FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 127249. February 27, 1998]

CAMARINES NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (CANORE-CO);

RUBEN N. BARRAMEDA; ELVIS L. ESPIRITU; MERARDO G.
ENERO, JR.; MARCELITO B. ABAS; and REYNALDO V.
ABUNDO, petitioners, vs. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, in his
capacity as Executive Secretary; REX TANTIONGCO; HONESTO
DE JESUS; ANDRES IBASCO; TEODULO M. MEA; and VICENTE
LUKBAN, respondent.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

May the Office of the President validly constitute an ad hoc committee to take over
and manage the affairs of an electric cooperative?
This is the key issue in this original action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court wherein the petitioners seek to (a) annul and set aside
Memorandum Order No. 409 of the Office of the President dated 3 December 1996
constituting an Ad Hoc Committee to take over and manage the affairs of
the Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc., (hereafter CANORECO) until such time
as a general membership meeting can be called to decide the serious issues affecting
the said cooperative and normalcy in operations is restored"; and (b) prohibit the
respondents from performing acts or continuing proceedings pursuant to the
Memorandum Order.
The factual backdrop of this case is not complicated.
Petitioner CANORECO is an electric cooperative organized under the provisions of
P.D. No. 269, otherwise known as the National Electrification Administration Decree, as
amended by P.D. No. 1645.
On 10 March 1990, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law R.A. No.
6938 and R.A. No. 6939. The former is the Cooperative Code of the Philippines, while
the latter created the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) and vested solely upon
the CDA the power to register cooperatives.
Article 122 of the Cooperative Code expressly provides that electric cooperatives
shall be covered by the Code. Article 128 of the said Code and Section 17 of R.A. No.
6939 similarly provide that cooperatives created under P.D. No. 269, as amended by
P.D. No. 1645, shall have three years within which to qualify and register with the CDA
and that after they shall have so qualified and registered, the provisions of Sections 3
and 5 of P.D. No. 1645 shall no longer be applicable to them. These Sections 3 and 5
read as follows:

SEC. 3. Section 5(a), Chapter II of Presidential Decree No. 269 is hereby

amended by adding sub-paragraph (6) to read as follows:

(6) To authorize the NEA Administrator to designate, subject to the

confirmation of the Board Administrators, an Acting General Manager and/or
Project Supervisor for a Cooperative where vacancies in the said positions
occur and/or when the interest of the Cooperative and the program so
requires, and to prescribe the functions of said Acting General Manager
and/or Project Supervisor, which powers shall not be nullified, altered or
diminished by any policy or resolution of the Board of Directors of the
Cooperative concerned.

...

SEC. 5. Section 10, Chapter II of Presidential Decree No. 269 is hereby

amended to read as follows:

Section 10. Enforcement Powers and Remedies. -- In the exercise of its

power of supervision and control over electric cooperatives and other
borrower, supervised or controlled entities, the NEA is empowered to issue
orders, rules and regulations and motu proprio or upon petition of third parties,
to conduct investigations, referenda and other similar actions in all matters
affecting said electric cooperatives and other borrower, or supervised or
controlled entities.

...
Finally, the repealing clause (Article 127) of the Cooperative Code provides:

Provided, however, That nothing in this Code shall be interpreted to mean the
amendment or repeal of any provision of Presidential Decree No.
269: Provided, further, That the electric cooperatives which qualify as such
under this Code shall fall under the coverage thereof.

CANORECO registered with the CDA pursuant to R.A. No. 6938 and R.A. No.
6939. On 8 March 1993, the CDA issued a Certificate of Provisional Registration (T-
003-93) to CANORECO effective for two years.[1] On 1 March 1995, the CDA extended
this provisional registration until 4 May 1997.[2] However, on 10 July 1996, CANORECO
filed with the CDA its approved amendments to its Articles of Cooperation converting
itself from a non-stock to a stock cooperative pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No.
6938 and the Omnibus Implementing Rules and Regulations on Electric
Cooperatives. On the same date the CDA issued a Certificate of Registration [3] of the
amendments to CANORECO Articles of Cooperation certifying that CANORECO is
registered as a full-[f]ledged cooperative under and by virtue of R.A. 6938.
Previously, on 11 March 1995, the Board of Directors of CANORECO[4] approved
Resolution No. 22 appointing petitioner Reynaldo V. Abundo as permanent General
Manager. The Board was composed of

Ruben N. Barrameda -- President

Elvis L. Espiritu -- Vice president

Merardo G. Enero, Jr. -- Secretary

Marcelito B. Abas -- Treasurer

Antonio R. Obias -- Director

Luis A. Pascua -- Director

Norberto Z. Ochoa -- Director

Leonida Z. Manalo -- OIC GM/Ex-Officio

On 28 May 1995, Antonio Obias, Norberto Ochoa, Luis Pascua, and Felicito Ilan
held a special meeting of the Board of Directors of CANORECO. The minutes of the
meeting[5] showed that President Ruben Barrameda, Vice-President Elvis Espiritu, and
Treasurer Marcelito Abas were absent; that Obias acted as temporary chairman; that
the latter informed those present that it was the responsibility of the Board after the
annual meeting to meet and elect the new set of officers, but that despite the fact that
he had called the attention of President Barrameda and Directors Abas and Espiritu for
the holding thereof, the three chose not to appear; and that those present in the special
meeting declared all positions in the board vacant and thereafter proceeded to hold
elections by secret balloting with all the directors present considered candidates for the
positions. The following won and were declared as the newly elected officers of the
CANORECO:

President . . . . . . . . Norberto Ochoa

Vice President . . . . Antonio Obias

Secretary . . . . . . . . Felicito Ilan

Treasurer. . . . . . . . Luis Pascua

 Thereupon, these newly elected officers approved the following resolutions:

1) Resolution No. 27, c.s. -- confirming the election of the new set of
officers of the Board of Directors of CANORECO

2) Resolution No. 28, c.s. -- recalling Resolution No. 22, c.s. appointing
Mr. Reynaldo V. Abundo as permanent General Manager in view of the
fact that such appointment was in violation of the provisions of R.A.
6713; declaring the position of General Manager as vacant; and
designating Mr. Oscar Acobera as Officer-in-Charge

3) Resolution No. 29, c.s. -- authorizing the Board President, or in his

absence, the Vice-President, countersigned by the Treasurer, or in his
absence, the Secretary, to be the only officers who can transfer funds
from savings to current accounts; and authorizing the Officer-in-Charge,
Mr. Acobera, to issue checks without countersignature in an amount not
to exceed P3,000.00 and in excess thereof, to be countersigned by the
President and/or the Treasurer

4) Resolution No. 30, c.s. -- hiring the services of Atty. Juanito Subia as
retainer-lawyer for CANORECO. [6]

The petitioners challenged the above resolutions and the election of officers by filing
with the CDA a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Board Resolutions and Election of
Officers with Prayer for Issuance of Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order, which the
CDA docketed as CDA-CO Case No. 95-010.
In its Resolution of 15 February 1996,[7] the CDA resolved the petition in favor of the
petitioners and decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Board Meeting of May 28, 1995,

participated by the respondents, and all the Resolutions issued on such
occasion, are hereby declared NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.

Likewise, the election of respondents Norberto Ochoa, Antonio Obias, Felicito

Ilan, and Luis Pascua, as President, Vice-President, Secretary, and
Treasurer, respectively, of CANORECO is hereby declared NULL AND
VOID AB INITIO.

Hence, respondents Norberto Ochoa, Antonio Obias, Felicito Ilan, and Luis
Pascua are hereby ordered to refrain from representing themselves as
President, Vice-President, Secretary, and Treasurer, respectively, of
CANORECO. The same respondents are further ordered to refrain from acting
as authorized signatories to the bank accounts of CANORECO.

Further respondent Felicito Ilan is hereby ordered to refrain from exercising

the duties and functions of a member of the Board of CANORECO until the
election protest is resolved with finality by the proper forum. In the meantime,
the incumbency of petitioner Merardo Enero, Jr. as Director of the
CANORECO Board is hereby recognized.

A status quo is hereby ordered as regards the position of General Manager,

being held by Mr. Reynaldo Abundo, considering that the recall of his
appointment was done under a void Resolution, and that the designation of
Mr. Oscar Acodera as Officer-in-Charge, under the same void Resolution, has
no force and effect.

Finally, respondents Antonio Obias, Norberto Ochoa, Luisito Pascua, and

petitioners Ruben Barrameda, Elvis Espiritu, Marcelito Abas and Merardo
Enero, Jr. are hereby ordered to work together, as Board of Directors, for the
common good of CANORECO and its consumer-members, and to maintain
an atmosphere of sincere cooperation among the officers and members of
CANORECO.

On 28 June 1996, in defiance of the abovementioned Resolution of the CDA and

with the active participation of some officials of the National Electrification
Administration (NEA), the group of Norberto Ochoa, Antonio Obias, Felicito Ilan, and
Luis Pascua forcibly took possession of the offices of CANORECO and assumed the
duties as officers thereof.[8]
On 26 September 1996, pursuant to the writ of execution and order to vacate issued
by the CDA, the petitioners were able to reassume control of the CANORECO and to
perform their respective functions.[9]
On 3 December 1996, the President of the Philippines issued Memorandum Order
No. 409[10] onstituting an Ad Hoc Committee to temporarily take over and manage the
affairs of CANORECO. It reads as follows:

To efficiently and effectively address the worsening problem of the Camarines

Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CANORECO) and in order not to prejudice
and endanger the interest of the people who rely on the said cooperative for
their supply of electricity, an AD HOC Committee is hereby constituted to take
over and manage the affairs of CANORECO until such time as a general
membership meeting can be called to decide the serious issues affecting the
said cooperative and normalcy in operations is restored. Further, if and when
warranted, the present Board of Directors may be called upon by the
Committee for advisory services without prejudice to the receipt of their per
diems as may be authorized by existing rules and regulations.

The AD HOC Committee shall be composed of the following:

REX TANTIONGCO -- Chairman

Presidential Assistant on Energy Affairs

HONESTO DE JESUS -- Member

Cooperative Development Authority Nominee

ANDRES IBASCO -- Member

Cooperative Development Authority Nominee

TEODULO M. MEA -- Member

National Electrification Administration Nominee

VICENTE LUKBAN -- Member

National Electrification Administration Nominee

The said Committee shall have the following functions:

1. Designate the following upon the recommendation of the Chairman:

1.1 an Acting General Manager who shall handle the day-to-day

operations of the Cooperative. In the meantime, the General
Manager shall be deemed to be on leave without prejudice to
the payment of his salaries legally due him; and

1.2 a Comptroller who shall handle the financial affairs of

the Cooperative.

2. Ensure that:

The AD HOC Committee shall submit a written report to the President,

through the Office of the Executive Secretary, every two (2) weeks from the
effectivity of this Order.
A General Membership Meeting shall be called by the AD HOC Committee to
determine whether or not there is a need to change the composition of the
membership of the Cooperatives Board of Directors. If the need exists, the AD
HOC Committee shall call for elections. Once the composition of the Board of
Directors is finally settled, it shall decide on the appointment of a General
Manager in accordance with prescribed laws, rules and regulations. Upon the
appointment of a General Manager, the Committee shall become functus
officio.

This Memorandum Order shall take effect immediately.

On 11 December 1996, the petitioners filed this petition wherein they claim that
I. THE PRESIDENT HAS NO POWER TO TAKE OVER AND MANAGE OR TO
ORDER THE TAKE-OVER OR MANAGEMENT OF CANORECO.
II. [THE] TAKE-OVER OF CANORECO BY THE AD HOC COMMITTEE IS
UNLAWFUL DESPITE DESIGNATION OF CANORECO CONSUMERS AS
MEMBERS OF AD HOC COMMITTEE.
III. [THE] RELEGATION OF PETITIONERS AS MERE ADVISERS TO THE AD HOC
COMMITTEE AMOUNTS TO REMOVAL FROM OFFICE WHICH THE PRESIDENT
HAS NO POWER TO DO. MOREOVER, PETITIONERS REMOVAL VIOLATES
PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
IV. THE PRESIDENT IS LIKEWISE WITHOUT POWER TO DESIGNATE OR ORDER
THE DESIGNATION OF AN ACTING GENERAL MANAGER FOR CANORECO
AND TO CONSIDER THE INCUMBENT REYNALDO V. ABUNDO TO BE ON
LEAVE.
The petitioners assert that there is no provision in the Constitution or in a statute
expressly, or even impliedly, authorizing the President or his representatives to take
over or order the take-over of electric cooperatives.Although conceding that while the
State, through its police power, has the right to interfere with private business or
commerce, they maintain that the exercise thereof is generally limited to the regulation
of the business or commerce and that the power to regulate does not include the power
to take over, control, manage, or direct the operation of the business. Accordingly, the
creation of the Ad Hoc Committee for the purpose of take-over was illegal and void.
The petitioners further claim that Memorandum Order No. 409 removed them from
their positions as members of the Board of Directors of CANORECO. The President
does not have the authority to appoint, much less to remove, members of the board of
directors of a private enterprise including electric cooperatives. He cannot rely on his
power of supervision over the NEA to justify the designation of an acting general
manager for CANORECO under P.D. No. 269 as amended by P.D. No. 1645, for
CANORECO had already registered with the CDA pursuant to R.A. No. 6938 and R.A.
No. 6939; hence, the latter laws now govern the internal affairs of CANORECO.
On 3 January 1997, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order.
 On 9 January 1997, the petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion informing the
Court that on 8 January 1997 respondent Rex Tantiongco notified the petitioners that
the Ad Hoc Committee was taking over the affairs and management of CANORECO
effective as of that date.[11] They reiterated their plea for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order because the Ad Hoc Committee has taken control of CANORECO and
usurped the functions of the individual petitioners.
In the Resolution dated 13 January 1997, we required respondents to comment on
the petition.
Despite four extensions granted it, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) failed to
file its Comment. Hence, in the resolution of 16 July 1997 we deemed the OSG to have
waived the filing of its Comment and declared this case submitted for decision. The
OSGs motion to admit its Comment, as well as the attached Comment, belatedly filed
on 24 July 1997 was merely noted without action in the resolution of 13 August
1997.We also subsequently denied for lack of merit its motion for reconsideration.
We find the instant petition impressed with merit.
Having registered itself with the CDA pursuant to Section 128 of R.A. No. 6938 and
Section 17 of R.A. No. 6939, CANORECO was brought under the coverage of said
laws. Article 38 of R.A. No. 6938 vests upon the board of directors the conduct and
management of the affairs of cooperatives, and Article 39 provides for the powers of the
board of directors. These sections read:

Article 38. Composition of the Board of Directors. -- The conduct and

management of the affairs of a cooperative shall be vested in a board of
directors which shall be composed of not less than five (5) nor more than
fifteen (15) members elected by the general assembly for a term fixed in the
by-laws but not exceeding a term of two (2) years and shall hold office until
their successors are duly elected and qualified, or until duly
removed.However, no director shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive
terms.

Article 39. Powers of the Board of Directors. -- The board of directors shall
direct and supervise the business, manage the property of the cooperative
and may, by resolution, exercise all such powers of the cooperative as are not
reserved for the general assembly under this Code and the by-laws.

As to the officers of cooperatives, Article 43 of the Code provides:

ART. 43. Officers of the Cooperatives. The board of directors shall elect from
among themselves only the chairman and vice-chairman, and elect or appoint
other officers of the cooperative from outside of the board in accordance with
their by-laws. All officers shall serve during good behavior and shall not be
removed except for cause and after due hearing. Loss of confidence shall not
be a valid ground for removal unless evidenced by acts or omissions causing
loss of confidence in the honesty and integrity of such officer. No two (2) or
more persons with relationship up to the third degree of consanguinity or
affinity shall serve as elective or appointive officers in the same board. [12]

Under Article 34 of the Code, the general assembly of cooperatives has the exclusive
power, which cannot be delegated, to elect or appoint the members of the board of
directors and to remove them for cause. Article 51 thereof provides for removal of
directors and officers as follows:

ART. 51. Removal. -- An elective officer, director, or committee member may

be removed by a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the voting members present and
constituting a quorum, in a regular or special general assembly meeting called
for the purpose. The person involved shall be given an opportunity to be heard
at said assembly.

Memorandum Order No. 409 clearly removed from the Board of Directors of
CANORECO the power to manage the affairs of CANORECO and transferred such
power to the Ad Hoc Committee, albeit temporarily.Considering that (1) the take-over
will be until such time that a general membership meeting can be called to decide the
serious issues affecting the said cooperative and normalcy in operations is restored,
and (2) the date such meeting shall be called and the determination of whether there is
a need to change the composition of the membership of CANORECOs Board of
Directors are exclusively left to the Ad Hoc Committee, it necessarily follows that the
incumbent directors were, for all intents and purposes, suspended at the least, and
removed, at the most, from their office. The said Memorandum did no less to the
lawfully appointed General Manager by directing that upon the settlement of the issue
concerning the composition of the board of directors the Committee shall decide on the
appointment of a general manager. In the meantime, it authorized the Committee to
designate upon the recommendation of the Chairman an Acting Manager, with the
lawfully appointed Manager considered on leave, but who is, however, entitled to the
payment of his salaries.
Nothing in law supported the take-over of the management of the affairs of
CANORECO, and the suspension, if not removal, of the Board of Directors and the
officers thereof.
It must be pointed out that the controversy which resulted in the issuance of the
Memorandum Order stemmed from a struggle between two groups vying for control of
the management of CANORECO. One faction was led by the group of Norberto Ochoa,
while the other was petitioners group whose members were, at that time, the incumbent
directors and officers. It was the action of Ochoa and his cohorts in holding a special
meeting on 28 May 1995 and then declaring vacant the positions of cooperative officers
and thereafter electing themselves to the positions of president, vice-president,
treasurer, and secretary of CANORECO which compelled the petitioners to file a
petition with the CDA. The CDA thereafter came out with a decision favorable to the
petitioners.
Obviously there was a clear case of intra-cooperative dispute. Article 121 of the
Cooperative Code is explicit on how the dispute should be resolved; thus:

ART. 121. Settlement of Disputes. -- Disputes among members, officers,

directors, and committee members, and intra-cooperative disputes shall, as
far as practicable, be settled amicably in accordance with the conciliation or
mediation mechanisms embodied in the by-laws of the cooperative, and in
applicable laws.

Should such a conciliation/mediation proceeding fail, the matter shall be

settled in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Complementing this Article is Section 8 of R.A. No. 6939, which provides:

SEC. 8. Mediation and Conciliation. Upon request of either or both or both

parties, the [CDA] shall mediate and conciliate disputes with the cooperative
or between cooperatives: Provided, That if no mediation or conciliation
succeeds within three (3) months from request thereof, a certificate of non-
resolution shall be issued by the commission prior to the filing of appropriate
action before the proper courts.

Even granting for the sake of argument that the party aggrieved by a decision of the
CDA could pursue an administrative appeal to the Office of the President on the theory
that the CDA is an agency under its direct supervision and control, still the Office of the
President could not in this case, motu proprio or upon request of a party, supplant or
overturn the decision of the CDA. The record does not disclose that the group of
Norberto Ochoa appealed from the decision of the CDA in CDA-CO Case No. 95-010 to
the Office of the President as the head of the Executive Department exercising
supervision and control over said agency. In fact the CDA had already issued a Cease
and Desist Order dated 14 August 1996 ordering Antonio Obias, Norberto Ochoa, Luis
Pascua, Felicito Ilan and their followers to cease and desist from acting as the Board of
Directors and Officers of Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative (CANORECO) and to
refrain from implementing their Resolution calling for the District V Election on August
17 and 24, 1996.[13] Consequently, the said decision of the CDA had long become final
and executory when Memorandum Order No. 409 was issued on 3 December
1996. That Memorandum cannot then be considered as one reversing the decision of
the CDA which had attained finality.
Under Section 15, Chapter III of Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292), decisions of administrative agencies become final and
executory fifteen days after receipt of a copy thereof by the party adversely affected
unless within that period an administrative appeal or judicial review, if proper, has been
perfected. One motion for reconsideration is allowed. A final resolution or decision of an
administrative agency also binds the Office of the President even if such agency is
under the administrative supervision and control of the latter.
We have stated before, and reiterate it now, that administrative decisions must end
sometime, as fully as public policy demands that finality be written on judicial
controversies. Public interest requires that proceedings already terminated should not
be altered at every step, for the rule of non quieta movere prescribes that what had
already been terminated should not be disturbed. A disregard of this principle does not
commend itself to sound public policy.[14]
Neither can police power be invoked to clothe with validity the assailed
Memorandum Order No. 409. Police power is the power inherent in a government to
enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and
general welfare of society.[15] It is lodged primarily in the legislature. By virtue of a valid
delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the President and
administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including
the barangay.[16] Delegation of legislative powers to the President is permitted in
Sections 23(2) and 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution. [17] The pertinent laws on
cooperatives, namely, R.A. No. 6938, R.A. No. 6939, and P.D. No. 269 as amended by
P.D. No. 1645 do not provide for the President or any other administrative body to take
over the internal management of a cooperative. Article 98 of R.A. 6938 instead
provides:

ART. 98. Regulation of Public Service Cooperatives. -- (1) The internal affairs
of public service cooperatives such as the rights and privileges of members,
the rules and procedures for meetings of the general assembly, board of
directors and committees; for the election and qualification of officers,
directors, and committee members; allocation and distribution of surpluses,
and all other matters relating to their internal affairs shall be governed by this
Code.

We do not then hesitate to rule that Memorandum Order No. 409 has no
constitutional and statutory basis. It violates the basic underlying principle enshrined in
Article 4(2) of R.A. No. 6938 that cooperatives are democratic organizations and that
their affairs shall be administered by persons elected or appointed in a manner agreed
upon by the members. Likewise, it runs counter to the policy set forth in Section 1 of
R.A. No. 6939 that the State shall, except as provided in said Act, maintain a policy of
non-interference in the management and operation of cooperatives.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and Memorandum Order No. 409
of the President is hereby declared INVALID.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 73140 May 29, 1987

RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP AND/OR SERGIO CORPUS, petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, TEODORICO L. RUIZ, as Labor Arbiter
and ROGELIO R. CORIA, respondents.

Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.

Guillermo H. Pulia for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the March 14, 1985 Decision of Labor Arbiter
Teodorico L. Ruiz which held that herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was illegally
dismissed; and of the Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission which
dismissed petitioner's appeal on the ground that the same was filed out of time.

In August, 1977, herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was hired by herein petitioner
Rizal Empire Insurance Group as a casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a day. On
January 1, 1978, he was made a regular employee, having been appointed as clerk-typist,
with a monthly salary of P300.00. Being a permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of
petitioner company's "General Information, Office Behavior and Other Rules and
Regulations." In the same year, without change in his position-designation, he was
transferred to the Claims Department and his salary was increased to P450,00 a month. In
1980, he was transferred to the Underwriting Department and his salary was increased to
P580.00 a month plus cost of living allowance, until he was transferred to the Fire
Department as filing clerk. In July, 1983, he was made an inspector of the Fire Division with
a monthly salary of P685.00 plus allowances and other benefits.

On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed from work,
allegedly, on the grounds of tardiness and unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed a
complaint with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), and in a Decision dated
March 14, 1985 (Record, pp. 80-87), Labor Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated him to his
position with back wages. Petitioner filed an appeal with the National labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) but, in a Resolution dated November 15, 1985 (Ibid, pp. 31-32), the
appeal was dismissed on the ground that the same had been filed out of time. Hence, the
instant petition (Ibid, pp. 2-22).
In compliance with the resolution of the Second Division of this Court dated April 30, 1986
(Ibid., p. 94), private respondent filed his Comment on May 23, 1986 (Ibid., pp. 97-101) and
public respondent on July 2, 1986 (Ibid., pp. 120-124).

On June 6, 1986, petitioners filed their Reply to private respondent's Comment (Ibid, pp.
102-105) and on July 25, 1986, their Reply to public respondent's Comment (Ibid., pp. 126-
131).

In a Resolution dated August 18, 1986, the Second Division of this Court resolved to give
due course to the petition and to require the parties to submit their respective memoranda
(Ibid., P. 132).

In compliance with the above mentioned Resolution, petitioners filed the,.r memorandum on
November 10, 1986; while private respondent filed his Memorandum on October 17, 1986
(Ibid, pp. 139-144), and public respondent on November 16, 1986 (Ibid., pp. 160-166).

Before going however, into the merits of the case, an important point to consider is whether
or not it is still within the jurisdiction of this Court to review.

Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission on appeal,
provides:

SECTION 1. (a) Appeal. — Decision or orders of a labor Arbiter shall be final

and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both of the
parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of notice thereof.

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 6. No extension of period. — No motion or request for extension of

the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be entertained.

The record shows that the employer (petitioner herein) received a copy of the decision of
the Labor Arbiter on April 1, 1985. It filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Memorandum of Appeal on April 11, 1985 and filed the Memorandum of Appeal on April 22,
1985. Pursuant to the "no extension policy" of the National Labor Relations Commission,
aforesaid motion for extension of time was denied in its resolution dated November 15,
1985 and the appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time (Rollo, pp. 31-32).

Petitioners claim, among other things, that respondent Commission committed a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in arbitrarily dismissing petitioners'
appeal on a technicality (Rollo, p. 9). It invokes the Rules of Court provision on liberal
construction of the Rules in the interest of substantial justice.

It will be noted however, that the foregoing provision refers to the Rules of Court. On the
other hand, the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission are clear and
explicit and leave no room for interpretation.
Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and
policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to
enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect (Espanol v. Philippine
Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314 [1985]).

Under the above-quoted provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the decision appealed from
in this case has become final and executory and can no longer be subject to appeal.

Even on the merits, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter appears to be correct; the consistent
promotions in rank and salary of the private respondent indicate he must have been a highly
efficient worker, who should be retained despite occasional lapses in punctuality and
attendance. Perfection cannot after all be demanded.

WHEREFORE, this petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965

EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.

Zulueta, Gonzales, Paculdo and Associates for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

CONCEPCION, J.:

During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines,
purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued
Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33)
municipalities enumerated in the margin.1 Soon after the date last mentioned, or on
November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and
as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his
representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said
Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power. Respondent maintains the contrary view and avers that the
present action is premature and that not all proper parties — referring to the officials of the
new political subdivisions in question — have been impleaded. Subsequently, the mayors of
several municipalities adversely affected by the aforementioned executive orders —
because the latter have taken away from the former the barrios composing the new political
subdivisions — intervened in the case. Moreover, Attorneys Enrique M. Fernando and
Emma Quisumbing-Fernando were allowed to and did appear as amici curiae.

The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:

Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed
except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.

Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:

All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the
provisions hereof.

Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be
created or the name of an existing one may be changed by the provincial board of
the province, upon recommendation of the council of the municipality or
municipalities in which the proposed barrio is stipulated. The recommendation of the
municipal council shall be embodied in a resolution approved by at least two-thirds of
the entire membership of the said council: Provided, however, That no new barrio
may be created if its population is less than five hundred persons.

Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may
"not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of
Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters
in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or
municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If
the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality
which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?"

Respondent answers in the affirmative, upon the theory that a new municipality can be
created without creating new barrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of
the new municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the main import of the petitioner's
argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new
barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which
consists of several barrios. The cogency and force of this argument is too obvious to be
denied or even questioned. Founded upon logic and experience, it cannot be offset except
by a clear manifestation of the intent of Congress to the contrary, and no such
manifestation, subsequent to the passage of Republic Act No. 2379, has been brought to
our attention.
Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed
executive orders are based, provides:

The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define

the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, [township]
municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory
comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate
any political division other than a province, into such portions as may be required,
merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision
so created, and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such
place therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of
the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained
whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any
province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by the
(Governor-General) President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes
necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer
or any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines, with the
recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having executive control
of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and assign
such officers to the new districts so formed.

Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing
authority, an equitable distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions
thereby affected shall be made in such manner as may be recommended by the
(Insular Auditor) Auditor General and approved by the (Governor-General) President
of the Philippines.

Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this
section does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relying
upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binañgonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he
claims, has settled it. Such claim is untenable, for said case involved, not the creation of a
new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory — from an already existing municipality
(Cardona) to another municipality (Binañgonan), likewise, existing at the time of and prior to
said transfer (See Gov't of the P.I. ex rel. Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality, of
Binañgonan [34 Phil. 518, 519-5201) — in consequence of the fixing and definition,
pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the common boundaries of two municipalities.

It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to
avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of
an administrative nature — involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry
into effect the law creating said municipalities — the authority to create municipal
corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it is "strictly
a legislative function" (State ex rel. Higgins vs. Aicklen, 119 S. 425, January 2, 1959) or
"solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power" (Udall vs. Severn, May 29, 1938,
79 P. 2d 347-349). As the Supreme Court of Washington has put it (Territory ex rel. Kelly
vs. Stewart, February 13, 1890, 23 Pac. 405, 409), "municipal corporations are purely the
creatures of statutes."
Although1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in
the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in
itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate2 — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions.2a Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect,
make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty,
whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. 2b Hence, he
could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also — and
this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be
attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the
system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our
Republican system.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled
requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a
law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President.
Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.
In this connection, we do not overlook the fact that, under the last clause of the first
sentence of Section 68, the President:

... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place
therein as the public welfare may require.

It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase "as the public
welfare may require" qualified, not the clauses preceding the one just quoted,
but only the place to which the seat of the government may be transferred. This fact
becomes more apparent when we consider that said Section 68 was originally Section 1 of
Act No. 1748,3 which provided that, "whenever in the judgment of the Governor-General
the public welfare requires, he may, by executive order," effect the changes enumerated
therein (as in said section 68), including the change of the seat of the government "to
such place ... as the public interest requires." The opening statement of said Section 1 of
Act No. 1748 — which was not included in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code
— governed the time at which, or the conditions under which, the powers therein conferred
could be exercised; whereas the last part of the first sentence of said section
referred exclusively to the place to which the seat of the government was to be transferred.

At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is concerned,
even if we assumed that the phrase "as the public welfare may require," in said Section 68,
qualifies all other clauses thereof. It is true that in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726)
and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had upheld "public welfare" and "public
interest," respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the authority to
execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in these cases — as all judicial
pronouncements — must be construed in relation to the specific facts and issues involved
therein, outside of which they do not constitute precedents and have no binding effect. 4 The
law construed in the Calalang case conferred upon the Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the power to issue rules
and regulations to promote safe transitupon national roads and streets. Upon the other
hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the Insular Treasurer, under Act No.
2581, to issue and cancel certificates or permits for the sale of speculative securities. Both
cases involved grants to administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of their
administrative functions, calling for the determination of questions of fact.

Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section 68. As above indicated, the
creation of municipalities, is not an administrative function, but one which is essentially
and eminently legislative in character. The question of whether or not "public interest"
demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact. it is "purely a legislativequestion
"(Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310-313,
315-318), or a political question (Udall vs. Severn, 79 P. 2d. 347-349). As the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin has aptly characterized it, "the question as to whether incorporation is
for the best interest of the community in any case is emphatically a question of public policy
and statecraft" (In re Village of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1033, 1035-1037).

For this reason, courts of justice have annulled, as constituting undue delegation of
legislative powers, state laws granting the judicial department, the power to determine
whether certain territories should be annexed to a particular municipality (Udall vs.
Severn, supra, 258-359); or vesting in a Commission the right to determine the plan and
frame of government of proposed villages and what functions shall be exercised by the
same, although the powers and functions of the village are specifically limited by statute (In
re Municipal Charters, 86 Atl. 307-308); or conferring upon courts the authority to declare a
given town or village incorporated, and designate its metes and bounds, upon petition of a
majority of the taxable inhabitants thereof, setting forth the area desired to be included in
such village (Territory ex rel Kelly vs. Stewart, 23 Pac. 405-409); or authorizing the territory
of a town, containing a given area and population, to be incorporated as a town, on certain
steps being taken by the inhabitants thereof and on certain determination by a court and
subsequent vote of the inhabitants in favor thereof, insofar as the court is allowed to
determine whether the lands embraced in the petition "ought justly" to be included in the
village, and whether the interest of the inhabitants will be promoted by such incorporation,
and to enlarge and diminish the boundaries of the proposed village "as justice may require"
(In re Villages of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1035-1037); or creating a Municipal Board of
Control which shall determine whether or not the laying out, construction or operation of a
toll road is in the "public interest" and whether the requirements of the law had been
complied with, in which case the board shall enter an order creating a municipal corporation
and fixing the name of the same (Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike
Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310).

Insofar as the validity of a delegation of power by Congress to the President is concerned,

the case of Schechter Poultry Corporation vs. U.S. (79 L. Ed. 1570) is quite relevant to the
one at bar. The Schechter case involved the constitutionality of Section 3 of the National
Industrial Recovery Act authorizing the President of the United States to approve "codes of
fair competition" submitted to him by one or more trade or industrial associations or
corporations which "impose no inequitable restrictions on admission to membership therein
and are truly representative," provided that such codes are not designed "to promote
monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will not operate to discriminate
against them, and will tend to effectuate the policy" of said Act. The Federal Supreme Court
held:

To summarize and conclude upon this point: Sec. 3 of the Recovery Act is without
precedent. It supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity. It does not
undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular states of fact
determined by appropriate administrative procedure. Instead of prescribing rules of
conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to prescribe them. For that legislative
undertaking, Sec. 3 sets up no standards, aside from the statement of the general
aims of rehabilitation, correction and expansion described in Sec. 1. In view of the
scope of that broad declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions that are
imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus
enacting laws for the government of trade and industry throughout the country, is
virtually unfettered. We think that the code making authority thus conferred is an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.

If the term "unfair competition" is so broad as to vest in the President a discretion that is
"virtually unfettered." and, consequently, tantamount to a delegation of legislative power, it
is obvious that "public welfare," which has even a broader connotation, leads to the same
result. In fact, if the validity of the delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld,
there would no longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the
President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be required by public welfare or public
interest. Such grant of authority would be a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in
favor of the Executive, and would bring about a total collapse of the democratic system
established by our Constitution, which it is the special duty and privilege of this Court to
uphold.

It may not be amiss to note that the executive orders in question were issued after the
legislative bills for the creation of the municipalities involved in this case had failed to pass
Congress. A better proof of the fact that the issuance of said executive orders entails the
exercise of purely legislative functions can hardly be given.

Again, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or
offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided
by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the
exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such
officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local
governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to
wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers
thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President
cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act Within the
scope of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has
failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law,
although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate
disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by
said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. He
may not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary
action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board. 5

Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove
any of its officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which
the official concerned resides, for his office would thereby become vacant. 6 Thus, by merely
brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it,
he could compel local officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over
them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution.

Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or
offices implies no more than the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to
interfere in the exercise of discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not
include the authority either to abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new
one. As a consequence, the alleged power of the President to create municipal corporations
would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even greater than that of
control which he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other words,
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the
constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of giving the President less power over local
governments than that vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it
reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over
municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or
offices.

In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does,
said Section 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917,
must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is
utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment. 7

There are only two (2) other points left for consideration, namely, respondent's claim (a) that
"not all the proper parties" — referring to the officers of the newly created municipalities —
"have been impleaded in this case," and (b) that "the present petition is premature."

As regards the first point, suffice it to say that the records do not show, and the parties do
not claim, that the officers of any of said municipalities have been appointed or elected and
assumed office. At any rate, the Solicitor General, who has appeared on behalf of
respondent Auditor General, is the officer authorized by law "to act and represent the
Government of the Philippines, its offices and agents, in any official investigation,
proceeding or matter requiring the services of a lawyer" (Section 1661, Revised
Administrative Code), and, in connection with the creation of the aforementioned
municipalities, which involves a political, not proprietary, function, said local officials, if any,
are mere agents or representatives of the national government. Their interest in the case at
bar has, accordingly, been, in effect, duly represented.8
With respect to the second point, respondent alleges that he has not as yet acted on any of
the executive order & in question and has not intimated how he would act in connection
therewith. It is, however, a matter of common, public knowledge, subject to judicial
cognizance, that the President has, for many years, issued executive orders creating
municipal corporations and that the same have been organized and in actual operation,
thus indicating, without peradventure of doubt, that the expenditures incidental thereto have
been sanctioned, approved or passed in audit by the General Auditing Office and its
officials. There is no reason to believe, therefore, that respondent would adopt a different
policy as regards the new municipalities involved in this case, in the absence of an
allegation to such effect, and none has been made by him.

WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab
initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of
public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the
municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 96938 October 15, 1991

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HEIRS OF ELIZAR NAMUCO, and HEIRS OF EUSEBIO
MANUEL, respondents.

Benigno M. Puno for private respondents.

Fetalino, Llamas-Villanueva and Noro for CSC.

NARVASA, J.:

In May, 1981, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) dismissed six (6)
employees as being "notoriously undersirable," they having allegedly been found to be
connected with irregularities in the canvass of supplies and materials. The dismissal was
based on Article IX, Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Law) 1 in relation to LOI 14-A
and/or LOI No. 72. The employees' Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently denied.
Five of these six dismissed employees appealed to the Merit Systems Board. The Board
found the dismissals to be illegal because effected without formal charges having been filed
or an opportunity given to the employees to answer, and ordered the remand of the cases
to the GSIS for appropriate disciplinary proceedings.

The GSIS appealed tothe Civil Service Commission. By Resolution dated October 21, 1987,
the Commission ruled that the dismissal of all five was indeed illegal and disposed as
follows:

WHEREFORE, it being obvious that respondents' separation from the service is

illegal, the GSIS is directed to reinstate them with payment of back salaries and
benefits due them not later than ten (10) days from receipt of a copy hereof, without
prejudice to the right of the GSIS to pursue proper disciplinary action against them. It
is also directed that the services of their replacement be terminated effective upon
reinstatement of herein respondents.

xxx xxx xxx

Still unconvinced, the GSIS appealed to the Supreme Court (G.R. Nos. 80321-22). Once
more, it was rebuffed. On July 4, 1988 this Court's Second Division promulgated a
Resolution which:

a) denied its petition for failing to show any grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Civl Service Commission, the dismissals of the employees having in truth been
made without formal charge and hearin, and

b) declared that reinstatement of said five employees was proper, "without prejudice
to the right of the GSIS to pursue proper disciplinary action against them;"

c) MODIFIED, however, the challenged CSC Resolution of October 21, 1987 "by
elminating the payment of back salaries to private respondents (employees) until the
outcome of the disciplinary proceedings is known, considering the gravity of the
offenses imputed to them ..., 2
d) ordered reinstateement only of three employees, namely: Domingo Canero, Renato Navarro and Belen Guerrero, "it appearing tht respondents Elizar Namuco and Eusebio Manuel have since
passed away." 3

On January 8, 1990, the aforesaid Resolution of July 4, 1988 having become final, the heirs of Namuco and Manuel filed a motion for
execution of the Civil Service Commission Resolution of October 21, 1987, supra. The GSIS opposed the motion. It argued that the CSC
Resolution of October 21, 1987 — directing reinstatement of the employees and payment to them of back salaries and benefits — had been
superseded by the Second Division's Resolution of July 4, 1988 — precisely eliminating the payment of back salaries.

The Civil Service Commission granted the motion for execution in an Order dated June 20, 1990. It accordingly directed the GSIS "to pay the
compulsory heirs of deceased Elizar Namuco and Eusebio Manuel for the period from the date of their illegal separation up to the date of
their demise." The GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration. It was denied by Order of the CSC dated November 22, 1990.
Once again the GSIS has come to this Court, this time praying that certiorari issue to nullify the Orders of June 20, 1990 and November 22,
1990. Here it contends that the Civil Service Commission has no pwer to execute its judgments and final orders or resolutions, and even
conceding the contrary, the writ of execution issued on June 20, 1990 is void because it varies this Court's Resolution of July 4, 1988.

The Civil Service Commission, like the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, is a consitutional commission invested by the Constitution and relevant laws not only with authority to administer the

but also with quasi-judicial powers. 5 It has the authority to hear and decide
civil service, 4

administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought to it on appeal. 6 The

Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision it within sixty days
from the date of its submission for on certiorari by any aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof. 7 It has the power, too, sitting en banc, to promulgate its own
rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices, which rules
should not however diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. 8
On October 9, 1989, the Civil Service Commission promulgated Resolution No. 89-779 adopting, approving and putting into effect simplified rules of procedure on administrative disciplinary and protest cases,

Those rules provide, among other

pursuant tothe authority granted by the constitutional and statutory provisions above cited, as well as Republic Act No. 6713. 9

things, 10 that decision in "administrative disciplinary cases" shall be immediately executory

unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. If the decision of the Commission is
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari, the same shall still be executory unless a
restraining order or preliminary injunction is issued by the High Court." 11 This is similar to a
provision in the former Civil Service Rules authorizing the Commissioner, "if public interest
so warrants, ... (to) order his decision executed pending appeal to the Civil Service Board of
Appeals." 12 The provisions are analogous and entirely consistent with the duty or
responsibility reposed in the Chairman by PD 807, subject to policies and resolutions
adopted by the Commission, "to enforce decision on administrative discipline involving
officials of the Commission," 13 as well as with Section 37 of the same decree declaring that
an appeal to the Commission 14 "shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in
case the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having
been under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins
an appeal."

In light of all the foregoing consitutional and statutory provisions, it would appear absurd to
deny to the Civil Service Commission the power or authority or order execution of its
decisions, resolutions or orders which, it should be stressed, it has been exercising through
the years. It would seem quite obvious that the authority to decide cases is inutile unless
accompanied by the authority to see taht what has been decided is carried out. Hence, the
grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge
cases, should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce
or execute the judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise provides.

In any event, the Commission's exercise of that power of execution has been sanctioned by
this Court in several cases.

In Cucharo v. Subido, 15 for instance, this Court sustained the challenged directive of the
Civil Service Commissioner, that his decision "be executed immediately 'but not beyond ten
days from receipt thereof ...". The Court said:
 As a major premise, it has been the repeated pronouncement of this Supreme
Tribunal that the Civil Service Commissioner has the discretion toorder the
immediate execution in the public interst of his decisionseparating petitioner-
appellant from the service, always sbuject however to the rule that, in the event the
Civil Service Board of Appeals or the proper court determines that his dismissal is
illegal, he should be paid the salary corresponding to the period of his separation
from the service unitl his reinstatement.

Petitioner GSIS concedes that the heirs of Namuco and Manuel "are entitled tothe
retirement/death and other benefits due them as government employees" since, at the time
of their death, they "can be considered not to have been separated from the separated from
the service." 16
It contend, however, that since Namuco and Manuel had not been "completely exonerated of the administrative charge filed against them — as the filing of the proper disciplinary action was yet to have been
taken had death not claimed them" — no back salaries may be paid to them, although they "may charge the period of (their) suspension against (their) leave credits, if any, and may commute such leave credits to
money

this, on the authority of this Court's decision in Clemente v. Commission on Audit. 18 It

value;" 17

is in line with these considerations, it argues, that the final and executory Resolution of this
Court's Second Division of July 4, 1988 should be construed; 19 and since the Commission's
Order of July 20, 1990 maikes a contrary disposition, the latter order obviously cannot
prevail and must be deemed void and ineffectual.

This Court's Resolution of July 4, 1988, as already stated, modified the Civil Service
Commission's Resolution of October 21, 1987 — inter alia granting back salaries tothe five
dismissed employees, including Namuco and Manuel — and pertinently reads as follows:

We modify the said Order, however, by eliminating the payment of back salaries to
private respondents until the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings is known,
considering the gravity of the offense imputed to them in connection with the
irregularities in the canvass of supplies and materials at the GSIS.

The reinstatement order shall apply only to respondents Domingo Canero, Renato
Navarro and Belen Guerrero, it appearing that respondents Elizar Namuco and
Eusebio Manuel have since passed away. ....

On the other hand, as also already stated, the Commission's Order of June 20, 1990
directed the GSIS "to pay the compulsory heirs of deceased Elizar Namuco and Eusebio
Manuel for the period from the date of their illegal separation up to the date of their demise."

The Commission asserted that in promulgating its disparate ruling, it was acting "in the
interest of justice and for other humanitarian reasons," since the question of whether or not
Namuco and Manuel should receive back salaries was "dependent on the result of the
disciplinary proceedings against their co-respondents in the administrative case before the
GSIS," and since at the tiem of their death, "no formal charge ... (had) as yet been made,
nor any finding of their personal culpability ... and ... they are no longer in a position to
refute the charge."

The Court agrees that the challenged orders of the Civil Service Commission should be
upheld, and not merely upon compassionate grounds, but simply because there is no fair
and feasible alternative in the circumstances. To be sure, if the deceased employees were
still alive, it would at least be arguable, positing the primacy of this Court's final dispositions,
that the issue of payment of their back salaries should properly await the outcome of the
disciplinary proceedings referred to in the Second Division's Resolution of July 4, 1988.

Death, however, has already sealed that outcome, foreclosing the initiation of disciplinary
administrative proceedings, or the continuation of any then pending, against the deceased
employees. Whatever may be said of the binding force of the Resolution of July 4, 1988 so
far as, to all intents and pursposes, it makes exoneration in the adminstrative proceedings a
condition precedent to payment of back salaries, it cannot exact an impossible performance
or decree a useless exercise. Even in the case of crimes, the death of the offender
exteinguishes criminal liability, not only as to the personal, but also as to the pecuniary,
penalties if it occurs before final judgment.20 In this context, the subsequent disciplinary
proceedings, even if not assailable on grounds of due process, would be an inutile, empty
procedure in so far as the deceased employees are concerned; they could not possibly be
bound by any substatiation in said proceedings of the original charges: irrigularities in the
canvass of supplies and materials. The questioned order of the Civil Service Commission
merely recognized the impossibility of complying with the Resolution of July 4, 1988 and the
legal futility of attempting a post-mortem investigation of the character contemplated.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 116801 April 6, 1995

GLORIA G. LASTIMOSA, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of

Cebu, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN CONRADO VASQUEZ, HONORABLE ARTURO C.
MOJICA, DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS, and HONORABLE
FRANKLIN DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, and UNDERSECRETARY OF
JUSTICE RAMON J. LIWAG, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This case requires us to determine the extent to which the Ombudsman may call
upon government prosecutors for assistance in the investigation and prosecution of
criminal cases cognizable by his office and the conditions under which he may do
so.

Petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa is First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.

Because she and the Provincial Prosecutor refused, or at any rate failed, to file a
criminal charge as ordered by the Ombudsman, an administrative complaint for
grave misconduct, insubordination, gross neglect of duty and maliciously refraining
from prosecuting crime was filed against her and the Provincial Prosecutor and a
charge for indirect contempt was brought against them, both in the Office of the
Ombudsman. In the meantime the two were placed under preventive suspension.
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner to set aside the
orders of the Ombudsman with respect to the two proceedings.

The background of this case is as follows:

On February 18, 1993 Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse of Santa Fe,
Cebu, filed a criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint
for immoral acts, abuse of authority and grave misconduct against the Municipal
Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo. 1 The cases were filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas where they were docketed as OMB-VIS-(CRIM)-93-0140 and
OMB-VIS-(ADM)-93-0036, respectively.

The complaint was assigned to a graft investigation officer who, after an

investigation, found no prima facie evidence and accordingly recommended the
dismissal of the complaint. After reviewing the matter, however, the Ombudsman,
Hon. Conrado Vasquez, disapproved the recommendation and instead directed that
Mayor Ilustrisimo be charged with attempted rape in the Regional Trial Court. 2

Accordingly, in a letter dated May 17, 1994, the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas,
respondent Arturo C. Mojica, referred the case to Cebu Provincial Prosecutor
Oliveros E. Kintanar for the "filing of appropriate information with the Regional Trial
Court of Danao City, . . ." 3 The case was eventually assigned to herein petitioner,
First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria G. Lastimosa.

It appears that petitioner conducted a preliminary investigation on the basis of which

she found that only acts of lasciviousness had been committed.4 With the approval of
Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar, she filed on July 4, 1994 an information for acts of
lasciviousness against Mayor Ilustrisimo with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Santa Fe. 5
In two letters written to the Provincial Prosecutor on July 11, 1994 and July 22, 1994,
Deputy Ombudsman Mojica inquired as to any action taken on the previous referral
of the case, more specifically the directive of the Ombudsman to charge Mayor
Ilustrisimo with attempted rape.6

As no case for attempted rape had been filed by the Prosecutor's Office, Deputy
Ombudsman Mojica ordered on July 27, 1994 Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and
petitioner Lastimosa to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt
for "refusing and failing to obey the lawful directives" of the Office of the
Ombudsman. 7

For this purpose a hearing was set on August 1, 1994. Petitioner and the Provincial
Prosecutor were given until August 3, 1994 within which to submit their answer. 8 An
answer 9 was timely filed by them and hearings were thereupon conducted.

It appears that earlier, on July 22, 1994, two cases had been filed against the two
prosecutors with the Office of the Ombudsman for Visayas by Julian Menchavez, a
resident of Santa Fe, Cebu. One was an administrative complaint for violation of
Republic Act No. 6713 and P.D. No. 807 (the Civil Service Law) 10 and another one
was a criminal complaint for violation of §3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and Art. 208
of the Revised Penal Code. 11 The complaints were based on the alleged refusal of
petitioner and Kintanar to obey the orders of the Ombudsman to charge Mayor
Ilustrisimo with attempted rape.

In the administrative case (OMB-VIS-(ADM)-94-0189) respondent Deputy

Ombudsman for Visayas Mojica issued an order on August 15, 1994, placing
petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa and Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar under
preventive suspension for a period of six (6) months, 12 pursuant to Rule III, §9 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (Administrative Order No. 7), in
relation to §24 of R.A. No. 6770. The order was approved by Ombudsman Conrado
M. Vasquez on August 16, 1994 and on August 18, 1994 Acting Secretary of Justice
Ramon J. Liwag designated Eduardo Concepcion of Region VII as Acting Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu.

On the other hand, the Graft Investigation Officer II, Edgardo G. Canton, issued
orders 13 in the two cases, directing petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar to
submit their counter affidavits and controverting evidence.

On September 6, 1994, petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa filed the present petition

for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the following orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman and Department of Justice:

(a) Letter dated May 17, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas
Arturo C. Mojica and related orders, referring to the Office of the Cebu
Provincial Prosecutor the records of OMB-VIS-CRIM-93-0140, entitled
Jessica V. Dayon vs. Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo, "for filing of the
appropriate action (for Attempted Rape) with the Regional Trial Court
of Danao City.
 (b) Order dated July 27, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman Mojica and
related orders directing petitioner and Cebu Provincial Prosecutor
Oliveros E. Kintanar to explain in writing within three (3) days from
receipt why they should not be punished for indirect Contempt of the
Office of the Ombudsman "for refusing and failing . . . to file the
appropriate Information for Attempted Rape against Mayor Rogelio
Ilustrisimo.

(c) The 1st Indorsement dated August 9, 1994 of Acting Justice

Secretary Ramon J. Liwag, ordering the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor to comply with the directive of the Office of the
Ombudsman that a charge for attempted rape be filed against
respondent Mayor Ilustrisimo in recognition of the authority of said
Office.

(d) Order dated August 15, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman Mojica, duly
approved by Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez, and related orders in
OMB-VIS-(ADM)-94-0189, entitled Julian Menchavez vs. Oliveros
Kintanar and Gloria Lastimosa, placing petitioner and Provincial
Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension for a period of six
(6) months, without pay.

(e) The 1st Indorsement dated August 18, 1994 of Acting Justice
Secretary Liwag directing Assistant Regional State Prosecutor
Eduardo O. Concepcion (Region VII) to implement the letter dated
August 15, 1994 of Ombudsman Vasquez, together with the Order
dated August 15, 1994, placing petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor
Kintanar under preventive suspension.

(f) Department Order No. 259 issued by Acting Secretary Liwag on

August 18, 1994, designating Assistant Regional State Prosecutor
Concepcion Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.

Petitioner raises a number of issues which will be discussed not necessarily in the
order they are stated in the petition.

I.

The pivotal question in this case is whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the
power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of the case
for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo. Lastimosa claims that the Office of the
Ombudsman and the prosecutor's office have concurrent authority to investigate
public officers or employees and that when the former first took cognizance of the
case against Mayor Ilustrisimo, it did so to the exclusion of the latter. It then became
the duty of the Ombudsman's office, according to petitioner, to finish the preliminary
investigation by filing the information in court instead of asking the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor to do so. Petitioner contends that the preparation and filing of
the information were part and parcel of the preliminary investigation assumed by the
Office of the Ombudsman and the filing of information in court could not be
delegated by it to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Petitioner defends her
actuations in conducting a preliminary investigation as having been made necessary
by the insistence of the Ombudsman to delegate the filing of the case to her office.

In any event, petitioner contends, the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction
over the case against the mayor because the crime involved (rape) was not
committed in relation to a public office. For this reason it is argued that the Office of
the Ombudsman has no authority to place her and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar
under preventive suspension for refusing to follow his orders and to cite them for
indirect contempt for such refusal.

Petitioner's contention has no merit. The office of the Ombudsman has the power to
"investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." 14 This power has been
held to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public
official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related to, or
connected with, or arise from, the performance of his official duty 15 It is enough that
the act or omission was committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape,
when committed by a public official like a municipal mayor, is within the power of the
Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.

In the existence of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors

for assistance. §31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) provides:

Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. — The Ombudsman

may utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate of deputize any
fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as
special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and
prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist
him as herein provided shall be under his supervision and control.
(Emphasis added)

It was on the basis of this provision that Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez and Deputy
Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica ordered the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu to file an
information for attempted rape against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrismo.

It does not matter that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor had already conducted
the preliminary investigation and all that remained to be done was for the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor to file the corresponding case in court. Even if the
preliminary investigation had been given over to the Provincial Prosecutor to
conduct, his determination of the nature of the offense to be charged would still be
subject to the approval of the Office of the Ombudsman. This is because under §31
of the Ombudsman's Act, when a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the
"supervision and control" of the Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the
power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify his
(prosecutor's) decision. 16 Petitioner cannot legally act on her own and refuse to
prepare and file the information as directed by the Ombudsman.

II.

The records show that despite repeated orders of the Ombudsman, petitioner
refused to file an information for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo, insisting
that after investigating the complaint in the case she found that he had committed
only acts of lasciviousness.

§15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman the power to
"punish for contempt, in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same
procedure and with the same penalties provided therein." There is no merit in the
argument that petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar cannot be held liable for
contempt because their refusal arose out of an administrative, rather than judicial,
proceeding before the Office of the Ombudsman. As petitioner herself says in
another context, the preliminary investigation of a case, of which the filing of an
information is a part, is quasi judicial in character.

Whether petitioner's refusal to follow the Ombudsman's orders constitutes a

defiance, disobedience or resistance of a lawful process, order or command of the
Ombudsman thus making her liable for indirect contempt under Rule 71, §3 of the
Rules of Court is for respondents to determine after appropriate hearing. At this point
it is important only to note the existence of the contempt power of the Ombudsman
as a means of enforcing his lawful orders.

III.

Neither is there any doubt as to the power of the Ombudsman to discipline petitioner
should it be found that she is guilty of grave misconduct, insubordination and/or
neglect of duty, nor of the Ombudsman's power to place her in the meantime under
preventive suspension. The pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act of 1989
state:

§21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. — The

Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all
elective and appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the
Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary.

§22. Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may

suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a)
the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty;
 (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the
respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated

by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without
pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office
of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the
respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be
counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.

A.

Petitioner contends that her suspension is invalid because the order was issued
without giving her and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar the opportunity to refute the
charges against them and because, at any rate, the evidence against them is not
strong as required by §24. The contention is without merit. Prior notice and hearing
is a not required, such suspension not being a penalty but only a preliminary step in
an administrative investigation. As held in Nera v. Garcia: 17

In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his

answer to the administrative complaint, suffice it to say that the
suspension was not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty
and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure.
Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If
after such investigation, the charges are established and the person
investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is
removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing
improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before
the opportunity to prove his innocence. (Emphasis added).

It is true that, under §24 of the Ombudsman's Act, to justify the preventive
suspension of a public official, the evidence against him should be strong, and any of
the following circumstances is present:

(a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,

oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty;

(b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or

(c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case
filed against him.

As held in Buenaseda v. Flavier, 18 however, whether the evidence of guilt is strong is

left to the determination of the Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence
before him. A preliminary hearing as in bail petitions in cases involving capital
offenses is not required. In rejecting a similar argument as that made by petitioner in
this case, this Court said in that case:
 The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining authority is
given the discretion to decide when the evidence of guilt is strong. This
fact is bolstered by Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which expressly left
such determination of guilt to the "judgment" of the Ombudsman on
the basis of the administrative complaint. . . . 19

In this case, respondent Deputy Ombudsman Mojica justified the preventive

suspension of petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar on the following
grounds:

A careful assessment of the facts and circumstances of the herein

cases and the records pertaining thereto against respondents
[Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and herein petitioner] clearly leads to
the conclusion that the evidence on record of guilt is strong and the
charges involved offenses of grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty
and dishonesty which will warrant respondents [Provincial Prosecutor
Kintanar and herein petitioner] removal from the service. Moreover,
considering the unabashed attitude of respondents in openly
announcing various false pretexts and alibis to justify their stubborn
disregard for the lawful directives of the Ombudsman as their official
position in their pleadings filed in OMB-VIS-0-94-0478 and in print and
broadcast media, the probability is strong that public service more
particularly in the prosecution of cases referred by the Office of the
Ombudsman to the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor's office will be
disrupted and prejudiced and the records of said cases even be
tampered with if respondents [Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and
herein petitioner] are allowed to stay in the Cebu Provincial
Prosecutor's Office during the pendency of these proceedings.

Indeed respondent Deputy Ombudsman Mojica had personal knowledge of the facts
justifying the preventive suspension of petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor since
the acts alleged in the administrative complaint against them were done in the
course of their official transaction with the Office of the Ombudsman. The
administrative complaint against petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar was
filed in connection with their designation as deputies of the ombudsman in the
prosecution of a criminal case against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo. Respondent
Deputy Ombudsman did not have to go far to verify the matters alleged in determine
whether the evidence of guilt of petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor was strong for
the purpose of placing them under preventive suspension.

Given the attitude displayed by petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor toward the
criminal case against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo, their preventive suspension is
justified to the end that the proper prosecution of that case may not be
hampered.20 In addition, because the charges against the two prosecutors involve
grave misconduct, insubordination and neglect of duty and these charges, if proven,
can lead to a dismissal from public office, the Ombudsman was justified in ordering
their preventive suspension.
 B.

Petitioner questions her preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay and
contends that it should only be for ninety (90) days on the basis of cases decided by
this Court. Petitioner is in error. She is referring to cases where the law is either
silent or expressly limits the period of suspension to ninety (90) days. With respect to
the first situation, we ruled in the case of Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan 21 that —

To the extent that there may be cases of indefinite suspension

imposed either under Section 13 of Rep. Act 3019, or Section 42 of
Pres. Decree 807, it is best for the guidance of all concerned that this
Court set forth the rules on the period of preventive suspension under
the aforementioned laws, as follows:

1. Preventive suspension under Section 13, Rep. Act 3019 as

amended shall be limited to a maximum period of ninety (90) days,
from issuances thereof, and this applies to all public officers, (as
defined in Section 2(b) of Rep. Act 3019) who are validly charged
under said Act.

2. Preventive suspension under Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807 shall

apply to all officers or employees whose positions are embraced in the
Civil Service, as provided under Sections 3 and 4 of said Pres. Decree
807, and shall be limited to a maximum period of ninety (90) days from
issuance, except where there is delay in the disposition of the case,
which is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in
which case the period of delay shall both be counted in computing the
period of suspension herein stated; provided that if the person
suspended is a presidential appointee, the continuance of his
suspension shall be for a reasonable time as the circumstances of the
case may warrant.

On the other hand, petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor were placed under
preventive suspension pursuant to §24 of the Ombudsman Act which expressly
provides that "the preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated
by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay." Their
preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay is thus according to law.

C.

Nor is there merit in petitioner's claim that the contempt charge should first be
resolved before any action in the administrative complaint case can be taken
because the contempt case involves a prejudicial question. There is simply no basis
for this contention. The two cases arose out of the same act or omission and may
proceed hand in hand, or one can be heard before the other. Whatever order is
followed will not really matter.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Motion to Lift
Order of Preventive Suspension is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Romero, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 109093 November 20, 1995

LOPE MACHETE, NICASIO JUMAWID, SANTIAGO JUMAWID, JOHN JUMAWID,

PEDRO GAMAYA, RENATO DELGADO, FERNANDO OMBAHIN, MATIAS ROLEDA,
PASIANO BARO, IGNACIO BARO, MAMERTO PLARAS and JUSTINIANO
VILLALON, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CELESTINO VILLALON, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Are Regional Trial Courts' vested with jurisdiction over cases for collection of back rentals
from leasehold tenants?

On 21 July 1989 private respondent Celestino Villalon filed a complaint for collection of back
rentals and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City against petitioners
Lope Machete, Nicasio Jumawid, Santiago Jumawid, John Jumawid, Pedro Gamaya,
Renato Delgado, Fernando Ombahin, Matias Roleda, Pasiano Baro, Ignacio Baro, Mamerto
Plaras and Justiniano Villalon. The complaint alleged that the parties entered into a
leasehold agreement with respect to private respondent's landholdings at Poblacion Norte,
Carmen, Bohol, under which petitioners were to pay private respondent a certain amount or
percentage of their harvests. However, despite repeated demands and with no valid reason,
petitioners failed to pay their respective rentals. Private respondent thus prayed that
petitioners be ordered to pay him back rentals and damages.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial
court over the subject matter. They contended that the case arose out of or was connected
with agrarian relations, hence, the subject matter of the complaint fell squarely within the
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
powers under Sec. 1, pars. (a) and (b), Rule II of the Revised Rules of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

On 22 August 1989 the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, 1 and on 28 September
1989 denied the motion for reconsideration.2

Private respondent sought annulment of both orders before respondent Court of Appeals
which on 21 May 1992 rendered judgment reversing the trial court and directing it to
assume jurisdiction over the case3 on the basis of its finding that —

. . . The CARL (RA 6657) and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform cannot
be seen to encompass a case of simple collection of back rentals by virtue of
an agreement, as the one at bar, where there is no agrarian dispute to speak
of (since the allegation of failure to pay the agreed rentals was never
controverted in the motion to dismiss) nor the issue raised on application,
implementation, enforcement or interpretation of these laws. 4

On 18 January 1993 the appellate court rejected the motion for

reconsideration.5

Petitioners maintain that the alleged cause of action of private respondent arose from an
agrarian relation and that respondent appellate court failed to consider that the agreement
involved is an agricultural leasehold contract, hence, the dispute is agrarian in nature. The
laws governing its execution and the rights and obligations of the parties thereto are
necessarily R.A. 3844,6 R.A. 66577 and other pertinent agrarian laws. Considering that the
application, implementation, enforcement or interpretation of said laws are matters which
have been vested in the DAR, this case is outside the jurisdiction of the trial court.

The petition is impressed with merit. Section 17 of E.O. 2298 vested the DAR with quasi-
judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters as well as exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform except
those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in accordance with law.

Executive Order 129-A, while in the process of reorganizing and strengthening the DAR,
created the DARAB to assume the powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of
agrarian reform cases.9 Section 1, pars. (a) and (b), Rule II of the Revised Rules of the
DARAB explicitly provides —

Sec. 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. — The Agrarian Reform

Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate,
to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and
matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Orders
 Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic
Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their
implementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend
over but not be limited to the following: (a) Cases involving the rights and
obligations of persons engaged in the cultivation and use of agricultural land
covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and other
agrarian laws, (b) Cases involving the valuation of land, and determination
and payment of just compensation, fixing and collection of lease rentals,
disturbance compensation, amortization payments, and similar disputes
concerning the functions of the Land Bank . . .

In Quismundo v. Court of Appeals,10 this Court interpreted the effect of Sec. 17 of E.O. 229
on P.D. 946, which amended R.A. 3844, the agrarian law then in force —

The above quoted provision (Sec. 17) should be deemed to have

repealed11 Sec. 12 (a) and (b) of Presidential Decree No. 946 which invested
the then courts of agrarian relations with original exclusive jurisdiction over
cases and questions involving rights granted and obligations imposed by
presidential issuances promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform
program.

Formerly, under Presidential Decree No. 946, amending Chapter IX of

Republic Act No. 3844, the courts of agrarian relations had original and
exclusive jurisdiction over "cases involving the rights and obligations of
persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land except those cognizable
by the National Labor Relations Commission" and "questions involving rights
granted and obligations imposed by laws, Presidential Decrees, Orders,
Instructions, Rules and Regulations issued and promulgated in relation to the
agrarian reform program," except those matters involving the administrative
implementation of the transfer of land to the tenant-farmer under Presidential
Decree No. 27 and amendments thereto which shall be exclusively
cognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.12

In 1980, upon the passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as
the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the courts of agrarian relations were
integrated into the regional trial courts and the jurisdiction of the former was
vested in the latter courts.13

However, with the enactment of Executive Order No. 229, which took effect
on August 29, 1987, fifteen (15) days after its release for publication in the
Official Gazette,14 the regional trial courts were divested of their general
jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters. The said jurisdiction is now vested
in the Department of Agrarian Reform.

On 15 June 1988 R.A. 6657 was passed containing provisions which evince and support
the intention of the legislature to vest in the DAR exclusive jurisdiction over all agrarian
reform matters.15 Section 50 thereof substantially reiterates Sec. 17 of E.O. 229 thus —
 Sec. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested
with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters
and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) . . .

Section 3, par. (d), thereof defines the term "agrarian dispute" as referring to any
controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes
concerning farm workers' associations or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such
tenurial arrangements.

However it may be mentioned in passing that the Regional Trial Courts have not been
completely divested of jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters. Section 56 of R.A. 6657
confers "special jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian Courts," which are Regional Trial Courts
designated by this Court — at least one (1) branch within each province — to act as such.
These Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts have, according to Sec.
57 of the same law, original and exclusive jurisdiction over: (a) all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners, and (b) the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under the Act.16

Consequently, there exists an agrarian dispute in the case at bench which is exclusively
cognizable by the DARAB. The failure of petitioners to pay back rentals pursuant to the
leasehold contract with private respondent is an issue which is clearly beyond the legal
competence of the trial court to resolve. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not
warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction
over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. 17

Thus, respondent appellate court erred in directing the trial court to assume jurisdiction over
this case. At any rate, the present legal battle is "not altogether lost" on the part of private
respondent because as this Court was quite emphatic in Quismundo v. Court of
Appeals,18 the resolution by the DAR is to the best advantage of the parties since it is in a
better position to resolve agrarian disputes, being the administrative agency presumably
possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. Further, the proceedings therein are
summary in nature and the department is not bound by the technical rules of procedure and
evidence, to the end that agrarian reform disputes and other issues will be adjudicated in a
just, expeditious and inexpensive proceeding.19

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals as well as its resolution

denying reconsideration is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The orders of the Regional Trial
Court of Tagbilaran City dated 22 August and 28 September 1989 are REINSTATED.
Consequently, let the records of this case be immediately transmitted to the appropriate
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for proper adjudication in
accordance with the ruling in Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals 20 and reiterated in Quismundo v. Court
of Appeals,21 as well as pertinent agrarian laws.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 143398. October 25, 2000]

RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION, FORMERLY SECOND DIVISION)
and JOSE T. RAMIREZ, respondents.

DECISION
PARDO, J.:

The case before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order seeking to nullify the order dated
June 15, 2000 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec), First
Division, giving notice to the parties of the promulgation of the resolution on the
[1]

case entitled Jose T. Ramirez, Protestee, versus Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr., Election Protest
Case No. 98-29, on June 20, 2000, at 2:00 in the afternoon and to prohibit the
respondent Commission on Election from promulgating the so called Guiani ponencia.[2]
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and respondent Jose T. Ramirez were candidates
for the position of Governor, Eastern Samar, during the May 11, 1998 elections. [3] On
May 16, 1998, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. as
the duly elected Governor, Eastern Samar, having obtained 46,547 votes, the highest
number of votes in the election returns.
On June 4, 1998, respondent Ramirez who obtained 45,934 votes, the second
highest number of votes, filed with the Comelec, an election protest [4] challenging the
results in a total of 201 precincts.[5] The case was assigned to the First Division (formerly
Second), Commission on Elections.[6]
On January 27, 2000, Commissioner Japal M. Guiani prepared and signed a
proposed resolution in the case. To such proposed ponencia, Commissioner Julio F.
Desamito dissented. Commissioner Luzviminda G.Tancangco at first did not indicate
her vote but said that she would wish to see both positions, if any, to make her (my)
final decision.[7]
In the meantime, on February 15, 2000, Commissioner Guiani retired from the
service. On March 3, 2000, the President of the Philippines appointed Commissioner
Rufino S. Javier to the seat vacated by Commissioner Guiani. Commissioner Javier
assumed office on April 4, 2000.
 On or about February 24, 2000, petitioner Ambil and respondent Ramirez received
a purported resolution promulgated on February 14, 2000, signed by Commissioner
Guiani and Tancangco, with Commissioner Desamito dissenting. The result was in favor
of respondent Ramirez who was declared winner by a margin of 1,176 votes. [8] On
February 28, 2000, the Comelec, First Division, declared that the thirteen-page
resolution is a useless scrap of paper which should be ignored by the parties in this
case there being no promulgation of the Resolution in the instant case. [9]
On March 31, 2000, the Comelec, First Division, issued an order setting the
promulgation of the resolution in the case (EPC Case No. 98-29) on April 6, 2000, at
2:00 in the afternoon.[10] However, on April 6, 2000, petitioner Ambil filed a motion to
cancel promulgation challenging the validity of the purported
Guiani resolution. The Comelec, First Division, acting on the motion, on the same date,
postponed the promulgation until this matter is resolved.[11]
On June 14, 2000, two members of the First Division, namely, Commissioners
Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Rufino S. Javier, sent a joint memorandum to
Commissioner Julio F. Desamito, presiding Commissioner, stating:

Pursuant to your recommendation in your April 18, 2000 Memorandum to the

Commission En Banc that this case be submitted for a reconsultation by the members
of the First Division, it is our position that we promulgate as soon as possible
the Guiani Resolution of the case. This is notwithstanding the Jamil vs. Comelec (283
SCRA 349), Solidbank vs. IAC (G. R. No. 73777) and other doctrinal cases on the
issue. After all, this Commission stood pat on its policy that what is controlling is the
date the ponente signed the questioned Resolution as what we did in promulgating the
case of Dumayas vs. Bernal (SPC 98-137).

In view of the foregoing, we recommend that we proceed with the promulgation of the
subject resolution and let the aggrieved party challenge it through a Motion for
Reconsideration before the Commission en banc or through a certiorari case before
the Supreme Court.[12]

On June 15, 2000, the Comelec, First Division, through Commissioner Julio F. Desamito, issued
an order setting the promulgation of the resolution in the case on June 20, 2000, at 2:00 oclock in
the afternoon.[13]

Without waiting for the promulgation of the resolution, on June 19, 2000, petitioner
interposed the instant petition.[14]
Petitioner Ambil seeks to annul the order dated June 15, 2000 setting the
promulgation of the resolution of the case (EPC Case No. 98-29) on June 20, 2000 at
2:00 in the afternoon, and prohibiting the Comelec, First Division, from promulgating the
purported Guiani resolution and directing the Comelec, First Division, to deliberate anew
on the case and to promulgate the resolution reached in the case after such
deliberation.[15]
 On June 20, 2000, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent
Comelec from implementing the June 15, 2000 order for the promulgation of the
resolution set on June 20, 2000 at 2:00 in the afternoon. At the same time, the Court
directed the respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from notice. [16]
On July 10, 2000, respondent Ramirez filed his comment.[17] Respondent Ramirez
admitted that the proposed resolution of Commissioner Guiani was no longer valid after
his retirement on February 15, 2000.[18] He submitted that Comelec, First Division, its
membership still constituting a majority, must elevate the protest case to the
Comelec en banc until resolved with finality.[19]
In his comment filed on August 29, 2000, the Solicitor General interposed no
objection to the petition.[20]
At issue in this petition is whether Comelec, First Division, in scheduling the
promulgation of the resolution in the case (EPC Case No. 98-29) acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
We find the petition without merit.
To begin with, the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the Comelec
is prescribed in the Constitution, as follows:

Section 7. Each commission shall decide by a

majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days
from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the rules of the commission or by the commission
itself. Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or by law, any decision, order,
or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari
by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof.[21] [emphasis supplied]

We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the
COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.[22] This decision
must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc,[23] not of a division,[24] certainly
not an interlocutory order of a division.[25] The Supreme Court has no power to review via
certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on
Elections.[26]

The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec en banc may be
elevated to the Supreme Court is by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of
the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, now expressly provided in Rule 64, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended.[27]
Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that there
be no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. A motion for reconsideration is a plain and adequate remedy provided by
law.[28] Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of
the petition.[29]

In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be

reviewed by the Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en
banc decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite
filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory.[30] Article IX-C, Section 3, 1987
Constitution provides as follows:

Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and
shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard
and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions
shall be decided by the Commission en banc. [emphasis supplied]

Similarly, the Rules of Procedure of the Comelec provide that a decision of a

division may be raised to the en banc via a motion for reconsideration.[31]
The case at bar is an election protest involving the position of Governor, Eastern
Samar.[32] It is within the original jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections in
division.[33] Admittedly, petitioner did not ask for a reconsideration of the divisions
resolution or final decision.[34] In fact, there was really no resolution or decision to speak
of [35] because there was yet no promulgation, which was still scheduled on June 20,
2000 at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon. Petitioner went directly to the Supreme Court from
an order of promulgation of the Resolution of this case by the First Division of the
Comelec.[36]
Under the existing Constitutional scheme, a party to an election case within the
jurisdiction of the Comelec in division can not dispense with the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of a decision, resolution or final order of the Division of the Commission
on Elections because the case would not reach the Comelec en banc without such
motion for reconsideration having been filed and resolved by the Division.
The instant case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions to the rule in
certiorari cases dispensing with a motion for reconsideration prior to the filing of a
petition.[37] In truth, the exceptions do not apply to election cases where a motion for
reconsideration is mandatory by Constitutional fiat to elevate the case to the Comelec en
banc, whose final decision is what is reviewable via certiorari before the Supreme
Court.[38]
We are aware of the ruling in Kho v. Commission on Elections, [39] that in a situation
such as this where the Commission on Elections in division committed grave abuse of
discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders
relative to an action pending before it and the controversy did not fall under any of the
instances mentioned in Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the
remedy of the aggrieved party is not to refer the controversy to the Commission en banc
as this is not permissible under its present rules but to elevate it to this Court via a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.This is the case relied upon by
the dissenting justice to support the proposition that resort to the Supreme Court from a
resolution of a Comelec Division is allowed.[40] Unfortunately, the Kho case has no
application to the case at bar. The issue therein is, may the Commission on Elections in
division admit an answer with counter-protest after the period to file the same has
expired?[41] The Comelec First Division admitted the answer with counter-protest of the
respondent. The Supreme Court declared such order void for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. [42] However, an
important moiety in the Kho case was not mentioned in the dissent. It is that the Comelec,
First Division, denied the prayer of petitioner for the elevation of the case to en
banc because the orders of admission were mere interlocutory orders.[43] Hence, the
aggrieved party had no choice but to seek recourse in the Supreme Court. Such
important fact is not present in the case at bar.
We must emphasize that what is questioned here is the order dated June 15, 2000,
which is a mere notice of the promulgation of the resolution in EPC Case No. 98-
29. We quote the order in question in full, to wit:

Pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 18 of the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, and

the Joint Memorandum of Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Rufino S.
Javier to the Presiding Commissioner of the First Division dated 14 June 2000
paragraph 5 of which states:

In view of the foregoing, we recommend that we proceed with the

promulgation of the subject resolution and let the aggrieved party challenge it
through a Motion for Reconsideration before the Commission en banc or through a
certiorari case before the Supreme Court.

the promulgation of the Resolution in this case is hereby set on Tuesday, June 20,
2000 at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon at the Comelec Session Hall, Intramuros,
Manila.

No further motion for postponement of the promulgation shall be entertained.

The Clerk of the Commission is directed to give the parties, through their Attorneys,
notice of this Order through telegram and by registered mail or personal delivery.

SO ORDERED.

Given this 15th day of June, 2000 in the City of Manila, Philippines.

FOR THE DIVISION:

[Sgd.] JULIO F. DESAMITO
Presiding Commissioner[44]
 There is nothing irregular about the order of promulgation of the resolution in the
case, except in the mind of suspicious parties. Perhaps what was wrong in the order
was the reference to the memorandum of the two commissioners that was not
necessary and was a superfluity, or excessus in linguae. All the members of the
Division were incumbent Commissioners of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
and had authority to decide the case in the Division. What appears to be patently null
and void is the so-called Guiani resolution if it is the one to be promulgated. We cannot
assume that the Comelec will promulgate a void resolution and violate the Constitution
and the law. We must assume that the members of the Commission in Division or en
banc are sworn to uphold and will obey the Constitution.
Consequently, the Guiani resolution is not at issue in the case at bar. No one
knows the contents of the sealed envelope containing the resolution to be promulgated
on June 20, 2000, simply because it has not been promulgated!
It may be true that the parties received a copy of what purports to be the Guiani
resolution,[45] declaring respondent Jose T. Ramirez the victor in the case. Such Guiani
resolution is admitted by the parties and considered by the Commission on Elections as
void. The Solicitor General submitted an advice that the same resolution is deemed
vacated by the retirement of Commissioner Guiani on February 15, 2000. [46] It can not
be promulgated anymore for all legal intents and purposes.
We rule that the so-called Guiani resolution is void for the following reasons:
First: A final decision or resolution becomes binding only after it is promulgated and
not before. Accordingly, one who is no longer a member of the Commission at the time
the final decision or resolution is promulgated cannot validly take part in that resolution
or decision.[47] Much more could he be the ponente of the resolution or decision. The
resolution or decision of the Division must be signed by a majority of its members and
duly promulgated.

Commissioner Guiani might have signed a draft ponencia prior to his retirement
from office, but when he vacated his office without the final decision or resolution having
been promulgated, his vote was automatically invalidated. [48] Before that resolution or
decision is so signed and promulgated, there is no valid resolution or decision to speak
of.[49]
Second: Atty. Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., Clerk of the First Division, Commission on
Elections, denied the release or promulgation of the Guiani resolution. He disowned the
initials on the face of the first page of the resolution showing its promulgation on
February 14, 2000, and said that it was a forgery. There is no record in the Electoral
Contests and Adjudication Department (ECAD) of the Commission on Election that a
resolution on the main merits of the case was promulgated.[50]
Third: By an order dated February 28, 2000, the Comelec, First
Division, disclaimed the alleged thirteen (13) page resolution for being a useless
scrap of paper which should be ignored by the parties there being no promulgation
of the resolution in the case.[51]
 Fourth: It is unlikely that Commissioner Tancangco affixed her signature on the
Guiani resolution. On the date that it was purportedly promulgated, which was
February 14, 2000, the Division issued an order where Commissioner Tancangco
expressed her reservations and stated that she wished to see both positions, if any,
before she made her final decision.[52]
A final decision or resolution of the Comelec, in Division or en banc is promulgated
on a date previously fixed, of which notice shall be served in advance upon the
parties or their attorneys personally or by registered mail or by telegram. [53]
It is jurisprudentially recognized that at any time before promulgation of a decision
or resolution, the ponente may change his mind. [54] Moreover, in this case, before a final
decision or resolution could be promulgated, the ponente retired and a new
commissioner appointed. And the incoming commissioner has decided to take part in
the resolution of the case. It is presumed that he had taken the position of his
predecessor because he co-signed the request for the promulgation of the Guiani
resolution.[55]
If petitioner were afraid that what would be promulgated by the Division was the
Guiani resolution, a copy of which he received by mail, which, as heretofore stated, was
not promulgated and the signature thereon of the clerk of court was a forgery, petitioner
could seek reconsideration of such patently void resolution and thereby the case would
be elevated to the Commission en banc.[56]
Considering the factual circumstances, we speculated ex mero motu that the
Comelec would promulgate a void resolution.
The sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without
rudder or compass.[57] We must not speculate that the Comelec would still promulgate a
void resolution despite knowledge that it is invalid or void ab initio.
Consequently, the filing of the instant petition before this Court was
premature. Petitioner failed to exhaust adequate administrative remedies available
before the COMELEC.
In a long line of cases, this Court has held consistently that before a party is allowed
to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of
all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction,
then such remedy should be exhausted first before the courts judicial power can be
sought. The premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of
action.[58]
This is the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. A motion for
reconsideration then is a pre-requisite to the viability of a special civil action
for certiorari, unless the party who avails of the latter can convincingly show that his
case falls under any of the following exceptions to the rule: (1) when the question is
purely legal, (2) where judicial intervention is urgent, (3) where its application may
cause great and irreparable damage, (4) where the controverted acts violate due
process, (5) failure of a high government official from whom relief is sought to act on the
matter, and seeks when the issue for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has
been rendered moot.[59]
This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical
and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser
expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to
state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from
a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied
with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its
error and to dispose of the case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the
principal of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not
an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the
peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it
is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved
is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the
administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the
respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the president bears
the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a
nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.[60] The administrative authorities must be given an opportunity to act and
correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.[61] Only after administrative
remedies are exhausted may judicial recourse be allowed.[62]
This case does not fall under any of the exceptions and indeed, as heretofore
stated, the exceptions do not apply to an election case within the jurisdiction of the
Comelec in Division.
Hence, the petition at bar must be dismissed for prematurity. Failure to exhaust
administrative remedies is fatal to a party's cause of action and a dismissal based on
that ground is tantamount to a dismissal based on lack of cause of action. [63]
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DISMISSES the petition for prematurity.
The Court orders the Commission on Elections, First Division, to resolve with all
deliberate dispatch Election Protest Case No. 98-29 and to promulgate its resolution
thereon adopted by majority vote within thirty (30) days from notice hereof.
The temporary restraining order issued on June 20, 2000, is hereby lifted and
dissolved, effective immediately.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
 [G.R. No. 111107. January 10, 1997]

LEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC),

Regional Executive Director (RED), Region 2 and JOVITO
LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity as Community Environment and
Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), both of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his capacity
as Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court at
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO and
VICTORIA DE GUZMAN, respondents.

DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:

Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies,

may an action for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the
subject matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to Section 68-A of P. D. 705, as
amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines?
Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to
confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products
in favor of the government?
These are two fundamental questions presented before us for our
resolution.
The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the
truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan
from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao,
Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents
for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan,
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in
Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck
and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to submit an
explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents,
however, failed to submit the required explanation. On June 22,
1989, Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR
[1]

sustained petitioner Layugans action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture

of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended
by Executive Order No. 277. Private respondents filed a letter of
reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of Executive
Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a subsequent order of July
12, 1989. Subsequently, the case was brought by the petitioners to the
[2]

Secretary of DENR pursuant to private respondents statement in their letter

dated June 28, 1989 that in case their letter for reconsideration would be
denied then this letter should be considered as an appeal to the
Secretary. Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin,
[3]

docketed as Civil Case 4031, was filed by the private respondents against
petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan with the Regional Trial
[4]

Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan, which issued a writ ordering the return of the
[5]

truck to private respondents. Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director

[6]

Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia,
that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in an
order dated December 28, 1989. Their motion for reconsideration having
[7]

been likewise denied, a petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with
the respondent Court of Appeals which sustained the trial courts order ruling
that the question involved is purely a legal question. Hence, this present
[8]

petition, with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary

[9]

injunction, seeking to reverse the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals

was filed by the petitioners on September 9, 1993. By virtue of the Resolution
dated September 27, 1993, the prayer for the issuance of temporary
[10]

restraining order of petitioners was granted by this Court.

Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners
aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because
the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to Section
68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. Private respondents, on the other
hand, would seek to avoid the operation of this principle asserting that the
instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine upon the justification that
(1) due process was violated because they were not given the chance to be
heard, and (2) the seizure and forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that
the Secretary of DENR and his representatives have no authority to confiscate
and forfeit conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products, and (b)
that the truck as admitted by petitioners was not used in the commission of
the crime.
Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and relevant
jurisprudence on the matter, we are of the opinion that the plea of petitioners
for reversal is in order.
 This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party
is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he
should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded
him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to
decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should
be exhausted first before courts judicial power can be sought. The premature
invocation of courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of action. Accordingly,
[11]

absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal

for lack of cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
[12]

remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing,
availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a
speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts
of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute
until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied
with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to
correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, we are not amiss to
reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested
by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and
its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and
circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a
violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal
[13]

question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to

[14]

lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the
[15]

administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6)

[16] [17]

when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of

the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when [18]

to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) [19]

when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject

[20]

matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does
[21]

not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. [22]

In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending
before the Secretary of DENR when it was forwarded to him following the
denial by the petitioners of the motion for reconsideration of private
respondents through the order of July 12, 1989. In their letter of
reconsideration dated June 28, 1989, private respondents clearly recognize
[23]

the presence of an administrative forum to which they seek to avail, as they

did avail, in the resolution of their case. The letter, reads, thus:

xxx
If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your favorable action, then this letter
should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary. [24]

It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the
Secretary for the review and disposition of their case. By appealing to him,
they acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain remedy still
available and open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus, they
cannot now, without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, seek courts intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant
of their relief during the pendency of an administrative proceedings.
Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws,
rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of
forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its
function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial
intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction.The
assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private
respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the
administrative agencys prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does
not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative
body of special competence. In Felipe Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy
[25]

Executive Secretary, which was reiterated in the recent case of Concerned

[26]

Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez, this Court held:

[27]

Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems
caused by unbriddled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A
long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters
which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of
such agencies.

To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the

instant controversy beyond the pale of the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and fall within the ambit of excepted cases heretofore
stated. However, considering the circumstances prevailing in this case, we
can not but rule out these assertions of private respondents to be without
merit. First, they argued that there was violation of due process because they
did not receive the May 23, 1989 order of confiscation of petitioner Layugan.
This contention has no leg to stand on. Due process does not necessarily
mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be
heard. One may be heard , not solely by verbal presentation but also, and
[28]

perhaps many times more creditably and practicable than oral argument,
through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules
[29]

of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process

cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, [30]

deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was

given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration, as in the [31]

instant case, when private respondents were undisputedly given the

opportunity to present their side when they filed a letter of reconsideration
dated June 28, 1989 which was, however, denied in an order of July 12, 1989
of Executive Director Baggayan. In Navarro III vs. Damasco, we ruled that :
[32]

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to

administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type
hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied
when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of
the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or
hearing.

Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and

forfeiture of the truck because the administrative officers of the DENR
allegedly have no power to perform these acts under the law. They insisted
that only the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in
transporting illegal forest products as can be gleaned from the second
paragraph of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. The pertinent
provision reads as follows:

SECTION 68. xxx

xxx

The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber
or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as
the machinery, equipments, implements and tools illegaly [sic] used in the area where
the timber or forest products are found. (Underline ours)

A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private

respondents thinking not only because the aforequoted provision apparently
does not mention nor include conveyances that can be the subject of
confiscation by the courts, but to a large extent, due to the fact that private
respondents interpretation of the subject provision unduly restricts the clear
intention of the law and inevitably reduces the other provision of Section 68-A
, which is quoted herein below:

SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized

Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other
forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized
representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut,
gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by
land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter. (Underline
ours)

It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his
duly authorized representatives are given the authority to confiscate and
forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws,
rules and regulations. The phrase to dispose of the same is broad enough to
cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only
limitation is that it should be made in accordance with pertinent laws,
regulations or policies on the matter. In the construction of statutes, it must be
read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the
statute. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved
[33]

and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such
construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the
benefits intended. In this wise, the observation of the Solicitor General is
[34]

significant, thus:

But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws more responsive to present
situations and realities and in view of the urgency to conserve the remaining resources
of the country, that the government opted to add Section 68-A. This amendatory
provision is an administrative remedy totally separate and distinct from criminal
proceedings. More than anything else, it is intended to supplant the inadequacies that
characterize enforcement of forestry laws through criminal actions. The preamble of
EO 277-the law that added Section 68-A to PD 705-is most revealing:

WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the

country for the benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos;

WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through
the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and
regulations;
WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical
difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised Forestry
Code of the Philippines; and

WHEREAS, to overcome this difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts more
responsive to present situations and realities;

It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to
confiscate, not only conveyances, but forest products as well. On the other
hand, confiscation of forest products by the court in a criminal action has long been
provided for in Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the power on confiscation
cannot be exercised except only through the court under Section 68, then Section 68-
A would have no purpose at all. Simply put, Section 68-A would not have provided
any solution to the problem perceived in EO 277, supra. [35]

Private respondents, likewise, contend that the seizure was illegal

because the petitioners themselves admitted in the Order dated July 12, 1989
of Executive Director Baggayan that the truck of private respondents was not
used in the commission of the crime. This order, a copy of which was given to
and received by the counsel of private respondents, reads in part , viz. :

xxx while it is true that the truck of your client was not used by her in the commission
of the crime, we uphold your claim that the truck owner is not liable for the crime and
in no case could a criminal case be filed against her as provided under Article 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code. xxx [36]

We observed that private respondents misread the content of the

aforestated order and obviously misinterpreted the intention of petitioners.
What is contemplated by the petitioners when they stated that the truck "was
not used in the commission of the crime" is that it was not used in the
commission of the crime of theft, hence, in no case can a criminal action be
filed against the owner thereof for violation of Article 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code. Petitioners did not eliminate the possibility that the truck
was being used in the commission of another crime, that is, the breach of
Section 68 of P.D.705 as amended by E.O. 277. In the same order of July 12,
1989, petitioners pointed out:

xxx However, under Section 68 of P.D.705 as amended and further amended by

Executive Order No.277 specifically provides for the confiscation of the conveyance
used in the transport of forest products not covered by the required legal documents.
She may not have been involved in the cutting and gathering of the product in
question but the fact that she accepted the goods for a fee or fare the same is therefor
liable. xxx
[37]

Private respondents, however, contended that there is no crime defined

and punishable under Section 68 other than qualified theft, so that, when
petitioners admitted in the July 12, 1989 order that private respondents could
not be charged for theft as provided for under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code, then necessarily private respondents could not have
committed an act constituting a crime under Section 68. We disagree. For
clarity, the provision of Section 68 of P.D. 705 before its amendment by E.O.
277 and the provision of Section 1 of E.O. No.277 amending the
aforementioned Section 68 are reproduced herein, thus:

SECTION 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without
license. - Any person who shall cut , gather , collect , or remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable and disposable public lands,
or from private lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license
or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code xxx. (Underscoring ours; Section 68, P.D.705
before its amendment by E.O.277 )

SECTION 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No.705, as amended, is hereby

amended to read as follows:

Section 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products
without license. -Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public
land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code xxx." (Underscoring ours; Section 1, E.O No. 277
amending Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended)

With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of

P.D. 705, the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing
forest products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent
now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code. This is clear from the language of Executive
Order No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase shall be guilty of qualified theft as
defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code
and inserted the words shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code . When the statute is clear and
explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or
rationalization of the law.
[38]

From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be
sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by
them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of
the P. D. 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of
action in view of the private respondents failure to exhaust administrative
remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower court
instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the
writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in the
administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to ones recourse to the
courts and more importantly, being an element of private respondents right of
action, is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court.
It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded solely
on the claim that the defendant wrongfully withholds the property sought to be
recovered. It lies to recover possession of personal chattels that are unlawfully
detained. To detain is defined as to mean to hold or keep in custody, and it
[39] [40]

has been held that there is tortuous taking whenever there is an unlawful
meddling with the property, or an exercise or claim of dominion over it, without
any pretense of authority or right; this, without manual seizing of the property
is sufficient. Under the Rules of Court, it is indispensable in replevin
[41]

proceedings, that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he is entitled
to the possession of property, that the property is wrongfully detained by the
defendant, alleging the cause of detention, that the same has not been taken
for tax assessment, or seized under execution, or attachment, or if so seized,
that it is exempt from such seizure, and the actual value of the
property. Private respondents miserably failed to convince this Court that a
[42]

wrongful detention of the subject truck obtains in the instant case. It should be
noted that the truck was seized by the petitioners because it was transporting
forest products with out the required permit of the DENR in manifest
contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O 277. Section 68-
A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well
as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized
representatives of the conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry
laws. Evidently, the continued possession or detention of the truck by the
petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible,
hence , no wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.
Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to
question the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in
pursuance to the authority given under P.D.705, as amended. Section 8 of the
said law is explicit that actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of Forest
Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said law are
subject to review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review
the decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil action
for certiorari or prohibition. It reads :

SECTION 8 . REVIEW - All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to
review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the
Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty
(30) days from the receipt of the aggrieved party of said decision, unless appealed to
the President in accordance with Executive Order No. 19, Series of 1966. The
Decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through a
special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the respondent

Court of Appeals dated October 16, 1991 and its Resolution dated July 14,
1992 are hereby SET ASIDE AND REVERSED; the Restraining Order
promulgated on September 27, 1993 is hereby made permanent; and the
Secretary of DENR is directed to resolve the controversy with utmost
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.