24 Interpretation of Stautes

24
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
Anurag Deep*
I INTRODUCTION
RULES OF interpretation provide strong base for the super structure of judicial
reasoning. Reasoned judgements very often need the logical support of certain
well settled principles generally applied by judges to arrive at convincing decisions.
The survey of the Supreme Court judgements during the year 2013 proved this
fact. The presumption of constitutionality of statute is elaborately analysed,
discussed and applied in various decisions. Resort to literary and purposive
interpretation has also helped the court at appropriate occasions. Internal aids of
preamble, titles, object clause, proviso etc., are also beneficially utilized. External
aids for example maxim, books, reports, etc., are also found useful. Out of various
decisions which were discussed in last survey1 two were referred for higher bench
as the judges of division bench had difference of opinion. It is a natural curiosity
as to the final outcome of these two judgements.2 The Supreme Court of India in
the search of ‘legislative intent’ had discussed almost all settled “rules of thumb”.
Due to presence of huge number of cases the present survey has avoided surveying
high court judgments and confined only to some important decisions of the Supreme
Court.3
In view of the legislative explosion and a responsive judiciary in India,
challenges regarding interpretation need no special explanation. A very recent
* Associate Professor, Indian Law Institute, New Delhi. The author sincerely
acknowledges Prof. Sushil K Verma, Professor (Retired), Faculty of Law, BHU,
Varanasi under whose guidance this work is produced. Prof. Sushil K Verma had been
a member of the faculty in The Indian Law Institute, New Delhi during 1969-71. He
had also served as assistant editor of The Journal of Indian Law Institute and the
Annual Survey of Indian Law. This author also acknowledges the assistance of Sumit
Mangla, LL.B. 5th year, Lloyd Law College, Greater Noida who was intern under him
in ILI during August 2014. The paragraphs cited herein are from india.nic.in manupatra/
westlaw/scconline online databases.
1 Anurag Deep, “Interpretation of Statutes” XL VIII ASIL 551-601 (2012).
2 M/S Delhi Airtech Services Private Ltd v State of U.P. AIR 2012 SC 573 and Ritesh
Sinha v. The State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 2013 SC 1132: (2013) 2 SCC 357. Both could
not reach finality in 2013.
3 Various software and search engine show almost more than two hundred cases where
the Supreme Court might have used the word interpretation in the year 2013.
752 Annual Survey of Indian Law [2013
work correctly reiterates that “one point should be uncontroversial: interpretation

is relative to the document being interpreted.”4 Divergent interpretation of the
court, therefore, is some time natural. The Supreme court, in the case of State of
Gujarat v. Hon’Ble Mr. Justice R.A. Mehta (Retd)5 however, started with reiterating
the warning which it gave fifty years back in a seven judges bench judgement. It
extracted from The Keshav Mills Co. Ltd., Petlad v. The Commissioner of Income-
tax, Bombay North, Ahmedabad,6 where this court held:7
When this Court decides questions of law, its decisions are, under
Art. 141, binding on all Courts within the territory of India, and
so, it must be the constant endeavour and concern of this Court
to introduce and maintain an element of certainty and continuity
in the interpretation of law in the country. Frequent exercise by
this Court of its power to review its earlier decisions on the
ground that the view pressed before it later appears to the Court
to be more reasonable, may incidentally tend to make law
uncertain and introduce confusion which must be consistently
avoided. [Emphasis added]
It has been rightly said that ‘words are not passive agents meaning the same
thing and carrying the same value at all times and in all contexts.’ 8 Though words
are relative in nature, it is difficult but desirable that certainty in law is not disturbed
and basic principles of interpretation are followed.
II BASIC PRINCIPLES
To begin with it would be appropriate to discuss certain basic principles

hereunder in separate headings.
Presumptions
Constitutionality of a statute
There are various interpretative tools for the determination of legal validity
of a provision. They are presumption of constitutionality, rule of severability,
4 Richard A Posner, Reflections on Judging, 232 (Harvard University Press, 2013).

5 (2013) 3 SCC 1; AIR 2013 SC 693. Division bench judgement is delivered by Balbir
Singh Chauhan J. The other member of the bench was Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim
Kalifulla , hereinafter referred as Gujarat Lokayukta case. In this case paragraphs
cited are from manupatra.
6 AIR 1965 SC 1636, it was a seven judges bench opinion.
7 Ibid. Also see, Gujarat Lokayukta case, para 6.
8 Friedrich Bodmer, The Loom of Language, (1944) as quoted in Regional Provident
Fund Commissioner v. Hooghly Mills Co. Ltd 2012 (1) SCALE 422, id. at 430. Also
in Constitution bench judgement in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association
v. Union of India 1993 (4) SCC 441 at 553. This treatise is also available on http://
archive.org/details/TheLoomOfLanguage. (last visited on Aug. 22, 2013).
Vol. XLIX] Interpretation of Statutes 753
reading down etc., State of Maharashtra v. Indian Hotel & Retaurants Assn,9
Namit Sharma second, 10 Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P,11 Suresh Kumar Kaushal
v. Naz Foundation,12 Manohar Lal Sharma v. The Principal Secretary13 is some
illustrations. Kaushal is intellectually very rich in considering all these means of
constitutionality. Tracing the importance of principle of constitutionality the court
extracted six points of Constitutional bench judgement in Ram Krishna Dalmia v.
Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar14 in the following words:15
.. … [T]hat there is always a presumption in favour of the
constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who
attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the
constitutional principles;
(c) that it must be presumed that the legislature understands and
correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are
directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its
discriminations are based on adequate grounds;
(d) that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may
confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be
the clearest;
(e) that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the
court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge,
matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume
every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of
legislation; and
9 AIR 2013 SC 2582; 2013 (9) SCALE 47, delivered by Surinder Singh Nijjar J and
concurring separate opinion by CJI Altamas Kabir, hereinafter referred as Bombay
Bar Dancer case. The paragraph of this case cited in this work is from PDF of the
judgement available at judis.nic.in.
10 Union of India v. Namit Sharma, AIR 2014 SC 122; 2013(11) SCALE 85, hereinafter
referred as Namit Sharma second. It was a review petition decided by A.K. Patnaik
(who delivered the unanimous verdict) and Arjan Kumar Sikri JJ. Previous case Union
of India v Namit Sharma (2013) 1 SCC 745 (hereinafter referred as Namit Sharma
First) was decided by the division bench of A.K. Patnaik J and Swatanter Kumar J
unanimously. Patnaik J was present in both Namit Sharma first and second. First was
over ruled by second. This is a peculiar case in last various years where on the same
issue between the same party, the same judge has two different opposite view. (In this
case the paragraph are cited from manupatra).
11 AIR 2014 SC 187; 2013 (13) SCALE 559. For details see infra. In a very brief para the
read down argument has been raised and rejected for interpretation of s.154 Cr PC.
12 (2014) 1SCC 1. G.S. Singhvi J delivered the unanimous verdict and Sudhansu Jyoti
Mukhopadhaya J was member of the bench, hereinafter referred as Kaushal. Paras
referred are from manupatra.
13 (2014) 2 SCC 532. The case has been unanimously decided by R.M. Lodha and
Kurian Joseph JJ. Madan B. Lokur J has different reasoning but concurrent opinion,
hereinafter referred as Manohar Lal Sharma. Paras referred are from Indlaw.
14 AIR 1958 SC 538, as cited in Kaushal para 26.
15 Id., para 27.
(f) that while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions
on the part of a legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing
on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought
to the notice of the court on which the classification may
reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of
constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding
that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for
subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile or
discriminating legislation.
On the question of whether principle of constitutionality is applicable to a
law which existed prior to the constitution Kaushal discussed article 13(1) and
article 372 of the constitution of India. The court took support from Ram Krishna
Dalmia,16 Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay,17 Anuj Garg v.
Hotel Association of India,18 John Vallamattom v. Union of India 19 and held:20
Every legislation enacted by Parliament or State Legislature
carries with it a presumption of constitutionality. This is founded
on the premise that the legislature, being a representative body
of the people and accountable to them is aware of their needs
and acts in their best interest within the confines of the
Constitution. There is nothing to suggest that this principle would
not apply to pre-Constitutional laws which have been adopted
by the Parliament and used with or without amendment. If no
amendment is made to a particular law it may represent a decision
that the Legislature has taken to leave the law as it is and this
decision is no different from a decision to amend and change
the law or enact a new law. In light of this, both pre and post
Constitutional laws are manifestations of the will of the people
of India through the Parliament and are presumed to be
constitutional. [Emphasis Added]
Self restraint, therefore, must be exercised and the analysis must be guided
by the implications of presumption of constitutionality.21 The court finally
concluded that:22
There is a presumption of constitutionality in favour of all laws,
including pre-Constitutional laws as the Parliament, in its
16 Supra note 14 at para 18.

17 1951 CriLJ 680.
18 (2008) 3 SCC 1.
19 AIR 2003 SC 2902.
21 Id. at para 32.
22 Id., para 31.
capacity as the representative of the people, is deemed to act for

the benefit of the people in light of their needs and the constraints
of the Constitution.
According to Kaushal23 doctrine of severability and the practice of reading
down are the other two important steps of interpretation. Kaushal can be used as
one of the most comprehensive modern authority on this point.24
Doctrine of severability
The court in Kaushal referred a passage from R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v.
The Union of India (UOI)25 where a Constitution Bench explained this doctrine
as follows:26
The doctrine of severability rests, as will presently be shown, on a
presumed intention of the legislature that if a part of a statute turns
out to be void that should not affect the validity of the rest of it,
and that that intention is to be ascertained from the terms of the
statute. It is the true nature of the subject-matter of the legislation
that is the determining factor, and while a classification made in
the statute might go far to support a conclusion in favour of
severability, the absence of it does not necessarily preclude it.27
A statute could be unconstitutional because of two reasons one, the subject-
matter being outside the competence of the legislature and two, provisions of
statute contravening constitutional prohibitions like part III, or Basic Structure
Theory. This is not material for what reason invalidity exists. When a statute is in
part void, it will be enforced as regards the rest, if that is severable from what is
invalid.28
Basis of severability
R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla summarised seven points from American case law
which was quoted with approval by Supreme Court in Kauhal as follows:29
i. In determining whether the valid parts of a statute are
separable from the invalid parts thereof, it is the intention
of the legislature that is the determining factor. The test to

24 Criticism of Kaushal is on final finding and not on this aspect.
25 AIR 1957 SC 628. In this case competitions of a gambling character were in question,
whether definition of ‘prize competition’ is wide enough to include also competitions
involving skill to a substantial degree.
26 Id., para 25.
27 Supra note 23.
28 AIR 1957 SC 628, para 25.
29 Supra note 23.
be applied is whether the legislature would have enacted

the valid part if it had known that the rest of the statute was
invalid. 30
ii. If the valid and invalid provisions are so inextricably mixed
up that they cannot be separated from one another, then the
invalidity of a portion must result in the invalidity of the
Act in its entirety. On the other hand, if they are so distinct
and separate that after striking out what is invalid, what
remains is in itself a complete code independent of the rest,
then it will be upheld notwithstanding that the rest has
become unenforceable.31
iii. Even when the provisions which are valid are distinct and
separate from those which are invalid, if they all form part
of a single scheme which is intended to be operative as a
whole, then also the invalidity of a part will result in the
failure of the whole. 32
iv. Likewise, when the valid and invalid parts of a statute are
independent and do not form part of a scheme but what is
left after omitting the invalid portion is so thin and truncated
as to be in substance different from what it was when it
emerged out of the legislature, then also it will be rejected
in its entirety.
v. The separability of the valid and invalid provisions of a
statute does not depend on whether the law is enacted in the
same section or different sections;33; it is not the form, but
the substance of the matter that is material, and that has to
be ascertained on an examination of the Act as a whole and
of the setting of the relevant provisions therein.
vi. If after the invalid portion is expunged from the statute what
remains cannot be enforced without making alterations and
modifications therein, then the whole of it must be struck
down as void, as otherwise it will amount to judicial
legislation.34
30 Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 82, at 156; Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Vol. 2,
at 176-177.
31 Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, Vol. 1 at 360-361; Crawford on Statutory
Construction, at 217-218.
32 Crawford at 218-219.
33 Cooley Vol. 1, at 361-362.
34 Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Vol. 2, at 194.
vii. In determining the legislative intent on the question of

separability, it will be legitimate to take into account the
history of the legislation, its object, the title and the preamble
to it.35
With the help of various authorities as discussed above the court made
following observation for the exercise or application of severability as interpretative
means:36
The doctrine of severability seeks to ensure that only that portion
of the law which is unconstitutional is so declared and the
remainder is saved. This doctrine should be applied keeping in
mind the scheme and purpose of the law and the intention of the
Legislature and should be avoided where the two portions are
inextricably mixed with one another.
In Bombay Bar Dancer case the argument to apply this doctrine has been
rejected which lead to declare section 33A and 33B of the Bombay Police Act,
1951 as unconstitutional. The court held as follows:37
We are also unable to accept the submission of Mr. Subramanium
that the provisions contained in Section 33A can be declared
constitutional by applying the doctrine of severability. Even if
Section 33B is declared unconstitutional, it would still retain
the provision contained in Section 33A which prohibits any kind
of dance by any person in the establishments covered under
Section 33A. [Emphasis added]
In Kaushal the severability rule was rejected and section 377 IPC was held
constitutional while in Bombay Bar Dancer case it was rejected to declare
provisions under question as unconstitutional.
In this context it is pertinent to note that Supreme Court being guardian of the
constitution has to act in two different ways. It has to be active, take interest in
protection of individual liberty. For example, it should declare any executive action
unconstitutional at the earliest if it violates fundamental right. But in some cases it
has to be reluctant and slow. For example if any provision of an enactment is in
question. Kaushal puts it this way:38
Another significant canon of determination of constitutionality
is that the Courts would be reluctant to declare a law invalid or
ultra vires on account of unconstitutionality. The Courts would
accept an interpretation, which would be in favour of
35 Id., Vol. 2, at 177-178.

36 Supra note 12, para 31.
constitutionality rather than the one which would render the

law unconstitutional. Declaring the law unconstitutional is
one of the last resorts taken by the Courts. [Emphasis added]
Reading down and reading into
Reading down is one of the tools used in the interpretative process to save
the provision from being turned down as violative of fundamental rights etc. This
tool has been widely discussed in Kaushal. A passing reference may be found in
Namit Sharma Second, Bombay Bar Dancer case and Manohar Lal Sharma. In
first three cases the court rejected the application of this tool while in last Manohar
Lal Sharma; it seems the court has accepted the argument of ‘read down.’ The
court in Kaushal has thoroughly discussed the rule of reading down and its
limitations in following words:39
The Courts would preferably put into service the principle of
‘reading down’ or ‘reading into’ the provision to make it
effective, workable and ensure the attainment of the object of
the Act. These are the principles which clearly emerge from the
consistent view taken by this Court in its various pronouncements
including the recent judgment in Namit Sharma.
Kaushal takes support from Namit Sharma First which has been overruled
by Namit Sharma Second in a review petition. This overruling does not dilute the
logic of reading down because Kaushal relied upon constitution bench judgement
of D.S. Nakara v. Union of India (UOI)40 where it observed:41
If from the impugned memoranda the event of being in service
and retiring subsequent to specified date is severed, all pensioners
would be governed by the liberalised pension scheme. …It does
therefore appear that the reading down of impugned memoranda
by severing the objectionable portion would not render the
liberalised pension scheme vague, unenforceable or unworkable.
The technique of reading down was applied in Namit Sharma first which was
decided last year. It invited severe criticism from all quarters. Sections 12(5) and
15(5) of the RTI Act, 2005 does not prescribe any basic qualification for
commissioners under RTI. Namit Sharma first conceived it as missing words and
held that such persons must have a basic degree in the respective field as otherwise
sections 12(5) and 15(5) of the Act are bound to offend the doctrine of equality.
39 Ibid.
40 (1983) 1 SCC 305. A Constitution bench of this court elucidated upon the practice of
reading down statutes as an application of the doctrine of severability while answering
in affirmative the question whether differential treatment to pensioners related to the
date of retirement qua the revised formula for computation of pension attracts Article
14 of the Constitution.
41 Id. at para 66.
Therefore the court incorporated the doctrine of “reading into” to avoid turning
down the provisions for the violation of article 14.42
Responding to the above argument Namit Sharma second says that parliament
never missed anything because they were clear in mind that the information
commission is going to be an administrative body. It observed:43
This “reading into” the provisions of Sections 12(5) and 15(5)
of the Act, words which Parliament has not intended is contrary
to the principles of statutory interpretation recognised by this
Court.
Another pertinent question is whether the interpretative seizure of severability
‘augment the class’ or ‘severance always cuts down the scope, never enlarges it’.
Kaushal also discusses this question with the help of D.S. Nakara, where the
Constitution bench observed: 44
…[W]e are not sure whether there is any principle which inhibits
the Court from striking down an unconstitutional part of a
legislative action which may have the tendency to enlarge the
width and coverage of the measure. Whenever classification is
held to be impermissible and the measure can be retained by
removing the unconstitutional portion of classification, by
striking down words of limitation, the resultant effect may be of
enlarging the class. In such a situation, the Court can strike down
the words of limitation in an enactment. That is what is called
reading down the measure. We know of no principle that
‘severance’ limits the scope of legislation and can never enlarge
it.
Kaushal also deliberates on the burden of proof, the matter of judicial notice
and belief in wisdom of state regarding rationale of discrimination. For these issues
the court extracted from Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Indore v.
Radhakrishan45 in the following words:46
…the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has
been a clear transgression of constitutional principles. For
sustaining the presumption of constitutionality the Court may
42 Namit Sharma first para, 106.2.

43 Namit Sharma Second, para 26. The court referred three judge bench judgement of
Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 323 where it was
held that the court could not correct or make up for any deficiencies or omissions in
the language of the statute. Courts cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation for
the very good reason that it has no power to legislate.
44 D.S. Nakara, para 68.
45 (1979) 2 SCC 249.
46 Ibid.
take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters

of common report, the history of the times and may assume
every state of facts which can be conceived it must always be
presumed that the Legislature understands and correctly
appreciates the need of its own people and that discrimination,
if any, is based on adequate grounds. It is well settled that courts
will be justified in giving a liberal interpretation to the section
in order to avoid constitutional invalidity. These principles have
given rise to rule of reading down the section if it becomes
necessary to uphold the validity of the sections.
In the case of Lalita Kumari it was argued that in the light of article 21,
provisions of section 154 of the Cr PC must be read down to mean that before
registering an FIR, the police officer must be satisfied that there is a prima facie
case for investigation. The constitution bench, however, declined to oblige this
argument.47
In the case of Manohar Lal Sharma48 the senior counsel for CBI has argued
that section 6A [of Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946] must be read
down to mean that prior approval is not necessary in cases where investigation is
monitored by the Constitutional court.49 Though the court did not directly address
this argument of ‘read down’ but the three judges bench held that the prior approval
of investigation required in section 6A is for the cases monitored by state. As the
case is monitored by constitutional courts like Supreme Court, this requirement is
not necessary. In other words the court allowed this argument of ‘read down.’50
Limits of reading down
Kaushal extracted a passage from Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (UOI)51
where the Court identified the limitations upon the practice of reading down: 52
… The device of reading down is not to be resorted to in order to
save the susceptibilities of the law makers, nor indeed to imagine
a law of one’s liking to have been passed. One must at least take
the Parliament at its word when, especially, it undertakes a
constitutional amendment.
47 Lalita Kumari,para 19.

48 (2014) 2 SCC 532.
49 Manohar Lal Sharma, at para 27.
50 Id. at para 65 and para 105.
51 (1980) 3 SCC 625.
52 Id. at para 69. In Minerva Mills the UOI argued that ‘Article 31C should be read down
so as to save it from the challenge of unconstitutionality.’ It suggested that ‘it would
be legitimate to read into that Article the intendment that only such laws would be
immunized from the challenge under articles 14 and 19 as do not damage or destroy the
basic structure of the Constitution.’ The court refused to apply the rule of reading
down.
The idea of reading down cannot be advanced if the provision empowers

nothing but arbitrariness. Kaushal illustrated it from Delhi Transport Corporation
v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress53 where in his concurring opinion, Ray J observed:54
This, however, does not under any circumstances mean that
where the plain and literal meaning that follows from a bare
reading of the provisions of the Act, Rule or Regulation that it
confers arbitrary, uncancalised, unbridled, unrestricted power
to terminate the services of a permanent employee without
recording any reasons for the same and without adhering to the
principles of natural justice and equality before the law as
envisaged in Article 14 of the Constitution, cannot be read down
to save the said provision from constitutional invalidity by
bringing or adding words in the said legislation such as saying
that it implies that reasons for the order of termination have to
be recorded. In interpreting the provisions of an Act, it is not
permissible where the plain language of the provision gives a
clear and unambiguous meaning can be interpreted by reading
down and presuming certain expressions in order to save it from
constitutional invalidity.
The court in Kaushal finally concluded that:55
The court can resort to reading down a law in order to save it
from being rendered unconstitutional. But while doing so, it
cannot change the essence of the law and create a new law which
in its opinion is more desirable.
In the Bombay Bar Dancer case the court reiterated that rule of reading down
can be applied “provided it does not clearly and flagrantly violate its constitutional
limits”. It, however, declined to do so in following words:
It is not possible to read down the expression any kind or type
of dance by any person to mean dances which are obscene and
derogatory to the dignity of women. Such reading down cannot
be permitted so long as any kind of dance is permitted in
establishments covered under Section 33 B[of Bombay Police
Act 1952].
53 1991 Supp (1) SCC 600.

54 In Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress 1991 Supp (1) SCC 600
Ray J also took note of Seervai Constitutional Law of India and Coin Howard, Australian
Federal Constitutional Law.
Bombay Bar Dancer case, 56 as submitted earlier the presumption of

constitutionality57 and reading down58 has been argued by the State counsel. On
the controversial question of burden of proof the State argued as follows: 59
On the basis of the above, it was submitted that the burden of
proof is upon the Respondents herein to prove that the enactment/
amendment is unconstitutional. Once the respondents prima
facie convince the Court that the enactment is unconstitutional
then the burden shifts upon the State to satisfy that the
restrictions imposed on the fundamental rights satisfy the test
of reasonableness. The High Court, according to the appellants,
failed to apply the aforesaid tests. [Emphasis added]
Exceptions of presumption of constitutionality
The general rule is that “…the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that
there has been a clear transgression of constitutional principles.” The exception to
presumption of constitutionality is a grey area because of lack of any legislative
direction and divergent opinion of Supreme Court of India. Kaushal judgement
has been severely criticized for not accepting the argument of exception. However
Bombay Bar Dancer case throws some light on it in following words: 60
The Preamble of the Constitution of India as also Articles 14 to
21, as rightly observed in the Constitutional Bench Judgment of
this Court in I.R. Coelho 61 form the heart and soul of the
Constitution. Taking away of these rights of equality by any
legislation would require clear proof of the justification for such
abridgment. Once the respondents had given prima facie proof
of the arbitrary classification of the establishments under
Sections 33A and 33B,[of Bombay Police Act, 1951] it was duty
of the State to justify the reasonableness of the classification.
[Emphasis added]
For this conclusion the division bench further relied on M/s. Laxmi
Khandsari,62 where this Court observed as follow:63
We, therefore, fully agree with the contention advanced by the
petitioners that where there is a clear violation of Article
56 Supra note 9.
57 Bombay Bar Dancer case, Id. at para 65-69.
58 Id. at para 70.
59 Id. at para 67.
60 Id. at para 100.
61 I.R. Coelho (Dead) by LRs. v. State of T.N. (2007) 2 SCC 1.
62 M/s. Laxmi Khandsari v. State of U.P. (1981) 2 SCC 600.
63 Id. at para 14.
19(1)(g), the State has to justify by acceptable evidence,

inevitable consequences or sufficient materials that the
restriction, whether partial or complete, is in public interest
and contains the quality of reasonableness. This proposition
has not been disputed by the counsel for the respondents, who
have, however, submitted that from the circumstances and
materials produced by them the onus of proving that the
restrictions are in public interest and are reasonable has been
amply discharged by them. [Emphasis added]
The court in Bombay Bar Dancer64case finally concluded that doctrine of
presumption of constitutionality has been rebutted by prima facie proving that
fundamental rights are violated and the state “herein have failed to satisfy the
aforesaid test laid down by this court.” 65 Establishing the rule of strict scrutiny
which negates presumption of constitutionality the court observed:66
….. [T]he State has failed to establish that the restriction is
reasonable or that it is in the interest of general public. The
High Court rightly scrutinized the impugned legislation in the
light of observations of this Court made in Narendra Kumar,67
wherein it was held that greater the restriction, the more the
need for scrutiny. The High Court noticed that in the guise of
regulation, the legislation has imposed a total ban on dancing in
the establishments covered under Section 33A [of Bombay
Police Act, 1951]. The High Court has also concluded that the
legislation has failed to satisfy the doctrine of direct and
inevitable effect.68
Other presumptions
Bombay Bar Dancer69case can also be highlighted for rejection of an irrational
presumption. The court observed in following words:70
The so called distinction is based purely on the basis of the
class of the performer and the so called superior class of
audience. Our judicial conscience would not permit us to
presume that the class to which an individual or the audience
belongs brings with him as a necessary concomitant a particular
64 2013 (9) SCALE 47.

65 Bombay Bar Dancer case, para 101.
66 Id. at para 110.
67 Narendra Kumar v. Union of India, (1960) 2 SCR 375.
68 The court admitted the argument of Dr Rajiv Dhavan at para 79 and referred Maneka
Gandhi’s case (1978) 1 SCC 248.
69 (2013) 8 SCC 519.
70 Id. at para 102.
kind of morality or decency. We are unable to accept the

presumption which runs through Sections 33A and 33B [Bombay
Police Act, 1951] that the enjoyment of same kind of
entertainment by the upper classes leads only to mere enjoyment
and in the case of poor classes; it would lead to immorality,
decadence and depravity. [Emphasis added]
On presumption it further added:71
Morality and depravity cannot be pigeon-holed by degrees
depending upon the classes of the audience. The aforesaid
presumption is also perplexing on the ground that in the banned
establishments even a non-obscene dance would be treated as
vulgar. On the other hand, it would be presumed that in the
exempted establishments any dance is non-obscene. The
underlying presumption at once puts the prohibited
establishments in a precarious position, in comparison to the
exempted class for the grant of a licence to hold a dance
performance. Yet at the same time, both kinds of establishments
are to be granted licenses and regulated by the same restrictions,
regulations and standing provisions. [Emphasis added]
In the opinion of the court the “presumption is elitist, which cannot be
countenanced under the egalitarian philosophy of our Constitution.”72 In the same
flow the court observed:73
. .… the classification between the exempted establishments and
prohibited establishments on the basis the legislation is based
on an unacceptable presumption that the so called elite i.e. rich
and the famous would have higher standards of decency,
morality or strength of character than their counter parts who
have to content themselves with lesser facilities of inferior quality
in the dance bars. Such a presumption is abhorrent to the resolve
in the Preamble of the Constitution to secure the citizens of
India. Equality of status and opportunity and dignity of the
individual. The State Government presumed that the
performance of an identical dance item in the establishments
having facilities less than 3 stars would be derogative to the
dignity of women and would be likely to deprave, corrupt or
injure public morality or morals; but would not be so in the
exempted establishments. [Emphasis Added]
71 Ibid.
72 Id. at para 103.
73 Id. at para 107.
The court in very strong words again rejected the presumption as under:
…the activities which are obscene or which are likely to deprave
and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences, cannot be distinguished on the basis as to whether
they are performing in 5 star hotels or in dance bars. The judicial
conscience of this Court would not give credence to a notion
that high morals and decent behaviour is the exclusive domain
of the upper classes; whereas vulgarity and depravity is limited
to the lower classes. Any classification made on the basis of
such invidious presumption is liable to be struck down being
wholly unconstitutional and particularly contrary to Article 14
of the Constitution of India. [Emphasis added]
Badshah v. Sou. Urmila Badshah Godse74 discusses the scope and limitation
of the phrase “wife”. In this case a lady married the petitioner as per Hindu Rites
and customs. After three month of marriage the lady came to know that the petitioner
was already married which he did not disclose to the lady while marrying. The
lady claimed maintenance for her and her daughter. The issue was whether a lady
who is not “legally wedded wife” may claim for maintenance under section 125,
Cr PC 1973 or not?
The court followed Dwarika Prasad Satpathy v. Bidyut Prava Dixit75
where it was held that:76
If the claimant in proceedings under Section 125 of the Code
succeeds in showing that she and the Respondent have lived
together as husband and wife, the court can presume that they
are legally wedded spouse, and in such a situation, the party
who denies the marital status can rebut the presumption’. 77
[Emphasis Added]
The court considered a recent decision as under:78
No doubt, in Chanmuniya v. Virendra Kumar Singh
Kushwaha,79 the Division Bench of this Court took the view
that the matter needs to be considered with respect to Section
125, Code of Criminal Procedure, by larger bench and in para 41,
three questions are formulated for determination by a larger bench…
74 AIR 2014 SC 869, 2014 CriLJ 1076, hereinafter referred as Badshah v Badshah. It
was unanimously decided on 18.10.2013, by Ranjana Prakash Desai and Arjan Kumar
Sikri, JJ. and delivered by Ranjana Prakash Desai. The paragraph of this case cited in
this work is from PDF of judgement available at judis.nic.in.
75 MANU/SC/0673/1999 : (1999) 7 SCC 675. Badshah v Badshah, para 10.
77 Ibid.
78 Id. at para 13.
79 (2011) 1 SCC 141.
Out of the three questions, the first one is relevant for our consideration
which is as follows:80
Whether the living together of a man and woman as husband
and wife for a considerable period of time would raise the
presumption of a valid marriage between them and whether
such a presumption would entitle the woman to maintenance
under Section 125, Code of Criminal Procedure?
Objective of section 125 is to provide financial relief to wife. A couple starts
living together in a traditional society; the community presumes that they must be
married. This is a social presumption. This social presumption becomes conclusive
for the purpose of law if the couple stays together for various years. Any other
presumption will always give benefit to male and will always be detrimental to the
interest of female. The court therefore held: 81
We are of the opinion that there is a non-rebuttable presumption
that the Legislature while making a provision like Section 125
Code of Criminal Procedure, to fulfill its Constitutional duty in
good faith, had always intended to give relief to the woman
becoming “wife” under such circumstances.
Similar question of presumption of marriage was raised in the case of Indra
Sarma v. V.K.V Sarma.82 The issue was if a female lives with a male knowing the
fact that the male is married, and is father of children and all family members of male
are opposed of her living together with male, can she argue this “relationship in
the nature of marriage” because she lived in for a long period of time. Will the ‘law
presumes that they are living together in consequence of a valid marriage’83
The court, taking clues from Gokal Chand v. Parvin Kumari 84held that:85
…the continuous cohabitation of man and woman as husband
and wife may raise the presumption of marriage, but the
80 Other two questions were—Whether strict proof of marriage is essential for a claim of
maintenance under s.125 Cr PC having regard to the provisions of the Domestic
Violence Act, 2005? Whether a marriage performed according to the customary rites
and ceremonies, without strictly fulfilling the requisites of s. 7(1) of the Hindu Marriage
Act, 1955, or any other personal law would entitle the woman to maintenance under
s. 125 Cr PC.?
81 Badshah v Badshah, para 22.
82 AIR 2014 SC 309. The judgement is delivered by K.S. Panicker Radhakrishnan J. The
other member of the bench was Pinaki Chandra Ghose J, hereinafter referred as Indra
Sharma.
83 Indra Sharma, para 56. In the case of Andrahennedige Dinohamy v. Wiketunge
Liyanapatabendage Balshamy, AIR 1927 PC 185 the Privy Council laid down a
generic proposition, that where a man and a woman are proved to have lived together
as husband and wife, the law presumes that they are living together in consequence of
a valid marriage.
84 AIR 1952 SC 231.
presumption which may be drawn from long cohabition is a

rebuttable one and if there are circumstances which weaken and
destroy that presumption, the Court cannot ignore them.
In this case the appellant lady knew the male is married. Therefore the court
held that:86
….[I]n the instant case, there is no necessity to rebut the
presumption, since the Appellant was aware that the Respondent
was a married person even before the commencement of their
relationship, hence the status of the Appellant is that of a
concubine or a mistress, who cannot enter into relationship in
the nature of a marriage.
In these type of cases the legislature should step in. It is correct that the female
partners are involved in those activities which the conservative societies find
immoral. This does not deprive of the female partner their claim for maintenance.
The incidents of living in, bigamous marriage are increasing because of departure
in social norms. Law should endeavour to check the departure but should not
leave the female on the mercy of males. Not providing maintenance will invite
further complications to these female. Such maintenance should also be made
mandatory and law should be changed accordingly.
Mandatory v. Directory
Whether a provision is non optional or optional is generally decided by the
words used in the provision. General understanding is that “shall” makes the
provision non optional while “may’ makes is optional. This ‘complexities of
distinction between mandatory and directory provisions have been a perennial
topic of intellectual debate.’
Shall and may
Namit Sharma second, observed that due to use of word ‘may’ in sections
2787and 28 of RTI mandatory directions cannot be given by court. The court held
as under: 88
The use of word “may” in Sections 27 and 28 of the Act make it
clear that Parliament has left it to the discretion of the rule making
authority to make rules to carry out the provisions of the Act.
Hence, no mandamus can be issued to the rule making authority
to make the rules either within a specific time or in a particular
86 Id at para 57.
87 RTI, 2005 s. 27- Power to make rules by competent authority- (1) The competent
authority may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules to carry out the
provisions of this Act.
88 Namit Sharma second, para 28.
manner. If, however, the rules are made by the rule making
authority and the rules are not in accordance with the provisions
of the Act, the Court can strike down such rules as ultra vires
the Act, but the Court cannot direct the rule making authority to
make the rules where the Legislature confers discretion on the
rule making authority to make rules. In the judgment under
review, therefore, this Court made a patent error in directing the
rule making authority to make rules within a period of six months.
This seems a literal meaning and literal use of word ‘may’. In various cases
the government and parliament misuse the word for small gains. The court here
agreed that a judicial member could have been a better option which is ‘ought
law’ not ‘is law’ that is out of the province of judiciary.
Shall: ordinary meaning
In the case of Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of UP,89 the question was how to interpret
“shall” used in section 154 of Cr PC 1973. The court rejected the argument that
shall should be like “may” and observed that ‘if a discretion, option or latitude is
allowed to the police in the matter of registration of FIRs, it can have serious
consequences on the public order situation and can also adversely affect the rights
of the victims including violating their fundamental right to equality.’90 Examining
three things, context, object and consequence of Cr PC 1973 it held as under:91
Therefore, the context in which the word “shall” appears in
Section 154(1) of the Code, the object for which it has been
used and the consequences that will follow from the infringement
of the direction to register FIRs, all these factors clearly show
that the word “shall” used in Section 154(1) needs to be given
its ordinary meaning of being of “mandatory” character. The
89 AIR 2014 SC 187, The constitution bench judgement was unanimously delivered by
P.Sathasivam CJI Other members were B.S.Chauhan, Ranjana Prakash Desai, Ranjan
Gogoi and S.A.Bobde, JJ hereinafter referred as Lalita Kumari. This case refers three
cases with same parties. First two are division bench while third is full bench of three
judges. Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 7 SCC 164; Lalita
Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 14 SCC 337. Lalita Kumari v.
Government of Uttar Pradesh (2012) 4 SCC 1. The last culminated into constitution
bench direction. On 05.03.14 five judges judgement in Lalita Kumari (12.11.13) has
been modified by three judges bench and clause (vii) of paragraph 111 has been
replaced in following manner: (vii) While ensuring and protecting the rights of the
accused and the complainant, a preliminary inquiry should be made time bound and
in any case it should not exceed fifteen days generally and in exceptional cases, by
giving adequate reasons, six weeks time is provided. The fact of such delay and the
causes of it must be reflected in the General Diary entry.
90 Lalita Kumari, at para 43.
91 Id. at para 44.
provisions of Section 154(1) of the Code, read in the light of the

statutory scheme, do not admit of conferring any discretion on
the officer in-charge of the police station for embarking upon a
preliminary inquiry prior to the registration of an FIR. It is settled
position of law that if the provision is unambiguous and the
legislative intent is clear, the court need not call into it any other
rules of construction.
Legislative intent, natural meaning and scheme of the statute all lead to one
conclusion that “shall” in the section is mandatory in nature. In the words of court: 92
In view of the above, the use of the word ‘shall’ coupled with
the Scheme of the Act lead to the conclusion that the legislators
intended that if an information relating to commission of a
cognizable offence is given, then it would mandatorily be
registered by the officer in-charge of the police station. Reading
‘shall’ as ‘may’, as contended by some counsel, would be against
the Scheme of the Code. Section 154 of the Code should be
strictly construed and the word ‘shall’ should be given its natural
meaning. The golden rule of interpretation can be given a go-by
only in cases where the language of the section is ambiguous
and/or leads to an absurdity.
….[I]t is thus unequivocally clear that registration of FIR is
mandatory and also that it is to be recorded in the FIR
Book…[Emphasis added]93
Shall: useless when provision is inapplicable
A unique position of “shall” can be found in Manohar Lal Sharma94 where
the interpretation of section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946
was in question. Section 6A provides that “Delhi Special Police Establishment
shall not conduct any inquiry or investigation into any offence alleged to have
been committed under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 except with the
previous approval of the Central Government...” According to ordinary meaning
of “shall” the provision is mandatory in nature and therefore it has to be applied
indiscriminatory. Whether this ordinary meaning of shall mandating a statutory
restriction is applicable in those matters where the Supreme Court is monitoring a
case or will it be applicable only if State is monitoring. The court held that if
constitutional courts are monitoring a case there is no need of application of section
6A. The court took support from the majority view of constitution bench in Union
Carbide Corporation v. Union of India95 “that the prohibitions or limitations or
92 Id. at para 45.

93 Id at para 63.
94 (2014) 2 SCC 532; AIR 2014 SC 666.
95 (1991) 4 SCC 584 at para 83.
provisions contained in ordinary laws, cannot ipso facto, act as prohibitions or

limitations on the constitutional powers under Article 142”96 and “in exercise of
the powers under Article 142 is to take note of the express prohibitions in any
substantive statutory provision based on some fundamental principles of public
policy and regulate the exercise of its power and discretion accordingly”.97 A
concurring opinion with different reasoning has been separately given by Madan
B Lokure J in following words:98
....[S]ection 6A of the Act must be meaningfully and realistically
read, only as an injunction to the executive and not as an
injunction to a constitutional court monitoring an investigation
under Article 32 of the Constitution in an exercise of judicial
review and of issuing a continuing mandamus.
In other words “shall” used in section 6A is mandatory if executive (State) is
monitoring a case while the provision becomes ineffective if constitutional courts
are monitoring the case.
M/S Delhi Airtech Services Private Ltd v State of U.P. 99 was a case discussed
in 2012 survey where interpretation of “shall” and “may” was also in issue. It has
been referred to larger bench (three judges bench)due to conflicting views of
division bench and could not be decided in 2013. In this judgement both judges
referred to the principle of strict construction to explore the intention of legislature
with different reasonings and final outcome.
Liberal v. Strict
Words should be given liberal or strict meaning is another area of debate. This
year the first important observation could be found in State of Gujarat v. Hon’Ble
Mr. Justice R.A. Mehta (Retd) 100 where the term ‘consultation’ contained in Section
3 of the Gujarat Lokayukta Act 1986, and primacy of opinion of high court judge
regarding appointment of the Lokayukta was in issue. The court stated one of the
principles of interpretation by extracting a passage from a British case which is as
under:101
Viscount Simon, L.C. in the case of Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated
Collieries Ltd,102 stated as follows:
96 Manohar Lal Sharma , para 50.

97 Id. at para 52.
98 Id. at para 105.
99 AIR 2012 SC 573 hereinafter referred as Delhi Airtech. This case was decided by a
division bench of Asok Kumar Ganguly and Swatanter Kumar JJ. They expressed
conflicting opinions on the issue.
100 (2013) 3 SCC 1, decided on 02.01.13. Judis.nic.in indate wise search does not show
this case.
101 Id. at para 66.
102 [1940] 3 All E.R. 549:[1940] A.C. 1014.
......if the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower

of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the
legislation we should avoid a construction which would
reduce the legislation to futility, the [court] should rather
accept the bolder construction, based on the view that
Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing
about an effective result.103 [Emphasis added].
The court in Badshah104 denied giving a legalistic interpretation of term ‘wife’
in section 125 with the help of its decision in Chanmuniya v. Virendra Kumar
Singh Kushwaha105 which is so stated in the following manner:106
A broad and expansive interpretation should be given to the term
“wife” to include even those cases where a man and woman have been
living together as husband and wife for reasonably long period of time,
and strict proof of marriage should not be a pre-condition for
maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure so as
to fulfill the true spirit and essence of the beneficial provision of
maintenance under Section 125.
The Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation v.
Diamond and Gem Development Corporation Ltd,107can be treated as fresh
authority on interpretation of contractual obligations where certain provisions of
Rajasthan Land Revenue (Industrial area Allotment) Rules, 1959 were in dispute. It
advocated literal rule of interpretation in following words:108
…Thus, contract being a creature of an agreement between two
or more parties, has to be interpreted giving literal meanings
unless, there is some ambiguity therein. The contract is to be
interpreted giving the actual meaning to the words contained
in the contract and it is not permissible for the court to make a
new contract, however is reasonable, if the parties have not
made it themselves. It is to be interpreted in such a way that its
terms may not be varied. The contract has to be interpreted
without giving any outside aid. The terms of the contract have
to be construed strictly without altering the nature of the contract,
as it may affect the interest of either of the parties adversely.109
103 Gujrat Lokayukta case, para 66.

104 Supra note 74.
105 MANU/SC/0807/2010; (2011) 1 SCC 141.
106 Badshah, para 12.
107 MANU/SC/0116/2013; (2013) 5 SCC 47; AIR 2013 SC 1241. The court has classified
the judgement in various heads. One head is head four (IV. Interpretation of terms of
contract), hereinafter referred as Rajasthan State Industrial Development. Paras cited
are from manupatra.
108 Id., para 16.
109 Ibid. The court found its justification from United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Harchand
Rai Chandan Lal AIR 2004 SC 4794; Polymat India P. Ltd. v. National Insurance Co.
Ltd. AIR 2005 SC 286.
Inclusive and exhaustive definition

Inclusive and exhaustive definition has remained a contemporary issue in
interpretative discussion which generally helps court understand whether liberal
or strict interpretation is required.
In the case of Indra Sarma110 the interpretation of phrase “relationship in the
nature of marriage” used in section 2(f) 111 of Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005 was under consideration. Should this phrase be liberally
construed to cover any relationship between male and female or should it be strictly
construed to exclude certain relationship. The court found first guidance from
word “means” used in the section. It observed:
The definition clause mentions only five categories of
relationships which exhausts itself since the expression “means”,
has been used. When a definition clause is defined to “mean”
such and such, the definition is prima facie restrictive and
exhaustive. Section 2(f) has not used the expression “include”
so as to make the definition exhaustive. It is in that context we
have to examine the meaning of the expression “relationship in
the nature of marriage”.
The court decided that ‘the Appellant was not ignorant of the fact that the
Respondent was a married person with wife and two children, hence, was party to
an adulterous and bigamous relationship’.
The court expressed its desire to reform law with its helplessness to reform in
following words:
Long standing relationship as a concubine, though not a
relationship in the nature of a marriage, of course, may at times,
deserves protection because that woman might not be financially
independent, but we are afraid that DV Act does not take care of
such relationships which may perhaps call for an amendment of
the definition of Section 2(f) of the DV Act, which is restrictive
and exhaustive.
110 AIR 2014 SC 309.

111 S. 2(f) in The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 “domestic
relationship” means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any
point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by
consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption
or are family members living together as a joint family; tc” (f) “domestic relationship”
means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time,
lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage,
or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members
living together as a joint family”
In the case of Balmer Lawrie and Co. Ltd. v Partha Sarathi Sen Roy112 while
dealing with the Article 12 constitution of India, the court discusses this exhaustive
and inclusive definition in following words:113
… it is evident that it is rather difficult to provide an exhaustive
definition of the term “authorities”, which would fall within the
ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution.
Narrating its reason for an inclusive definition of article 12 the court further
observed:
This is precisely why, only an inclusive definition is possible. It
is in order to keep pace with the broad approach adopted with
respect to the doctrine of equality enshrined in Articles 14 and
16 of the Constitution, that whenever possible courts have tried
to curb the arbitrary exercise of power against individuals by
centers of power, Budh Singh and therefore, there has been a
corresponding expansion of the judicial definition of the term
State, as mentioned in Article 12 of the Constitution.
In this case the meaning of ‘deep and pervasive control’ was under discussion.
Should this phrase be given liberal interpretation or strict? This interpretation
became relevant because of the question whether Balmer Lawrie and Company
Ltd is a State or not within the purview of article 12 of the Constitution of India.
Balmer Lawrie is a government company in which around 59% shares are held by
the government. The court observed: 114
The said issue has been considered by various larger benches,
and it has been held that in order to meet the requirements of
law with respect to being a State, the concerned company must
be under the deep and pervasive control of the government.
While quoting from Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India115 the court
observed:116
In conclusion, it should be noted that there can be no two views
about the fact that the Constitution of this country is a living
organism and it is the duty of Courts to interpret the same to
fulfil the needs and aspirations of the people depending on the
needs of the time. [Emphasis added]
Initially article 12 of the constitution of India had ‘a limited objective of
granting judicial review of actions of such authorities which are created under the
112 MANU/SC/0171 (2013) 8SCC 345, Decided on 20.02.2013, hereinafter referred as

Balmer Lawrie. Paras cited herein are from manupatra.
113 Balmer Lawrie, para 12.
114 Id., para 6.
115 AIR 2005 SC 2677.
116 As cited in Balmer Lawrie at para 10.
Statute and which discharge State functions’. This objective, however, has been
changed because the policy of government changed. This change in policy can
also be traced in judicial interpretation of “other authorities” and “other authorities”
include bodies other than statutory bodies.117 The court continued from Zee
Telefilms Ltd.:118
However, because of the need of the day this Court in noticing
the socio- economic policy of the country thought it fit to expand
the definition of the term “other authorities” to include bodies
other than statutory bodies. This development of law by judicial
interpretation culminated in the judgment of the 7-Judge Bench
in the case of Pradeep Kumar Biswas.119
Any further extension of article 12, according to the court, was unwarranted:120
It is to be noted that in the meantime the socio-economic policy
of the Government of India has changed in the case Balco
Employees’ Union (Regd.) v. Union of India121and the State is
today distancing itself from commercial activities and
concentrating on governance rather than on business. Therefore,
the situation prevailing at the time of Sukhdev Singh 122 is not in
existence at least for the time being, hence, there seems to be no
need to further expand the scope of “other authorities” in Article
12 by judicial interpretation at least for the time being.
The court also warned that judicial interpretation should not be a used as a
tool to remove the line between State enterprise and a non- State enterprise:
It should also be borne in mind that as noticed above, in a
democracy there is a dividing line between a State enterprise
and a non- State enterprise, which is distinct and the judiciary
should not be an instrument to erase the said dividing line
unless, of course, the circumstances of the day require it to
do so.
Criticising the over enthusiastic approach towards liberal interpretation and not
exploring the possibility of applying the other rules of interpretation the court in the
case of Thalappalam Ser. Coop. Bank ltd. v. State of Kerala123 held as under:124
117 Rajasthan State Electricity Board Jaipur v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1967 SC 1857; Sukhdev
Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi, AIR 1975 SC 1331para 35 of Zee
Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India.
118 Zee Telefilms Ltd. Para 35, in Balmer Lawrie at para 10.
119 Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 5 SCC 111.
120 Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India, Para 35, as quoted in Balmer Lawrie at para 10.
121 2002 2 SCC 333.
122 AIR 1975 SC 1331.
123 2013 (12) SCALE 527, hereinafter referred as Thalappalam. The judgement is delivered
by K.S. Panicker and Radhakrishnan JJ. The Para cited herein are from judis.nic.in
124 Id., para 43.
We are of the view that the High Court has given a complete go-
bye to the above-mentioned statutory principles and gone at a
tangent by mis-interpreting the meaning and content of Section
2(has given a liberal construction to expression “public
authority” under Section 2(h) of the Act, bearing in mind the
“transformation of law” and its “ultimate object” i.e. to achieve
“transparency and accountability”, which according to the court
could alone advance the objective of the Act. Further, the High
Court has also opined that RTI Act will certainly help as a
protection against the mismanagement of the society by the
managing committee and the society’s liabilities and that vigilant
members of the public body by obtaining information through
the RTI Act, will be able to detect and prevent mismanagement
in time.
Stating reason on why a liberal construction is not warranted the court found
that:125
In our view, the categories mentioned in Section 2(h) of the Act
exhaust themselves, hence, there is no question of adopting a
liberal construction to the expression “public authority” to bring
in other categories into its fold, which do not satisfy the tests we
have laid down. Court cannot, when language is clear and
unambiguous, adopt such a construction which, according to
the Court, would only advance the objective of the Act. We are
also aware of the opening part of the definition clause which
states “unless the context otherwise requires”. No materials have
been made available to show that the cooperative societies, with
which we are concerned, in the context of the Act, would fall
within the definition of Section 2(h) of the Act.126
In Devender Pal Singh Bhullar v. State of N.C.T. of Delhi,127 the court dealt
with the issue of delay in Capital Punishment. It found Maneka Gandhi v. Union
of India128 relevant through Bachan Singh v State Of Punjab.129 In Bachan Singh
Sarkaria J of the constitution bench referred Maneka Gandhi and observed:130
125 Ibid.
126 Thalappalam, para 43.
127 2013(5) SCALE 575, at para 5.
128 (1978) 1 SCC 248.
129 AIR 1980 SC 898, 1980 CriLJ 636, 1982.
130 Bachan Singh, para 136. ‘No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty
except according to procedure established by law.’ If this Article is expanded in
accordance with the interpretative principle indicated in Maneka Gandhi, it will read
as follows: No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according
to fair, just and reasonable procedure established by valid law.In the converse positive
form, the expanded Article will read as below:A person may be deprived of his life or
…Thus expanded and read for interpretative purposes, Article 21

clearly brings out the implication, that the founding fathers
recognised the right of the State to deprive a person of his life or
personal liberty in accordance with fair, just and reasonable procedure
established by valid law. … On parity of reasoning, it cannot be said
that death penalty for the offence of murder violates the basic structure
of the Constitution.131
In the case of Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. The State of Maharashtra132the
conviction and sentence of prisoners involved in Bombay Blast (post ayodhya
demolition) was in question. The court observed: 133
…[t]he majority view in Bachan Singh, 134 gave a wider
interpretation to the term special reasons by embracing within
its ambit both the circumstances connected with the particular
crime and the criminal. Upshot of this interpretation is that the
special reasons required for confirming the death sentence under
Section 302 or in the context of this case in Section 3(2) (i) of
TADA will have to be identified by balancing the aggravating
and mitigating or extenuating circumstances.
In Surinder Singh the court accepted that ‘penal provisions have to be
construed strictly.’135The court also admitted the fact that literal and lexical
construction may defeat the purpose.136
In Manohar Lal Sharma137 the question was “whether the approval of the
Central Government is necessary under Section 6A of the Delhi Special Police
Establishment Act, 1946 in a matter where the inquiry/investigation into the crime
under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is being monitored by the Court.” it
was argued that “requirement of sanction under Section 6A is to be interpreted
strictly and cannot be waived under any circumstances. The court, however, held
that “Such an interpretation will be directly contrary to the power (as well as
constitutional duty) of the constitutional court to monitor an investigation in
larger public interest.138 It is the duty of this court that anti-corruption laws which
personal liberty in accordance with fair, just and reasonable procedure established by
valid law.
131 Indeed Bachan Singh at para 136 starts with following: 136. Article 21 reads as under:
[Emphasis Added]
132 (2013) 13 SCC 1, the case has been decided by P. Sathasivam, J hereinafter referred as
Yakub Abdul Razak Memon. Paras cited herein are from
133 Id. at para 490.
134 AIR 1980 SC 898.
135 Surinder Singh, para 17.
136 Id., para 18. Discussed in detail under the head Penal v. Remedial.
137 (2014) 2 SCC 532.
138 Supra note 96, para 26, cited in judis.nic.in.
are penal statute are interpreted and worked out in such a fashion that helps in
minimizing abuse of public office for private gain.139
Penal v. Remedial Statutes
Dowry cases
Dowry death cases are one of the species of cruelty against women. In last
few years the ‘cruelty against women’ cases are on the priority radar of all the
wings of governance. Interpretations in this respect revolves round the diverse
and inconsistent meaning of dowry, relative of husband, wife etc. The inconsistency
owes its origin to the use of different interpretative rules and tools by apex judiciary.
The case under discussion considers the word ‘soon before’, difference between
dowry demand and business demand. The interpretation of ‘soon before’ has not
created much controversy. However, the interpretation of word ‘dowry’ and its
distinction from demand for business has developed some disputes. Certain
judgements argue that Indian Penal Code and Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 being
penal legislation, has to be strictly interpreted while a few judgements feel that
strict interpretation is too lexican to serve the purpose.
In the case of Vipin Jaiswal v. State of AP rep. by Pub. Prosecutor140 the
interpretation of expression ‘dowry’ and “in connection with the marriage of the
parties to the marriage” was one of the issues.141
Is it wide enough to cover any monetary demand for any purpose [in this
case demand of Rs. 50,000/- made by the Appellant for purchase of a computer]?
Or the demand must be very closely related ‘in connection with the marriage’.
The court observed:142
In our view, both the Trial Court and the High Court failed to
appreciate that the demand, if at all made by the Appellant on
139 Id. at para 59.

140 AIR 2013 SC 1567; 2013 CriLJ 2095.
141 Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 S. 2 runs as under here :
Explanation II.-The expression ‘valuable security’ has the same meaning as in Sec. 30
of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).
Definition of ‘dowry’-In this act, ‘dowry’ means any property or valuable security
given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly-
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or
(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to
the marriage or to any other person; at or before or any time after the marriage in
connection with the marriage of said parties but does not include dower or mahr in the
case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies.
142 Vipin Jaiswal, at para 6.
the deceased for purchasing a computer to start a business six

months after the marriage, was not in connection with the
marriage and was not really a ‘dowry demand’ within the
meaning of Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
The court imported its ratio from Appasaheb v. State of Maharashtra,143
where the court held:144
In view of the aforesaid definition145 of the word “dowry” any
property or valuable security should be given or agreed to be
given either directly or indirectly at or before or any time after
the marriage and in connection with the marriage of the said
parties. Therefore, the giving or taking of property or valuable
security must have some connection with the marriage of the
parties and a correlation between the giving or taking of property
or valuable security with the marriage of the parties is essential.
On the point of interpretation the court observed in the case of Appasaheb v.
State of Maharastra146
Being a penal provision it has to be strictly construed. Dowry is
a fairly well known social custom or practice in India. It is well
settled principle of interpretation of Statute that if the Act is passed
with reference to a particular trade, business or transaction and
words are used which everybody conversant with that trade,
business or transaction knows or understands to have a particular
meaning in it, then the words are to be construed as having that
particular meaning.147 [Emphasis Added]
Taking clues from precedent and the rule of strict interpretation the court
decided that demand of Rupees 50000/ for computer after six months of marriage is
not ‘in connection with the marriage’ and therefore does not amount to ‘dowry’.
Surinder Singh v. State of Haryana148 is on the point of ‘soon before’ used in
section 304B, Indian Penal Code, 1960 and 113B Indian Evidence Act, 1872 where
the court observed: 149
For the presumptions contemplated under these Sections to
spring into action, it is necessary to show that the cruelty or
143 MANU/SC/7002/2007 .
144 Id., para 9.
145 See supra note 141.
147 The court also cited Union of India v. Garware Nylons Ltd. AIR (1996) SC 3509
MANU/SC/0967/1996; and Chemicals and Fibres of India v. Union of India, AIR
(1997) SC 558) MANU/SC/0147/1997.
148 (2014) 4 SCC 129, Ranjana Prakash Desai and Madan B. Lokur, JJ. Unanimous
decision of division bench, hereinafter referred as Surinder Singh. The para cited are
at judis.nic.in
149 Id. at para13.
harassment was caused soon before the death. The

interpretation of the words ‘soon before’ is, therefore, important.
The question is how ‘soon before’? This would obviously
depend on facts and circumstances of each case.
Therefore, ‘soon before’ is a relative term. In matters of emotions
we cannot have fixed formulae. The time-lag may differ from
case to case. This must be kept in mind while examining each
case of dowry death.150
Applying this test the court found that the complete period of marriage was a
period of cruelty for demand of dowry and therefore could be covered under ‘soon
before’:151
The cruelty was spread over the short period covering the date
of her marriage till her death displaying a course of conduct. In
her case, in our opinion, cruelty caused to her on any day from
the date of her marriage i.e. 20/04/1994 till the date of her death
i.e. 22/07/1994 could be cruelty caused ‘soon before’ her death.
Dowry demand vis a vis other commercial demands
Should the word ‘dowry’ be given wide interpretation to incorporate every
demand by husband and his relative or should ‘dowry’ be limited to literal meaning
to provide space to the argument of ‘demand made for business’?
The issue, therefore, was ‘being a penal provision section 2 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 will have to be construed strictly’ or not because in the case
of Vipin Jaiswal152 and Appasaheb v. State of Maharashtra,153 the court construed
it strictly.154 Admitting this fact the court in Surinder Singh observed:155
It is true that penal provisions have to be construed strictly.
However, we may mention that in Murlidhar Meghraj Loya v.
State of Maharashtra156 this Court was dealing with the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. Speaking for this
Court, Krishna Iyer, J. held that It is trite that the social mission
of Food Laws should inform the interpretative process so that
the legal blow may fall on every adulterator.]any narrow and
pedantic, literal and lexical construction of food laws is likely
150 Ibid.
151 Id. at para 15.
152 (2013) 3 SCC 684.
153 (2007) 9 SCC 721.
155 Id., para 18.
156 (1976) 3 SCC 684,
157 Id. at para 5.
to leave loopholes for the offender to sneak out of the meshes of

law and should be discouraged and criminal jurisprudence must
depart from old canons defeating criminal statutes calculated
to protect the public health and the nation’s wealth.157 Similar
view was taken in Kisan Trimbak Kothula v. State of
Maharashtra.158
The court also found force from State of Maharashtra v. Natwarlal
Damodardas Soni159 which dealt with section 135 of the Customs Act and Rule
126-H(2)(d) of the Defence of India Rules, where a narrow construction given by
the high court was rejected, because:160
that will emasculate these provisions and render them ineffective
as a weapon for combating gold smuggling. It was further held
that the provisions have to be specially construed in a manner
which will suppress the mischief and advance the object which
the legislature had in view.161
While we reiterate what this Court has said in Appasaheb that a
penal statute has to be construed strictly, in light of Kisan Trimbak
and Natwarlal Damodardas, we are of the opinion that penal
statute, even if it has to be strictly construed, must be so construed
as not to defeat its purport…The presumption under Section 113B
of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and the presumption under
Section 304B of the IPC have a purpose. These are beneficent
provisions aimed at giving relief to a woman subjected to cruelty
158 (1977) 1 SCC 300, [1977]2SCR102), AIR1977SC435, decided on 7.11.1976, by P.N.

Bhagwati, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali and V.R. Krishna Iyer, JJ. This judgement being a full
bench judgement has greater force than previous one.
159 (1980) 4 SCC 669.
161 State of Maharashtra v. Natwarlal Damodardas Soni AIR 1980 SC 593, 1980 CriLJ
429, (The original paragraph runs as under: The High Court has held that these Rules
do not apply because the accused respondent had not acquired possession of these
gold biscuits by purchase or otherwise within the meaning of these Rules. Such a
narrow construction of this expression, in our opinion, will emasculate these provisions
and render them ineffective as a weapon for combating gold smuggling. As was pointed
out by this Court in Balakrishna Chhaganlal v. State of West Bengal MANU/SC/
0088/1975:1975CriLJ1862;Rule 126P(2)(ii) penalises a person who has in his
possession or under his, control any quantity of gold in contravention of any provision
of this part, and the court cannot cut back on the width of the language used, bearing
in mind the purpose of plenary control the state wanted to impose on gold, and
exempt smuggled gold from the expression “any quantity of gold” in, that sub-rule.
These provisions have, therefore, to be specially construed in a manner which will
suppress the mischief and advance the object which the Legislature had in view. The
High Court was, in error in adopting too narrow a construction which tends to stultify
the law. The second charge thus had been fully established against the respondent.
routinely in an Indian household. The meaning to be applied to

each word of these provisions has to be in accord with the
legislative intent. Even while construing these provisions strictly
care will have to be taken to see that their object is not frustrated.
The court in Surinder singh case found proofs to convince that the demand
of Rs 60000/ was in continuation of demand made in marriage while in Vipin
Jaiswal the court did not found convincing evidence that the demand of Rs 50000/
was not in continuity of the previous dowry transactions.
Extradition: principle of speciality
Deciding a case of extradition the Supreme Court in Abu Salem Abdul Qayyum
Ansari v. Central Bureau of Investigation162 restated that its previous interpretation
of Principle of Speciality in the case of same accused holds good. It observed: 163
...the analysis and reasoning rendered in the impugned
judgment164 with regard to the interpretation of the Principle of
Speciality still stands good as the law declared by this Court u/
art. 141 of the Constitution of India shall be binding on all courts
within the territory of India.
Principle of Speciality has been discussed in Daya Singh Lahoria v. Union
of India165 as under:166
The doctrine of speciality is yet another established rule of
international law relating to extradition. Thus, when a person is
extradited for a particular crime, he can be tried for only that
crime. If the requesting State deems it desirable to try the
extradited fugitive for some other crime committed before his
extradition, the fugitive has to be brought to the status quo ante,
in the sense that he has to be returned first to the State which
granted the extradition and a fresh extradition has to be requested
for the latter crime. The Indian Extradition Act makes a specific
provision to that effect. In view of Section 21 of the Indian
Extradition Act, 1962 an extradited fugitive cannot be tried in
India for any offence other than the one for which he has been
extradited unless he has been restored to or has had an
opportunity to return to the State which surrendered him. The
doctrine of speciality is in fact a corollary to the principles of
double criminality, and the aforesaid doctrine is premised on
162 JT 2013 (11 )SC 14 hereinafter referred as Abdul Qayyum Ansari, decided by P.
Sathasivam CJI and Chelameswar. The work referred here are from Indlaw.
163 Id., para 16.
164 (2011) 11 SCC 214.
165 (2001) 4 SCC 516 2001.
166 Id., para 23.
the assumption that whenever a State uses its formal process to

surrender a person to another State for a specific charge, the
requesting State shall carry out its intended purpose of
prosecuting or punishing the offender for the offence charged in
its request for extradition and none other.
NDPS: Rights and Privilege
Court while interpretation should be cautious of the fact that interpretation of
fundamental rights in the constitution of India is different from interpretation of a
privilege and human rights under national or international instruments.167 In the
case of Budh Singh v. State of Haryana 168 the ‘true and correct meaning of the
effect of the period/periods of remissions’ was in question.169 On 13.12.1988 the
accused committed offence under NDPS Act 1985. On 29.5.1989 section 32A
was incorporated by amendment in NDPS Act which prohibited the executive to
extend its discretionary power for remission after completion of a substantial part
of imprisonment under Cr PC 1973. 170Can this section 32A have retrospective
operation? In other words can section 32A be interpreted in a manner that makes
it applicable in offences committed prior to 29.5.1989?
A liberal, accused centric and impact based interpretation will screen the
offender from anything detrimental to his interest. Literal interpretation has deprived
the offender of his opportunity of consideration for remission but for 32A the
application of offender has not even been considered. The court, however, toe the
line of state. It followed two constitution bench judgements of Sarat Chandra
Rabha v. Khagendranath Nath171 and Maru Ram v. Union of India172 and rightly
held as under:173
…[W]hat Section 32A has done is to obliterate the benefit of
remission(s) that a convict under the NDPS Act would have
normally earned. But, if the correct legal position is that the
remission(s) do not in any way touch or affect the penalty/
sentence imposed by a Court, we do not see how the exclusion
of benefit of remission can be understood to have the effect of
enlarging the period of incarceration of an accused convicted
under the NDPS Act or as to how the said provision, i.e., Section
32A, can have the effect of making a convict undergo a longer
167 The Budh Singh judgement neither uses the word interpretation, construction nor
privilege or human rights.
168 AIR 2013 SC 2386, hereinafter referred as Budh Singh. Decided on 11.03.13. Para
referred in this case are from manupatra.
169 Budh Singh, para 5.
170 S. 432 and 433 of CrPC 1973 deals with this power of the appropriate government.
171 AIR 1961 SC 334.
172 (1981) 1 SCC 107 (para 27).
173 Budh Singh, para 9.
period of sentence than what the Act had contemplated at the

time of commission of the offence.
Article 20(1) of constitution of India recognises a fundamental right while
section 432 and 433 of Cr PC 1973 recognises a privilege. According to article
13(2) constitution of India State is not prohibited from taking away a privilege,
benefit etc.
Regarding retrospectively operation Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Ch.
Gandhi 174extracts a passage from Bennion’s.175 While emphasizing on the concept
of retrospective legislation and rights, the learned author has stated thus:
The essential idea of a legal system is that current law should
govern current activities. Elsewhere in this work a particular Act
is likened to a floodlight switched on or off, and the general
body of law to the circumambient air. Clumsy though these images
are, they show the inappropriateness of retrospective laws. If
we do something today, we feel that the law applying to it should
be the law in force today, not tomorrow’s backward adjustment
of it. Such, we believe, is the nature of law. Dislike of ex post
facto law is enshrined in the United States Constitution and in
the Constitution of many American States, which forbid it. The
true principle is that lex prospicit non respicit (law looks forward
not back). As Willes, J. said retrospective legislation is ‘contrary
to the general principle that legislation by which the conduct of
mankind is to be regulated ought, when introduced for the first
time, to deal with future acts, and ought not to change the
character of past transactions carried on upon the faith of the
then existing law.
Cannons of interpretation
Traditional legal wisdom classifies fundamental rules of statutory interpretation
into three categories for convenience viz. literal, golden and mischief rules.
Authorities, however, do not follow a straight jacket classification. On various
occasion these rules undergo fusion or overlapping. ‘The first and foremost
principle of interpretation of a statute in every system of interpretation is the literal
rule of interpretation. The other rules of interpretation e.g., the mischief rule,
purposive interpretation, etc. can only be resorted to when the plain words of a
statute are ambiguous or lead to no intelligible results or if read literally would
nullify the very object of the statute.’176
174 (2013) 5 SCC 111.

175 Francis Bennion’s Statutory Interpretation, 2nd edn., (1992).
176 M/s Hiralal Rattanlal v. State of U.P, (1973)1 SCC 216, Premanand v. Mohan Koikal
(2011) 4 SCC 266, also see Lalita Kumari, para 37.
Literal Meaning: The First Principle

In the case of Lalita Kumari177 the constitution bench delivered its opinion
on the interpretation of various sections of Cr PC, 1973 to ascertain whether police
has any discretion to register FIR in cognizable offence cases or not. The court
took support from various cases178 where it was observed that, “Where the words
of a statute are absolutely clear and unambiguous, recourse cannot be had to the
principles of interpretation other than the literal rule…” 179
It was contented that any and every first information in section 154 is not to
be recorded as FIR because it has to be first incorporated in General Diary/Station
Diary/Daily Diary. “Then if any preliminary inquiry is needed the police officer
may conduct the same and thereafter the information will be registered” as FIR.180
The court held “this interpretation is wholly unfounded.”181
Providing reason to the above conclusion the court observed:182
If at all, there is any inconsistency in the provisions of
Section154 of the Code and Section 44 of the Police Act, 1861,
with regard to the fact as to whether the FIR is to be registered
in the FIR book or in the General Diary, the provisions of Section
154 of the Code will prevail and the provisions of Section 44 of
the Police Act, 1861 shall be void to the extent of the repugnancy.
Literal meaning has been discussed in 2012 the judgement of Namit Sharma,183
which has generated maximum ripples and disappointment in legal circle. It felt that
language of RTI Act 2005 in section 12 and 15 was not plain. There was ambiguity
and the parliament missed something very important. On the other hand Namit
Sharma second, feels that provision is plain and unambiguous. Intention of
legislature is clear. Therefore judiciary should not intervene.
From plain and simple language of Sections 18, 19 and 20 of RTI Act 2005 the
court inquired whether information commission has to decide a dispute or not. It
observed in following words:184
. …[H]ence, the functions of the Information Commissions are
limited to ensuring that a person who has sought information
from a public authority in accordance with his right to

178 M/s Hiralal Rattanlal v. State of U.P, (1973)1 SCC 216, Premanand v. Mohan Koikal
(2011) 4 SCC 266.
180 Id. at para 47
181 Id. at para 48.
182 Id. at para 61.
183 (2013)1 SCC 745, referred as Namit Sharma first.
information conferred Under Section 3 of the Act is not denied

such information except in accordance with the provisions of
the Act. ... While deciding whether a citizen should or should
not get a particular information “which is held by or under the
control of any public authority”, the Information Commission
does not decide a dispute between two or more parties
concerning their legal rights other than their right to get
information in possession of a public authority. [Emphasis
added]
What is the nature of function of information commission? Is it judicial, quasi
judicial or administrative? On the basis of plain meaning of sections 18, 19 and 20
and section 3 the court held:185
This function obviously is not a judicial function, but an
administrative function conferred by the Act on the Information
Commissions.
On the logic that the function of information commission is non judicial in
nature the court attempted to get some reason behind the disputed sections: 186
Perhaps for this reason, Parliament has not provided in Sections
12(5) and 15(5) of the Act for appointment of persons with
judicial experience and acumen and retired Judges of the High
Court as Information Commissioners and retired Judges of the
Supreme Court and Chief Justice of the High Court as Chief
Information Commissioner …
The court, therefore, inferred that the (so called) omission by parliament, of
not providing basic qualification and use of word ‘wide knowledge and experience’
is deliberate and it was not a case where ‘Court as the interpreter of law is supposed
to supply omissions, correct uncertainties, and harmonize results’.
Golden rule
‘When there are two meanings the court generally selects the meaning which
is just and convenient and that which avoids absurd result.’187
In Lalita Kumari where mandatory registration of FIR was in question it was
observed that “the golden rule of interpretation can be given a go-by only in cases
where the language of the section is ambiguous and/or leads to an absurdity.” 188
On the issue of MPs or MLAs as Information Commissioner Namit Sharma
second, acknowledges that two possible interpretations could be conceived. Dealing
185 Ibid.
187 Sir Rupert Cross, Statutory Interpretation, 15 (Butterworths, London, 1976).
with first possibilities it found that this one could violate equality clause. In the
words of the court: 189
...There could be two interpretations of Sections 12(6) and 15(6)
of the Act. One interpretation could be that a Member of
Parliament or Member of the Legislature of any State or Union
Territory, as the case may be, or a person holding any other
office of profit or connected with any political party or carrying
on any business or pursuing any profession will not be eligible
to be considered for appointment as a Chief Information
Commissioner and Information Commissioner. If this
interpretation is given to Sections 12(6) and 15(6) of the Act,
then it will obviously offend the equality clause in Article 14 of
the Constitution as it debars such persons from being considered
for appointment as Chief Information Commissioner and
Information Commissioners.
On second possibilities it observed:190
The second interpretation of Sections 12(6) and 15(6) of the
Act could be that once a person is appointed as a Chief
Information Commissioner or Information Commissioner, he
cannot continue to be a Member of Parliament or Member of
the Legislature of any State or Union Territory, as the case may
be, or hold any other office of profit or remain connected with
any political party or carry on any business or pursue any
profession. If this interpretation is given to Sections 12(6) and
15(6) of the Act then the interpretation would effectuate the
object of the Act inasmuch as Chief Information Commissioner
and Information Commissioners would be able to perform their
functions in the Information Commission without being
influenced by their political, business, professional or other
interests.
The court therefore followed the second interpretation: 191
It is this second interpretation of Sections 12(6) and 15(6) of
the Act which has been rightly given in the judgment under
review and Sections 12(6) and 15(6) of the Act have been held
as not to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Therefore,
the argument of Mr. Sharma, learned Counsel for the
Respondent-writ Petitioner, that if we do not read Sections 12(5)
and 15(5) of the Act in the manner suggested in the judgment

190 Ibid.
191 Ibid.
under review, the provisions of Sections 12(5) and 15(5) of the

Act would be ultra vires the Article14 of the Constitution, is
misconceived.
Mischief rule 192
A glimpse of mischief rule may be found in Gujrat Lokayukta case where the
court observed:193
The court must adopt a construction which suppresses the
mischief and advances the remedy and “to suppress subtle
inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and
pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and
remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act,
pro bono publico”.
In the case of Surinder Singh194 the court extracted from State of Maharashtra
v. Natwarlal Damodardas Soni,195 and reiterated that:196
the provisions have to be specially construed in a manner which
will suppress the mischief and advance the object which the
legislature had in view.197
In Badshah v. Badshah198 also Heydon’ rule was applied as under:199
Thus, while interpreting a statute the court may not only take
into consideration the purpose for which the statute was enacted,
192 Heydon’s Case [1584] EWHC Exch J36 (01 Jan 1584). is, probably, the oldest authority
in the area of interpretation. It propounds the rule as under: For the sure and true
interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or
enlarging of the common law,) four things are to be discerned and considered: 1st.
What was the common law before the making of the Act. 2nd. What was the mischief
and defect for which the common law did not provide. 3rd. What remedy the Parliament
hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth. And, 4th. The
true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the Judges is always to make such
construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress
subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato
commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent
of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico.
193 State Of Gujarat v. Hon’Ble Mr. Justice R.A. Mehta (Retd), 2013) 3 SCC 1, AIR 2013
SC 693.
194 Surrender singh para 18.
195 (1980) 4 SCC 669. In this case a narrow construction given by the high court was
rejected while dealing with s. 135 of the Customs Act and Rule 126-H(2)(d) of the
Defence of India Rules.
197 State of Maharashtra v. Natwarlal Damodardas Soni AIR 1980 SC 593, 1980 CriLJ
429.
198 AIR 2014 SC 869.
199 Ibid.
but also the mischief it seeks to suppress. It is this mischief rule,

first propounded in Heydon’s Case (1854) 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 7b
which became the historical source of purposive interpretation.
Purposivistic interpretation
Regarding origin, concept and development of the technique of interpretation
Bennion200 remarks:
General judicial adoption of the term ‘purposive construction’ is recent,
but the concept is not new. Viscount Dilhorne, citing Coke, said that
while it is now fashionable to talk of a purposive construction of a statute
the need for such a construction has been recognised since the seventeenth
century. In fact the recognition goes considerably further back than that.201
(Emphasis added)
Gujrat Lokayukta case discusses the need of purposive interpretation to
realise the objective of an enactment. The division bench quoted with approval
the observation of Whitney v. Inland Revenue Commissioner,202 which is as
under:203
A statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation
thereof by a court should be to secure that object unless crucial
omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable....
It further observed: 204
The doctrine of purposive construction may be taken recourse
to for the purpose of giving full effect to statutory provisions,
and the courts must state what meaning the statute should bear,
rather than rendering the statute a nullity, as statutes are meant
to be operative and not inept. The courts must refrain from
declaring a statute to be unworkable. The rules of interpretation
require that construction, which carries forward the objectives
of the statute, protects interest of the parties and keeps the
remedy alive, should be preferred, looking into the text and
context of the statute. Construction given by the court must
promote the object of the statute and serve the purpose for
which it has been enacted and not efface its very purpose. “The
courts strongly lean against any construction which stands to
reduce a statute to futility. The provision of the statute must be so
construed so as to make it effective and operative. (Emphasis added)
200 Bennion Statutory Interpretation (5th edn. 2008)

201 Also cited in Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v. Hooghly Mills Co.Ltd 2012
(1) SCALE 422, at para 37.
202 [1926] A.C. 37.
203 Supra note 103.
204 Id. at para 67.
In the case of Rajasthan State Industrial Development205the court dealt with

the interpretation of contract. The court found DLF Universal Ltd. v. Director, T.
and C. Planning Department Haryana206 very relevant where it was observed:207
It is a settled principle in law that a contract is interpreted
according to its purpose. The purpose of a contract is the
interests, objectives, values, policy that the contract is designed
to actualise. It comprises joint intent of the parties. Every such
contract expresses the autonomy of the contractual parties’
private will. It creates reasonable, legally protected expectations
between the parties and reliance on its results. Consistent with
the character of purposive interpretation, the court is required
to determine the ultimate purpose of a contract primarily by the
joint intent of the parties at the time the contract so formed.
[Emphasis Added]
Namit Sharma first and second discussed the need of purposive rule of
interpretation. 208 Section 12(5) and 15(5) of RTI Act, 2005 provides no specific
qualification for members of Information Commissions, though it uses the phrase
‘wide knowledge and experience’. 209
The Chief Information Commissioner and Information
Commissioners shall be persons of eminence in public life with
wide knowledge and experience in law, science and technology,
social service, management, journalism, mass media or administration
and governance.
What is the meaning of the phrase ‘wide knowledge and experience’? Whether
these words include the basic qualification in that subject. The issue before the
court was whether the phrase is too vague to provide any clear guideline?210 And
consequently are they against article 14.
In Namit Sharma first the court found that the statute was clear enough to
determine the qualification for the appointment of the Information Commissioners
both at Central and state level. The court therefore held: 211
The provisions of Sections 12(5) and 15(5) of the Act of 2005 are
held to be constitutionally valid, but with the rider that, to give
205 Rajasthan State Industrial Development, supra note 107, at para 17.
206 AIR 2011 SC 1463.
207 Supra note 205.
208 AIR 2014 SC 122. Same provision is provided for State Information Commissioner in
Section 15 (5).
209 RTI Act 2005, S. 12 (5).
210 Anurag Deep, ‘‘Interpretation of Statutes’’, XLVIII ASIL 551-602 (2012) 578.
211 Namit Sharma first, para 106. 2.
it a meaningful and purposive interpretation, it is necessary

for the Court to ‘read into’ these provisions some aspects
without which these provisions are bound to offend the doctrine
of equality.212
The court, therefore held in previous Namit Sharma case that: 213
Thus, we hold and declare that the expression ‘knowledge and
experience’ appearing in these provisions would mean and
include a basic degree in the respective field and the experience
gained thereafter. Further, without any peradventure and
veritably, we state that appointments of legally qualified,
judicially trained and experienced persons would certainly
manifest in more effective serving of the ends of justice as well
as ensuring better administration of justice by the Commission.
It would render the adjudicatory process which involves critical
legal questions and nuances of law, more adherent to justice
and shall enhance the public confidence in the working of the
Commission. This is the obvious interpretation of the language
of these provisions and, in fact, is the essence thereof.214
[Emphasis Added]
The court in Namit Sharma second, was not in agreement with purposive
interpretation made in Namit Sharma first. Rather it started with plain meaning
rule explaining sections 18, 19 and 20 of the Act. It observed:215
It will be clear from the plain and simple language of Sections
18, 19 and 20 of the Act that, Under Section 18 the Information
Commission has the power and function to receive and inquire
into a complaint from any person who is not able to secure
information from a public authority, Under Section 19 it decides
appeals against the decisions of the Central Public Information
Officer or the State Public Information Officer relating to
information sought by a person, and Under Section 20 it can
impose a penalty only for the purpose of ensuring that the correct
information is furnished to a person seeking information from a
public authority. 216
Badshah v. Badshah217 discusses the scope and limitation of the phrase
“wife”. Whether a lady who is not “legally wedded wife” may claim maintenance
212 Namit Sharma second, para 7.2.

213 Namit Sharma first, para 106.2.
214 Ibid, Also Namit Sharma Second, para 7.2.
215 Namit Sharma Second, para 20
216 Ibid.
217 AIR 2014 SC 869.
under Section 125, Code of Criminal Procedure or not? The court did three things.
Firstly there was proof of marriage, secondly it harmonized the judicial approach
and then it observed:218
Thirdly, in such cases, purposive interpretation needs to be
given to the provisions of Section 125, Code of Criminal
Procedure While dealing with the application of destitute wife
or hapless children or parents under this provision, the Court is
dealing with the marginalized sections of the society.
Purposive interpretation and constitutional mandate
The court in Badshah inter related the objective of section 125, Cr PC 1973
with the goal of social justice and observed:219
The purpose [of section 125 CrPC 1973] is to achieve “social
justice” which is the Constitutional vision, enshrined in the
Preamble of the Constitution of India. … Therefore, it becomes
the bounden duty of the Courts to advance the cause of the social
justice. While giving interpretation to a particular provision,
the Court is supposed to bridge the gap between the law and
society.
It further observed:220
In both Constitutional and statutory interpretation, the Court is
supposed to exercise discretion in determining the proper
relationship between the subjective and objective purpose of the
law.
The judgement quoted two eminent authorities in this context. From ‘The
Nature of Judicial Process’ he cited Cardozo that ‘no system of jus scriptum has
been able to escape the need of it’ and continued:221
It is true that Codes and Statutes do not render the Judge
superfluous, nor his work perfunctory and mechanical. There
are gaps to be filled. There are hardships and wrongs to be
mitigated if not avoided. Interpretation is often spoken of as if it
were nothing but the search and the discovery of a meaning
which, however, obscure and latent, had none the less a real and
ascertainable pre-existence in the legislator’s mind. The process
is, indeed, that at times, but it is often something more. The

219 Ibid.
220 Badshah v Badshah, para 20. Available at : http://judis.nic.in & para 16 at SCc online.
221 Ibid.
ascertainment of intention may be the least of a judge’s troubles

in ascribing meaning to a stature.222
The second authority, the judgement quoted, was Gray who, hundred years
ago observed:223
The fact is that the difficulties of so-called interpretation arise
when the legislature has had no meaning at all; when the
question which is raised on the statute never occurred to it; when
what the judges have to do is, not to determine that the legislature
did mean on a point which was present to its mind, but to guess
what is would have intended on a point not present to its mind,
if the point had been present.224
The court observed what are three basic functions of court in the words of
Cardazo:225
The Court as the interpreter of law is supposed to supply omissions,
correct uncertainties, and harmonize results with justice through a
method of free decision-”libre recherche sceintifique” i.e. “free
Scientific research”. We are of the opinion that there is a non-
rebuttable presumption that the Legislature while making a
provision like Section 125 Code of Criminal Procedure, to fulfill
its Constitutional duty in good faith, had always intended to give
relief to the woman becoming “wife” under such circumstances.
After 2012, 16 December Gang rape case226 crime against women is in focus
in India and all machinery of State is trying good to check the menace. Zero
tolerance and no compromise are the policy words. In such scenario whether a
compromise between husband and wife could be a ground for quashing an FIR,
that too when the FIR discloses commission of a non bailable, cognizable offence
against women. Jitendra Raghuvanshi v. Babita Raghuvanshi,227answers this
222 Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of Judicial Process, Lecture I. Introduction-The

Method of Philosophy, (Yale University Press 1921) available at: http://
www.constitution.org/cmt/cardozo/jud_proc.htm.(last visited on Aug. 26th 2014).
223 John Chipman Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law (The Columbia university
press, 1909). The book is available on https://archive.org/stream/
natureandsource04graygoog#pag.
224 Badshah, para 21.
225 Badshah, para 22. The words “supply omissions, correct uncertainties, and harmonize
results with justice through a method of free decision-”libre recherche sceintifique” are
from The Nature of Judicial Process.
226 FIR No. 413/2012 State ( Government of NCT of Delhi) v. Ram Singh. Decided bythe
court of Yogesh Khanna ASI, Special - Fast Track Courts.
227 (2013) 4 SCC 58, decided on March 15, 2013. Unanimous decision by three judges
bench P. Sathasivam, Jagdish Singh Kehar and Kurian Joseph, JJ. Delivered by P.
Sathhasivam J, hereinafter referred as Jitendra Raghuvanshi.
query where mutual relationship of section 482 and 320 of CrPC 1973 was in question.
The Supreme Court referred a number of judgements228 and quoted B.S. Joshi v.
State of Haryana,229 where it was held that:230
....[W]e are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of
securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary,
Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of
quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the
facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not
such a power. [Emphasis Added]
The judgement no where uses the word interpretation or construction still
this judgement is of interpretative value as the judgement is influenced by the
purpose or object of enactment.
In the last survey of 2012 the case of Ritesh Sinha v. The State of Uttar
Pradesh231 had been discussed under purposive interpretation head. Here an order
for taking the voice sample was challenged as violative of article 20(3) of
Constitution of India. The division bench was not unanimous and therefore, the
case was referred for three judge’s bench. In 2013 the case could not be decided.
Harmonious construction and Implication of interpretation
Harmonious construction of two inconsistent provisions is a priority practice
in interpretative business. However, harmonious construction of two different
judgements is also a part of judicial interpretation. A point of interpretative
importance could be found in Badshah232regarding harmonious construction. In
this case the court has to consider judgements having different findings on the
interpretation of word ‘wife’ in section 125 of Cr PC 1973.
The court considered the case of Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao
Shivram Adhav233 and Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat 234 where it
was held that a Hindu lady who married with a person who had a living lawfully
wedded wife cannot be treated to be “legally wedded wife”. She, therefore, cannot
228 State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 and explaining the decisions
rendered in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551, Surendra Nath
Mohanty v. State of Orissa (1999) 5 SCC 238 and Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial
Magistrate (1998) 5 SCC 749.
229 (2003) 4 SCC 675.
230 Id., para 8.
231 AIR 2013 SC 1132: (2013) 2 SCC 357: MANU/SC/1072/2012. The case was decided
by Ranjana Prakash Desai and Aftab Alam, JJ. Due to divergence of opinion the case
has been referred to higher bench.
232 AIR 2014 SC 869.
233 (1988) 1 SCC 530.
234 (2005) 3 SCC 636.
claim maintenance under section 125. On the other hand in Dwarika Prasad
Satpathy v. Bidyut Prava Dixit 235 held that:236
Once it is admitted that the marriage procedure was followed then
it is not necessary to further probe into whether the said procedure
was complete as per the Hindu Rites in the proceedings under
Section 125, Code of Criminal Procedure.
The court relied on the judgement of five judges bench of the Supreme court
in S. Sethurathinam Pillai v. Barbara alias Dolly Sethurathinam 237 where on
maintenance under Cr PC 1898, Section 488, (similar to section 125, Cr PC 1973
1973)it was observed:
We do not think it necessary in this case to decide the case on
the merits. The order passed in an application filed under Section
488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a summary order which
does not finally determine the rights and obligations of the parties
thereto. It is an order made in a proceeding under a provision
enacted with a view to provide a summary remedy for providing
maintenance, and for preventing vagrancy. The decision of the
criminal court that there was a marriage between Barbara and
Sethurathinam and that it was a valid marriage will not operate
as decisive in any civil proceeding between the parties for
determining those questions. We are informed at the Bar that
Sethurathinam has lodged a suit in the civil court for decision
on the factum and validity of the marriage. Since the order of
the criminal court is a summary order and is not conclusive
between the parties, we do not think it necessary to decide
whether on the evidence the High Court was justified in reaching
the conclusion it has reached. It cannot be denied that there was
some evidence on which the conclusion could be reached.
In Chanmuniya case, also the court held that for section 125, Cr PC valid
marriage need not be proved and a presumption could be drawn. 238 The court then
held that:239
….[S]he should know that second marriage with such a person
is impermissible and there is an embargo under the Hindu
Marriage Act and therefore she has to suffer the consequences
thereof. The said judgment240 would not apply to those cases
235 (1999) 7 SCC 675. Badshah v. Badshah, para 10.

236 Ibid.
237 (1971) 3 SCC 923, at 924; Badshah v Badshah, para 9.
238 Chanmuniya v. Chanmuniya Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha , (2011) 1 SCC 141.
240 Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav and Savitaben Somabhai
Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat.
where a man marriages second time by keeping that lady in dark

about the first surviving marriage. That is the only way two sets
of judgments can be reconciled and harmonized.
In the case of Bank of Baroda v. S.K. Kool (D) Through L.Rs241 there was a
dispute as to the interpretation of clause 6(b) of the Bipartite Settlement 2002 and
article 22(1) of Bank of Baroda (Employees) Pension Regulation, 1995. The
regulation has been made in exercise of powers conferred by clause (f) of sub-
section (ii) of section 19 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of
Undertaking) Act, 1970. As per ‘article 22(1) of the Regulation, removal of an
employee from the service of the bank would entail forfeiture of entire past service
and consequently he shall not be entitled to pensionary benefits. Clause 6(b) of
the Bipartite Settlement, however, provides that an employee found guilty of gross
misconduct may be removed from service with superannuation benefits.’242 The
High Court (Allahabad) observed:243
It is true that both the provisions have to be harmonized. What
logically follows from bare reading of the aforesaid provisions
is that the disciplinary authority has the competence to inflict
punishment of removal from service with a condition that such
removal from service shall not in any way result in forfeiture of
pensionary benefits to which the workman concerned is
otherwise eligible. Only simple reading of the words “AS
WOULD BE DUE OTHERWISE” would mean that irrespective
of the order of punishment of removal from service, workman
would be entitled to superannuation benefits, if it is found due
otherwise i.e. if the workman concerned satisfies the other
requirement of superannuation benefits under Regulations, 1995,
namely, he has completed requisite number of years of working
etc.
The Supreme Court held 244
Regulation in question is statutory in nature and the court
should accept an interpretation which would not make any
other provision redundant. [Emphasis added]
241 AIR 2014 SC 915, hereinafter referred as SK Kool.

242 Id., para 7. Cl. 6(b) of the Bipartite Settlement : An employee found guilty of gross
misconduct may; (a)...(b) be removed from service with superannuation benefits i.e.
Pension and/or Provident Fund and Gratuity as would be due otherwise under the
Rules or Regulations prevailing at the relevant time and without disqualification from
future employment, or...Art.22(1) of Bank of Baroda (Employees) Pension Regulation,
1995 : Forfeiture of service: (1) Resignation or dismissal or removal or termination
of an employee from the service of the Bank shall entail forfeiture of his entire past
service and consequently shall not qualify for pensionary benefits.
243 As cited in SK Kool at para 5.
244 SK Kool, para 10.
The court, however, warned that:245

From a plain reading of the aforesaid Regulation, it is evident
that removal of an employee shall entail forfeiture of his entire
past service and consequently such an employee shall not qualify
for pensionary benefits. If we accept this submission, no
employee removed from service in any event would be entitled
for pensionary benefits. But the fact of the matter is that the
Bipartite Settlement provides for removal from service with
pensionary benefits “as would be due otherwise under the Rules
or Regulations prevailing at the relevant time”. The consequence
of this construction would be that the words quoted above shall
become a dead letter. Such a construction has to be avoided.
The construction canvassed by the employer shall give nothing
to the employees in any event. Will it not be a fraud Bipartite
Settlement? Obviously it would be. [Emphasis added]
Applying rules of harmonious construction as applied by the high court, the
Supreme Court observed:246
From the conspectus of what we have observed we have no doubt
that such of the employees who are otherwise eligible for
superannuation benefit are removed from service in terms of
Clause 6(b) of the Bipartite Settlement shall be entitled to
superannuation benefits. This is the only construction which
would harmonise the two provisions. It is well settled rule of
construction that in case of apparent conflict between the two
provisions, they should be so interpreted that the effect is given
to both. [Emphasis added]
On the basis of harmonious construction the court held: 247
Hence, we are of the opinion that such of the employees who
are otherwise entitled to superannuation benefits under the
Regulation if visited with the penalty of removal from service
with superannuation benefits shall be entitled for those benefits
and such of the employees though visited with the same penalty
but are not eligible for superannuation benefits under the
Regulation shall not be entitled to that.
Without naming literal rule of interpretation the court in the case of National
Federation of the Blind 248stated that ‘… it is a settled rule of interpretation that if
245 Id., para 12.

246 Id., para 13.
247 Ibid.
248 2013 Indlaw SC 674; (2013) 10 SCC 772. Unenimously decided by full bench and
decided by CJI Hon’ble Justice P. Sathashivam. Other member of the bench were
Ranjana Prakash Desai and Ranjana Yogoi.
the language of a statutory provision is unambiguous, it has to be interpreted

according to the plain meaning of the said statutory provision.’ Applying this rule
the court held:249
In the present case, the plain and unambiguous meaning of
Section 33 is that every appropriate Government has to appoint
a minimum of 3% vacancies in an establishment out of which
1% each shall be reserved for persons suffering from blindness
and low vision, persons suffering from hearing impairment and
persons suffering from locomotor or cerebral palsy. [Emphasis
added]
The court further held that: 250
…if we accept that the computation of reservation in respect of
Group C and D posts is against the total vacancies in the cadre
strength because of the applicability of the scheme of reservation
in Group C and D posts prior to enactment, Section 33 does not
distinguish the manner of computation of reservation between
Group A and B posts or Group C and D posts respectively. As
such, one statutory provision cannot be interpreted and applied
differently for the same subject matter. [Emphasis added]
II LEGISLATIVE INTENTION
General
Regarding legislative intention one very recent work, acknowledges that: 251
For at least six centuries, common law courts have maintained that the
‘primary object of statutory interpretation ’is to determine what intention
is conveyed either expressly or by implication by the language used’, or
in other words, ’to give effect to the intention of the [lawmaker] as that
intention is to be gathered from the language employed having regard to
the context in connection with which it its employed’.
The primary task of a judge while interpretation is to gather the intention of
legislation. However doubts have been raised whether gathering intention of
249 Ibid.
250 Id at para 38. The appellants (state) argued that ‘since reservation of persons with
disabilities in Group C and D has been in force prior to the enactment and is being
made against the total number of vacancies in the cadre strength according to the OM
dated 29.12.2005 but the actual import of s. 33 is that it has to be computed against
identified posts only.
251 Sir Peter Benson Maxwell, The Interpretation of Statutes (Maxwell & Son, 1883),
Attorney-general v. Carlton Bank [1899] 2 QB 158,164 (Lord Russel), in Richard
Ekins and Jeffrey Goldsworhty, “The Reality And Indispensability of Legislative
Intentions,” 36: 1 The Sydney law review, 39 (2014).
legislature is primary task or is it a type of fiction. 252 If the traditional wisdom

prevails, exploring the intention of legislature is a fundamental task which may be
some time clear and obvious. In those cases the guideline for court could be
found in Gujrat Lokayukta case253 where the court observed:254
A statute must be construed in such a manner so as to ensure
that the Act itself does not become a dead letter, and the obvious
intention of the legislature does not stand defeated, unless it
leads to a case of absolute intractability in use.
If the intention is not obvious the words of the statute must be seen. And in
cases where issue of reservation is subject matter of discussion, the court has to
balance various competing interest. National Federation of the Blind 255 discusses
legislative intention in detail. The main question in this case was ‘is it obligatory
on the part of the government establishments to provide at least 3% reservation of
posts in the total cadre strength and not in the identified vacancies’. In other words
the controversy was reservation in cadre strength vis a vis vacancies. The
controversy raised because of conjoint reading(or misreading) and contradictory
interpretation of section 32, 33 and 36 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal
Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995. Section 32
stipulates for identification of posts which can be reserved for persons with
disabilities. Section 33 provides for reservation of posts and section 36 thereof
provides that in case a vacancy is not filled up due to non-availability of a suitable
person with disability, in any recruitment year such vacancy is to be carried forward
in the succeeding recruitment year. Section 33 uses the word ‘vacancies’. Does
this mean vacancies only against identified post or does it include unidentified
post? National Federation of Blind extracted a passage from Prakash Nath Khanna
v. Commissioner of Income Tax,256 where it was stated that: 257
The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor
of legislative intent. The first and primary rule of construction
is that the intention of the legislation must be found in the words
used by the legislature itself. The question is not what may be
supposed and has been intended but what has been said. “Statutes
should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid”, Judge Learned
Hand said, “but words must be construed with some imagination
of the purposes which lie behind them”.258 (Emphasis added)
252 Ibid.
253 Supra note 5.
254 Id. at para 67.
255 Supra note 248.
256 (2004) 9 SCC 686.
258 Ibid. The court (without providing any citation) also referred Lenigh Valley Coal Co.
v. Yensavage. The view was reiterated in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of
Vedem Vasco De Gama and Padma Sundara Rao v. State of T.N. The original quotation
If the words of provision are clear and intention could be gathered from that
there is no space for headings, marginal note in statute or judicial thinking. They
could be very helpful if the provision is ambiguous.
The court resolved the conflict and held:259
Thus, after thoughtful consideration, we are of the view that the
computation of reservation for persons with disabilities has to
be computed in case of Group A, B, C and D posts in an identical
manner viz., “computing 3% reservation on total number of
vacancies in the cadre strength” which is the intention of the
legislature.
Primary sources: Statutes
The court took support from proviso to section 33 of Disabilities Act 1995:260
The proviso also justifies the above said interpretation that the
computation of reservation has to be against the total number
of 261 vacancies in the cadre strength and not against the
identified posts. Had the legislature intended to mandate for
computation of reservation against the identified posts only, there
was no need for inserting the proviso to Section which empowers
the appropriate Government to exempt any establishment either
partly or fully from the purview of the Section subject to such
conditions contained in the notification to be issued in the
Official Gazette in this behalf. Certainly, the legislature did not
intend to give such arbitrary power for exemption from
reservation for persons with disabilities to be exercised by the
is as under: It is well settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into
a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the
legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative
intent. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislation
must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. The question is not what
may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said. “Statutes should be
construed, not as theorems of Euclid”, Judge Learned Hand said, “but words must be
construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them”. (See Lenigh
Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage (218 FR 547). The view was reiterated in Union of
India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama (AIR 1990 SC 981), and
Padma Sundara Rao (dead) v. State of Tamil Nadu. (2002 (3) SCC 533.
260 Id. at para 33. S. 33 proviso runs as under: Provided that the appropriate Government
may, having regard to the type of work carried on in any department or establishment,
by notification subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in such
notification, exempt any establishment from the provisions of this section.
261 The judgement available at Judis.nic.in does not show ‘of’ after number [writes total
number vacancies] Westlaw, Manupatra also misses ‘Of’. Scconline shows ‘of’.
appropriate Government when the computation is intended to

be made against the identified posts. [Emphasis added]
Legislative intention was also inferred from section 41: 262
In this regard, another provision of the said Act also supports
this interpretation. Section 41 of the said Act mandates the
appropriate Government to frame incentive schemes for employers
with a view to ensure that 5% of their work force is composed of
persons with disabilities. ... Thus, on a conjoint reading of Sections
33 and 41, it is clear that while Section 33 provides for a minimum
level of representation of 3% in the establishments of appropriate
Government, the legislature intended to ensure 5% of
representation in the entire work force both in public as well as
private sector. [Emphasis added]
Secondary sources: Bills, etc
Draft of Rights of Persons with Disabilities Bill, 2012 also lent support to this
intention of legislature: 263
Moreover, the intention of the legislature while framing the Act
can also be inferred from the Draft Rights of Persons with
Disabilities Bill, 2012, which is pending in the Parliament for
approval. In Chapter 6 of the Bill, viz., Special Provisions for
Persons with Benchmark Disabilities, similar sections like
Sections 32 & 33 in the Act have been incorporated under
Sections 38 and 39.
A perusal of Sections 38 and 39 of the Bill clarifies all the
ambiguities raised in this appeal. The intention of the legislature
is clearly to reserve in every establishment under the appropriate
Government, not less than 3% of the vacancies for the persons
or class of persons with disability, of which 1% each shall be
reserved for persons suffering from blindness or low vision,
hearing impairment and locomotor disability or cerebral palsy in
the posts identified for each disability. [Emphasis added]
The court held that ‘3% reservation for the disabled persons has to be
computed on the basis of total strength of the cadre, i.e., both identified as well as
unidentified posts’. In order to correctly understand and interpret the word
‘vacancies’ the court divided section 33 into three parts. The first part is 264
262 National Federation of Blind, at para 34. Disabilities Act 1995, S. 41:Incentives to
employers to ensure five per cent of the work force is composed of persons with
disabilities: The appropriate Government and the local authorities shall, within limits
to their economic capacity and development, provide incentives to employers both in
public and private sectors to ensure that at least five percent of their work force is
composed of persons with disabilities.
263 Id. at para 35.
264 Id. at para 31.
every appropriate Government shall appoint in every

establishment such percentage of vacancies not less than 3%
for persons or class of persons with disability.
The court elaborated the meaning of first part in following words:265
It is evident from this part that it mandates every appropriate
Government shall appoint a minimum of 3% vacancies in its
establishments for persons with disabilities. In this light, the
contention of the Union of India that reservation in terms of
Section 33 has to be computed against identified posts only is
not tenable by any method of interpretation of this part of the
Section.266
The second part of section 33 is 267
...of which one percent each shall be reserved for persons
suffering from blindness or low vision, hearing impairment &
locomotor disability or cerebral palsy in the posts identified for
each disability. [Emphasis added]
The court took note of the words “of which” in section 33 of Disability Act 1995:268
From the above, it is clear that it deals with distribution of 3%
posts in every establishment among 3 categories of disabilities.
It starts from the word “of which”. The word “of which” has to
relate to appointing not less than 3% vacancies in an
establishment and, in any way, it does not refer to the identified
posts.
The court considered if the word ‘vacancy’ may mean ‘identified vacancies’:269
In fact, the contention of the Union of India is sought to be
justified by bringing the last portion of the second part of the
section viz. “....identified posts” in this very first part which
deals with the statutory obligation imposed upon the appropriate
Government to “appoint not less than 3% vacancies for the
persons or class of persons with disabilities.”
The court, however, felt that ‘established rule of interpretation’ do not allow
the meaning as abovementioned. Analysing first two part of section 33, the court
observed:270
265 Ibid.
266 Ibid.
267 Id at para 32.
268 Ibid.
269 Ibid.
270 Ibid.
In our considered view, it is not plausible in the light of

established rules of interpretation. The minimum level of
representation of persons with disabilities has been provided in
this very first part and the second part deals with the distribution
of this 3% among the three categories of disabilities. Further, in
the last portion of the second part the words used are “in the
identified posts for each disability” and not “of identified posts”.
This can only mean that out of minimum 3% of vacancies of
posts in the establishments 1% each has to be given to each of
the 3 categories of disability viz., blind and low vision, hearing
impaired and locomotor disabled or cerebral palsy separately
and the number of appointments equivalent to the 1% for each
disability out of total 3% has to be made against the vacancies
in the identified posts. The attempt to read identified posts in
the first part itself and also to read the same to have any relation
with the computation of reservation is completely misconceived.
[Emphasis added]
After seeking legislative intention the court exercised another tool of
interpretation ie., objective accomplishment and observed that ‘the Act is a social
legislation enacted for the benefit of persons with disabilities and its provisions
must be interpreted in order to fulfill its objective.’270a
In Thalappalam Ser. Coop. Bank ltd. v. State of Kerala the court observed:271
Legislative intention is clear and is discernible from Section 2(h)
[of RTI Act 2005]that intends to include various categories,
discussed earlier. It is trite law that the primarily language
employed is the determinative factor of the legislative intention
and the intention of the legislature must be found…
Lalita Kumari also seeks legislative intention through amendment: 272
The insertion of sub-section (3) of Section 154, by way of an
amendment, reveals the intention of the legislature to ensure
that no information of commission of a cognizable offence must
be ignored or not acted upon which would result in unjustified
protection of the alleged offender/accused.
Gathering intention: the negative way
In order to gather the intention of legislature the judiciary in previous cases
has used the presence of words and provisions in enactment or Bill. Some time
absence of certain provision also throw light on intention of legislature. Legal
270a Id. at para 36.

272 Lalita Kumari, para 74.
authorities like Law Commission of India etc some time make good suggestions to
reform law. If they are not incorporated by parliament, does this also indicate
intention of legislature? Kaushal is affirmative on this negative way of gathering
intention. Kaushal notices the absence of any amendment in section 377 and non
implementation of the report of Law Commission of India as supportive evidence
to read the mind of legislature. It observed: 273
After the adoption of the IPC in 1950, around 30 amendments
have been made to the statute, the most recent being in 2013
which specifically deals with sexual offences, a category to which
Section 377 IPC belongs. The 172nd Law Commission Report
specifically recommended deletion of that section and the issue
has repeatedly come up for debate. However, the Legislature
has chosen not to amend the law or revisit it. This shows that
Parliament, which is undisputedly the representative body of
the people of India has not thought it proper to delete the
provision.
While the logic as above quoted is convincing what is not understandable is
the corroborative support from the inaction of Union of India in Naz foundation
case of Delhi high court274 judgement. It observed: 275
Such a conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that despite
the decision of the Union of India to not challenge in appeal the
order of the Delhi High Court, the Parliament has not made any
amendment in the law. While this does not make the law immune
from constitutional challenge, it must nonetheless guide our
understanding of character, scope, ambit and import.
There seems some inconsistency in the above two paragraphs. Did this
approach of Union of India strengthened the conclusion or dilutes the
conclusion?
Intent of the contract
Where there is some ambiguity as to the words in a provision of law, the
judiciary has to seek intention of legislature. What will happen in case of terms of
an agreement in a contract? The Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Industrial
Development276 discusses that intent of agreement has to be traced in joint intent
of both parties. Taking out a paragraph from DLF Universal Ltd. v. Director, T. and
C. Planning Department Haryana277 it observed:

274 Naz Foundation v Government of NCT of Delhi, 2009 (160) DLT 277.
275 Kaushal, para 32.
276 Supra note 107.
277 AIR 2011 SC 1463.
It is not the intent of a single party; it is the joint intent of both

parties and the joint intent of the parties is to be discovered from
the entirety of the contract and the circumstances surrounding
its formation.
In other words the intent of contract is different from intent of legislation. For
intent of contract joint intention of both parties has to be considered.
III JUDICIAL LEGISLATION
Judicial legislation is an established fact as we have mentioned in our last year

survey 2012. The whole of common law and the law of tort is judge made law.278
It has been rightly observed that:279
...[I]n the performance of this duty the Judges do not act as
computers into which are fed the statutes and the rules for the
construction of statutes and from whom issue forth the
mathematically correct answer … They are not legislators, but
finishers, refiners and polishers of legislation which comes to
them in a state requiring varying degrees of further processing.
In Namit Sharma second the court overruled its previous directions in Namit
Sharma first. The court, inferred that the omission, if any, is deliberate and it was
not a case where ‘Court as the interpreter of law is supposed to supply omissions,
correct uncertainties, and harmonize results’. It warned:280
…any direction by this Court for appointment of persons with
judicial experience, training and acumen and Judges as
Information Commissioners and Chief Information
Commissioner would amount to encroachment in the field of
legislation.
It followed the seven-Judge Bench ruling in P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of
Karnataka:281
Courts can declare the law, they can interpret the law, they can
remove obvious lacunae and fill the gaps but they cannot
entrench upon in the field of legislation properly meant for the
legislature.
278 Dicey, Law and Public Opinion in England, (2nd edn. with preface by ECS Wade,
Macmillon, 1962).
279 Donaldson J, Corocraft Ltd v Pan American Airways Inc. [1968] 3 WLR 714 at 732.
280 Namit Sharma second.
281 (2002) 4 SCC 578. P. Ramachandra Rao was also referred as binding in Ranjan
Dwevedi v. CBI, through Director, AIR 2012 SC 3217 where Chandramauli Prasad J
held that he was willing to give a fresh look but ‘judicial discipline expects us to
follow the ratio and prohibits laying down any principle in derogation of the ratio
laid down’ in seven-judge Constitution Bench judgement in P. Ramachandra Rao v.
Namit Sharma second used the precedent of Union of India v. Deoki Nandan
Aggarwal 282 where V. Ramaswami J writing the judgment on behalf of a three
judge bench says:283
It is not the duty of the Court either to enlarge the scope of the
legislation or the intention of the legislature when the language
of the provision is plain and unambiguous. The Court cannot
rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation for the very good reason
that it has no power to legislate. The power to legislate has not
been conferred on the courts. The Court cannot add words to a
statute or read words into it which are not there. Assuming there
is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature
the Court could not go to its aid to correct or make up the
deficiency. Courts shall decide what the law is and not what it
should be. The Court of course adopts a construction which will
carry out the obvious intention of the legislature but could not
legislate itself. But to invoke judicial activism to set at naught
legislative judgment is subversive of the constitutional harmony
and comity of instrumentalities. [Emphasis Added]
Principle of severability and reading down leads to various questions, for
example does it lead to judicial legislation? On judicial legislation Kaushal
imported the answer from Constitution Bench judgement of D.S. Nakara v. Union
of India (UOI)284 as under:285
In reading down the memoranda, is this Court legislating? Of course
‘not’ When we delete basis of classification as violative of Article
14, we merely set at naught the unconstitutional portion retaining
the constitutional portion.286
In the case of Thalappalam,287 the court referred Magor and St. Mellons
Rural District Council v. New Port Corporation,288 where the courts were warned
that they are not entitled to usurp the legislative function under the guise of
interpretation. The Court mentioned various judicial authorities like D.A.
State of Karnataka. In Ranjan Dwevedi, the case was pending in trial court itself for
more than 37 years. The petitioners presented a writ petition praying for quashing of
the charges and trial because of violation of his fundamental right of speedy trial. The
court rejected this contention.
282 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 323. A full bench decision.
284 (1983)1 SCC 305.
285 D.S. Nakara, para 67.
286 Also see Kaushal, para 30.
287 Supra note 123.
288 (1951) 2 All ER 839 (HL).
Venkatachalam v. Dy. Transport Commissioner,289 Union of India v. Elphinstone

Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd,290 District Mining Officer v. Tata Iron & Steel
Co,291 Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) v. State of Tamil Nadu,292 . Maulvi Hussain
Haji Abraham Umarji v. State of Gujarat,293 where it was held that the court must
avoid the danger of an apriori determination of the meaning of a provision based
on their own preconceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which
the provisions to be interpreted is somehow fitted. It is trite law that words of a
statute are clear, plain and unambiguous i.e. they are reasonably susceptible to
only one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective
of the consequences, meaning thereby when the language is clear and unambiguous
and admits of only one meaning, no question of construction of a statute arises,
for the statute speaks for itself. 294 It reiterated from Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi
Sadhukhan,295 where the court observed: 296
…[I]f the words used are capable of one construction only then it would
not be open to courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the
ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object
and policy of the Act.
If the provisions have no ambiguity the court must not interpret it in such a
manner that the subjectivity of judge becomes the outcome of interpretation leading
to judicial legislation. The court in National Federation of Blind 297 warned: 298
It is clear that when the provision is plainly worded and
unambiguous, it has to be interpreted in such a way that the
Court must avoid the danger of a prior determination of the
meaning of a provision based on their own preconceived notions
of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to
be interpreted is somewhat fitted. While interpreting the
provisions, the Court only interprets the law and cannot legislate
it. It is the function of the Legislature to amend, modify or repeal
it, if deemed necessary. [Emphasis added]
In other words ‘ought law’ should be best left to legislative domain.
289 (1977) 2 SCC273.

290 (2 001) 4 SCC 139.
291 (2001) 7 SCC 358.
292 (2002) 3 SCC 533.
293 (2004) 6 SCC 672.
295 AIR 1957 SC 907.
297 Supra note 248.
298 Id. at para 44.
IV INTERNAL AID
The internal aids to construction are the parts of the enactment itself eg.,
preamble, long and short titles, headings, marginal-notes, proviso, exceptions etc.
Role of headings and plain meaning rule
Every provision has main heading followed by text. What is the value of
headings while interpretation? Is it at par with text? If the two conveys inconsistent
meaning, what is the right way of construction of provision? National Federation
of Blind 299 highlights this issue where the Supreme Court while discussing vacancy
or post based reservation observed:300
Yet another contention raised by the appellants is that the
reservation for persons with disabilities must be vacancy based
reservation whereas Respondent No. 1 herein contended that it
must be post based reservation as laid down by the High Court
in the impugned judgment. Respondent No. 1 herein relied upon
the heading of Section 33 of the Act [Bombay Police Act, 1951],
viz., ‘Reservation of Posts’, to propose the view that the
reservation policy contemplated under Section 33 is post based
reservation. [Emphasis added]
The court addressed this issue with the help of its previous observation in
Prakash Nath Khanna v. Commissioner of Income Tax:301
It is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read
anything into a statutory provision which is plain and
unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature.
Plain meaning rule does not ‘give any weightage to headings’.The court
observed:302
It is settled law that while interpreting any provision of a statute
the plain meaning has to be given effect and if language therein
is simple and unambiguous, there is no need to traverse beyond
the same. Likewise, if the language of the relevant section gives
a simple meaning and message, it should be interpreted in such
a way and there is no need to give any weightage to headings of
those paragraphs.
Determining the limits of heading and marginal note the court held:303
The heading of a Section or marginal note may be relied upon
to clear any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation of the
299 Supra note 248.

300 Id. at para 42.
301 (2004) 9 SCC 686 at para 13.
303 Id. at para 45.
provision and to discern the legislative intent. However, when

the Section is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to traverse
beyond those words, hence, the headings or marginal notes
cannot control the meaning of the body of the section. [Emphasis
added]
Applying the above criteria the court held that ‘the heading of Section 33 of
the Act is “Reservation of posts” will not play a crucial role, when the Section is
clear and unambiguous.’
Preamble, object and reason of Act
In Bombay Bar Dancer case the validity of section 33A and 33B of Bombay
Police Act, 1951 had been challenged on the basis of article 14 and 19. The court
held that unless the object clause is sufficiently clear in its classification made in
the provision, it cannot be helpful in screening a provision. It held: 304
A perusal of the Objects and the Reasons would show that the
impugned legislation proceed on a hypothesis that different dance
bars are being used as meeting points of criminals and pick up points
of the girls. Objects and Reasons say nothing about any evidence
having been presented to the Government that these dance bars are
actively involved in trafficking of women.
Proviso
In the case of National Federation of Blind the court took help of proviso to
section 33 of Disabilities Act 1995, which has already been discussed under
legislative intent head.305
Office Memorandum
Can an Office Memorandum be used to interpret a provision of a statute. In
the case of Manohar Lal Sharma answers this query in negative in following
words:306
The Office Memorandum relied on by the learned Attorney-
General can hardly be termed as efficacious in any manner.
Firstly, it cannot be used to interpret a provision of law such as
Section 6A of the [Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946
]Act. I am not inclined to give any importance to the Office
Memorandum for understanding or appreciating Section 6A of
the Act.

305 Id. at para 33. S. 33 proviso runs as under:Provided that the appropriate Government
may, having regard to the type of work carried on in any department or establishment,
by notification subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in such
notification, exempt any establishment from the provisions of this section.
306 Manohar Lal Sharma, para 28.
The court has rightly observed as above because a memorandum is an

executive document while an Act is a legislative instrument. A court while exercising
its power under article 32 and 142 cannot be guided by an executive directive while
interpreting a provision of a statute.
V EXTERNAL AID
Legal maxim
In the Gujrat Lokayukta case307 the term ‘consultation’ contained in section
3 of the Gujarat Lokayukta Act 1986, was in question. The court observed:
In the process of statutory construction, the court must construe
the Act before it, bearing in mind the legal maxim ut res magis
valeat quam pereat - which mean - it is better for a thing to have
effect than for it to be made void, i.e., a statute must be construed
in such a manner, so as to make it workable.
Ut res magis valeat guam pereat has been discussed in Badshah308 where the
court observed: 309
The court would also invoke the legal maxim construction ut
res magis valeat guam pereat, in such cases i.e. where alternative
constructions are possible the Court must give effect to that which
will be responsible for the smooth working of the system for
which the statute has been enacted rather than one which will
put a road block in its way. If the choice is between two
interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the
manifest purpose of the legislation should be avoided. We should
avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility
and should accept the bolder construction based on the view
that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing
about an effective result. If this interpretation is not accepted, it
would amount to giving a premium to the husband for defrauding
the wife. Therefore, at least for the purpose of claiming
maintenance under Section125, Code of Criminal Procedure,
such a woman is to be treated as the legally wedded wife.
To justify its stand the court quoted with approval following statement from
Capt. Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Veena Kaushal:310
The brooding presence of the Constitutional empathy for the
weaker sections like women and children must inform
307 Supra note 193.

308 AIR 2014 SC 869
310 (1978) 4 SCC 70.
interpretation if it has to have social relevance. So viewed, it is

possible to be selective in picking out that interpretation out
of two alternatives which advances the cause - the cause of the
derelicts.311
In Lalita Kumari the court used uniusest exclusion alterius without any
discussion as under:312
The maxim expression uniusest exclusion alterius (expression
of one thing is the exclusion of another) applies in the
interpretation of Section154 of the Code, where the mandate of
recording the information in writing excludes the possibility of
not recording an information of commission of a cognizable
crime in the special register.
Dictionary
In a very recent research article Richard A Posner has made some comments.
He has observed that though judges are not consistent in use of ‘preferred’
dictionaries “dictionaries have become a principle source of determining the
meaning of statutes”. 313 In the case of Rajasthan State Industrial Development 314
the phrase Mutatis Mutandis was explained with various previous judgements.
The court took support from Ashok Service Centre v. State of Orissa,315 where
dictionaries were used to understand the meaning of the phrase:
Earl Jowitt’s ‘The Dictionary of English Law 1959)’ defines
‘mutatis mutandis’ as ‘with the necessary changes in points of
detail’. Black’s Law Dictionary (Revised 4th Edn. 1968) defines
‘mutatis mutandis’ as ‘with the necessary changes in points of
detail, meaning that matters or things are generally the same,
but to be altered when necessary, as to names, offices, and the
like...’Extension of an earlier Act mutatis mutandis to a later
Act, brings in the idea of adaptation, but so far only as it is
necessary for the purpose, making a change without altering the
essential nature of the things changed, subject of course to
express provisions made in the later Act....In the circumstances
the conclusion reached by the High Court that the two Acts
were independent of each other was wrong. We are of the view
that, it is necessary to read and to construe the two Acts together
as if the two Acts are one, and while doing so to give effect to
the provisions of the Act which is a later one in preference to the
311 Badshah para 27.

313 Richard A Posner, Reflections on Judging, 181 (Harward University Press, 2013).
314 Rajasthan State Industrial Development, Supra note 107.
315 MANU/SC/0313/1983MANU/SC/0313/1983 : AIR 1983 SC 394.
provisions of the Principal Act wherever the Act has manifested

an intention to modify the Principal Act....
Kaushal being a case containing various technical words, use of dictionary
etc. was natural. With the assistance of various dictionaries the court found following
meaning:316
Buggery – a carnal copulation against nature; a man or a woman
with a brute beast, a man with a man, or man unnaturally with a
woman. This term is often used interchangeably with
“sodomy”.317
Carnal – Pertaining to the body, its passions and its appetites animal; fleshy;
sensual; impure; sexual. 318
Carnal knowledge – Coitus; copulation; the act of a man having sexual bodily
connections with a woman; sexual intercourse. Carnal knowledge of a child is
unlawful sexual intercourse with a female child under the age of consent. It is a
statutory crime, usually a felony. Such offense is popularly known as “statutory
rape”. While penetration is an essential element, there is “carnal knowledge” if
there is the slightest penetration of the sexual organ of the female by the sexual
organ of the male.319 It is not necessary that the vagina be entered or that the
hymen be ruptured; the entering of the vulva or labia is sufficient. 320
Nature-(1) A fundamental quality that distinguishes one thing from another;
the essence of something. (2) Something pure or true as distinguished from
something artificial or contrived. (3) The basic instincts or impulses of someone
or something.321
The word ‘intercourse’ means ‘sexual connection’. In Khanu v. Emperor322
the meaning of the word ‘intercourse’ has been considered:
Intercourse may be defined as mutual frequent action by members
of independent organization. Then commercial intercourse,
social intercourse, etc. have been considered; and then appears.
By a metaphor the word intercourse, like the word commerce, is
applied to the relations of the sexes. Here also there is the
temporary visitation of one organism by a member of the other
organization, for certain clearly defined and limited objects. The

317 Black’s Law Dictionary 6th edn. 1990.
318 People v. Battilana, 52 Cal. App.2d 685, 126 P.2d 923, 928 (Black’s Law Dictionary
6th edn. 1990).
319 State v. Cross, 2000 S.E.2d 27, 29.
320 De Armond v. State, Okl. Cr., 285 P.2d 236. (Black’s Law Dictionary 6th edn. 1990)
321 Black’s Law Dictionary 9th edn. 2009.
322 AIR 1925 Sind 286.
primary object of the visiting organization is to obtain euphoria

by means of a detent of the nerves consequent on the sexual
crisis. But there is no intercourse unless the visiting member is
enveloped at least partially by the visited organism, for
intercourse connotes reciprocity.
According to Concise Oxford Dictionary ‘penetrate’ means in the ‘find access
into or through, pass through.’ When the male organ is inserted between the thighs
kept together and tight, is there no penetration? The word ‘insert’ means place, fit,
thrust. Therefore, if the male organ is ‘inserted’ or ‘thrust’ between the thighs,
there is ‘penetration’ to constitute unnatural offence.323
Kaushal also quoted from Calvin Francis v. Orissa 324 where the Orissa
High Court observed:325
In Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, the word ‘buggery’ is said to be
synonymous with sodomy. In K. J. Ayer’s Manual of Law Terms
and Phrases (as Judicially Expounded), the meaning of the word
‘sodomy’ is stated to be a carnal knowledge committed against
the order of Nature by a man with a man or in the same unnatural
manner with a woman, or by a man or woman in any manner
with a beast. This is called buggery. 326
The dictionary meaning of ‘pervasive’ is: 327
It means that which pervades/tends to pervade in such a way, so
as to be, or become, prevalent or dominant. Extensive or far
reaching, spreading through every part of something.
Delivering on what it meant by ‘pervasive control’ or ‘regulate’ the court
observed:328
When we discuss ‘pervasive control’, the term ‘control’ is taken
to mean check, restraint or influence. Control is intended to
regulate, and to hold in check, or to restrain from action. The
word ‘regulate’, would mean to control or to adjust by rule, or
to subject to governing principles.329
323 Khanu v. Emperor AIR 1925 Sind 286, para 20, Kaushal, para 38.
324 1992 (2) Crimes 455.
325 Id., para 12.
327 Balmer Lawrie , para 6.
329 Ibid. See also State of Mysore v. Allum Karibasauppa, AIR 1974 SC 1863; U.P. Co-
operative Cane Unions Federations v. West U.P. Sugar Mills Association, AIR 2004
SC 3697; Zee Telefilms Ltd., (supra); and Union of India (UOI) v. Asian Food Industries,
AIR 2007 SC 750.
The court has also occasion to examine the meaning of ‘unconscionable’. It

observed: 330
The dictionary meaning of the word ‘unconscionable’ is
“showing no regard for conscience; irreconcilable with what is
right or reasonable. An unconscionable bargain would therefore,
be one which is irreconcilable with what is right or reasonable.
Legislation has also interfered in many cases to prevent one party
to a contract from taking undue or unfair advantage of the other.
Instances of this type of legislation are usury laws, debt relief
laws and laws regulating the hours of work and conditions of
service of workmen and their unfair discharge from service, as
also control orders directing a party to sell a particular essential
commodity to another”.
Books
The court in Rajasthan State Industrial Development331extracted from Anson’s
Law of Contract which says:
…a basic principle of the Common Law of Contract is that the
parties are free to determine for themselves what primary
obligations they will accept...Today, the position is seen in a
different light. Freedom of contract is generally regarded as a
reasonable, social, ideal only to the extent that equality of
bargaining power between the contracting parties can be assumed
and no injury is done to the interests of the community at large.332
Reports
In Bombay Bar Dancer case the findings of various reports were submitted
to justify the ban on dancing of bargirl. The reports, however, failed to satisfy the
court that there is intelligible differentia. The reports as external aid to interpretation
were too meaningless to be used because of credibility. The court held as under:333
The High Court, in our opinion, has rightly declined to rely upon
the Prayas and Shubhada Chaukar’s report. The number of
respondents interviewed was so miniscule as to render both
the studies meaningless. As noticed earlier, the subsequent
report submitted by SNDT University has substantially
contradicted the conclusions reached by the other two reports.

331 Supra, note 107.
332 DLF Universal Ltd. v. Director, T. and C. Planning Department Haryana AIR 2011
SC 1463.
The court found that “isolated examples would not be sufficient to establish
the connection of the dance bars covered under section 33A with trafficking.”334
[Emphasis added]
Lalita Kumari, also takes support from various reports including Malimath
Committee report for the purpose of interpretation.335
VI MISCELLENOUS
Legal fiction
Legal fiction is a powerful means in the hands of law to create something
artificially. It comes with various nomenclatures. Deemed to be, as if etc. Rajasthan
State Industrial Development336 gives the meaning of “As if” used in Clause (iv)
of Rule 11-A of Rajasthan Land Revenue (Industrial area Allotment) Rules, 1959 in
following words:337
The expression “as if”, is used to make one applicable in respect
of the other. The words “as if” create a legal fiction. By it,
when a person is “deemed to be” something, the only meaning
possible is that, while in reality he is not that something, but
for the purposes of the Act of legislature he is required to be
treated that something, and not otherwise. It is a well settled
rule of interpretation that, in construing the scope of a legal
fiction, it would be proper and even necessary, to assume all
those facts on the basis of which alone, such fiction can operate.
The words “as if”, in fact show the distinction between two
things and, such words must be used only for a limited purpose.
They further show that a legal fiction must be limited to the
purpose for which it was created.338
Legal fiction, its purpose and its application was discussed in Industrial
Supplies Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India,339 which is also referred in Rajasthan State
Industrial Development 340 where the court observed as follows: 341
334 Id, para 105.
336 Supra, note 107.
337 Ibid. Rajasthan State Industrial Development discusses ‘as if’ in a separate head at
para 19.
338 Ibid. See also Radhakissen Chamria v. Durga Prasad Chamria , AIR 1940 PC 167;
Commr. of Income-tax, Delhi v. S. Teja Singh, 1959 SC 352; Ram Kishore Sen v.
Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 644; Sher Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 200;
State of Maharashtra v. Laljit Rajshi Shah, AIR 2000 SC 937; Paramjeet Singh
Patheja v. ICDS Ltd. AIR 2007 SC 168; and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Willamson
Financial Services, (2008) 2 SCC 202) as authority on the point.
339 AIR 1980 SC 1858.
340 Supra note 107.
341 Id. at para 21
It is now axiomatic that when a legal fiction is incorporated in a

statute, the court has to ascertain for what purpose the fiction is
created. After ascertaining the purpose, full effect must be given
to the statutory fiction and it should be carried to its logical
conclusion. The court has to assume all the facts and
consequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries to
giving effect to the fiction.
Writ jurisdiction and contractual obligation
New economic policy has provided ample scope of sharp rise in business. As
contract is the basis of mercantile law the contractual obligations has increased in
form and content. No surprise, aggrieved parties may try to invoke writ jurisdiction
of courts. Rajasthan State Industrial Development,342 however, reiterates the
position as held in Kerala State Electricity Board v. Kurien E. Kalathil,343 where
the court held as under:344
The interpretation and implementation of a clause in a contract cannot be
the subject-matter of a writ petition. ....If a term of a contract is violated, ordinarily
the remedy is not the writ petition under Article 226. We are also unable to agree
with the observations of the High Court that the contractor was seeking enforcement
of a statutory contract.....The contract between the parties is in the realm of private
law. It is not a statutory contract. The disputes relating to interpretation of the
terms and conditions of such a contract could not have been agitated in a petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. That is a matter for adjudication by
a civil court or in arbitration if provided for in the contract.... The contractor
should have relegated to other remedies.[[Emphasis added]
Comparative law and constitutional interpretation
In India judges and writers have a tendency to quote laws, legal materials and
quotations from foreign jurisdictions. In foreign judgements and works Indian
judgements, legislative developments etc are not discussed with the same vigour
as we Indians do.
In Kaushal the court has warned the courts while using position in other
foreign jurisdiction. It observed:345
In its anxiety to protect the so-called rights of LGBT persons
and to declare that Section 377 IPC violates the right to privacy,
autonomy and dignity, the High Court has extensively relied upon
the judgments of other jurisdictions. Though these judgments
342 MANU/SC/0116/2013.
343 AIR 2000 SC 2573.
344 Rajasthan State Industrial Development, Supra note 107, para 13.
shed considerable light on various aspects of this right and are

informative in relation to the plight of sexual minorities, we feel
that they cannot be applied blindfolded for deciding the
constitutionality of the law enacted by the Indian legislature.
Kaushal reiterated the caution through Constitutional Bench judgement of
Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P.346 forty years back that the courts “have grave
doubts about the expediency of transplanting Western experience in our country.
Social conditions are different and so also the general intellectual level.”
The court in Bhullar second compared India with the USA while quoting its
previous decision in T.V. Vatheeswaran’s case. In State of Tamil Nadu v T.V.
Vatheeswaran347 the court observed:348
In the United States of America where the right to a speedy trial
is a Constitutionally guaranteed right, the denial of a speedy
trial has been held to entitle an accused person to the dismissal
of the indictment or the vacation of the sentence. 349 Analogy of
American law is not permissible, but interpreting our
Constitution sui generis, as we are bound to do, we find no
impediment in holding that the dehumanising factor of prolonged
delay in the execution of a sentence of death has the
Constitutional implication of depriving a person of his life in an
unjust, unfair and unreasonable way...350
The constitution of India has borrowed good number of its elements from the
instruments of other nations. This could be one strong justification of why a good
number of learned advocates and judges are ‘in the habit of’ relying on foreign
jurisdictions. The Supreme court, however, has been cautious which can be reflected
by a five judges constitution bench observation in Babulal Parate v. The State of
Bombay351 that “it will be improper to import into the question of construction
doctrines of democratic theory and practice obtaining in other countries, unrelated
to the tenor, scheme and words of the provisions which we have to construe.”
Competence of legislature
In the case of Lily Thomas v. Union of India352 public interest litigation was
filed for declaring sub-sections (4) of section 8 of the Representation of the People
Act, 1951 as ultra vires the Constitution.353 In other words whether “Parliament
346 (1973) 1 SCC 20.
347 (1983) 2 SCC 68.
348 Vatheeswaran’s case, para 27.
349 Strunk v. United States.
350 Bhullar Ist, para 27.
351 1960 SCR (1) 605.
352 Indlaw SC 419 AIR 2013 SC 2662, hereinafter referred as Lily Thomas. This is a
division bench judgement delivered by A.K. Patnaik J, the para referred herein are
from Indlow.
353 Lily Thomas, para 1.
lacked the legislative power to enact sub-section (4) of section 8 of Representation

of People Act, 1951”.354
The court extracted a Privy Council ruling of The Empress v. Burah,355 where
Selborne J laid down the following fundamental principles for interpretation of a
written Constitution laying down the powers of the Indian Legislature356 and
observed that the correctness of the “principles with regard to interpretation of a
written Constitution has been re-affirmed by the majority of Judges in the case
Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala”.357 On this point it concluded:358
Hence, when a question is raised whether Parliament has exceeded the
limits of its powers, courts have to decide the question by looking to
the terms of the instrument by which affirmatively, the legislative
powers were created, and by which negatively, they are restricted.
Competence of parties: locus standi
Locus Standi of third party in criminal case is not open to much discussion.
Third party, however, can have locus standi in exceptional cases if interpretation
of public importance is involved. In the case of Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Raju,
through Member, Juvenile Justice Board 359 the court accepted this exception in
following words:360
Petitioners seek is an authoritative pronouncement of the true
purport and effect of the different provisions of the JJ Act so as
354 Id. at para 14. According to court this issue was not at all considered by the Constitution
Bench in K. Prabhakaran, 2005 Indlaw SC 1999.
355 [1878] 5 I.A. 178]
356 Lily Thomas, para14.
357 AIR 1973 SC 1465. The principles are as under: The Indian Legislature has powers
expressly limited by the Act of the Imperial Parliament which created it; and it can, of
course, do nothing beyond the limits which circumscribes these powers. But, when
acting within these limits, it is not in any sense an agent or delegate of the Imperial
Parliament, but has, and was intended to have, plenary powers of legislation, as large,
and of the same nature, as those of Parliament itself. The established Courts of Justice,
when a question arises whether the prescribed limits have been exceeded, must of
necessity determine that question; and the only way in which they can properly do so,
is by looking to the terms of the instrument by which, affirmatively, the legislative
powers were created, and by which, negatively, they are restricted. If what has been
done is legislation within the general scope of the affirmative words which give the
power, and if it violates no express condition or restriction by which that power is
limited (in which category would, of course, be included any Act of the Imperial
Parliament at variance with it), it is not for any Court of Justice to inquire further, or
to enlarge constructively those conditions and restrictions.
358 Lily Thomas, para14.
359 MANU/SC/0849 2013. (2013) 10 SCC 465. The paras referred herein are from
manupatra.
360 Id. at para 12.
to take a juvenile out of the purview of the said Act in case he

had committed an offence, which, according to the Petitioners,
on a true interpretation of Section 2(p)of the Act, is required to
be identified and distinguished to justify a separate course of
action, namely, trial in a regular Court of Law as a specific offence
under the Penal Code and in accordance with the provisions of
the Code of Criminal Procedure. …In fact, interpretation of the
relevant provisions of the JJ Act in any manner by this Court, if
made, will not be confined to the first Respondent alone but
will have an effect on all juveniles who may come into conflict
with law both in the immediate and distant future. …If this Court
is to interpret the provisions of the Act in the manner sought by
the Petitioners, the possible effect thereof in so far as the first
Respondent is concerned will pale into insignificance in the
backdrop of the far reaching consequences that such an
interpretation may have on an indeterminate number of persons
not presently before the Court. We … hold that the special leave
petition does not suffer from the vice of absence of locus …, will
proceed to hear the special leave petition on merits.
Meaning of particular words
i. Coparcenary property : Meaning In the case of Rohit Chauhan v. Surinder
Singh361 the Supreme Court stated the meaning of coparcenary property in following
words:362
In our opinion coparcenary property means the property which consists of
ancestral property and a coparcener would mean a person who shares equally with
others in inheritance in the estate of common ancestor. Coparcenary is a narrower
body than the Joint Hindu family and before commencement of Hindu Succession
(Amendment) Act, 2005, only male members of the family used to acquire by birth
an interest in the coparcenary property. A coparcener has no definite share in the
coparcenary property but he has an undivided interest in it and one has to bear in
mind that it enlarges by deaths and diminishes by births in the family. It is not
static. We are further of the opinion that so long, on partition an ancestral property
remains in the hand of a single person, it has to be treated as a separate property
and such a person shall be entitled to dispose of the coparcenary property treating
it to be his separate property but if a son is subsequently born, the alienation made
before the birth cannot be questioned. But, the moment a son is born, the property
becomes a coparcenary property and the son would acquire interest in that and
become a coparcener.
361 (2013) 9 SCC 419, Decided on July 15, 2013.

362 Id at para 11.
ii. “As-is-where-is” is a phrase which is widely used in contractual

documents. Rajasthan State Industrial Development carried the meaning from
Punjab Urban Planning and Development Authority v. Raghu Nath Gupta 363
where the court explained in following words: 364
… the commercial plots were allotted on “as-is-where-is” basis. The allottees
would have ascertained the facilities available at the time of auction and after
having accepted the commercial plots on “as-is-where-is” basis, they cannot be
heard to contend that PUDA[Punjab Urban Planning and Development Authority]
had not provided the basic amenities like parking, lights, roads, water, sewerage,
etc. If the allottees were not interested in taking the commercial plots on “as-is-
where-is” basis, they should not have accepted the allotment and after having
accepted the allotment on “as-is-where-is” basis, they are estopped from
contending that the basic amenities like parking, lights, roads, water, sewerage,
etc. were not provided by PUDA when the plots were allotted....365
iii. Post, ‘vacancies’, ‘of which’ National federation of Blind discusses the
meaning of “posts”, “vacancies” and “of which” used in context of Persons with
Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act,
1995. 366 For the meaning the court relied on the judgement of Constitution Bench
in R.K Sabharwal v. State of Punjab367 which reads as under: 368
The expressions “posts” and “vacancies”, often used in the executive
instructions providing for reservations, are rather problematical. The word “post”
means an appointment, job, office or employment. A position to which a person is
appointed. “Vacancy” means an unoccupied post or office. The plain meaning of
the two expressions make it clear that there must be a ‘post’ in existence to enable
the ‘vacancy’ to occur. The cadre- strength is always measured by the number of
posts comprising the cadre. Right to be considered for appointment can only be
claimed in respect of a post in a cadre. As a consequence the percentage of
reservation has to be worked out in relation to the number of posts, which form the
363 (2012) 8 SCC 197.

364 Rajasthan State Industrial Development, Supra note 107 at para 18. The court also
pointed out UT Chandigarh Admn. v. Amarjeet Singh (2009) 4 SCC 660.
365 Ibid.
366 Supra note 248.
367 1995 Indlaw SC 1756.
368 Id., para 16.
cadre-strength. The concept of ‘vacancy’ has no relevance in operating the

percentage of reservation. 369
iv. “Control” word also came for discussion in some cases. In the case of
Balmer Lawrie370 took support from Vodafone judgement for meaning of control:371
‘Control’ is a mixed question of law and fact. The control of a company
resides in the voting power of its shareholders and shares represent an interest of
a shareholder which is made up of various rights contained in the contract embedded
in the Articles of Association. The question is, what is the nature of the “control”
that a parent company has over its subsidiary? It is not suggested that a parent
company never has control over the subsidiary. Control, in our view, is an interest
arising from holding a particular number of shares and the same cannot be separately
acquired or transferred. Each share represents a vote in the management of the
company and such a vote can be utilized to control the company.
After discussing various judicial authorities and dictionary meaning of ‘deep
and pervasive’ the court concluded:372
In the event that the Government provides financial support to
a company, but does not retain any control/watch over how it is
spent, then the same would not fall within the ambit of exercising
deep and pervasive control. Such control must be particular to
the body in question, and not general in nature. It must also be
deep and pervasive. The control should not therefore, be merely
regulatory.
Section 2(h) (d)(i) of Right To Information Act, 2005 while defining “public
authority” uses the phrase ‘body owned, controlled or substantially financed’.
The court in the case Thalappalam,373 had to examine the meaning of these words.
While making a comparison of with article 12, constitution of India where the same
word “controlled” has been used, the court observed:374
369 National federation of Blind, para 46.

370 Balmer Lawrie, at para 15.
371 Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 613. As quoted
in Balmer Lawrie, para 15.
373 2013(12) SCALE 527.
Let us examine the meaning of the expression “controlled” in the

context of RTI Act and not in the context of the expression
“controlled” judicially interpreted while examining the scope
of the expression “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution or
in the context of maintainability of a writ against a body or
authority under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
The court in Thalappalam relied upon from State of West Bengal v. Nripendra
Nath Bagchi,375 Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh v. L.V.A. Dixitulu.376 The court
extracted from Corporation of the City of Nagpur. Civil Lines, Nagpur v.
Ramchandra,377 where it observed:
It is thus now settled by this Court that the term “control” is of
a very wide connotation and amplitude and includes a large
variety of powers which are incidental or consequential to achieve
the powers-vested in the authority concerned…378 [Emphasis
added]
The court made a tour to its previous judgements like The Shamrao Vithal
Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Kasargode Pandhuranga Mallya,379 State of Mysore v.
Allum Karibasappa,380 Madan Mohan Choudhary v.State of Bihar,381 and held
that: 382
The word “control” is also sometimes used synonyms with
superintendence, management or authority to direct, restrict or
regulate by a superior authority in exercise of its supervisory
power.
It further explained the meaning and scope of the phrase “substantially
financed” used in sections 2(h) (d)(i) & (ii), while defining the expression public
authority as well as in section 2(a) of the Act, while defining the expression
“appropriate government”. It observed:383
...A body can be substantially financed, directly or indirectly by
funds provided by the appropriate Government. The expression
“substantially financed”, as such, has not been defined under
375 AIR 1966 SC 447.

376 (1979) 2 SCC 34.
377 (1981) 2 SCC 714.
379 (1972) 4 SCC 600.
380 (1974) 2 SCC 498.
381 (1999) 3 SCC 396.
383 Id. at para 36.
the Act. “Substantial” means “in a substantial manner so as to

be substantial.
Comparative law from British jurisdiction came for the support of the court
which stated as under:384
In Palser v. Grimling,385 while interpreting the provisions of
Section 10(1) of the Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions
Act, 1923, the House of Lords held that “substantial” is not the
same as “not unsubstantial” i.e. just enough to avoid the de
minimis principle. The word “substantial” literally means solid,
massive etc. [Emphasis Added]
Applying the precedent the court concluded on this point:
Legislature has used the expression “substantially financed” in
Sections 2(h)(d)(i) and (ii) indicating that the degree of financing must
be actual, existing, positive and real to a substantial extent, not
moderate, ordinary, tolerable etc.386
Implications of interpretation
While interpreting any provision should a court be conscious of its impact
and implications? The answer is yes because words do not have same meaning all
the time. National Federation of Blind judgement rightly considers that: 387
acceptance of the interpretation as argued by the appellants[UoI]
that computation of reservation has to be against the identified
posts only, ‘would result into uncertainty of the application of
the scheme of reservation’… [Emphasis added]
This uncertainty could be due to two reasons. The court has given first
reason with examples:387A
…[T]hat identification has never been uniform between the Centre
and States and even between the Departments of any
Government. For example, while a post of middle school teacher
has been notified as identified as suitable for the blind and low
vision by the Central Government, it has not been identified as
suitable for the blind and low vision in some States such as
Gujarat and J&K etc.
384 Ibid.
385 (1948) 1 All ER 1, 11 (HL).
386 Thalappalam, para36.
387 National Federation of Blind at para 35.
387A Id. at para 39.
One of the purposes of interpretation is to reduce and if possible remove

uncertainty in legal provision. This uncertainty ‘has led to a series of litigations
which have been pending in various high courts. The second reason of uncertainty
could be found in the paragraph 4 of the office memorandum (OM) dated 29.12.2005.
while ‘dealing with the issue of identification of jobs/posts in sub clause (b) states
that list of the jobs/posts notified by the Ministry of Social Justice & Empowerment
is not exhaustive which further makes the computation of reservation uncertain
and arbitrary in the event of acceptance of the contention raised by the appellants.’
If ‘vacancies’ used in section 33 does mean only identified vacancies, as contended
by Union of India, it would lead to arbitrariness, uncertainty and litigation.
Budh Singh v. State of Haryana,388 discussed under head penal versus remedial
can also be studied in the context of implication of law.
VII CONCLUDING REMARKS
This year’s survey is significant in respect of the fact that it reflects the
importance of various interpretative tools like presumption of constitutionality,
rule of severability, etc. The survey also indicates that interpretation of penal laws
is not limited to strict or literal construction. Regarding use of internal aids like
headings of text, object clause they are well applied after a detailed analysis.
Increasing role of comparative law in interpretation and their repercussions are
also highlights of this year’s survey. State of Maharashtra v Indian Hotel &
Retaurants Assn389 @ Bombay Bar dancer case, Namit Sharma second,390 Lalita
Kumari v. Govt. of U.P.,391 Suresh Kumar Kaushal v. Naz Foundation,392 Manohar
Lal Sharma v. The Principal Secretary 393 are cases where presumption of
constitutionality, rule of severability and reading down as an interpretative tool
has been discussed. Presumption of constitutionality is a rebuttable presumption.
It conceives three situations. One, if the petitioner is not able to convince prima
facie that a provision violates fundamental rights etc., the court had observed that
the law is valid. Second, if the petitioner is able to convince and prima facie rebuts
the presumption, then the state comes in picture so far as burden of proof is
concerned. If the state is able to convince the court that the provision is within the
bounds of established principle and law, the provision is held to be valid. Third, if
after prima facie proof of violation of fundamental rights etc, the state is not able
to justify the grounds of restrictions the provision is not valid. Kaushal comes in
first category while Bombay Bar dancer falls in third category. Kaushal did not
accept that the prima facie violations of fundamental rights have been established.
388 AIR 2013 SC 2386 .

389 (2013) 8 SCC 519.
390 Union of India v Namit Sharma, AIR 2014 SC 122.
391 (2014) 2 SCC1.
392 (2014) 1 SCC 1.
393 (2014) 2 SCC 532.
It, therefore, held that section 377 of IPC is not violative of article 14, 15 or 21. On
the other hand in Bombay Bar dancer case the aggrieved persons could prima
facie convince that sections 33A and 33B, [of Bombay Police Act, 1951] lead to
arbitrary classification. Burden of proof then shifted to state and it was duty of
the state to justify the reasonableness of the classification, which the state could
not do. The court, therefore, held both of these sections unconstitutional.
Another device of interpretation as submitted above, is reading down which
is used to save the provision from being turned down as violative of fundamental
rights etc. Kaushal with the help of previous authorities has widely discussed it. A
passing reference has also been made in Namit Sharma second, Bombay Bar
Dancer case. In the three cases the court rejected the application of this tool while
in Manohar Lal Sharma, it seems the court has accepted the argument of ‘reading
down.’
Various legal authorities like Law Commission of India, Supreme Court itself
recommend modifications in laws. If they are not incorporated by parliament,
does this also indicate intention of legislature? Kaushal is affirmative on this
negative approach of gathering intention. Kaushal notices the absence of any
amendment in section 377 and non implementation of the report of Law
Commission of India as supportive evidence to read the mind of legislature. This
proposition of Kaushal is ‘risky if not reckless’ because sometime the Legislature
in India is infamous for conscious disregard of constitutional provisions. It is not
that they do not want to legislate. Their priority list is volatile where important
legislative business some time gets low priority.
Namit Sharma second was able to contain to an extent the reaction and
resentment among legal and RTI circle. Namit Sharma first decided in 2012. It is
unique in the sense that Justice Patnaik was present in both Namit Sharma first
and Second. In Namit Sharma second he delivered the verdict overruling Namit
Sharma first where he was an agreed silent judge. It seems he agreed with both
judgements. Namit Sharma second agreed that a judicial member could have been
better which is an orbiter remark. Namit Sharma first thought law should be like
this and therefore the bench incorporated its subjectivity or thinking in the
judgement. In Namit Sharma first the thinking was ‘ought law’ not ‘is law’ which
is not the province of judges. The court denied giving liberal construction in
Balmer Lawrie for article 12 of constitution of India because due to new economic
policy the situation has changed and interpretation should not be a used as a tool
to remove the line between State enterprise and a non- State enterprise.
Penal laws are known for their strict interpretation where words have to be
literally interpreted. However, the penal legislation which are either protective or
procedural in nature are being given liberal and purposive interpretation. It results
in inconsistency in judicial approach.
Interpretation of penal laws regarding dowry is showing inconsistent trends
in last few years. Meaning of words like ‘dowry’, ‘relative of husband’, ‘wife’
have been given diverse meaning. Indications of Vipin Jaiswal and Surinder singh
decided in 2013 can be summarized as under:
a. One transaction rule-Prosecution has not only to prove that there

was some demand of money or property but also that the demand
was not independent of dowry transactions, ie not for business
or commercial purpose but to satisfy the customary practice of
dowry.
b. Inconsistency in judicial means of reasoning-The judges are in
dilemma which interpretative tool to use? Whether to interpret
strictly or take into consideration the objective of legislation?
This dilemma is a part of judicial process but law has to reduce
this dilemma to reduce chances of discretion and enhance the
chance of certainty. Otherwise the illustrations of two
inconsistent interpretations of same provision will increase as
happened in Vipin Jaiswal and Surinder singh. Both are decided
in 2013 on section 2 of Dowry Prohibition Act 1961, but in
Vipin tool used was literal interpretation while in Surinder singh
liberal interpretation was made to satisfy the objective of
legislation.
c. Judicial process and individual psychology-While Vipin Jaiswal
has no female member on bench, Surinder singh has one female
member who wrote the judgement. It is difficult to state that this
could be reason of a different approach but there is no difficulty
in stating that Surinder singh is right direction.
d. Parliament should intervene with an explanation that ‘any
demand was for business needs and not in continuity of dowry
has to be proved by the accused party.’
e. It seems in Vipin Jaisawal and Appasaheb the court is more
worried for the misuse of section 498A and 304B and therefore
interpreted to balance the needle in favour of husband and his
relatives. In other words while Surinder singh is a victim oriented
interpretation, Vipin Jaisawal is concerned for individual liberty
of accused.
In 2012 also there was some controversy on the issue whether section 304B
Indian Penal Code creates a legal fiction or not? In Devinder @Kala Ram v. State
Of Haryana394 the bench observed that “the word ‘deemed’ in Section 304B, IPC,
however, does not create a legal fiction but creates a presumption that the husband
or relative of the husband has caused dowry death.”395 In a previous decision in
2012 the Supreme Court in Rajesh Bhatnagar v. State of Uttarakhand,396 maintained
that “it is by fiction of law, that the husband or relative would be presumed to have
committed the offence of dowry death rendering them liable for punishment unless
the presumption is rebutted”.
394 MANU/SC/0894/2012 10 SCC 763.
395 Id. at para 9.
396 (2012) 7 SCC 91.
Badshah rejected the argument that the term ‘wife’ in section 125 of Cr PC be
given a legalistic interpretation because it is a penal legislation. It allowed a broad
and expansive interpretation and include even those cases where a man and woman
have been living together as husband and wife. Similarly Manohar Lal Sharma
shows that the enactment dealing with prevention of corruption should not be
casualty of literal or traditional approach and the limitation of section 6A of DSPEA
1946 requiring prior approval before investigation cannot limit the power of
constitutional courts. However same spirit of interpretation cannot be found in the
case of Indra Sarma where the phrase “relationship in the nature of marriage”
used in section 2(f) of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
was given a strict interpretation because the section used ‘means’ and not ‘includes.’
The law needs to be amended to make it inclusive and because of immoral
relationship the female cannot be left at the mercy of male partners and conservative
societies. The message from Budh Singh is that article 20(1) of constitution of
India recognises a fundamental right while section 432 and 433 of Cr PC 1973
recognise a privilege. Retrospective Operation of Sec. 32A of NDPS is permissible
(32A not being a sustantive criminal Law). According to article 13(2) of the
constitution of India, State is not prohibited from taking away a privilege, benefit
etc and while interpreting a provision the court will take note of this fact. Present
survey reveals that like previous years this year also the court has taken recourse
of various principles and rules of interpretation. It is neither possible nor desirable
to stick to one rule of interpretation if the situation so demands. In this context
Friedrich Bodmer is worth quoting that:398
Words … [d]o not come in standard shapes and sizes like coins
from the mint, nor do they go forth with a degree to all the world
that they shall mean only so much, no more and no less. Through
its own particular personality each word has a penumbra of
meaning which no draftsman can entirely cut away. It refuses to
be used as a mathematical symbol.
397 Decided on May 07, 2013.

398 Friedrich Bodmer, The Loom of Language, (1944) as quoted in Hooghly Mills, id. at
430, para 32. Also see in Constitution bench judgement in S.C. Advocates-on-Record
Association v. Union of India 1993 (4) SCC 441 at 553. This treatise is also available
on http://archive.org/details/TheLoomOfLanguage, last visited on Aug. 22, 2013.
Bodmer, was a Swiss Philologist and a Professor in the Massachusetts Institute of
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work correctly reiterates that “one point should be uncontroversial: interpretation

To begin with it would be appropriate to discuss certain basic principles

4 Richard A Posner, Reflections on Judging, 232 (Harvard University Press, 2013).

16 Supra note 14 at para 18.

capacity as the representative of the people, is deemed to act for

23 Supra note 12 at para 29.

be applied is whether the legislature would have enacted

vii. In determining the legislative intent on the question of

35 Id., Vol. 2, at 177-178.

constitutionality rather than the one which would render the

42 Namit Sharma first para, 106.2.

take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters

47 Lalita Kumari,para 19.

The idea of reading down cannot be advanced if the provision empowers

53 1991 Supp (1) SCC 600.

Bombay Bar Dancer case, 56 as submitted earlier the presumption of

19(1)(g), the State has to justify by acceptable evidence,

64 2013 (9) SCALE 47.

kind of morality or decency. We are unable to accept the

presumption which may be drawn from long cohabition is a

provisions of Section 154(1) of the Code, read in the light of the

92 Id. at para 45.

provisions contained in ordinary laws, cannot ipso facto, act as prohibitions or

96 Manohar Lal Sharma , para 50.

......if the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower

103 Gujrat Lokayukta case, para 66.

Inclusive and exhaustive definition

110 AIR 2014 SC 309.

112 MANU/SC/0171 (2013) 8SCC 345, Decided on 20.02.2013, hereinafter referred as

…Thus expanded and read for interpretative purposes, Article 21

139 Id. at para 59.

the deceased for purchasing a computer to start a business six

harassment was caused soon before the death. The

to leave loopholes for the offender to sneak out of the meshes of

158 (1977) 1 SCC 300, [1977]2SCR102), AIR1977SC435, decided on 7.11.1976, by P.N.

routinely in an Indian household. The meaning to be applied to

the assumption that whenever a State uses its formal process to

period of sentence than what the Act had contemplated at the

174 (2013) 5 SCC 111.

Literal Meaning: The First Principle

177 Lalita Kumari, at para 37.

information conferred Under Section 3 of the Act is not denied

189 Namit Sharma second, para 28.

under review, the provisions of Sections 12(5) and 15(5) of the

but also the mischief it seeks to suppress. It is this mischief rule,

200 Bennion Statutory Interpretation (5th edn. 2008)

In the case of Rajasthan State Industrial Development205the court dealt with

it a meaningful and purposive interpretation, it is necessary

212 Namit Sharma second, para 7.2.

218 Supra note 74 at para 17.

ascertainment of intention may be the least of a judge’s troubles

222 Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of Judicial Process, Lecture I. Introduction-The

235 (1999) 7 SCC 675. Badshah v. Badshah, para 10.

where a man marriages second time by keeping that lady in dark

241 AIR 2014 SC 915, hereinafter referred as SK Kool.

The court, however, warned that:245

245 Id., para 12.

the language of a statutory provision is unambiguous, it has to be interpreted