 [Per J. Del Castillo,
First Division]; People v. Chua, G. R. No. 187052, September 13, 2012, 680 SCRA 575, 592–591 [Per J.
Villarama. First Division].
139
See Go v. The Fifth Division of Sandiganbayan, 558 Phil. 736, 744 (2007) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, Third
Division].
140
Dungo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 209464, July 1, 2015 citing Tan v. Ballena, 579 Phil. 503,
527-528 (2008).
141
People v. De Gracia, G.R. Nos. 102009-10 July 6, 1994.
142
People v. De Gracia, G.R. Nos. 102009-10 July 6, 1994.
143
Dungo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 209464, July 1, 2015 citing LUIS B. REYES, THE REVISED
PENAL CODE: CRIMINAL LAW - BOOK ONE 56 (17th ed. 2008).
144
Section 1 of RA 3019.
145
Section 2 of RA 6713.
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prohibitum. Accordingly, good faith and absence of criminal

intent are never acceptable defenses.146
141. As opined by Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta

during the oral arguments:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Just for Solicitor General Calida. I just want to ask
questions from Solicitor General Calida, just few
questions. Now. let's go to the SALN law. We all
understand that the SALN law is a malum
prohibitum?
SOLICITOR GENERAL CALIDA:

Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
And that failure to file the SALN, makes the public
official administratively liable and criminally liable?

Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Good faith is not a defense in violation of
SALN law?

Yes, Your Honor, because it is mala prohibita.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
I remember when I was a Justice at the
Sandiganbayan, there were many government officials
who were charged with violation of SALN law. And I could
not recall an instance were the public official proceeded
to trial, all of them pleaded guilty for violation of SALN
law. The latest was a former ex or a retired general.
where he pleaded guilty for violation of the SALN law for
three (3) years. In other words, its not only
administrative liability, insofar as the SALN law, it is also
a criminal, there is also a criminal liability in the SALN
law?

Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
146
See Romarico v. People, G.R. No. 183891, August 3, 2010; Tan, et al. v. Ballena, et al., G.R. No. 168111,
July 4, 2008; People v. De Gracia, G.R. Nos. 102009-10 July 6, 1994.
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Do you agree?

I agree, Your Honor.147
142. It is significant to point out that even the

Respondent herself concurs that the non-filing of SALN of
SALN is malum prohibitum:
JUSTICE TIJAM:
The requirement, Chief Justice, is malum prohibitum,
correct, the filing of the SALN?

That’s why we have to file. That’s why we have to
file. 148
143. Simply put, the filing of a SALN can readily be

proved by the existence of such SALN. The failure of the
Review and Compliance Committee to notify Respondent of
her non-filing of SALNs is of no moment. If at all, such failure
will only subject the members of the Committee or the Head
of the Agency to administrative liability.149 Indeed, to pursue
Respondent’s logic, a government employee who did not file
her SALN prior to February 2013 can evade liability for such
nonfeasance simply because she was not informed of the non-
filing of her SALN. Nevertheless, as the famous aphorism
goes, integrity is doing the right thing, even when no one is
watching.
144. One thing is beyond quibbling: a public officer’s

failure to religiously comply with the constitutional and
statutory requirement of filing the SALN negates any claim of
proven integrity.
VII. RESPONDENT FAILED

TO FILE HER SALNS AS
REQUIRED BY LAW.
147
TSN, pp. 92-93.
148
TSN, p. 145.
149
Under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 10, s. 2006, failure to comply with the Review and
Compliance Procedure in the Filing and Submission of the SALN Form shall be liable for Simple Neglect of
Duty.
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145. Respondent asserts that she complied with the

SALN laws when she was a professor at the UP College of Law.
The evidence belies her assertion.
146. Before her appointment as a member of this

Honorable Court, Respondent was a faculty member of the UP
College of Law from 1986 until 2006.150 She deliberately failed
to file her SALN with her employer, UP, eleven times in her
twenty years as a law professor. Based on the UPHRDO
Certification and Letter of Director Escoto, she only filed her
SALNs for the years 1985, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995,
1996, 1997, and 2002.151
147. Respondent should know that the SALN is not a

mere formal requirement that she can choose to lightly brush
aside. The Constitution obligates a public officer or employee,
upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be
required by law, to submit a declaration under oath of his
assets, liabilities, and net worth.152 The Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards is no less emphatic: it behooves every
government official or employee to accomplish and submit a
sworn statement completely disclosing his or her assets,
liabilities, net worth, and financial and business interests.153
148. She cannot ignore this inflexible requirement and

shroud herself with the doctrine of presumption of regularity.
The presumption of regularity attaches only to official acts and
not to all acts of officials. Just because a public officer
performed the act does not necessarily mean that such act is
clothed with the presumption of regularity. “Official acts” are
those specified by law as an official duty or as a function
attached to a public position.154
149. As stated above, her blatant violation of the

Constitution, R.A. No. 3019, and R.A. No. 6713 casts doubt
on her integrity. It was futile for her to merely allege that she
150
Annex “A” of Petition.
151
Annex “O” to “O-8” of Reply.
152
Section 17, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
153
RA 6713 or the “Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
154
Reyes v. Belisario, G.R. No. 154652, August 14, 2009.
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filed her SALNS and will produce them before the Senate, as
shown in the interpellation of Respondent by Associate Justice
Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro:
JUSTICE DE CASTRO:
So, what I can, what is clear from your answer now is
as of today, you cannot produce your SALN for December 31,
2005 and your SALN for June 1st, 2006? So, that is your
answer, you have no SALN that you can produce now?

I have my SALNS ...
JUSTICE DE CASTRO:
But you cannot produce them …

...and I will produce them especially when the Senate
impeachment trial begins, I will produce them.155
150. Respondent cannot rely on mere allegations. By

alleging facts, she unwittingly undermined her objection to
the jurisdiction of the Court. She became bound to prove her
allegations. Ei incumbit probation qui decit, non qui negat.
151. She apparently painted herself in a corner.

Respondent stated that it was infeasible to recover her SALNs
fifteen years and older. When asked by Associate Justice
Teresita De Castro, however, why she failed to submit her
SALNS which are much later than fifteen years or those closer
to 2012, Respondent replied that she does not have copies of
them:
JUSTICE DE CASTRO:
I'm not yet, I'm not yet finished. You can make your
comment later if you want. So, from 2012, ten years before
that would be from 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007,
2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, that's a period of ten years. You
mentioned only your problem about securing your SALN
which are already fifteen years old. Why did you not submit
your SALN which is later that fifteen years or closer to 2012?
Whether it is ten years before or twelve years before? I
submitted mine fifteen years before 2012, Justice Carpio
submitted his, fourteen years before 2012, so, we were able
155
TSN, p. 37.
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to substantially comply with the requirement of the JBC.

Now, in your case, you were speaking about your 15-year
old SALNS which you said is difficult to find. But why did you
not submit your SALN which are much later than 1995 or
1998? 2006 when you resigned from UP, that's just barely
how many years before, that's five years before...that's
before 2012. So, it's within your reach, it's not fifteen years
or more. How come you did not even submit your SALN at
the very least from 2002, '03, '04, '05 and '06? As I
mentioned earlier, you should have submitted two sworn
Statement of Assets and Liabilities in 2006. One, intended
for December 31, 2005 and another one intended for June
1, 2006, why were you not able to submit at least these five
SALNS?

With all due respect, Justice De Castro, you have made
a self-serving statement that only ten SALNS were required.
The IBC never changed its rules and I will ask that we flash
all the documents which showed that the JBC always
required all. Now, and its Minutes of 20 July 2012, they
basically said, and this is what Justice Peralta was saying:
Why don't we go to the SALN submissions one by one
according to the matrix, including mine, which means he
saw already my SALN requirements as early as July 20,
2012. And what is shown...
JUSTICE DE CASTRO:
Excuse me, excuse me…

And what is shown? Justice Abad was, when Justice
Abad's SALN was being examined, he was only able to
submit how many? 6? 5? And then Justice Peralta said, O,
he was working in the OSG since '70 hindi na mahahanap
yan, matagal na. But that's the same statement I am
making. I cannot find my own SALNS because I do not keep
a copy of those things. And so, from Justice Abad, the JBC
said, Okay na 'yan, substantial compliance. Ang sabi ni
Senator Escudero, As long as there is an attempt to comply
with the requirement ...
JUSTICE DE CASTRO:
Excuse me. Chief Justice, I am asking you a question,
please answer the question, Why did you not submit? Let's
not talk about the JBC.

No. But you started your question with that premise
that the IBC was only requiring ten years/ so how can you
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now...You change the premise of your question and I'll

answer.
JUSTICE DE CASTRO:
I'm not... My question now is that, Why did you not
submit your SALN...

Because I don't have copies of them. Justice De Castro,
I was called by Richard Pascual in the afternoon of a Friday,
Saturday, Sunday there is no work. Monday, he said the last
day is Monday. Under that situation, I had only one, no
choice, I said, It's not with me, it's infeasible. Because why?
What did the College of Law say? Ay Ma'am, your SALNs are
not here in your 201 file. Why don't you write UP-HRDO?
And of course, by the time I will write HRDO, the deadline
has passed. So, what else am I going to say? That's exactly
the same statement that Dean Pangalangan said. What did
Dean Pangalangan say? Dean Pangalangan said that
because of the age of the records they are not with him so
he will look for them not even in UP but in the Civil Service
Commission and then the JBC made a categorical finding
that he has substantially comply simply because he could
not find it in UP and he was therefore considered to have
complied.
JUSTICE DE CASTRO:
Excuse me, we're not talking about Pangalangan, we're
not talking about Robert Abad....156
152. Respondent’s admissions in this exchange, taken

with the UPHRDO Certification and Letter of Director Escoto,
prove that she did not religiously file her SALNs as required
by law, which rendered her ineligible for appointment to the
judiciary.
VII.a. Petitioner discharged its

burden of proof by presenting
credible evidence to prove
Respondent’s ineligibility.
153. Quo Warranto is a special civil action. As in all civil

cases, the party making allegations has the burden of proving
them by a preponderance of evidence.157
156
TSN, pp 51-53.
157
RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Sec. 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined - In civil cases, the
party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining
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154. Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit,

and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is
usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater
weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible
evidence.” It is evidence which is more convincing to the court
as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto.158
155. The Solicitor General submitted to the Court

Certifications159 from the UPHRDO and the Ombudsman
stating that they only had a number of Respondent’s SALNs
on file. From these Certifications, it can readily be inferred
that Respondent failed to file her SALNs for other years, i.e.,
for 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1992, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003,
2004, 2005 and 2006.
156. By presenting preponderant evidence, Petitioner

discharged its burden of proof. It was able to show that
because Respondent did not file her SALNs annually, she
could not have shown that she is of proven integrity.
157. Arguing differently, Respondent invokes David v.

SET. This divergence of positions can be traced to the what
160
appears to be confusion on her part regarding burden of proof

and burden of evidence.
158. Burden of proof is different from burden of

evidence. In David v. SET,161 the same case cited by
Respondent to support her erroneous plea, the Court
distinguished the two:
Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present

evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his
where the preponderance or superior weight of the evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may
consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence,
their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which
they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also
their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon trial. The court may also consider
the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
158
Spouses Ramos v. Raul Obispo, G.R. No. 193804, February 27, 2013.
159
See Annexes “B” and “C” of Petition; Annex “O” of Reply.
160
G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016
161
Id.
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claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by

law." Burden of proof lies on the party making the
allegations; that is, the party who "alleges the affirmative
of the issue" Burden of proof never shifts from one
party to another. What shifts is the burden of
evidence. This shift happens when a party makes a
prima facie case in his or her favor. The other party
then bears the "burden of going forward" with the
evidence considering that which has ostensibly been
established against him or her. In an action for quo
warranto, the court said that the burden of proof necessarily
falls on the party who brings the action and who alleges that
the respondent is ineligible for the office involved in the
controversy. In proceedings before quasi-judicial bodies
such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the requisite quantum
of proof is substantial evidence. This burden was petitioner's
to discharge. Once the petitioner makes a prima facie
case, the burden of evidence shifts to the respondent.
159. Although both Petitioner and Respondent had their

respective burdens of proof, the burden of evidence had
shifted to Respondent after the Certifications from the
UPHRDO and the Ombudsman were submitted. She had the
“burden of going forward” with the evidence. She did not.
Throughout the oral argument, she contented herself with
copious invocations of Concerned Taxpayer v. Doblada162
and Vitangcol v. People.163 Her defense revolved mainly
around the following statements: “I could not find them (her
SALNs)164”; “I had no legal obligation to keep my records.”165
“I religiously filed but I could not locate them”166 and “How
can I remember all the notaries in my life?”167
160. Respondent kept making excuses, even to the point

of attributing the fault to everybody else.

With all due respect, Justice De Castro, you have made
a self-serving statement that only ten SALNS were required.
The JBC never changed its rules and I will ask that we flash
all the documents which showed that the JBC always
required all. Now, and its Minutes of 20 July 2012, they
162
A.M. No. P-99-1342, June 8, 2005.
163
G.R. No. 207406, January 13, 2016.
164
TSN, p. 52.
165
TSN, p. 147.
166
TSN, pp. 116-117.
167
TSN, p. 146.
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basically said, and this is what Justice Peralta was saying:

Why don't we go to the SALN submissions one by one
according to the matrix, including mine, which means he
saw already my SALN requirements as early as July 20,
2012. And what is shown...
JUSTICE DE CASTRO:
Excuse me, excuse me…

And what is shown? Justice Abad was, when Justice
Abad's SALN was being examined, he was only able to
submit how many? 6? 5? And then Justice Peralta said, O,
he was working in the OSG since '70 hindi na mahahanap
yan, matagal na. But that's the same statement I am
making. I cannot find my own SALNS because I do not keep
a copy of those things. And so, from Justice Abad, the JBC
said, Okay na 'yan, substantial compliance. Ang sabi ni
Senator Escudero, As long as there is an attempt to comply
with the requirement ...168

Because I don't have copies of them. Justice De
Castro, I was called by Richard Pascual in the afternoon of
a Friday, Saturday, Sunday there is no work. Monday, he
said the last day is Monday. Under that situation, I had only
one, no choice, I said, It's not with me, it's infeasible.
Because why? What did the College of Law say? Ay Ma'am,
your SALNs are not here in your 201 file. Why don't you
write UP-HRDO? And of course, by the time I will write
HRDO, the deadline has passed. So, what else am I going
to say? That's exactly the same statement that Dean
Pangalangan said. What did Dean Pangalangan say? Dean
Pangalangan said that because of the age of the records
they are not with him so he will look for them not even in
UP but in the Civil Service Commission and then the JBC
made a categorical finding that he has substantially comply
simply because he could not find it in UP and he was
therefore considered to have complied. ...169
161. As acutely observed by Associate Justice Samuel R.

Martires, Respondent resorted to the fallacy tu quoque, which
is a “diversionary tactic by using the fault of others to justify
168
TSN, pp. 51-52.
169
TSN, pp. 52-53.
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one’s own fault.”170 A typical tu quoque involves charging

the accuser with whatever it is you've just been accused
of rather than refuting the truth of the accusation – an
evasive strategy that may or may not meet with
success. 171
162. Apart from her tu quoque arguments,

Respondent offered no evidence to contradict the evidence
presented by Petitioner. It has been the consistent rule that
without clear, convincing, and more than preponderant
evidence to controvert, the presumption of regularity, the
evidentiary weight conferred upon such public document with
respect to its execution, as well as the statements and the
authenticity of the signatures thereon, stand.172 Belief,
suspicion and conjectures cannot overcome the presumption
of regularity and legality which attaches to the disputed
certification.173
VII.b. Respondent’s reliance

on the case of Doblada is
misplaced.
163. Respondent cannot invoke Doblada as it is

inapplicable in the present case of quo warranto.
164. First, Doblada is not determinative of the issues in

the present case. Norberto Doblada, Sheriff IV of RTC of
Pasig, Branch 155, was administratively charged for having
acquired properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary
as public employee. The Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) verbally accused Doblada of non-submission of his
SALN for the years 1975, 1977 to 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994,
1999, and 2000. 174 The issues in Doblada did not involve
qualifications to public office unlike the present petition which
concerns Respondent’s eligibility as Chief Justice. The JBC
requirement for the submission of SALNs is for the purpose of
170
TSN, p. 187.
171
Tu quoque. (n) In Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary. Retrieved from https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/tu%20quoque, last accessed on April 17, 2018.
172
Spouses Dumalagan v. Spouses Liwagon, G.R. No. 193117, November 26, 2014.
173
Empaynado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91606, December 17, 1991.
174
A.M. No. P-99-1342, June 8, 2005.
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determining whether an applicant to the post of Chief Justice

is one of proven integrity.
165. Second, the Court found no sufficient evidence to

prove that Doblada failed to file his SALNs for several years
since he was able to present his 2000 SALN, which was
appended to the letter dated May 7, 2001 of the Acting Branch
Clerk of Court of RTC Pasig, Branch 55. Since the 2000 SALN
was one of those that the OCA did not have a copy of, it could
not readily be concluded that Doblada failed to file his SALNs
for those years. There was a possibility that the OCA might
have lost his other SALNs that could not be found in its record.
In the present case, Respondent failed to offer any
countervailing evidence to disprove the Certifications issued
by UPHRDO and Ombudsman. She cannot rely on Doblada to
justify her non-filing of SALNs, because Doblada offered
evidence to the contrary; on the other hand, Respondent
failed to do so.
166. Lastly, the statement in Doblada that Respondent

relies upon is a mere dictum. The issue in that case centered
on the unexplained wealth of Doblada. He was dismissed from
service for his failure to declare a true and detailed statement
of his assets and liabilities. Moreover, Doblada was decided
only in 2005, long before Respondent violated the legal
requirement on the filing of SALNs. Doblada cannot be applied
retroactively to her violations of the SALN laws. Clearly,
Respondent cannot rely on Doblada as her defense for non-
filing. She must show to the satisfaction of the Court that she
indeed religiously filed her SALNs as required by law. Even
her 1989 SALN which was allegedly found in a filing cabinet
in UP cannot be given evidentiary weight, considering its
doubtful origin.175 UP, in its reply to the OSG’s letter request
for copies of Respondent’s SALNs, submitted only SALNs for
the years 1985, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997,
and 2002.176 The 1989 SALN is not among the submitted
documents. Besides, the 1989 SALN cannot be presented at
this time, as Respondent failed to raise it at the outset.
175
TSN, p. 87.
176
Annex “O” of the Reply.
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VII.c. Respondent’s
demeanor, marked by
belligerence and evasiveness,
established that she is not a
credible witness.
167. Respondent displayed belligerence and evasiveness

during her interpellation. The Justices of the Court witnessed
her behavior. The Court can consider her demeanor in
resolving the issue of whether she complied with the SALN
requirement religiously.
168. The hostility of Respondent was evident

immediately after she took her oath. During the interpellation
by Justice de Castro, she refused to answer whether she
religiously complied with the submission of her SALNs.
Instead, Respondent challenged the Honorable Justices to
give their assurance that should a petition for quo warranto
be filed against them, that they will also make a sworn
declaration before the Court:
CLERK OF COURT:
Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but the truth, so help you God?
CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO

I do.
ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE CARPIO:

Thank you. Okay, Justice De Castro will ask question.
JUSTICE DE CASTRO:
I would like to ask you about the submission of your
SALN. Did you religiously comply with the submission of the
SALN as mandated by law?

Justice De Castro and my colleagues, before I answer
that question, can I have your assurance that should a quo
warranto Petition be filed against any of you on the ground
that one or more of your SALNS are not on record, that you
would also under oath declare before this Court answer all
questions regarding your SALNs, for example, Justice De
Castro, who should have filed thirty-nine (39) SALNS but filed
only fifteen (15) with the JBC?
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JUSTICE DE CASTRO:
Will you please answer the question? You are asked a
question.

Yes.
JUSTICE DE CASTRO:
You are placed under oath.

Yes, that's true.
JUSTICE DE CASTRO:
You are not supposed to ...

Well, that is your expectation, Justice De Castro, but
this is important because this is a due process and equal
protection issue I am raising now.
ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE CARPIO:

Yeah, will the Chief Justice just answer the question.177
169. Respondent was also evasive: she appeared to be

layering her defenses as to why she filed or did not file her
SALNs, deviating from her earlier defense that she was not in
the habit of keeping a file of her SALNs. This was evident during
her interpellation by Justice Jardeleza:
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
Now, you remember that you filed?
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
But you did not keep a copy?

I don't keep copies.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
So...

So, even all of my retrievals are not from my files
because, if you have transferred residences seven (7) times
and when I left UP, I never ever thought that I am going back
to government. I was already fully committed to private
177
TSN, pp. 26-27.
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practice. There was really no point in keeping my files and I

have transferred residence seven (7) times, once a broad.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
So, let's go into these reasons, that you transferred
residences seven (7) times. Now, I go back you don't keep a
copy even with your 1985?

Yes.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
From the beginning you never kept a copy.

None.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
None. So, it has nothing to do with your
transferring places seven (7) times?

When I transferred residence. I transferred once
in 1987; then I transferred two (2) more times, after
that, then in 1992, then in 1994, and then in November
of 1994, and then in my present residence. So, seven
(7) times. Once, specially in my 1992 travel, I went to
the United States and I gave all my possessions for
safekeeping by different people. And I have different
offices. So, it's not incumbent upon me to keep those
files.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
Madam Witness, I'll repeat my question of fact,
when in 1985 you started to file a SALN, it was already
your habit or your practice not to keep files?

When I was in UP, there were times when I would
have files but after I left UP, no more files.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
Okay. So you do not have your 1986, and it could
be that you had but you did not keep your files?

Yes.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
Or it could be because you had transferred seven
(7) …
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...times
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
...time. Now, it is not because you, nobody
reminded you to file?

What do you mean? That I received no
compliance directive? I received no compliance
directive, SolGen.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
No?

Sorry, Justice Jardeleza.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
My question is, with respect to 1986

Nobody ever told me that I have not filed my SALN.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
You remember that with your 1986?

Yes.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
Yes. So, your answer now is. in fact, you filed but
you do not remember if anybody reminded you to file
for 1986?

Yes, Sir.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
Who was the responsible officer in UP in 1986 who was
supposed to remind you?

That's 32 years ago, Justice Jardeleza, I was 26 years
old then.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
The answer is, you cannot remember?
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Yes.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
You cannot remember. So, in 1986, you do not have a
copy of your SALN it is not because you were not permanent
at that time?

1996?
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
No, no, 1986. I'm still in 1986.

So, it's not with us.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
No, my question is you are not telling us as a matter of
fact...

Okay, why there is none…
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
...you did not file because you were not yet permanent
in 1986?

I was complying with the SALN law, I will stick with my
answer that to the best of my recollection I filed all my SALN
requirements. But without prejudice to my citation of the IRR
Rules and the law itself where exceptions are provided.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
Another question of fact, in 1986 you were not on
leave?

No, I was not on leave.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
So, you were under full compensation?

I was under compensation but I was on a temporary
capacity
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
And of course, that's your legal defense. The fact that
you were on a temporary capacity means, you are excused
from filing a SALN?
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That's how the law says it.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
Was that your state of mind then? That is why is it
possible that you were not filing because you already knew
that you are not required?
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
I am asking a question. So, your state of mind in
1986...

Is that I filed. I filed.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
You filed. Despite what you now profess that if
you are not permanent or you don't have
compensation, you need not file?

Yes.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
Yes. Now...

But that's not my profession, that's what the law is
saying.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
I agree, now, in 1986 what year was Noblado [sic]
promulgated?

2005.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
2005, therefore, the Noblado [sic] case was not yet
around in 1986?

I couldn't have read it in 1986.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
You could not have read it and therefore, in 1986 again,
you were religiously filing because wala pa ho, yung Noblado
[sic] case?

I was filing regardless of whether or not there was case.
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JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
Now...

Are you implying Justice that I …
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
I'm not implying Chief, I am asking questions of fact,
all the arguments that you can make will be made by the
counsel. May I proceed Mr. Acting Chief Justice? Chief, may I
proceed? Now, statements have been made about hidden
wealth, you filed in 1986 as you now assert, it is because you
had the duty to file it has nothing to do whether you have
hidden wealth or not, is that right?

I filed whether there was a duty or not it's contestable.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
So, the reasons I am asking these questions one
by one, Madam Respondent, is that, it seems to me,
you are layering a lot of defenses as to why you filed
or not filed. So, but the question of fact that I'll keep
asking is, all the eleven (11) times, so that I don't
have to repeat, in each instant. In the eleven (11)
times that the Government claims you did not file and
you are not presenting us, evidence to the contrary
your assertion is that, you filed?

Yes.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JARDELEZA:

In addition to the defenses that you have, which will
be...

Yes.

...you do not keep a copy, it was not in your habit to
copy, nobody reminded you, you were abroad, you have no
compensation, you were not permanent, you have no hidden
wealth?

Justice Jardeleza, the burden of proof is on the
Petitioner, that's categorical. Now, in fact, in the years I was
not…
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Chief, can I...

May I just add...178
170. The Court had the unique opportunity to observe

the demeanor of the Respondent and determine her credibility
as a witness. In People v. Mangune179 citing People v.
Sapigao, Jr.180, the Court ruled that the emphasis, gesture,
and inflection of the voice are potent aids in ascertaining the
witness’ credibility:
These are important in determining the truthfulness

of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the
face of conflicting testimonies. For, indeed, the emphasis,
gesture, and inflection of the voice are potent aids in
ascertaining the witness’ credibility, and the trial
court has the opportunity and can take advantage of
these aids. These cannot be incorporated in the record so
that all that the appellate court can see are the cold words
of the witness contained in transcript of testimonies with the
risk that some of what the witness actually said may have
been lost in the process of transcribing. As correctly stated
by an American court, "There is an inherent impossibility of
determining with any degree of accuracy what credit is
justly due to a witness from merely reading the words
spoken by him, even if there were no doubt as to the identity
of the words. However artful a corrupt witness may be,
there is generally, under the pressure of a skillful
cross-examination, something in his manner or
bearing on the stand that betrays him, and thereby
destroys the force of his testimony….
171. Associate Justice Jardeleza appropriately directed

Petitioner to point out the demeanor of Respondent in this
Memorandum, viz.:
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
Because it is almost like, I go back to the question, the
right thing is to file a SALN beyond all of the legal
requirements, it is the right thing to do. So, when nobody is
watching we should file. So did the Chief file or not? The
178
TSN, pp. 106-113; Emphases supplied.
179
G.R. No. 186463, November 14, 2012
180
G.R. No. 178485, September 4, 2009, 598 SCRA 416, 425-426, cited in People v. Dion, id. at 133-134.
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government is saying, she did not eleven (11) times and now
there is one (1) SALN submitted, so maybe ten (10) times.
The Chief, she says, "l did file. So, I almost have a situation
of: He said, the government said, she says she filed, the
government says, "she did not file." So, I would like the two
(2) sides to put that, I cannot improve on the way our expert
Justice Luke Bersamin explain on the technicalities of burden
of proof. But I would like you to consider that the Chief Justice
has made herself available today and I know the position of
the Chief Justice and the position of the respondent is, we are
not a trier of facts but under our Rules of Evidence and you
don't have to be technical about this, the credibility of a
witness whom the triers of fact have listened to, the
demeanor of the witness, her interest or lack of interest, the
way she has testified, is going to be important. So, I wish
both sides and again with all due respect to your jurisdictional
objections, with all due respect to the position that we are
not a trier of fact. The reality is today, you have fourteen (14)
members of the Court, peers of the witness, who have
listened to her, make her side. Thank you.181
172. Respondent’s conduct can only be characterized as

belligerent and evasive. She cannot therefore be considered
as a credible witness.
VIII. RESPONDENT
COMMITTED A
MISREPRESENTATION TO
BE SHORTLISTED BY THE
JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL.
173. In the Letter dated July 23, 2012 that Respondent

submitted to the JBC in relation to her application for the Chief
Justice, she committed a gross misrepresentation when she
explained that she was not able to submit her SALNs because
it was “infeasible” to retrieve them.182 From Respondent’s
explanation, it can be implied that she filed all her SALNs,
when actually she did not.
174. The UPHRDO Certification and Letter of Director

Escoto shows that Respondent filed her SALNs only for the
181
TSN, pp. 236-237.
182
See Respondent’s Letter dated 23 July 2012 attached as Annex “E” of the Petition.
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years 1985, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and
2002.183 If she had submitted them, it would become clear to
the JBC that she did not file her SALNs annually. Respondent
thus changed her tune during the oral arguments, asserting
that she had a lot of work to do as an Associate Justice of the
Court:
JUSTICE DE CASTRO:
So, the readily available SALN, if you really went to
U.P., you could have easily gotten 2002...

How could I have gone to U.P., I was already working
inside the Supreme Court. We had a lot of work. So, I just
called U.P., they said, it's not in your 201 please write. So, ...
JUSTICE DE CASTRO:
While we were all working also in the Supreme Court,
but we were able to produce our SALNS.

I had left U.P. a long time ago
JUSTICE DE CASTRO:
...fifteen years, and I, even my SALN in the
Sandiganbayan I was able to produce even. And I didn't make
the excuse. Because if you are applying for the highest post
of the Land, why highest post in the Judiciary, will you take
that attitude? That you have no time...184
175. The JBC Announcement for applications for the

position of Chief Justice is dated June 5, 2012.185 The deadline
for applications or recommendations was on June 18, 2012,
while the submission for other documentary requirements
was on July 3, 2012. Respondent had more or less a month
to comply with the submissions required by the JBC. By not
submitting her SALNs, Respondent deprived the JBC of the
opportunity to intelligently assess her integrity to be Chief
Justice. Her scheme to throw a monkey wrench on the process
became clear during the oral arguments:
JUSTICE DE CASTRO:
183
Annex “O” to “O-8” of the Reply.
184
TSN, pp. 70-71.
185
Annex “H” of the Petition.
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Let's go now to your July 23,2012 letter. Your letter

stated that, this is about the call of a certain Richard Pascual
of the JBC. You said, This refers to the follow-up of Atty.
Richard Pascual on Friday, July 20, regarding the submission
of my previous SALN from 1995 to 1999. Then you stated,
Considering that most of my government records in the
academe are more than fifteen years old, it is reasonable to
consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files. Now, but
the JBC, you're mentioning about the fifteen years SALN,
what about your SALN which is closer to 2012? And I recall
distinctly that the substantial compliance considered by the
IBC is at least 10 years before 2012 and that is based on the
law and regulations that the repository of, the official
repository of the SALN should keep the SALN for a period of
ten years.

Your Honor, may I dispute that…
JUSTICE DE CASTRO:
Wait, I'm not yet...

… factually…
JUSTICE DE CASTRO:
I'm not yet, I'm not yet finished. You can make your
comment later if you want. So, from 2012, ten years before
that would be from 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007,
2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, that's a period of ten years. You
mentioned only your problem about securing your SALN
which are already fifteen years old. Why did you not submit
your SALN which is later that fifteen years or closer to 2012?
Whether it is ten years before or twelve years before? I
submitted mine fifteen years before 2012, Justice Carpio
submitted his, fourteen years before 2012, so, we were able
to substantially comply with the requirement of the JBC.
Now, in your case, you were speaking about your 15-year
old SALNS which you said is difficult to find. But why did you
not submit your SALN which are much later than 1995 or
1998? 2006 when you resigned from UP, that's just barely
how many years before, that's five years before...that's
before 2012. So, it's within your reach, it's not fifteen years
or more. How come you did not even submit your SALN at
the very least from 2002, '03, '04, '05 and '06? As I
mentioned earlier, you should have submitted two sworn
Statement of Assets and Liabilities in 2006. One, intended
for December 31, 2005 and another one intended for June
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1, 2006, why were you not able to submit at least these five
SALNS?186

Because I don't have copies of them. Justice De Castro,
I was called by Richard Pascual in the afternoon of a Friday,
Saturday, Sunday there is no work. Monday, he said the last
day is Monday. Under that situation, I had only one, no
choice, I said, It's not with me, it's infeasible. Because why?
What did the College of Law say? Ay Ma'am, your SALNs are
not here in your 201 file. Why don't you write UP-HRDO? And
of course, by the time I will write HRDO, the deadline has
passed. So, what else am I going to say? That's exactly the
same statement that Dean Pangalangan said. What did Dean
Pangalangan say? Dean Pangalangan said that because of the
age of the records they are not with him so he will look for
them not even in UP but in the Civil Service Commission and
then the JBC made a categorical finding that he has
substantially comply simply because he could not find it in UP
and he was therefore considered to have complied.187
JUSTICE DE CASTRO:
...you're required to file all your SALN. And as you
mentioned, you're disputing the 10 years. Okay, it's up to
you, if you want to dispute that. But there is a mark disparity
between our submission and yours. You did not submit a
single SALN from U.P. while, so, you submitted only your
SALN that you filed in the Supreme Court. But you worked in
government, in U.P., for 20 years. And not a single SALN in
U.P...

Your Honors...
JUSTICE DE CASTRO:
...you were not submitted any one of those…

Your Honors, since I started teaching, I have moved
residences seven (7) times. One of those movements was
abroad where I left all my documents with other people. I
have not been a religious keeper of my U.P. documents. So,
after that explanation, anyway the minutes will show, that
any of the members can ask me during the interview or clarify
at any time. No such clarification was made. So, what am I
186
TSN, pp. 50-51.
187
TSN, p. 52.
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to do? I didn't even know how the JBC was looking at my

application.
JUSTICE DE CASTRO:
Okay. So, you did not submit a single SALN, when you
applied for Chief Justice, you did not submit a single SALN
that you were required to file during the 20 years that you
were in U.P. And you want to compare that with us and with
the others. But you submitted only, okay, 2009, 2010 and
2011 and the 2009 is very irregular' Because that was, you
were not in government service on December 31, 2009' And
yet, when you assumed office as Associate Justice of
Supreme Court, you did not submit your SALN as of August.
I think, you were appointed August also….188
176. The connection between Respondent’s failure to file

her SALNs and the need for her to show that she possessed
the requisite integrity cannot be understated. As the filing of
a SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement for public
officers and employees, she was bound to submit her SALNs.
By submitting SALNs less than those required by the JBC of
other applicants for Chief Justice, and without lawful
justification for her non-compliance, Respondent was unable
to prove her integrity before the JBC. As succinctly put by
Associate Justice De Castro:
But the point here is this. Did you religiously file your
SALN as you represented to the JBC when you applied for
Chief Justice because remember when the application for
Chief Justice was opened that was about a month after Chief
Justice Corona was dismissed, was removed by
impeachment and it was all about SALN. So, JBC should
have been very strict about the SALN. So, we are trying to
find out if the JBC correctly applied their requirements to
you and whether or not you represented truthfully to the
JBC that you complied with the law. That’s all that we are
dealing with...189
177. It is significant to note that most of the SALNs

deliberately not filed by Respondent were during the years
that she was engaged by the OSG in the PIATCO case:
188
TSN, pp. 64-65.
189
TSN, p. 75.
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…. Now, pertinent to the questions of Justice Peralta,

when did you first receive income, PIATCO income from the
government?

2004 was the first payment that they gave me.

Yes, in fact, your PIATCO income was for the years
2004, 2OO5,2006 up to 2009.

Okay, yes, Justice.

And in fact, in the Verified Answer that you filed with
the House, the income for 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008,
2009, is around, if Counsel will remember correctly, P30.3
million pesos?

Yes.

Or around 600 plus thousand U.S.?

For all of those five years, yes.

For all of those six years. And the fact that you have a
number, then, you will know how much you earned per year.

It was very, you could not say that any year was typical.
During the first few years, the service was intense, so the
income would be higher, during the end years, the income
would be very low because the fees being charged were
already not much.

So, to your recollection, what was the most, for the first
two years the most intense?

Yes.

Yes, so, subject to, because I will ask later on Counsel
to submit not now, the income for each of those years. So,
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the biggest income would come in 2004 and 2005, is that

right?

Yes.

Yes, now, this is my question, of course now you will
say again that, so the question I have is, did you file your
SALN for 2004?

Yes.
And also for 2005...

Yes, to the best of my recollection, that would be my
answer, Sir.

And also for 2006?

Yes.

The SALN for these three years, particularly, are not
among those that you have recently found?

No.190
178. It is therefore patent that Respondent cannot

excuse her failure to file SALNs annually. If the JBC had not
be misled by the Report that she submitted complete
requirements, she would have been deemed ineligible for
appointment to the judiciary.
IX. RESPONDENT
COMMITTED A LITANY OF
FALSEHOODS.
179. A close scrutiny of Respondent’s SALNs shows the

falsehoods that she foisted.
190
TSN, pp. 117-119.
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SALN ITEM REMARKS

1990 and 1991 Pieces of jewelry 1.Respondent
declared pieces of
jewelry valued at
P15,000.00 in her
1991 SALN, which she
acquired from 1986 to
1991, but her 1990
SALN does not declare
that she has pieces of
jewelry.
1996 1. notarized only on
June 29, 1998;
2. notarized only by
an Administrative
Officer IV;
3. not signed by the
spouse
Stocks Acquired 1986-1996
but not reflected in
1990-1991 SALNs
1997 1. notarized twice:
first, by an
Administrative Officer
IV on June 29, 2008
(on the same day that
1996 SALN was
notarized); second, by
Atty. Borlas on August
21, 2003 (on the
same day that 1998,
1999, 2002 SALNs
were notarized);191
3. not signed by
spouse
1998 1. used the form as of
December 31 2000s
as evidences by the
erasure of the
numbers “200” in the
heading;
2. notarized only on
August 21, 2003
2006 Stamp Receipt No stamp receipt by
the University of the
Philippines
191
See Annex “P.”
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Personal Properties No
specified/particular
values but only
aggregate value of ₱ 9
Million
Date of Accomplished only on
Accomplishment July 27, 2010 or four
years late
Notarization Not notarized
1) It is fabricated as it was only
accomplished on July 27, 2010, the date
she submitted it to the JBC;
2) It also observed that she has no SALN

as of June 1, 2006, the date she
resigned from UP, as required by law
(Exit SALN);
3) Respondent’s claim that this 2006 SALN

is actually her 2010 SALN used during
her application as Associate Justice is
belied by the huge disparity and
numerous discrepancies between this
SALN and her SALN as of December 31,
2010 submitted to the Supreme Court.
The 2 SALNs, in fact, used different
forms.
2009 Position Misrepresented
herself as Associate
Justice when she was
only appointed in
August 16, 2010
Date of filing Filed only in June 22,
2012
Table B Business Declared business
Interests and interests and
Financial Connections connections in
SUDECO, Seaport,
RFM/Swift, and
Uniwide acquired
before 2000 but did
not declare in her
2002 and 2006 SALNs
[except in 1998 SALN
for SUDECO]
It is also observed
that the 2009 SALN is
fabricated as it bears
a handwritten phrase
“Revised as of June
22, 2012”, the date
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she submitted it to
the JBC. It is highly
irregular that a SALN
be revised three years
later.
2010 Memorial Lot in Cavite Acquired in 1997 but
not declared in her
1998, 2002 and 2006
SALNs
Vehicle-Toyota Acquired in 1997 but
Corolla 1997 model not declared in 2002
and 2006 SALNs
Vehicle-Toyota Altis Acquired in 2005 but
2005 model not declared in 2006
SALN
180. Respondent has belittled the relevance of the SALN

by regarding it as mere formality. Her non-declaration and
misrepresentation in her SALNs evince a disturbing defiance
of the constitutional and statutory requirement to submit
SALN. Worse, it demonstrates her lack of integrity and moral
fitness to hold the office of the Chief Justice.
X. RESPONDENT DID NOT

FILE HER SALNS FOR 2005
AND 2006 TO CONCEAL HER
TRUE INCOME AS LEGAL
COUNSEL FOR THE
GOVERNMENT IN THE
PIATCO CASE.
181. During the Oral Argument, some Members of the

Court raised questions regarding Respondent’s income from
the Philippine Government as a counsel in the case involving
PIATCO.
182. Associate Justice Peralta inquired as to the time

when Respondent started earning legal fees from the
government as a counsel in the PIATCO case:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Alright. Now, in your comment, or anyway. I will not
ask the question... Do you know when the Chief Justice
started earning income as a lawyer in the PIATCO cases?
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I was not yet the Solicitor General but...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
But based on records, when did she start receiving fees
from PIATCO cases?

Okay.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Will you please check your records.
(SolGen Calida conferring with his co-counsel.)

Your Honor, I think the best person who can answer
that is the respondent, Your Honor, because she was the one
who received millions.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, but based on your records because hearing, in
the impeachment I can recall years but you confirm. I think
she started as a consultant of PIATCO sometime in 2003? Or
late 2003 and then she started receiving payments, millions
of pesos in 2004, just your records.

In her Personal Data Sheet, Your Honor, or PDS…
JUSTICE PERALTA:
It's not in the Personal Data Sheet…

The amounts, Your Honor?
JUSTICE PERALTA:
...I am asking you the documents that would show that
she received income or fees from PIATCO starting in 2004.
You cannot recall?

I'm sorry, Your Honor, we did not bring the copy.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Anyway, anyway, can you confirm that she was a
counsel of the government?

Yes, Your Honor.
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JUSTICE PERALTA:
To represent the government in PIATCO cases?

Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
And that she received millions of pesos, dollars but
converted into millions of pesos?

That's correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
And she started receiving all these fees, 2004, 2005
and 2006?

Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
I will now go back to my first question, if she was on
leave and still a government official and she earned millions
of pesos in 2004, 2005 and 2006 was she mandated under
the law and in the Constitution to declare her income in the
SALN and therefore it was important for her to file the SALN?

Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
That the income derived from PIATCO and those
declared the SALN would show how much taxes she should
have paid?

That’s correct, your Honor.192
183. When Petitioner’s counsel made inquiries, it turned

out that as early as 2004, Respondent was already rendering
services as legal counsel for PIATCO. It was at this point that
another secret was exposed. According to Dir. Escoto of the
UPHRDO, “based on Respondent’s 201 file, no record appears
192
TSN, pp. 94-96.
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of the Permission to Engage in the Limited Practice of

Profession” for the period 2004 to 2006.193
184. Associate Justice Jardeleza likewise asked

Respondent’s counsel with regard to the amount of legal fees
that she earned from the PIATCO case:
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
Atty. Poblador, this is just almost a housekeeping
question. If you remember counsel. a while ago I asked, can
you submit the break down of the fees, PIATCO fees of the
Chief Justice from '04 up to '09?
ATTY. POBLADOR:
Yes, Your Honor.194
185. The question is relevant to the legal obligation of

Respondent to file her SALNs during the time of her employ
with the OSG despite being on leave from UP.
186. Respondent failed to file her SALNs for 2005 and

2006, the same period when she made underdeclarations in
four of her Quarterly VAT Returns. The reason for her non-
filing of the SALNs can very well be explained by the fact that,
had she done so, she would have had to declare her income
from legal fees as part of her assets.
187. Under Section 248(B) of the National Internal

Revenue Code, there is a prima facie evidence of a false or
fraudulent return if there is a substantial underdeclaration of
taxable sales, receipt or income. The failure to report sales,
receipts or income in an amount exceeding 30% what is
declared in the returns constitute substantial
underdeclaration.
188. Respondent made substantial underdeclarations in

her VAT returns filed for: (1) the third and fourth quarters of
2005; (2) the third quarter of 2006, (3) the third and fourth
quarters of 2007; and (4) the fourth quarter of 2008—periods
193
See Item No. 2 of Annex “D” of the Petition.
194
TSN, p. 235.
Page 79 of 81
MEMORANDUM
G.R. No. 237428
x---------------------------------------------------------------------x
in which the underdeclarations exceeded the 30% threshold

that evidences fraud on the part of Respondent, viz:
REP. DE VERA. And if this is the case that it is

more than 30 percent, then, there is fraud? Isn’t
it that it has a bigger imprisonment than ordinary
tax evasion case?
MR. GUBALLA. Yes, Your Honor. Pwede siyang

pumasok sa 255. Ay, 254 and 255.
(House Committee on Justice Hearing, TSN, 27

February 2018/LCLV/XXXIII-2)
189. Considering that Respondent underdeclared her

income in four of her Quarterly VAT Returns for 2005 and
2006, three of which were substantial underdeclarations, She
chose not to comply with the SALN requirement to conceal
her true income and evade the payment of correct amount of
taxes. This means that she cannot be said to possess the
proven integrity required of all members of the Judiciary.
AFTERWORD
190. Respondent herself eloquently stated in her dissent

in PS Bank v. Senate Impeachment Court,195 “those who
accept a public office do so cum onere, or with a burden, and
are considered as accepting its burdens and obligations,
together with its benefits. They thereby subject themselves
to all constitutional and legislative provisions relating thereto,
and undertake to perform all the duties of their office. The
public has the right to demand the performance of those
duties.”
191. She can be measured by the same yardstick.

Among the obligations imposed on public officers by the
Constitution, R.A. No. 3019, and R.A. No. 6713 is the annual
filing of SALNs. She cannot be excused from complying with
the law by claiming that one cannot acquire ill-gotten wealth
in UP. If lowly court employees could be penalized for failing
to file SALNs, there is no reason why she should be considered
eligible for appointment to the highest post in the judiciary
195
G.R. No. 200238. February 9, 2012.
Page 80 of 81
MEMORANDUM
G.R. No. 237428
x---------------------------------------------------------------------x
notwithstanding her abject failure to comply with the SALN

requirement.
192. The Court is now called upon to decide the quo

warranto petition. It should now choose between placing
Respondent on equal footing with other public servants and
applying the law with a firm hand, or placing her on a pedestal
and giving her special treatment.
PRAYER
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines consequently prays

that this Honorable Court: (1) DECLARE as void Maria
Lourdes P.A. Sereno’s appointment on August 24, 2012 as
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines; and (2)
OUST Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno from the position of Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
Petitioner also requests that the Court grant such other

relief as may be just and equitable under the circumstances.
Makati City, for Baguio City, April 20, 2018.
Page 81 of 81

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Republic of the Philippines

- versus - G.R. No. 237428

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor

The 1987 Constitution requires that an appointee to the

to shortlist an applicant whose dismissal appeared certain

The public was also kept in the dark about Respondent’s

THE RELEVANT PROCEEDINGS1

1. On March 5, 2018, Petitioner Republic of the

2. On the same date, Petitioner filed a Very Urgent

3. On March 6, 2018, the Court in a Resolution

4. On April 2, 2018, Respondent filed an Ad Cautelam

5. In a Resolution dated April 3, 2018, the Court

6. In the Advisory, the Court required the parties to

7. In compliance with the Advisory, Petitioner

8. During the oral argument on April 10, 2018,

9. After the oral argument, the Court directed the

THE ANTECEDENT FACTS

10. Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno began

11. While a professor at the College of Law, Respondent

Year/ Period Covered Signed/Notarized On

12. Respondent also appears to have submitted a SALN

13. To explore other opportunities,17 Respondent took

1. June 1, 2000 – May 31, 2001

14. While she was employed at UP, Respondent also

United Nations Development Program, Word Bank, US Agency

15. On June 1, 2006, Respondent resigned from the UP

16. In July 2010, Respondent applied for the position of

17. After the position of Chief Justice became vacant in

1. Sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and

a. for those in the government: all previous

2. Waiver in favor of the JBC of the confidentiality

18. On June 5, 2012, the JBC issued another

A member of the Supreme Court must:

a. be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines

19. The announcement stated that candidates for the

20. It was not divulged to the public that in her

Government again in 2010 as Associate Justice of the

23. The complaint was endorsed by twenty-five

24. On November 23, 2017, the House of

25. In the course of the impeachment proceedings at

26. According to Guballa, Respondent failed to pay all

PERIOD GROSS SALES OUTPUT TAX TAX PAID

27. The Summary Report revealed that Respondent

28. After comparing Respondent’s Quarterly VAT

29. Thereafter, the Solicitor General received a letter

30. The issues, as identified by the Court in its Advisory

a. Whether … the Court can assume

b. Whether … the petition may be dismissed

c. Whether … the respondent cab be

d. Whether … the respondent filed her SALN

e. Whether … the failure to file the SALN will

f. Whether … the Certification issued by the

g. Whether … the petition for quo warranto

h. Whether … the submission of the

i. Whether … the SALN is the only way of

j. Whether … the Judicial and Bar Council’s

k. Whether … the Court, in the exercise of

l. Whether … the JBC acted with grave