Rodolfo D. Llamas Vs Executive Secretary Oscar Orbos and Mariano Un Ocampo, Iii 202 SCRA 844 1991-10-15

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(133) RODOLFO D.

LLAMAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR ORBOS and


MARIANO UN OCAMPO, III

202 SCRA 844 1991-10-15

Facts:

An administrative case was filed against Private respondent, governor of


Tarlac Province, for alleged acts of graft and corruption. While serving his 90-day
suspension, Petitioner, as vice-governor, assumed his office. However, less than 30
days after, Private respondent returned with a Resolution issued by Public
respondent by authority of the President, granting executive clemency to
respondent governor.

Issue:

WON executive clemency granted in favour of respondent governor is


Constitutional considering Petitioner’s contention that the President may grant
executive clemency only in criminal cases, and considering further Respondent
governor’s contention avers that since under the Constitution full discretionary
authority is granted to the President on the exercise of executive clemency.

Held:

Yes, the executive clemency granted in favour of respondent governor is


Constitutional.

Sec. 19, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution states that: “Except in cases of
impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a
majority of all the Members of the Congress.”

In this case, the Court applied the doctrine “Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos
distinguire debemos”. In other words, if the law does not distinguish, so we must not
distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases exclusive
clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment
cases. It is the court’s considered view that if the President can grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with
much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which
are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
(134) WILFREDO TORRES Y SUMULONG VS HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, THE
CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF MPARDONS AND PAROLE, and THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF
PRISONS 152 SCRA 272 1987-07-23

Facts:

A conditional pardon was granted to Petitioner by the President, after the


former was convicted of the crime of two counts of estafa, on condition that
Petitioner shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Years later,
Petitioner was charged with twenty counts of estafa, resulting in the President’s
cancellation of his pardon and the issuance of an order for the Petitioner’s arrest and
recommitment.

Issue:

WON cancellation of Petitioner’s conditional pardon and issuance of an order


of his arrest and recommitment is Constitutional considering Petitioner’s contention
that he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final
judgment of his latter criminal cases.

Held:

Yes, the cancellation of pardon and issuance of order of arrest and


recommitment is Constitutional.

In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who
is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department
has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised
Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon
a convict who "having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall
violate any of the conditions of such pardon."

Under Sec. 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 which


empowered the President: “to grant to convicted persons reprieves or pardons,
either plenary or partial, conditional, or unconditional; to suspend sentences without
pardon, remit fines, and order the discharge of any convicted person upon parole,
subject to such conditions as he may impose; and to authorize the arrest and
reincarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the
condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence.”
In this case, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the
President's executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny. No judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary.
(135) VICENTE GARCIA VS. THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
THE HONORABLE MINISTER, LAND TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS,
THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, TELECOM REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IV

GR No. 75025 1993-09-14

Facts:

The President granted executive clemency to Petitioner, a supervising lineman


in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of Telecommunications, after having been
convicted for qualified theft. The Petitioner then filed a claim for payment of back
wages.

Issues:

WON Petitioner is entitled to the claiming for payment of back salaries


considering Petitioner’s contention that after being reinstated pursuant to the grant
of executive clemency, he is entitled to such, and considering further the
Respondent’s contention that executive clemency was granted to the Petitioner for
the purpose of reinstatement only since it was silent on the matter of back wages.

Facts:

Yes, Petitioner is entitled to the claiming for payment of back salaries.

Under Philippine Jurisprudence, the very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or


remission of guilt and not forgiveness. However, if the pardon is based on the
innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him a new man and
as innocent as if he had not been charged.

In this case, the acquittal of Petitioner by the trial court was founded not on
lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that Petitioner did not commit
the offense imputed to him. Petitioner’s innocence is the primary reason behind the
grant of executive clemency to him, resulting in his reinstatement. Petitioner’s
automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back wages. This
is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the start and to make
reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the
service.
(136) ISABELO T. SABELLO VS DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS

GR No. 87687 1989-12-26

Facts:

Petitioner, an elementary school principal, was granted absolute pardon by


the President, restoring him to “full civil and political rights”, after having been
convicted of violating the Anti-Graft And Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner then
applied for reinstatement and was reinstated not to his former position, but as a
mere classroom teacher.

Issue:

WON Petitioner merits reappointment to his position as elementary school


principal considering Petitioner’s contention that he must be restored to the same
position he was in before he was convicted on a mere technical error and for which
he was given an absolute pardon, and considering further the Respondent’s
contention that that there is no justiciable controversy in this case.

Held:

Yes, Petitioner merits reappointment to his position as elementary school


principal.

In Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., the Court held that the absolute disqualification
from office or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed
under the penal code and that pardon frees the individual from all the penalties and
legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights.

In this case, the petitioner had been unfairly deprived of what is rightfully his,
the discretion is qualified by the requirements of giving justice to the petitioner. It is
no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the appointing power, but discretion
tempered with fairness and justice. As there are no circumstances that would
warrant the diminution of the Petitioner’s rank, justice and equity dictate that he be
returned to his former position of Elementary School Principal I and not to that of a
mere classroom teacher.

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