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    The L1 'RR KI1/ Cil Ol 7 P Xi .I. LF:V R: Memorandum From RT Hon Robin Cook MP

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    In my resignation speech I said, "iraq probably has no weapons of mass destruction" I have never ruled out the possibility that we may unearth some old stocks of biological toxins or chemical agents. It is unlikely that we will now find a nuclear programme capable of producing a nuclear weapon on a timescale that would justify urgent action.

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    The L1 'RR KI1/ Cil Ol 7 P Xi .I. LF:V R: Memorandum From RT Hon Robin Cook MP

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    In my resignation speech I said, "iraq probably has no weapons of mass destruction" I have never ruled out the possibility that we may unearth some old stocks of biological toxins or chemical agents. It is unlikely that we will now find a nuclear programme capable of producing a nuclear weapon on a timescale that would justify urgent action.

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    In my resignation speech I said, "iraq probably has no weapons of mass destruction" I have never ruled out the possibility that we may unearth some old stocks of biological toxins or chemical agents. It is unlikely that we will now find a nuclear programme capable of producing a nuclear weapon on a timescale that would justify urgent action.

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    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
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    41 views4 pages

    The L1 'RR KI1/ Cil Ol 7 P Xi .I. LF:V R: Memorandum From RT Hon Robin Cook MP

    Uploaded by

    Bren-R
    In my resignation speech I said, "iraq probably has no weapons of mass destruction" I have never ruled out the possibility that we may unearth some old stocks of biological toxins or chemical agents. It is unlikely that we will now find a nuclear programme capable of producing a nuclear weapon on a timescale that would justify urgent action.

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    of 4

    House of Commons - Foreign Affairs - Written Evidence Page 1 of 4

    The L1 ;~'rr>~;~~ KI1\~cil~ol~7 P~xi .i .~~lF:v~r Search F-

    Advanced 5

    Home Glossary Index Contact Us Parliament Live section . .. Gc

    Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Evidence


    Written

    Memorandum from Rt Hon Robin Cook MP

    1 . In my resignation speech I said, "Iraq probably has no weapons


    of mass destruction in the commonly understood sense of the term-
    namely, a credible device capable of being delivered against a
    strategic city target" . This would now appear to be correct . Such
    weapons require substantial industrial plant and a large workforce. It
    is inconceivable that both could have been kept concealed for the two
    months we have been in occupation of Iraq .

    2 . I have never ruled out the possibility that we may unearth some
    old stocks of biological toxins or chemical agents and it is possible that
    we may yet find some battlefield chemical shells. Nevertheless, this
    would not constitute Weapons of Mass Destruction and would not
    justify the claim before the war that Iraq posed what the Prime
    Minister described as "a current and serious threat" (Foreword to the
    September dossier) .

    3 . There arise from the present position on the ground five clusters
    of questions which I hope your inquiry will be able to resolve :

    4. Why is there such a difference between the claims made before


    the war and the reality established after the war?

    5. The following claims are now unlikely to be substantiated,


    however much longer time is given .

    - "Iraq continues to produce chemical agents for chemical weapons; has rebuilt
    previously destroyed production plants across Iraq" (The Prime Minister,
    (Hansard) 24 September, at Column three) . If we have not yet identified any of
    these "rebuilt production plants" it is unlikely that we ever will . A chemical
    production facility is a substantial enterprise and there is probably no country that
    has been more mapped by aerial surveillance than Iraq.

    - "Saddam continues in his efforts to develop nuclear weapons" (The Prime


    Minister's Foreword to the September dossier.) Again it is unlikely that we will
    now find a nuclear programme capable of producing a nuclear weapon on a
    timescale that would justify urgent action. A nuclear weapons programme requires
    substantial industrial sites and will often release identifiable radiation signals.

    The Prime Minister further added on 24 September "We know that Saddam has
    been trying to buy significant quantities ofuranium from Africa" . Since the
    February presentation by the IAEA to the Security Council we know that the

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    House ofCommons - Foreign Affairs - Written Evidence Page 2 of 4

    documents which provided the primary evidence for this claim were crude
    forgeries.

    - "Saddam has existing and active plans for the use of chemical and biological
    weapons, which could be activated within 45 minutes" (The Prime Minister,
    (Hansard) 24 September, Column 3). We have now inspected every munitions
    storage facility in Iraq and have found no chemical or biological weapon and none
    within a 45 minute radius of artillery deployments. I note that the Government no
    longer predicts that they will find actual weapons but that they will produce
    evidence of programmes. As this Committee shadows the Foreign Office, it is only
    fair to note that the Foreign Office, and Jack Straw, were notably more cautious in
    their clams.

    6 . Did the Government itself come to doubt these claims before the
    war?

    7 . It is now admitted by the State Department that Colin Powell had


    serious doubts about the intelligence material and spent four days
    challenging it before his presentation to the Security Council in
    February . His presentation was more cautious than the September
    dossier and the uranium from Africa claim was rejected by him .

    8. Given the close relationship between State and Foreign Office did
    they share with us their doubts? If they did not, are we not concerned
    that they concealed those doubts from us?

    9 . None of the above claims from the September debate were


    repeated by the Government in the March debate . This is curious given
    the pressure they were under to secure a majority for military action .
    Had the Government itself come to doubt the reliability of the
    September claims? If so, should Ministers not have corrected the
    record before asking the House to vote on war?

    10 . Could biological or chemical agents have fallen into the hands of


    terrorists since the war?

    11 . In his speech on 18 March, the Prime Minister laid great stress


    on the danger that a capability for Weapons of Mass Destruction might
    pass from rogue states to terrorist organisations . "The possibility of the
    two coming together-of terrorist groups in possession of weapons of
    mass destruction or even of a so-called dirty radiological bomb-is
    now, in my judgment, a real and present danger to Britain and its
    national security ." (Hansard,18 March, column 788)

    12. Government statements have repeatedly quantified the volume


    of chemical and biological agents in Iraq which remain unaccounted
    for. Most frequently they quote 10,000 litres of anthrax . Until the war
    any such stocks would be securely guarded by the inner core of
    Saddam's elaborate security forces . However, since the war and the
    collapse of the security apparatus, they presumably have been left
    unguarded and unsecured . ~C , ~ ( OI O

    http://www .publications.parliament .uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/813/813we02 .htm 04/08/03


    House of Commons - Foreign Affairs - Written Evidence Page 3 of 4

    13 . Does the Government really believe that such stocks of chemical


    and biological agents existed at the time of the war? If so, what
    assurances can they offer that they have not since become accessible
    to any of the terrorist organisations in the region? Instead of
    eliminating the risk of transfer of Weapons of Mass Destruction to
    terrorist organisations, could the war have opened potential access to
    such material by terrorists? In particular, could the looting of the AI
    Tuwaitta nuclear plant not have provided precisely the radiological
    material for a dirty bomb about which the Prime Minister expressed
    specific concern?

    14. Why do we not allow the UN Weapon Inspectors back into Iraq?

    15 . The war was justified by Saddam's failure to show sufficient


    compliance with the UN Weapons Inspectors . Ironically, it is now we
    who are refusing any compliance with the same inspectors .

    16 . I can understand that in view of their longstanding hostility to


    the UN Inspectors the US may not be willing to admit them into their
    sector. Presumably, though, it would still be open to British forces to
    admit the UN Weapons Inspectors to the territory they occupy .

    17 . It is difficult to resist the conclusion that the primary reason for


    keeping out the United Nations Weapons Inspectors is that they would
    confirm there was no immediate threat from a credible Weapons of
    Mass Destruction .

    18 . Does the absence of Weapons of Mass Destruction undermine


    the legal basis of the war?

    19 . Throughout the build-up to war the Government studiously


    avoided justifying invasion on the grounds that it would remove
    Saddam . "I have never put the justification for action as regime
    change ." (The Prime Minister, (Hansard) 18 March, column 772) .
    Undoubtedly, the principal reason for such caution was the legal advice
    that there was no basis in international law for an attack to remove
    Saddam .

    20 . The Attorney General's legal advice is founded entirely on the


    failure of Saddam to comply with the "obligations on Iraq to eliminate
    its weapons of mass destruction" . I am no lawyer, but it does appear
    arguable that if Iraq had no Weapons of Mass Destruction there could
    in logic be no legal basis for a war to eliminate them .

    21 . In present circumstances the Attorney General's opinion would


    appear to be sound in theory but unsound in fact . As Menzies
    Campbell observed in the recent debate, it must be doubtful if the
    Attorney General would have given the same opinion if he had known
    then that it would prove so difficult to find any prohibited weapons .

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    House of Commons - Foreign Affairs - Written Evidence Page 4 of4

    22 . I fully understand why the Foreign Affairs Committee has chosen


    to focus the present inquiry on the justification for the war. However,
    there has been a much wider impact on our international relations
    from Britain's participation in the unilateral decision of the United
    States to launch a pre-emptive strike. The Iraq war has divided us
    from our principle partners in Europe. It has removed us from the
    inside track which we had built up with Russia under Putin . It has
    undermined the authority of the Security Council as the forum for
    multilateral decisions on peace and security . It has reduced our
    standing throughout the Third World, where few countries supported
    US intervention . It has broken up the impressive global coalition
    against world terrorism, which came into being in response to the
    attack on the twin towers.

    23 . These consequences represent damage to our national interests


    greater than any gain for Britain from its part in the war. I hope that in
    longer time the Foreign Affairs may be able to review the impact of the
    war on Britain's foreign relations .

    Robin Cook MP

    17 June 2003

    Parliamentary copyright 2003 Prepared 7 July 2003

    F~tC 13 (O(cle
    http ://www .publications .parliament.uk/pa/cm2002031cmselect/cmfaff/8131813we02 .htm 04/08/03

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