Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-51291 May 29, 1984
FRANCISCO CUIZON, ROSITA CUIZON, PURIFICATION C. GUIDO married to TEODORO GUIDO, and JUAN
ARCHE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE R. RAMOLETE, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch III, DOMINGO L.
ANTIGUA and SEGUNDO ZAMBO, respondents.
Eliseo C. Alinsug for petitioners.
Loreto M. Pono for respondents Domingo Antigua and Segundo Zambo.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The sole issue in this petition for certiorari is whether or not a probate court has jurisdiction over parcels of
land already covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title issued in favor of owners who are not parties to the
intestate proceedings if the said parcels have been included in the inventory of properties of the estate
prepared by the administrator.
For a clearer understanding of the present case, the background facts may be appreciated. As far back
as 1961, Marciano Cuizon applied for the registration of several parcels of land located at Opao, Mandaue
City then covered by certificates of Tax Declaration in Land Registration Case No. N-179. In 1970, he
distributed his property between his two children, Rufina and Irene. Part of the property given to Irene
consisted largely of salt beds which eventually became the subject of this controversy.
On December 29, 1971, Irene Cuizon executed a Deed of Sale with Reservation of Usufruct involving the
said salt beds in favor of the petitioners Francisco, Rosita and Purificacion, all surnamed Cuizon. At that
time, Francisco and Rosita were minors and assisted by their mother, Rufina, only sister of Irene. However,
the sale was not registered because the petitioners felt it was unnecessary due to the lifetime usufructuary
rights of Irene.
Although the decision in L.R. Case No. N-179 was rendered way back in 1962, the decree of registration No.
N-161246 and the corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. 0171 was issued only in 1976 in the name of
Marciano Cuizon. In that same year, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 10477 covering the property in question
was issued by the Register of Deeds to Irene Cuizon. The latter died in 1978. In the extrajudicial settlement of
the estate, her alleged half sister and sole heir Rufina adjudicated to herself all the property of the
decedent including the property in question. After the notice of the extrajudicial settlement was duly
published in a newspaper of general circulation, Rufina thereafter, executed a deed of Confirmation of
Sale wherein she confirmed and ratified the deed of sale of December 29, 1971 executed by the late Irene
and renounced and waived whatever rights, interest, and participation she may have in the property in
question in favor of the petitioners. The deed was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds and annotated
at the back of TCT No. 10477. Subsequently, TCT No. 12665 was issued in favor of the petitioners.
On September 28, 1978, a petition for letters of administrator was filed before the Court of First Instance of
Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 3864-R) by respondent Domingo Antigua, allegedly selected by the heirs of Irene
numbering seventeen (17) in all to act as administrator of the estate of the decedent. The petition was
granted.
Respondent Antigua as administrator filed an inventory of the estate of Irene. He included in the inventory
the property in question which was being administered by Juan Arche, one of the petitioners. On June 27,
1979, respondent Antigua filed a motion asking the court for authority to sell the salt from the property and
praying that petitioner Arche be ordered to deliver the salt to the administrator. The motion was granted
and respondent court issued the following order:
The administrator, thru this motion, informs the Court that the estate owns some beds and fish pond located
in Opao, Mandaue City that these salt beds are producing salt which are now in the warehouse in
Mandaue City, under the custody of Juan Arche that the value of the salt in the warehouse is estimated to
be worth P5,000.00 are beginning to melt and, unless they are sold as soon as possible, they may
depreciate in value. It is likewise prayed in this motion that Juan Arche be ordered to deliver the salt in
question to the administrator such other products of the land now in his (Juan Arche) possession.
xxx xxx xxx
Let this motion be, as it is hereby GRANTED. The administrator is hereby authorized to sell the salt now in the
custody of Juan Arche and the latter (Juan Arche) is hereby ordered to deliver the salt in question to the
administrator in order to effect the sale thereof and he is likewise directed to deliver such other products of
the land to the administrator.
Subsequently, on three different occasions, respondent Segundo Zambo with the aid of several men,
sought to enforce the order of the respondent court, compelling the petitioners to come to us on certiorari.
On September 14, 1979, we issued a restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the above
order of the respondent court and from further interfering with the petitioners in their peaceful possession
and cultivation of the property in question.
The thrust of the petitioners' argument is that the respondent court, as a court handling only the intestate
proceedings, had neither the authority to adjudicate controverted rights nor to divest them of their
possession and ownership of the property in question and hand over the same to the administrator.
Petitioners further contend that the proper remedy of the respondent administrator is to file a separate civil
action to recover the same.
On the other hand, the respondent administrator banked on the failure of the petitioners to first apply for
relief in the court of origin before filing the present petition. According to him this was a fatal defect. In
addition, the administrator stated that the deed of sale of December 29, 1971 lost its efficacy upon the
rendition of judgment and issuance of the decree in favor of Irene Cuizon.
It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate
cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are
equally (claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is
to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so (Mallari v. Mallari, 92 Phil. 694; Baquial v.
Amihan, 92 Phil. 501).
Similarly, in Valero Vda. de Rodriguez vs. CA., (91 SCRA 540) we held that for the purpose of determining
whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory the probate court may pass
upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a
separate a petition regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties (3 Moran's Comments on
the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pages 448-9 and 473: Lachenal v. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA
262, 266).
In the instant case, the property involved is not only claimed by outside parties but it, was sold seven years
before the death of the decedent and is duly titled in the name of the vendees who are not party to the
proceedings. In Bolisay vs. Alcid, (85 SCRA 213), this Court was confronted with a similar situation. The
petitioners therein sought to annul the order of the respondent court in a special proceeding which in
effect ruled that notwithstanding that the subject property was duly titled in the name of petitioners, the
administratrix of the intestate estate involved in said proceeding had the right to collect the rentals of said
property over the objection of the titled owners just because it was included in the inventory of said estate
and there was an ordinary action in the regular court over the ownership thereof and the estate was one
of the parties therein. This Court viewed the petition as one seeking for a prima facie determination and not
a final resolution of the claim of ownership.
We held that:
... Considering that as aforestated the said property is titled under the Torrens System in the names of the
petitioners, it does appear strange, in the light of the probate court's own ruling that it has no jurisdiction to
pass on the issue of ownership, that the same court deemed the same as part of the estate under
administration just because the administratrix, alleges it is still owned by the estate and has in fact listed it in
the inventory submitted by her to the court.
It does not matter that respondent - administratrix has evidence purporting to support her claim of
ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is
endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law itself,
which, of course, does not include, bringing up the matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. In other words, in Our considered view, the mere
inclusion in the inventory submitted by the administrator of the estate of a deceased person of a given
property does not of itself deprive the probate court of authority to inquire into the property of such
inclusion in case an heir or a third party claims adverse title thereto. To hold otherwise would render inutile
the power of that court to make a prima facie determination of the issue of ownership recognized in the
above quoted precedents. The correct rule is that the probate court should resolve the issue before it
provisionally, as basis for its inclusion in or exclusion from the inventory. It does not even matter that the issue
is raised after approval of the inventory because "apparently, it is not necessary that the inventory and
appraisal be approved by the Court." (Francisco on the Rules of Court Vol. V-B, p. 99, citing Siy Chong Keng
vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 60 Phil. 494)
In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by Torrens Title is
involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of
strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the
property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly,
when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title.
Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the possession of third parties and
more important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the
respondent court should have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the
property in question from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such
third persons of their possession and ownership of the property. Respondent court was clearly without
jurisdiction to issue the order of June 27, 1979. Thus, it was unnecessary for the petitioners to first apply for
relief with the intestate court.
Even assuming the truth of the private respondents' allegations that the sale of December 29, 1971 was
effected under suspicious circumstances and tainted with fraud and that the right of Rufina as alleged
half-sister and sole heir of Irene remains open to question, these issues may only be threshed out in a
separate civil action filed by the respondent administrator against the petitioners and not in the intestate
proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the respondent court's order dated June 27, 1979 is
hereby set aside and declared void as issued in excess of its jurisdiction. Our restraining order enjoining the
enforcement of the June 27, 1979 order and the respondents from further interfering, through the intestate
proceedings, in the peaceful possession and cultivation of the land in question by the petitioners is hereby
made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.