Issuance of Negotiable Instruments (Digested Cases)
Issuance of Negotiable Instruments (Digested Cases)
Issuance of Negotiable Instruments (Digested Cases)
Facts: Raul Sesbreno filed a complaint for damages against Assistant City Fiscal Bienvenido Mabanto
before the RTC of Cebu City. After trial, judgment was rendered ordering Mabanto to pay Sesbreno
P11,000. The decision having become final and executory, the trial court ordered its execution upon
Sesbreno’s motion. The writ of execution was issued despite Mabanto’s objection. A notice of
garnishment was served upon Loreto de la Victoria as City Fiscal of Mandaue City where Mabanto was
then detailed. De la Victoria moved to quash the notice of garnishment claiming that he was not in
possession of any money, funds, etc. belonging to Mabanto until delivered to him, and as such are still
public funds which could not be subject of garnishment..
Issue: Whether the checks subject of garnishment belong to Mabanto or whether they still belong to
the government.
Held: Under Section 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, every contract on a negotiable instrument
is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto. As
ordinarily understood, delivery means the transfer of the possession of the instrument by the maker
or drawer with the intent to transfer title to the payee and recognize him as the holder thereof.
Herein, the salary check of a government officer or employee does not belong to him before it is
physically delivered to him. Inasmuch as said checks had not yet been delivered to Mabanto, they did
not belong to him and still had the character of public funds. As a necessary consequence of being
public fund, the checks may not be garnished to satisfy the judgment.
ASTRO ELECTRONICS CORP. & PETER ROXAS v. PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE
CORPORATION
Doctrine:
Persons who write their names on the face of promissory notes are makers. Thus, even without the phrase “personal
capacity,” a person who signs on the instrument twice will still be primarily liable as a joint and several debtor.
Facts:
Astro was granted several loans by the Philippine Trust Company (Philtrust) amounting to P3,000,000.00 with interest
and secured by three promissory notes. In each of these promissory notes, it appears that petitioner Roxas signed
twice, as President of Astro and in his personal capacity. Roxas also signed a Continuing Surety ship Agreement in
favor of Philtrust Bank, as President of Astro and as surety.
Thereafter, Philguarantee, with the consent of Astro, guaranteed in favor of Philtrust the payment of 70% of Astro’s
loan, subject to the condition that upon payment by Philguanrantee of said amount, it shall be proportionally
subrogated to the rights of Philtrust against Astro. As a result of Astro’s failure to pay its loan obligations, despite
demands, Philguarantee paid 70% of the guaranteed loan to Philtrust. Subsequently, Philguarantee filed against
Astro and Roxas a complaint for sum of money with the RTC of Makati.
Roxas disclaims any liability on the instruments, alleging, inter alia, that he merely signed the same in blank and the
phrases “in his personal capacity” and “in his official capacity” were fraudulently inserted without his knowledge.
The trial court ruled in favor of Philguarantee, stating that if Roxas really intended to sign the instruments merely in
his capacity as President of Astro, then he should have signed only once in the promissory note. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Roxas should be solidarily liable with Astro for the sum awarded by the RTC
Held:
Yes. In signing his name aside from being the President of Astro, Roxas became a co-maker of the promissory notes
and cannot escape any liability arising from it. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, persons who write their names
on the face of promissory notes are makers. Thus, even without the phrase “personal capacity,” Roxas will still be
primarily liable as a joint and several debtor under the notes considering that his intention to be liable as such is
manifested by the fact that he affixed his signature on each of the promissory notes twice which necessarily would
imply that he is undertaking the obligation in two different capacities, official and personal.
Moreover, an instrument which begins with “I”, “We”, or “Either of us” promise to pay, when signed by two or more
persons, makes them solidary liable (Republic Planters Bank vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93073, December 21,
1992). Having signed under such terms, Roxas assumed the solidary liability of a debtor and Philtrust Bank may
choose to enforce the notes against him alone or jointly with Astro.
It devolves upon one to overcome the presumptions that private transactions are presumed to be fair and regular and
that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns (Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116710). Bare
allegations, when unsubstantiated by evidence, documentary or otherwise, are not equivalent to proof under our
Rules of Court (Coronel vs. Constantino, G.R. No. 121069, February 7, 2003). Since Roxas failed to prove the truth
of his allegations that the phrases “in his personal capacity” and “in his official capacity” were inserted on the notes
without his knowledge, said presumptions shall prevail over his claims.
FACTS:
Sima Wei executed a promissory note in consideration of a loan secured from petitioner
bank. She was able to pay partially for the loan but failed
to pay for the balance. She then issued two checks to pay the unpaid balance but for some
unexplainable reason, the checks were not received
by the bank but ended up in the hands of someone else. The bank
instituted actions against Sima Wei and other people. The trial court dismissed the case and
the CA affirmed this decision.
ISSUE:
HELD:
A negotiable instrument, of which a check is, is not only a written evidence of a contract right but is
also a species of property. Just as a deed to a piece of land must be delivered in order to convey
title to the grantee, so must a negotiable instrument be delivered to the payee in order to
evidence its existence as a binding contract. Section 16 provides that every contract on a
negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of
giving effect thereto. Thus,
the payee of the negotiable instrument acquires no interest with respect thereto until its
delivery to him. Delivery of an instrument from the drawer to the payee, there can be no liability on
the instrument. Moreover, such delivery must be intended to give effect to the instrument.
Facts:
A. Francisco Realty granted a loan of P7.5 M to spouses Javillonar, in consideration of which,
the latter executed a promissory note, a real estate mortgage over a certain property, and a
deed of sale of said mortgaged property in favor of A. Francisco.
Upon maturity, Javillonar spouses failed to pay, and as a consequence, A. Francisco
registered the sale of the mortgaged property, for which a new TCT was issued.
A. Francisco demanded possession of the mortgaged realty. Spouses refused to
vacate. Hence, A. Francisco filed a case for possession before the RTC.
The spouses admitted that they owed money in favor of A. Francisco but they also alleged
that it was not their intention to sell the realty as the deed of sale executed by them was
merely an additional security for the payment of their loan. RTC adjudged in favor of A.
Francisco. On appeal, CA reversed RTC decision and dismissed the complaint against the
spouses holding that the deed of sale was void, being in the nature of a pactum
commissorium prohibited by law. Hence, this petition with the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not the deed of sale executed by the spouses was void, being in the nature of
pactum commissorium.
Held:
Yes. Art. 2088 of the Civil Code provides that the creditor cannot appropriate the things
given by way of pledge or mortgage, or dispose of them. Any stipulation to the contrary is
void. What is envisioned by this article is a provision in the deed of mortgage providing for
the automatic conveyance of the mortgaged property in case of the failure of the debtor to
pay the loan. A pactum commissorium is a forfeiture clause in a deed of mortgage. The
proscribed stipulation of automatic conveyance must be found in the mortgage deed itself.
In the case at bar, the stipulations in the promissory note provide that, upon failure of
spouses to pay interest, ownership of the property would be automatically transferred to A.
Francisco and the deed of sale in its favor would be registered. These stipulations are in
substance a pactum commissorium. They embody the two elements of pactum
commissorium, to wit:
(1) that there should be a pledge or mortgage wherein a property is pledged or mortgaged
by way of security for the payment of the principal obligation;
(2) that there should be a stipulation for an automatic appropriation by the creditor of the
thing pledged or mortgaged in the event of non-payment of the principal obligation within
the stipulated period.
Facts: Republic Planters Bank issued 9 promissory notes signed by Shozo Yamaguchi (President) and
Fermin Canlas (Treasurer) of Worldwide Garment Manufacturing Inc. Yamaguchi and Canlas were
authorized by the corporation to apply for credit facilities with the bank in form of export advances
and letters of credit or trust receipts accommodations. Three years after, the bank filed an action to
recover the sums of money covered by the promissory notes. Worldwide Garment Manufacturing
changed its name to Pinch Manufacturing Corp. Canlas alleged he was not liable personally for the
corporate acts that he performed, and that the notes were still blank when he signed them.
Issue: Whether the corporate treasurer is liable for the amounts in the promissory notes.
Held: Canlas is a co-maker of the promissory notes, under the law, and cannot escape liability arising
therefrom. Inasmuch as the instrument contained the words “I promise to pay” and is signed by two
or more persons, said persons are deemed to be jointly and severally liable thereon. As the
promissory notes are stereotype ones issued by the bank in printed form with blank spaces filled up as
per agreed terms of the loan, following customary procedures, leaving the debtors to do nothing but
read the terms and conditions therein and to sign as makers or co-makers. Section 14 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law, therefore, does not apply. Canlas is solidarily liable with the corporation
for the amount of the 9 promissory notes.
Samsung Construction Company Philippines, Inc. vs. Far East Bank and Trust and CA
Facts:
Samsung Construction maintained a current account with Far East Bank and Trust Bank
(FETBC) in its Bel-Air Makati Branch, with Jong Kyu Lee who is the Project Manager as the sole
signatory and Kyu Yong Lee having the checks in his custody as the company’s accountant. A
certain Roberto Gonzaga presented an FETBC Check on the same branch. The check was
payable to cash and drawn against the account of Samsung Construction amounting to P995,
500.00. The teller and the bank officers were satisfied with the genuineness of the signature in
the check and confirmed the identity of Gonzaga with the assistant accountant of Samsung
Construction who was also familiar and known to them, the latter being present at the bank
premises at that time. In the end, the check was authorized to be encashed. The Project
Manager and the Accountant of the company found out the next day that the last blank check
was missing and that the check was encashed with Jong’s signature being forged. Samsung
Construction demanded reimbursement of the amount encashed and when it was not heeded
immediately, it filed a Complaint against the bank for violation of Sec. 23 of Negotiable
Instruments Law.
In the RTC, it held that Jong’s signature on the check was forged and ordered the bank to pay
company for the amount plus interest. During appeal in CA, this decision was reversed by
stating that even assuming there was forgery, it occurred due to the negligence of Samsung
Construction specifically the accountant for lack of care in keeping the checks. The decision
was appealed to SC, based on the grounds that the CA misapprehended the facts and erred
when it said that the company has been negligent in safekeeping the check.
Issue:
Is bank liable to reimburse the amount encashed through forgery?
Ruling:
Yes, the bank is liable to pay Samsung Construction. Therefore, the decision of CA is set aside.
Under Sec. 23 of Negotiable Instruments Law, forgery is a real or absolute defense by the party
whose signature is forged. The general rule remains that the drawee who has paid upon the
forged signature bears the loss. The exception to this rule arises only when negligence can be
traced on the part of the drawer whose signature was forged, and the need arises to weigh the
comparative negligence between the drawer and the drawee to determine who should bear the
burden of loss. The Court finds no basis to conclude that Samsung Construction was negligent
in the safekeeping of its checks especially that Samsung Construction reported the forgery
almost immediately upon discovery. The general rule imputing liability on the drawee who paid
out on the forgery holds in this case.
The circumstances should have aroused the suspicion of the bank, as it is not ordinary business
practice for a check for such large amount to be made payable to cash or to bearer, instead of
to the order of a specified person. Extraordinary diligence dictates that FEBTC should have
ascertained from Jong personally that the signature in the questionable check was his. Still,
even if the bank performed with utmost diligence, the drawer whose signature was forged may
still recover from the bank as long as he or she is not precluded from setting up the defense of
forgery. After all, Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law plainly states that no right to
enforce the payment of a check can arise out of a forged signature. Since the drawer, Samsung
Construction, is not precluded by negligence from setting up the forgery, the general rule should
apply. Consequently, if a bank pays a forged check, it must be considered as paying out of its
funds and cannot charge the amount so paid to the account of the depositor. A bank is liable,
irrespective of its good faith, in paying a forged check.
FACTS:
Ong was supposed to be the payee of the checks issued by Island Securities. Ong has a current
account with petitioner bank. He opted to
sell his shares of stock through Island Securities. The company in turn issued checks in favor of
Ong but unfortunately, the latter wasn't able to receive any. His signatures were forged by Tamlinco
and the checks were deposited in his own account with petitioner. Ong then sought to collect the
money from the family of Tamlinco first before filing a complaint with the Central Bank. As his efforts
were futile to recover his money, he filed
an action against the petitioner. The trial and appellate court decided in favor of Ong.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Since the signature of the payee was forged, such signature should be
deemed inoperative and ineffectual. Petitioner, as the collecting bank, grossly erred in making
payment by virtue of said forged signature. The payee, herein respondent, should therefore be allowed
to collect from the collecting bank.
It should be liable for the loss because it is its legal duty to ascertain that
the payee’s endorsement was genuine before cashing the check. As a general rule, a bank or
corporation who has obtained possession of a check with an unauthorized or forged indorsement of the
payee’s signature and who collects the amount of the check other from the drawee, is liable for the
proceeds thereof to the payee or the other owner, notwithstanding that
the amount has been paid to the person from whom the check was obtained.
On the issue of laches, Ong didn't sit on his rights. He immediately sought the intervention of Tamlinco’s
family to collect the sum of money, and later
the Central Bank. Only after exhausting all the measures to settle the issue amicably did he file
the action.
Republic Bank vs Mauricia
Ebrada
65 SCRA 680 – Mercantile Law – Negotiable Instruments Law – Consideration – Forgery –
Liability of Accommodation Party
On January 15, 1963, the Bureau of Treasury issued a back pay check to Martin Lorenzo in
the amount of P1,246.08. The drawee named therein was Republic Bank. The check was
subsequently indorsed to Ramon Lorenzo, then to Delia Dominguez and then to Mauricia
Ebrada. Ebrada encashed the check with the Republic Bank. Republic Bank paid the
amount of the check to Ebrada. Ebrada, upon receiving the cash, gave it to Dominguez;
Dominguez in turn gave the cash to Ramon Lorenzo.
Later, the Bureau of Treasury notified that the check was a forgery because the payee
named therein (Martin Lorenzo) was actually dead 11 years ago before the check was
issued. Republic Bank refunded the amount to the Bureau of Treasury. The bank then
demanded Ebrada to refund them.
ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Bank may recover from Ebrada.
HELD: Yes. Ebrada, being the last indorser, warranted the genuineness of the signatures of
the payee and the previous indorsers. The drawee bank is not duty bound to ascertain
whether or not the signatures of the payee and the indorsers are genuine. One who
purchases a check or draft is bound to satisfy himself that the paper is genuine and that by
indorsing it or presenting it for payment or putting it into circulation before presentation he
impliedly asserts that he has performed his duty and the drawee (in this case Republic
Bank) who has paid the forged check, without actual negligence on his part, may recover
the money paid from such negligent purchasers.
But Ebrada did not profit from this because she, upon receiving the encashment, gave the
same to Dominguez?
She is still liable because she is considered as an accommodation party – pursuant to
Section 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. An accommodation party is one who has
signed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without receiving value
therefor, and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person. Such a person is
liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstanding such holder at the time of
taking the instrument knew him to be only an accommodation party.
Negotiable Instruments Digest: BPI FAMILY BANK v.
EDGARDO BUENAVENTURA et al.
BPI FAMILY BANK v. EDGARDO BUENAVENTURA et al.
FACTS:
Petitioners then drew a check amounting to P91, 270.00 which was dishonored
upon presentment for payment for the reason that the account was already closed in spite
of the balance in their current account. They subsequently learned that the Bank of the
Philippine Islands unilaterally freeze their Current account on the ground that the source of
fund was illegal or unauthorized.
BPI-FB refused to reinstate the account even after demand from the petitioners. It
asserted that the freezing of the account was triggered by the forgery claim of FMIC and
the unauthorized fund transfer to Tevesteco. The check received by Buenaventura, et al.
from Amado Franco was drawn by Eladio Teves and Joseph Teves against the Current
Account of the Tevesteco Arrastre Stevedoring Co., Inc. (Tevesteco) by means of forgery.
ISSUE:
WON BPI-FB is liable for the loss due to its negligence to detect forgery prior to
clearing the check?
HELD:
YES. Every bank that issues checks for the use of its customers should know
whether or not the drawer's signature thereon is genuine, whether there are sufficient funds
in the drawers account to cover checks issued, and it should be able to detect alterations,
erasures, superimpositions or intercalations thereon, for these instruments are prepared,
printed and issued by itself, it has control of the drawer's account, and it is supposed to be
familiar with the drawer's signature. It should possess appropriate detecting devices for
uncovering forgeries and/or alterations on these instruments. Unless a forgery or alteration
is attributable to the fault or negligence of the drawer himself, the remedy of the drawee
bank that negligently clears a forged and/or altered check for payment is against the party
responsible for the forgery or alteration, otherwise, it bears the loss. Having been negligent
in detecting the forgery prior to clearing the check, BPI-FB should bear the loss and can’t
shift the blame to Buenaventura, et al. having failed to show any participation on their part in
the forgery.
FACTS:
Pipe Master Corp (Pipe Master) represented by Yu Kio, its president, applied for check discounting with
Filipinas Orient Finance Corp (Filipinas Orient). The latter approved and granted the same supported by
a Board Resolution
Tan Juan Lian, as vice president, then executed in favor of Filipinas Orient a continuing guaranty that he
shall pay at maturity any and all promissory notes, drafts, checks, or other instruments or evidence of
indebtedness for which Pipe Master may become liable; that the extent of his liability shall not at any
one time exceed the sum of P1,000,000.00; and that in the event of default by Pipe Master, Filipinas
Orient may proceed directly against him.
Under the check discounting agreement between Pipe Master and Filipinas Orient, Yu Kio sold to
Filipinas Orient four MBTC checks amounting to P1,000,000.00. In exchange for the four MBTC checks,
Filipinas Orient issued to Yu Kio four PBCom crossed checks totaling P964,303.62, payable to Pipe
Master with the statement “for payee’s account only.”
Upon his receipt of the four PBCom checks, Yu Kio indorsed and deposited in the MBTC, in his personal
account, three of the checks valued at P721,596.95. As to the remaining check amounting
to P242,706.67, he deposited it in the Solid Bank Corp (Solid Bank), also in his personal
account. Eventually, PBCom paid MBTC and Solid Bank the amounts of the checks. In turn, MBTC and
Solid Bank credited the value of the checks to the personal accounts of Yu Kio.
Subsequently, when Filipinas Orient presented the four MBTC checks equivalent to P1,000,000.00 it
received from Yu Kio, they were dishonored by the drawee bank. Pipe Master, the drawer, refused to
pay the amounts of the checks, claiming that it never received the proceeds of the PBCom checks as
they were delivered and paid to the wrong party, Yu Kio, who was not the named payee.
Filipinas Orient then demanded that PBCom restore to its (Orient’s) account the value of the PBCom
checks. In turn, PBCom sought reimbursement from MBTC and Solid Bank, being the collecting banks,
but they refused. Thus, Filipinas Orient filed with the RTC, a complaint for a sum of money against Pipe
Master, Tan Juan Lian and/or PBCom.
CA affirmed in toto the Decision of the trial court. Hence, the instant consolidated petitions filed by
MBTC and Solid Bank.
ISSUE: WON Metro Bank and Solid Bank, petitioners, are liable to respondent Filipinas Orient for
accepting the PBCom crossed checks payable to Pipe Master
HELD:
A check is defined by law as a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand The NIL is
silent with respect to crossed checks. Nonetheless, this Court has taken judicial cognizance of
the practice that a check with two parallel lines on the upper left hand corner means that it
could only be deposited and not converted into cash. The crossing of a check with the phrase
“Payee’s Account Only” is a warning that the check should be deposited in the account of the
payee. It is the collecting bank which is bound to scrutinize the check and to know its depositors
before it can make the clearing indorsement, “all prior indorsements and/or lack of indorsement
guaranteed.”
Here, petitioner banks have the obligation to ensure that the PBCom checks were deposited in
accordance with the instructions stated in the checks. The four PBCom checks in question had
been crossed and issued “for payee’s account only.” This could only mean that the drawer,
Filipinas Orient, intended the same for deposit only by the payee, Pipe Master. The effect of
crossing a check means that the drawer had intended the check for deposit only by the rightful
person, i.e., the payee named therein – Pipe Master.
The banks accommodated Yu Kio, being a valued client and the president of Pipe Master, and
accepted the crossed checks. They stamped at the back thereof that “all prior indorsements
and/or lack of indorsements are guaranteed.” In so doing, they became general
endorsers. Under Section 66 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, an endorser warrants “that the
instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be; that he has a good title to it;
that all prior parties had capacity to contract; and that the instrument is at the time of his
indorsement valid and subsisting.”
Clearly, petitioner banks, being endorsers, cannot deny liability.
o In Associated Bank v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the collecting bank or last
endorser generally suffers the loss because it has the duty to ascertain the genuineness
of all prior indorsements and is privy to the depositor who negotiated the check.
PBCom, as the drawee bank, cannot be held liable since it mainly relied on the express
guarantee made by petitioners, the collecting banks, of all prior indorsements.
Evidently, petitioner banks disregarded established banking rules and procedures. They were
negligent in accepting the checks and allowing the transaction to push through. Therefore,
petitioner banks are liable to respondent Filipinas Orient.
In fine, it must be emphasized that the law imposes on the collecting bank the duty to diligently
scrutinize the checks deposited with it for the purpose of determining their genuineness and
regularity. The collecting bank, being primarily engaged in banking, holds itself out to the public
as the expert on this field, and the law thus holds it to a high standard of conduct. Since
petitioner banks’ negligence was the direct cause of the misappropriation of the checks, they
should bear and answer for respondent Filipinas Orient’s loss, without prejudice to their filing of
an appropriate action against Yu Kio.
Facts: The Ministry of Education and Culture issued 15 checks drawn against respondent which petitioner accepted
for deposit on various dates. After 24 hours from submission of the checks to respondent for clearing, petitioner paid
the value of the checks and allowed the withdrawals of the deposits. However, on 14 October 1981, respondent
returned all the checks to petitioner without clearing them on the ground that they were materially altered. Thus,
petitioner instituted an action for collection of sums of money against respondent to recover the value of the checks.
Issue: Whether the alterations in the serial numbers of the check is a material alteration.
Held: No. Sections 124 and 125 of Act No. 2031, otherwise known as the Negotiable Instruments Law, provide:
SEC. 124. Alteration of instrument; effect of. ― Where a negotiable instrument is materially altered without the
assent of all parties liable thereon, it is avoided, except as against a party who has himself made, authorized, or
assented to the alteration and subsequent indorsers. But when an instrument has been materially altered and is in the
hands of a holder in due course, not a party to the alteration, he may enforce payment thereof according to its
original tenor.
SEC. 125. What constitutes a material alteration. ― Any alteration which changes: (a) The date; (b) The sum
payable, either for principal or interest; (c) The time or place of payment; (d) The number or the relations of the
parties; (e) The medium or currency in which payment is to be made; or which adds a place of payment where no
place of payment is specified, or any other change or addition which alters the effect of the instrument in any
respect, is a material alteration.
An alteration is said to be material if it alters the effect of the instrument. It means an unauthorized change in an
instrument that purports to modify in any respect the obligation of a party or an unauthorized addition of words or
numbers or other change to an incomplete instrument relating to the obligation of a party. In other words, a material
alteration is one which changes the items which are required to be stated under Section 1 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law.
The case at the bench is unique in the sense that what was altered is the serial number of the check in question, an
item which, it can readily be observed, is not an essential requisite for negotiability under Section 1 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law. The aforementioned alteration did not change the relations between the parties. The
name of the drawer and the drawee were not altered. The intended payee was the same. The sum of money due to
the payee remained the same.
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FACTS:
DECS issued a check in favor of Abante Marketing containing a specific serial number, drawn
against PNB. The check was deposited by Abante in
its account with Capitol and the latter consequently deposited the same
with its account with PBCOM which later deposited it with petitioner for
clearing. The check was thereafter cleared. However, on a relevant date,
petitioner PNB returned the check on account that there had been a material alteration on
it. Subsequent debits were made but Capitol cannot debit the account of Abante any longer for the
latter had withdrawn all the money already from the account. This prompted Capitol to seek
reclarification from PBCOM and demanded the recrediting of its account. PBCOM followed suit by
doing the same against PNB. Demands unheeded,
it filed an action against PBCOM and the latter filed a third-party complaint against petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not such alteration should adversely affect the negotiability of the instrument
HELD:
An alteration is said to be material if it alters the effect of the instrument. It means an unauthorized
change in the instrument that purports to modify
in any respect the obligation of a party or an unauthorized addition of words or numbers or other
change to an incomplete instrument relating to
the obligation of the party. In other words, a material alteration is one which changes the items
which are required to be stated under Section 1 of the NIL.
In this case, the alleged material alteration was the alteration of the serial
number of the check in issue—which is not an essential element of a negotiable instrument under
Section 1. PNB alleges that the alteration was
material since it is an accepted concept that a TCAA check by its very
nature is the medium of exchange of governments, instrumentalities and
agencies. As a safety measure, every government office or agency is assigned checks bearing
different serial numbers.
But this contention has to fail. The check’s serial number is not the sole indicia of its origin. The name
of the government agency issuing the check is clearly stated therein. Thus, the check’s drawer is
sufficiently identified, rendering redundant the referral to its serial number.
Therefore, there being no material alteration in the check committed, PNB could not return the check to
PBCOM. It should pay the same.