Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union v.

Court of Appeals

Facts: On November 11, 1996, the Union filed a petition for a certification election so that it may be declared the
exclusive bargaining representative of the Hotel’s employees for the purpose of collective bargaining. The petition
was dismissed by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on January 15, 1997.
After a few months, despite the dismissal of their petition, the Union sent a letter to the Hotel informing the latter of its
desire to negotiate for a collective bargaining agreement. The Hotel, however, refused to negotiate with the Union,
citing the earlier dismissal of the Union’s petition for certification by DOLE.
Failing to settle the issue, the Union staged a strike against the Hotel. Numerous confrontations followed, further
straining the relationship between the Union and the Hotel. The Hotel claims that the strike was illegal and dismissed
some employees for their participation in the allegedly illegal concerted activity. The Union, on the other hand,
accused the Hotel of illegally dismissing the workers.
A Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code was later filed by the Union before the
Secretary of Labor. Thereafter, Secretary of Labor Trajano issued an Order directing the striking officers and
members of the Union to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours and the Hotel to accept them back under the
same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the strike.
After receiving the above order the members of the Union reported for work, but the Hotel refused to accept them and
instead filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Secretary’s Order.
Acting on the motion for reconsideration, then Acting Secretary of Labor Español modified the one earlier issued by
Secretary Trajano and instead directed that the strikers be reinstated only in the payroll.
This is where the controversy arose. The union alleged that the Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of
discretion for modifying its earlier order and requiring instead the reinstatement of the employees in the payroll.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the Union’s petition and affirmed the Secretary of Labor’s Order for payroll
reinstatement. It held that the challenged order is merely an error of judgment and not a grave abuse of discretion
and that payroll reinstatement is not prohibited by law, but may be “called for” under certain circumstances. The CA
cited University of Santo Tomas vs. NLRC as basis for its ruling.
Ruling: The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the CA, and ruled that the Secretary of Labor committed grave
abused of discretion in ordering payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement. The Court noted the
difference between UST case and the instant case. In UST case the teachers could not be given back their
academic assignments since the order of the Secretary for them to return to work was given in the middle
of the first semester of the academic year. The NLRC was, therefore, faced with a situation where the
striking teachers were entitled to a return to work order, but the university could not immediately reinstate
them since it would be impracticable and detrimental to the students to change teachers at that point in
time.
In the present case, there is no similar compelling reason that called for payroll reinstatement as an alternative
remedy. A strained relationship between the striking employees and management is no reason for payroll
reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement.
Under Article 263(g), all workers must immediately return to work and all employers must readmit all of them under
the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Court pointed out that the law uses the
precise phrase of “under the same terms and conditions,” revealing that it contemplates only actual reinstatement.
This is in keeping with the rationale that any work stoppage or slowdown in that particular industry can be inimical to
the national economy.
The Court reiterates that Article 263(g) was not written to protect labor from the excesses of management, nor was it
written to ease management from expenses, which it normally incurs during a work stoppage or slowdown. This law
was written as a means to be used by the State to protect itself from an emergency or crisis. It is not for labor, nor is it
for management.

VICTORIA V. INCIONG (1988)

FACTS: Victoria was employed in Far East Broadcasting Company. Helater together with other employees organized
an employee’s union. They sought recognition from the company but the lattermaintained that they cannot as they
are not under the scope of the Industrial Peace Act. Despite conciliation efforts and advise by the NCMB that they
cannot be recognized as the broadcasting company is not included in the Industrial Peace Act, they staged a strike.
This prompted the company to file for damages and preliminary injunction. Petitioner was subsequently dismissed
from the company and he alleged that he was illegally dismissed since prior clearance is needed from the Secretary
before the dismissal of employees or cessation of business.
HELD: Technically speaking, no clearance was obtained by private respondentfrom the then Secretary of Labor, the
last step towards full compliancewith the requirements of law on the matter of dismissal of employees.However, the
rationale behind the clearance requirement was fully met.The Secretary of Labor was apprised of private
respondent's intention toterminate the services of petitioner. This in effect is an application forclearance to dismiss
petitioner from employment. The affirmance of therestrictive condition in the dispositive portion of the labor arbiter's
decisionin NLRC Case Nos. 0021 and 0285 by the Secretary of Labor and theOffice of the President of the
Philippines, signifies a grant of authority todismiss petitioner in case the strike is declared illegal by the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan. Consequently and as correctly stated by the Solicitor General, private respondent acted in good
faith when it terminated the employment of petitioner upon a declaration of illegality of the strike by the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan. Moreover, the then Secretary of Labor manifested his conformity to the dismissal, not once, but
twice. In this regard, the mandatory rule on clearance need not be applied. The strike staged by the union in 1972
was a futile move. The law then enforced, Republic Act 875 specifically excluded respondent company from its
coverage. Even if the parties had gone to court to compel recognition, no positive relief could have been obtained
since the same was not sanctioned by law. Because of this, there was no necessity on the part of private respondent
to show specific acts of petitioner during the strike to justify his dismissal. This is a matter of responsibility and of
answerability. Petitioner as a union leader, must see to it that the policies and activities of the union in the conduct of
labor relations are within the precepts of law and any deviation.

St. Martin Funeral vs. NLRC

Facts: Respondent Aricayos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal to the labor arbiter. There being no employer-
employee relationship between the two, petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Arcayos appealed to NLRC
cotending errors of the labor arbiter.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over NLRC appeals?

RULING: First established in 1972, decisions of NLRC were declared to be appealable to the Secretary of labor and,
ultimately to the President. But under the present state law, there is no provision for appeals from NLRC decisions.
The court held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of
law and jurisdiction even though not right of review is given by statute, that the purpose of jurisdiction review is to
keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties; and that is part of
the checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust
jurisdictions. Subsequently under RA 7902, effective March 1995, the mode for judicial review over NLRC decisions
in that of a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The same confuses by declaring that the CA has no appellate
jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of SC, including the NLRC decisions.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of BP 129 to supposed appeals from NLRC to SC are
interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. All such petitions should
henceforth be initially filed in the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as appropriate forum for the relief desired. Case
remanded to CA.

Deltaventures Resouces, Inc. v. Cabato et al., 327 SCRA 521, 2000

Facts: In 1992, a Decision was rendered by Executive Labor Arbiter Norma Olegario, NLRCRegional Arbitration
Board, Cordillera Administrative Region entitled “Bernardino et al. v. Green Mountain Farm, Roberto Ongpin and
Almus Alabe” which declared the respondents guilty of Illegal Dismissal and Unfair Labor Practice, ordering them to
pay the complainants in solidum1 in the amount respective of the illegally dismissed employees. In June 1994, the LA
issued a writ of execution directing NLRC Deputy Sherriff Ventura to execute judgment against respondents then
proceeded to enforce the writ by garnishing certain properties of respondents. Finding that the respondents do not
have sufficient personal properties to satisfy the monetary award, Sherriff Ventura proceeded to levy upon a real
property registered in Roberto Ongpin’s name—one of the respondents. Meanwhile, before the scheduled auction
sale, Deltaventures filed before the Commission a third party claim asserting ownership over the property levied upon
and subject of the Sherriff notice of sale. LA thus issued an order to suspend the auction sale until Deltaventures’
claim is resolved. However, in August 1994, Deltaventures filed with the RTC a complaint for injunction and damages
with prayer for the issuance of TRO against Sherriff Ventura reiterating the same allegation raised in the third party
claim it filed with the Commission. Further, Deltaventures filed with the NLRC a manifestation, questioning the
NLRC’s authority to hear the case, the matter being within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The manifestation
however was dismissed by the LA. Meanwhile, respondent-laborers, moved for the dismissal of the civil case on the
ground of
lack of jurisdiction.
Issue: May the trial court take cognizance of the complaint filed by Deltaventures?

Ruling: The Court notes that the complaint before the trial court was for the recovery of possession and injunction—
but in essence, it was an action challenging the legality or propriety of the levy vis-à-vis the alias writ of execution,
including the acts performed by the Labor Arbiter and the Deputy Sherriff implementing the writ. Thus, the complaint
was in effect a motion to quash on the writ of execution of a decision rendered on a case properly within the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter—to wit: Illegal Dismissal and ULP. Each is liable in full payment of performance, and
the creditor may choose which of the obligants he will sue. Considering the factual setting, it is then logical to
conclude that the subject matter or the third party claim is but an incident of the labor case, a matter beyond the
jurisdiction of the RTC. To hold otherwise is to sanction split jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly
administration of justice. Jurisdiction—once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues
until the case is terminated. Whatever irregularities attended the issuance and execution of the writ should be
referred to the same administrative tribunal which rendered the decision. This is because any court which issued a
writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and
to control its own processes. The broad powers granted to the LA and NLRC by Articles 217, 218 and 224 of the
Labor Code can only be interpreted as vesting in them jurisdiction over incidents arising from, in connection with or
relating to labor disputes, as the controversy under consideration is to the exclusion of the regular courts. Further, the
Labor Code in Article 254 explicitly prohibits issuance of a TRO or permanent injunction or restraining order in any
case involving or growing out of labor disputes by any court or other entity (except as otherwise provided in Articles
218 and 264). As correctly observed by the court a quo, the main issue and subject of the amended complaint for
injunction are questions interwoven by the execution of the Commission’s decision. Furthermore, the power of the
Labor Arbiter to issue writ of execution carries with it the power to inquire into the correctness of the execution of his
decision and to consider whatever supervening events might transpire during such execution. Lastly, the Regional
Trial Court, being a co-equal body of the NLRC, has no jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or injunction to
enjoin the execution of any decision of the latter.

Abbot Laboratories Philippines Inc. vs. Abbott Laboratories Employees Union 323 SCRA 392 January 26,
2000

FACTS: Abbott Laboratories Employees Union (ALEU) filed an application for union registration with DOLE. The
Bureau of Labor Relations approved the petition and issued the corresponding certificate of registration, thereby
transforming ALEU into a legitimate labor organization. Abbott Laboratories Philippines Inc., the company in which
ALEU sought to operate, sought to cancel ALEU's certificate of registration, on the grounds that the latter's
application was not signed by at least 20% of the rank and file employees of Abbot, and that it failed to submit copies
of its books of account. Subsequently, the Regional Director of the BLR upheld the said petition and cancelled ALEU's
certificate of registration. On appeal, the BLR reversed the judgement of the Regional Director, and upheld ALEU's
legitimacy. Abbot appealed the BLR's decision to the Secretary of Labor. The latter refused to act on Abbott's appeal,
citing the fact that the SOLE has no jurisdiction to review the decision of the BLR on appeals in cancellation cases
emanating from the BLR Regional Office. The decision of the BLR in such cases is final and executory, and any
appeal on the same must be filed with the BLR as a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Does the Secretary of Labor have jurisdiction to review the decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations in such
a case?

HELD: No. The appellate jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor is limited to a review of cancellation proceedings
decided by the BLR in the exercise of its (BLR) exclusive and original jurisdiction. In this case, the BLR exercised its
appellate power to review the decision of the Regional Director in a petition to cancel a union's certificate of
registration. The Secretary of Labor has no jurisdiction over such a case, since the BLR's decision in the same is final
and not appealable.

AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE-SANTIAGO CITY v. CHELLY P. NACINO, GR No. 162739, 2008-02-12

FactsL Petitioner AMA Computer College employed Chelly P. Nacino as Online Coordinator of the college. One day,
during inspection, the Human Resources Division Supervisor, Ms. San Pedro found Nacino absent from his post. San
Pedro then issued a Memorandum requiring Nacino to explain his absence. Nacino filed with San Pedro a written
explanation claiming that he had to rush home because he was suffering from LBM and that the facilities in the school
were inadequate. Not satisfied with the explanation, San Pedro sought another explanation but Nacino furnished the
same written explanation earlier submitted. San Pedro then filed a formal complaint against Nacino for false
testimony, in addition to the charge of abandonment. The Investigating Committee found Nacino guilty as charged,
and was subsequently dismissed from the service. Aggrieved, Nacino filed a complaint for Illegal Suspension and
Termination before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). AMA's representative, signed the
submission Agreement, accepting the jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrator Samaniego over the controversy. The parties
agreed to settle the case amicably, with Nacino discharging and releasing AMA from all his claims in consideration of
the sum of P7,719.81. The Decision embodying the Compromise was duly prepared and signed, but the check in
payment of the consideration for the settlement had yet to be released. During the pendency of the case, Nacino died
in an accident. The Voluntary Arbitrator ordered Nacino's reinstatement and the payment of his backwages and 13 th
month pay. He manifested that, due to AMA's failure to pay the sum of P7,719.81, Nacino withdrew from the
Compromise Agreement. then issued a Writ of Execution upon motion of Nacino's surviving spouse.

AMA filed a Motion to Quash the said Writ but the Voluntary Arbitrator allegedly refused to receive the same. Thus,
the heirs of Nacino were able to garnish AMA's bank deposits in the amount of P52,021.70. AMA filed a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. The CA dismissed the said petition because it was a wrong mode of review.
It held that the proper remedy was an appeal by way of Rule 43. The CA held an erroneous appeal shall be
dismissed outright pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50. MR was also denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue: W/N the CA committed an error in dismissing the petition for certiorari under Rule 65. - NO

The instant petition lacks merit. Pertinent is our ruling in Centro Escolar University Faculty v. CA where we held: We
find that the CA did not err in holding that petitioner used a wrong remedy when it filed a special civil action on
certiorari under Rule 65 instead of an appeal under Rule 43. The Court held that decisions of the voluntary arbitrator
under the Labor Code are appealable to the CA. In that case, the Court observed that the Labor Code was silent as
regards the appeals from the decisions of the voluntary arbitrator, unlike those of the Labor Arbiter which may be
appealed to the NLRC. The Court noted, however, that the voluntary arbitrator is a government instrumentality within
the contemplation of Section 9 of BP 129 which provides for the appellate jurisdiction of the CA. The decisions of the
voluntary arbitrator are akin to those of the RTC, and, therefore, should first be appealed to the CA before being
elevated to this Court. This is in furtherance and consistent with the original purpose of Circular No. 1-91 to provide a
uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial agencies not expressly excepted from
the coverage of Section 9 of BP 129.

We are not unmindful of instances when certiorari was granted despite the availability of appeal, such as (a) when
public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c)
when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of
judicial authority. However, none of these recognized exceptions attends the case at bar. AMA has sadly failed to
show circumstances that would justify a deviation from the general rule.
While it is true that, a petition for certiorari may be treated as having been filed under Rule 45, the petition for
certiorari filed by petitioner before the CA cannot be treated as such, without the exceptional circumstances
mentioned above, because it was filed way beyond the 15-day reglementary period within which to file the Petition for
Review. By parity of reasoning, the same reglementary period should apply to appeals taken from the decisions of
Voluntary Arbitrators under Rule 43. The assailed Decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator had already become final and
executory and beyond the purview of this Court to act upon.

PAL v. NLRC G.R. No. 126805 March 16, 2000.

FACTS: Private respondents Pescante and another PAL employee, Vcente were employed by Pal as load controller
and check-in clerk, respectively. On January 19, 1993, a passenger by the name of Cominero checked in for the
flight. It appears that Vicente reflected a lighter weight of baggage on Cominero’s ticket to make it appear that the
same was within the allowable level. When the anomaly was later discovered, Vicente went to the cashier to pay the
excess baggage fee. Cominero further paid the sum representing the excess baggage fee. Vicente implicated
private respondent in the anomaly. Private respondent and Vicente were charged with “fraud against the company”
and were found guilty and meted with the penalty of dismissal. The NLRC found that the alleged defrauding of
petitioner’s excess baggage revenue was not the handiwork of private respondent and that petitioner failed to show it
suffered loss in revenues as a consequence of private respondent’s questioned act.

ISSUE: W/N private respondent was validly dismissed.

HELD: Yes. The core of petitioner’s evidence against private respondent included the report of Vicente. It was
erroneous for the NLRC to have discredited Vicente’s testimony because he appeared guilty as well. There is
substantial evidence showing that private respondent had direct involvement in the illegal pooling of baggage.
Private respondent’s act is inexcusable as it constitutes a serious offense under petitioner’s Code of Discipline. The
fact that petitioner failed to show it suffered losses in revenue is immaterial as private respondent’s mere attempt to
deprive petitioner of its lawful remedy is already tantamount to fraud. Therefore, private respondent was validly
dismissed and as such was for a just cause, he is not entitled to backwages nor separation pay.

Manila Electric v. Quisumbing

Facts: Members of the Private respondent union were dissatisfied with the terms of a CBA with petitioner. The parties
in this case were ordered by the Sec. of Labor to execute a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) wherein.The CBA
allowed for the increase in the wages of the employees concerned. The petitioner argues that if such increase were
allowed, it would pass off such to the consumers.

Issue: W/N matters of salary are part of management prerogative

RULING: Yes. There is no need to consult the Secretary of Labor in cases involving contracting out for 6 months or
more as it is part of management prerogative. However, a line must be drawn with respect to management
prerogatives on business operations per se and those which affect the rights of the workers. Employers must see to it
that that employees are properly informed of its decisions to attain harmonious labor relations and enlighten the
worker as to their rights.The contracting out business or services is an exercise of business judgment if it is for the
promotion of efficiency and attainment of economy. Management must be motivated by good faith and contracting out
should not be done to circumvent the law. Provided there was no malice or that it was not done arbitrarily, the courts
will not interfere with the exercise of this judgment.

PAL v NLRC G.R. 55159 Dec. 22, 1989

Facts: Petitioner PAL admitted respondent DOLINA at their Aviation School for training as pilot with an agreement to
provide regular and permanent employment to DOLINA upon completion of the 6-month training. DOLINA, upon
finishing the 6-month training logged only 84H 55M flying time, much lower than the required 500H flying time for
regularization. He was extended to complete this requirement but still failed to reach the 500H minimum. He was
extended for the second time where he finished the minimum requirement and applied for regularization. Pending
physical exam by the flight surgeon, he was extended for the third time. On the psychological exam, he was found
unacceptable in his Adaptability Rating and rendered him disqualified for regular employment. PAL placed DOLINA on
preventive suspension pending their application for clearance for the latter’s termination. DOLINA filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal to which the OIC of DOLE Regional Office IV lifted the suspension with full backwages but referred
the termination and damages to the Labor Arbiter (LA). PAL appealed the OIC order to Sec of Labor. Pending
resolution, the parties agreed before the Undersecretary Of Labor to consider DOLINA in the payroll pending the
cases final resolution by arbitration. Two months later, Acting Sec of Labor issued an order finding the suspension
moot due to the agreement and referred the case for arbitration. LA granted PAL’s termination clearance and denied
claim for damages. DOLINA appealed to NLRC, contending that LA’s decision is not final due to timely appeal. ·
NLRC rendered decision that the termination sufficiently passed test of validity, but DOLINA should be returned to the
payroll pending the case’s final resolution. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N NLRC commited grave abuse of discretion in holding that DOLINA is entitled to his salaries until the
cases final resolution.

HELD: Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE and declared void the decision of NLRC to entitle DOLINA with wages
pending final resolution of the case and made permanent the TRO. NLRC contended that the timely appeal of the
LA’s decision had not made the decision final and that the final resolution of the case by arbitration includes the
appeal. Court said NO, and that it would create an absurdity as it would cover even those under certiorari in the court
and the employee would continue to receive salary without rendering services regardless of the outcome of the case.
Furthermore, proceedings on appeal before the NLRC cannot be considered as part of the arbitration. When the LA
renders his decision, the compulsory arbitration is deemed terminated. Any appeal of such decision is beyond the
scope of arbitration.
 HAWAIIAN-PHILIPPINE CO. v GULMATICO, et al., G.R. No. 106231, November 16, 1994

FACTS: National Federation of Sugar Workers-Food and General Trades, private respondent, filed an action against
Hawaiian Philippine Company for claims under RA 809 (the Sugar act of 1952). They alleged that they have never
availed of the benefits due them under the said law. Under such statute, the proceeds of any increase in participation
shall be divided, in which 60% for laborers’ and 40% for the planters. Hawaiian, petitioner, argued that respondent
Labor Arbiter Gulmatico has no jurisdiction over the case considering their case which does not fall under Article 217
of the Labor Code. It further contended that it has no employer-employee relationship.

ISSUE: Whether or not public respondent Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case against petitioner.

HELD: While jurisdiction over controversies involving agricultural workers has been transferred from the Court of
Agrarian Relations to the Labor Arbiters under the Labor Code, said transferred jurisdiction is however, not without
limitations. The controversy must fall under one of the cases enumerated in the Labor Code which was due or in
connection with an employer-employee relationship. However, there is no employer- employee relationship between
petitioner and respondent union. Hence, respondent labor arbiter has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case
against the petitioner. Wherefore, petition is granted.

PNB vs. Cabansag, GR No. 157010, June 21, 2005

Facts: Florence Cabansag went to Singapore as a tourist. While she was there, she looked for a job and eventually
applied with the Singapore Branch of the Philippine National Bank. PNB is a private banking corporation organized
and existing under Philippine laws. She was eventually employed and was issued an employment pass. In her job
offer, it was stated, among others, that she was to be put on probation for 3 months and termination of her
employment may be made by either party after 1 day notice while on probation, and 1 month notice or 1 month pay in
lieu of notice upon confirmation. She accepted the terms and was issued an OEC by the POEA. She was
commended for her good work. However, she was informed by Ruben Tobias, the bank president, that she would
have to resign in line with some cost cutting and realignment measures of the company. She refused but was
informed by Tobias that if she does not resign, he will terminate her instead.

Issues:

1. W/N the arbitration branch of the NLRC has jurisdiction

Ruling:

1. Labor arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising from employer-employee relations
including termination disputes involving all workers, including OFWs. Here, Cabansag applied for and
secured an OEC from the POEA through the Philippine Embassy. The OEC authorized her working status in
a foreign country and entitled her to all benefits and processes under our statutes. Although she may been a
direct hire at the commencement of her employment, she became an OFW who was covered by Philippine
labor laws and policies upon certification by the POEA. When she was illegally terminated, she already
possessed the POEA employment certificate.
2. A migrant worker “refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a
remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a legal resident; to be used interchangeably with
overseas Filipino worker.” Here, Cabansag was a Filipino, not a legal resident of Singapore, and employed
by petitioner in its branch office in Singapore. She is clearly an OFW/migrant worker. Thus, she has the
option where to file her Complaint for illegal dismissal. She can either file at the Regional Arbitration Branch
where she resides or the RAB where the employer is situated. Thus, in filing her Complaint before the RAB
office in Quezon City, she has made a valid choice of proper venue.
3. The appellate court was correct in holding that respondent was already a regular employee at the time of her
dismissal, because her three-month probationary period of employment had already ended. This ruling is in
accordance with Article 281 of the Labor Code: “An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary
period shall be considered a regular employee.” Indeed, petitioner recognized respondent as such at the
time it dismissed her, by giving her one month’s salary in lieu of a one-month notice, consistent with
provision No. 6 of her employment Contract.
 DAYAG, et al v CANIZARES, NLRC, G.R. NO. 124193, March 6, 1998

FACTS: Petitioners were hired to work as tower crane operators by one Alfredo Young, a building contractor doing
business in the name of Young’s construction. In 1991, they were transferred to Cebu City to work for Young’s
Shoemart Cebu Project. Petitioner William Dayag asked permission to go to Manila to attend family matters and was
allowed to do so but was not paid for January 23-30 due to his accountability for the loss of certain construction tools.
The other petitioners left due to harassment by young. Thereafter, petitioner banded together and filed a complaint
against Young before the NCR Arbitration Branch NLRC which was assigned to Labor Arbiter Cenizares. Further,
Young filed a “Motion to transfer the case” to the Reginal Arbitration Brach, Region VII of the NLRC. He contended
that the case should be filed in Cebu City because it is the location of the workplace of the petitioner. However, it was
opposed by the petitioner on the ground that they are both form Metro Manila and that they could not afford trips to
Cebu, in addition, they claimed that respondent’s main office is in Corinthian Garden in Quezon City. Labor Arbiter
Cenizares granted Young’s motion to transfer the case in Cebu. Petitioner appealed to NLRC but such was
dismissed. Hence, they filed a MFR and this time the commission set aside its previous decision and remanded the
case to the original arbitration branch of the NCR for further proceedings. On the other hand, Young filed his own
MFR and the NLRC reinstated its first decision directing the transfer of the case to Cebu City.

ISSUE: Whether the Labor Arbiter acted with grave abuse of discretion when it entertained Young’s motion to
transfer.

HELD: No. The SC ruled that litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on
technicalities. Petitioners were able to file an opposition on the “motion to transfer case” which was considered by
Labor Arbiter Cenizares. Hence, there is no showing that they have been unduly prejudiced by the motion’s failure to
give notice and hearing. However, Young cannot derive comfort from this petition. The SC held that the question of
venue relates more to the convenience of the parties rather than upon the substance and merits of the case. This is
to assure convenience for the plaintiff and his witness and to promote the ends of justice under the principle that the
state shall afford protection to labor. The reason for this is that the worker, being the economically-disadvantaged
party, the nearest governmental machinery to settle the dispute must be placed at his immediate disposal, and the
other party is not to be given the choice of another competent agency sitting in another place as this will unduly
burden the former. WHEREFORE, petition is granted.

SM AGRI AND GENERAL MACHINERIES, petitioner,vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Third
Division), EXECUTIVE LABOR ARBITER, REGION V, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF ALBAY, or any of his
deputies, and VIVENCIO ABO, respondents.

G.R. No. 74806 January 9, 1989

FACTS:Private respondent Vivencio Abo was first employed on 2 August 1976 by SM Industries as Officer-in-Charge
(OIC) of a branch office. In 1981, SM Industries changed its business name into SM Agricultural and General
Machineries where Mr. Abo remained, to work as an OIC, until his termination from employment on 31 May 1982.

In a complaint filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment, docketed as Case No. RAB-V-No. 0891-82, 3 private
respondent charged petitioner for unlawful dismissal and prayed for an award of damages. Petitioner's defense to the
charge was the willful disobedience on the part of Abo in refusing to report sales, collection reports and monthly
allowance since his appointment as OIC in January 1981 which, according to petitioner, rendered the termination of
his employment on 31 May 1982 lawful.

The Labor Arbiter, on 29 March 1984, rendered a decision in favor of private respondent, copy of which was received
by petitioner on 10 April 1984.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of said decision contending that the appeal was filed within the reglementary 10-
day period as provided in Art 223 of the Labor Code. According to petitioner, it was physically impossible to file the
appeal on 20 April 1984 either personally or by registered mail, since it was Good Friday, a Legal Holiday. Such being
the case, he filed the appeal on 23 April 1984 (Monday) which was the first business day after the Legal Holiday.
Petitioner, while admitting that he filed the appeal on the 13th day, argued that the computation of the 10-day period
requirement should not be strictly applied to this case. NLRC, however, denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration
in its 7 April 1986 resolution. Hence, this present recourse by the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner's appeal on the
ground of tardiness or late filing.

HELD: When the last day for filing an appeal falls on a legal Holiday, the same can be filed on the next business day
following said Legal Holiday. In fact, the Revised Administrative Code, specifically, Sec. 31, Art. VIII thereof, clearly
provides that:

Sec. 31. Pretermission of Holiday. — “Where the day, or the last day, for doing any act required or permitted by law
falls on a holiday, the act may be done on the next succeeding business day.”

in Vir-Jen Shipping case

We uphod the interpretation made that the 10-day period fixed by Art. 223 of the Labor Code contemplates
calendar days and not working days, the court recognizes an exception to this general rule, i.e., where the
10th day is a Sunday or a Legal Holiday, in which event, the appeal can be filed on the next business day.
Consequently, in such a case, the supposedly last day to appeal will not be deemed the last day because it
happens to be a Sunday or Legal Holiday. Instead, the act can be done on the next business day following
that Sunday or Legal Holiday.

VirJen Shipping and Marine Services vs. NLRC

Facts: Certain seamen entered into a contract of employment for a 12-month period. Some three months after the
commencement of their employment, the seamen demanded a 50% increase of their salaries and benefits. The
seamen demanded this increase while their vessel was on route to a port in Australia controlled by the International
Transport Federation (ITP) where the ITF could detain the vessels unless it paid its season ITF rates.

The agent of the owner of the vessel agreed to a 25% increase, but when the vessel arrived in Japan shortly
afterwards, the seamen were repatriated to Manila and their contract terminated.

Two motions for reconsideration filed with Second Division were denied by said Division. Another motion for
reconsideration was filed with the Supreme Court en banc which gave its due course, after finding that there was a
need to reconcile the decision of the Second Division with that of the First Division with the Wallen Decision. In that
decision, the First Division had ruled that the termination of the seamen was illegal.

Issue: Whether or not the termination of the seamen was illegal.

Held: The termination of the contract of the seamen was illegal. A manning contract involves the interests not only of
the signatories thereto, such as the local Filipino recruiting agent, the foreign owner of vessel and the Filipino seamen
in general as well as the country itself. Conformably to the power vested in the NSB, the law requires that all
manning contracts shall be approved by said agency. The stringent rules governing Filipino seamen abroad foreign
ships are dictated by national interest.