Election Law Nachura

ELECTION LAWS
Election Laws 513
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
A. Definitions.
1. Suffrage: the right to vote in the election of officers chosen by the people
and in the determination of questions submitted to the people. Includes within its
scope: election, plebiscite, initiative and referendum.
2. Election: the means by which the people choose their officials for a definite
and fixed period and to whom they entrust for the time being the exercise of the
powers of government. Kinds:
a) Regular: one provided by law for the election of officers either nation-
wide or in certain subdivisions thereof, after the expiration of the full term of the
former officers.
b) Special: one held to fill a vacancy in office before the expiration of the
full term for which the incumbent was elected.
B. Theories on Suffrage.
1. Natural right theory: Suffrage is a natural and inherent right of every citizen
who is not disqualified by reason of his own reprehensible conduct or unfitness.
2. Social expediency: Suffrage is a public office or function conferred upon
the citizen for reasons of social expediency; conferred upon those who are fit and
capable of discharging it.
3. Tribal theory: It is a necessary attribute of membership in the State.
4. Feudal theory: It is an adjunct of a particular status, generally tenurial in
character, i.e., a vested privilege usually accompanying ownership of land.
5. Ethical theory: It is a necessary and essential means for the
development of society.
C. Theory prevailing in the Philippines: Suffrage is both a privilege and an

obligation.
D. System of election adopted in the Philippines: Since 1901, the

Australian system, first conceived by Francis S. Dutton, a member of the
Legislature of South Australia. The distinguishing feature of the system is strict
secrecy in balloting.
E. Constitutional mandate on Congress [Sec. 2, Art. V, Constitution]:
1. To provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot, and
for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

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a) Sec. 12, R. A. 7166 provides for absentee voting, but is applicable only to the
elections for the President, Vice President and Senators, and limited to members
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police and other
government officers and employees who are duly registered voters and who, on
election day, may temporarily be assigned in connection with the performance of
election duties to places where they are not registered voters.
b) R.A. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) addressed the
need for overseas Filipinos to be able to vote in Philippine elections. See following
Chapter on VOTERS: QUALIFICATION AND REGISTRATION, for more detailed
discussion.
2. To design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterate to vote without
the assistance of other persons.
F. Election period. Unless otherwise fixed by the Comelec in special cases, the
election period shall commence 90 days before the day of the election and shall
end 30 days thereafter [Sec. 9, Art. IX-C, Constitution].

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II. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

[See CHAPTER XI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]
III. VOTERS: QUALIFICATION AND REGISTRATION

A. Qualifications for suffrage: “Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of
age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding
the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be
imposed on the exercise of suffrage [Sec. 1, Art. V, Constitution].
1. Any person who transfers residence to another city, municipality or

country solely by reason of his occupation, profession or employment in private or
public service, education, etc., shall not be deemed to have lost his original
residence [Sec. 117, B.P 881],
2. In Makalintal v. Comelec, G.R. No. 157013, July 3, 2003, challenged as

unconstitutional was Sec. 5(d) of R.A. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act
of 2003), which provides that among those disqualified to vote is an immigrant or
a permanent resident (of another country) who is recognized as such in the host
country, unless he/she executes an affidavit declaring the he/ she shall resume
actual, physical, permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years
from approval of his/her registration under the said Act, and that he/she had not
applied for citizenship in another country.. On this challenge, the Supreme Court
said that inasmuch as the essence of R.A. 9189 is to enfranchise overseas
qualified Filipinos, the Court should take a holistic view of the pertinent provisions
of both the Constitution and R.A. 9189. The law was enacted in obeisance to the
mandate of the first paragraph of Sec. 2, Art. V of the Constitution, that Congress
shall provide a system for voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. It must be stressed
that Sec. 2 does not provide for the parameters of the exercise of legislative
authority in enacting said law. Hence, in the absence of restrictions, Congress is
presumed to have duly exercised its function as defined in Art. VI of the
Constitution.
a) In this case, the Supreme Court continued by saying that contrary to the
claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or
enfranchising act. The affidavit required is not only proof of the intention of the
immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the
Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that

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he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. It must be emphasized that
Sec. 5(d) does not only require an affidavit or a promise to “resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years from the approval
of his/her registration”, the Filipino abroad must also declare that they have not
applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, they must return to the Philippines
otherwise, their failure to return “shall be cause for the removal” of their names
“from the National Registry of absentee voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia”.
B. Disqualifications [Sec. 118, B.P. 881]:
1. Any person sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less
than one year (unless granted a plenary pardon or an amnesty); but right is
reacquired upon the expiration of 5 years after service of sentence.
2. Any person adjudged by final judgment of having committed any crime

involving disloyalty to the government or any crime against national security
(unless restored to full civil and political rights in accordance with law); but right is
reacquired upon the expiration of 5 years after service of sentence.
3. Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority.
C. Registration of voters. It shall be the duty of every citizen to register and cast
his vote [Sec. 4, B.P. 881]. In order that a qualified elector may vote in any election,
plebiscite or referendum, he must be registered in the Permanent List of Voters for
the city or municipality in which he resides [Sec. 115, BP 881],
1. Registration does not confer the right to vote; it is but a condition

precedent to the exercise of the right. Registration is a regulation, not a
qualification [Yra v. Abano, 52 Phil 380],
2. General Registration of voters. Immediately after the barangay elections

in 1997, the existing certified list of voters shall cease to be effective and operative.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections and all elections, plebiscites, referenda,
initiatives and recalls subsequent thereto, the Comelec shall undertake a general
registration of voters [Sec. 7, R.A. 8189 (The Voters Registration Act of 1996)]. 3
3. System of Continuing Registration. The personal filing of

application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of
the Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall,
however, be conducted during the period starting 120 days before a regular
election and 90 days before a special election [Sec. 8, R.A. 8189].

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a) \nAkbayan Youth v. Comelec, G.R. No. 147066, March 26, 2001, the
Supreme Court upheld the action of the Comelec denying petitioners’ request for
two (2) additional registration days in order to enfranchise more than 4 million youth
between the ages 18-21 who failed to register on or before December 27, 2000.
The law was simply followed by the Comelec, and it is an accepted doctrine in
administrative law that the determination of administrative agencies as to the
operation, implementation and application of a law is accorded great weight,
considering that these specialized government bodies are, by their nature and
functions, in the best position to know what they can possibly do or not do under
prevailing circumstances.
4. Disqualification. The same grounds as the disqualifications for suffrage.
5. Illiterate or disabled voters. Any illiterate person may register with the
assistance of the Election Officer or any member of an accredited citizen’s arms.
The application for registration of a physically disabled person may be prepared
by any relative within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity or by the
Election Officer or any member of an accredited citizen’s arm using the data
supplied by the applicant [Sec. 14, R.A. 8189],
6. Election Registration Board [Sec. 15, R.A. 8189]. There shall be in each
city and municipality as many Election Registration Boards as there are election
officers therein. The Board shall be composed of the Election Officer as chairman,
and as members, the public school official most senior in rank and the local civil
registrar, or in his absence, the city or municipal treasurer. No member of the Board
shall be related to each other or to any incumbent city or municipal elective official
within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. Every registered party and
such organizations as may be authorized by the Commission shall be entitled to a
watcher in every registration board.
7. Challenges to right to register [Sec. 18, R.A. 8189]. Any voter, candidate
or representative of a registered political party may challenge in writing any
application for registration, stating the grounds therefor. The challenge shall be
under oath and attached to the application, together with the proof of notice of
hearing to the challenger and the applicant. Oppositions to contest a registrant’s
application for inclusion in the voters’ list must, in all cases, be filed not later than
the second Monday of the month in which the same is scheduled to be heard or
processed by the Election Registration Board. The hearing on the challenge shall
be heard on the third Monday of the month and the decision shall be rendered
before the end of the month. 8
8. Deactivation of Registration [Sec. 27, R.A. 8189]. The Board shall

deactivate the registration and remove the registration records of the
following
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persons from the corresponding precinct book of voters and place the same,
properly marked and dated in indelible ink, in the inactive file after entering the
cause or causes of deactivation: [a] Any person who has been sentence by final
judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than one year, such disability not
having been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty; Provided, however, that any
person disqualified to vote (because of this) shall automatically reacquire the right
to vote upon expiration of five years after service of sentence as certified by the
clerks of courts; [b] any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by a
competent court or tribunal of having caused/committed any crime involving
disloyalty to the duly constituted government, such as rebellion, sedition, violation
of the anti-subversion and firearms laws, or any crime against national security,
unless restored to his full civil and political rights in accordance with law, Provided
that he shall regain his right to vote automatically upon expiration of five years from
service of sentence; [c] any person declared by competent authority to be insane
or incompetent unless such disqualification has been subsequently removed by a
declaration of a proper authority that such person is no longer insane or
incompetent; [d] any person who did not vote in the two successive preceding
regular elections as shown by their voting records (for this purpose, regular
elections do not include the Sangguniang Kabataan elections); [e] any person
whose registration has been ordered excluded by the court; and [f] any person who
has lost his Filipino citizenship.
9. Reactivation of Registration [Sec. 28, R.A. 8189]. Any voter whose

registration has been deactivated may file with the Election Officer a sworn
application for reactivation of his registration in the form of an affidavit stating that
the grounds for the deactivation no longer exist any time but not later than 120
days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election. The Election
Officer shall submit such application to the Election Registration Board for
appropriate action.
10. Preparation and Posting of the Certified List of Voters [Sec. 30, R.A.
8189]. The Board shall prepare and post a certified list of voters 90 days before a
regular election and 60 days before a special election and furnish copies thereof
to the provincial, regional and national central files. Copies of the certified list, along
with a list of deactivated voters categorized by precinct per barangay shall also be
posted in the office of the Election Officer and in the bulletin board of each
city/municipal hall.
D. Inclusion and Exclusion proceedings.
1. Common rules governing judicial proceedings in the matter of inclusion,

exclusion and correction of names of voters.

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a) Petition for inclusion, exclusion or correction of names of voters shall

be filed during office hours.
b) Notice of the place, date and time of the hearing of the petition shall
be served upon the members of the Board and the challenged voter upon filing of
the petition.
c) A petition shall refer only to one precinct and shall implead the Board
as respondents.
d) No costs shall be assessed agaipst any party in these proceedings.
However, if the court finds that the application has been filed solely to harass the
adverse party and cause him to incur expenses, it shall order the culpable party to
pay the costs and incidental expenses.
e) Any voter, candidate or political party affected by the proceedings
may intervene and present his evidence.
f) The decision shall be based on the evidence presented and in no
case rendered upon a stipulation of facts. If the question is whether or not the voter
is real or fictitious, his non-appearance on the day set for hearing shall be prima
facie evidence that the challenged voter is fictitious.
g) The petition shall be heard and decided within 10 days from the date
of its filing. Cases appealed to the RTC shall be decided within 10 days from
receipt of the appbal. In all cases, the court shall decide these petitions not later
than 15 days before the election and the decision shall become final and
executory.
2. Jurisdiction in inclusion and exclusion cases [Sec. 33, R.A. 8189], The
Municipal and Metropolitan Trial Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all cases of inclusion and exclusion of voters in their respective
cities and municipalities. Decisions of the Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Courts
may be appealed by the aggrieved party to the Regional Trial Court within five
days from receipt of notice thereof. Otherwise, said decision shall become final
and executory. The RfC shall decide the appeal within 10 days from the time it is
received and the decision shall immediately become final and executory. No
motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
3. Petition for Inclusion [Sec. 34, R.A. 8189]. Any person whose application
for registration has been disapproved by the Board or whose name has been
stricken out from the list may file with the court a petition to include his name in the
permanent list of voters in his precinct at any time except 105 days prior to a
regular election or 75 days prior to a special election. It shall be supported by a
certificate of disapproval or his application and proof of service of notice of his
petition upon the Board. The petition shall be decided within 15 days after its filing.
4
4. Petition for Exclusion [Sec. 35, R.A. 8189], Any registered voter,
representative of a political party or the Election Officer, may file with the
court
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a sworn petition for the exclusion of a voter from the permanent list of voters giving
the name, address and the precinct of the challenged voter at any time except 100
days prior to a regular election or 65 days prior to a special election. The petition
shall be accompanied by proof of notice to the Board and to the challenged voter,
and shall be decided within 10 days from its filing.
E. Annulment of Book of Voters [Sec. 39, R.A. 8189]. The Commission shall,
upon verified petition of any voter or election qfficer or duly registered political
party, and after notice and hearing, annul any book of voters that is not prepared
in accordance with the provisions of this law, or was prepared through fraud,
bribery, forgery, impersonation, intimidation, force or any similar irregularity, dr
which contains data that are statistically improbable. No order, ruling or decision
annulling a book of voters shall be executed within 90 days before an election.
1. However, the annulment of the list of voters shall not constitute a ground for a
pre-proclamation contest [Ututalum v. Comelec, 181 SCRA 335].

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IV. POLITICAL PARTIES
A. Party System. A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according
to the free choice of the people [Sec. 2(5), Art. IX-C, Constitution],
1. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization or coalition shall be

valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in the
Constitution [Sec. 7, Art. IX-C],
a) Partv-List System. The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional

representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof
registered with the Commission on Elections [RA 7941].
2. Political parties registered under the party-list system shall be entitled to

appoint poll watchers in accordance with law [Sec. 8, Art. IX-C],
3. Party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the total number of

representatives in the House of Representatives [Sec. 5(2), Art. VI].
B. Political Party.
1. Definitions [See R.A. 7941 (The Party-List System Act)].
a) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition

of parties.
b) Apolitical party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government
and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office. It is
a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of
at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is
spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and
provinces comprising the region.
c) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to
any of the following sectors: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers and professionals, whose principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector.
d) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of
groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics,
employment, interests or concerns.

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e) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national,

regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes.
2. Registration. In order to acquire juridical personality as a political party, to

entitle it to the benefits and privileges granted under the Constitution and the laws,
and in order to participate in the party-lists system, the group must register with
the Commission on Elections by filing with the Comelec not later than 90 days
before the election a verified petition stating its desire to participate in the party-
list system as a national, regional, sectoral party or organization or a coalition of
such parties or organizations.
a) Groups which cannot be registered as political parties: [i] religious

denominations or sects; [ii] those who seek to achieve their goals through violence
or unlawful means; [iii] those who refuse to uphold and adhere to the Constitution;
and [iv] those supported by foreign governments [Sec. 2(5), Art IX-C].
b). Grounds for cancellation of registration: Accepting financial

contributions from foreign governments or their agencies [Sec. 2(5), Art. IX-C],
Under R.A. 7941, the Comelec may, motu propio or upon a verified complaint of
any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration
of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition, on any of the
following grounds: [i] it is a religious sect or denomination, organization or
association organized for religious purposes; [ii] it advocates violence or unlawful
means to seek its goal; [iii] it is a foreign party or organization; [iv] it is receiving
support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members, or
indirectly through third parties, for partisan election purposes; [v] it violates or fails
to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections; [vi] it declares
untruthful statements in its petition; [vii] it has ceased to exist for at least one year;
and [viii] it fails to participate in the last two preceding elections, or fails to obtain
at least 2% of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two preceding
elections for the constituency in which it was registered.
3. Nomination of party-list representatives, etc.. Read R.A. 7941 See

Chapter VIII, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 4
4. Authority of the Commission on Elections. Flowing from its

constitutional power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of the election and its power to register and regulate
political parties, the Commission on Elections may resolve matters
involving the

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ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers [Laban
ng Demokratikong Pilipino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 161265, February 24, 2004].

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V. CANDIDATES;
CERTIFICATES OF
CANDIDACY
A. Qualifications.
1. Qualifications prescribed by law are continuing requirements and must be
possessed for the duration of the officer’s active tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title to the office may be seasonably challenged. See
Frivaldo v. Comelec, 174 SCRA 245; Labo v. Comelec, 176 SCRA 1].
2. When should the qualification/s be possessed. The Local Government

Code does not specify any particular date when the candidate must possess
Filipino citizenship. Philippine citizenship is required to ensure that no alien shall
govern our people. An official begins to govern only upon his proclamation and on
the day that his term begins. Since Frivaldo took his oath of allegiance on June
30, 1995, when his application for repatriation was granted by the Special
Committee on Naturalization created under PD 825, he was, therefore, qualified
to be proclaimed and to assume office. Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code
speaks of qualifications of elective officials, not of candidates. Furthermore,
repatriation retroacts to the date of the filing of his application (for repatriation) on
August 17, 1994 [Frivaldo v. Comelec, 257 SCRA 727].
B. Disqualifications.
1. Under the Omnibus Election Code [B.P. 881]: FIMI
a) Declared as incompetent or insane by competent authority.

b) Sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or any
offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than 18 months
imprisonment.
c) Sentenced by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.
i) In Villaber v. Comelec, G.R. No. 148326, November 15, 2001, it was

held that violation of Batas Pambansa No. 22 is a crime involving moral turpitude,
because the accused knows at the time of the issuance of the check that he does
not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the
check in full upon presentment. A conviction thereof shows that the accused is
guilty of deceit, and certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of the
person.

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ii) Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law involves moral turpitude, and

the only legal effect of probation is to suspend the implementation of the sentence.
Thus, the disqualification still subsists [De la Torre v. Comelec, 258 SCRA 483].
This is modified by Moreno v. Comelec, infra.
d) Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a

foreign country (unless he has waived his status as such) [Sec. 68, B.P. 881]. See
Caasi v. Comelec, 191 SCRA 229, where the Supreme Court said that a “green
card” is ample proof that the holder thereof is a permanent resident of, or an
immigrant to, the United States.
2. Under the Local Government Code [Sec. 40, R.A. 7160]: Applicable to
candidates for local elective office only:
a) Those sentenced bv final judgment for an offense punishable bv one

year or more of imprisonment, within two years after serving sentence.
i) Even if the candidate is under probation, the disqualification still

subsists, because the effect of the probation is only to suspend the implementation
of the sentence [De la Torre v. Comelec, supra.]. This is modified by Moreno v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 168550, August 10, 2006, where the Supreme Court, citing
Baclayon v. Mutia, said that probation is not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a
suspension of the imposition of the sentence. The grant of probation to petitioner
suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the
accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the right to follow a
profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage. Thus, during the period of probation, the probationer is not disqualified
from running for a public office because the accessory penalty of disqualification
from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation. Furthermore, in
the case of Moreno, the trial court had already issued an order finally discharging
him, and under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law, the final discharge of the probationer
shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his
conviction, and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense
for which the probation was granted.
b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case.
i) In Grego v. Comelec, G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997, it was held that
an elective local official who was removed from office as a result of an
administrative case prior to January 1, 1992 (the date of effectivity of the Local
Government Code), is not disqualified from running for an elective local public
office, because Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code cannot be given retroactive
effect.

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Election Laws
ii) In Reyes v. Comelec, 254 SCRA 514, the Supreme Court ruled that
the petitioner, a Municipal Mayor who had been ordered removed from office by
the Sanggunian Panlalawigan, was disqualified, even as he alleged that the
decision was not yet final because he had not yet received a copy of the decision,
inasmuch as it was shown that he merely refused to accept delivery of the copy of
the decision.
c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines.
d) Those with dual citizenship.
i) In Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630, reiterated in Valles v.

Comelec, G.R. No. 137000, August 09, 2000, the Supreme Court clarified the “dual
citizenship” disqualification and reconciled the same with Sec. 5, Art. IV of the
Constitution on “dual allegiance”. Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen
may, without performing any act and as an involuntary consequence of the
conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another State, the Court
explained that “dual citizenship” as a disqualification must refer to citizens with
“dual allegiance”. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under the disqualification.
ii) Furthermore, for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that

they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. The filing of a certificate of
candidacy suffices to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification as dual citizen. This is so, because in the certificate of candidacy,
one declares that he is a Filipino citizen, and that he will support and defend the
Constitution and will maintain true faith and allegiance to the same. Such
declaration under oath operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship
[Mercado v. Manzano, supra.].
iii) However, in the case of a former Filipino who lost Philippine

citizenship and thereafter reacquires it by taking the oath of allegiance as required
in R.A. 9225, he must personally swear to an oath renouncing all foreign
citizenship at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The mere filing of
the certificate of candidacy is not sufficient, because Sec. 5 (2) of R.A. 9225
categorically requires the individual to state in clear and unequivocal terms that he
is renouncing all foreign citizenship, failing which he is disqualified from running
for an elective office [Lopez v. Comelec, G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008, reiterated
in Jacot v. Del and Comelec, G.R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008].

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e) Fugitives from justice in criminal and non-political case here and

abroad. A “fugitive from justice”, as defined by the Supreme Court in Marquez v.
Comelec, 243 SCRA 538, “includes not only those who flee after conviction to
avoid punishment, but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution”. Rodriguez cannot be considered a “fugitive from justice”, because
his arrival in the Philippines from the U.S. preceded the filing of the felony
complaint in the Los Angeles Court and the issuance of the arrest warrant by the
same foreign court, by almost five months [Rodriguez v. Comelec, G.R. No.
120099, July 24, 1996].
f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acouired

the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivitv
of the Local Government Code.
i) In Caasi v. Comelec, 191 SCRA 229, the Supreme Court said that
possession of a “green card” is ample evidence to show that the person is an
immigrant to, or a permanent resident of, the United States of America.
g) Those who are insane or feebleminded.
3. Additional grounds for disqualification [Sec. 68, B.P. 881], After having
filed a certificate of candidacy, the following shall be disqualified from continuing
as candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office:
a) One who has given money or other material consideration to

influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions.
b) One who committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy.
c) One who spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that

allowed by the Code.
d) One who has solicited, received or made contributions prohibited

under Sec. 89 (transportation, food and drinks), Sec. 95 (public or private financial
institutions, public utilities or exploitation of natural resources, contractors of public
works or other government contracts; franchise holders or concessionaires;
educational institutions receiving grants from the government, officials of the Civil
Service or the AFP, foreigners or foreign corporations), Sec. 96 (foreign-sourced
contributions), Sec. 97 (raising of funds through lotteries, cockfights, boxing bouts,
bingo, beauty contests, etc.), and Sec. 104 (prohibited contributions to churches,
schoolbuildings, roads, bridges, medical clinics, etc.).

528 Election Laws
e) One who has violated the provisions of Sec. 80 (campaign period),

Sec. 83 (removal, destruction of lawful election propaganda), Sec. 85 (prohibited
forms of propaganda). Sec. 86 (regulation of propaganda through mass media). In
Pangkat Laguna v. Comelec, G.R. No. 148075, February 4, 2002, the Supreme
Court held that the acts of Laguna .Governor Lazaro in ordering the purchase of
trophies, basketballs, volleyballs, chessboard sets, and the distribution of medals
and pins to various schools, did not constitute a violation of Sec. 80 on premature
campaigning. Respondent Lazaro was not in any way directly or indirectly soliciting
votes; she was merely performing the duties and tasks imposed upon her by law,
which duties she had sworn to perform as Governor of Laguna.
f) One who has violated the provisions of Sec. 261 (election
offenses).
C. Certificate of Candidacy.
1. Effect of filing certificate of candidacy:

a) Officials holding appointive offices, including active members of AFP
and officers of government-owned or -controlled corporations shall be considered
ipso facto resigned [Sec. 66, B.P. 881]. In PNOC Energy Development Corporation
v. NLRC, G.R. No. 100947, May 31, 1993, it was held that this section applies
even to employees of government-owned or -controlled corporations without an
original charter.
2. Formal defects in the certificate of candidacy.
a) While the certificate of candidacy is required to be under oath, the

election of a candidate cannot be annulled on the sole ground of formal defects in
his certificate, such as lack of the required oath [De Guzman v. Board of
Canvassers, 48 Phil 211],
b) In Jurilla v. Comelec, G.R. No. 105435, June 2, 1994, it was held that
the omission by the candidate (for Councilor in Quezon City) to indicate in his
certificate of candidacy his precinct number and the particular barangay where he
is a registered voter, is not sufficient ground to disqualify the candidate, because
the Local Government Code does not require these data to be indicated in the
certificate. It is enough that he is a registered voter in the precinct where he intends
to vote which should be within the district where he is running for office. 3
3. Death, disqualification or withdrawal of candidate. If after the last day

for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered

Election Laws 529
political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person
belonging to and certified by the same political party may file a certificate of
candidacy for the office not later than mid-day of the day of the election [Sec. 77,
B.P. 881].
a) In Luna v. Comelec, G.R. No. 165983, April 24, 2007, Luna filed her
certificate of candidacy for the position of Vice-Mayor of Lagayan, Abra, as
substitute for Hans Roger who withdrew his COC. Private respondents challenged
the validity of the substitution, alleging that Hans Roger was only 20 years old and,
therefore, disqualified to run for Vice Mayor; accordingly, he cannot be substituted
by Luna. The Supreme Court ruled that the substitution was valid. When a
candidate files his COC, the Comelec has only a ministerial duty to receive and
acknowledge its receipt pursuant to Sec. 76 of the Omnibus Election Code. Since
Hans withdrew his COC, and the Comelec found that Luna complied with all the
procedural requirements for a valid substitution, Luna could validly substitute for
Hans Roger.
4. Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy. The withdrawal of the certificate

of candidacy shall effect the disqualification of the candidate to be elected for the
position [Ycain v. Caneja, 81 Phil 773], The withdrawal of the withdrawal, for the
purpose of reviving the certificate of candidacy, must be made within the period
provided by law for the filing of certificates of candidacy [Monsale v. Nico, 83 Phil
758].
a) There is nothing in Sec. 73, B.P. 881, which mandates that the affidavit
of withdrawal must be filed with the same office where the certificate of candidacy
to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed directly with the main office of the
Comelec, the office of the regional election director concerned, the office of the
provincial election supervisor of the province to which the municipality belongs, or
the office of the municipal election officer of the municipality. Accordingly, in this
case, the Supreme Court held that there was valid withdrawal by petitioner of her
certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Baybay, Leyte [Loreto-Go v. Comelec, G.R.
No. 147741, May 10, 2001].. 5
5. Filing of two certificates of candidacy. When a person files two

certificates of candidacy for different offices, he becomes ineligible for
either position [Sec. 73, B.P. 881]. He may withdraw one of his certificates
by filing a sworn declaration with the Commission before the deadline for
the filing of certificates of candidacy. In Loreto-Go v. Comelec, supra., the
petitioner filed two certificates; one for Governor of Leyte, and another for
Mayor of Baybay, Leyte. With the Supreme Court ruling that she had validly
withdrawn her certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Baybay, she was,
therefore, considered a bona fide candidate for Governor of Leyte.

530
Election Laws
6. Duty of the Comelec. Subject to its authority over nuisance

candidates and its power to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
under Sec. 78, B.P. 881, the Comelec shall have only the ministerial duty to
receive and acknowledge receipt of the certificates of candidacy [Sec. 76, B.P.
881],
a) As early as in Abcede v. Imperial, 103 Phil 136, the Supreme Court

said that the Commission has no discretion to give or not to give due course to a
certificate of candidacy filed in due form. While the Commission may look into
patent defects in the certificate, it may not go into matters not appearing on their
face.
b) Accordingly, the Comelec may not, by itself, without proper

proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due
form. Sec, 78, B.P. 881, which treats of a petition to deny due course to or cancel
a certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material representation therein is
false, requires that the candidate must be notified of the petition against him, and
he should be given the opportunity to present evidence in his behalf [Cipriano v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 158830, August 10, 2004].
7. Instances when the Comelec may go beyond the face of the certificate of
candidacy:
a) Nuisance candidates [R.A. 6646]. The Comelec may, motu propio, or

upon verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel
a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that the said certificate was filed: (i) To put
the election process in mockery or disrepute; (ii) To cause confusion among the
voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates; or (iii) By other
circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona
fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate has been filed, and thus
prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.
i) The proclamation of the winning candidate renders moot and

academic a motion for reconsideration filed by a candidate who had been earlier
declared by the Comelec to be a nuisance candidate [Garcia v. Comelec G R No.
121139, July 12, 1996].
b) Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A

verified petition may be filed exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained in the certificate as required under Sec. 74 is false. The
petition may be filed not later than 25 days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not
later than 15 days before the election [Sec. 78, B.P. 881].

Election Laws 531
i) Jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy

lies with the Comelec in division, not with the Comelec en banc [Garvida v. Sales,
G.R. No. 122872, September 10, 1997], To deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy entails the exercise by the Comelec of its quasi-judicial,
not simply its administrative, powers. Hence, the Court may only compel the
Comelec to exercise its discretion and resolve the matter but it may not control the
manner of exercising such discretion [Quizon v. Comelec,
G. R. No. 177927, February 15, 2008],
ii) In Villaberv. Comelec, G.R. No. 148326, November 15, 2001,

respondent Douglas Cagas filed a petition for the cancellation of petitioner’s
certificate of candidacy on the ground that the latter made a false material
representation in his certificate when he said that he is “eligible for the office
sought to be elected to” since he had been convicted of violating B.P. 22, a crime
involving moral turpitude.
iii) In Loong v. Comelec, 216 SCRA 760, it was held that the petition
for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Loong for alleged
misrepresentation as to his age, filed by Ututalum beyond the 25-day period from
the last day for filing certificates of candidacy cannot be given due course. Neither
can it be treated as a quo warranto petition since there has been no proclamation
yet. The ruling in Frivaldo v. Comelec cannot be invoked, because in the latter
case, the ground for disqualification was citizenship. [As pointed out by Justice
Gutierrez in his concurring opinion, where the disqualification is based on age,
residence, or any of the other grounds for ineligibility, the prescriptive period
should be applied strictly.]
iv) A facsimile of a petition for disqualification is not a genuine

pleading; it is not sanctioned by the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Thus, the
Comelec should not have acted on it, but should have awaited receipt of the
original petition filed through registered mail [Garvida v. Sales, 271 SCRA 767].
c) Filing of a disqualification case on any of the grounds enumerated

in Sec. 68, B.P. 881. i)
i) The jurisdiction of the Comelec to disqualify candidates is

limited to those enumerated in Sec. 68, B.P. 881. All other election
offenses are beyond the ambit of the Comelec jurisdiction. They are
criminal and not administrative in nature, and the power of the Comelec
over such cases is confined to the conduct of preliminary investigation on
the alleged election offense for the purpose of prosecuting the alleged
offenders before the courts of justice [Codilla v. Comelec, G.R. No.
150605, December 10, 2004],

532 Election Laws
ii) Under Section 2, Comelec Resolution No. 2050, the Comelec is

mandated to dismiss a complaint for the disqualification of a candidate who has
been charged with an election offense but who has already been proclaimed as
the winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. In this case, the petitioners had
already been proclaimed winners on May 18, 2001, and the private respondents
filed their complaint for the disqualification of petitioners only on June 23, 2001.
The Comelec found probable cause against the petitioners for the offense
charged, and directed its Law Department to file the appropriate Information.
Clearly, then, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed resolution disqualifying the
petitioners from the positions they were respectively elected to [Albana v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 163302, July 23, 2004],
8. Effect of disqualification case. Any candidate who has been declared by

final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his
guilt is strong [Sec. 6, R.A. 6646],
a) Note that the Comelec can suspend proclamation only when

evidence of the winning candidate’s guilt is strong [Codilla v. Comelec, supra.].
b) The use of the word “may” indicates that the suspension of the
proclamation is merely permissive. If the Comelec does not find any sufficient
ground to suspend proclamation, then a proclamation may be made [Grego v.
Comelec, 274 SCRA 481].
c) Where the decision of the Comelec disqualifying the candidate is not

yet final and executory on election day, the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI), in
the exercise of its ministerial duty, is under obligation to count and tally the votes
cast in favor of the candidate [Papandayan v. Comelec, G.R. No. 147909, April
16, 2002],
d) In Ortega v. Comelec, 211 SCRA 297, companion case to Labo v.

Comelec, the Supreme Court held that it is incorrect to argue that since a
candidate has been disqualified, the votes intended for the disqualified candidate
should, in effect, be considered null and void. This would amount to
disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides, x x x The

Election Laws 533
rule would have been different if the electorate, fully aware in fact and in law of a
candidate’s disqualification, so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In
such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of
their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes,
in which case the eligible candidate obtaining the next highest number of votes
may be deemed elected. [Note that in this case, the Comelec resolution
disqualifying Labo had not yet become final on the day of the election.] This was
reiterated in Aquino v. Comelec, 248 SCRA 400, where the Supreme Court said
that if Aquino were disqualified before the elections, the votes for him, given the
acrimony which attended the campaign, would not have automatically gone to
second-placer Syjuco. The same rule was applied in Nolasco v. Comelec, 275
SCRA 762, Sunga v. Comelec, 288 SCRA 76, and Codilla v. Comelec, supra..
e) In Aznar v. Comelec, 185 SCRA 703, it was held that a petition for
disqualification cannot be treated as a petition for quo warranto as the former is
unquestionably premature.
f) In Marcos v. Comelec, 248 SCRA 300, it was held that Secs. 6 and 7,
R.A. 6646, in relation to Sec. 78, B.P. 881, show that the Comelec does not lose
jurisdiction even with the lapse of the period provided in Sec. 78, B.P. 881. It is
settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified
period is generally construed to be merely directory.
g) In Nolasco v. Comelec, 275 SCRA 762, it was held that by virtue of the
constitutional grant of plenary authority to the Comelec, it has jurisdiction over
proclamation and disqualification cases, and the Comelec may not be hamstrung
by its own procedure in Resolution No. 2050, even if the petition for disqualification
is filed after the election. These petitions for disqualification are subject to
summary hearing.

534 Election Laws
VI. CAMPAIGN; ELECTION PROPAGANDA;

CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENSES
A. Election campaign or partisan political activity. Read Sec. 79, BP 881.
1. Election campaign or partisan political activity refers to an act desig ned

to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to public
office.
a) If done for the purpose of enhancing the chances of aspirants for

nomination for candidacy to a public office by a political party, etc., it shall not be
considered as election campaign or partisan political activity.
b) It shall be unlawful for any person or any party to engage in election

campaign or partisan political activity except during the campaign period [Sec. 80,
BP 881].
i) The essential elements for violation of Section 80 are: [a] a

person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity as defined in
Section 79; [b] the act is designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular
candidate; and [c] the act is done outside the campaign period [Lanot v. Comelec,
G.R. No. 164858, November 16, 2006],
ii) In this case, Henry Lanot, a candidate for Mayor of Pasig City,
filed a petition to disqualify opponent Vicente Eusebio for engaging in an election
campaign outside of the designated period by uttering defamatory statements
against Lanot, causing the publication of a press release predicting his victory,
installing billboards, streamers, posters and stickers printed with his surname in
Pasig City, addressing a large group of people during a medical mission sponsored
by the Pasig City government, and distributing shoes to schoolchildren in Pasig
public schools to induce their parents to vote for him. The Court found that Eusebio
filed his COC on December 29, 2003, and he allegedly committed the acts before
the start of the campaign period commencing on March 24, 2004. Sec. 11 of RA
8436 moved the deadline for the filing of COCs from March 23, 2004 to January
2, 2004, or 81 days earlier. Under Sec. 11, the only purpose for the early filing of
COCs is to give ample time for the printing of official ballots. Congress never
intended that the early filing of COCs is to make the person immediately a
candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots. This legislative intent
prevents the immediate application of Sec. 80 to those who file their COCs to meet
the early deadline. The clear intention pf Congress was to preserve the election
period as fixed

Election Laws 535
by existing law prior to RA 8436, and one who files a COC within the early deadline
“will still not be considered as a candidate”. Accordingly, Eusebio became a
candidate only on March 23, 2004 for all purposes other than the printing of ballots.
Thus, his acts prior to March 23, 2004, even if constituting election campaign or
partisan political activity are not punishable under Sec. 80 [Lanot v. Comelec,
supra.].
c) Distinguish this from the prohibition on members of the Civil Service

to engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign
under Sec. 2 (4), Art. IX-B, Philippine Constitution.
2. Public Rally. Any political party or candidate shall notify the election
registrar of any public rally said political party or candidate intends to organize and
hold in the city or municipality, and within seven working days thereafter submit to
the election registrar a statement of expenses incurred in connection therewith
[Sec. 88, B.P. 881],
B. Lawful election propaganda. Read Sec. 82.
C. Prohibited election propaganda. Read Sec. 85.
1. In Badoy v. Comelec, 35 SCRA 285, the prohibition against certain forms

of election propaganda was upheld as a valid exercise of the police power, “to
prevent the perversion and prostitution of the electoral apparatus, and of the denial
of due process of law”.
a) But this evil does not obtain in a plebiscite, because in a plebiscite the
electorate is asked to vote for or against issues, not candidates [Sanidad v.
2. In Chavez v. Comelec, G.R. No. 162777, August31, 2004, the Supreme

Court upheld the validity of the Comelec resolution that all propaganda materials,
including advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image or
mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or display
thereof becomes a candidate for public office, be immediately removed, otherwise,
this shall be presumed as premature campaigning in violation of Sec. 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code. 3
3. See National Press Club v. Comelec, 207 SCRA 1; Adiong v.

Comelec, 207 SCRA 712; Social Weather Stations v. Comelec, G.R. No.
147571, May 5, 2001; discussed in Freedom of Expression, Chapter 6,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

536 Election Laws
D. Prohibited Contributions. Read Secs. 95-97.
E. Limitations on expenses; lawful expenditures. Read Secs. 100-102.
1. Sec. 13, R.A. 7166 provides that for the 1992 synchronized elections, the
aggregate amount that a candidate or registered political party may spend for
election campaign shall be as follows:
a) For candidates: P10 for President and Vice President; and for other
candidates P3.00 for every voter currently registered in the constituency where he
filed his certificate of candidacy; Provided, that a candidate without any political
party and without support from any political party may be allowed to spend P5.00
for every such voter; and
b) For political parties: P5.00 for every voter currently registered in the
constituency or constituencies where it has official candidates.
F. Statement of contributions and expenses [Sec. 14, R.A. 7166]. Every

candidate and treasurer of the political party shall, within 30 days after the day of
the election, file in duplicate with the offices of the Commission, the full, true and
itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with the
election.
1. No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his
office until he has filed the statement of contributions and expenditures herein
required. The same prohibition shall apply if the political party that nominated the
winning candidate fails to file the statement required herein.
2. Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file the

statements or reports in connection with electoral contributions and expenditures
as required shall constitute an administrative offense for which the offenders shall
be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from P1,000 to P30,000 in the
discretion of the Commission. The fine shall be paid within 30 days from receipt of
notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of execution
issued by the Commission against the properties of the offender. For the
commission of a second or subsequent offense the administrative fine shall range
from P2.000 to P60,000, in the discretion of the Commission. In addition, the
offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
a) In Pilar v. Comelec, 245 SCRA 759, the Supreme Court said that the
requirement to file the statement covers even those who withdrew as candidates
after having filed their certificates, because Sec. 14, R.A. 7166, does not make
any distinction.

Election Laws 537
VII. BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTORS;

WATCHERS
A. Composition of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI): A chairman, a

member and a poll clerk, who must be public school teachers. A member must be
of good moral character and irreproachable reputation, a registered voter of the
City or municipality, never been convicted of any election offense or any other
crime punishable by more than 6 months imprisonment, able to speak and write
English or the local dialect.
1. Disqualification, (a) Must not be related within the 4th civil degree by
consanguinity or affinity to any member of the BEI or to any candidate to be voted
for in the polling place, (b) Must not engage in any partisan political activity.
B. Powers of the BEI: Conduct the voting and counting of votes in the polling
place; act as deputies of the COMELEC in supervision and control of the polling
place; maintain order within the polling place and its premises to keep access
thereto open and unobstructed and to enforce obedience to its lawful orders, and
perform such other functions as prescribed by the Code or by the rules of the
Comelec.
1. Proceedings: Shall be public and held only in the polling place although
the counting of votes and preparation of the return may be done in the nearest
safe barangay or school building within the municipality by unanimous vote of the
board and concurred in by a majority of the watchers present, if there is imminent
danger of violence, terrorism, disorder or similar causes. The BEI shall act through
its Chairman, and shall decide without delay by majority vote all questions which
may arise in the performance of its duties.
C. Watchers. Each candidate and political party or coalition of political parties

duly registered with the Commission and fielding candidates in the May 11, 1998
elections including those participating under the party-list system of
representation, may appoint two watchers, to serve alternately, in every polling
place. However, candidates for Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang
Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan, belonging to the same ticket or slate shall
collectively be entitled to one watcher. Duly accredited citizens’ arms of the
Commission shall be entitled to appoint a watcher in every polling place. Other
civic, religious, professional, business, service, youth and any other similar
organizations, with prior authority from the Commission, shall be entitled
collectively to appoint one watcher in every polling place.

538 Election Laws
1. Qualifications: Qualified voter of the city or municipality, of good

reputation, never been convicted of any election offense or any crime, knows how
to read and write English, Pilipino, or any of the prevailing local dialects, and not
related within the 4th civil degree by consanguinity or affinity to any member of the
BEI in the polling place where he seeks appointment as watcher.
2. Rights and duties: Stay in the space reserved for them inside the polling
place; witness and inform themselves of the proceedings of the BEI; take notes,
photographs of proceedings; file protest against any irregularity or violation of law;
be furnished with a certificate of the number of votes cast for each candidate, duly
signed and thumbmarked by the members of the BEI.

Election Laws 539
VIII. CASTING OF VOTES
A. Procedure. Read Secs. 190-198, BP 881.
1. Preparation of ballots for illiterate and disabled. An illiterate or disabled

voter may be assisted in the preparation of his ballot by a relative within the 4 th
civil degree by consanguinity or affinity; or, if he has none, by any person of his
confidence who belongs to the same household, or by any member of the BEI;
Provided, that no voter shall be allowed to vote as an illiterate unless so indicated
in his registration record; and Provided, further, that in no case shall an assistor
assist more than three times, except the members of the BEI.
2. Authentication of ballot. In every case, the chairman of the board shall, in

the presence of the voter, affix his signature at the back of the ballot before issuing
it to the voter. Failure to authenticate the ballot shall be noted in the Minutes of
Voting and Counting of Votes, and shall constitute an election offense.
a) There is nothing in the law that provides that a ballot which has not
been authenticated shall be deemed spurious. The law merely makes the
Chairman of the BEI accountable for such an omission [Libanan v. HRET, G.R.
No. 129783, December 22, 1997]. Thus, it was held in Punzalan v. Comelec, 289
SCRA 702, that the ballot is valid even if it is not signed at the back by the
Chairman of the BEI.
3. Challenge of illegal voter. Any voter or watcher may challenge any person
offering to vote for not being registered, for using the name of another, or for
suffering from existing disqualification. A challenge may likewise be made on the
ground that the challenged person has received or expects to receive, paid,
offered or promised to pay, contributed, offered or promised to contribute money
or anything of value as consideration for his vote or for the vote of another; made
or received a promise to influence the giving or withholding of any such vote; or
made a bet or is interested directly or indirectly in a bet which depends upon the
results of the election. The challenged voter shall take an oath before the BEI that
he has not committed any of the acts alleged in the challenge.
a) The swqrn statement of the challenged voter may then be used as a

basis for subsequent prosecution for perjury.

540 Election Laws
IX. COUNTING OF VOTES
A. Procedure. Read Secs. 206-210, BP 881.
1. Manner of counting votes [Sec. 25, R.A. 7166]: In reading the individual
official ballots during the counting, the chairman, poll clerk and the third member
shall assume such positions as to provide the watchers and the members of the
public as may be conveniently accommodated in the polling place, unimpeded
view of the ballot being read by the chairman, of the election returns and the tally
board being simultaneously accomplished by the poll clerk and the third member
respectively, without touching any of these election documents. The table shall be
cleared of all unnecessary writing paraphernalia. Any violation of this requirement
shall constitute an election offense punishable under Secs. 263 and 264 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
B. Rules for appreciation of ballots. Read Sec. 211, BP 881.

1. Some rules: '
a) Idem sonans. A name or surname incorrectly written which, when

read, has a sound similar to the name or surname of a candidate when correctly
written shall be counted in his favor.
b) When two or more words are written on the same line on the ballot,
all of which are the surnames of two or more candidates, the same shall not be
counted for any of them, unless one is the surname of an incumbent who has
served for at least one year in which case it shall be counted in favor of the latter.
c) When on the ballot is written a single word which is the first name of
a candidate and which is at the same time the surname of his opponent, the vote
shall be counted in favor of the latter.
d) When two words are written on the ballot, one of which is the first
name of the candidate and the other is the surname of his opponent, the vote shall
not be counted for either.
e) Ballots which contain prefixes such as “Sr.”, “Mr.”, “Datu”, “Ginoo”,

etc., shall be valid.
f) The use of nicknames and appellation of affection and friendship, if

accompanied by the first name or surname of the candidate, does not annul

Election Laws 541
such vote, except when they were used as a means to identify the voter, in which
case, the whole ballot is invalid.
g) If the candidates voted for exceed the number of those to be elected,

the ballot is valid, but the votes shall be counted only in favor of the candidates
whose names were firstly written by the voter within the space provided for said
office in the ballot until the authorized number is covered.
2. Some rulings on appreciation of ballots:
a) Appreciation of ballots is a function of the BEI, not of the Board of

Canvassers [Sanchez v. Comelec, 153 SCRA 67],
b) Where the name of the candidate is not written in the proper space in
the ballot but is preceded by the name of the office for which he* is a candidate, the
vote shall be considered valid for such candidate. In appreciating a ballot, the object
should be to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter if it can be
determined with reasonable certainty. Thus, the name of the candidate preceded
by the words “Bo. Barangay” should be interpreted to mean “Po. (or Punong)
Barangay”, and should be counted for the candidate [Bautista v. Castro, 206 SCRA
305]. But where the name of the candidate is written seven times in the ballot, it is
clear that the same is intended to identify the ballot, and thus, the vote should be
invalidated [Bautista v. Castro, supra.].
c) In Villagracia v. Comelec, G.R. No. 168296, January 31, 2006, it was

held that a distinction must be made between marks that were apparently
carelessly or innocently made, which do not invalidate the ballot, and marks
purposely placed thereon by the voter with a view to possible future identification,
which invalidates it. In this case, the invalidated ballots are marked with the words
“Joker” (14 ballots), “Alas” (6 ballots), “Queen” (7 ballots), and “Kamatis” (7
ballots), all written in the number 7 slot of the list of Kagawad for Sangguniang
Barangay, and appearing only in ballots wherein the Punong Barangay voted for
was petitioner. Clearly, the marks indicate no other intention than to identify the
ballots; indubitably, these are marked ballots and were properly invalidated.
d) In Bautista v. Comelec, G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998, the

Supreme Court upheld the use of separate tallies for votes considered stray
(because of the pendency of a motion for reconsideration filed by the candidate
who was declared a nuisance candidate). After the motion for reconsideration was
denied by the Comelec, the votes in the separate tally were allowed to be credited
as part of the valid votes cast in favor of the petitioner.

542 Election Laws
C. Election Return. The BEI shall prepare the election return simultaneously
with the counting of the votes in the polling place.
1. In the election for President, Vice President, Senators, and Members

of the House of Representatives, and parties, organizations or coalitions
participating under the party-list system, the returns shall be prepared in seven
copies, and distributed as follows:
1st - to city or municipal board of canvassers;

2nd - to Congress, directed to the President of the Senate;
3rd - to the Commission on Elections;
4th - to the dominant majority party as determined by the
Commission;
5th - to the dominant minority party as determined by the
Commission;
6th - to the citizen’s arm authorized by the Commission to conduct an
unofficial count;
7th - deposited inside the compartment of the ballot box for valid
ballots.
2. In the election of local officials:
1st - to the city or municipal board of canvassers;

2nd - to the Commission on Elections
3rd - to the provincial board of canvassers
4 th . to the dominant majority party as determined by the
Commission;
5th - to the dominant minority party as determined by the
Commission;
6th - to the citizen’s arm authorized by the Commission to conduct an
unofficial count;
7th - to be deposited inside the compartment of the ballot box for valid
ballots.
D. Announcement of the result of the election. Upon the completion of the

election returns, the chairman of the BEI shall orally and publicly announce the
total number of votes received in the election in the polling place by each and every
one of the candidates.
E. BEI to issue Certificate of Votes to Watchers. BEI to issue Certificate of

Votes to Watchers. This certificate is issued upon request. Sec. 16, R.A. 6646,
requires that the Certificate of Votes must be signed and thumbmarked by each
member of the BEI which issues the same.

Election Laws 543
1. The Certificate of Votes is evidence not only of tampering, alteration,

falsification or any other anomaly in the preparation of the election returns, but also
of the votes obtained by the candidates [Balindong v. Comelec, 27 SCRA 567].
2. However, in Garay v. Comelec, 261 SCRA 222, the Supreme Court held
that a Certificate of Votes can never be a valid basis for canvass; it can only be
evidence to prove tampering, alteration, falsification or any other anomaly
committed in the election returns concerned, when duly authenticated. A
Certificate of Votes does not constitute sufficient evidence of the true and genuine
results of the elections; only election returns are. In like manner, neither is the tally
board sufficient evidence of the real results of the election.

544 Election Laws
X. CANVASS AND PROCLAMATION
A. Canvassing by Provincial, City, District and Municipal Board of

Canvassers. Read Secs. 28-29, RA 7166 .
1. Composition of the Board of Canvassers.
a. Provincial: The provincial election supervisor or a lawyer in the regional

office of the Comelec, as chairman, the provincial fiscal, as vice chairman, and the
provincial superintendent of schools as member. In the event of non-availability,
absence, disqualification or incapacity, substitute members are the following, in
the order named: Provincial Auditor, Register of Deeds, Clerk of Court nominated
by the Executive Judge, and any other available appointive provincial official.
b) City: The city election registrar or a lawyer of the Comelec, as

chairman, the city fiscal, as vice chairman, and the city superintendent of schools,
as member. Substitute members are officials in the city corresponding to the
substitutes in the provincial board of canvassers.
c) Municipal: The election registrar or a representative of the Comelec,

as chairman, the municipal treasurer, as vice chairman, and the most senior district
school supervisor, or in his absence, a principal of the school or the elementary
school, as member. Substitute members are the Municipal Administrator,
Municipal Assessor, Clerk of Court nominated by the Executive Judge, or any
other available appointive municipal officials.
2. Prohibited relationship. Related within the 4th civil degree by

consanguinity or affinity to any of the candidates whose votes will be canvassed
by the Board, or to any member of the same Board.
3. Prohibition against leaving station. During the period beginning election

day until proclamation of winning candidates, no member of the Board shall be
transferred, assigned or detailed outside of his official station without the prior
authority of the Comelec.
B. Congress as Board of Canvassers for election of President and Vice President

[Sec. 30, R.A. 7166], 1
1. Congress shall determine the authenticity and due execution of the

certificates of canvass for President and Vice President as accomplished
and transmitted to it by the local boards of canvassers, on a showing that:
(a)

Election Laws 545
Each certificate of canvass was executed, signed and thumbmarked by the

chairman and transmitted to Congress by them; (b) Each certificate of canvass
contains the names of all the candidates for President and Vice President and their
corresponding votes in words and in figures; and (c) There exists no discrepancy
in other authentic copies of the certificates of canvass or discrepancy in the votes
of any candidate in words and figures in the same certificate.
2. When the certificate of canvass, duly certified by the board of canvassers

of each province, city or district, appears to be incomplete, the Senate President
shall require the board of canvassers concerned to transmit by personal delivery,
the election returns from polling places that were not included in the certificate of
canvass and supporting statements.
3. When it appears that any certificate of canvass or supporting statement

of votes by precinct bears erasures or alterations which may cast doubt as to the
veracity of the number of votes stated therein and may affect the result of the
election, upon request of the presidential or vice presidential candidate concerned
or his party, Congress shall, for the sole purpose of verifying the actual number of
votes cast for President and Vice President, count the votes as they appear in the
copies of the election returns submitted to it.
4. Cases:
a) Sec. 18.5 of R.A. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003) , insofar as it grants sweeping authority to the Commission on
Elections to proclaim all winning candidates, is unconstitutional as it is repugnant
to Sec. 4, Art. VII of the Constitution, which vests in Congress the authority to
proclaim the winning Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates [Makalintal v.
Comelec, supra.]
b) In Ruy Elias Lopez v. Senate of the Philippines, supra., it was held

that Congress may validly delegate the preliminary determination of the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass to a Joint
Congressional Committee constituted under the Rules adopted by the Joint
Session of Congress.
c) In Pimentel, Jr. v. Joint Committee of Congress to Canvass the Votes

Cast for President and Vice President, supra., the Supreme Court held that even
after Congress had adjourned its regular session, it may continue to perform the
constitutional duty of canvassing the presidential and vicepresidential election
results without need of any call for a special session by the President.

546 Election Laws
C. COMELEC en banc as National Board of Canvassers for Senatorial

Elections [Sec. 30, RA 7166].
1. Pursuant to Sec. 30, R.A. 7166, the power to determine the authenticity
and due execution of the Certificates of Canvass (COCs) for Senators exclusively
rests in the Comelec, as National Board of Canvassers, not on the provincial board
of canvassers. Thus, the Special Provincial Board of Canvassers (SPBOC) validly
denied the repeated motions of Pimentel to question the Bedol Provincial Board of
Canvassers and the Municipal Board of Canvassers during its proceedings,
because allowing the same would be ultra vires. Furthermore, it would be
tantamount to allowing a pre-proclamation contest which is prohibited by Sec. 15,
R.A. 7166 [Pimentel III v. Comelec, G.R. No. 178413, March 13, 2008].
D. Duty of the Board of Canvassers. A canvassing board performs a purely

ministerial function, that of compiling and adding the results as they appear in the
returns transmitted to it [Guiao v. Comelec, 137 SCRA 366].
1. The Comelec shall have direct control and supervision over the board of
canvassers.
2. During the canvass, the Board of Canvassers prepares the Statement of

Votes, which is tabulation per precinct of the votes obtained by the candidates as
reflected in the election returns. It is the Statement of Votes which forms the basis
of the Certificate of Canvass and of the proclamation.
a) In Castromayor v. Comelec, 250 SCRA 298, after the Municipal

Board of Canvassers had proclaimed the petitioner as the 8th winning candidate
for member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Calinog, Iloilo, on the strength of an
erroneous tabulation of votes, the Board of Canvassers discovered that it should
have been Demorito, not the petitioner, who should have been proclaimed, and
thus post-haste faxed a copy of the correct tabulation to the Comelec. The
Comelec then issued a resolution directing the Board of Canvassers to reconvene
and annul the proclamation of the petitioner, and to proclaim the winning
candidate. On petitioner’s claim that no notice nor opportunity to be heard was
given to him by the Comelec, the Supreme Court said that, in order to obviate the
necessity of remanding the case to the Comelec for further proceedings, the Board
of Canvassers should proceed to hear the petitioner’s objections and, only if
warranted, should it then annul the proclamation of the petitioner.
E. Nature of Proceedings. Canvass proceedings are administrative and

summary in nature.

Election Laws 547
1. A majority vote of all the members of the board shall be necessary to

render a decision [Sec. 225, B.P. 881],
2. Where it has been duly determined by the Comelec that actual voting and
election by the registered voters had taken place, the election returns cannot be
disregarded and excluded — with the corresponding disenfranchisement of voters
— but must be accorded prima facie status as bona fide reports of the result of
the voting for canvassing and proclamation purposes, x x x The summary nature
of the proceedings requires that the written objections (to the returns) be filed only
during this stage, because it is only at this time that the inclusion or exclusion of
any return is in issue; mere allegations of duress, coercion, fraud, cannot
invalidate election returns which are otherwise clean on their face. See Grand
Alliance for Democracy v. Comelec, 150 SCRA 665; Guiao v. Comelec, supra..
3. Any registered political party, coalition of parties, through their

representatives, and any candidate has the right to be present and to counsel
during the canvass of election returns. They shall have the right to examine the
returns being canvassed without touching them, to make their observations
thereon, and file their challenges in accordance with the rules and regulations of
the Comelec [Sec. 25, R.A. 6646],
4. It shall be unlawful for any officer or member of the AFP, including the
National Police, or any peace officer or any armed or unarmed persons belonging
to an extra-legal police agency, special forces, reaction forces, strike forces, home
defense forces, barangay self-defense units, etc. to enter the room where the
canvassing of the election returns are held, and within a radius of 50 meters from
such room [Sec. 232, B.P. 881],
5. The Comelec may order the annulment of the Certificate of Canvass

which it found to be tampered after examining the copies of the election returns of
the Municipal Judge and the Comelec — not the copy of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers — because all the copies of the election returns are original copies
although the copy of the Municipal Board of Canvassers is the original copy. Sec.
15, R.A. 7166, does not specify that the Comelec shall use the copy of the election
return of the Municipal Board of Canvassers in correcting a manifest error
[Mastura v. Comelec, 285 SCRA 493],
F. Proclamation., After the canvass of election returns, in the absence of a

perfected appeal to the Comelec, the Board of Canvassers shall proclaim the
winning candidates. 1
1 ■ It is now settled that an incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot

be made the basis of a proclamation. A canvass cannot be reflective

548 Election Laws
of the true vote of the electorate unless all returns are considered and none is
omitted. When the municipal board of canvassers, in this case, disregarded the
five election returns, it in effect disenfranchised the voters of the excluded
precincts. The fact that a candidate illegally proclaimed has assumed office is not
a bar to the exercise by the Comelec of the authority to-annul any canvass and
proclamation illegally made. It is true that after proclamation, the remedy of a party
aggrieved in an election is an election protest. But this is on the assumption that
there has been a valid proclamation. Where a proclamation is null and void, the
proclaimed candidate’s assumption of office cannot deprive the Comelec of the
power to declare such a proclamation a nullity [Utto v. Comelec, G.R. No. 150111,
January 31, 2002].
2. In Baterina v. Comelec, 205 SCRA 1, where what was filed was a petition
to restrain the canvass and proclamation, or to suspend the effects of any
proclamation, it was held that the petition was not the appeal referred to in Sec.
245 which will operate to bar the Provincial Board of Canvassers from making any
proclamation without authority from the Comelec.
3. Petitioners, members of the Board of Canvassers, who proclaimed as the

8th winning candidate one who did not obtain the 8th highest number of votes, may
be criminally prosecuted for violation of Sec. 231 (failure to proclaim the winning
candidate) [Agujetas v. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 17]. 4
4. Nolaw provides for a reglementary period within which to file a petition

for annulment of election if there is, as yet, no proclamation [Loong v.

Election Laws 549
XI. PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY

A. Defined. Apre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or
affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any
candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before
the board or directly with the Comelec, or any matter raised under Sections 233,
234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of the election returns [Sec. 241, B.P. 881]. The institution of the pre-
proclamation cointroversy was intended to prevent the nefarious practice known
as “grab-the-proclamation, prolong-the-protest”.
1. No pre-proclamation cases in election of national officials [Sec. 15, R.A.

7166], For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and
Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be
allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of the election returns or the certificates of canvass, as the case may
be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing
body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct
manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it. Questions
affecting the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers may be
initiated in the board or directly with the Commission.
a) Parties adversely affected by a ruling of the board of canvassers on

questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board may appeal the
matter to the Commission within three (3) days from a ruling thereon. The
Commission shall summarily decide the case within five (5) days from the filing
thereof [Sec. 19, R.A. 7166], In this case, therefore, the Comelec may still entertain
a pre-proclamation controversy involving the illegal composition or proceedings of
the Board of Canvassers [Lim v. Comelec],
b) Manifest errors. Likewise, the Comelec may entertain petitions for the
correction of “manifest errors” in the Certificate of Canvass or in the election
returns. But to be “manifest”, the errors must appear on the face of the Certificates
of Canvass or election returns sought to be corrected, and objections thereto must
have been made before the Board of Canvassers and specifically noted in .the
minutes of their respective proceedings [Chavez v. Comelec, 211 SCRA 315].
A“manifest error” is one that is visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding;
that which is open, palpable, incontrovertible, needing no evidence to make it more
clear [O’Hara v. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 148941-42, March 12, 2002].

550 Election Laws
i) A petition for correction of errors in the Certificate of Canvass

may be filed at any time before proclamation [Bince v. Comelec, 242 SCRA 273],
However, in Torres v. Comelec, 270 SCRA 583, it was held that although the
provision applies to a pre-proclamation controversy, there is nothing to prevent its
application to cases in which the validity of the proclamation is in question. Since
the Statement of Votes is the basis of the Certificate of Canvass and of the
proclamation, any error in the Statement affects the validity of the proclamation.
Thus, even if the petitioner had already been proclaimed, his proclamation is void,
and the Comelec has the power to annul the same.
ii) Corrections should be made by inserting the corrections in the

Statement of Votes or by preparing a new Statement of Votes incorporating the
corrections [Ramirez v. Comelec, 270 SCRA 590].
2. Pre-proclamation case different from an action for annulment of election

results or declaration of failure of elections. In Abaya v. Comelec,
G. R. No. 145007-08, January 28, 2003, the Supreme Court had occasion to
reiterate the distinction, as earlier pronounced in Loong v. Comelec, supra., viz:
While the Comelec is restricted in pre-proclamation cases to an examination of the
election returns on their face and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind
them and investigate election irregularities, in cases of actions for annulment of
election results or declaration of failure of elections, the Comelec may conduct
technical examination of election documents and compare and analyze voters’
signatures and fingerprints in order to determine whether or not the elections had
indeed been free, honest and clean.
a) But this principle that, in pre-proclamation cases, the Comelec is

without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind the election returns and investigate
election irregularities presupposes that the returns “appear to be authentic and
duly accomplished on their face”. Where, as in this case, there is a prima facie
showing that the return is not genuine, several entries having been omitted in the
questioned election return, the principle does not apply. The Comelec is not
powerless to determine if there is basis for the exclusion of the questioned election
return [Lee v. Comelec, G.R. No. 157004, July 4, 2003]. Thus, in Jainal v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 174551, March 7, 2007, the Supreme Court said that the
Comelec did not have to look at other evidence to conclude that the election
returns were manufactured, because the defects were apparent on the face of the
election returns themselves. Earlier, in Chu v. Comelec, 377 Phil. 509 (1999), it
was already intimated that a pre-proclamation case is the proper remedy if the
defects and irregularities are apparent from a physical inspection of the election
returns.
b) But where the resolution of the issues raised would require the
Comelec to “pierce the veil” of election returns that appear prima facie regular,

Election Laws 551
the remedy is a regular election protest [Sebastian v. Comelec, 327 SCRA 406
(2000)].
B. Comelec Jurisdiction. The Comelec has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-

proclamation cases.
1. While the Comelec has merely appellate jurisdiction over election contests
involving municipal offices, it cannot be deprived of its exclusive jurisdiction over
pre-proclamation contests, indeed, it is immaterial if some of the grounds adduced
are grounds for an election contest rather than for a pre-proclamation controversy
[Olfato v. Comelec, 103 SCRA 741].
C. Issues which may be raised [Sec. 243, B.P. 881],
1. Illegal composition or proceedings of the Board of Canvassers.
a) Under Comelec rules, if the petition involves the illegal composition

of the Board of Canvassers, it must be filed immediately when the Board begins
to act as such, or at the time of the appointment of the member whose capacity as
such is objected to [Villamor v. Comelec, G.R. No. 169865, July 1, 2006].
b) By participating in the proceedings, the petitioner is deemed to have

acquiesced in the composition of the Board of Canvassers. A petition based on
illegal composition of the board of canvassers should be filed immediately when
the Board begins to act. A petition filed five days after proclamation is filed out of
time [Laodeno v. Comelec, 276 SCRA 705].
2. The canvassed election returns are incompletecontain material defects in

the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof, as mentioned in Secs. 233,
234, 235 and 236 of this Code.
a) Sec. 233: When the election returns are delayed, lost or destroyed,
the Board may use any of the authentic copies of said election returns or a certified
copy issued by the Comelec. [Note: Notwithstanding the fact that not all the returns
have been received, the Board may terminate the canvass and proclaim the
winners on the basis of available returns if the missing election returns will not
affect the results of the election.]
b) Sec. 234: If some requisites, in form or data, had been omitted in the
election returns, the Board shall call for all the members of the BEI to complete or
correct the return. [Note: For this purpose, the Board may even order the opening
of the ballot box and recount the votes.]

552
Election Laws
i) It is error for the Comelec to exclude from the canvass election

returns where the defect in the return refers only to some incomplete data,
inasmuch as Sec. 234, B.P. 881, should then be applied [Patoray v. Comelec 249
SCRA 440].
c) Sec. 235: When the election returns submitted to the Board appear
to be tampered with, altered or falsified after they have left the hands of the BEI,
or otherwise not authentic, or prepared under duress, force, intimidation, etc., the
Board shall use the other copies of said returns x x x If the other copies are likewise
tampered with, etc., the Board or any candidate affected shall bring the matter to
the Comelec x x x The Comelec, after giving notice to all candidates concerned,
and after being satisfied that the integrity of the ballot box had been duly
preserved, shall order the opening of the ballot box and order the BEI to recount
the votes of the candidates affected, and to prepare a new election return.
d) Sec. 236: Where there exists discrepancies in other authentic copies

of the returns or discrepancies in the votes of any candidate in words and figures
in the same return, and the difference affects the results of the election, the
Comelec, upon motion of the Board of Canvassers shall order the opening of the
ballot box to recount the votes cast for the purpose of determining the true result
of the count of votes of the candidates concerned.
i) Where the Certificate of Votes shows tampering, alteration and

falsification, or any other anomaly in the preparation of the election return, the
Comelec should order a recount of the votes cast in the precinct, after determining
that the ballot box has not been tampered with. The failure of the Comelec to do
so, after excluding the return, will result in the disenfranchisement of the voters in
the particular precinct. Neither can the Certificate of Votes be used for the canvass
because it was signed only by the Chairman [Patoray v. Comelec, 249 SCRA 440],
[NOTE: While the duty of the Board of Canvassers is ministerial and, as a general
rule, it may not inquire into issues beyond the election return, the situations
contemplated in Secs. 234, 235 and 236 allow the Board of Canvassers to order
the opening of the ballot box and recount the votes of the candidates affected.]
3. The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or

intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic.
a) See Lagumbay v. Comelec, 16 SCRA 175, on what an obviously

manufactured return is. It was in this case that the Supreme Court enunciated the
doctrine of statistical improbabilities.

Election Laws
b) In pre-proclamation contests, the Board of Canvassers and the Comelec

are not required to look beyond or behind the election returns which are, on their
face, regular and authentic. In this case, petitioner failed to justify the exclusion of
the challenged returns on the ground of duress, intimidation, threat or coercion,
inasmuch as he offered only self-serving affidavits. Absent any evidence
appearing on the face of the returns that they are indeed spurious, manufactured
or tampered with, the election irregularities cited by the petitioner, which would
require evidence aliunde, cannot be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy
[Dumayas, Jr. v. Comelec, G.R. No. 141952-53, April 20, 2001],
. 4. When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places

were canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved
candidate or candidates.
D. Procedure. Read Secs. 244-245, B.R 881; Secs. 17-22, R.A. 7166.
1. Commencement of pre-proclamation controversy [Sec. 17, R.A. 7166],

Questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers
may be initiated directly with the Commission. However, matters raised under
Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election
returns, and the certificates of canvass shall be brought in the first instance before
the board of canvassers only.
2. Summary disposition of pre-proclamation controversies [Sec. 18, R.A.

7166], All pre-proclamation controversies on election returns or certificates of
canvass shall, on the basis of the records and evidence elevated to it by the board
of canvassers, be disposed of summarily by the Commission within 7 days from
receipt thereof. Its decision shall be executory after the lapse of 7 days from receipt
by the losing party.
3. Disposition of contested election returns [Sec. 20, R.A. 7166],
a) Any candidate, political party or coalition of political parties contesting

the inclusion or exclusion in the canvass of any election returns on any of the
grounds authorized under the Omnibus Election Code shall submit their oral
objections to the chairman of the board of canvassers at the time the questioned
return is presented for inclusion in the canvass. Such objection shall be recorded
in the minutes of the canvass.
b) Upon receipt of any such objection, the board of canvassers shall

automatically defer the canvass of the contested returns and shall proceed to
canvass the returns which are not contested by any party.

554 Election Laws
c) Simultaneous with the oral objection, the objecting party shall also
enter his objection in the form for written objections to be prescribed by the
Commission. Within 24 hours from and after the presentation of such an objection,
the objecting party shall submit the evidence in support of the objection, which
shall be attached to the form for, written objections. Within the same period of 24
hours after presentation of the objection any party may file a written and verified
opposition to the objection in the form also to be prescribed by the Commission,
attaching thereto supporting evidence if any. The board shall not entertain any
objection or opposition unless reduced to writing in the prescribed forms. The
evidence attached to the objections or opposition, submitted by the parties, shall
be immediately and formally admitted into the records of the board by the
Chairman affixing his signature at the back of each and every page thereof.
d) Upon receipt of the evidence, the board shall take up the contested
returns, consider the written objections thereto and opposition, if any, and
summarily and immediately rule thereon. The board shall enter its ruling on the
prescribed form and authenticate the same by the signatures of its members.
e) Any party adversely affected by the ruling of the board shall

immediately inform the board if he intends to appeal said ruling. The board shall
enter said information in the minutes of the canvass, set aside the returns and
proceed to consider the other returns.
f) After all the uncontested returns have been canvassed and the
contested returns ruled upon by it, the board shall suspend the canvass. Within
48 hours therefrom, any party adversely affected by the ruling may file with the
board a written and verified notice of appeal; and within an unextendible period of
5 days thereafter, an appeal taken to the Commission.
i) In Castromayor v. Comelec, 250 SCRA 298, it was held that a

proclamation based on incomplete returns is void. Similarly, in Jamil v. Comelec,
G.R. No. 123648, December 15, 1997, it was ruled that where there is yet no
complete canvass, there can be no valid proclamation.
g) Immediately upon receipt of the notice of appeal, the board shall

make an appropriate report to the Commission, elevating therewith the complete
records and evidence submitted in the canvass, and furnishing the parties with
copies of the report.
h) On the basis of the records and evidence elevated to it by the board,

the Commission shall decide summarily the appeal within 7 days from the receipt
of said records and evidence. Any appeal brought before the

Election Laws 555
Commission on the ruling of the board, without the accomplished forms and the
evidence appended thereto, shall be summarily dismissed. The decision of the
Commission shall be executory after the lapse of 7 days from receipt thereof by
the losing party.
i) The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner

unless authorized by the Commission after the latter has ruled on the objections
brought to it on appeal by the losing party. Any proclamation made in violation
hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely affect
the results of the election.
4. Partial proclamation [Sec. 21, R.A. 7166]. Notwithstanding the pendency

of any pre-proclamation controversy, the Commission may summarily order the
proclamation of other winning candidates whose election will not be affected by
the outcome of the controversy.
[Note: The procedure prescribed above is mandatory; non-compliance with any of

the steps is fatal to the pre-proclamation petition.]
D. Cases.
1. Sanchez v. Comelec, 153 SCRA 67. On the basic issue of whether

Sanchez’ petition for recount and/or re-appreciation of ballots may be considered
a pre-proclamation controversy, the Supreme Court said NO, for the following
reasons:
a) An election return is “incomplete” if there is an omission in the

election return of the name of any candidate and/or his corresponding votes, or in
case the number of votes for a candidate had been omitted. Here, the election
returns are complete and indicate the name of Sanchez as well as the number of
votes counted and appreciated in his favor by the BEI. x x x Errors in appreciation
of ballots by the BEI are proper subject for an election protest and not for a pre-
proclamation contest.
b) The appreciation of ballots is not part of the proceedings of the Board

of Canvassers; it is performed by the BEI at the precinct level. This is reiterated in
Chavez v. Comelec, supra..
c) The enumeration of the issues which may be raised in a pre-

proclamation controversy under Sec. 243, BP 881, is restrictive and exclusive. The
complete election returns whose authenticity is not in question must be prima facie
considered valid for the purpose of canvass and proclamation.

556 Election Laws
d) To expand the issues beyond those enumerated in Sec. 243 and

allow recount or re-appreciation where a claim of misdeclaration of stray votes is
made would open the floodgates to such claims and paralyze canvass and
proclamation proceedings, given the propensity of the loser to demand a recount.
The policy of the law is that a pre-proclamation controversy should be summarily
decided.
e) The ground for recount relied upon by Sanchez is clearly not among
the issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy. His allegation of
invalidation of “Sanchez” votes intended for him bears no relation to the
correctness and authenticity of the election returns canvassed.
2. In Patoray v. Comelec, 279 SCRA 470, it was held that where the
objections to the inclusion of the election returns are directed primarily at the
ballots reflected in the returns, the issue involves appreciation of ballots and
cannot be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy.
3. In Balindong v. Comelec, 260 SCRA 494, and in Matalam v. Comelec,

271 SCRA 733, the Supreme Court said that the technical examination of the
signatures and thumb marks of voters runs counter to the nature and scope of a
pre-proclamation contest; the remedy is to raise these issues in an election protest.
4. In Alfonso v. Comelec, G.R. No. 107847, June 2, 1994, after the Comelec
had ruled that the votes for Pedro Alfonso should not be credited to petitioner Irma
Alfonso (who substituted for her father, Pedro, because the latter died on the eve
of the election), the Comelec ordered the City Board of Canvassers to re-canvass
the election returns, without opening the ballot boxes, and proclaim the winning
candidates. On the denial by the Comelec of petitioner’s request that the ballot
boxes be opened and the votes counted, the Supreme Court held that the Comelec
did not commit grave abuse of discretion, because the prayer for re-opening of
ballot boxes is not a proper issue in a preproclamation controversy, but should be
threshed out in an election contest.
5. Villaroya v. Comelec, 155 SCRA 633. In a pre-proclamation contest, the

Comelec may order the correction of a clerical error in the Statement of Votes
(prepared by the Board of Canvassers to correspond to the figures reflected in the
election returns — even if the candidate/representative failed to file the timely
protest during the canvassing, as the error in the Statement of Votes was not
apparent on its face. 6
6. Duremdes v. Comelec, 178 SCRA 746. The failure to object to the

Statement of Votes before the Board of Canvassers does not constitute a
bar

Election Lem s 557
to raising the issue for the first time before the Comelec; the law is silent as to
when they may be raised. The Statement of Votes supports the certificate of
canvass and shall be the basis of proclamation. Consequently, any error in the
Statement of Votes would affect the proclamation made on the basis thereof, x x
x An election contest presupposes a valid proclamation. When the proclamation is
null and void, it is no proclamation at all, and the assumption of office by the
proclaimed candidate cannot deprive the Comelec of the power to declare such
nullity in an appropriate pre-proclamation controversy.
a) Thus, in Castromayor v. Comelec, 250 SCRA 298, the Supreme

Court said that any party dissatisfied with the ruling of the Board of Canvassers
(after it was ordered by the Comelec to reconvene and annul the proclamation of
the petitioner) shall have the right to appeal to the Comelec. Since the Statement
of Votes which was to be corrected by the Board forms the basis of the Certificate
of Canvass and the proclamation, petitioner begs the question by saying that this
is not a pre-proclamation controversy and the procedure for pre-proclamation
controversies cannot be applied to the correction in the computation of the total
number of votes obtained by the candidates in the Statement of Votes.
b) Likewise, in Mentang v. Comelec, G.R. No. 110347, February 4,

1994, the Court declared that it had already ruled that the filing of a petition to
annul a proclamation suspends the running of the 10-day period within which to
file an election contest, provided that there are allegations which, when proved,
will render the proclamation null and void. Such petition may be filed directly with
the Comelec even as a pre-proclamation controversy, provided it is done within
ten days after proclamation. [NOTE: A petition to correct manifest errors must be
filed within five days from proclamation, if filed directly with the Comelec; while
there does not seem to be a fixed time frame within which to file a petition to annul
a proclamation, the same being limited only by the standard of reasonableness.] 7
7. In Bince v. Comelec, 242 SCRA 273, it was held that the Comelec
cannot be faulted for subsequently annulling a proclamation on account of
a mathematical error committed by the Board of Canvassers in the
computation of votes received by both petitioner and private respondent.
What is sought by private respondent is the correction of manifest mistakes
in the mathematical addition or mere mechanical errors in the addition of
votes, and does not involve the opening of ballot boxes or the examination
or appreciation of ballots. While Sec. 7, Rule 27, Comelec Rules of
Procedure, provides that the petition for correction may be filed at any time
before proclamation, there is nothing to suggest that it cannot be applied to
cases like the one at bar in which the validity of the proclamation is precisely
in question [Castromayor v. Comelec, supra.].

558
Election Laws
8. Ututalum v. Comelec, 181 SCRA 335. The padding of the Registry List of
Voters of a municipality is not a listed ground for a pre-proclamation controversy.
9. Lazatin v. Comelec, 157 SCRA 337. Because the petitioner had already
been proclaimed (on orders of the Comelec), had taken his oath and had assumed
his duties as Member, House of Representatives, the issue of invalidity of his
proclamation and irregularities connected therewith, is a matter properly
addressed to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (which is the sole
judge of all contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of Members of
the House of Representatives). See also Aquino v. Comelec, supra., where it was
held that assumption of jurisdiction by the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) takes place only after the winning candidate has been duly
proclaimed and has taken the oath of office, because it is only then that he is said
to be a member of the House of Representatives.
10. Darantinao v. Comelec (June, 1989). The Comelec has the power to
inquire whether the members of the Board of Canvassers are qualified or not, and
whether or not an election had been held in a precinct, in order to determine the
integrity of the election returns.
11. Alangdeo v. Comelec (June 1989). The filing with the Comelec of a
petition to annul or to suspend proclamation shall suspend the running of the
period to file an election protest.
12. Casimiro v. Comelec, 171 SCRA 468. The affidavits of the watcher and
the petitioner (alleging duress, fraud, coercion or intimidation attendant to
preparation of election returns) are self-serving.
13. Mayor v. Comelec (January 1989). After the proclaimed winner had
assumed office, the proper remedy is an election protest, not a pre-proclamation
controversy.

Election Laws 559
XII. ELECTION CONTESTS
A. Jurisdiction over Election Contests.

1. Original and exclusive.
a) PresidentA/ice President... .... Supreme Court

b) Senator ................................ .... Senate Electoral Tribunal
c) Representative ..................... ... HR Electoral Tribunal
d) Regional/Provincial/City.... .... COMELEC
e) Municipal ............................. .... RTC
f) Barangay.............................. .....Municipal/Metropolitan Trial Court
2. Appellate Jurisdiction.
a) From decisions of the RTC and Municipal/City Courts, appeal shall be

made exclusively to the Comelec, whose decision shall be final, executory and
unappealable.
i) Election Contests for Municipal Offices. All election contests

involving municipal offices filed with the Regional Trial Court shall be decided
expeditiously. The decision may be appealed to the Commission within five days
from promulgation or receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved party. The
Commission shall decide the appeal within 60 days after it is submitted for
decision, but not later than 6 months after the filing of the appeal, which decision
shall be final, unappealable and executory [Sec. 22, R.A. 7166]. A motion for the
reconsideration of the RTC decision is a prohibited pleading, and does not interrupt
the running of the 5-day period for appeal [Veloria v. Comelec, 211 SCRA 907],
But the Comelec cannot deprive the RTC of its competence to order execution of
its decision pending appeal, this being a judicial prerogative and there being no
law disauthorizing the same; besides, the Comelec rules would deprive the
prevailing party of a substantial right to move for such relief [Garcia v. de Jesus,
206 SCRA 779; Malaluan v. Comelec, 254 SCRA 397].
ii) In the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction, the Comelec

has the power to issue writs of prohibition, mandamus or certiorari, because the
last paragraph of Sec. 50, B.R 697, is still in full force and effect, and has not been
repealed nor amended by B.R 881 [Relampagos v. Cumba, 243 SCRA 502]. This
abandons the ruling in Veloria and in Garcia.
iii) The provision of R.A. 6679 granting appellate jurisdiction to

Regional Trial Courts over decisions of Municipal Courts in electoral cases

560 Election Laws
involving elective barangay officials is unconstitutional [Flores v. Comelec, 184

SCRA 484]. But in the absence of any express provision in the governing law, it is
the Regional Trial Court, a court of general jurisdiction, which has jurisdiction over
controversies involving election of members of the Sangguniang Kabataan
[Mercado v. Board of Election Supervisors, G.R. No. 1097.13, April 6, 1995].
iv) The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the Comelec in
appealed cases involving elective municipal and barangay officials are final,
executory and unappealable does not preclude a recourse to the Supreme Court
by way of a special civil action for certiorari [Galido v. Comelec, 193 SCRA 78].
But this recourse is available only when the Comelec’s factual determination is
marred by grave abuse of discretion [Alvarez v. Comelec, G.R. No. 142527, March
1, 2001].
b) From decisions of the Comelec, appeal shall be made through a

Petition for Review by Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to be filed
with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy of the
decision, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess
of jurisdiction or violation of due process. See Aratuc v. Comelec, 88 SCRA 251.
. c) From a decision of the Electoral Tribunal, appeal shall be through a Petition

for Review to be filed with the Supreme Court, on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a violation of due process.
See Robles v. HR Electoral Tribunal, 181 SCRA 780.
i) In Puzon v. HRET (February, 1989), the Supreme Court declared

that review of a decision of the Electoral Tribunal is possible only in the exercise
of supervisory or extraordinary jurisdiction, and only upon showing that the
Tribunal’s error results from a whimsical, capricious, unwarranted, arbitrary or
despotic exercise of power.
ii) In Lazatin v. HRET, 168 SCRA 391, the Supreme Court said that
for purposes of election contests cognizable by the Electoral Tribunal, the HRET
rules of procedure shall prevail over the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code.
iii) In Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 166 SCRA 651, the

Senators-members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot be disqualified from
hearing the case, as the mass disqualification would leave the tribunal no
alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform. This
does not preclude the possibility of a Senator-member inhibiting himself

Election Laws 561
from sitting in judgment on a case before said tribunal, as his conscience may dictate.
3. Actions which may be filed:
a) Election Protest.
b) Quo Warranto
B. Election Protest.
1. Requisites:
a) Must be filed bv anv candidate who has filed a certificate of candidacy
and has been voted upon for the same office. Thus, in Tan v. Comelec (June
1898), it was held that the Gubernatorial candidate is not the proper party to
institute election protest regarding the election of the Vice Governor, Board
members and Municipal Mayors.
b) On grounds of fraud, terrorism, irregularities or illegal acts committed

before, during or after the casting and counting of votes.
i) The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the

candidate proclaimed elected by the board of canvassers is the true and lawful
choice of the electorate. The proceeding may be instituted on the theory that the
election returns, which are deemed prima facie to be the true reports of how the
electorate voted on election day and which serve as the basis for the proclamation
of the winning candidate, do not accurately reflect the true will of the voters due to
alleged irregularities that attended the counting of the ballots. In a protest
prosecuted on such a theory, the protestant ordinarily prays that the official count
as reflected in the election returns be set aside in favor of a revision and recount
of the ballots, the results of which should be made to prevail over those reflected
in the returns pursuant to the doctrine that “in an election contest where what is
involved is the number of votes of each candidate, the best and the most
conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves”. However, the superior status of
the ballots as evidence of how the electorate voted presupposes that these were
the very same ballots actually cast and counted in the elections. Thus, it has been
held that before the ballots found in a box can be used to set aside the returns, the
court (or the Comelec, as the case may be) must be sure that it has before it the
same ballots deposited by the voters [Rosal v. Comelec, G.R. No. 168253, March
16, 2007].
ia) Thus, in this case, the Court laid down the following guidelines: [a]
the ballots cannot be used to overturn the official count as reflected in the

562 Election Lam s
election returns unless it is first shown affirmatively that the ballots have been
preserved with a care which precludes the opportunity of tampering and all
suspicion of change, abstraction or substitution; [b] the burden of proving that the
integrity of the ballots has been preserved in such a manner is on the protestant;
[c] where a mode of preserving the ballots is enjoined by law, proof must be made
of such substantial compliance with the requirements of that mode as would
provide assurance that the ballots have been kept inviolate notwithstanding slight
deviations from the precise mode of achieving that end; [d] it is only when the
protestant has shown substantial compliance with the provisions of law on the
preservation of the ballots that the burden of proving actual tampering or the
likelihood thereof shifts to the protestee; and [e] only if it appears to the satisfaction
of the court or Comelec that the integrity of the ballots has been preserve should
it adopt the result as shown by the recount and not as reflected in the election
returns.
ii) In Arao v. Comelec, 210 SCRA 290, it was held that the failure
of the protestant to raise the question of identical handwriting or of impugning the
validity of the ballots on that ground does not preclude the Comelec from rejecting
the ballots. Unlike an ordinary suit, an election protest is of utmost public concern.
The rights of the contending parties must yield to the far greater interest of the
citizens in upholding the sanctity of the ballot. Thus, the Comelec simply cannot
close its eyes to the illegality of the ballots, even if the protestant omitted to raise
the ground in his protest. In Erni v. Comelec, 243 SCRA 706, the Court upheld the
authority of the Comelec to determine whether ballots had been written by two or
more persons, or in groups written by only one hand, without need of calling for
the services of handwriting experts, this investigation being more in the nature of
an internal process.
iii) An order regarding the revision of ballots is an interlocutory order

because it still requires a party to perform certain acts leading to the final
adjudication of the case [Bulaong v. Comelec, 220 SCRA 745].
iv) As a general rule, the filing of an election protest or quo warranto

precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy or amounts to
an abandonment of one earlier filed [Laodeno v. Comelec, 276 SCRA 706], thus
depriving the Comelec of the authority to inquire into and pass upon the title of the
protestee or the validity of his proclamation. The reason for this is that once the
competent tribunal has acquired jurisdiction over an election protest or a petition
for quo warranto, all questions relative thereto will have to be decided in the case
itself and not in another proceeding. This procedure will prevent confusion and
conflict of authority [Villamor v. Comelec, G.R. No. 169865, July 21, 2006].

Election Laws 563
iva) This rule, however, admits of the following exceptions: [a]

The Board of Canvassers was improperly constituted; [b] Quo warranto is not the
proper remedy; [c] What was filed was not really a petition for quo warranto or an
election protest but a petition to annul a proclamation; [d] The filing of an election
contest was expressly made without prejudice to the preproclamation controversy,
or was made ad cautelam; or [e] The proclamation was null and void [Samad v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 107854, July 16, 1993; reiterated in Dumayas, Jr. v. Comelec,
G.R. No. 141952-53, April 20, 2001]. If the proclamation is void, the pre-
proclamation case is not rendered moot and academic [Ramirez v. Comelec, 270
SCRA 590],
ivb) But in Tan v. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 166143-47, November

20, 2006, the Supreme Court said that there is no law or rule prohibiting the
simultaneous prosecution or adjudication of pre-proclamation controversies and
election protests. Allowing the simultaneous prosecution scenario may be
explained by the fact that pre-proclamation controversies and election protests
differ in terms of the issues involved and the evidence admissible in each case,
and the objective each seeks to achieve. [NOTE: As these cases involve elective
provincial offices, the Comelec has original exclusive jurisdiction over both pre-
proclamation controversies and election contests. Obviously, there can be no
conflict of authority, and thus the cases can be simultaneously prosecuted before,
and adjudicated by, the same tribunal.]
v) The entry of a general denial in an election case does not amount

to an admission of the material allegations in the protest [Loyola v. HRET, G.R.
No. 109026, January 4, 1994].
vi) Where the private respondent failed to commence the revision of

the ballots in the counter-protested precincts, stubbornly maintaining that said
ballots should be revised only if it is shown after the revision (of the ballots in the
protested precincts) that the petitioner leads private respondent, the latter must be
deemed to have abandoned or waived his counter-protest [Abeja v. Judge Tazada,
G.R. NO. 112283, August 30, 1994].
vii) In Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Fidel Valdez Ramos, 253 SCRA

599, it was held that the election protest filed by Santiago against President Ramos
was rendered moot and academic by the election of Santiago as a Senator in the
May 1995 elections and her assumption of office as such on June 30,1995. In
assuming the office of Senator, the Protestant has effectively abandoned or
withdrawn this protest, or at the very least, in the language of Moraleja v. Relova,
abandoned her “determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in
the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate”. Moreover, the dismissal of
this protest would serve public interest as it would

564 Election Laws
dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential election,
thereby enhancing the all too crucial political stability of the nation during this
period of national recovery.
viii) Where the Comelec had, in previous cases, ruled that the venue
for the revision of ballots shall be in Manila, it is grave abuse of discretion for the
Comelec to deny petitioner’s request for the revision of ballots to be held in Manila
on the pretext that there is not enough storage space to contain the ballot boxes;
such inconsistent action tends to denigrate public trust in the objectivity and
dependability of the Comelec [Cabagnot v. Comelec, 260 SCRA 503].
ix) Where the omissions are merely administrative lapses, e.g.,

absence of the chairman’s signature on the voter’ affidavits, list of voters or voting
records, the absence or excess of detachable coupons, or discrepancy in the
number of detachable coupons and the number of ballots, it was error for the
HRET to nullify the election results in the absence of a clear showing of fraud. The
voters should not be penalized for something not of their own making [Arroyo v.
HRET, 246 SCRA 384],
c) Within ten (101 davs from proclamation of the results of the election.
i) The period for filing an election protest is suspended during the

pendency of a pre-proclamation controversy [Gatchalian v. Comelec, 245 SCRA
208; Manahan v. Bernardo, G.R. No. 125752, December 22, 1997].
ii) Where, after five days from the proclamation of the winning
candidate, the loser files a motion for reconsideration in the pre-proclamation
controversy, there are only five days which remain of the period within which to file
an election protest [Roquero v. Comelec, 289 SCRA 150],
iii) The Comelec may not entertain a counter-protest filed beyond

the reglementary period to file the same [Kho v. Comelec, G.R. No. 124033,
September 25, 1997],
iv) A petition or protest contesting the election of a barangay official

should be decided by the municipal or metropolitan trial court within 15 days from
filing thereof, because an election case, unlike ordinary actions, involves public
interest [Bolalin v. Judge Occiano, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1104, February 14, 1997]. 2
2. Payment of Docket Fee. A protestant has to pay a docket fee of

P300 and an additional docket fee if there is a claim for damages. For failure
to pay

Election Laws 565
the basic docket fee, the protest should be dismissed [Gatchalian v. Comelec,
245 SCRA 208; Soller v. Comelec, 339 SCRA 685],
a) While it is true that the court acquires jurisdiction over a case only
upon complete payment of the prescribed fees, the rule admits of exceptions, as
when the party never raised the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court [Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, supra.]. In Villagracia v. Comelec, G.R. No. 168296, January 31,
2006, in an election protest involving barangay elective office, the petitioner raised
the issue that the court had no jurisdiction because of the failure of the other party
to pay the correct filing fees for the first time on appeal before the Comelec. The
Supreme Court held that the petitioner participated in the proceedings and
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court. It was only after the trial
court issued its decision adverse to him that the petitioner raised the issue of
jurisdiction, for the first time on appeal with the Comelec.
3. Certificate of Absence of Forum Shopping. The requirement under

Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94 applies to election cases [Loyola v. Court of
Appeals, 245 SCRA 477; Tomarong v. Lubguban, 269 SCRA 624],
4. Death of Protestant. The death of the protestant does not extinguish an

election protest. In De Castro v. Comelec, 267 SCRA 806, it was held that an
election protest is imbued with public interest which raises it onto a plane over and
above ordinary civil actions, because it involves not only the adjudication of the
private interest of the rival candidates but also the paramount need of dispelling
once and for all the uncertainty that beclouds the real choice of the electorate with
respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the office within their gift. In this
case, it was held that the Vice Mayor-elect has the status of a real party in interest
in the continuation of the proceedings. See also Lomugdang v. Comelec, 21 SCRA
402.
a) In Poe v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, PET Case No. 002, March 29,

2005, the Supreme Court said that if persons not real parties in the action could
be allowed to intervene, proceedings will be unnecessarily complicated, expensive
and interminable — and this is not the policy of the law. Inasmuch as no real parties
such as the vice-presidential aspirants in the 2004 elections have come forward to
intervene, or to be substituted for the deceased protestant, it is far more prudent
to abide by the existing and strict limitations on intervention and substitution under
the law and the rules.
C. Quo Warranto.
1. Requisites:
a) Filed by any registered voter in the constituency.
OUTLINE REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

566 Election Laws
b) On grounds of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the

Philippines.
c) Within ten (10) days from proclamation of the results of the election.
2. Cases; ,
a) In Sampayan v. Daza, 213 SCRA 807, the petition for prohibition filed
with the Supreme Court by residents of Northern Samar against Congressman
Daza for the latter being allegedly a green card holder and a permanent resident
of the U.S., was dismissed on the following grounds: [i] the case has become moot
and academic, because Daza’s term was to end June 30, 1992; [ii] the Supreme
Court is without jurisdiction, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal being
the proper forum, as the latter is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives;
and [iii] as a de facto officer, Daza cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed
during his term of office, because his acts are valid.
b) In Frivaldo v. Comelec, 174 SCRA 245, the Court held that

considering that the copy of Frivaldo’s certificate of naturalization in the U.S. was
obtained only in September, 1988, the petition for disqualification may still be
considered as having been seasonably filed even if filed more than seven months
from the proclamation. Relate this to Loong v. Comelec, 216 SCRA 760.
c) In Marquez v. Comelec, G.R. No. 112889, April 18, 1995, the

SupremeCourt held that Art. 73 of the Rules Implementing the Local Government
Code (particularly Sec. 40, R.A. 7160), to the extent that it confines the term
“fugitive from justice” to refer only to a person “who has been convicted by final
judgment” is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law. The term
“fugitives from justice” includes “not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment, but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution”. Thus, in Rodriguez v. Comelec, G.R. No. 120099, July 24, 1996, the
Supreme Court ruled that Rodriguez cannot be considered a “fugitive from justice”,
because his arrival in the Philippines from the U.S. preceded the filing of the felony
charges and the issuance of the warrant for his arrest by the Los Angeles Court
by at least five months.
D. Distinctions between Quo Warranto in elective and in appointive

office. 1
1. In an elective office: the issue is eligibility of the officer-elect; the

court or tribunal cannot declare the protestant (or the candidate who
obtained

Election Laws 567
the second highest number of votes) as having been elected. See Labo v.
Comelec, 176 SCRA 1;Abella v. Comelec, 201 SCRA 253; Ortega v. Comelec,
211 SCRA 297; Sunga v. Comelec, 288 SCRA 76..
a) Thus, in Ocampo v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R.

No. 158466, June 15, 2004, after the HRET had declared Mark Crespo (Mark
Jimenez) “ineligible for the Office of Representative of the 6th district of Manila for
lack of residence in the district”, and Pablo Ocampo, the second placer, moved
that he be declared the winner, the Supreme Court said that there must be a final
judgment (of disqualification) before the election in order that the votes of the
disqualified candidate can be considered “stray”. The obvious rationale is that in
voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment during
election day, the people voted for him bona fide, without any intention to misapply
their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be
the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government.
Thus, to proclaim the second placer would be anathema to the most basic precepts
of republicanism and democracy enshrined in our Constitution. It would, in effect,
be advocating a massive disenfranchisement of the majority of the voters of the
6th district of Manila.
2. In an pppointive office: the issue is the legality of the appointment; the

court determines who of the parties has legal title to the office.
D. Execution pending appeal. The trial court may grant a motion for execution
pending appeal, because the mere filing of an appeal does not divest the trial court
of its jurisdiction over a case and to resolve pending incidents. Since the court had
jurisdiction to act on the motion (for execution pending appeal) at the time it was
filed, that jurisdiction continued until the matter was resolved, and was not lost by
the subsequent action of the opposing party [Edding v. Comelec, 246 SCRA 502],
1. The rationale why such execution is allowed in election cases, as stated

in Gahol v. Riodique, G.R. No. L-40415, June 27, 1975, is “to give as much
recognition to the worth of the trial judge’s decision as that which is initially
ascribed by law to the proclamation of the board of canvassers. Indeed, to deprive
trial courts of their discretion to grant execution pending appeal would “bring back
the ghost of the ‘grab the proclamation, prolong the protest’ techniques so often
resorted to by devious politicians in the past in their efforts to perpetuate their hold
on an elective public office” [Uy v. Comelec, cited in Santos v. Comelec, G.R. No.
155618, March 26, 2003]. 2
2. In Navarosa v. Comelec, G.R. No. 157957, September 18, 2003,

it was held that the Regional Trial Court may grant a motion for execution
pending

568
Election Laws
appeal when there are valid and special reasons to grant the same, such as (a)
the public interest involved or the will of the electorate; (b) the shortness of the
remaining portion of the term; or (c) the length of time that the election contest has
been pending. Earlier, in Gutierrez v. Comelec, 270 SCRA 413, and in Ramas v.
Comelec, 286 SCRA 189, the Supreme Court ruled that the fact that only a short
period is left of the term of office is a good ground for execution pending appeal.
3. However, the rule must be strictly construed against the movant,

and only when the reason is of such urgency will such execution pending appeal
be allowed, as it is an exception to the general rule. Following civil law
jurisprudence, the reasons allowing for immediate execution must be of such
urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage of the losing party should such party
secure a reversal of the judgment on appeal. Absent such, the order must be
stricken down as flawed with grave abuse of discretion. Not every invocation of
public interest with particular reference to the will of the electorate may be
appreciated as a good reason, especially so if the same appears to be self-serving
and has not been clearly established. Public interest will be best served only when
the candidates voted for the position are finally proclaimed and ajudged winner in
the election [Camlian v. Comelec, G.R. No. 124169 April 18, 1997]. ’
4. The motion for execution pending appeal must be filed before the
expiration of the period for appeal [Relampagos v. Cumba, 243 SCRA 690]. In
Asmala v. Comelec, 289 SCRA 746, the Supreme Court said that the parties had
five days from service of judgment within which to appeal, and although the
respondent had filed his appeal on time, the appeal was deemed perfected as to
him only. This did not deprive the petitioner of the right to avail himself of the five-
day period to appeal, if he so desired. Accordingly, during this five- day period, the
petitioner may file a motion for execution pending appeal. This ruling was
reiterated in Zacate v. Comeelc, G.R. No. 144678, March 1, 2001.
F. Award of Damages. Award of Damages. Actual or compensatory damages

may be granted in all election contests or in quo warranto proceedings in
accordance with law [Sec. 259, B.P. 881],
1. It was the intent of the legislators to do away with the provisions

indemnifying the victorious party for expenses incurred in the election contest, in
the absence of a wrongful act or omission clearly attributable to the losing party
[Atienza v. Comelec, G.R. No. 108533, December 20, 1994]. 2
2. When the appeal from a decision in an election case has already

become moot, the case being an election protest involving the office of mayor

Election Laws 569
the term of which has already expired, the appeal is dismissible on that ground,
unless a decision on the merits would be of practical value. In the case at bench,
the petition appears to be moot and academic because the parties are contesting
an election post to which their right to the office no longer exists; however, the
question as to damages remains ripe for adjudication [Malaluan v. Comelec, 254
SCRA 397], But the award of damages was reversed by the Supreme Court,
saying that the criterion for a justifiable award of election protest expenses and
salaries and emoluments remains to be the existence of pertinent breach of
obligations arising from contracts or quasi-contracts, tortious acts or crimes or a
specific legal provision authorizing the money claim in the context of election
cases. If any damage had been suffered by private respondent due to the
execution of judgment pending appeal, that damage may be said to be equivalent
to damnum absque injuria.
G. Interpretation of certain words and phrases. See Javier v. Comelec, 144 SCRA
194. '
1. Contest: any matter involving the title or claim of title to an elective office,
made before or after proclamation of the winner, whether or not the contestant is
claiming the office in dispute.
2. Election, returns and qualifications: in its totality, refers to all matters

affecting the validity of the contestee’s title to the position.
3. Election: refers to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters,
the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of votes.
4. Returns: shall include the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of
the winners, together with questions concerning the composition of the Board of
Canvassers and the authenticity of elections returns. 5
5. Qualifications: matters which could be raised in a Quo Warranto

proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty to the
Republic, or his ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.

Election Laws 571
B. Jurisdiction over election offenses.
1. Investigation and prosecution. The Commission on Elections has

exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute cases involving violations of
election laws [Sec. 2(6), Art. IX-C, Constitution; De Jesus v. People, 120 SCRA
760; Corpus v. Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA 281]; but it may validly delegate the power
to the Provincial Prosecutor, as it did when it promulgated Resolution No. 1862,
dated March 2, 1987 [People v. Judge Basilia, 179 SCRA 87],
a) But it is not the duty of the Comelec, as investigator and prosecutor,

to gather proof in support of a complaint filed before it [Kilosbayan v. Comelec,
G. R. No. 128054, October 16, 1997],
2. Trial and decision. The Regional Trial Court has exclusive original
jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal actions or proceedings for violation of
election laws. The metropolitan or municipal trial court, by way of exception,
exercises jurisdiction only over offenses relating to failure to register or to vote. It
is the special intention of the Omnibus Election Code to vest in the regional trial
court jurisdiction over election offenses as a matter of exception to the general
provisions on jurisdiction over criminal cases found under B.P 129, as amended
(even by R.A. 7691) [Naldoza v. Lavilles, 254 SCRA 286]. This ruling is reiterated
in Comelec v. Noynay, 292 SCRA 254, calling attention to Sec. 268, BP 881.
C. Preferential disposition of election offenses [Sec. 269, B.P. 881],
1. Investigation and prosecution of election offenses shall be given priority

by the Comelec. The investigating officer shall resolve the case within five (5) days
from submission.
2. The courts shall likewise give preference to election offenses over all
other cases, except petitions for a writ of habeas corpus. Cases shall be decided
within thirty (30) days from submission.
D. Prescription period for election offenses. Five (5) years from date of
commission.

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What are the different theories on suffrage discussed?

What are the different theories on suffrage discussed?

What system of election has been adopted in the Philippines?

What system of election has been adopted in the Philippines?

ELECTION LAWS

Election Laws 513

C. Theory prevailing in the Philippines: Suffrage is both a privilege and an

D. System of election adopted in the Philippines: Since 1901, the

E. Constitutional mandate on Congress [Sec. 2, Art. V, Constitution]:

OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

II. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

III. VOTERS: QUALIFICATION AND REGISTRATION

1. Any person who transfers residence to another city, municipality or

2. In Makalintal v. Comelec, G.R. No. 157013, July 3, 2003, challenged as

OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

B. Disqualifications [Sec. 118, B.P. 881]:

2. Any person adjudged by final judgment of having committed any crime

3. Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority.

1. Registration does not confer the right to vote; it is but a condition

2. General Registration of voters. Immediately after the barangay elections

3. System of Continuing Registration. The personal filing of

OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

4. Disqualification. The same grounds as the disqualifications for suffrage.

8. Deactivation of Registration [Sec. 27, R.A. 8189]. The Board shall

9. Reactivation of Registration [Sec. 28, R.A. 8189]. Any voter whose

D. Inclusion and Exclusion proceedings.

1. Common rules governing judicial proceedings in the matter of inclusion,

OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

a) Petition for inclusion, exclusion or correction of names of voters shall

OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

IV. POLITICAL PARTIES

1. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization or coalition shall be

a) Partv-List System. The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional

2. Political parties registered under the party-list system shall be entitled to

3. Party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the total number of

1. Definitions [See R.A. 7941 (The Party-List System Act)].

a) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition

OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

e) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national,

2. Registration. In order to acquire juridical personality as a political party, to

a) Groups which cannot be registered as political parties: [i] religious

b). Grounds for cancellation of registration: Accepting financial

3. Nomination of party-list representatives, etc.. Read R.A. 7941 See

4. Authority of the Commission on Elections. Flowing from its

OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

2. When should the qualification/s be possessed. The Local Government

1. Under the Omnibus Election Code [B.P. 881]: FIMI

a) Declared as incompetent or insane by competent authority.

c) Sentenced by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.

i) In Villaber v. Comelec, G.R. No. 148326, November 15, 2001, it was

OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

ii) Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law involves moral turpitude, and

d) Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a

a) Those sentenced bv final judgment for an offense punishable bv one

i) Even if the candidate is under probation, the disqualification still

b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case.

OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW