Hilton v.

Guyot

Hilton (Plaintiff) and Libbey (Plaintiff), New York citizens trading in Paris, were
sued in France by Guyot (Defendant), the administrator of a French firm, for
sums allegedly owed to that firm. The Plaintiffs appeared and litigated the merits
in the French proceeding. The French court rendered a judgment against them
that was affirmed by a higher court and became final. Defendant then sought to
enforce that judgment in federal district court in New York. That court held the
judgment enforceable without retrial on the merits. The Plaintiffs then appealed
to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Issue
Do laws have any effect, of their own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty
from which its authority is derived?

Held
(Gray, J.) No. No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the
sovereignty from which its authority is derived. No sovereign is bound, unless by
special compact, to execute within his dominions a judgment rendered by the
tribunals of another state, and if execution be sought by suit upon the judgment
or otherwise, the tribunal in which the suit is brought, or from which execution is
sought, is, on principle, at liberty to examine into the merits of such judgment,
and to give effect to it or not, as may be found just and equitable. However, the
general comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage
among most civilized states, by which the final judgments of foreign courts of
competent jurisdiction are reciprocally carried into execution, under certain
regulations and restrictions, which differ in different countries. Additionally,
judgments rendered in France, or in any foreign country, by the laws of which our
own judgments are reviewable upon the merits, are not entitled to full credit and
conclusive effect when sued upon in this country, but are prima facie evidence
only of the justice of the plaintiffs’ claim. Reversed.

Dissent
(Fuller, C.J.) The doctrine of res judicata should be applicable to domestic
judgments as well as to foreign judgments, and rests on the same general
ground of public policy that there should be an end of litigation.

Gemperle vs. Schenker

Facts:

This case was the result of William Gemperle’s retaliatory act when
respondent spouses Paul and Helen Schenker filed a case against him for the
enforcement of Schenker's allegedly initial subscription to the shares of stock of the
Philippines-Swiss Trading Co., Inc. and the exercise of his alleged pre-emptive rights
to the then unissued original capital stock of said corporation and the increase
thereof, as well as for an accounting and damages. Petitioner alleged that the said
complaint tainted his name as a businessman. He then filed a complaint for damages
and prays for the retraction of statements made by Helen Schenker.
Summons was personally served to Helen Schenker but not to Paul Schenker.
Helen then filed an answer with a counterclaim, but Paul Schenker filed a motion to
dismiss arguing that the court never acquired jurisdiction over his person since
admittedly, he is a Swiss citizen, residing in Zurich, Switzerland, and has not been
actually served with summons in the Philippines.

Issue:

Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Paul Schenker.

Ruling:

Yes, although as a rule, when the defendant is a non-resident and in an accion

in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be acquired only
through voluntary appearance or personal service of summons. But this case is an
exception to the said rule. The Supreme ratiocinated:

“We hold that the lower court had acquired jurisdiction over said defendant,
through service of the summons addressed to him upon Mrs. Schenker, it appearing
from said answer that she is the representative and attorney-in-fact of her husband
aforementioned civil case No. Q-2796, which apparently was filed at her behest, in
her aforementioned representative capacity. In other words, Mrs. Schenker had
authority to sue, and had actually sued on behalf of her husband, so that she was,
also, empowered to represent him in suits filed against him, particularly in a case,
like the of the one at bar, which is consequence of the action brought by her on his
behalf.”

Briefly, in an accion in personam where the defendant is a non-resident, substituted

service of summons does not apply. However, by way of exception, substituted
service of summons may be effected, if the following requisites are present:

1. The summons is served to the spouse of the defendant

2. The spouse must be residing in the Philippines

3. The spouse is appointed as attorney-in-fact of the spouse defendant in a
previous case involving the non-resident spouse.

BELEN V. CHAVEZ, G.R. NO 175334 (2008)


FACTS: Spouses Pacleb (private respondents) filed an action for the enforcement of a
foreign judgment against spouses Belen (petitioners). The complaint alleged that the
Pacleb secured a judgment by default rendered by Judge John W. Green of the Superior
Court of the State of California, which ordered the spouses Belen to pay $56,204.69
representing loan repayment and share in the profits plus interest and costs of suit. The
summons was served on the Belen’s address in Laguna, as was alleged in the
complaint, and received by Marcelo M. Belen.

1. Spouses Belen filed an answer alleging that they were actually residents of California
and that their liability had already been extinguished via a release abstract
judgment issued in the collection case abroad. 


2. For failure to attend the pre-trial conference, the RTC ordered the ex parte
presentation of evidence for Pacleb. 


3. Belen subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss citing the judgment of dismissal issued
by the Superior Court of California; however the MTD was dismissed for failure to
submit a copy of the judgment of dismissal 


4. Spouses Pacleb, for their part, filed for the amendment of the complaint, stating that
they withdrew the complaint (in California) because of the prohibitive cost of
litigation. 


5. For failure of spouses Belen to appear in the rescheduled pre-trial conference, RTC
declared Belen in default and allowed the presentation of ex parte evidence. In
the meantime, the counsel (Alcantara) of petitioners died without the RTC being
informed of such fact. The RTC ruled against Belen and ordered them to pay
Pacleb 


6. A copy of the decision was sent to Atty. Alcantara but was returned with the notation
“addressee deceased.” A copy of the same was then sent to the last known
address of spouses Belen in Laguna. Atty. Culvera, the new counsel of spouses
Belen, filed a motion to quash the Writ of Execution as well as a notice of appeal.
The RTC denied the same. 


7. Petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari (Rule 65) alleging that CA committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to quash the writ of
execution and notice of appeal despite sufficient legal bases in support thereof. 


ISSUE: WON the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners through
either the proper service of summons or the appearance of Atty. Alcantara on behalf of
petitioners

HELD: Yes.
As a rule, if defendants have not been summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over
their person, and a judgment rendered against them is null and void. To be bound by a
decision, a party should first be subject to the court’s jurisdiction.
 . Jurisdiction over the
person of a resident Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the
complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired
either through the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance
in court and their submission to its authority. In an action in personam, jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case
defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service
of summons as provided under Sec 7, Rule 14 ROC. If he cannot be personally served
with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be made in accordance
with Sec 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country, any of the following
modes of service may be resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in Sec 8; (2)
personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also
with leave of court; or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.

In an action in personam wherein the defendant is a non-resident who does not

voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court, personal service of summons
within the state is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over her person. This method
of service is possible if such defendant is physically present in the country. If he is not
found therein, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot
validly try and decide the case against him. An exception was laid down in Gemperle v.
Schenker wherein a non-resident was served with summons through his wife, who was a
resident of the Philippines and who was his representative and attorney-in-fact in a prior
civil case filed by him; moreover, the second case was a mere offshoot of the first case.

CAB: the records of the case reveal that spouses Belen were permanent residents of
California. It has been consistently maintained that they were not physically resent in the
Philippines.

The running of the fifteen-day period for appeal did not commence upon the service of
the RTC decision at the address on record of Atty. Alcantara or at the Laguna address. It
is deemed served on petitioners only upon its receipt by Atty. Culvera on 29 December
2003. Therefore, the filing of the Notice of Appeal on 06 January 2004 is within the
reglementary period and should be given due course.

Pennoyer vs Neff

Facts. Mitchell, a lawyer, sued Defendant, his client, in Oregon state court for
unpaid legal fees. At the time Defendant was a non-resident of the state who was
not personally served with process. Constructive service was issued upon
Defendant by publication. Defendant did not come to court or otherwise resist the
lawsuit, and default judgment was entered against him. After the default
judgment, Defendant acquired 300 acres of land in Oregon. To satisfy his
judgment against Defendant, Mitchell had the sheriff seize and sell Defendant’s
land. The land was purchased by Plaintiff, who received a sheriff’s deed as
evidence of title. The sheriff then turned the sale proceeds over to Mitchell.
Shortly after the sheriff’s sale, Defendant discovered what had happened to his
land and brought suit against Plaintiff to recover the land. This appeal followed
after Defendant lost his suit against Plaintiff.
Issue. Can judgments obtained against non-residents who fail to appear in court
be sustained by default judgments where service of process is accomplished
solely through publication (i.e. constructive service)?
Is constructive service sufficient notice to attach property within the forum state
owned by a non-resident?

Held. No. The personal judgment recovered in the state court of Oregon against
Plaintiff was without validity, and the decision of the Court of Appeals overturning
that judgment was affirmed.
When a suit is merely in personam (i.e. against a person), constructive service
through publication upon a non-resident is ineffective.

No state can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property
without its territory. However, a state may subject property within its boundaries
to the payments of its citizens, even when the land is owned by a non-resident,
without infringing upon the sovereignty of the state of residency of the landowner.

Discussion. Here the Supreme Court of the United States is distinguishing

between suits in personam, and in rem. An in personam suit is a suit against a
person, whose purpose is to determine the personal rights and obligations of the
defendant. An in rem action, meanwhile, is an action where jurisdiction pertains
to property. Thus the court reasoned that constructive service is sufficient to
inform parties of action taken against any properties owned by them within the
forum state, because property is always in possession of the owner, and seizure
of the property will inform the owner of legal action taken against him.

Imternatonal Shoe v Washington

Facts. International Shoe Co., Defendant, was a company based in Delaware

with an office in St. Louis, Missouri. Defendant employed salesmen that resided
in Washington to sell their product in the state of Washington. Defendant
regularly shipped orders to the salesmen who accepted them, the salesmen
would display the products at places in Washington, and the salesmen were
compensated by commission for sale of the products. The salesmen were also
reimbursed for the cost of renting the places of business in Washington.
Washington sued Defendant after Defendant failed to make contributions to an
unemployment compensation fund exacted by state statutes. The Washington
statute said that the commissioner could issue personal service if Defendant was
found within the state, or by mailing it to Defendant if Defendant was not in the
state. The notice of assessment was served upon Defendant’s salesperson and
a copy of the notice was mailed to Defendant. Defendant appeared specially,
moving to set aside the order that service upon the salesperson was proper
service. Defendant also argued that it did not “do business”�in the state, that
there was no agent upon which service could be made, and that Defendant did
not furnish employment within the meaning of the statute. Defendant also argued
that the statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and imposed a prohibitive burden of interstate commerce. The trial court found
for Washington and the Supreme Court of Washington affirmed, reasoning that
the continuous flow of Defendant’s product into Washington was sufficient to
establish personal jurisdiction. Defendant appealed.

Issue. Is service of process upon Defendant’s agent sufficient notice when the
corporation’s activities result in a large volume of interstate business so that the
corporation receives the protection of the laws of the state and the suit is related
to the activities which make the corporation present?

Held. Yes. Affirmed. The general rule is that in order to have jurisdiction with
someone outside the state, the person must have certain minimum contacts with
it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice. For a corporation, the “minimum contacts”�required
are not just continuous and systematic activities but also those that give rise to
the liabilities sued on. Defendant could have sued someone in Washington. It
was afforded the protection of the laws of that state, and therefore it should be
subject to suit.

Dissent. The state’s power to tax should not be qualified by an ambiguous

statement regarding fair play and substantial justice.

Discussion. This decision articulates the rule for determining whether a state
has personal jurisdiction over an absent defendant via the “minimum contacts”�
test. In general, International Shoe demonstrates that contacts with a state
should be evaluated in terms of how “fair”�it would be to exercise jurisdiction
over an absent defendant.

Mullane v Central Hanover trust and bank

Facts. Appellee, Central Hanover Bank & Trust, set up common fund pursuant to
a New York statute allowing the creation of common funds for distribution of
judicial settlement trusts. There were 113 participating trusts. Appellee petitioned
for settlement of its first account as common trustee. Some of the beneficiaries
were not residents of New York. “Notice”�was by publication for four weeks in a
local newspaper. Appellee had notified those people by mail that were of full age
and sound mind who would be entitled to share in the principal if the interest they
held became distributable. Appellant was appointed as special guardian and
attorney for all persons known or unknown not otherwise appearing who had or
might thereafter have any interest in the income of the common trust fund.
Appellee was appointed to represent those interested in the principal. Appellant
appeared specially, objecting that notice by publication, permitted under the
applicable statute was inadequate to afford t
he beneficiaries due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and that
therefore jurisdiction was lacking.

Issue. Is notice by publication of a judicial settlement to unknown beneficiaries of

a common trust reasonable notice under the due process requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment?
Is notice by publication to all of the beneficiaries of a common trust whose
residences are known reasonable notice under the due process requirements of
the Fourteenth Amendment?

Held. First issue: Yyes. Second issue: Nno.

Whether or not the action is in personam or in rem, the court can determine the
interests of all claimants as long as there is a procedure allowing for notice and
an opportunity to be heard.

There has to be notice and opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of
the case. The claimants at issue could potentially be deprived of property here,
as the proposed disposition cuts off their rights to sue for negligent or illegal
impairments of their interests. In addition, the court’s decision appoints someone
who, without their knowledge, could use the trust to obtain the fees and
expenses necessary for a sham proceeding.

There need not be personal service because the state has an interest in settling
trusts. “Notice has to be reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pending action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections.”�You do not have to notify all the beneficiaries when
the trust concerns many small interests. Sending notice to most of them will
protect their interests sufficiently.

The New York Banking Law, however, that does not require notice to all persons
whose whereabouts are known, violates the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because contacting beneficiaries by mail at their last
known address is not particularly burdensome.

Dissent. Justice Burton: Omitted from casebook.

Discussion. The majority’s opinion illustrates that notice by publication will not
suffice only because it would be burdensome for the plaintiff to notify all parties
involved. If the plaintiff knows of a way to contact the parties, then the plaintiff
must bear that expense. Mailing notice to an address, if known, will suffice.
Notice by publication will suffice only if there is no practical way of knowing the
identity or location of the party.

Shaffer v Heitner
acts. Plaintiff, a stockholder for Greyhound Corp., a company incorporated in
Delaware with its principal place of business in Arizona, sued Greyhound Corp.,
Greyhound Lines, Inc., (a subsidiary of Greyhound Corp.) and present and
former officers of the two companies for violating duties to Greyhound Corp. by
causing it to be liable for damages in an antitrust suit and a fine in a criminal
contempt action in Oregon. Plaintiff filed a motion for sequestration of the
officers’ stock. Under a Delaware statute, Delaware is the situs of all stock in
Delaware corporations. The stock was seized. Defendants were notified by
certified mail of the sequestration and notice was published in a Delaware
newspaper. Defendants entered a special appearance so they could move to
quash service of process and vacate the sequestration order. Defendant argued
that the order violated due process and therefore the property could not be
attached in Delaware. In addition, Defendants argued that they did not have the
minimum contacts with Delaware required to establish jurisdiction under
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95
(1945). In addition, Defendants argued that the sequestration procedures were
inconsistent with the Sniadach cases (see Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,
395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969)). The Court of Chancery
found for Plaintiff and the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the Court of
Chancery. The Supreme Court of Delaware reasoned that the Sniadach cases
involved default judgments and not compelling a party to appear. This court
furthered reasoned that sequestration procedures help to adjudicate claims of
mismanagement against Delaware companies, and do not cause permanent
deprivation of property to their shareholders. Defendants appealed.

Issue. In order for the forum state to exercise in rem jurisdiction on a

nonresident, must the nonresident have minimum contacts with the forum state
such that the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the benefits of that
state’s laws? If so, must the cause of action be sufficiently related to the contacts
the nonresident has with the forum state?

Held. Yes to both. Judgment reversed. In rem is not a proceeding against the
property, it is a proceeding against a person’s interest in the property. You need
to give an owner of property reasonable and appropriate notice of an in rem
proceeding so that he or she recognizes that such a proceeding directly affects
his or her interests. Having property in a state does not give the state jurisdiction
over causes of action unrelated to the property unless the person also passes
the minimum contacts test articulated in the International Shoe decision. If it is
unconstitutional to exercise jurisdiction over the person directly then it should be
unconstitutional to assert jurisdiction indirectly. Plaintiff’s argument that Delaware
has an interest in asserting jurisdiction over corporate fiduciaries is not
established by Delaware law. Delaware law determines that it has jurisdiction
over Defendants because Defendants’ property is in Delaware; and not due to
their status as corporate fiduciaries. First, the statute authorizing jurisdiction does
not specifically apply to stockholder derivative actions. Moreover, Plaintiff’s
inability to secure jurisdiction over seven of the defendants because they didn’t
have property in Delaware shows that there is no necessary relationship between
corporate fiduciaries and stockholders. In addition, Plaintiff has not demonstrated
that Delaware is a fair forum. Plaintiff must demonstrate more than the
applicability of Delaware’s laws to the controversy to establish a basis for
jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants have received benefits from
Delaware laws only demonstrates that it would be appropriate for Delaware law
to govern obligations between Defendant and stockholders. This argument does
not require that Delaware be permitted to exercise jurisdiction, especially
considering its lack of a long-arm statute. Concurrence. Justice Stevens: The
majority should not broadly eliminate in rem jurisdiction by stating that there is no
personal jurisdiction if the only contact the defendant has with the forum state is
property located in the state. There are other means of acquiring jurisdiction over
local actions that may be unintentionally limited by this broad language. Justice
Brennan (concurring in part and dissenting in part): The Delaware sequestration
statute embodies quasi in rem jurisdiction that is no longer valid. The parties did
not make the minimum contacts test an issue so the court should not have
decided this issue. There is no proper factual record for determining the level of
contacts in this case. This is also a constitutional question, and this decision will
reach to all the state statutes that permit quasi in rem action through
sequestration of property. The general rule is that the forum state has jurisdiction
over the directors and officers of a corporation chartered by the state in a
shareholder derivative action. A state’s valid substantive interests are
considerations in assessing the constitutionality of exercising jurisdiction.
Delaware has interests in preventing local corporations from being victims of
foreign stockholders and in regulating its own corporations. In addition,
jurisdiction can be based on out-of-state activities that have foreseeable effects
in the forum state. Delaware’s failure to express an interest in corporate
fiduciaries does not pertain to the minimum contacts analysis. In addition, there
was purposeful availment of the forum’s laws because the corporate officers
entered business relationships with Greyhound’s stockholders pursuant to the
laws of Delaware.

Discussion. As the concurring opinions illustrate, it is highly unlikely a court has

personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant that is absent from the forum
state when the only contact is property owned by the defendant located within
the forum state. Even if the property is connected to the suit, minimum contacts
must still be established in compliance with the International Shoe test.

PERKINS VS. ROXAS

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
IDONAH PERKINS vs. ROXAS ET AL.
GRN 47517, June 27, 1941

FACTS:
July 5, 1938, respondent Eugene Perkins filed a complaint in the CFI- Manila against
the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company for the recovery of a sum consisting of
dividends which have been declared and made payable on shares of stock registered
in his name, payment of which was being withheld by the company, and for the
recognition of his right to the control and disposal of said shares to the exclusion of
all others. The company alleged, by way of defense that the withholding of plaintiff’s
right to the disposal and control of the shares was due to certain demands made
with respect to said shares by the petitioner Idonah Perkins, and by one Engelhard.

Eugene Perkins included in his modified complaint as parties defendants petitioner,

Idonah Perkins, and Engelhard. Eugene Perkins prayed that petitioner Idonah
Perkins and H. Engelhard be adjudged without interest in the shares of stock in
question and excluded from any claim they assert thereon. Summons by publication
were served upon the nonresident defendants Idonah Perkins and Engelhard.
Engelhard filed his answer. Petitioner filed her answer with a crosscomplaint in
which she sets up a judgment allegedly obtained by her against respondent Eugene
Perkins, from the SC of the State of New York, wherein it is declared that she is the
sole legal owner and entitled to the possession and control of the shares of stock in
question with all the cash dividends declared thereon by the Benguet Consolidated
Mining Company.

Idonah Perkins filed a demurrer thereto on the ground that “the court has no
jurisdiction of the subject of the action,” because the alleged judgment of the SC of
the State of New York is res judicata. Petitioner’s demurrer was overruled, thus this
petition.

ISSUE:
WON in view of the alleged judgment entered in favor of the petitioner by the SC of
New York and which is claimed by her to be res judicata on all questions raised by
the respondent, Eugene Perkins, the local court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action.

RULING:
By jurisdiction over the subject matter is meant the nature of the cause of action and
of the relief sought, and this is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes
the court, and is to be sought for in general nature of its powers, or in authority
specially conferred. In the present case, the amended complaint filed by the
respondent, Eugene Perkins alleged calls for the adjudication of title to certain
shares of stock of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and the granting of
affirmative reliefs, which fall within the general jurisdiction of the CFI- Manila.
Similarly CFI- Manila is empowered to adjudicate the several demands contained in
petitioner’s crosscomplaint.

Idonah Perkins in her crosscomplaint brought suit against Eugene Perkins and the
Benguet Consolidated Mining Company upon the alleged judgment of the SC of the
State of New York and asked the court below to render judgment enforcing that New
York judgment, and to issue execution thereon. This is a form of action recognized
by section 309 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 47, Rule 39, Rules of
Court) and which falls within the general jurisdiction of the CFI- Manila, to
adjudicate, settle and determine.

The petitioner expresses the fear that the respondent judge may render judgment
“annulling the final, subsisting, valid judgment rendered and entered in this
petitioner’s favor by the courts of the State of New York, which decision is res
judicata on all the questions constituting the subject matter of civil case” and argues
on the assumption that the respondent judge is without jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the cause. Whether or not the respondent judge in the course of the
proceedings will give validity and efficacy to the New York judgment set up by the
petitioner in her cross-complaint is a question that goes to the merits of the
controversy and relates to the rights of the parties as between each other, and not to
the jurisdiction or power of the court. The test of jurisdiction is whether or not the
tribunal has power to enter upon the inquiry, not whether its conclusion in the
course of it is right or wrong. If its decision is erroneous, its judgment can be
reversed on appeal; but its determination of the question, which the petitioner here
anticipates and seeks to prevent, is the exercise by that court and the rightful
exercise of its jurisdiction.

Petition denied.

Heine v. New York Life Insurance Company

Facts
The New York Life Insurance Company and the Guardian Insurance Company ("the
insurance companies") were corporations created in New York, USA. As conditions
to be allowed to conduct business in Germany, they were made to agree to be
supervised by German authorities, to invest the proceeds of policies in German
securities, and to establish a local agency to whom summons may be served. The
insurance companies were later sued before courts in both the US and Germany for
the recovery on some 240 life insurance policies issued in Germany to German
nationals, payable in German currency.

Arguments for the Plaintiff

As the US courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, they have
no choice but to try the case.

Issue
Whether or not the US courts may dismiss the case on the ground of forum non
conveniens.

Held
Yes. Under the circumstances, the case may be more suitably tried before German
courts.
Ratio Decidendi
The courts in both jurisdictions are competent to try the case and summons may be
served upon the insurance companies in both jurisdictions. Requiring the insurance
companies to defend their interests in the US would subject them to great and
unnecessary inconvenience and expenses, including the possibility of having to
bring documentary evidence all the way from their office in Germany. Moreover,
trying the case in the US additionally burden the courts in that jurisdiction, to the
detriment of other litigants. The assumption of jurisdiction over a case the cause of
action of which arose from another jurisdiction and wherein both parties are non-
residents is discretionary upon the court.

In Re: Union Carbide Gas Plant Disaster

Facts
On the night of 23 December 1984, a gas leak occurred at the pesticide plant of
Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) in Bhopal, India resulting in the deaths of more
than 2,000 people and injuries to more than 200,000 others. . Thereafter, the India
passed a law giving the Indian government the exclusive right to represent the
victims of the disaster. As thus, the Indian government filed a complaint before a
New York district court. The Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens and lack of personality. The district
court granted the motion on three conditions, namely, that UCC: (1) consent to the
jurisdiction of Indian courts and waive defenses based on the Statute of Limitations;
(2) agree to the satisfy the judgement of the Indian court, provided it complied with
the requirements of due process; and (3) be subject to discovery under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure of the US. Consequently, the Indian government filed sued
the UCIL and the UCC before the a district court in India. The UCC appealed the
conditions.

Arguments for the Defendant

While Indian courts may provide an adequate alternative forum, they adhere to
standards of due process much lower than that followed in the US. Hence, US courts
must supervise the proceedings before Indian courts.

Issue
Whether or not the dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens is proper.

Held
Yes. The Indian courts are adequate alternative fora.

Ratio Decidendi
Almost all of the estimated 200,000 plaintiffs are citizens and residents of India who
have revoked their representation by an American counsel in favor of the Indian
government, which now prefers Indian courts. Further, the UCC has already
consented to the assumption of jurisdiction by the Indian courts. All the witnesses
and evidence are likewise in India.
As to the conditions, the first is valid in order to secure the viability of the Indian
courts as alternate fora. The second is problematic as it gives the impression that
foreign judgments the UCC's consent is necessary in order for the judgement of the
Indian courts to be enforceable in New York. The laws of New York, in fact,
recognizes that a judgment rendered by a foreign court may be enforced in that
State except if such judgment was rendered in violation of due process or without
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The request of UCC of supervision by
US courts of Indian courts is untenable. The power of US courts cannot extend
beyond their territorial jurisdiction. Moreover, once US courts dismiss a case on the
ground of forum non conveniens, they lose any further jurisdiction over the case,
except in case of an action for enforcement later on. Denial of due process may,
however, constitute a defense against the enforcement of the Indian judgment. The
third condition is likewise invalid. Basic justice dictates that both parties must be
given equal access to evidence in each other's possession. Hence, both parties
maybe subjected to the modes of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure on equal terms subject to approval by Indian courts.

Crescent petroleum vs Mv lok maheshwari

RESCENT PETROLEUM, LTD.,

Petitioner, vs. M/V "LOK
MAHESHWARI," THE SHIPPING
CORPORATION OF INDIA, and
PORTSERV LIMITED
G.R. No. 155014 November 11, 2005
FACTS:
Respondent M/V "Lok Maheshwari" (Vessel) is an oceangoing vessel
of Indian registry that is owned by respondent Shipping Corporation of
India (SCI), a corporation organized and existing under the laws of India
and principally owned by the Government of India. It was time-chartered by
respondent SCI to Halla Merchant Marine Co. Ltd. (Halla), a South Korean
company. Halla, in turn, sub-chartered the Vessel through a time charter to
Transmar Shipping, Inc. (Transmar). Transmar further sub-chartered the
Vessel to Portserv Limited (Portserv). Both Transmar and Portserv are
corporations organized and existing under the laws of Canada.
On or about November 1, 1995, Portserv requested petitioner
Crescent Petroleum, Ltd. (Crescent), a corporation organized and existing
under the laws of Canada that is engaged in the business of selling
petroleum and oil products for the use and operation of oceangoing
vessels, to deliver marine fuel oils (bunker fuels) to the Vessel. Petitioner
Crescent granted and confirmed the request through an advice via
facsimile dated November 2, 1995. As security for the payment of the
bunker fuels and related services, petitioner Crescent received two (2)
checks in the amounts of US$100,000.00 and US$200,000.00. Thus,
petitioner Crescent contracted with its supplier, Marine Petrobulk Limited
(Marine Petrobulk), another Canadian corporation, for the physical delivery
of the bunker fuels to the Vessel.
On or about November 4, 1995, Marine Petrobulk delivered the
bunker fuels amounting to US$103,544 inclusive of barging and demurrage
charges to the Vessel at the port of Pioneer Grain, Vancouver, Canada. The
Chief Engineer Officer of the Vessel duly acknowledged and received the
delivery receipt. Marine Petrobulk issued an invoice to petitioner Crescent
for the US$101,400.00 worth of the bunker fuels. Petitioner Crescent issued
a check for the same amount in favor of Marine Petrobulk, which check was
duly encashed.
Having paid Marine Petrobulk, petitioner Crescent issued a revised
invoice dated November 21, 1995 to "Portserv Limited, and/or the Master,
and/or Owners, and/or Operators, and/or Charterers of M/V ‘Lok
Maheshwari’" in the amount of US$103,544.00 with instruction to remit the
amount on or before December 1, 1995. The period lapsed and several
demands were made but no payment was received. Also, the checks issued
to petitioner Crescent as security for the payment of the bunker fuels were
dishonored for insufficiency of funds. As a consequence, petitioner
Crescent incurred additional expenses of US$8,572.61 for interest, tracking
fees, and legal fees.
On May 2, 1996, while the Vessel was docked at the port of Cebu
City, petitioner Crescent instituted before the RTC of Cebu City an action
"for a sum of money with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary attachment" against respondents Vessel and SCI, Portserv
and/or Transmar.
On May 3, 1996, the trial court issued a writ of attachment against the
Vessel with bond at P2,710,000.00. Petitioner Crescent withdrew its prayer
for a temporary restraining order and posted the required bond.
On May 18, 1996, summonses were served to respondents Vessel
and SCI, and Portserv and/or Transmar through the Master of the Vessel.
On May 28, 1996, respondents Vessel and SCI, through Pioneer Insurance
and Surety Corporation (Pioneer), filed an urgent ex-parte motion to
approve Pioneer’s letter of undertaking, to consider it as counter-bond and
to discharge the attachment. On May 29, 1996, the trial court granted the
motion; thus, the letter of undertaking was approved as counter-bond to
discharge the attachment.
ISSUE:
Whether the Philippine court has or will exercise jurisdiction and entitled to
maritime lien under our laws on foreign vessel docked on Philippine port
and supplies furnished to a vessel in a foreign port?
RULING:
In a suit to establish and enforce a maritime lien for supplies
furnished to a vessel in a foreign port, whether such lien exists, or whether
the court has or will exercise jurisdiction, depends on the law of the
country where the supplies were furnished, which must be pleaded and
proved.
The Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis trilogy of cases, which replaced such
single-factor methodologies as the law of the place of supply. The multiple-
contact test to determine, in the absence of a specific Congressional
directive as to the statute’s reach, which jurisdiction’s law should be
applied. The following factors were considered: (1) place of the wrongful
act; (2) law of the flag; (3) allegiance or domicile of the injured; (4)
allegiance of the defendant shipowner; (5) place of contract; (6)
inaccessibility of foreign forum; and (7) law of the forum. This is applicable
not only to personal injury claims arising under the Jones Act but to all
matters arising under maritime law in general
The Court cannot sustain petitioner Crescent’s insistence on the
application of P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 and hold
that a maritime lien exists. Out of the seven basic factors listed in the case
of Lauritzen, Philippine law only falls under one – the law of the forum. All
other elements are foreign – Canada is the place of the wrongful act, of the
allegiance or domicile of the injured and the place of contract; India is the
law of the flag and the allegiance of the defendant shipowner. Applying
P.D. No. 1521,a maritime lien exists would not promote the public policy
behind the enactment of the law to develop the domestic shipping industry.
Opening up our courts to foreign suppliers by granting them a maritime
lien under our laws even if they are not entitled to a maritime lien under
their laws will encourage forum shopping. In light of the interests of the
various foreign elements involved, it is clear that Canada has the most
significant interest in this dispute. The injured party is a Canadian
corporation, the sub-charterer which placed the orders for the supplies is
also Canadian, the entity which physically delivered the bunker fuels is in
Canada, the place of contracting and negotiation is in Canada, and the
supplies were delivered in Canada.

WING ON COMPANY V. SYYAP

-Wing On Company incorporated in NY
-Syyap Co., Inc. incorporated in RP
-contract entered in NY:
for the purchase of clothing material, w/ verbal agreement that Syyap would pay Wing On
the value of the clothing material, then after the sale, the profits would be divided between
them
-clothing materials worth $22,246.04 shipped from NY to RP
-only $3,530.04 paid. Syyap failed to settle debt and account for profits.
-Wing On Company sued Syyap in RP.
TC: for Wing On
Arguments of Syyap:
(1) no jurisdiction: Wing On is not licensed to do business in RP, no legal capacity to sue
(2) should have declined jurisdiction: forum non conveniens
HELD
Affirm!
On Forum non Conveniens
WHEN COURT WOULD DECLINE JURISDICTION BASED ON FOUM NON
CONVENIENS
-Unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum
should rarely be disturbed
-Consideration of inadequacy to enforce the judgment
HERE: Defendant in the Philippines. So for the court to assume jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, RP Court is the convenient forum.
-the present suit is a PERSONAL ACTION, the case may be commenced and tried where
the defendant resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff resides, at the election of the
plaintiff.
Summary: should consider both public and private interests
Private interests:
*relative ease of access to source of proof
*Availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses
*cost of obtaining and attendance off willing witnesses
*possibility of viewing the premises if appropriate
*all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive
Public Interest
*administrative difficulties encountered when courts are congested
*jury duty: burden on community
*appropriateness of having the trial in a court that is familiar with the applicable state
law rather than getting another forum enmeshed in a complicated conflict-of-laws
problem
WHEN CAN'T REFUSE TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION:
*when the forum is the only state where jurisdiction over defendant can be obtained
*when the forum provides procedural remedies not available in another state
2. ASSUME JURISDICTION
GR: apply law of the forum
1. A specific law of the forum decrees that internal law should apply
Civil Code
Article 16: makes real and personal proerty subject to the law of the country where they
are situated
Intestate and testamentary succession: governed by lex nationale of the person whose
succession is under consideration
Article 829: makes revocation done outside the Philippines valid according to the law of
the place where the will was made or lex domicilli
Article 819: prohibits Filipinos from making joint wills even if valid in the country where
they were executed
2. The proper foreign law was not properly pleaded and proved
-no Judicial notice of foreign law
Relevant rules of evidence:
 To prove written foreign law: follow requirements in Sec 24-25, Rule 132
 May be subject of judicial admission
 Processual presumption - no proof nor admission, foreign law presumed to be the same
as that in the Philippines
Rule 132
Section 19 - CLASSES OF DOCUMENTS
For the purpose of their presentation evidence,
documents are either public or private.
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS are:
a. The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;
b. Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and
c. Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to
the entered therein.
All other writings are PRIVATE.
Section 24 - PROOF OF OFFICIAL RECORD
The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19,
when admissible for any purpose,
may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy,
and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,
with a certificate that such officer has the custody.
If the office in which the record is kept is in foreign country,
the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept,
and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Section 25 - WHAT ATTESTATION OF COPY MUST STATE
Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested
for the purpose of evidence,
the attestation must state, in substance,
that the copy is a correct copy of the original,
or a specific part thereof, as the case may be.
The attestation must be
under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or
if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
…
To prove unwritten foreign law – Sec 46, Rule 130
Section 46 - LEARNED TREATISES
A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, law, science, or art
is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the court takes
judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies, that the writer of the
statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or
calling as expert in the subject.
 Requisites:
1. The court takes judicial notice thereof
2. The same is testified to by a witness expert in the subject
 CA took judicial notice of the Ballantyne Scale of Values[1]
Legal treatises also included
FLEUMER V. HIX
FACTS:
-Fleumer, the special administrator of Hix, presented the latter's will for probate in the
Philippines
-the will did not show the following:
*acknowledgment by Hix in the presence of 2 competent witnesses
*W subscribed to will in presence of testator, and of each other
-Fleumer wanted to present the said will, executed in West Virginia by Hix who was
residing at the time there, in RP
(not sure): Fleumer alleges that under W. Virginia law, will is duly executed
TO PROVE W. Virginia law: submitted a copy of Section 3868 of Act 1882 as found in
West Virginia Code + Certified by the Director of our National Library
HELD: Should prove foreign law first before courts of RP take cognizance
-no judicial notice, foreign laws must be proved as facts
HERE:
-no showing that the book from which an extract was taken was printed or published under
the authority of the State of West Virginia
-No attestation by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the seal
of the State of West Virginia (Section 301, Code of Civil Procedure back then? Now
R132.24-25)
-no evidence to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the
time the alleged will was executed
+
Due execution of the will was not established: only showed testimony of the petitioner
PHILIPPINE TRUST CO. V. BOHANAN
FACTS
-C.O. Bohanan, citizen of Nevada, died with a Will.
-Philippine Trust Co. was named executer of the will
-Will gave to *a grandson: P90,819.67 of the P211,639 + 1/2 of all shares of stock of
several mining companies
*brother and sister: 1/2 of all shares of stock of several mining companies
*Only P6k was left to each of his children
-widow and 2 children of C.O. Bohanan questioned the validity of the will in the hearing
for the project of partition (will already admitted)
HELD: Even if Nevada law not proved in this stage of the proceeding, it was taken
judicial notice of because Philippine Trust Co. already produced Section 9905 of the
Compiled Nevada laws twice before the courts below. As Nevada law does not impose
compulsory heirs, project partition valid
Discussion
-Old Civil Law applicable: died 1944 while NCC applied 1945
Old civil code provides that the ff would be governed by the national law of the person
whose succession is in order:
*order of succession
*extent of successional rights
*intrinsic validity of provisions of the will
-Here, CO Bohanan was a NEVADAn citizen.
-Nevada laws allow a testator to dispose of all his properties by will.
-to prove foreign law:
Section 41: an official record/entry…may be evidenced by
*official publication
*copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy + (if not
kept in RP) certificate that such officer has custody
-HOW NEVADA LAW recognized
>During the October 1954 hearing of the Motion of Magdalena Bohanan for withdrawal
of ther P20k share, Nevada Law was introduced as Exhibit 2
>During the January 1950 hearing, law was presented as Exhibit B
>Children and widow did not dispute the provisions of the laws of State of Nevada
>>>SO HERE, court decided to take judicial notice of the Nevada law, as presented in the
earlier stages of the case
 The case falls under any of the exceptions to the application of foreign law:
...when foreign law is
(1) contrary to an important public policy of the forum
(2) penal in nature
(3) procedural in nature
 (4) purely fiscal/administrative in nature
(5) (will) work undeniable injustice to the citizens of the forum
(6) case involves real/personal property situated in theforum
(7) application of foreign law might endanger vital interest of the state (forum)
(8) contrary to good morals

Saudi Arabian Airlines v Resbescencio

The Facts of the Case.

In this case, Respondents (complainants before the Labor Arbiter) were recruited
and hired by Saudia as Temporary Flight Attendants with the accreditation and
approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. After undergoing
seminars required by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration for
deployment overseas, as well as training modules offered by Saudia (e.g., initial flight
attendant/training course and transition training), and after working as Temporary
Flight Attendants, respondents became Permanent Flight Attendants. They then
entered into Cabin Attendant contracts with Saudia: Ma. Jopette M. Rebesencio (Ma.
Jopette) on May 16, 1990; Montassah B. Sacar-Adiong (Montassah) and Rouen Ruth
A. Cristobal (Rouen Ruth) on May 22, 1993; and Loraine Schneider-Cruz (Loraine)
on August 27, 1995.

Respondents continued their employment with Saudia until they were separated
from service on various dates in 2006. Respondents contended that the termination
of their employment was illegal. They alleged that the termination was made solely
because they were pregnant.

Saudia anchored its disapproval of respondents’ maternity leaves and demand for
their resignation on its “Unified Employment Contract for Female Cabin Attendants”
(Unified Contract). Under the Unified Contract, the employment of a Flight
Attendant who becomes pregnant is rendered void. It provides:

(H) Due to the essential nature of the Air Hostess functions to be physically fit on
board to provide various services required in normal or emergency cases on both
domestic/international flights beside her role in maintaining continuous safety and
security of passengers, and since she will not be able to maintain the required
medical fitness while at work in case of pregnancy, accordingly, if the
Air Hostess becomes pregnant at any time during the term of this
contract, this shall render her employment contract as void and she
will be terminated due to lack of medical fitness.(Emphasis supplied)

On November 8, 2007, respondents filed a Complaint against Saudia and its officers
for illegal dismissal and for underpayment of salary, overtime pay, premium pay for
holiday, rest day, premium, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, separation
pay, night shift differentials, medical expense reimbursements, retirement benefits,
illegal deduction, lay-over expense and allowances, moral and exemplary damages,
and attorney’s fees.
The issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not there was an illegal
dismissal of the respondents?

The Supreme Court's Decision.

Yes, the respondents were illegally dismissed.

The initial issue here was whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over
the case. Petitioner Saudia states that the Philippine courts have no jurisdiction and
that the law that should be applied in the instant case is Saudi Arabia law. The Court
stated that this is incorrect. The Court has jurisdiction in this case.

The Court stated in the case;

Saudia asserts that stipulations set in the Cabin Attendant contracts require the
application of the laws of Saudi Arabia. It insists that the need to comply with these
stipulations calls into operation the doctrine of forum non conveniens and, in turn,
makes it necessary for Philippine tribunals to refrain from exercising
jurisdiction. Forum non conveniens, like the rules of forum shopping, litispendentia,
and res judicata, is a means of addressing the problem of parallel litigation. While
the rules of forum shopping, litis pendentia, and res judicata are designed to address
the problem of parallel litigation within a single jurisdiction, forum non
conveniens is a means devised to address parallel litigation arising in multiple
jurisdictions.

On the matter of pleading forum non conveniens, we state the rule, thus: Forum non
conveniens must not only be clearly pleaded as a ground for dismissal; it must be
pleaded as such at the earliest possible opportunity. Otherwise, it shall be deemed
waived.

It further stated:
Forum non conveniens finds no application and does not operate to divest Philippine
tribunals of jurisdiction and to require the application of foreign law. Saudia
invokes forum non conveniens to supposedly effectuate the stipulations of the Cabin
Attendant contracts that require the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia.

xxx

So informed and animated, we emphasize the glaringly discriminatory nature of

Saudia’s policy. As argued by respondents, Saudia’s policy entails the termination of
employment of flight attendants who become pregnant. At the risk of stating the
obvious, pregnancy is an occurrence that pertains specifically to women. Saudia’s
policy excludes from and restricts employment on the basis of no other consideration
but sex.

We do not lose sight of the reality that pregnancy does present physical limitations
that may render difficult the performance of functions associated with being a flight
attendant. Nevertheless, it would be the height of iniquity to view pregnancy as a
disability so permanent and immutable that it must entail the termination of one’s
employment. It is clear to us that any individual, regardless of gender, may be
subject to exigencies that limit the performance of functions. However, we fail to
appreciate how pregnancy could be such an impairing occurrence that it leaves no
other recourse but the complete termination of the means through which a woman
earns a living.

Oddly enough, the petitioner Saudia themselves stated that the Saudi law does not
allow the termination of employment of women who take maternity leaves;

Consistent with lex loci intentionis, to the extent that it is proper and practicable
(i.e., “to make an intelligent decision”), Philippine tribunals may apply the foreign
law selected by the parties. In fact, (albeit without meaning to make a
pronouncement on the accuracy and reliability of respondents’ citation) in this case,
respondents themselves have made averments as to the laws of Saudi Arabia. In their
Comment, respondents write:

Under the Labor Laws of Saudi Arabia and the Philippines[,] it is illegal and unlawful
to terminate the employment of any woman by virtue of pregnancy. The law in Saudi
Arabia is even more harsh and strict [sic] in that no employer can terminate the
employment of a female worker or give her a warning of the same while on Maternity
Leave, the specific provision of Saudi Labor Laws on the matter is hereto quoted as
follows: “An employer may not terminate the employment of a female worker or give
her a warning of the same while on maternity leave.” (Article 155, Labor Law of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Royal Decree No. M/51.)

The Court then decided:

WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATIONS that first, petitioner Brenda J. Betia
is not solidarily liable with petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines, and second, that
petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is liable for moral and exemplary damages. The
June 16, 2011 Decision and the September 13, 2011 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113006 are hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.
Accordingly, petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is ordered to pay respondents:
( 1) Full backwages and all other benefits computed from the respective dates in
which each of the respondents were illegally terminated until the finality of this
Decision;
(2) Separation pay computed from the respective dates in which each of the
respondents commenced employment until the finality of this Decision at the rate of
one ( 1) month's salary for every year of service, with a fraction of a year of at least six
( 6) months being counted as one ( 1) whole year;
(3) Moral damages in the amount of Pl00,000.00 per respondent;
(4) Exemplary damages in th~ amount of P200,000.00 per
respondent; and
(5) Attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total award. Interest of 6% per annum
shall likewise be imposed on the total judgment award from the finality of this
Decision until full satisfaction thereof.

This. case is REMANDED. to the Labor Arbiter to make a detailed computation of

the amounts due to respondents which petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines should pay
without delay.
GRAY v GRAY until babcok v jackson

Check book, coz net is an asshole

ALLISON G. GIBBS, PETITIONER-APPELLE, VS. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE
CITY OF MANILA, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
G.R. NO. L-35694; December 23 1933

FACTS:
1) Eva Johnson Gibbs; died intestate in Palo Alto, California on November 28,
1929. At the time of her death, she and her husband Allison Gibbs, were citizens of
the State of California and domiciled therein. Allison filed a petition with the trial
court to transfer to his name, several parcels of land located in Manila.
2) Court of First Instance of Manila, issued a final order requiring the register of
deeds of the City of Manila to cancel certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and
28331, covering lands located in the City of Manila, and issue in lieu thereof new
certificates of transfer of title in favor of Allison D. Gibbs without requiring him to
present any document showing that the succession tax due under Article XI of
Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code has been paid.
2) The said order of the court of March 10, 1931, recites that the parcels of land
covered by said certificates of title formerly belonged to the conjugal partnership of
the spouse Gibbs
3) The register of deeds of the City of Manila, declined to accept as binding said
decree of court of September 22,1930, and refused to register the transfer of title of
the said conjugal property to Allison D. Gibbs, on the ground that the corresponding
inheritance tax had not been paid citing Section 1547 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of
the Administrative Code provides in part that:
Registers of deeds shall not register in the registry of property any document
transferring real property or real rights therein or any chattel mortgage, by
way of gifts mortis causa, legacy or inheritance, unless the payment of the tax
fixed in this article and actually due thereon shall be shown. And they shall
immediately notify the Collector of Internal Revenue or the corresponding
provincial treasurer of the non payment of the tax discovered by them…
5) December 26, 1930, Allison D. Gibbs filed in the said court a petition for an
order requiring the said register of deeds “to issue the corresponding titles” to the
petitioner without requiring previous payment of any inheritance tax.
6) After due hearing of the parties, the court reaffirmed said order of September
22, 1930, and entered the order of March 10, 1931, which is under review on this
appeal.
7) The appellee contends that the law of California should determine the nature
and extent of the title, if any, that vested in Eva Johnson Gibbs under the three
certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331 above referred to, citing article 9 of
the Civil Code. But that, even if the nature and extent of her title under said
certificates be governed by the law of the Philippine Islands, the laws of California
govern the succession to such title, citing the second paragraph of article 10 of the
Civil Code
a. Article 9 of the Civil Code:
“The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and
legal capacity of persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside
in a foreign country.” -- It is argued that the conjugal right of the California
wife in community real estate in the Philippine Islands is a personal right and
must, therefore, be settled by the law governing her personal status, that is, the
law of California.
b. Article 10 of the Civil Code:
“Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of
succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic
validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or
the country in which it may be situated.”
8) The trial court found that under the law of California, upon the death of the
wife, the entire community property without administration belongs to the
surviving husband through absolute ownership and not by sucession, thus there can
be no inheritance tax.

1st ISSUE: WON the Government of the Philippines ( at the time, was still a colony of
the United states) can apply the principles of Private international law.
2nd ISSUE: WON the transfer of title in favor of Allison Gibbs from the conjugal
ownership with Eva Gibbs, his wife, be subject to succession or inheritance tax by
the government of the Philippines?

RULING ON 1ST ISSUE: YES, The Philippines can apply conflict of law rules
The Organic Act of the Philippine Islands (Act of Congress, August 29, 1916,
known as the "Jones Law") as regards the determination of private rights,
grants practical autonomy to the Government of the Philippine Islands. This
Government, therefore, may apply the principles and rules of private
international law (conflicts of laws) on the same footing as an organized
territory or state of the United States. We should, therefore, resort to the law
of California, the nationality and domicile of Mrs. Gibbs, to ascertain the norm
which would be applied here as law were there any question as to her status.

RULING ON 2ND ISSUE: YES, The Lands are subject to Inheritance Tax.
1) Upon the death of the wife, under California law, the husband is the absolute
owner of all the community property from the moment of the death of his wife, not
by virtue of succession or by virtue of her death, but by virtue of the fact that when
the death of the wife precedes that of the husband he acquires the community
property, not as an heir or as the beneficiary of his deceased wife, but because she
never had more than an inchoate interest or expentancy which is extinguished upon
her death.
a. Quoting the case of Estate of Klumpke (167 Cal., 415, 419):
“The decisions under this section (1401 Civil Code of California) are uniform to the
effect that the husband does not take the community property upon the death of the
wife by succession, but that he holds it all from the moment of her death as though
required by himself. … It never belonged to the estate of the deceased wife.”
2) Following the Californian law, there was no inheritance.
a. Article 10 can be invoked only when the deceased was vested with a
descendible interest in property within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.
b. However, it is stated in 5 Cal. Jur., 478 (United States jurisprudence):
In accord with the rule that real property is subject to the lex rei sitae, the
respective rights of husband and wife in such property, in the absence of
an antenuptial contract, are determined by the law of the place where the
property is situated.

c. It is admitted that the Philippine lands here in question were acquired as

community property of the conjugal partnership of the appellee and his wife.
Under the law of the Philippine Islands, she was vested of a title equal to that
of her husband. The nature and extent of the title which vested in Mrs. Gibbs at
the time of the acquisition of the community lands here in question must be
determined in accordance with the lex rei sitae.
Article 1407 of the Civil Code provides:
All the property of the spouses shall be deemed partnership property in the absence
of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Article 1395
provides:
"The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules of law applicable to the
contract of partnership in all matters in which such rules do not conflict with the
express provisions of this chapter." Article 1414 provides that "the husband may
dispose by will of his half only of the property of the conjugal partnership." Article
1426 provides that upon dissolution of the conjugal partnership and after inventory
and liquidation, "the net remainder of the partnership property shall be divided
share and share alike between the husband and wife, or their respective heirs.”
Under the provisions of the Civil Code and the jurisprudence prevailing here,
the wife, upon the acquisition of any conjugal property, becomes immediately
vested with an interest and title therein equal to that of her husband, subject
to the power of management and disposition which the law vests in the
husband. Immediately upon her death, if there are no obligations of the
decedent, as is true in the present case, her share in the conjugal property is
transmitted to her heirs by succession. (Articles 657, 659, 661, Civil Code; cf. also
Coronel vs. Ona, 33 Phil., 456, 469.)
d. The descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands aforesaid was
transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance and this transmission plainly
falls within the language of section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the
Administrative Code which levies a tax on inheritances. ORDER REVERSED.
PETITION DISMISSED.

Haumschild v Continental Casualty

Facts
Mrs. Haumschild (Plaintiff) and her husband (Defendant) were residents of
Wisconsin travelling in California. While in California, Plaintiff was injured in an
automobile accident as a result of her husband’s negligence. California law
prohibited a husband or wife from bringing suit against a spouse for negligence,
however, the law of Wisconsin did not. Mrs. Haumschild (Plaintiff) sued her
husband (Defendant) in Wisconsin.

Issue
Where the place of the wrong prohibits husbands and wives from suing each
other for negligence, may the court of the spouses’ domicile apply its own law
which would allow such suits?

Held
(Currie, J.) Yes. Where the place of the wrong prohibits husbands and wives
from suing each other for negligence, the court of the spouses’ domicile may
apply its own law that would allow such suits. This case presents the issue of
capacity to sue due to marital status. This relates to substantive family law and
not to substantive tort law. While the majority of the states recognize the place of
the wrong as governing capacity, we feel that the state of the domicile has a
greater interest in such cases than the state where the wrong took place. While
California’s conflict of laws rule would refer to our law to determine the wife’s
capacity, we do not feel it proper to resort to the awkward principles of renvoi to
accomplish what we feel to be the desired result. The law of the place of the
wrong will govern as to substantive tort law, but the law of the domicile will
govern as to capacity to sue. Mrs. Haumschild (Plaintiff) should be allowed to
recover. Reversed and remanded.

Discussion
If the state of domicile will govern on the issue of interspousal immunity, then a
California wife injured by her husband would be denied recovery in a Wisconsin
court. But if the state of domicile views the immunity question as procedural tort
law, the court’s decision would appear unsatisfactory. Wisconsin would then be
imposing its substantive family law in substitution for the other state’s procedural
tort law. However, on balance, the Wisconsin court’s approach would appear to
be well-reasoned, since the marital partners’ expectations (one could suppose)
would appear to be grounded in their domicile’s family law.

Aznar v Garcia

Civil Law – Application of Laws – Foreign Law – Nationality Principle – Internal and Conflict
Rule
Application of the Renvoi Doctrine
Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California where he resided
for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary
until his death. In his will, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen (legitimate), as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of money in favor of Helen
Christensen Garcia (illegitimate). Adolfo Aznar was the executor of the estate. Counsel for
Helen claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, California law should be
applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile. On
the other hand, counsel for Maria, averred that the national law of the deceased must
apply, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything under California law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in determining
the successional rights of his heirs.
HELD: The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in
effect that there are two rules in California on the matter; the internal law which applies to
Californians domiciled in California and the conflict rule for Californians domiciled outside
of California. Christensen being domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile must
be followed. The case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings – the
determination of the successional rights under Philippine law only.

Testate of Amos Bellis vs. Edward A. Bellis, et al

FACTS:

Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had five
legitimate children with his first wife (whom he divorced), three legitimate children with his
second wife (who survived him) and, finally, three illegitimate children.

6 years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he executed two(2) wills, apportioning the remainder of his
estate and properties to his seven surviving children. The appellants filed their oppositions
to the project of partition claiming that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which
they were entitled according to the Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased
wanted his Philippine estate to be governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation of two
separate wills.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the
illegitimate children’s successional rights

RULING:

Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be
distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void,
for his national law cannot be ignored in view of those matters that Article 10 — now Article
16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his
will should be governed by his national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then
his will, which deprived his illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid.

The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under
the texas law, which is the national law of the deceased.

Zalamea vs. Court of Appeals 288 SCRA 23 (1993)

FACTS:
Spouses Cesar and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana Zalamea, purchased three (3)
airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. (TWA) for a flight
from New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984. The tickets of the spouses were
purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets
represented confirmed reservations.

While in New York, on June 4, 1984, the spouses Zalamea and their daughter received a notice
of reconfirmation of their reservations for said flight. On the appointed date, however, the spouses
Zalamea and their daughter checked in at 10:00 am, an hour earlier than the scheduled flight at
11:00 am but were placed on the wait-list because the number of passengers who checked in
before tem had already taken all the seats available on the flight.

Out of the 42 names on the wait-list, the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board the flight
to Los Angeles, including Cesar Zalamea. The two others, on the other hand, being ranked lower
than 22, were not able to fly. As it were, those holding full-fare ticket were given first priority
among the wait-listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket of his
daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while his wife and daughter, who presented the
discounted tickets were denied boarding. Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles, Mrs.
Zalamea and her daughter, could not be accommodated because it was full booked. Thus, they
were constrained to book in another flight and purchased two tickets from American Airlines.

Upon their arrival in the Philippines, the spouses Zalamea filed an action for damages based on
breach of contract of air carriage before the RTC of Makati which rendered a decision in their
favor ordering the TWA to pay the price of the tickets bought from American Airlines together with
moral damages and attorney’s fees. On appeal, the CA held that moral damages are recoverable
in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only where there is fraud or
bad faith. It further stated that since it is a matter of record that overbooking of flights is a
common and accepted practice of airlines in the United States and is specifically allowed under
the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board, neither fraud nor bad faith could
be imputed on TWA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in accepting the finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by
the US Code of Federal Regulations and in holding that there was no fraud or bad faith on the
part of TWA ?

HELD:
The CA was in error. There was fraud or bad faith on the part of TWA when it did not allow Mrs.
Zalamea and her daughter to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets. The
US law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved.

1.) Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the court take judicial notice of them. Like any
other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officers having legal custody of the record, or by
his deputy and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may
be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul-general, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Phil. stationed in the foreign country
in which the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office. Here, TWA relied solely on
the testimony of its customer service agent in her deposition that the Code of Federal Regulations
of the Civil Aeronautic Board allows overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official
publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus, the CA’s finding that overbooking is
specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.

"That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not allow
petitioners to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be disputed.
The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved. Foreign
laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof
or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a
secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by
any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer service
agent, in her deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil
Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official publication of said
code was presented as evidence. Thus, respondent court's finding that overbooking is specifically
allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact."

"Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable to
the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which require that the law of
the place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court where the
passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the
defendant airline. Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in
this case would be Philippine law."

Other Issues:

2.) Even if the claimed US Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable to
the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which requires that the law
of the place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court where the
passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the
airline.

3.) Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the
passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. Where an airline had deliberately
overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of
them would show up for check in. for the indignity and inconvenience of being refused a
confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenger is entitled to an award of moral damages. This
is so, for a contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public duty --- a duty to provide
public service and convenience to its passengers which must be paramount to self-interest or
enrichment. Even on the assumption that overbooking is allowed, TWA is still guilty of bad faith in
not informing its passengers beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage even if they
have confirmed tickets if there was overbooking. Moreover, TWA was also guilty of not informing
its passengers of its alleged policy of giving less priority to discounted tickets. Evidently, TWA
placed self-interest over the rights of the spouses Zalamea and their daughter under their
contract of carriage. Such conscious disregard make respondent TWA liable for moral damages,
and to deter breach of contracts by TWA in similar fashion in the future, the SC adjudged TWA
liable for exemplary damages, as well.
 14. ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH-
KUWAITPetitioners, vs. MA. JOSEFA ECHIN, Respondent.G.R. No. 178551October 11, 2010

FACTS:

Respondent Echin was hired by petitioner ATCI in behalf of its principal co-petitioner, Ministry
of Public Health of Kuwait, for the position of medical technologist under a two-year contract with
a monthly salary of US$1,200.00.Within a year. Respondent was terminated for not passing the
probationary period which was under the Memorandum of Agreement. Ministry denied respondent‘s
request and she returned to the Philippines shouldering her own fair. Respondent filed with the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint against ATCI for illegal dismissal. Labor
Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of respondent and ordered ATCI to pay her $3,600.00, her salary for the three
months unexpired portion of the contract. ATCI appealed Labor Arbiter‘s decision, however, NLRC
affirmed the latter‘s decision and denied petitioner ATCI‘s motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner appealed to the Court Appeals contending that their principal being a foreign government
agency is immune from suit, and as such, immunity extended to them.

Appellate Court affirmed NLRC‘s decision. It noted that under the law, a private employment Agency shall assume
all responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of employment of an overseas worker;
hence, it can be sued jointly and severally with the foreign principal for any violation of the
recruitment agreement or contract of employment.

Petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners be held liable considering that the contract specifically stipulates that
respondent‘s employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait

HELD:

It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law
has the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumptionwhich, in this
case, petitioners failed to discharge. The Court’s ruling in EDI-Staffbuilders Int’l., v.
NLRC illuminates:

In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically

states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the
contract (e.g. specific causes for termination, termination procedures, etc.).
Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the
contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the termination
of the employment of Gran.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law
is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the
judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is
presumed to know only domestic or forum law.

Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the
matter; thus, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity
 approach or processual presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law
is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that
foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in
determining the issues presented before us.
Phil aluminum wheels inc. vs FASGi
Facts:
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only
be alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a
copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.

In 1978, FASGI Enterprises Inc. (FASGI), a foreign corporation organized under the laws of
California, USA, entered into a contract with Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. (PAWI), a
Philippine corporation, whereby the latter agrees to deliver 8,594 wheels to FASGI. FASGI
received the wheels and so it paid PAWI $216,444.30. Later however, FASGI found out that
the wheels are defective and did not comply with certain US standards. So in 1979, FASGI
sued PAWI in a California court. In 1980, a settlement was reached but PAWI failed to
comply with the terms of the agreement. A second agreement was made but PAWI was
again remiss in its obligation. The agreement basically provides that PAWI shall return the
purchase price in installment and conversely, FASGI shall return the wheel in installment.
PAWI was only able to make two installments (which were actually made beyond the
scheduled date). FASGI also returned the corresponding number of wheels. Eventually in
1982, FASGI sought the enforcement of the agreement and it received a favorable
judgment from the California court. PAWI is then ordered to pay an equivalent of P252k
plus damages but FASGI was not ordered to return the remaining wheels. PAWI was not
able to comply with the court order in the US. So in 1983, FASGI filed a complaint for the
enforcement of a foreign judgment with RTC-Makati. Hearings were made and in 1990, the
trial judge ruled against FASGI on the ground that the foreign judgment is tainted with
fraud because FASGI was not ordered to return the remaining wheels (unjust enrichment)
and that PAWI’s American lawyer entered into the agreements without the consent of
PAWI. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign judgment may be enforced here in the Philippines.
HELD: Yes. The judgment is valid. A valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be
recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are
concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full
and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that trial upon regular
proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or voluntary appearance of the
defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration
of justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system
of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment. A foreign judgment is
presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary
showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due
notice in the foreign forum.
In this case, PAWI was very well represented in the California court. PAWI’s insistence that
its American lawyer colluded with FASGI; that he entered into the compromise agreement
without PAWI’s authority is belied by the fact that PAWI initially complied with the
agreement. It did not disclaim the agreement. It sent two installments (though belatedly)
but failed to comply on the rest. It cannot now aver that the agreement is without its
authority. Further, it is just but fair for the California court not to order FASGI to return the
remaining wheels because of PAWI’s arrears.

REPUBLIC VS ORBECIDO
Posted by kaye lee on 9:15 AM
472 SCRA 114, GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005 [Article 26;Divorce]

FACTS:
Orbecido and Villanueva were married ad had two children. Wife went to US to
work and later became a US citizen. Thereafter he learned from his son that his
wife obtained divorce and married another man. Orbecido filed a petition for
authority to remarry under the Article 26 (2) of the Family Code. RTC
Zamboanga del Sur granted his petition. The SolGen's motion for reconsideration
was denied. Orbecido filed a petition for review of certiorari on the Decision of the
RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 (2).

RULING:
Yes. Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties
who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later
on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other
party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.

The reckoning point is not their citizenship at the time of celebration of marriage,
but their citizenship at the time the divorce decree is obtained abroad by alien
spouse capacitating him/her to remarry.

However, Orbecido is barred from remarrying because he did not present

competent evidence showing his wife had obtained a divorce decree and had
remarried.

Northwest Orient airlines v CA

FACTS:
 Northwest Airlines (Northwest) and C.F. Sharp & Company (C.F.),
through its Japan branch, entered into an International Passenger
Sales Agency Agreement, whereby the Northwest authorized the
C.F. to sell its air transportation tickets
 March 25, 1980: Unable to remit the proceeds of the ticket
sales, Northwest sued C.F. in Tokyo, Japan, for collection of the unremitted proceeds
of the ticket sales, with claim for damages
 April 11, 1980: writ of summons was issued by the 36th Civil
Department, Tokyo District Court of Japan
 The attempt to serve the summons was unsuccessful because Mr. Dinozo was in
Manila and would be back on April 24, 1980
 April 24, 1980: Mr. Dinozo returned to C.F. Office to serve the
summons but he refused to receive claiming that he no longer an
employee
 After the 2 attempts of service were unsuccessful, Supreme Court of Japan
sent the summons together with the other legal documents to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan> Japanese Embassy in
Manila>Ministry (now Department) of Foreign Affairs of the
Philippines>Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Manila who ordered Deputy Sheriff Rolando
Balingit>C.F. Main Office
 August 28, 1980: C.F. received from Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit
the writ of summons but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing.
 January 29, 1981: Tokyo Court rendered judgment ordering the C.F. to
pay 83,158,195 Yen and damages for delay at the rate of 6% per
annum from August 28, 1980 up to and until payment is completed
 March 24, 1981: C.F. received from Deputy Sheriff Balingit copy of the
judgment. C.F. did not appeal so it became final and executory
 May 20, 1983: Northwest filed a suit for enforcement of the judgment
a RTC
 July 16, 1983: C.F. averred that the Japanese Court sought to be enforced is null and
void and unenforceable in this jurisdiction having been rendered without due and
proper notice and/or with collusion or fraud and/or upon a clear mistake of law and
fact. The foreign judgment in the Japanese Court sought in this
action is null and void for want of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant considering that this is an action in personam. The
process of the Court in Japan sent to the Philippines which is
outside Japanese jurisdiction cannot confer jurisdiction over the
defendant in the case before the Japanese Court of the case at bar
 CA sustained RTC: Court agrees that if the C.F. in a foreign court is
a resident in the court of that foreign court such court could acquire
jurisdiction over the person of C.F. but it must be served in the
territorial jurisdiction of the foreign court
ISSUE: W/N the Japanese Court has jurisdiction over C.F.

HELD: YES. instant petition is partly GRANTED, and the challenged

decision is AFFIRMED insofar as it denied NORTHWEST's claims for
attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and exemplary damages
 Consequently, the party attacking (C.F.) a foreign judgment has the burden of
overcoming the presumption of its validity
 Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the
service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the
Japanese court must stand.
 Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be
similar with the Philippine law on service of summons on a private
foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines. Section 14,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that if the defendant is a
foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines, service may
be made:
 (1) on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that
purpose, or,
 (2) if there is no such resident agent, on the government official
designated by law to that effect; or
 (3) on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
 If the foreign corporation has designated an agent to receive
summons, the designation is exclusive, and service of summons is
without force and gives the court no jurisdiction unless made upon
him.
 Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be made on
the government official designated by law, to wit:
 (a) the Insurance Commissioner in the case of a foreign insurance
company
 (b) the Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a foreign banking
corporation
 (c) the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the case of other
foreign corporations duly licensed to do business in the Philippines.
Whenever service of process is so made, the government office or
official served shall transmit by mail a copy of the summons or
other legal proccess to the corporation at its home or principal
office. The sending of such copy is a necessary part of the service.
 The service on the proper government official under Section 14, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court, in relation to Section 128 of the Corporation Code
 Our laws and jurisprudence indicate a purpose to assimilate foreign corporations,
duly licensed to do business here, to the status of domestic corporations
 We think it would be entirely out of line with this policy should we make a
discrimination against a foreign corporation, like the petitioner, and subject its
property to the harsh writ of seizure by attachment when it has complied not only
with every requirement of law made specially of foreign corporations, but in addition
with every requirement of law made of domestic corporations
 In as much as SHARP was admittedly doing business in Japan through its four duly
registered branches at the time the collection suit against it was filed, then in the light
of the processual presumption, SHARP may be deemed a resident of Japan, and, as
such, was amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be deemed to
have assented to the said courts' lawful methods of serving process.
 Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by the
Japanese Court was valid not only under the processual
presumption but also because of the presumption of regularity of
performance of official duty.

Boudard v Tait
Facts:
Emilie Boudard, as widow of Marie Theodore Boudard and as guardian of her
children born during their marriage obtained a judgment in their favor from CFI
Hanoi, French Indo-China for the sum of 40,000 piastras plus interest. The
judgment was against Stewart Tait who had been declared in default for his
failure to appear at the trial before court.

Theodore Boudard, who was an employee of Stewart Tait, was killed in Hanoi by
other employees of Tait, although "outside of the fulfillment of a duty", according
to the English translation of a certified copy of the French decision. The dismissal
of the complaint was based principally on the lack of jurisdiction of the CFI Hanoi
to render judgment. It was found that the Tait was not a resident of, nor domiciled
in that country. Also, the evidence adduced at the trial proves that neither Tait
nor his agent or employees were ever in Hanoi and that Theodore had never, at
any time, been his employee.

Issue:
1. Whether or not court erred in admitting evidence for judicial foreign records (in
this case, it was the Hanoi decision).

2. Whether or not the court erred in declaring that it was indispensable for Tait to
be served with summons in Hanoi.

3. Whether or not the decision of CFI Hanoi was already conclusive.

Held:
1. Yes, Boudard failed to show that the proceedings against Tait in CFI Hanoi
were in accordance with the laws of France then in force.

Further, Boudard failed to show that they are certified copies of judicial records.
They argue that the papers are the original documents and that the French
consul in the Philippines has confirmed this fact. This is not sufficient to authorize
a deviation from the rule established by law. The best evidence of a foreign
judicial proceeding is a certified copy with all the formalities required.

2. No. French law regarding summons states that: those who have no known
residence in France shall be served summons in the place of their present
residence; if the place is unknown, writ shall be placed at the main door of the
hall of the court where the complaint is filed.
In the case, it was shown that summons were delivered in Manila to J.M.
Shotwell, a representative or agent of Churchill and Tait, Inc. which is an entity
entirely different from Tait. Also, evidence shows that Tait was not in Hanoi
during the time the complaint was filed by Boudard. The rule is that judicial
proceedings in a foreign country,regarding payment of money, are only effective
against a party if summons is duly served on him within such foreign country
before the proceedings.

3. No. The decision cannot be conclusive to such an extent that it cannot be

contested. It merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of Boudard's
claim and admits proof to the contrary.

The effect of a judgment of any tribunal of a foreign country is:

- In case of judgment against a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon
the title to the thing.

- In case of judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of

a right as between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent
title, but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of:
-> want of jurisdiction
-> want of notice to the party
-> collusion
-> fraud
-> clear mistake of law or fact

Ramirez v. Gmur

Doctrine: It is established by the great weight of authority that the court of a country
in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and to which one or both may resort
merely for obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial
status; and a divorce granted by such a court is not entitled to recognition elsewhere.
The voluntary appearance of the defendant before such a tribunal does not invest the
court with jurisdiction.

Facts:
 Samuel Bischoff Werthmuller, a native of Switzerland but a resident of the
Philippines, died in Iloilo City on Junne 29, 1913, leaving valuable asset
which he disposed by will. His will was offered for probate in the CFI of Iloilo,
which allowed it. Werthmuller’s widow, Doñ a Ana M. Ramirez, was named as
executrix. Everything was given to the widow, as the will provided, except for
a piece of real property in the City of Thun, Switzerland, which was devised
to Werthmuller’s brothers and sisters.
 Werthmuller seemed to have ignored in making his will that he had heirs
from his natural daughter, Leona Castro.
 Leona Castro was the daughter of Felisa Castro and an unknown father.
There was an annotation on the margin of the original baptismal entry of
 Leona Castro that a public document (an “escritura”) states that she was
recognized by Samuel Bischoff on June 22, 1877. This annotation was
authenticated by the signature of Father Ferrero, whose deposition was
taken in this case. Father Ferrero testified that the word “escritura” in this
entry means a public document; and he says that such document was
exhibited to him when the marginal note was added to the baptismal record
and supplied the basis of the annotation in the entry.
 Samuel Bischoff tacitly recognized Leona Castro as his daughter and treated
her as such. Leona Castro was later married to Frederick von Kauffman, a
British subject, born in HK and lived in Iloilo City. Leona Castro and von
Kauffman had 3 children (Elene, Federico and Ernesto). Leona Castro was
then brought to Thun, Switzerland to recuperate her health. Years later,
Leona Castro informed von Kauffman that she does not want to stay married
with the latter.
 Von Kauffman later obtained a divorce decree in Paris, France. It showed that
Leona Castro lived in Paris, though there is no evidence showing that she
acquired permanent domicile in Paris.
 The estrangement of von Kauffman and Leona Castro was because Leona Castro
was attracted to Dr. Ernest Emil Mory, the physician in charge of the sanitarium in
Switzerland where Leona Castro was brought. Dr. Mory and Leona Castro was
 later married in London, England. It appears that Dr. Mory was already married to
a certain Helena Wolpman, but had divorced her.
 Before Dr. Mory and Leona Castro got married, they begot a daughter named
Leontina Elizabeth in Thun, Switzerland. A 2nd daughter, Carmen Maria, was born in
Berne, Switzerland, and a 3rd daughter, Esther. On October 6, 1910, Leona Castro
died.
 Now, the 2 sets of children are claiming from the estate of Samuel Werthmuller. Otto
Gmur is the guardian of the 3 Mory daughters. Frederick von Kauffman
appeared as guardian for his own children.
 Ana Ramirez insists, as against the Mory daughters, that the Leona Castro had
never been recognized by Samuel Werthmuller at all.
 As to the Mory daughters, Leontina Elizabeth is considered an illegitimate daughter
which was legitimated by the subsequent marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona Castro.
Carmen Maria and Esther Renate, on the other hand, are to considered legitimate
offspring of Leona Castro since the latter’s marriage to von Kauffman was already
divorced when they were born and Leona was already married to Dr. Mory.
 The von Kauffman children insists that the divorce decree was wholly invalid;
that the Mory daughters are the offspring of an adulterous relationship; and that the
von Kauffman daughters alone should be entitled to participate in the division of the
estate.

Issue: Whether or not the Mory daughters and the von Kauffman children are entitled
to participate in the division of the estate of Samuel Bischoff Werthmuller.

Held: The SC held that the von Kauffman children are entitled to participate in the
inheritance as legitimate children of Leona Castro and Frederick von Kauffman. Leona
Castro’s relationship to Samuel Werthmuller was ruled as follows:

 It is satisfactorily shown that Leona Castro was a recognized natural daughter of

 Samuel Bischoff. The memorandum made by Father Ferrero as to the recognition of
Leona Castro was found satisfactory, even though the original was not presented
after diligent search and secondary evidence as well as Fr. Ferrero’s deposition was
presented.
 It will be observed that the recognition of Leona Castro as the daughter of Samuel
Bischoff occurred prior to the date when the Civil Code was put in force in these
Islands; and consequently, her rights as derived from the recognition must be
determined under the law as it then existed, that is, under Law 11 of Toro, which
afterwards became Law 1, title 5, book 10, of the Novisima Recopilacion. Under that
law recognition could be established by proof of acts on the part of the parent
unequivocally recognizing the status of his offspring. In other words, at tacit
recognition was sufficient. Under article 131 of the present Civil Code, the
acknowledgment of a natural child must be made in the record of birth, by will, or in
another public instrument. We believe the recognition of Leona Castro is sufficiently
shown whether the case be judged by the one provision or the other.
 But it is contended by counsel for Doña Ana Ramirez that only children born of
persons free to marry may possess the status of recognized natural children, and
there is no evidence to show that Felisa Castro was either a single woman or widow
at the time of the conception or birth of Leona. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, it must be presumed that she was single or a widow.
 From the fact that Leona Castro was an acknowledged natural daughter of her
father, it follows that had she survived him she would have been his forced heir, he
having died after the Civil Code took effect; and as such forced heir she would have
been entitled to one-third of the inheritance.
 To determine the rights of the Mory daughters, the SC had to consider the
validity of the divorce decree obtained by von Kauffman in Paris. If the decree
is valid, then the marriage of Mory and Leona Castro is valid and the Mory
daughters are entitled to participate in the division of the estate. Otherwise, the
Mory daughters would have no such right.
 As to the Mory daughters, the SC held that the divorce decree relied upon
cannot be recognized as valid in the courts of the Philippines. The French
tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain an action for the dissolution of a
marriage contracted in the Philippines by a person domiciled here, such
marriage being indissoluble under the laws then prevailing in this country.
 The evidence shows conclusively that Frederick von Kauffman at all times since
earliest youth has been, and is now, domiciled in the city of Iloilo in the Philippine
Islands; that he there married Leona Castro, who was a citizen of the Philippine
Islands, and that Iloilo was their matrimonial domicile; that his departure from iloilo for
the purpose of taking his wife to Switzerland was limited to that purpose alone,
without any intent to establish a domicile elsewhere; and finally that he went to Paris
in 1904, for the sole purpose of getting a divorce, without any intention of
establishing a permanent residence in that city. The evidence shows that the decree
was entered against the defendant in default, for failure to answer, and there is
nothing to show that she had acquired, or had attempted to acquire, a permanent
domicile in the City of Paris. It is evident of course that the presence of both the
spouses in that city was due merely to the mutual desire to procure a divorce from
each other.
 It is established by the great weight of authority that the court of a country in
which neither of the spouses is domiciled and to which one or both may resort
merely for obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their
matrimonial status; and a divorce granted by such a court is not entitled to
recognition elsewhere. The voluntary appearance of the defendant before such
 a tribunal does not invest the court with jurisdiction.
 It follows that, to give a court jurisdiction on the ground of the plaintiff's
residence in the State or country of the judicial forum, his residence must be
bona fide. If a spouse leaves the family domicile and goes to another State for
the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce, and with no intention of remaining, his
residence there is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the courts of that
State. This is especially true where the cause of divorce is one not recognized
by the laws of the State of his own domicile.
 As the divorce granted by the French court must be ignored, it results that the
marriage of Doctor Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not
legalize their relations; and the circumstance that they afterwards passed for
husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal significance.
The claims of the Mory children to participate in the estate of Samuel Bischoff must
therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated, and
acknowledged natural children. The children of adulterous relations are wholly
excluded. The word "descendants," as used in article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be
interpreted to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations.

Even if the claims of the children were made after the probate, the same are not divested by
the decree admitting the will to probate since such decree is only conclusive as to the due
execution of the will and not its intrinsic

BORTHWICK vs. CASTRO BARTOLOME

FACTS
Petitioner William Borthwick, an American citizen living in the Philippines, owned real property
interests in Hawaii. In his business dealings with private respondent, Joseph Scallon,
Borthwick issued the promissory notes now sued upon, but failed to pay the sums owing upon
maturity and despite demands. The promissory notes provided that upon default, action may
be brought for collection in Los Angeles, California, or at Scallon's option, in Manila or
Honolulu.

Borthwick was served with summons when he was in California, pursuant to Hawaiian law
allowing service of process on a person outside the territorial confines of the State. Because
Borthwick ignored the summons, a judgment by default was entered against him.

However, Scallon's attempt to have the judgment executed in Hawaii and California failed
because Borthwick had no assets in those states. Scallon then came to the Philippines and
brought suit against Borthwick seeking enforcement of the default judgment of the Hawaii
court. Again, after due proceedings, judgment by default was rendered against him, ordering
Borthwick to pay Scallon the amount prayed for.

The court issued an amendatory order and upon receipt by Borthwick, he moved for a new
trial, alleging that the promissory notes did not arise from business dealings in Hawaii, nor did
he own real estate therein. He contended that the judgment of the court of Hawaii is
unenforceable in the Philippines because it was invalid for want of jurisdiction over the cause
of action and over his person. The motion was denied, hence this petition.]

RULING
"It is true that a foreign judgment against a person is merely "presumptive evidence of a right
as between the parties," and rejection thereof may be justified, among others, by "evidence of
a want of jurisdiction" of the issuing authority, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In the case
at bar, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Hawaii hinged entirely on the existence of either
of two facts in accordance with its State laws, i.e., either Borthwick owned real property in
Hawaii, or the promissory notes' sued upon resulted from his business transactions therein.
Scallon's complaint clearly alleged both facts. Borthwick was accorded opportunity to answer
the complaint and impugn those facts, but he failed to appear and was in consequence
declared in default. There thus exists no evidence in the record of the Hawaii case upon which
to lay a conclusion of lack of jurisdiction, as Borthwick now urges.

The opportunity to negate the foreign court's competence by proving the non-existence of said
jurisdictional facts established in the original action, was again afforded to Borthwick in the
Court of First Instance of MF kati, where enforcement of the Hawaii judgment was sought. This
time it was the summons of the domestic court which Borthwick chose to ignore, but with the
same result: he was declared in default. And in the default judgment subsequently
promulgated, the Court a quo decreed enforcement of die judgment affirming among others
the jurisdictional facts, that Borthwick owned real property in Hawaii and transacted business
therein.

In the light of these antecedents, it is plain that what Borthwick seeks in essence is one more
opportunity, a third, to challenge the jurisdiction of the Hawaii Court and the merits of the
cause of action which that Court had adjudged to have been established against him. This he
may obtain only if he succeeds in showing that the declaration of his default was incorrect. He
has unfortunately not been able to do that; hence, the verdict must go against him."

OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION v CA

FACTS:

This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by the Civil Judge
of Dehra Dun, India in favor of the petitioner, against the private respondent, PACIFIC
CEMENT COMPANY, INCORPORATED. The petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and
controlled by the Government of India while the private respondent is a private corporation
duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.

The conflict between the petitioner and the private respondent rooted from the failure of the
respondent to deliver 43,000 metric tons of oil well cement to the petitioner even it had
already received payment and despite petitioner’s several demands. The petitioner then
informed the private respondent that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to
Clause 16 of their contract which stipulates that he venue for arbitration shall be at Dehra
dun.
The chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute in favour of the petitioner
setting forth the arbitral award. To enable the petitioner to execute the above award, it filed a
Petition before the Court of the Civil Judge in Dehra Dun. India praying that the decision of
the arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India. This was objected by the respondent but
foreign court refused to admit the private respondent's objections for failure to pay the
required filing fees. Despite notice sent to the private respondent of the foregoing order and
several demands by the petitioner for compliance therewith, the private respondent refused
to pay the amount adjudged by the foreign court as owing to the petitioner.

The petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao
City for the enforcement of the aforementioned judgment of the foreign court. The private
respondent moved to dismiss the complaint. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of a valid
cause of action. The petitioner then appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which
affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. In its decision, the appellate court concurred with the
RTC's ruling that the arbitrator did not have jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties,
thus, the foreign court could not validly adopt the arbitrator's award. The petitioner filed this
petition for review on certiorari,

ISSUE:
Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between the petitioner and the
private respondent under Clause 16 of the contract.

RULING:

The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein dearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not
preclude the validity of "memorandum decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of
fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.

Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected

by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was
rendered differs from that of the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. If
the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final and
executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts in this jurisdiction
cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because our rules provide otherwise.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals sustaining the trial court's dismissal of the OIL AND NATURAL GAS
COMMISSION's complaint before Branch 30 of the RTC of Surigao City is REVERSED,

Nouvion v Freeman

Ratio: A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may be final and binding, even though a
right of appeal to a superior court remains open.
Lord Herschell stated on the question of finality or conclusiveness of a foreign judgment: ‘in order to
establish that such a judgment has been pronounced it must be shown that in the court by which it
was pronounced it conclusively, finally, and for ever established the existence of the debt of which it
is sought to be made conclusive evidence in this country, so as to make it res judicata between the
parties. If it is not conclusive in the same court which pronounced it, so that notwithstanding such a
judgment the existence of the debt may between the same parties be afterwards contested in that
Court, and upon proper proceedings being taken and such contest being adjudicated upon, it may
be declared that there existed no obligation to pay the bet at all, then I do not think that a judgment
which is of that character can be regarded as finally and conclusively evidencing the debt, as so
entitling the person who has obtained the judgment to claim a decree from our Courts for the
payment of that debt.’

COWANS VS TICONDEROGA PULP AND PAPER COMPANY

FACTS:
The action is brought to recover on a money judgment which these plaintiffs
recovered in the Province of Quebec, Canada. The case was there tried on the merits
and the judgment is not tainted with fraud, nor with an offense against our public
policy.
In this case, the respondent's proposition is that the judgment is only prima facie
evidence, because, under the Quebec law (Code Civ. Proc. of Quebec, § 210): "Any
defense which was or might have been set up to the original action may be pleaded
to an action brought upon a judgment rendered out of Canada." In other words, that
the courts of New York State should not recognize the judgments of the Province of
Quebec as adjudications of the issues because the courts of Quebec do not
reciprocate as to judgments of the State of New York.

ISSUE:
Whether the Quebec judgment is merely a prima facie proof of liability in NY court
against which any defense which could have been used at the trial in the Quebec
court is available to defeat recovery here, or is it conclusive.

RULING:

The force and effect which is to be given to a foreign judgment is for each sovereign
power to determine for itself. Its policy in this respect is determined by its statutes
or by the decisions of its courts. There is in this State no constitutional or statutory
provision declaring the policy of the State respecting judgments recovered in
jurisdictions outside of the United States.

The general rule in this State is settled as follows: A judgment recovered in a foreign
country, when sued upon in the courts of this State, is conclusive so far as to
preclude a retrial of the merits of the case, subject, however, to certain well-
recognized exceptions, namely, where the judgment is tainted with fraud, or with an
offense against the public policy of the State, or the foreign court had not
jurisdiction.
Among other things it is said that private rights are acquired under the foreign
judgment; that "the question is one of private rather than public international law,
of private right rather than public relations;" and "our courts will recognize private
rights acquired under foreign laws and the sufficiency of the evidence establishing
such rights;" the rule, though it had its source in comity, "prevails to-day by its own
strength;" it "rests not on the basis of reciprocity but rather upon the
persuasiveness of the foreign judgment." It is true Judge POUND suggests that the
rule in New York State could be upheld in this case without disregarding the
prevailing opinion; that much in that opinion is dictum and that that which was
necessarily decided was not in conflict with the general rule in this State; that in any
event this plaintiff, who had invoked the powers of a foreign court, could not now be
heard to question what his own choice had brought upon him. But these comments
are not the basis of the decision; they are but assurances that the application of the
rule is in this case particularly just. The last sentence of the opinion is: "The law of
the State of New York remains unchanged and the French judgment should be given
full faith and credit."

Of course comity adds nothing to the strength, worth, or, as Judge POUND call it,
"persuasiveness" of the foreign judgment. The same persuasiveness is present with
or without comity, or with or without reciprocity; and, without reciprocity, the
United States Supreme Court still gives the foreign judgment recognition. It is to be
received in evidence as prima facie proof of the cause of action. If no defense on the
merits is made it is sufficient proof on which to render judgment. Still, if there is
want of reciprocity between the two countries, that court would deny to the foreign
judgment the persuasiveness it really possesses. Our Court of Appeals has we think
definitely refused to accept that holding as the policy of this State; and, without
reciprocity, would give to the foreign judgment the full effect to which its
persuasiveness entitles it. The decision in the Hilton case would deprive a party of
the private rights he has acquired by reason of a foreign judgment because the
country in whose courts that judgment was rendered has a rule of evidence
different from that which we have and does not give the same effect as this State
gives to a foreign judgment.

We think the general rule as above stated must be applied to this case, and that the
proposition which the respondent would maintain is in conflict with the policy and
law of this State.

NGENOHL vs. OLSEN AND COMPANY, INC

G.R. No. L-22288
January 12, 1925
FACTS: In 1919, the acting Alien Property Custodian of the United
States, by virtue of the Trading with the Enemy Act as amended,
required and caused to be conveyed to him the property and business
then belonging to the company known as Syndicat Oriente, formed
under the laws of Belgium, of which the plaintiff was the “gestor,” and
an enemy as defined in said Act. The primary purpose of the proceeding
was to seize, sell and convey any and all of the property owned and held
by the company within the jurisdiction of the United States, as a war
measure, upon the ground that they were alien enemies of the United
States.
During the public sale, defendant corporation was the highest bidder.
The said Alien Property Custodian of the United States having thereafter
accepted said bid and received from the defendant corporation in cash
the amount of said bid, did execute in favor of the defendant corporation
a deed of conveyance. The defendant paid in good faith, and took over
the property and assets of the company, including its trade-marks and
trade names and its business as a going concern

After obtaining the proceeds from the sale, the plaintiff in violation of
the conveyance, wrongfully instituted an action in the Supreme Court of
Hongkong against the defendant in which the plaintiff claimed to be the
sole owner of the trade-marks for the exports of the business. The
Supreme Court of Hongkong ruled in favor of the plaintiff, allegedly
through misrepresentation, ordering defendant to pay the former for
costs and AF. The Court ruled that the deed of conveyance limited the
sale of the business to the trademarks within the Philippines, implying
that the plaintiff is still entitled to the sell the cigars under the same
trademarks through exporting, which accounts to 95% of the total sales
of the company. (This means that the plaintiff paid the cash equivalent
of the whole of the business but only entitled to 5% of the such, the sales
within the Philippines)- UNFAIR TALAGA!

The CFI rendered judgment for the plaintiff for the full amount of his
claim, with interest, from which the defendant appeals. Defendant
company alleges that when he purchased the property and business, all
trademarks are included; that the subject of the sale is not only those
trademarks for sales within the Philippines.

ISSUE: Should the judgment rendered by the Hongkong court be

enforced by Philippine courts?
HELD: NO; we do not hesitate to say that the judgment rendered in the
Hongkong court was a clear mistake of both law and fact, and that it
ought not to be enforced in the Philippine Islands.
The business of the plaintiff is almost exclusively an export business,
and that the transfer of the goodwill thereof necessarily carried with it
the transfer of said export business and of the trade-marks and trade
names which could not be disconnected therefrom
—- It is conceded that the Hongkong court had jurisdiction and that the
defendant appeared in the action and contested the case on its merits.
Hence, there was no collusion. Neither is it claimed that there was any
fraud, but it is vigorously contended that the Hongkong judgment was a
clear mistake of both law and fact. Exclusive of the provisions of section
311 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is very doubtful whether it could be
sustained upon the ground of comity or the Law of Nations. As between
allied nations and under the law of comity, their mutual policy should be
to sustain and enforce the spirit and intention with which the seizure
and sale of any property of an alien enemy was made rather than to
minimize, destroy or defeat them.

We are construing a deed of conveyance from the United States to the

defendant. The primary purpose of the whole proceeding was to seize
and convey all of the property of the plaintiff or his company within the
jurisdiction of the United States, including trade names and trade-
marks as those of an alien enemy. To now give the defendant the use
and benefit of only 5 per cent of such trade names and trade-marks, and
to permit the plaintiff to have and retain the other 95 per cent to his own
use and benefit after he has ratified and confirmed the sale, would
impugn the honor and good name of the United States in the whole
proceeding and defeat the very purpose for which it seized and sold the
property of an alien enemy, to wipe Ingenohl and his company out of
existence and put them out of business in so far as the United States had
the power to do so

Be that as it may, this court is bound be section 311 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. That law was enacted by the Legislature of the Philippine
Islands, and as to the Philippine Islands, it is the law of the land. In the
absence of that statute, no matter how wrongful the judgment of the
Hongkong court may be, there would be strong reasons for holding that
it should be enforced by this court.

MIJARES V. RANADA (2005)

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 139325, April 12, 2005 ]
PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, LORETTA ANN P.
ROSALES, HILDA B. NARCISO, SR. MARIANI
DIMARANAN, SFIC, AND JOEL C. LAMANGAN IN
THEIR BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THE CLASS
PLAINTIFFS IN CLASS ACTION NO. MDL 840,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF HAWAII,
PETITIONERS, VS. HON. SANTIAGO JAVIER
RANADA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING
JUDGE OF BRANCH 137, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, MAKATI CITY, AND THE ESTATE OF
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, THROUGH ITS COURT
APPOINTED LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES IN
CLASS ACTION MDL 840, UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT OF HAWAII, NAMELY: IMELDA
R. MARCOS AND FERDINAND MARCOS, JR.,
RESPONDENTS.

Facts:
Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al.*, all of whom suffered
human rights violations during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their
favor against the Estate of the late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly
$1.9B in compensatory and exemplary damages for tortuous violations of
international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final Judgment was
affirmed by the US Court of Appeals.

As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the RTC Makati for the
enforcement of the Final Judgment, paying P410 as docket and filing fees based
on Rule 141, §7(b) where the value of the subject matter is incapable of
pecuniary estimation. The Estate of Marcos however, filed a MTD alleging the
non-payment of the correct filing fees. RTC Makati dismissed the Complaint
stating that the subject matter was capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved
a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of a definite sum of
money allowing for the easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment.
As such, the proper filing fee was P472M, which Petitioners had not paid.

Issue: Whether or not the amount paid by the Petitioners is the proper filing fee.

Ruling:

Yes, but on a different basis—amount merely corresponds to the same amount

required for “other actions not involving property”. RTC Makati erred in
concluding that the filing fee should be computed on the basis of the total sum
claimed or the stated value of the property in litigation. The Petitioner’s Complaint
was lodged against the Estate of Marcos but it is clearly based on a judgment,
the Final Judgment of the US District Court. However, the Petitioners err in
stating that the Final Judgment is incapable of pecuniary estimation because it is
so capable. On this point, Petitioners state that this might lead to an instance
wherein a first level court (MTC, MeTC, etc.) would have jurisdiction to enforce a
foreign judgment. Under the B.P.129, such courts are not vested with such
jurisdiction. §33 of B.P.129 refers to instances wherein the cause of action or
subject matter pertains to an assertion of rights over property or a sum of money.
But here, the subject matter is the foreign judgment itself. §16 of B.P.129 reveals
that the complaint for enforcement of judgment even if capable of pecuniary
estimation would fall under the jurisdiction of the RTCs. Thus, the Complaint to
enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimations
but at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate,
thus placing it beyond the ambit of §7(a) of Rule 141. What governs the proper
computation of the filing fees over Complaints for the enforcement of foreign
judgments is §7(b)(3), involving “other actions not involving property.”

Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas Case Digest

G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010
FACTS:

Gerbert Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen but now a naturalized Canadian, married Daisylyn
Sto. Tomas, a Filipina. He soon left to Canada after their wedding due to work commitments.
He returned to Philippines on April 2005 only to find out Daisylyn has an affair with another
man. Gerbert returned to Canada to file a divorce that took effect on January 2006.

Two years later, he found another Filipina and wanted to marry her in the Philippines. He
went to Pasig City Registrar's Office to register his Canadian divorce decree but was denied
considering that his marriage with Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law, that the
foregin divorce must be recognized judicially by the Philippine court.

Gerbert subsequently filed at the Regional Trial Court a judicial recognition of foreign
divorce but was subsequently denied since he is not the proper party and according to Article
26 of the Civil Code, only a Filipino spouse can avail the remedy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 26 can also be applied to Corpuz' petition of recognition of the foreign
divorce decree

HELD:

The Court held that alien spouses cannot claim the right as it is only in favor of Filipino
spouses. The legislative intent of Article 26 is for the benefit of the clarification of the marital
status of the Filipino spouse.

However, aliens are not strip to petition to the RTC for his foreign divorce decree as it is a
conclusive presumption of evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce decree with
confirmity to the alien's national law.

The Pasig City Registrar's Office acted out of line when it registered the foreign divorce
decree without judicial order recognition. Therefore, the registration is still deemed to be
void.