Abalos V Philex Mining Corp
Abalos V Philex Mining Corp
Abalos V Philex Mining Corp
Petitioners aver that when the March 5, 1994 order directing their reinstatement became final and executory, Arbitrator Valdez no longer had
jurisdiction to modify the same. According to them, an order that has become final and executory can no longer be modified or altered.
Petitioners further insist that Philex failed to sufficiently establish (1) that there were supervening events which rendered enforcement of the
final order unjust, and (2) that the positions vacated by them no longer existed and there were no similar positions available for them. Petitioners
point out that Philex did not conduct any investigation as to the manner and purpose of the abolition of their former positions. They also assert
that Philex subcontracted to outsiders the work previously performed by the retrenched employees, which proved that there was no need to
abolish their positions.
As to the alleged strained relations between the parties, petitioners maintain that this was also not proven adequately. Petitioners submit that
for this doctrine to apply, it must be shown that the affected employees occupied positions of trust and confidence, or that the employees
differences with their employer are of such nature or degree as to preclude reinstatement. Petitioners argue that neither of these conditions is
present in this case.
For its part, respondent contends that it presented evidence showing the impossibility and inappropriateness of reinstatement, which justify the
modification of the March 5, 1994 arbitration order. Arbitrator Valdez found proof of this fact and upon appeal, the Court of Appeals declared
said finding as sufficiently supported by evidence. Invoking the principle embodied in Compania Maritima, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,[if
!supportFootnotes][8][endif] respondent avers that this factual finding must be accorded great weight, in the absence of any showing that it is whimsical,
capricious, or arbitrary.
A basic tenet in our rules of procedure is that an award that is final and executory cannot be amended or modified anymore. Nothing is more
settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether
the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. [if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] However, this rule is
subject to exceptions as stated in the case of David vs. CA, 316 SCRA 710 (1999), cited by respondent:
One exception is that where facts and/or events transpire after a decision has become executory, which facts and/or events present a supervening
cause or reason which renders the final and executory decision no longer enforceable. Under the law, the court may modify or alter a judgment
even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, as where certain
facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory.[if
!supportFootnotes][10][endif]
In David, we held also that where an execution order [which] has been issued is still pending, all proceedings on the execution are still proceedings
in the suit.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] As such, modification of the execution of such judgment is allowed.
In Torres vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 330 SCRA 311 (2000), this Court ruled that:
Execution is the final stage of litigation, the end of the suit. It cannot be frustrated except for serious reasons demanded by justice and equity. In
this jurisdiction, the rule is that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of execution
to enforce the judgment. A writ of execution may however be refused on equitable grounds as when there was a change in the situation of the
parties that would make execution inequitable or when certain circumstances, which transpired after judgment became final, rendered execution
of judgment unjust. The fact that the decision has become final does not preclude a modification or an alteration thereof because even with the
finality of judgment, when its execution becomes impossible or unjust, it may be modified or altered to harmonize the same with justice and the
facts (emphasis supplied). [if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
In Deltaventures Resources Inc. vs. Cabato, 327 SCRA 521 (2000), we held that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the
parties but continues until the case is terminated.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] The power of a voluntary arbitrator to issue a writ of execution carries
with it the power to inquire into the correctness of its execution and to consider whatever supervening events transpire during execution.[if
!supportFootnotes][14][endif] Therefore, we are in agreement with the appellate court that a voluntary arbitrator has jurisdiction to amend the mode of
business. Petitioners herein are part of the rank-and-file workforce; they are cooks, miners, helpers and mechanics of the respondent.[if
!supportFootnotes][16][endif] As held also in the Mercury Drug case:
To protect labors security of tenure, we emphasize that the doctrine of strained relations should be strictly applied so as not to deprive an illegally
dismissed employee of his right to reinstatement. Every labor dispute almost always results in strained relations and the phrase cannot be given
an overarching interpretation, otherwise an unjustly dismissed employee can never be reinstated.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif]
Considering the circumstances in the present case, we find that the only issue to be resolved is whether the supervening events are grave enough
to warrant a modification in the execution of the judgment. Both the voluntary arbitrator and the Court of Appeals found that reinstatement is
no longer possible due to the fact that respondent has been continuously suffering business losses and reducing the number of its employees
pending litigation, and so the positions held by petitioners were abolished as a cost-cutting measure.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] Petitioners argue,
however, that to excuse the respondent from reinstating the petitioners would be to allow it to do indirectly what it was not allowed to do directly
the retrenchment of the petitioners. They add that what is so scheming about this ploy is that respondent now tries to justify its refusal to
reinstate the petitioners by its very own act of abolishing their positions.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]
Despite our sympathy for the workers plight, however, we find no legal support for their opposition to the conclusion and findings of the voluntary
arbitrator and the Court of Appeals. On record, there is no showing that the abolition of the petitioners positions was capricious or whimsical.
The appellate court, as well as the voluntary arbitrator, based their decisions on applicable law and the evidence. As confirmed by the appellate
court, the voluntary arbitrator also found that petitioners reinstatement had become not only inappropriate but also impossible.
Regrettably, petitioners now raise questions the determination of which would require the Court to look into the evidence adduced by the parties.
This cannot be done in a petition for review on certiorari. It is outside its purview under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court. Factual findings of
labor officials who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdiction are generally accorded not only respect
but even finality, and bind us when supported by substantial evidence.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] It is not our function to assess and evaluate the
evidence all over again, particularly where the findings of both the arbitrator and the Court of Appeals coincide. Thus, in this case, absent a
showing of an error of law committed by the court below, or of whimsical or capricious exercise of its judgment, or a demonstrable lack of basis
for its conclusions, we may not disturb its factual findings,[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif] much less reverse its judgment outright.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision dated July 30, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50167, sustaining the
order dated December 11, 1998 of the Arbitrator of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board, Cordillera Administrative Region, Baguio City,
is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.