SR.11.10961 - Sour Well Design Guide

Restricted SR.11.
10961
Sour Well Design Guide

by
R. Nelson (UAO/W/C)
This document is classified as Restricted. Access is allowed to Shell personnel, designated Associate Companies and
Contractors working on Shell projects who have signed a confidentiality agreement with a Shell Group Company.
'Shell Personnel' includes all staff with a personal contract with a Shell Group Company. Issuance of this document is
restricted to staff employed by a Shell Group Company. Neither the whole nor any part of this document may be
disclosed to Non-Shell Personnel without the prior written consent of the copyright owners.
Copyright SIEP B.V. 2011.
Shell International Exploration and Production B.V., Rijswijk

Further electronic copies can be obtained from the Global Information Centre.
SR.11.10961 - II - Restricted
Executive summary
This document is intended to be a design guide for wells containing hydrogen sulphide (H2S),
often referred to as sour wells.
This is not a design standard, it is a guide intended to assist well construction and intervention
personnel with the basics of sour well design.
Throughout this document, references are made to existing Shell, government, and Industry
standards. The most recent standards will take precedence over what is written in this guide.
Although this document contains some sour operational procedures that are integral to sour
design, it is by no means comprehensive. It is intended that the details of sour well design and
procedures be included in sour chapters of existing wells standards. For example, there is a sour
section in the Casing and Tubing Design Manual1. Sour sections will be added to other well
standards in the future.
Consult the latest version of the Shell HSSE Control Framework5 for H2S HSSE related standards
and procedures.
SR.11.10961 - III - Restricted
Table of contents
Executive summary II
1. Introduction 1
2. Prevention and Mitigation 3
2.1. Risk 3
2.2. Barriers 3
2.3. Mitigation 4
3. HSSE 6
3.1. Hydrogen Sulphide (H2S) Properties 6
3.2. Sulphur Dioxide (SO2) Properties 7
3.3. H2S training 8
3.4. Breathing Apparatus 8
3.5. H2S Monitors and Meters 10
3.6. Venting versus Burning 10
3.7. Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS or Concurrent Operations) 11
4. Material Selection 12
4.1. General 12
4.2. Casing and Tubing 15
4.3. Accessories 16
4.4. BOP Material 17
4.5. Wellheads 18
4.6. Drill String 18
4.7. Welding 19
4.8. Elastomers 19
4.9. Fishing Equipment 19
4.10. Cement 20
5. Drilling and Workover Fluid Systems 21
5.1. Facts of H2S in Water 21
5.2. Drilling Overbalanced 21
5.3. Circulating Out a Wellbore During a Workover 22
5.4. Circulating Out a Sour Fluid Kick 22
6. Blowout Preventer System (BOPs and Associated Equipment) 23
6.1. BOP Material Specifications 23
6.2. BOP Stack Configuration 23
6.3. Other Considerations 23
7. Sour Coring & Drill Stem Testing 24
7.1. Coring High Risk Wells 24
7.2. Coring Low Risk Wells 24
7.3. Drill Stem Testing 24
8. Wireline Operations 25
SR.11.10961 - IV - Restricted
8.1. Surface Equipment 25

8.2. Wireline and Downhole Tools 26
8.3. Bleed and Purge 27
9. Coiled Tubing Operations 28
9.1. Material Specifications 28
9.2. Coiled Tubing BOP configuration 30
9.3. Operational Practices 31
10. Snubbing 32
10.1. Material Specifications 32
10.2. Well Categories 32
10.3. Snubbing HSE 33
10.4. Snubbing BOPs 33
11. Underbalanced Drilling (UBD) 34
11.1. Common Items for Jointed Pipe and Coiled Tubing 34
11.2. UBD Using Jointed Pipe 35
11.3. UBD Using Coiled Tubing 36
12. Well Testing 37
12.1. Well Testing HSE 37
12.2. Equipment 37
12.3. Sampling 37
12.4. Flaring 39
12.5. Air Quality 40
12.6. Dispersion Modelling 41
References 42
Bibliographic information 46
Report distribution 47
SR.11.10961 -1- Restricted
1. Introduction
This document is intended to be a design guide for wells containing hydrogen sulphide (H2S),
often referred to as sour wells.
This is not a design standard, it is a guide intended to assist well construction and intervention
personnel with the basics of sour well design.
Throughout this document, references are made to existing Shell, government, and Industry
standards. The most recent standards will take precedence over what is written in this guide.
Although this document contains some sour operational procedures that are integral to sour
design, it is by no means comprehensive. It is intended that the details of sour well design and
procedures be included in sour chapters of existing wells standards. For example, there is a sour
section in the Casing and Tubing Design Manual1. Sour sections will be added to other well
standards in the future.
Consult the latest version of the Shell HSSE Control Framework5 for H2S HSSE related standards
and procedures.
Throughout this document reference is made to high risk wells and low risk wells. This is an
attempt to categorize the very diverse range of H2S levels, types of wells, and physical locations
into just 2 broad classes. The table below can be used as a guide, although this is not an absolute
definition and specific circumstances will override.
High Risk Low Risk

Design Fully into the Sulphide In the Sulphide Stress Cracking Regime for
Stress Cracking Regime for materials. However borderline
materials. circumstances may be suitable for a fit-for-
purpose design.
HSE Lethal. Non-lethal, especially if below the
Occupational Exposure Limit (OEL).
Risk Assessment For the purposes of this For the purposes of this guide, RAM
Matrix (RAM) guide, RAM categories categories blue.
yellow and red.
Quantification of Sulphide Stress Cracking and toxicity are provided in the body of the document.
Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM)5
Note that HPHT wells, especially offshore, could be considered High Risk RAM yellow category, even at
very low H2S concentrations, and should be designed accordingly.
Recommendations for design and procedures listed in this document are suitable for all sour wells.
Alternatives are provided for low risk wells. It is up to the user to do a risk assessment on both
the probability of a failure and the consequences of that failure before using these alternatives.
2. Prevention and Mitigation

This is not indented to be a complete ―bow-tie‖ analysis for sour wells. The ―bow-tie‖ concept is
used here to illustrate some of the additional issues that need to be considered when planning
sour wells.
Hazards and Effects Analysis
2.1. Risk
Remembering that Risk = Probability x Consequence, efforts on the left side of the Hazards &
Effects (HEMP) Bow-Tie are to reduce the probability of an uncontrolled release by the effective
use of barriers.
Efforts on the right hand side of the HEMP bow-tie are to mitigate the consequence of an
uncontrolled release.
2.2. Barriers
The barrier philosophy is aligned with the standards outlined in the ―Shell Casing and Tubing
Design Manual‖1, the ―Pressure Control Manual for Drilling, Completion and Well Intervention
Operations‖2, and the ―EP Well Integrity Management Manual‖3. Hence for sour wells, 2 physical
barriers need to be used as a minimum, 3 are preferred.
The use of a Surface Controlled Subsurface Safety Valve (SCSSV) as a barrier is usually not
allowed as part of the 2 main barriers because they are not totally leak proof. The Shell Pressure
Control Manual2 states, “Safety valves are generally considered a barrier if inflow tested with a
zero leak rate. (NB API definition of a sub surface safety valve includes an acceptable leak rate).”
Hence, it is recommended to limit a SCSSV to a 3rd barrier and to also do a risk review and
follow the ―Discipline Controls and Assurance Framework‖ in wells (DCAF)4 for approval.
Just like any non-sour operation, the Shell Pressure Control Manual2 states “One barrier may be
acceptable only in the case were the well cannot produce to the environment without the use of
pressure boosting. A risk assessment must prove the acceptability of operating under a single
barrier protection. Details will be documented in the drilling program.” The ―EP Well Integrity
Management Manual‖3 further notes that this will require Technical Authority approval following
the DCAF4 process. An example where a single barrier may be acceptable is a low risk, low GOR
oil well on artificial lift. Note that some local government regulations forbid the use of only 1
barrier.
 With only a single barrier (e.g. packerless completion of an oil well on artificial lift), one
needs to pay closer attention to both the design (e.g. perhaps more corrosion allowance in
the casing thickness or cathodic protection) and the safety critical tasks to make sure the
single barrier is still acceptable (e.g. more frequent pressure tests or inspection logs of the
casing).
 Escalation factors need to be carefully reviewed when considering any deviation.
2.3. Mitigation
Because of the risk of H2S toxic harm to people, more attention needs to be applied to Emergency
Response Planning (ERP) for both to the well crews and the public.
 For high risk wells, the toxic plume for an uncontrolled release can spread quickly and
endanger both nearby oilfield workers and the public. Hence, a good ERP will include: 5,6,7,8
- An estimate of the plume toxic area created by a full blowout. This is usually done by
using a computer dispersion model for a non-buoyant plume (plume is very cold due to
sonic velocity at the exit point). There is much debate over the appropriate toxic load to
be used in the dispersion models for public safety during an emergency. This is different
than the long term Occupational Exposure Limit (OEL, see section 3.1) used for non-
emergencies. Often a value of 100 ppm over a 30 minute exposure time is used6,66 for
emergency planning. Consult your local operating company policies and government
regulations.
- A plan for temporary safe refuge and evacuation for both workers and public. Planning
for large population centres such as schools and towns is especially important. There
should be more than one evacuation route for the public.
- Pre-education of those within the potential toxic plume area.
- A rapid notification system to alert the public in case of an emergency.
- A barricaded exclusion zone during the emergency.
- Mobile air quality measurement systems.
- A medical emergency response system.
- A clear company internal communication system with clearly identified roles and
responsibilities.
- Ignition criteria. Often, the dispersion modeling indicates that the toxic H2S plume would
spread so rapidly that the company man on-site needs to take immediate action to ignite
the blowout, thereby turning H2S into SO2. SO2 is also toxic, but the burning
hydrocarbon now wafts the SO2 high in the air and dilutes it.
 One should consider wellsite specific ERPs for high risk wells. For low risk wells, an inclusive
field wide ERP may be sufficient. In any case, clear ERP responsibilities between the wells
department and the operating department need to be established.
The operating company should conduct mock well ERP exercises on a regular basis. Practices
such as this are an excellent way to train the key people (Operator, service companies,
government agencies, & the public) in order to improve upon weaknesses found in the system.
A Surface Controlled Subsurface Safety Valve (SCSSV) should be considered part of the
mitigation strategy in that it reduces the amount of uncontrolled flow should a major wellhead
failure occur. Hence, it is great insurance in case of insurrection. They are generally set up so they
close on such indicators as low pipeline or tubing head pressure and so would not close with
small leaks. They could be setup to close in conjunction with H2S detection systems at the wellsite
provided one is satisfied with H2S detectors integrity when exposed to the extremes of outside
conditions.
3. HSSE
The Shell ―HSSE & SP Control Framework‖5 defines and communicates HSSE & SP requirements.
This framework can be found at http://sww.manuals.shell.com/HSSE/. It currently contains
requirements for Acute Toxic Substances such as H2S and Process Safety Basic Requirement
(PSBR) 10, ―Sour Gas (H2S)‖.
The HSSE Control Framework is currently undergoing transition from the EP HSSE requirements &
guidelines documented in the EP 2005 and EP 95 series.
Until the transition to this framework is complete, several relevant EP-95 documents are still
available at http://sww.shell.com/bms/Common/hsse/index.html.
In addition, most regions with sour operations have developed their own local H2S HSSE
Standards & Procedures. Local examples can be found in references 9, 10, 11 & 12.
Some Shell Design & Engineering Practices (DEPs) have relevance to H2S related HSSE.13,14 API
RP 497 and API PR 688 also contain HSE related recommendations.
Although the following sections provides some of the Wells H2S related HSSE information, always
consult the ―HSSE & SP Control Framework‖ 5 and your HSSE representative for the most recent
H2S related HSSE standards and procedures.
3.1. Hydrogen Sulphide (H2S) Properties

Data from references 15 and 16.
Physical State: Colourless Gas
Odour: Rotten egg odour
Odour Threshold: 0.005 ppm
Freezing/Pour Point: -85 °C
Boiling Point: -60 °C
Vapour Density (Air = 1): 1.2
Lower Flammable Limit: 4 % (by vol. In air)
Upper Flammable Limit: 44 % (by vol. In air)
Auto-ignition Temperature: 260 °C
Solubility in Water: 4 g/L (at 20 °C)
Molecular Weight: 34.1 grams
Reactivity: H2S can form pyrophoric iron sulphide on internal
metal surfaces in the absence of oxygen. This can
auto ignite when it comes into contact with air.
H2S toxicity levels5,17,18,66

H2 S % H2S ppm Hazard
0.0001 1 Offensive odour
0.001 10 Generally accepted Occupational Exposure Limit, OEL (time
weighted average) Respiratory protection required beyond
this level. See note below*.
0.002 – 0.02 20- 200 Loss of smell and eye and throat irritation.
0.01 100 Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH). Often a
value of 100 ppm over a 30 minute exposure time is used for
Emergency Planning and Evacuation6,66.
0.02- 0.05 200 - Loss of breathing and death within hours
500
0.05 - 0.07 500 - Affects central nervous system, loss of reasoning, loss of
700 balance, unconscious and breathing stops within minutes.
0.07 + 700+ Immediately unconscious. Permanent brain damage and death
if not rescued immediately.
* Note that this OEL value varies according to local government regulation. In many areas of the
world, it was set at 10 ppm based on values published by the American Conference of
Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH). ACGIH changed their values in year 201018.
The American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) houses the committee
that investigates, recommends, and annually reviews safe exposure limits for chemical substances.
The Threshold Limit Value (TLV) of a chemical substance is a level to which it is believed a worker can be exposed, day
after day for a working lifetime, without adverse health effects.
 The Threshold Limit Value - Time Weighted Average (TLV-TWA) is the average exposure on the basis of an
8h/day, 40h/week work schedule. For H2S, the TLV-TWA was 10ppm (since 1966). Early in 2010 the
ACGIH lowered the TLV-TWA to 1ppm.
 The Threshold Limit Value - Short Term Exposure Limit (TLV-STEL) relates to spot exposure for a duration of 15
minutes that cannot be repeated more than 4 times a day. The TLV-STEL for H2S was15ppm (since 1976); it
is now 5ppm.
The Shell Health organization has decided in 2010 that Shell will use their ―OEL Protocol‖ for H2S
and that there will not be a Shell Global OEL standard value for H2S19.
Consult your local Hygienist for the Occupational Exposure Limit (OEL) to use for your area!
3.2. Sulphur Dioxide (SO2) Properties

When H2S is burnt, sulphur dioxide (SO2) is formed. It is also toxic, but has the advantage of
being more readily dispersed because the heat of the flame helps to waft the SO2 into the air and
mix with the air diluting it before coming back to the ground.
Note the values quoted in this table74,75 vary slightly from reference to reference:
Physical State: Colourless Gas

Odour: Strong pungent, irritating odour
Odour Threshold: 0.5-3 ppm
Melting / Freezing Point: -76oC
Boiling Point: -10oC
Vapour Density (Air = 1): 2.26 at 0°C (significantly heavier than air)
Molecular Weight: 64.06
Flammable Limit: Not flammable
Solubility in Water: 11.9 % by weight in water at 15 °C. 85 g/L at 25oC.
Sulphur Dioxide is rapidly converted to sulphuric acid with
low pH.
Toxicity Levels18,66,74
SO2 g/m3 SO2 SO2 Hazard
µg/m3 ppm
0.005320 5,320 2 Threshold Limit Value for 8 hr Time Weighted
Average (TLV- TWA) exposure & the most
often used Occupational Exposure Limit (OEL).
0.0133 13,300 5 TLV - Short Term Exposure Limit of 15 minutes.
0.262 262,000 100 Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health
(IDLH)
3.3. H2S training

All workers on a sour site need to have basic H2S training & certification including knowledge of
H2S properties, its effect on humans, hand held H2S detection systems, types of breathing
apparatus (self contained, supplied air, escape packs) and when to use each type, practice with
the breathing apparatus, and individual emergency response actions5,7,8.
Most areas that have sour oilfield operations also have commercial H2S courses available to them.
An example would be H2S Alive put on by Enform in Canada17. Some Operating Companies
have developed their own in-house courses.
Crews need to take training for H2S emergencies before entering the sour zone and during work
in the sour zone. This re-enforces individual responsibilities and actions during an H2S release5.
3.4. Breathing Apparatus

It is recommended that a worker not be asked to routinely work in an H2S environment without the
use of breathing apparatus, regardless of the Occupational Exposure Limit (OEL) as per the
Personal Protective Equipment section in Shell’s ―HSSE & SP Control Framework Commitment &
Policy‖5.
Although easier to implement in new field developments, this may be impractical for some existing
low H2S field wide situations such as < 10 ppm open system sour waterfloods.
 Breathing System types:
- Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) with a full face mask and backpack
mounted tank with regulator.
- Supplied Air Breathing Apparatus (SABA) with a full face mask and regulator hooked
up to an air hose being fed by a bank of pressurized air bottles, often referred to as a
cascade system. The air bottles are in turn re-supplied by air compressors, sometimes
on-site in remote locations.
- Escape pack consisting of a full face mask and a small air bottle with just enough air to
escape from the high H2S zone. This small air cylinder must be used in conjunction with
SABA in case the main air supply is cut for some reason. An escape pack can also be
used by individuals on a sour site for escape purposes only (depending on company
policy).
 A positive pressure demand face mask system (supplies more pressure inside the mask than
outside) is recommended over a pressure demand system (works on a negative pressure
when you take a breath to supply the air)5,7,8.
 There are 2 basic types of masks; one that seals on the face itself which requires a clean
shaven face and a cowl devise that affects a type of seal around the neck for full beard
situations. What particular brand and model to use is beyond the scope of this document.
Contact your HSE specialist.
 There has recently been a lot of discussion on the respirator protection factor (or workplace
protection factor - WPF). This is the ratio between the H2S concentration outside the face
piece and its concentration inside the face piece (i.e. a measure of seal efficiency).
Manufactures and various agencies20,21 publish values for different types of masks. When
applying these values, there is a concern that current masks are unsuitable for very high H2S
levels.
- For wells work, a worker should not be expected to routinely work in a high H2S
environment. That is to say, the breathing apparatus is not a primary barrier for worker
safety, but is used in case H2S is inadvertently present (e.g. when breaking pressure
components after bleeding and purging).
- There are a few non-emergency exceptions where the worker may be exposed to H2S
such as pulling sour core, or working on the mud tanks after circulating sour fluid to
surface, and taking well test separator atmospheric liquid samples. In these cases,
actions can be used to reduce the exposure:
- Let the core de-gas in the wellbore near the surface before pulling above the floor.
- Increased ventilation on the rig floor and mud tanks.
- For emergency situations such as a kick or uncontrolled flow, the majority of the
workers need to be evacuated (to temporary safe shelters initially if in remote
locations) with only a critical few exposed to the effluent for only as long as it takes
to perform their designated emergency action.
Consult your HSE specialist for more detailed and up-to-date advice.
SR.11.10961 - 10 - Restricted
3.5. H2S Monitors and Meters

Consult your local specialist on the type and brand to use in your circumstances. Below is a short
listing of generic types and common uses.
 Portable personal monitors used by workers to alert them of the presence of H2S in order to
evacuate safely.
 Portable length of stain tube devices used to check for the presence of H2S in conjunction with
using breathing apparatus.
- Common types are the Draeger bellows unit and the GasTech piston unit. Both use
length of stain tubes.
- Can also be used to test for H2S content in the gas during a well test.
 Portable hand held electrical measurement devices are sometimes used instead of length of
stain tube devices to check for the presence of H2S. Often these devices have multi-heads for
detecting other gases and explosion limits.
 Portable electrical monitors used in areas where H2S may be expected should there be a
release7,8.
- At the shale shaker & mud tanks, inside substructures, rig floor, driller’s station, bell
nipple, living quarters, etc.
- Around well test equipment.
- Sometimes used above the pack-off on wireline or coiled tubing.
- Around other sour facilities when conducting SIMOPS.
- Place portable H2S and SO2 monitors at strategic locations where a plume from a well
test flare is expected to be.
 Locate windsocks on the location so they can be seen from the operating areas.
3.6. Venting versus Burning

It is recommended that all pressure containing equipment be first de-pressured, then purged with
a sweet fluid, and then opened while wearing breathing apparatus with a back-up buddy.
 This ensures maximum worker safety in that the pressure equipment should have no H2S in it
when the pressure seal is broken and so the breathing apparatus in this case is not a primary
barrier, but is worn in case the purge was not sufficient.
 For low risk wells it may be acceptable to eliminate the purge step provided the H2S levels
are below the accepted OEL value.
It is recommended that all sour gas emanating from depressurizing operations be burnt
converting the H2S to SO2.
 For high concentrations of H2S, this is a basic worksite safety requirement. There are
documented cases where high H2S gas was not burned, but inadvertently vented from a
wireline lubricator and this increased the H2S concentration around the wellsite to values
above the OEL22.
 For low risk wells, especially if the H2S level is below the OEL value, one may consider
venting instead of burning the gas.
- Venting may be an option to consider where routine flare options are not readily
available such as some configurations on offshore wells or remote land locations with no
near-by public. The vent lines should extend a good distance downwind away from the
work area and wearing masks during venting would be a prudent precaution.
- However, one must realize that the worker is knowingly being exposed to H2S. Hence,
do an ALARP review (As Low As Reasonably Practical) before adopting venting. Also see
section 3.4.
It is recommended that all sour gas kicks be burnt converting the H2S to SO2.
 Same reasoning as for depressurizing operations except the volumes are bigger and hence
more risk in venting. ―EP 95-0210 Drilling HSE Manual‖5 states that the outlet from the
vacuum degasser and the mud-gas separator be burnt. An auto ignition system or continuous
pilot is also recommended.
 Similarly, for very low risk wells, especially if the H2S level is below the OEL value, one may
consider venting instead of burning the gas following the same reasoning and precautions
and ALARP review as given for depressurizing operations.
It is highly recommended that all sour well test fluid be burnt converting the H2S to SO2.
 Same reasoning as above except the volumes are vastly larger and hence there is far more
risk in venting.
 Similarly, for very low risk wells, especially if the H2S level is below the OEL value, although
not preferred, one may consider venting instead of burning the gas following the same
reasoning and precautions and ALARP review as described above.
3.7. Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS or Concurrent Operations)

SIMOPS can be and have been successfully carried out on sour installations. This may include
Drilling and Drilling, Drilling and Completions/Well Intervention, Drilling and Production,
Completions/Well Intervention and Production, sour to sour and sour to sweet, etc.
 Shell has SIMOPS experience in sour offshore fields such as the Fairway field in Alabama
USA with about 1.5% H2S and the Pearl project in Qatar with about 1% H2S23. Shell Canada
has conducted SIMOPS on land exceeding 15% H2S. Petroleum Development Oman (PDO)
has done SIMOPS on land in the 2-5% H2S range.
 It is recommended upgrading any existing SIMOPS plan originally designed for sweet
operations as there may be more sour rig activities that require the other operation to shut-
down and vice versa.
 The use of a SCSSV is recommended in the producing wells as an additional mitigation
measure that can be closed during some well construction operations (e.g. raising the
derrick). It also acts to mitigate the size of the release should the producing wellhead have a
catastrophic failure and helps to prevent the spread of the blowout fire to the adjacent
operation.
 The use of portable H2S monitors placed strategically around the respective operations is
recommended.
 Barriers and exclusion zones may be more restrictive with sour SIMOPS.
 The Emergency Response Plan (ERP) for Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPs) during an
emergency needs to include sour specific issues. For example, adjacent operations may need
to be shut-down and de-manned at an earlier stage of the emergency, especially in isolated
locations such as offshore platforms, or if a blowout needs immediate ignition.
4. Material Selection
4.1. General
The Shell Casing and Tubing Design manual1 states, “Well construction materials SHALL be
selected to withstand the construction and production fluids environment during the planned
lifetime of the well.” For sour wells, materials selection needs to consider catastrophic cracking
which can occur quite fast and is controlled by use of crack resistant material; and also corrosion
due to exposure to H2S and CO2 acid gases, which may be mitigated by use of corrosion resistant
materials or chemical treatment.
In addition to this guideline, it is recommended that team members engaging in sour operations
have basic sour materials training and that sour materials expert advice be sought early on in the
design stage.
Cracking:
 It is important to note that H2S related cracking failure can occur within a few hours of
exposure. For this reason, especially if the H2S concentration is uncertain, a robust sour
material approach is recommended because operational response time to alleviate the
problem may not be available.
 As paraphrased from the ―Shell Casing and Tubing Design Guide‖1, mechanisms of failure
involving H2S can be classified as Environment Assisted Cracking (EAC). It can occur in many
materials, is dependent on the pH level, the temperature, and the mechanical stress level24.
EAC includes phenomena such as Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC), Sulphide Stress Cracking
(SSC) and Hydrogen Induced Cracking (HIC), and it manifests itself by two failure
mechanisms: Crack Initiation and Crack Propagation.
 As can be seen in the reproduced graph from ISO 15156-2:20031,24, it only takes 0.05 psi
(0.3 kPa) H2S partial pressure before standard materials are susceptible to SSC.
The non-cracking region is below 0.05 psi partial pressure regardless of the pH. Regions
1,2,3,& 4 lying to the right of the vertical 0.05 psi pp line outline zones of increasing
cracking severity and hence there are more limits on the material specs when moving from
region 1 through 4.
In a mixture of gases, the partial pressure of each individual component is equal to its mole
fraction in the mixture times the total gas pressure. For practical purposes for most gases
encountered in the oilfield, the mole fraction is roughly equal to the volume fraction. Hence:
H2S Partial Pressure (pp) = Total System Pressure x H2S concentration (ppm) x 1/1,000,000.
Example:
H2S pp = 5000 psi x 50 ppm / 1,000,000 = 0.25 psi. This is clearly into the SSC cracking
regime. The next step would be determining the system pH to see what SSC region your
application falls into. There are techniques to determine the system pH in ISO 1515624 and in
various Shell tools68.
Understanding and using ISO 15156 effectively is very difficult for the casual user and so it is
advisable to consult your sour materials expert if your application is in any of the SSC
regions.
 To ensure the material is resistant to H2S related cracking all sour fluid wet parts need to, as
a minimum, conform the Shell Casing and Tubing Design Manual 1 and DEP 30.10.02.15-
Gen - Materials for Use in H2S Containing Environments‖ 71, both of which have strict sour
service requirements in line with but generally exceeding those in ISO 15156 Sour Service
Material Specifications24.
 For marginal materials, especially if just into the ISO cracking regime, a Fit-for-Purpose
design may be possible1. Consult Shell’s sour service materials Principal Technical Expert
(PTE) or Subject Matter Expert (SME) who can help with fit-for-purpose design and failure risk
analysis.
 A lot of other relevant Shell sour material information can be found in the current listing of
Shell Design & Engineering Practices (DEPs)29: For example; ―DEP 39-01-10-12 - Selection of
Material For Life Cycle Performance- Upstream Equipment‖69, ―DEP 39-01-20-30 -
Corrosion-Resistant Alloy Seamless Tubes For Use As Casing, Tubing And Coupling Stock‖70,
―DEP-01-10-32-Gen - Specification of Nickel Base Alloy 718‖26.
 References 25, 68, & 69 contain lists of NACE / ISO material that Shell has found not
suitable for sour service in wells. The revised DEP 30.10.02.15-Gen71 due to be issued in
2011 should also contain a similar listing. Once issued, it should be used as the main
reference. In the meantime below are excerpts from references 25, 68, & 69 highlighting
some unsuitable material that often shows up in well equipment:
- Austenitic stainless steel UNS 30400 (also known as AISI type 304 stainless steel).
- Precipitation-hardened martensitic stainless steels, e.g. UNS S17400 (also known as 17-
4 PH). This sometimes shows up in valve stems and wellheads and in small assemblies in
downhole tools because it has a high strength. Shell has had failures in well
applications. It is sometimes used successfully in low stress situations (ensure the
consequence of failure is tolerable).
- Nickel-copper alloys such as UNS N04400 (also known as Monel 400), and N05500
(also known as Monel K-500). Sometimes shows up in bolting.
- Monel is commonly used for non-magnetic drill collars where it is an acceptable risk
because the collars either have very little tensile load compared to their yield or they
are in compression. In addition, if they fail, it is unlikely that well control would be
lost.
- Monel & 9Cr1Mo (& sometimes 110 grade carbon steel) shows up in downhole lock
mandrels and nipples because it is the world standard for sweet service due to its
good strength and will not rust when sitting on the shelf.
- Precipitation-hardened nickel-based superalloy UNS N07750 (also known as Inconel
X750). Sometimes thought to be interchangeable with Inconel 718, but it is not!
Sometimes shows up in springs.
- For Precipitation-hardened nickel-based superalloy UNS N07718 (such as Inconel 718),
follow the specification set out in DEP 31.01.10.3226 (API 6A 71867 with restrictions).
 Use of non-sour spec material may be acceptable provided the operating temperature always
exceeds a specified threshold temperature. The Shell Casing and Tubing Design Manual1 and
ISO 1515624 outline these values for various casing and tubing grades (e.g. greater than
150oF, 65oC for N-80 type Q & C-95, greater than 175oF, 80oC for N-80 & P110, and
greater than 225oF, 107oC for Q125).
API RP 7G ―Recommended Practices for Drill Stem Design and Operating Limits‖35 suggests it
is acceptable to use a temperature threshold as low as 135oF (57oC) for some ―marginally
susceptible materials‖. However, bear in mind many drilling components are high strength
and highly stressed and so would not fit into this ―marginally susceptible‖ category.
- If planning on using non ISO sour spec material, all temperature cases need to be
reviewed to ensure the temperature criterion is adhered to.
- Examples are: circulating out a highly sour drilling kick, cooling bullhead kill down
the tubing with sour gas in the annulus, or lost circulation on a workover cooling the
well followed by a kick.
- Generally speaking, the H2S source contacting the temperature sensitive low alloy
steel needs to be removed before cooling the metal. For example, a kill that removes
the H2S exposure just before it cools the metal. Shell materials experts are hoping to
more fully quantify the cooling conditions that lead to failure in the near future.
- It is highly recommended to seek advice from Shell’s sour service materials Principal
Technical Expert (PTE) or Subject Matter Expert (SME) if you are planning on utilizing
this threshold temperature technique.
 Safety critical equipment (e.g. pressure barrier control devices like wellheads, lubricators,
stuffing boxes, BOPs, chokes, tubing and casing and their accessories, packers, etc) should
not only be sour service qualified but also adhere to strict material Quality Assurance and
Quality Control procedures and be traceable. The Shell Casing and Tubing Design Manual1
and Canada’s IRPs30,31 have many references to this requirement.
Corrosion:
In addition to SCC and SSC, corrosion must also be considered in the design of sour wells.
For corrosion to take place there must be a water phase present and water is present in most sour
hydrocarbon wells due to water of condensation or the production of free formation water.
Corrosion is either dominated by H2S which usually forms a protective iron sulphide scale (FeS),
or by CO2 which will form a far less protective iron carbonate scale. Hence, an H2S dominated
corrosion rate will be lower than a CO2 dominated corrosion rate. The corrosion is considered to
be H2S dominated forming an iron sulphide film if the partial pressure ratio is pCO2 / pH2S <
2027.
 However, if iron sulphide scale destabilizers are present, such as chlorides (Cl-) or free
elemental sulphur, the corrosion rates by pitting will be significantly higher27,28.
- Elemental sulphur will destabilize an iron sulphide film resulting in aggressive pitting.
Elemental sulphur can be either produced by the well itself or created by oxygen
contamination reacting with H2S. For example, a sour water injection system with
oxygen contamination will both create sulphur and destabilize the iron sulphide film.
Corrosion inhibition or alternative materials such as high nickel CRA may need to be
used.
- High chloride levels disrupt the normally protective iron sulphide (Fe2S) scale on carbon
steel 27,28. Free formation water often contains very high Cl- levels. Corrosion inhibition
or alternative materials such as high nickel CRA may need to be used.
- Spent HCl acid water also contains high Cl- levels that may affect pipeline corrosion and
may also affect well tubing, especially if the well takes a long time to clean-up post
stimulation. Typically nothing is done about the tubing for this short duration clean-up,
although a batch corrosion inhibitor could be used. Pipeline protection guidance is given
in reference 28.
 CO2 dominated corrosion rates can be high (> 25 mm/yr) in certain conditions of CO2
partial pressure, temperature, and flow. Corrosion inhibition can be effective in controlling
this type of corrosion.
 Specialist support should be sought in assessing H2S and CO2 corrosion rates and corrosion
control by chemical inhibition in wells.
 Corrosion may be tolerated by well components to a greater or lesser degree, depending
upon required functionality and local economics. Since a small amount of corrosion on a
valve gate, flapper, or seat may completely destroy its function, corrosion resistant trim
should be considered for these and similar components.
4.2. Casing and Tubing

Sour service casing and tubing material standards are set out in the Shell Casing and Tubing
Design Manual1.
This Design Manual states, “If a sour reservoir is targeted, or if the reservoir may become sour
during the well’s design life due to, for example, seawater flooding, the tubing and production
casing shall be properly specified for EAC (Environment Assisted Cracking) resistance. This shall
also be the case for exploration wells or injection wells that are used for short-term production
(such as DSTs).
When drilling through a possibly sour zone, intermediate casings shall be fully EAC resistant in
the standard case (see Chapter 6.7.3.a of reference 1). However, the intermediate casings are not
required to be fully EAC resistant in a fit-for-purpose kick design approach (see Chapter 6.7.3.b
of reference 1), provided the drilling procedure ensures any sour kick is scavenged or bullheaded.
Wells that drill through (potentially) sour formations shall make use of drilling tubulars, wellheads,
BOPs, rig and crew capable of operating in a sour environment.”
 As can be seen, the standard design case is to make the casing / wellhead / BOP system
sour spec if drilling through a sour zone and for producing a sour zone. It is recommended
that this standard fully SSC resistant system design be used for most sour wells and for sure
on all high risk wells30.
 When drilling through a sour zone, a fit-for-purpose (FFP) alternative of scavenging the H2S
or bullheading a kick is available for intermediate drilling casing / liner systems. One could
consider this option for low risk wells. Items to consider are:
- Effective scavenging of high concentrations of H2S / sulphides is difficult and the

scavenging process is relatively slow. Hence the recommendation to limit to low H2S
wells.
- Chapter 6.7.3.b the Casing & Tubing Design Manual1 states, ”FFP design to alternative
kick intensity or limited kick volume shall take account of the well control infrastructure,
the well control response time, the capacity to bullhead a kick into formation, and the
consequence of failure of containment. Design to alternative kick intensity or to limited
kick volume shall be approved by the Wells DTA (Delegated Technical Authority) with
technical input by the applicable Wells QTP (Qualified Technical Professional as defined
in DCAF).”
- There could be several escalation factors that would bring sour fluids in contact with
the intermediate casing, BOPs, and upper section of drill pipe. Examples are: a
power failure so can’t pump, can’t bullhead with existing pumps, bullheading
fractures the formation and causes massive lost circulation which takes all the drilling
fluid on location, weather or insurrection conditions forcing personnel evacuation or
riser disconnect, bit plugged so can’t circulate, chokes washed out with no more
replacement parts onsite, etc.
4.3. Accessories
If the casing and tubing needs to be sour spec, then the fluid wet parts of the associated
accessories also need to be sour spec. In principal, the same quality assurance and quality control
should be applied to these components as the tubular goods.
Accessories cannot usually be made from casing or tubing or coupling stock. Hence, these
components are usually made from UNS G41xxo (formerly AISI 41xx) carbon steel with
appropriate chemistry, heat treating, and hardness to provide a sulphide stress cracking resistant
product with a yield strength of about 80 000 psi.
―DEP 30.10.02.15-Gen - Materials for Use in H2S Containing Environments‖71 (ISO 1515624 with
restrictions) should be used to ensure appropriate properties for sour service.
 References listed in section 4.1 are other valuable sources of information on materials for
accessories. Canada’s IRP Volume II on Completions, section 2.3 on accessories is non Shell
source of materials information31.
 Warning: 9Cr1Mo or Monel (& sometimes 110 grade carbon steel) are common materials
used in flow control lock mandrels and nipples because it is the world standard for sweet
service due to its good strength and will not rust when sitting on the shelf. These should not be
used in sour service25,68,69.
- Use UNS G41xxo (AISI 41xx) nipples and mandrels and prongs.
Warning: This reduces the pressure differential rating of the plugs because of the slightly
lower yield strength.
- If higher pressure differentials are needed, then use higher yield strength, high nickel
CRA.
 Some components such as packer slips need to be hard. This is usually acceptable because
the components that operate with compressive loads making them less susceptible to
hydrogen sulphide stress corrosion cracking because cracking is considered a tension failure
and so there should be no SSC in a pure compression mode (all 3 principal stresses in
compression).
- Be aware that many components that have a compressive load also have a tensile stress
(e.g. a compressive axial load with a bursting pressure or bending stress).
If corrosion resistance (due to high Cl- water for instance) or high strength is needed in addition to
hydrogen sulphide stress cracking resistance, then high nickel CRA parts are needed.
 DEP 30.10.02.15-Gen71 (ISO 1515624 with restrictions) should be used to ensure
appropriate CRA properties for the environment.
 Appropriately sourced26,71 Inconel 718, Hasteloy 625, and Incoloy 925 are often used for
fluid wet parts of packers, tailpipes, and flow control devices such as nipples, SCSSVs, etc.
- Galvanic corrosion with high nickel CRA components attached to carbon steel tubing is
not an issue.
4.4. BOP Material

As per the Shell Casing and Tubing Design Manual1, ”Wells that drill through (potentially) sour
formations shall make use of drilling tubulars, wellheads, BOPs, rig and crew capable of
operating in a sour environment.” Hence, the fluid wet pressure containing components of the
BOP system need to be sour spec when drilling or working over a sour zone.
For sour material selection, follow DEP 30.10.02.15-Gen71 (ISO 1515624 with restrictions). Also
review section 20 of API RP 53 ―Recommended Practices for Blowout Prevention Equipment
Systems for Drilling Wells32 and API 16A ―Specification for Drill-through Equipment33.
 Fluid wet components include all associated valves, gauges, choke lines to the downstream
valves on the choke manifold.
 The components should be certifiable and traceable as sour service. Qualifying existing
equipment such as BOPs for drilling rigs, hoists, CT, & wireline will be problematic since
there may be no material traceability.
- As an alternate to buying new traceable DEP 30.10.02.15-Gen71 components for low
risk wells, this traceability issue may be overcome with the involvement of a materials
specialist, by doing metallurgical tests such as hardness checks and chemical checks (by
scraping a metal sample from the equipment).
- Welded areas are always suspect because the heat affected zone is usually not sulphide
stress crack resistant unless it is properly pre and post weld heat treated.
- If in doubt about an elastomeric material, change it out.
 Nitrile Butyl Rubber (NBR) is the most common elastomer used for the main sealing elements
in the BOP rams. Nitrile does deteriorate in H2S by hardening and cracking. Hence pre-job
checks and again after a major well control event would be prudent. Hydrogenated Nitrile
Butyl Rubber (HNBR) is more resistant, but about twice the price. Annular BOP seal elements
are usually natural rubber which has better H2S resistance than Nitrile.
 BOP flange bolting can be a controversial issue since they are not fluid wet components and
not normally exposed to H2S. Three options exist: 24,30,34
- Use of ASTM B7 & L7, which does not meet the sour service material requirements of
ISO 15156, but provides full API pressure rating. Before using this option, carefully
review the risk of H2S exposure (e.g. escalating factors such as flange leaks).
- Use of ASTM B7M & L7M, which meet the sour service material requirements of ISO
15156 but may require pressure de-rating of the BOP stack in some sizes (API 6A34).
- Use of high strength, high alloy bolting, (such as ASTM 453 Grade 660), stamped A2
or equivalent. These materials are SSC resistant and of strength comparable to B7
bolting.
 Shear Rams are most often not fully sour spec.
- The shear ram block can be made sour spec. The 2009 version of ISO 1515624 states
for shear rams, “Rams manufactured in quenched and tempered, Cr-Mo low alloy steels
(UNS G41XX0, formerly AISI 4IXX, and modifications) are acceptable if the hardness
does not exceed 26 HRC. If the hardness of these alloys exceeds 22 HRC, careful
attention shall be paid to chemical composition and heat treatment to ensure their SSC
resistance. SSC testing, as agreed with the equipment user, shall demonstrate that the
performance of the alloy meets or exceeds that of field proven material.”
- Note the onus placed on the user to agree with the material selection and testing.
- ISO 1515624 recognizes that the cutting edge of the shear blades needs to be very hard
and so the 2009 version states, “The high strength steels used for blowout preventer
(BOP) shear blades can be susceptible to SSC. The suitability of shear blades that do not
comply with this annex is the responsibility of the equipment user.”
- Note the responsibility is placed on the user.
- The BOP suppliers will often state that their shear blades are NACE / ISO compliant.
However, one can see from the ISO statements that this in itself is insufficient information
for the user. Most suppliers will not reveal the exact material of the shear ram body let
alone the cutting edge. It is believed that most cutting edges are carbon steel hardened
by carburizing or similar processes and hence not truly SSC resistant.
- It may be possible to make blades hard enough out of sour spec MP35N or titanium
or similar material.
- See EP 2002-1500 ―Pressure Control Manual for Drilling, Completion and Well
Intervention Operations‖2 for further details. Contact the Well Control and BOP
equipment Principal Technical Experts (PTEs) for the most current advice.
4.5. Wellheads
If the casing and tubing needs to be sour spec, then the fluid wet pressure containing components
of the wellhead system also need to be sour spec as per API 6A34. Bolting issues are similar to that
for BOPs.
If corrosion is also expected, the fluid wet parts of the wellhead can be clad with high nickel CRA.
4.6. Drill String

Sour service drill pipe is recommended for high risk wells, especially if a sour gas kick is
anticipated7,30. Drill pipe a critical pressure containing item in the wellbore which should not fail
during a sour gas kick.
 API RP 7G35 mentions sulphide stress cracking resistant material and refers to NACE MR-01-
75 (now ISO 15156). Far more detail is contained in Canada’s IRP Volume 1 on Drilling
Critical Sour Wells30 which lists fully sour service drill pipe and tool joint specifications. This
was initially developed in Canada because a non-sour spec drill pipe parted during a
significant sour gas blow-out in 1982 which complicated the well control efforts36. In fact
many of the recommendations in the IRP can be attributed to the learnings of that blowout.
Note that the material specs in IRP 1 were written by now retired Shell Canada materials
experts.
 IRP Volume 1 also describes an option for hardness testing of existing non sour spec H, E and
G grades of drill pipe. This option was phased out in Canada in 2010 for ―Critical Sour
Wells‖ (high risk wells in the terms of this document). However, it is still a valid option for low
risk wells.
 IRP Volume 1 also states that API grade S-135 drill pipe could be used with “strict exposure
control since S-135 is highly susceptible to both H2S and chloride-induced failure.”
Exposure control would entail strict drilling fluid pH control, zinc carbonate scavenging,
limiting the amount of exposure to small amounts of H2S such as drill gas & connection gas &
trip gas, and committing to bullheading larger kicks. It is recommended to conduct an
ALARP review and follow the Discipline Controls and Assurance Framework (DCAF) when
considering this option.
4.7. Welding
Welding is always difficult, especially in the field, because the heat affected zone is usually not
sulphide stress crack resistant unless it is properly preheated, normalized, and often post heat
treated. Some sour material welding information can be found in ISO 1515624 and also in
Canada’s IRP Volume I30 (including welding surface casing bowls).
Contact your material specialist for procedures and quality checks for welding sour service
material.
4.8. Elastomers
ASTM D471-06E158 or NACE TM0187773 can be used for elastomer testing. A good elastomer
guide for sour service can be found in section 2.11 of IRP Volume II on Completions31.
 Nitrile butyl rubber (NBR) is the most common elastomer used in the oil and gas industry.
- Nitrile does deteriorate in H2S by hardening and cracking. It is also susceptible to
deterioration in aromatic hydrocarbons and amine compounds.
- Never-the-less, Nitrile is often used for static seals in H2S service, such as BOP rams and
packer body main sealing elements.
 Hydrogenated nitrile butyl rubber (HNBR) is more resistant in H2S.
 Fluorocarbon (e.g. Viton) and Tetrafluoroethylene-propylene (e.g. Aflas) are often used in
dynamic seals such as packer locator seal assemblies. Aflas has poor low temperature
properties and some extrusion problems at high temperatures.
4.9. Fishing Equipment

Many components of fishing assemblies cannot be made to the ISO 1515624 sour service spec
because of the high strengths needed (e.g. overshot grapples).
Mitigations are:
 Fish in sweet fluid if possible.
- Fill well with workover brine / oil.

- Displace H2S gas with N2 if need to fish in gas filled hole.
 Change out tools regularly & then heat in the shop to remove hydrogen from the exposed
tools35 (materials experts can advise on temps and duration).
 Coat tools in a strong H2S inhibitor before running (e.g. Shell Canada has used Halliburton’s
CoilGard™ Sulphide Stress-Cracking Inhibitor and its predecessor, Crak-Chek-97).
4.10. Cement
For CO2 dominated systems, the CO2 can degrade Portland oilwell cement over time into calcium
carbonate, silica gel, and water via carbonic acid attack of the cement72. To reduce this effect, the
cement matrix permeability can be reduced by additives and the reactive Portland content can be
reduced by the use of silica flour and flyash. Alternately, non Portland systems can be used such
as Alumina based cement.
For H2S dominated systems, the degradation of Portland oilwell cement has not been problematic
because the reaction products created are less soluble than the calcium carbonate formed with
CO2 attack. Thus, the reaction products plug the cement matrix reducing further attack.
Combined CO2 / H2S systems are probably more aggressive than H2S alone. It is unknown at
what CO2 / H2S ratio the transition to CO2 dominated degradation happens. This is subject to
future research. However, there are a multitude of combined CO2 / H2S wells cemented with
Portland cement that have no known cement degradation issues. For example, Shell Canada has
60 years of history in cementing mixed CO2 / H2S systems with Portland cement with no issues
that can be attributed to cement degradation caused by acid gas attack. The CO2 / H2S ratio
ranged from 0.2 to 12.
It is beyond the scope of this document to provide any more detail, especially since the knowledge
in this area is evolving rapidly. Contact Shell’s cement Subject Matter Expert.
5. Drilling and Workover Fluid Systems

5.1. Facts of H2S in WaterH2S gas dissolves in water far more readily than methane.
 3.92 g/L (20 °C) for H2S compared to 0.035 g/L (17 °C) for methane. Source:
Wikipedia and NACE Corrosion Engineers Reference Book.
 Hence, when reducing the pressure of a sour water system, H2S gas will come out of
solution in much higher concentrations relative to the gas originally above the liquid.
Conditions where H2S toxicity is low for the primary gas stream may be many times
more toxic above depressured liquids. For example, this happens in the mud pits when
circulating a kick out and in the gas evolved in a low stage test separator.
 H2S gas rapidly dissociates into bi-sulphide (HS-) and sulphide (S=) ions in the presence of
water.
 This reaction is pH dependent and reversible.
 H2S will dissolve in both the oil phase and the water phase of an invert oil emulsion
drilling fluid.
5.2. Drilling Overbalanced

When drilling overbalanced and circulating through an open system, keep the pH of the
circulating liquid above 10 in order to shift the H2S gas into sulphide ions. Remove the sulphides
by treating the system with zinc carbonate16,30,37.
 Note that reference 37 also demonstrated that many H2S scavengers that act on the H2S gas
are very slow reacting, while the disassociation of H2S into ions when in water is fast. Hence
treat the sulphides dissolved in the water and not the H2S gas. Note also that many H2S
scavengers offered by the drilling fluid companies as an alternate to zinc carbonate are quite
toxic to handle.
 Not only is zinc carbonate applicable for water based systems but also for invert emulsion
mud systems.
- H2S is dissolved in the water phase of the invert and then disassociates into ions just like
in a water based system. The water phase on an invert is usually highly buffered with
lime and so immediate pH control with an H2S influx is usually not an issue. The H2S that
is dissolved in the oil phase of an invert mud can be released as the pressure and
temperature drops in the well and at the mud tanks. With time, the H2S seems to shift to
the water phase and is removed with zinc carbonate.
 Note that it is impractical to use pure oil based open tank systems because some H2S will
dissolve in the oil and H2S scavengers for pure oil systems are very toxic and not practical to
handle on a rig. Hence, use an invert emulsion mud if you wish an oil continuous phase fluid.
Monitor sulphides in the mud by a Hach test, Garret Gas Train, or ―Mud Duck‖ (an instrument
that can continuously measure sulphides and pH in the drilling fluid)16.
5.3. Circulating Out a Wellbore During a Workover

Assume the liquid to be sour and capable of releasing high concentrations of H2S.
 Examples would be contaminated tubing kill fluid, A-annulus fluid after a tubing leak, gas
trapped below a packer when milling it out, etc.
In this circumstance, the liquid returns should be directed to a pressure separator and then to a
pressurized storage vessel or evaporated through a burner / flare. The evolved sour gas should
be flared (see HSSE section 3.6 for reasons and alternatives).
 For low risk wells, circulating to an open tank could be considered if the H2S value is
less than the OEL as measured above the tank. However, remember that even low
primary gas concentrations may give rise to high levels above depressured liquids
(see section 5.1). The pH of the fluid around the sour gas pockets will be lowered so
be prepared for extra pH and sulphide scavenger control.
5.4. Circulating Out a Sour Fluid Kick

Assume the liquid to be sour and capable of releasing high concentrations of H2S.
In a drilling case, the pH of the fluid around the kick will be lowered so be prepared for extra pH
and sulphide scavenger control when the kick is circulated.
 See HSSE section 3.6 for burning versus venting of kick gas.
In a workover case, the kick returns should be directed to a pressure separator and then to a
pressurized storage vessel or sent through a burner / flare. The evolved sour gas should be burnt
See HSSE section 3.6 for reasons and alternatives.
 For low risk workover cases, circulating to an open /degasser tank system could be
considered if the H2S value is less than the OEL. This is not recommended for high risk wells
because most workover fluids do not have the same degree of pH buffering and are often
clear brines with no means of suspending zinc carbonate.
6. Blowout Preventer System (BOPs and Associated Equipment)

This section is aligned with the Shell BOP standard EP 2002-1500 ―Pressure Control Manual for
Drilling, Completions and Well Intervention‖2.
6.1. BOP Material Specifications

See section 4.4
6.2. BOP Stack Configuration

As per EP2002-15002, shear / blind rams should be provided for any well. In addition, shear
rams are mandatory for wells “that have the potential to flow to surface and the max anticipated
closed in pressure is higher than 3000 psi.” This is especially true for high risk sour wells30,31.
 For low risk sour wells below 3000 psi closed in pressure, the shear capability could possibly
be eliminated following risk analysis and DCAF4 processes.
6.3. Other Considerations

In addition to the Mud-Gas Separator requirements in EP2002-1500, for high risk wells one
should review the requirements in IRP Volume 130 that were developed because of an inadequate
system used on a significant sour gas blowout in Canada in the 1980s36.
7. Sour Coring & Drill Stem Testing
7.1. Coring High Risk Wells

It is recommended to do the following:5,7,10,30
 Penetrate the upper porous interface before coring and perform a check trip (wiper trip) and
circulate bottoms up in order to confirm correct mud density overbalance, lost circulation
tendencies, mud properties, etc.
 Install a pump out circulating sub close to the core barrel to have the ability to circulate
should the core barrel get plugged (with LC material for example).
 After tripping in the core barrel, bottoms up should be circulated and the wellbore confirmed
dead prior to coring.
 After coring, circulate bottoms up and flow check prior to pulling out of the hole.
 Workers on the floor need to use protective breathing apparatus when pulling the core. API
RP497 and EP 95-02105 recommend a minimum of 10 stands before the core is at surface.
- Check H2S levels when the core barrel is opened and the core removed. It is a good
practice to let the core degas in the open before close inspection and shipping. Label
with H2S hazard information for shipping.
- For high H2S wells, consider allowing the core to partly degas when still in the wellbore
near the surface. This way the H2S gas evolving will get dissolved into the drilling mud.
7.2. Coring Low Risk Wells

 After Risk Review and DCAF processes, some of the above precautions could be reduced,
especially if the H2S level is less than the OEL. See sections 3 and 5.
7.3. Drill Stem Testing

High risk wells should not be drill stem tested.
 Sour spec tubulars have limited strength for manipulating and pulling DST packers and
equipment.
 Less confidence in maintaining barrier integrity (packer seats, etc.) than with a full production
test.
 Difficult to safely handle sour fluids left inside the test string on a drilling rig.
Low risk wells could be DSTed with precautions10,38, using similar surface equipment and
procedures for wellhead-on well testing as per section 12.
8. Wireline Operations
This section includes braided electric wireline, braided non-electric wireline, slickline and
continuous solid sheath wireline (such as fibre optic line). This section is intended as a supplement
to EP 95-1815 Volume 4.2, ―Wireline Operations‖39.
For high risk wells, detailed equipment specifications and operational procedures are documented
in reference 10, ―Well Services Procedures and Practices Manual‖ and reference 31, ―IRP Volume
2 Completing and Servicing Critical Sour Wells‖. Below are some of the more salient points.
For low risk wells, deviations could be acceptable following the risk analysis and DCAF processes.
8.1. Surface Equipment

Common to all wireline types:
 All pressure control equipment which may be exposed to sour fluid needs to be DEP
30.10.02.15-Gen71 (ISO 1515624 with restrictions) certified and traceable. See section 4 on
materials and elastomers. EP 95-1815 Volume 4.2, ―Wireline Operations‖39 describes color
coding for sour service lubricators.
 The remote controls for the BOPs, the braided line pack-off, and the slick line stuffing box
should be a safe distance upwind from the wellhead.
 The connection to the wellhead should be flanged.
 Quick union connections with elastomeric seals such as Bowen connections are acceptable
for lubricator connections above the wireline BOPs.
- For low risk wells such as low pressure sour oil wells, the use of tubing thread connectors
to the wellhead and for the lubricator could be considered.
 A flanged kill line connection below the BOP’s is recommended.
 The lubricator should have at least two ports fitted with sour service valves for bleeding off
sour fluids and pressure monitoring.
 A velocity check should be installed at the top of the lubricator.
 The BOP / lubricator system should be pressure tested with non-flammable liquid or N2 and
the system retested every time the lubricator connections are broken for multiple wireline
runs.
Braided Wireline:
A grease injection system should be used on all sour wells open to flow with known or expected
pressure at the wellhead.
 Rig or hoist operations (Christmas tree off) using braided e-line line work with a full kill fluid
column normally do not use grease injection or wireline BOPs (rig BOPs used). If the braided
line work could cause the primary fluid column barrier to be lost (e.g. perforating, pulling
downhole plugs), then grease injection and wireline BOPs should be used.
 One grease pump should supply the grease injection control head and have its own grease
supply. The second grease pump should provide back up and be able to inject grease
between the 2 BOP rams. It should also have an independent grease supply.
 The grease injection supply ports should be equipped with a check valve.
 The grease head bleed off hose should have an isolation valve a minimum of 3 metres from
the discharge end and be tied down at ground level and terminate a minimum of 15 metres
downwind from wellhead.
 All grease supply manifolds and pumps should be remotely operated a safe distance upwind
from the wellhead.
A dual hydraulic BOP system with grease injection between rams should be used10,31,39. Wells
exceeding 35 MPa should have a third BOP configured to hold pressure from below and should
be used for back up only10,31.
 Low risk wells such as low GOR artificial lift wells may not need dual ram BOPs, but remote
hydraulic control is still recommended. The risk assessment and DCAF process should be
used.
Due to inherently more risk of seal integrity when using braided line versus slickline, sufficient kill
fluid (e.g. 1.5 times tubing volume) and pumping capability should be onsite for high risk wells.
Slick line and continuous solid sheath wireline:

2 hydraulically operated wireline BOPs are recommended.
For high pressure wells, consider also using grease injection for an additional barrier and to
reduce odours.
8.2. Wireline and Downhole Tools

Use Sour Wireline meeting DEP 30.10.02.15-Gen71 (ISO 1515624 with restrictions) sour spec.
 For operations where the hole is standing full of sweet kill fluid and expected to stay full, sour
wireline is not needed. Such is the case for electric line logging during drilling operations or
cased hole logging with the formation isolated. However, for wellhead-on situations, a sour
service BOP and lubricator system is still recommended.
 The following table was adapted from reference 10, Shell Canada’s wells manuals and
updates information contained in the 1995 version of EP 95-1815 Volume 4.2, ―Wireline
Operations‖39.
Wireline Material H2S CO2 Cl- Sulphur Temp
Alloy+ UNS Suitability Suitability Suitability Suitability Limit
MP 35 N R30035 OK OK OK Solid & 121oC
Liquid S with S
GD31MO N08926 Possibly OK OK Solid S 121oC
25-6MO Highly Alloyed OK* In Sour.
SUPA 75 Austenitic SS 100oc with S
316 SS S31600 Possibly OK < 25000 No 121oC
Austenitic SS OK* PPM In Sour
@ 66oC
Improved N/A No < 2 MPa <25000 No Ltd App
plow steel PPM
+
These are examples of common alloy trade names used in wireline. Refer to the material UNS
number and ISO 1515624 for any alternate material offered by the wireline company.
*These alloys as manufactured for wireline use do not strictly meet ISO 15156 for sour service.
S31600 cannot be cold worked to be ISO sour spec, but it probably is during the manufacturing
process to get the strength needed and in any case it is cold worked when in use. Similarly,
N08926 has a max hardness limit of HRC 35 when cold worked in order to be still sour service.
Experience by some operators has demonstrated that they perform satisfactorily in some H2S
environments. It is up to each region to qualify these marginal materials for their own fit-for-
purpose conditions.
Use downhole tools meeting the DEP 30.10.02.15-Gen71 (ISO 1515624 with restrictions) sour
spec.
 See section 4 on Material Selection taking special note of material not to use.
 All tools in sour service should be inspected at least once every 12 months and more often if
extensively used or exposed to severe conditions. Service company records should be
checked. Knuckle joints should be avoided in sour wells if possible as they are prone to
failure.
 Tools should have wrench flats or quick connectors. Pipe wrenches should not be used on
anything going into sour wells because they create stress riser marks leading to SSC.
8.3. Bleed and Purge

As per section 3.6 it is recommended that all pressure containing equipment be first de-pressured,
then purged with a sweet fluid, and then opened while wearing breathing apparatus with a back-
up buddy.
 On sour locations where no permanent flare system is available, bleed down the
lubricator through a small portable flare system and burn the sour effluent.
 Examples of purge fluid are hydrate inhibited water or sweet gas or N2. The wireline
company often carries a small N2 bottle for such purge operations.
 Options exist in section 3.6 for low risk wells.
9. Coiled Tubing Operations

This section is intended as a supplement to SIEP 99-5634 ―Coiled Tubing Drilling Guide –
Update‖40, and EP 95-1815 Volume 4.1 ―Coiled Tubing Operations‖41, and API RP 16ST ―Coiled
Tubing Well control Equipment Systems‖ 50. These three references do not currently have much
information on sour applications.
One very good all encompassing industry reference for coiled tubing is the Canadian IRP 21
―Coiled Tubing Operations‖51 which includes both sweet and sour applications. This document
was just published in Sept 2010 and as a result, the sour service CT sections on IRP 2 on
Completing and Servicing Critical Sour Wells31 and IRP 6 on Critical Sour Underbalanced
Drilling55 will get removed or redone. In the meantime, all 3 IRP documents are valuable sources
of information for sour CT.
9.1. Material Specifications

Coil Material
Coil for sour service is typically made from 70,000 psi or 80,000 psi or sometimes 90,000 yield
strength material (70, 80 & 90 grade). What is different than regular jointed sour service tubing
is that coiled tubing is welded and it is plastically deformed; both bad things for SSC. Having said
that, properly managed CT does perform very well in sour service applications.
Normal CT material and welding procedures may not be suitable for your sour wells. In addition
to DEP 30.10.02.15-Gen71 (ISO 1515624 with restrictions), IRP 21 Coiled Tubing Operations51 has
set some minimum specifications. The user is encouraged to review the full document for a
comprehensive understanding. Below are some excerpts:
Chemical Composition Limits for Sour Service CT from IRP 2151
Element Minimum (wt%) Maximum (wt%)

Carbon 0.05 0.16
Chromium 0.45 0.70
Copper N/A 0.40
Manganese 0.50 1.00
Molybdenum N/A 0.23
Nickel N/A 0.30
Phosphorous N/A 0.025
Silicon 0.30 0.50
Sulphur N/A 0.005
IRP 21 also states the “The longitudinal weld seam shall be annealed after welding” and “The
tube body shall be stress-relieved after all tube manufacturing cold working”.
There should be no butt welds in the CT string for sour well applications. IRP21 has specifications
for welding the CT connector at the reel end.
A pre-job non-destructive inspection is recommended for the coiled tubing string, regardless if it is
new from the mill or used42.
 This is because manufacturing defects are often not detected at the mill and mechanical
damage during shipping and on used CT (gripper marks for example) can cause the CT to
fail rapidly in a sour environment42,43,49.
- For low risk wells, this may not be necessary.
IPR 2151 recommends the application of an H2S inhibitor on the exterior surface of the CT for all
grades where H2S > 1%. 90 grade coiled tubing is more susceptible than 80 grade to Sulphide
Stress Cracking. Hence, the application on the exterior surface of an H 2S inhibitor is mandatory
for 90 grade43,44,45,46,47,48,51. This will also help reduce the probability of hydrogen induced
cracking, HIC . This was a direct result of several 90 grade CT failures in sour gas wells in
Canada by other operators that led to a joint industry task force in which Shell was heavily
involved.
100 grade and higher material must not be used in sour service at the present time.
Double sided exposure to sour fluids (i.e. sour fluid inside and outside the CT) should be
avoided43,51.
 This will have implications on fluid recirculation for sour underbalanced drilling.
 Besides well control2, this is another reason why one should always use double check valves
in the CT bottom hole assembly and never reverse circulate in a sour application.
Fatigue life is drastically reduced in the presence of H2S43,49,51.

 IRP 2151 states “For sour service with continuous application of H2S inhibitor during a sour CT
operation, the accumulated fatigue in the base tubing of any section of the string should not
exceed 40% of its predicted life to failure in air under the same pressures and bending
strains”.
Furthermore, “For tubing not protected by H2S inhibitor during the sour CT operation, the
accumulated fatigue in the base tubing should not exceed 15% of the predicted life to failure
in air under the same pressures and bending strains”.
 This makes it especially important for the coiled tubing service company to track the complete
service history of any individual coil used in sour service operations.
Corrosion inhibition of hydrochloric acid (HCl) is more difficult in the presence of H2S and the CT
supplier usually has a lower acceptable pitting and general corrosion loss for CT due to its thin
wall and the exposure times when using CT for acid placement are often long. If HCl acid jobs
are to be run in the presence of H2S in the wellbore (e.g. acid work in a sour gas filled hole), the
acid inhibition requirements should be tested.
Bottom Hole Assembly Material

Use downhole tools meeting the DEP 30.10.02.15-Gen71 (ISO 1515624 with restrictions) sour
spec.
See section 4 on Material Selection taking special note of material not to use.
Coiled Tubing BOP Material

The BOP system including the lubricator should be DEP 30.10.02.15-Gen71 (ISO 1515624 with
restrictions) sour spec certified and traceable.31,32, 33 See also section 4.4.
Standard shear ram blade edges are usually made of carburized carbon steel that do not
conform to ISO 15156. Consideration should be give to specifying fully ISO 15156 compliant
material or managing the exposure of the shear ram with the use of sweet fluid31.
 For example, fluid could be pumped continually across a kill line Tee placed above the flow
return line.
9.2. Coiled Tubing BOP configuration

Common Issues
 All connections from the wellhead up to the uppermost BOP should be flanged. Quick union
connections with elastomeric seals are acceptable for lubricator connections.
 Accumulator and backup requirements and choke systems as per sweet systems2,50,51.
 There is an abundance of BOP & flow configurations used for CT. Well Serving applications
usually have the flow return on the wellhead flow Tee (cross) below the BOPs while Drilling
applications usually have the flow return line above the BOPs.
 There are many pros and cons in selecting the best configuration for an individual
application let alone if it is a sour application. It is beyond the scope of this document to
define what is best. EP 95-1815 Volume 4.1 ―Coiled Tubing Operations‖41 and API RP 16ST
―Coiled Tubing Well control Equipment Systems‖ 50 and IRP 21 ―Coiled Tubing Operations‖51
are excellent references in this matter.
- As a starting point, the sections below describe the more common sour gas
configurations and discrepancies.
Well Servicing
The most common arrangement for low risk wells from bottom up is: a main kill line connection &
fluid return connection (often the wellhead Flow Tee), tubing rams, bi-directional slip rams,
emergency kill line connection, shear rams, blind rams, lubricator section, stuffing box/stripper.
The addition of an annular BOP is suggested for high risk wells.

 IPR 2151 suggests the annular be placed above the uppermost blind ram.
 EP 95-181541 suggests the annular be below the main BOPs.
 In any case, an annular can act as a second barrier when replacing packing in the stuffing
box/stripper.
 IRP 2151 suggests that an additional stripper is an acceptable alternate to the annular BOP.
Indeed, Shell Canada currently prefers this for most sour well servicing work.
- The lower stripper is operated at a lower packoff pressure allowing lubricant or
inhibitors to be pumped between the strippers. This is one way of adding the H2S
inhibitor mandatory for 90 grade CT.
In addition to the annular BOP or extra stripper, for very high risk wells (for example > 1% H2S &
high impact to public or use in a confined space such as offshore), the addition of another tubing
ram below the main tubing ram in the quad BOP is recommended51.
 For this type of well up to 5000 psi (35MPa), Shell Canada currently uses a dual stripper, a
quad BOP, and an additional tubing ram.
EP 95-181541 describes a “shear seal BOP as an assembly that is capable of holding, cutting,
and sealing coiled tubing in the event of a controlled or emergency well closure. Generally it is
used as a backup to the Quad BOP, and used where there is risk that the coil tubing may need to
be cut in an emergency …….”
 API RP 16ST50 calls for a shear-blind ram below the quad BOP for wells greater than 5000
psi (35 MPa).
Drilling
The minimum recommended arrangement for high risk wells from bottom up is: 51 a kill & bleed
off spool, pipe rams, a kill & bleed off spool, blind / shear rams, pipe rams, annular bag,
lubricator section with flow outlet, stuffing box/stripper. Alternates can be found in API 16ST50.
The configuration may be dictated by local regulation and EP2002-15002, and should not, in
theory, vary significantly from the configuration used for jointed pipe.
9.3. Operational Practices

 Place CT at a safe distance upwind of the wellhead8.
 Consider placing an H2S sensor above the packoff/stripper.
 The CT operator needs to have Self Contained Breathing Apparatus available in the control
unit.
 If the reservoir fluid or a completion/workover fluid is suspected to be incompatible with the
BOP Elastomers, provisions should be made for the injection of a flush fluid across a kill line
Tee placed above the flow return line. An example of an incompatible chemical would be
dimethyl disulphide (DMDS) sulphur solvent.
 Because of the consequences of a sour gas leak, it is recommended to maintain sufficient kill
fluid volume in case an emergency kill is required.
 Follow similar procedures for bleed and purge and burning as per wireline. See sections 3.6
and 8.3.
10. Snubbing
This section is intended as a sour well enhancement to EP 95-1816 Volume 4.3 ―Snubbing /
Hydraulic Workover Operations‖52.
API RP 497 and API RP688 have one paragraph on snubbing on sour wells.
In Canada, there are 2 Industry Recommended Practices that outline snubbing standards and
procedures for sour wells. IRP Volume 15 ―Snubbing Operations‖53 addresses both sweet and
sour wells and IRP 2 ―Completion and Servicing of Critical Sour Wells‖ is meant for high risk sour
wells31.
Shell Canada also has information on sour snubbing in their Well Services Procedures and
Practices (WSPP) manual10.
Below are a few of the more salient points.
10.1. Material Specifications

As per section 4.4 on BOP systems, all fluid wet parts of the snubbing / stripping system need to
meet DEP 30.10.02.15-Gen71 (ISO 1515624 with restrictions) sour spec.
10.2. Well Categories

IRP 1553 attempts to define categories of wells with increasing standards and procedures for more
risky categories. The chart from the 2007 version of IRP 1553 is reproduced here:
In the context of this guide, a sour well would mean a low risk well covered by IRP
15 and a Critical Sour would mean a high risk well covered by IRPs 2 and 15.
10.3. Snubbing HSE

According to API RP 497 and 688, “Snubbing operations should be restricted to daylight hours,
excepting where emergency or environmental conditions dictate that such operations be
performed in hours of darkness.” Other references state that snubbing at night is acceptable with
sufficient lighting. Snubbing when in pipe-light mode is not recommended at night for sour
operations.
Additional H2S monitors should be located at the snubbing work basket, the pipe insertion point,
at ground level near the safety BOPs, and at the accumulator vent31 .
Provide workers in the snubbing work basket with self contained air supply for escape or
emergency use7,8.
 For high risk wells, SCBA or SABA should be worn on the rig floor and in the snubbing
basket at the beginning of the snubbing / stripping operation, but can be removed once it
is determined safe. Escape bottles must be available for all SABA31.
Explosion proof radio communication should be provided for workers in the basket to use with or
without a mask on31.
Both the Shell Canada WSPP manual10 and IRP 1553 recommend the use of an N2 blanket in the
well as an extra worker safety precaution against H2S leaks during the subbing / stripping
operation.
IRP 1553 notes that iron sulphide is pyrophoric (see section 3.1 for definition), and so “purge the
BOP stack of any explosive gases. Water can be used to purge and keep tools wet.”
Most references recommend a risk assessment and specific emergency plans for the workers
(public ERPs as per section 2.3).
10.4. Snubbing BOPs

Double valves should be used on the snubbing unit and bleed-off and equalize loops53, at least
for high risk wells.
The references describe the snubbing BOP accumulator size, recharge requirements and remote
control panel requirements that are similar to the main BOP system needs described in EP2002-
15002.
11. Underbalanced Drilling (UBD)

Before undertaking sour UBD, the user should become familiar with the following references:
API RP 92U ―Underbalanced Drilling Operations‖54, Industry Recommended Practice (IRP) Volume
6 ―Critical Sour Underbalanced Drilling‖55, API spec. 16 RCD ―Specification for Drill Through
Equipment Rotating Control Devices‖56.
11.1. Common Items for Jointed Pipe and Coiled Tubing

Comply with sour HSE standards as outlined in section 3.
All sour gas should be flared or directed down the production pipeline.
 As per section 3.6, for very low risk wells, especially if the H2S level is below the OEL value,
one may consider venting instead of burning the gas.
 It may not be possible to undertake long duration UBD because of flare & vent air quality
restrictions (greenhouse gas, H2S, SO2, and sulphur limits). See section 12 on well testing.
UBD often requires the addition of gas into the drilling fluid system (two phase) to enable
underbalanced bottom hole pressures. Often nitrogen is used for this application. Sour UBD
operations may require combustible gas be added to the circulating medium instead of nitrogen
to ensure combustion of the H2S at the flare.
 Alternately, it may be possible to add sufficient combustion gas directly at the flare.
 Modelling should be done to ensure sufficient enrichment for combustion.
Flare designs and practices used for well testing may not be appropriate for UBD due to the
intermittent (e.g. for connections) nature of UBD.
All tank systems used should be enclosed and purged to the flare system.
Sometimes membrane separation units are used as the source of N2 added to the drilling medium
to achieve underbalance. Note that these units leave up to 5% residual oxygen in the N2.
 Besides creating an oxygen corrosion issue, oxygen and H2S will form elemental sulphur
which is very corrosive.
 The explosive envelope of hydrocarbons increase in the presence of H2S57. Reference 57
should be studied before using membrane units.
Shale shakers, if used, should be enclosed with extractor fans venting air & gasses from cuttings
to a safe area. Note that despite enclosing the shakers, air will be sucked in around the cuttings
discharge, so this modification effectively only vents gas from the cuttings away from the work
area. This vent system should not be taken to the flare area (cold vent) due to the entrained air.
11.2. UBD Using Jointed Pipe

Comply with DEP 30.10.02.15-Gen71 (ISO 1515624 with restrictions) for all fluid wet components
as per section 4.
 It is particularly important to emphasis sour spec equipment for the safety critical components
in contact with the sour fluids such as the casing, BOP & diverter system, and drill pipe.
 If re-circulating sour drilling fluids, then the entire system needs to be reviewed for sour
serviceability assuming the fluid will be in the SSC range (0.3 kPa H2S pp)24 when pumped.
This will include the pumps, pump discharge lines, etc.
Comply with API RP 92U ―Underbalanced Drilling Operations―54.
UBD with jointed pipe and sour produced fluids are not, in of themselves, a justification for not
deploying UBD. However additional equipment and procedures must be used to safely conduct
the operations:
 The combination of UBD and sour fluids should weigh heavily in consideration of the overall
higher risk of sour UBD:
- Higher probability of errant H2S emissions with UBD (e.g. when making drilling
connections, open tank systems, etc), compared to closed systems such as sour well
testing systems and sour production systems.
- Higher consequence levels with sour fluids than sweet fluids.
 Snubbing / stripping jointed pipe on trips will have the same issues as section 10 on
snubbing. In addition, even if downhole closure devices in the casing are used to aid in
pulling the drill string bottom hole assembly, the presence of sour gas above the closure
device must be purged and breathing apparatus worn on the floor.
 Even if pressurized separation systems are used, the final stage of mud gas separation should
be an atmospheric mud gas separator (MGS) to remove as much gas as possible before fluid
is sent to open tanks. If possible this MGS should be operated above atmospheric
temperature. This will help stabilize the mud in the tanks such that there is minimal off-
gassing from drill string when making connections.
- An alternate would be to operate a sour gas stripping system to remove the H2S /
sulphides from the return fluid before being sent to open tanks for circulating back into
the well. The sour stripped gas should be burnt.
- Because most UBD fluid systems do not have appreciable viscosity for solids suspension,
the addition of large quantities of zinc carbonate needed in conjunction with elevated
pH as per section 5.2 is not practical for UBD. Similar issues as per section 5.2 for H2S
scavengers for pure oil systems.
 Use only Rotating Control Devices (RCDs) which have had their pressure ratings verified
using API 16 RCD56 test procedures.
 See section 4.4 and 4.8 for BOP elastomer selection. Since the (RCD) is a primary barrier
used during UBD, it is recommended that coupon testing of the seal element for compatibility
with the sour return fluids be conducted (e.g. ASTM D471-06E158 or NACE TM0187773).
 It should be recognized that even with the practices described above only limited H2S
concentrations in the produced / re-circulated fluid can be managed while staying within the
OEL limits. Manageable H2S concentrations in produced fluids will vary depending on mud
type and tank farm design but a good rule of thumb is concentrations above 0.5 to 1.0%
H2S will not be manageable with jointed pipe UBD systems.
11.3. UBD Using Coiled Tubing

CT System
Refer to section 9 for using coiled tubing systems in a sour environment.
Fatigue life is shortened in a sour environment, especially in the relatively rougher drilling
application43,49,51.
As mentioned in section 9.1, double sided exposure to sour fluids (i.e. sour fluid inside and
outside the CT) should be avoided43.
 This implies the need for a sour gas stripping system if the return fluid is to be circulated back
into the well. The sour stripped gas should be burnt.
CT BOP system
Refer to 9.2 for CT BOP systems.
The addition of a second stripper should be considered and the addition of bi-directional slip
rams is recommended51.
Pipeline flow
It is strongly recommended that high H2S UBD operations are only conducted where gas returns
can be taken down a pipeline to field sweetening facilities. Higher pressure (e.g. 1440 psi) 4
phase (including cuttings) separation equipment is available to facilitate taking gas returns down
the pipeline. It should be understood that, even coil tubing UBD requires frequent stops, so checks
should be made to ensure the gathering system has the capacity for these flow variances.
Nitrogen addition for two phase injection may compromise downstream compressor operation
and the sweetening facilities sales gas specifications which may require the use of sweet gas
injection.
Shale Shaker
The use of shale shaker systems may not be possible with higher H2S concentrations. In this case
UBD may still be able to proceed by taking all cuttings returned to an enclosed tank, which is
subsequently cleaned after completion of the drilling operations. Smaller hole volumes associated
with coil tubing drilling may be an enabler for this.
12. Well Testing

12.1. Well Testing HSE
Follow HSE guidelines set out in section 3.
Exclusion zones around the wellhead and test equipment is recommended with entry only by
authorized personnel equipped with the appropriate breathing apparatus.
H2S monitors at the wellhead and test equipment are recommended.
The pressure relief valves on the pressure vessels need their own separate lines to the flare / vent
system.
 It is highly recommended that wells with greater H2S than the local OEL value have the
capability of flaring this gas.
Breathing apparatus must be worn when sampling.

 Recommended even for wells less than the H2S OEL because of the concentrating effect of
H2S preferentially dissolved in the water in the separator, and then being released at
atmospheric pressure in high concentrations. See section 5.1.
 This is one of the few instances where the breathing apparatus is used as the primary barrier
used to keep H2S from the worker.
As per section 3.6, before breaking any pressure containing components, purge the H2S fluids
and then wear breathing apparatus with a buddy system when opening.
 This is recommended even for wells less than the H2S OEL because of the concentrating effect
of H2S preferentially dissolved in the water left in the separator, and then being released at
atmospheric pressure in high concentrations as per section 5.1.
12.2. Equipment
All fluid wet parts from the wellhead to downstream of the low pressure separator need to m DEP
30.10.02.15-Gen71 (ISO 1515624 with restrictions) sour spec certified and traceable.
Often sour wells produce quite a nasty mixture containing H2S, mercaptans, elemental sulphur,
CO2, and highly aromatic liquids which make elastomer selection difficult (see section 4.8). It is
made even worse if sulphur solvents like dimethyl disulphide (DMDS) are used. In these instances,
it is best to use metal to metal seals like flanged connections, at least to the high pressure
separator.
12.3. Sampling
Pressurized sample containers need to be DEP 30.10.02.15-Gen71 (ISO 1515624 with restrictions)
sour spec. These cylinders are often made from annealed 316 stainless steel. This is OK provided
there is no chloride water carryover into these gas cylinders. Hardened 316 SS is not OK. AISI
41xx carbon steel is OK, but the wet H2S will react with the carbon steel to form an iron sulphide
film. This will then give an erroneous H2S reading for low concentrations.
For high H2S wells, it is now common to rely on the laboratory gas chromatograph analysis from
the pressurized gas cylinder for the H2S concentration. If a high degree of accuracy is needed,
consider the use of an on-site gas chromatograph using samples from the pressurized gas
cylinder and following all the proper sampling procedures to avoid contamination from the
sample lines, etc.
 The Tutweiler titration technique and length of stain tubes (Draeger, GasTec) have too large
of measurement errors for low H2S wells. They remain good field tools for operations use.
 Do not use non-pressurized gas samples such as Tetlar bags, because of their inaccuracies
(contamination with air and they do leak with time).
 Consult Shell’s well test and sampling specialists.
The H2S values in the gas phase taken from the test separator during post stimulation cleanup will
not be representative of the formation H2S concentration.
 The first formation gas produced will likely have low H2S readings.
 During the bulk of the cleanup, the H2S readings for the gas phase are likely to be high
because of all the H2S dissolved into the stimulation fluid and then released in the separator.
See section 5.1.
 This problem is more pronounced in low permeability wells that take a long time to clean up.
 This problem also manifests itself in wells producing free formation water which is saturated
in dissolved H2S.
 The gas in the low pressure separator (surge vessel) will also have a very large H2S
concentration from all the H2S evolving from the produced water.
If the well is expected to produce very dry gas with no heavy ends (C2+), the presence of
elemental sulphur dissolved in the gas is very likely59, 60.
 This dissolved elemental sulphur will precipitate out of the gas as the pressure and
temperature is reduced from the reservoir to the test separator. Below about 110 oC, it will
form a solid and plug the tubing, SCSSV, choke, and fill the separator.
 Elemental sulphur is very corrosive and especially corrosive in the presence of high chloride
water.
 Guidance on if this will happen and how bad it may be and what to do about it can be
provided by the Wells Sour Gas PTE or Alberta Sulphur Research (ASRL) located in Canada.
Shell Canada is a member of ASRL.
- The use of a sulphur solvent61 will most likely be needed. This will be a logistical problem
in remote areas.
 Early in the field appraisal stage for wells that are suspected to produce elemental sulphur,
consider obtaining a pressurized downhole sample to get analyzed for elemental sulphur.
Follow ASRLs sampling guide62 and contact ASRL for technical and logistical advice.
Gas and liquid hydrocarbon samples should be analyzed for all sulphur species including
mercaptans. These compounds greatly affect gas plant sweetening design. Contact Shell’s well test
and sampling specialists.
12.4. Flaring
It is highly recommended that all sour well test effluent be burnt or directed down the production
pipeline.
 Note that high chloride spent acid or free formation water may not be compatible with
carbon steel pipeline systems. See section 4.1.
- If this is the case, the sour water will need to be evaporated in a burner / flare system.
- Some areas have the capability of storing and hauling sour liquids (water, oil, &
condensate) in contained pressure systems.10,38 In this case, the hydrocarbon can be
directed down the pipeline while the incompatible spent acid water is stored and trucked
to disposal facilities.
Although not recommended due to the large well test gas volumes, it may be possible to vent low
risk wells. See section 3.6.
A continuous ignition system such as a sweet fuel pilot is recommended for all sour gas flaring.
The use of a portable incinerator instead of a pipe flare for the gas is possible but fraught with the
following problems:
 SO2 dispersion is typically worse than a properly burning vertical pipe flare because exit
velocities are lower due to the large incinerator diameter and the burner is much closer to the
ground. However, conversion efficiency can be greater than 99%63 and the flame is
protected from the vagrancies of the wind.
 The flow rate operating envelope is much narrower than a pipe flare and most commercial
portable incinerators operate at the very low end of normal well test flare rates.
 Incinerators need a relatively stable fuel composition to operate efficiently. Hence, they are
not suitable for post stimulation clean-up, especially if CO2 or N2 was used in the stimulation.
 Incinerators typically cannot handle the gas from the pressure relief valves on the pressure
vessels (test separator), and so a flare stack with a continuous pilot is still needed.
 Some models can be very noisy, depending upon the burner design.
 Should the burner go out, worker safety is compromised since the burner unit is very close to
the ground (the need for refractory brick makes them very heavy and impractical to elevate)
allowing H2S to spread along the ground.
Burning liquid hydrocarbons containing H2S can be problematic.

 If not burnt efficiently, liquid hydrocarbons (oil or condensate) will create soot particles
(smoke). These soot particles can be microscopic and contain carcinogenic compounds64.
 The closer to sonic exit velocity the more efficient the burning, but this probably will still
create soot. Horizontal flare pipes (flare pits) typically create soot when burning liquid
hydrocarbons.
 The most efficient liquid burning is done with air assisted nozzles using air from a
compressor. A Shell global well test standard to be issued in the near future will document the
standards for these burners. In the meantime, there are several commercial air assisted
burners available from well test companies. Obviously one should choose a liquid burner
with a high efficiency to eliminate the soot and to convert the H2S to SO2. Consult the Well
Testing Principal Technical Expert (PTE).
 These burners are close to the ground and so good SO2 dispersion may be hard to achieve.
On the plus side, the bulk of the H2S will be in the gas phase that can be burned separately.
Portable H2S and SO2 monitors should be set up in locations that the dispersion model indicates
air quality standards may be exceeded and at populated places. There are wireless portable
detectors that can communicate back to the well site and even computer internet sites for instant
real time knowledge of air quality. Windsocks are also needed.
In areas of variable / unpredictable wind, consider using two flare locations in order to minimize
well testing disruptions.
12.5. Air Quality

Air quality guidelines for H2S and SO2 vary from country to country with variations due to
whether the particular regulator wishes to protect the health of humans & animals or vegetation or
both. Consult your local regulations.
Parameter A selection of air quality standards from various counties
H2S Ranges from 0.005 to 0.025 ppm for 1 hour,
and 0.003 to 0.1 ppm for 24 hours.
SO2 Range from 0.1 to 0.3 ppm for 1 hr,
and 0.04 to 0.17 ppm for 24 hours.
WHO76 suggests 0.047 ppm for 24 hours with an aim to lower it to
0.0188 ppm.
In addition, well testing can emit a large amount of total sulphur into the air. Below is a graph
depicting the equivalent sulphur emitted to the atmosphere by flaring sour gas:
Hence, it may not be possible to undertake long duration flaring because of flare & vent air
quality restrictions (greenhouse gas, H2S, SO2, and sulphur limits).
12.6. Dispersion Modelling

H2S and SO2 dispersion modeling needs to be done to ascertain if flaring of the sour gas is within
the local air quality and public health standards.
USA Environment Protection Agency (EPA) and other regulators including the Energy Resources
Conservation Board (ERCB) in Canada65 have stated that the normal gas flare combustion &
conversion efficiency for a vertical straight pipe flare is > 98% (i.e. 98% of H2S converted to SO2)
 Combustion efficiencies are not known for horizontal pipes (flare pits), but are bound to be
lower than vertical pipes due to poorer air mixing into the fuel.
SO2 dispersion efficiencies are governed by heating value of the fuel, height of the exit point of
the fuel above ground, combustion efficiency, and exit velocity.
Dispersion modelling of well test flaring requires specialist expertise, especially if using a liquid
burner combined with a gas pipe flare.
 There is a wide variety of dispersion models; many commercial and some Shell proprietary.
Which one to use depends upon the terrain and the accuracy desired63, 65.
 Proper meteorological data is an essential input to all dispersion models. It is recommended
to start collecting such data in the exploration and appraisal phases of sour gas
developments for the benefit of well test flaring and to assist field and plant flare design and
operation.
 Reference 65 includes many valuable tips for modeling well test flares. For example, the stack
tip downwash option should be turned off because well test exit velocities are high.
 Portable H2S and SO2 monitors should be set up in locations that the dispersion modeling
indicates air quality may be exceeded and populated places like campsites and public.
For high H2S wells and wells near hilly terrain, often flaring has to be restricted during certain
weather conditions due to poor dispersion. These interruptions need to be taken into account in
the well test design.
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Approved For Use In Shell Canada Limited’s Foothills Sour Gas Wells‖, M. G. Hay / Revision
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University of Calgary, R.G. Moore, The University of Calgary, C.A. (Kip) Pratt, SHELL Canada
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Bibliographic information
Classification Restricted
Report Number SR.11.10961
Title Sour Well Design Guide
Author(s) R. Nelson (UAO/W/C)
Keywords H2S, Sour Wells, Sour Materials, Hydrogen Sulphide
Date of Issue March 2011
US Export Control EAR 99
WBSE Code 50140
Reviewed by Wells Discipline Leadership Team
Approved by David Stewart (PTW/X)
Sponsoring Shell International Exploration and Production B. V. , Rijswijk
Company /
Customer
Issuing Company Shell International Exploration and Production
P.O. Box 60
2280 AB Rijswijk
The Netherlands
Report distribution
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[email protected]
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Sour Well Design Guide

Shell International Exploration and Production B.V., Rijswijk

8.1. Surface Equipment 25

High Risk Low Risk

Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM)5

2. Prevention and Mitigation

Hazards and Effects Analysis

3.1. Hydrogen Sulphide (H2S) Properties

H2S toxicity levels5,17,18,66

3.2. Sulphur Dioxide (SO2) Properties

Physical State: Colourless Gas

3.3. H2S training

3.4. Breathing Apparatus

3.5. H2S Monitors and Meters

3.6. Venting versus Burning

3.7. Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS or Concurrent Operations)

4.2. Casing and Tubing

- Effective scavenging of high concentrations of H2S / sulphides is difficult and the

4.4. BOP Material

4.6. Drill String

4.9. Fishing Equipment

- Fill well with workover brine / oil.

5. Drilling and Workover Fluid Systems

5.2. Drilling Overbalanced

5.3. Circulating Out a Wellbore During a Workover

5.4. Circulating Out a Sour Fluid Kick

6. Blowout Preventer System (BOPs and Associated Equipment)

6.1. BOP Material Specifications

6.2. BOP Stack Configuration

6.3. Other Considerations

7. Sour Coring & Drill Stem Testing

7.1. Coring High Risk Wells

7.2. Coring Low Risk Wells

7.3. Drill Stem Testing

8.1. Surface Equipment

Slick line and continuous solid sheath wireline:

8.2. Wireline and Downhole Tools

8.3. Bleed and Purge

9. Coiled Tubing Operations

9.1. Material Specifications

Chemical Composition Limits for Sour Service CT from IRP 2151

Element Minimum (wt%) Maximum (wt%)

Fatigue life is drastically reduced in the presence of H2S43,49,51.

Bottom Hole Assembly Material

Coiled Tubing BOP Material

9.2. Coiled Tubing BOP configuration

The addition of an annular BOP is suggested for high risk wells.

9.3. Operational Practices

Below are a few of the more salient points.

10.1. Material Specifications

10.2. Well Categories

10.3. Snubbing HSE

10.4. Snubbing BOPs

11. Underbalanced Drilling (UBD)

11.1. Common Items for Jointed Pipe and Coiled Tubing

11.2. UBD Using Jointed Pipe

Comply with API RP 92U ―Underbalanced Drilling Operations―54.

11.3. UBD Using Coiled Tubing

12. Well Testing