Labor Law Case Digest

LABOR LAW I –November 11, 2017  The San Miguel Sales Forces Union (PTGWO), representing
the salesmen and helpers within Metro Manila, filed a

2. San Miguel Corp. vs. NLRC
complaint with the Bureau of Labor Relations praying that
Facts: SMC be compelled to pay in proper cases the difference in
monetary benefits between what it had theretofore been
 On May 1, 1974, the Labor Code brought into being a new
granting and that payable under the Labor Code.
employees’ compensation program.
 The Union filed a second complaint with the Labor Arbiters

 Prior to the inauguration of this new compensation program, it
Office, accusing SMC of non compliance with the
had been the practice of SMC to grant to its salesmen and
requirements of PD 851 of premium pay for work done during
helpers suffering work-connected sickness or disability, their
rest days and holidays, and underpayment of wages under PD
basic salary and other benefits consisting of average
928.
commission one sack of rice per month, free hospitalization
and cost of living allowance.
 Conciliation proceedings failed to bring an amicable
settlement.
 The aggregate value of these benefits was, of course, higher
than the corresponding benefits under the Workmen’s
 LA: Sustained the Union. SMC is under legal obligation to pay
Compensation Act.
the union members who have suffered industrial accident and
illnesses, the difference between what they receive from the
 This practice was discontinued by petitioner, on effectivity of
State Insurance Fund and their monthly salary as this has
the new compensation scheme.
been its practice and policy before the effectivity of the Code.
 It registered itself and its employees with the Social Security

 NLRC: Affirmed. Hence, this petition.
System, commenced to pay to the State Insurance Fund the
required monthly premium contributions and started to comply
 ISSUES:
with all the obligations imposed on all employers by the new
1. Whether the Bureau of Labor Relations has jurisdiction
law.
DINO - LAPEZ - MANGUERA - MORALES, C. - MORALES, I. – UMANGAY

2. Whether or not the Labor Code put an end to the SMC’s o It is evident that what was sought to be litigated by the
voluntarily assumed obligation, prior to the Code’s enactment, union before the Bureau of Labor relations was the
of paying work-connected disability benefits to its employees matter of its members’ entitlement to benefits for work-
connected disability. Hence fall within the catch-all
 RULING: phrase “any other matter related thereto.”
1. NO.
2. NO.
o At the time of the initiation (January 1978) of the
proceedings before the Bureau of Labor Relations by o The right to compensation or benefit for the loss or
the Union, for the purpose of defining and in effect impairment of an employee’s earning capacity due to
expanding the benefits otherwise due to its members work-related illness or injury is premised on the
under the new compensation program of the Labor occurrence of the illness or injury. It accrues upon, and
Code, the Bureau – and the LA and the NLRC – had not before, the happening of these contingencies.
no jurisdiction of the subject matter thereof.
o Since as has already been stated, claims for indemnity
o That particular subject matter had already been placed under the Labor Code are to be adjudicated “in
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the SSS accordance with the law an rules at the time their
subject to appeal to the Employee’s Compensation causes of action accrued,” the benefits due to an
Commission. Art. 180 of the Labor Code provides: employee suffering from a compensable disability must
“The system shall have original and exclusive be computed in accordance with the method existing at
jurisdiction to settle any dispute from this Title the time of the illness or the injury.
with respect to coverage, entitlement to benefits
collection and payment of contributions and o It is thus obvious that an employee acquires no vested
penalties thereon, or any other matter related right to a program of compensation benefits simply
thereto, subject to appeal to the Commission, because it was operative at the time he became
which shall decide appealed cases within 20 employed and had been subsequently discontinued.
working days from the submission of evidence.” That he must have incurred the illness or injury during
the program’s effectivity, given the cut-off date set by
law, is the only fact which operates to vest the right to

be indemnified according to either the phased-out  ISSUES: Whether the brain tumor which causes are
scheme or the new one. unknown but contracted during employment is
compensable?
3. Raro vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission  RULING:

o NO.
Facts:
o Section 1(b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on
 Zaida Raro states that she was in perfect health when Employees Compensation clearly defines who are
employed as a clerk by the Bureau of Mines and Geo- entitled. It provides:
Sciences at its Daet, Camarines Norte regional office on “For the sickness and the resulting disability or
March 17, 1975. death to be compensable, the sickness must be
the result of an occupational disease listed
 Four years later, she began suffering from severe and under Annex A of these rules with the
recurrent headaches coupled with blurring of vision. She conditions set therein satisfied, otherwise, proof
sought medical treatment in Manila. She was then a Mining must be shown that the risk of contracting the
Recorder in the Bureau. disease is increased by the working conditions.”
 She was diagnosed at the Makati Medical Center to be o The law requires the claimant to prove a positive thing
suffering from brain tumor. By that time, her memory, – that the illness was caused by employment and the
sense of time, vision, and reasoning power had been lost. risk of contracting the disease is increased by the
working conditions.
 A claim for disability benefits filed by her husband with the

GSIS was denied. o To say that since the proof is not available, therefore,
the trust fund has the obligation to pay is contrary to
 On appeal, the Employees’ Compensation Commission the legal requirement that proof must be adduced. The
affirmed. existence of otherwise non-existent proof cannot be
presumed.

o The Court recognized the fact that cancer is a disease  GSIS, however, denied the claim on the ground that at the
of still unknown origin which strikes people in all walks time of SPO2 Alegres death, he was performing a personal
of life, employed or unemployed. Unless it be shown activity which was not work-connected. Subsequent appeal to
that a particular form of cancer is caused by specific the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) proved
working conditions, the Court cannot conclude that it futile as said body, in a decision dated May 9, 1996, merely
was the employment which increased the risk of affirmed the ruling of the GSIS. However, the CA reversed the
contracting the disease. decision when appealed.
Citing Nitura v. Employees Compensation Commission[3] and

o Hence, the Commission’s ruling is affirmed.
Employees Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals,[4] the
appellate court explained the conclusion arrived at, thus:
4. GSIS VS. CA  [T]he Supreme Court held that the concept of a workplace
cannot always be literally applied to a person in active duty
FACTS:
status, as if he were a machine operator or a worker in an
 Private respondent Felonila Alegres is the wife of the assembly line in a factory or a clerk in a particular fixed office.
deceased SPO2 Alegre who was a police officer assigned to

It is our considered view that, as applied to a peace officer, his work
the PNP.
place is not confined to the police precinct or station but to any place
 On December 6, 1994, he was driving his tricycle and ferrying
where his services, as a lawman, to maintain peace and security, are
passengers within the vicinity of Imelda Commercial Complex
required.
when SPO4 Alejandro Tenorio, Jr., Team/Desk Officer of the
Police Assistance Center located at said complex, confronted
 At the time of his death, Alegre was driving a tricycle at the
him regarding his tour of duty. SPO2 Alegre allegedly snubbed
northeastern part of the Imelda Commercial Complex where
SPO4 Tenorio and even directed curse words upon the latter.
the police assistance center is located. There can be no
A verbal tussle then ensued between the two which led to the
dispute therefore that he met his death literally in his place of
fatal shooting of the deceased police officer.
work.
 On account of Alegres death, his wife filed a claim for death
benefits with the GSIS pursuant to PD 626.

 However, the argument, though initially plausible, overlooks difficult to understand then why SPO2 Alegres widow
the fact that policemen, by the nature of their functions, are should be denied the claims otherwise due her.
deemed to be on a round-the-clock duty.
 Obviously, the matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to at
the time he met his death, that of ferrying passengers for
ISSUE: WON the death of SPO2 Alegre is compensable pursuant to
a fee, was intrinsically private and unofficial in nature
the applicable laws and regulations.
proceeding as it did from no particular directive or
RULING: NO permission of his superior officer.
 In the absence of such prior authority as in the cases of

Under the pertinent guidelines of the ECC on compensability, it is
Hinoguin and Nitura, or peacekeeping nature of the act
provided that for the injury and the resulting disability or death to be
attended to by the policeman at the time he died even
compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident
without the explicit permission or directive of a superior
satisfying all of the following conditions:
officer, as in the case of P/Sgt. Alvaran, there is no
(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where justification for holding that SPO2 Alegre met the
his work requires him to be; requisites set forth in the ECC guidelines. That he may be
called upon at any time to render police work as he is
(2) The employee must have been performing his official
considered to be on a round-the-clock duty and was not
functions; and
on an approved vacation leave will not change the
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must conclusion arrived at considering that he was not placed
have been executing an order for the employer. in a situation where he was required to exercise his
 Taking together jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines authority and duty as a policeman. In fact, he was refusing
of the ECC with respect to claims for death benefits, to render one pointing out that he already complied with
namely: (a) that the employee must be at the place where the duty detail.
his work requires him to be; (b) that the employee must  At any rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine, as applied to
have been performing his official functions; and (c) that if policemen and soldiers, serves more as an after-the-fact
the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must validation of their acts to place them within the scope of
have been executing an order for the employer, it is not the guidelines rather than a blanket license to benefit
them in all situations that may give rise to their deaths.
 In other words, the 24-hour duty doctrine should not be request having been denied, he made arrangement for a loan
sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing of P250.00 from the company. The company filed a report with
the death of a police officer but only to those which, the Workmen's Compensation Commission manifesting its
although not on official line of duty, are nonetheless desire to controvert the claim if one is filed later.
basically police service in character.  Deceased's widow filed a formal claim for compensation which
was referred to a hearing officer who, after hearing, rendered
decision ordering the company to pay to claimant death
benefits, reimbursements, burial expense and attorney’s fees.
 The company filed a petition for reconsideration based on
three grounds:
5. LUZON STEVEDORING CO. INC VS. WCC (January 31, 1964)
o (a) there was no causal connection between Cordero's
FACTS: death and his employment as a sailor;
o (b) Cordero's death was due to his own negligence;
 Deceased Antonio Cordero was employed as a sailor on a and
barge of the Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. receiving a wage of o (c) claimant's right, if will, is already barred by Section
verify P28.00 a week. His duty was to look after the safety of 24 of Act 3428, as amended.
the barge and its cargo especially in the absence of the
patron. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AFFIRMED.
 On 1956, Cordero, having been requested by the patron to
ISSUE: WON the death of Antonio Cordero is compensable.
take over, was left alone in charge of the barge.
 Two days later his lifeless body was found floating in the
1. Whether the claimant’s right is already barred by Sec. 24
Pasig river by Det. Labao of the Manila Police Department. A
of Act 3428, as amended.
post-mortem examination revealed that he died of asphyxia as
2. Whether there was a causal connection between Cordero’s
a result of submersion in water.
death and his employment as a sailor.
 After the incident, Ramon Relente president of the union to
3. Whether Cordero’s death was due to his own negligence.
which the deceased belonged, reported the matter to the
officer in charge of the marine department of the company and RULING: YES (1. No; 2. Yes; 3. No)
asked for financial aid to the family of the deceased, and this

1. Under section 24 of Act 3428, in order for a claim for 2. While in the strict sense death caught up with Cordero when
compensation may prosper, it is necessary that it be made not he was not in the barge where he is supposed to be for 24
later than three months after the death of the deceased and hours watching and taking care of it but swimming with some
that if that is not done the claim may considered of no legal companions somewhere in the Pasig river near where the
effects. barge was moored, it may be said that he died in line of duty
for he was then undertaking something that is necessary
 However, in this case, it pears that when Antonio to his personal need and comfort since the taking of bath
Cordero died notice of his death was given by Ramon is not only habitual in a sailor but necessary to the human
Relente two or three days thereof to the officer in body.
charge of the marine department of the company.
Relente likewise asked the company to extend certain  He went swimming not for pleasure, not for fun, but in
financial aid to the family of the victim and when this answer to the daily need nature, in the same manner
was denied he made representations that some loan as a human being needs to answer other calls, such as
extended to it to cover the expenses it may have to eating, sleeping and the like. When these needs are
face as a result of Cordero's death. satisfied in the course of employment and something
 We believe that such request for financial aid can be takes place that may cause injury, harm or death to the
considered as advance filing of claim in employee or laborer, it is fair and logical that the
contemplation of law for then the company cannot happening be considered as one occurring in the
plead surprise the preparation of its defense, this being course of employment for under the circumstances it
the only tenable reason for requiring an early filing of cannot be undertaken in any other way.
the claim on the part of the employee or heirs of the  The situation would be different if the mishap occurs in
deceased. a manner that it may clearly show that the laborer has
 This is especially so taking into account that under acted beyond his duty or course of employment. Not so
Section 44 of the same Act it is presumed that "the in this case.
claim comes within the provision of the Act and that
sufficient notice thereof was given." This provision 3. Neither can it be contended that in going out with some
should be liberally construed. companions to swim the deceased is guilty of notorious
negligence for the reason that if his purpose was to take a

bath he could have done it with the aid of a water tank on purchased by his agents to Nueva Ecija or Tarlac, the same
board the barge. had to be ferried in bancas across the Magat River in Aurora,
Isabela, towards the other bank, which is Cabatuan; from
 If the deceased were one who does not know how to Cabatuan side to Guimba, the palay were hauled by truck
swim or is not a sailor accustomed to the perils of the which was regularly driven by Valentin Lagman. Respondent's
water, the argument may have some value but not so truck driver on the Aurora side was Primitivo Apolonio
in the case of the deceased who undisputable was a  Because his child became seriously ill, Lagman engaged the
swimmer. services of Marciano Barawid to substitute him in undertaking
 He must have preferred to take a bath while swimming the trip to Isabela, with the understanding that he (Barawid),
than by pouring water over his body on board the was to receive his (Lagman's) pay during the latter's absence.
barge because of his awareness that he was swimmer  Barawid drove respondent's truck up to the Cabatuan side of
and for him to swim in a river was merely routine. And the Magat River to await for the palay that were to be ferried
if he died in the course thereof it must be due to an from the Aurora side. On the same date, instead of awaiting
event that he has not foreseen. the palay on the Cabatuan side, Barawid crossed the Magat
 At any rate there is no clear evidence that his death River and joined Apolonio on the Aurora side in hauling the
was due to his notorious negligence and not to a palay. After having collected all the palay on the Aurora side,
cause which he could not have reasonably avoided.  Apolonio and Barawid reached the river's bank at about 9:00
o'clock in the evening, and both helped in loading three (3)
6. PAEZ vs. WCC
bancas. Apolonio advised Barawid not to ride the third banca
because same was already fully loaded, but to take another to
FACTS:
Guimba, as he had to drive a new truck of his brother-in-law.
 Paez and his wife were on and sometime before 1953, While in the midst of the Magat River, the banca capsized and
engaged in the business of buying palay for the King Tong sunk, and Barawid was drowned.
Seng Ricemill of Victoria, Tarlac, with the latter supplying the
ISSUE:
capital of P1,000.00 to P2,000.00.
 Paez had been buying palay in Isabela. For such purpose, he
1. WON the WCC has jurisdiction over the case;
employed agents, two truck drivers and two truck helpers, all
2. WON the death of Barawid arose out of and in the course
of whom were paid on commission basis. In bringing the palay
of employment.
RULING: enumerated therein are among those that are
considered hazardous or deleterious to the employees.
1. YES. The Workmen's Compensation Act No. 3428. as  True it is, that the mere act of buying and selling palay
amended provides — is in itself not hazardous, but when the one engaged in
the business used motor vehicles to transport the
SEC. 42. Law applicable to small industries.— All
goods, especially when, as in the instant case, the
claims for compensation by reason of an accident in an
place of purchase was very far from the place of sale
enterprise, industry, or business carried on or in a trade,
(Isabela to Tarlac), that business became inherently
occupation or profession exercised by an employer for the
hazardous and dangerous. To a driver, like the
purpose of gain, whose capital amounts to less than ten
deceased Barawid, risk on the road was great,
thousand pesos and is not hazardous or deleterious to
resulting from hold-ups and outlaws, falling into
employees, shall be governed by the provisions of Act
ravines, vehicular accidents of all sorts, collisions, tire
Numbered Eighteen hundred and seventy-four and its
blowouts, etc.
amendments: Provided, however, That the following
 There seem to be no serious discussion that the
enterprises or establishments shall be among those
regular use of motor vehicles by the claimant's own
considered hazardous or deleterious to employees:
employees makes the business hazardous
 The respondent Court found that petitioner was in a
(1) Any business for the transportation of persons
sense engaged in the transportation of goods (palay),
or goods, or both; ....
by charging freight from other persons who loaded their
 The regular use of motor vehicles, was indispensable palay in his trucks, thereby definitely classifying the
and essential in carrying on petitioner's business, and business of the petitioner as hazardous.
necessarily placed his business under the category of
2. The deceased Marciano Barawid left the International truck
hazardous enterprises. Without the use of motor
assigned to him and went to the other side of the Magat
vehicles, it would be extremely difficult for petitioner to
River (Aurora side) for the purpose of advising the other
conduct such business.
truck driver, Primitivo Apolonio, to have all the palay
 The provision of law above cited is not exclusive, for it
bought by the respondent's agent loaded early because he
clearly provides that the enterprises or establishments
was in a hurry to go back to Guimba. In fact, Barawid

joined Apolonio in the work of loading and unloading the employment.(Larsen's Workmen's
palay at the bank of the river to be ferried towards the Compensation Text, Vol. 7, p. P338)
Cabatuan side where the International truck was parked.
"Simply stated, 'if the act is one for the benefit of the employer or for
 The activities performed by Barawid, we believe, the mutual benefit of both, an injury arising out of it will usually be
were incidental to his duties not only as driver compensable.
but as purchaser of the respondent who was
engaged in the business of buying and selling
palay. It is reasonable to expect an employee,
7. LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.
as in the case of Barawid to help a co-employee
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and LEONARDA
in the performance of his duties. And even
VDA. DE HAYSON respondents.
granting, only for the sake of argument, that the
acts performed by the deceased were not strictly
FACTS:
within the bounds of his duties, still he was, in the
fullest sense of the term, in the course of the  The deceased Pantaleon Hayson was employed by the
employment. For the performance of those acts — respondent Luzon Stevedoring Corporation as a Gang Boss or
helping the other employee of the respondent load capataz with a daily wage of P 9.00. He was on duty as such
and unload palay — would inure to the benefit of capataz on board the M/V President Aguinaldo, while he and
the respondent in the pursuit of his business. other laborers were waiting for the cargoes and telling stories
As Arthur Larsen, an eminent authority on the to pass the time, the 3rd Officer of the M/V President
subject of Workmen's Compensation Laws, has put Aguinaldo approached them. Since there was a party on board
it: the boat at that time and since it was a cold night, the
o An act outside an employee's regular deceased asked for something to drink from the 3rd Officer.
duties which is undertaken in good faith So, the 3rd Officer left them for a while and when he returned
to advance the employer's interests, the latter gave them a half-filled bottle of pocket-size Tanduay
whether or not the employee's own Rhum.
assigned work is hereby furthered, is
within the course of

 The group then took turns in drinking from the said bottle with  Referee Martinez denied the motion for reconsideration. The
the deceased taking the first drink. After his co- workers drank entire record of the case was thus elevated to the Workmen's
from the supposed bottle of Tanduay Rhum they found out that Compensation Commission for review.
the contents of the said bottle was rot liquor but oil of winter  The Workmen's Compensation Commission affirmed the
green, About an hour after that the late Pantaleon Hayson decision appealed from.
complained of stomach pain and he was immediately brought
to the San Pedro Hospital where he due to poisoning  Petitioner insists that the deceased was notoriously negligent
according to the findings of the attending physician, and which because he drank from the bottle containing oil of wintergreen
was confirmed by the autopsy. not only once but continued to do so despite the unanimous
opinion of his companions for which reason his death falls
 It was also established that the deceased was not a heavy outside the compensatory coverage of the Workmen’s
drinker as testified to by Segundo Catalan also an employee of Compensation Act.
the respondent and who was present at the incident because
he was on duty together with the deceased. ISSUE:
Whether or not the claim for compensation benefit on account of

 From the facts as established, the Referee ruled that the death
Pantaleon’s demise due to accidental poisoning when he mistook oil
of Pantaleon Hayson arose out of and in the course of his
of wintergreen for Tanduay Rhum falls within the coverage of the
employment as capataz, and ordered Luzon Stevedoring
Workmen’s Compensation Act.
Corporation to pay the claimant for compensation and burial
expenses.
RULING:
 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Referee's  The Court ruled that the claim for compensation falls within the
decision raising as sole ground the allegation that Pantaleon coverage of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
Hayson was notoriously negligent, hence, his death is not
compensable under Section 4 of Act 3428, as amended.  To constitute notorious negligence, it must be shown that the
act of the deceased entirely wants in care as to raise a
presumption that he was conscious of the probable
consequences of his carelessness and indifferent to the

danger of injury to himself and other persons. It must be could not have distinguished the taste of the kind of wine, so
equivalent to the doing of an intentional wrong. Certainly, this much so, that when his companions tasted the wine later, and
Commission cannot consider the attitude of the deceased in told him that it contained oil of wintergreen, he even bragged
the case at bar to constitute notorious negligence, because he that it was stateside, an act which projected his innocence.
was not aware of the probable consequences of his act, nor And even if he drank after he was told that the bottle contained
was it shown that there was an intent on his part to end his life. oil of wintergreen, still the same could not constitute notorious
If at all, his attitude simply constitutes simple negligence, negligence on his part, because there was no showing that he
which is well within the compensatory coverage of the Act. admitted knowledge that the contents of the bottle was oil of
wintergreen, nor was there a warning made by his companions
 It was established that the deceased was not a heavy drinker that drinking the same could be fatal to him.
and at the time they asked something to drink from the 3rd  Considering the philosophy behind the requirement that to be
Officer of the boat, the deceased or his companions were not compensable the death must occur while the worker is
shown to have drunk any liquor or anything that could have performing some work in the course of his employment, the
affected the mental state of the deceased at the time he asked authorities are to the effect that to come within the purview of
a drink from the said Officer. Nor was it shown that previous to such requirement, three things must concur: the injury must be
the incident, the deceased was so despondent that there was received during the period covered by the employment; the
an intention on his part to end his life. All that they did in worker must be shown to have been injured at the time and
asking for a drink from the Officer is what ordinary persons place where the performance of his work requires him to be;
would do under the circumstances. It was a cold night on and the worker must have been doing something in pursuance
board the boat and they were waiting for work, then, it was but of his work.
natural that they want to do something to alleviate the cold. In
the nature of their job, occasional drinking is quite ordinary and  In the instant case, the Court holds and rules that the above
does not in any way violate standard rules and regulations, conditions have been established and met. Indeed, acts
unless of course the same is done to the extent of causing reasonably necessary to health and comfort of an employee
drunkenness. Being not a drinker as he was, the deceased while at work, such as satisfaction of his thirst, hunger, or
could not be expected to know the different tastes of wines. other physical demands. or protecting himself from excessive
That what he drank contained oil of wintergreen made no cold, are incidental to the employment and injuries sustained
difference to him because as stated, he was not a drinker and in the performance of such acts are compensable as arising

out of and in the course of the employment. Island, Batanes. Rolando perished as a result of that incident.
 The law presumes that a claim is compensable, absent  Claiming that Rolando's untimely death at the age of twenty-
substantial evidence to the contrary. So this Court has five was due to the negligence of petitioner, his parents,
consistently and resolutely adhered to the doctrine that even respondents Felix Lim and Consorcia Geveia, sued petitioner
where the cause of death is unknown, the right to in the Court of First Instance for damages.
compensation subsists, the underlying philosophy being that
the Workmen's Compensation Act is a social loesiation  By way of affirmative defense, petitioner claimed that the
formulated in obeisance to the social justice guarantee of the private respondents had already been compensated by the
Constitution, its raison d'etre being to alleviate and ameliorate Workmen’s Compensation Commission (WCC) for the same
the plight of the workingman, and thus uplift the quality of life incident, for which reason they are now precluded from
of the laboring class. And so, it has been reiterated in a long seeking other remedies against the same employer under the
chain of workmen's compensation cases elevated to and Civil Code.
resolved by this Court that the Workmen's Compensation Law
should be construed fairly, reasonably and liberally in favor of  A protracted legal battle over procedural points ensued.
and for the benefit of employees and their dependents and an Finally, the case was set for pre-trial. Petitioner sought the
doubts as to the right of compensation as well as all dismissal of the complaint on
presumptions resolved in their favour.
 In his order, respondent Judge Avelino upheld respondents'
vigorous opposition and denied petitioner's motion to dismiss
for being unmeritorious. Its motion for reconsideration having
8. YSMAEL MARITIME CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. AVELINO,
met the same fate, petitioner filed the instant special civil
et al., respondents
action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction, contending that respondent judge acted
FACTS:
with grave abuse of discretion when he refused to dismiss the
 Rolando G. Lim, a licensed second mate, was on board the complaint for damages on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
vessel M/S Rajah, owned by petitioner Ysmael Maritime This Court subsequently granted a temporary restraining order
Corporation, when the same ran ground and sank near Sabtan

prohibiting the trial court from proceeding with the hearing of damages for the death of five miners in a cave in on June 28,
the case. 1967, this Court was confronted with three divergent opinions on
the exclusivity rule as presented by several amici curiae One
ISSUE: view is that the injured employee or his heirs, in case of death,
may initiate an action to recover damages [not compensation
Whether or not the compensation remedy under the Workmen's
under the Workmen's Compensation Act) with the regular courts
Compensation Act [WCA], and now under the Labor Code, for work-
on the basis of negligence of the employer pursuant to the Civil
connected death or injuries sustained by an employee, is exclusive of
Code. Another view, as enunciated in the Robles case, is that the
the other remedies available under the Civil Code.
remedy of an employee for work connected injury or accident is
exclusive in accordance with Section 5 of the WCA. A third view
RULING:
is that the action is selective and the employee or his heirs have
 The Court ruled that respondent Lim spouses cannot be allowed a choice of availing themselves of the benefits under the WCA or
to maintain their present action to recover additional damages of suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher
against petitioner under the Civil Code. In open court, respondent damages from the employer by reason of his negligence. But
Consorcia Geveia admitted that they had previously filed a claim once the election has been exercised, the employee or his heirs
for death benefits with the WCC and had received the are no longer free to opt for the other remedy. In other words, the
compensation payable to them under the WCA. It is therefore employee cannot pursue both actions simultaneously. This latter
clear that respondents had not only opted to recover under the Act view was adopted by the majority, in the Floresca case,
but they had also been duly paid. At the very least, a sense of fair reiterating as main authority its earlier decision in Pacaña vs.
play would demand that if a person entitled to a choice of Cebu Autobus Company, L-25382, April 30, 1982, 32 SCRA 442.
remedies made a first election and accepted the benefits thereof, In so doing, the Court rejected the doctrine of exclusivity of the
he should no longer be allowed to exercise the second option. rights and remedies granted by the WCA as laid down in the
"Having staked his fortunes on a particular remedy, [he] is Robles case. 'Three justices dissented.
precluded from pursuing the alternate course, at least until the
9. GSIS vs. CA
prior claim is rejected by the Compensation Commission
FACTS:
 In the recent case of Floresca vs. Philex Mining Company, L-
30642, April 30, 1985, 136 SCRA 141, involving a complaint for 

Efrenia D. Celoso was a classroom teacher assigned by the under our rules. Pursuant to the ECC resolution, the GSIS
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) in Panit- awarded petitioner permanent partial disability benefits
an, Capiz. She had been in the government teaching service corresponding to 45 months.
since 1951 up to November, 1985 when she retired (at 55) due
to poor health. While she was teaching her Grade I pupils the  The petitioner underwent a surgical operation on her
proper way of scrubbing and sweeping the floor, she spine. Her condition worsened.
accidentally slipped. Her back hit the edge of a desk. She later
complained of weak lower extremities and difficulty in walking.  The petitioner filed with the GSIS a petition for conversion
praying that her disability status be changed from
 She underwent an x-ray examination and results of the permanent partial disability to permanent total disability,
examination revealed that she had pulmonary tuberculosis with the corresponding adjustment of her disability
and a compression fracture in the spine with sclerosis. benefits.
After a second x-ray examination, she was found to be
suffering from Potts disease and was advised to undergo  However, the GSIS did not give the petition due course.
an operation.
 Efrenia Celoso then filed a petition with the Court of
 She filed with the GSIS a claim for disability benefits Appeals which decided in her favor.
under P.D. 626, as amended. The GSIS denied the claim
by reason of prescription, holding that the petitioner  Petitioner GSIS filed a petition and contends that the
should have filed her claim within one year from the period of 120 days is not the determining factor for an
occurrence of the contingency in March 1982. injury or an illness to be pronounced as permanent total
disability; that an injury or an illness that goes beyond the
 The petitioner appealed to the ECC. said period of 120 days may still be considered permanent
partial disability pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule X of the Rules on
 ECC reversed the decision of the GSIS and ruled that the Employees Compensation, as amended; and that she
application for leave of absence of herein petitioner with cannot further be entitled to her claim for conversion to
the Department of Education on July 19, 1982 is permanent total disability; that for any progression of a
considered a constructive filing of the compensation claim retired employees condition after the date of her

retirement is no longer within the compensatory coverage significance but on the loss of earning capacity.
of P.D. 626, since severance of an employee-employer Permanent total disability means disablement of an
relationship result to the release of the State Insurance employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work
Fund from any liability in the event of sickness and of a similar nature that she was trained for or accustomed
resulting disability or death after such retirement or to perform, or any kind of work which a person of her
separation from the service; and that having been granted mentality and attainment could do. It does not mean
the maximum benefits commensurate to the degree of her absolute helplessness. In the case at bar, with more
disability at retirement date, she is no longer entitled to reason private respondent should be granted permanent
additional compensation benefits. total disability benefits.
ISSUE:
 A person’s disability might not emerge at one precise moment
Whether or not private respondent Efrenia Celosos request for the in time but rather over a period of time. It is possible that an
conversion of her permanent partial disability to permanent total injury which at first was considered to be temporary may later
disability should be granted. on become permanent or one who suffers a partial disability
RULING: becomes totally and permanently disabled from the same
cause. While private respondent was awarded the benefits
 The Court rule for private respondent.
commensurate to the degree of her physical condition at the
Sec. 2, Rule X of the Rules on Employees time of her retirement, it is however not disputed by petitioner
Compensation states that: GSIS that private respondent later on became permanently
and totally disabled.
The income benefit shall be paid beginning
with the first day of disability. If caused by an
 Where an employee is constrained to retire at an early
injury, it shall not be paid longer than 120
age due to his illness and the illness persists even after
consecutive days except where such injury still
retirement, resulting in his continued unemployment, such
require medical attendance beyond 120 days, in
a condition amounts to total disability, which should entitle
which case benefit for temporary total disability
him to the maximum benefits allowed by law
shall be paid.
 Disability should not be understood more on its medical

10. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) v. THE described ailment. Her illness was evaluated as compensable
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ROSA BALAIS (Jan. 29, 1998) by the GSIS Medical Evaluation and Underwriting Group.
GSIS granted her temporary total disability (TTD) benefits for
FACTS: the period starting and subsequently, permanent partial
disability (PPD) benefits for nine months starting on March 2,
 Private respondent started working as an emergency
1990.
employee of the National Housing Authority (NHA) in 1952.
She then rose from the ranks until she was promoted to Chief
 The private respondent requested the GSIS for the conversion
Paying Cashier in 1984.
of the classification of her disability benefits from permanent
partial disability (PPD) to permanent total disability (PTD).
 Medical records disclose that on December 17, 1989, private
Such plea was denied by the GSIS on the ground that the
respondent suddenly experienced chills, followed by loss of
GSIS Medical Evaluation and Underwriting Department which
consciousness. She was brought to the Capitol Medical Center
evaluated her claim found no basis to alter its findings. That
where she was sedated but allowed to go home after three
the results of the physical examination did not satisfy the
hours.
criteria for permanent total disability. Moreover, she was told
that the pension granted to her was the maximum benefit due
 Later, on the same day, however, she vomited several times
her under the Rating Schedule established by the ECC.
and suffered from parie-occipital pains. She was again rushed
to U.E.R.M. Medical Center where she underwent a thorough
 The denial of her request then prompted private respondent to
medical examination. She was diagnosed to be suffering from
file a request for reconsideration of the earlier denial of her
Subarachnoid Hemorrhage Secondary to Ruptured
application for the conversion of her disability benefits from
Aneurysm. After undergoing craniotomy, she was finally
permanent partial disability to permanent total disability,
discharged from the hospital on January 20, 1990.
explaining that since the time of her operation she continued to
suffer from dizziness, headaches, loss of memory and inability
 Despite her operation, private respondent could not perform
to properly sleep. Moreover, she contended that there were
her duties as efficiently as she had done prior to her illness.
instances when she felt extremely weak and could not walk
This forced her to retire early from the government service on
without support. She further stated that she was required to
March 1, 1990 at the age of 62. Thus, private respondent filed
a claim for disability benefits with the GSIS for the above-
take medication for life. disability becomes totally and permanently disabled from the
same cause.
 The GSIS, however, denied reconsideration which denial was
later affirmed on appeal by the ECC in its decision.  The Court has ruled that disability should not be understood
more on its medical significance but on the loss of earning
 CA: Promulgated a decision favorable to private respondent. capacity. Private respondent’s persistent illness indeed forced
her to retire early which, in turn, resulted in her unemployment,
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is entitled to conversion of and loss of earning capacity.
her benefits from permanent partial disability to permanent total
disability.  It has been a consistent pronouncement of this Court that
permanent total disability means disablement of an
HELD: YES.
employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of a
similar nature that she was trained for or accustomed to
 While it is true that the degree of private respondent’s physical
perform, or any kind of work which a person of her mentality
condition at the time of her retirement was not considered as
and attainment could do.
permanent total disability, yet, it cannot be denied that her
condition subsequently worsened after her head operation and
 It is also important to note that private respondent was
consequent retirement. In fact, she suffered afterwards from
constrained to retire at the age of 62 years because of her
some ailments like headaches, dizziness, weakness, inability
impaired physical condition. This, again, is another indication
to properly sleep, inability to walk without support and failure to
that her disability is permanent and total. As held by this Court,
regain her memory. All these circumstances ineluctably
the fact of an employee’s disability is placed beyond question
demonstrate the seriousness of her condition, contrary to the
with the approval of the employees optional retirement, for
claim of petitioner. More than that, it was also undisputed that
such is authorized only when the employee is `physically
private respondent was made to take her medication for life.
incapable to render sound and efficient service.
 A person’s disability may not manifest fully at one precise

 In the case at bar, the denial of the claim for permanent total
moment in time but rather over a period of time. It is possible
disability benefit of private respondent who, for 38 long years
that an injury which at first was considered to be temporary
during her prime had rendered her best service with an
may later on become permanent or one who suffers a partial
unblemished record and who was compelled to retire on  The medical records of private respondent reveal that he was
account of her worsening condition, would indeed subvert the suffering from Acute Myocardial Infraction and was confined
salutary intentions of the law in favor of the worker. The Court, at the Notre Dame Hospital in Cotabato City from September
therefore, affirms the decision of the respondent Court of 13, 1988 to September 19, 1988 and at the Philippine Heart
Appeals decreeing conversion of private respondent’s Center from September 6, 1994 to September 26, 1994.
disability from permanent partial disability to permanent total
disability.  Thus, private respondent filed with the GSIS, Cotabato
Branch, a claim for compensation benefits under P.D. 626, as
11. GSIS v. CA (March 4, 1999) amended. Finding his application meritorious and his ailment
compensable, the GSIS awarded him a Temporary Total
FACTS:
Disability income benefit during the periods of July 16 to July
21, 1994 and August 24 to August 29, 1994, as well as
 On June 10, 1964, private respondent Romeo S. Bella was
reimbursement for medical expenses. Private respondent
employed by the Bureau of Animal Industry as a livestock
Romeo S. Bella was also granted a Permanent Partial
inspector. He retired from the service on August 16, 1986. On
Disability income benefit equivalent to thirty-eight (38) months
July 16, 1987, he was re-employed by the Department of
for his Ischemic Cardiomayopathy.
Agriculture as Agricultural Food Technologist and on March 1,
1994, promoted to the position of Agriculturist II.
 Private respondent requested for the conversion of his benefits
from Permanent Partial Disability to Permanent Total
 As disclosed by his records of employment, private
Disability, reasoning out that his ailments of Ischemic
respondent was suspended without pay from September 1,
Cardiomayopathy[6] and Chronic Obstructure Pulmonary
1993 to March 1, 1994. A month after, or on April 1, 1994, to
Disease rendered him unable to engage in any gainful
be precise, he was reinstated to his former position as
occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days, as
Agriculturist II at the Provincial Agricultural Office in Tacurong,
certified to by his attending physicians, Dr. Romulo Uy, Dr.
Sultan Kudarat. On July 1, 1995, private respondent who was
Anne Marie Luat, Dr. Danilo Rustia, Dr. Juanito Lastimosa and
then 56years old, filed a terminal leave of absence due to
Dr. Eldefonso Maglasang.
physical disability.

 GSIS denied his request for Permanent Total Disability on the  Petitioner contends that the criteria for Permanent Total
ground that the degree of private respondents disability as Disability, like permanent complete paralysis of two limbs
evaluated by petitioners medical officers, did not satisfy the have not been met by private respondent’s ailment and
criteria for Permanent Total Disability. His motion for physical condition. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor
reconsideration was similarly denied. General, total disability does not mean a state of absolute
helplessness, but disablement of an employee to earn wages
 On appeal, the Employees Compensation Commission in the same kind of work or a work of similar nature, that he
(ECC) affirmed the Decision of the GSIS, denying private was trained or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work
respondents request for conversion of his Permanent Partial which a person of his mentality and attachments could do.
Disability benefit to Permanent Total Disability benefit.
 The fact that he was forced to retire at the early age of 56,
 CA: Came out with its decision reversing the Decision of the due to a sickness disabling him from performing his job as
Employees Compensation Commission. Agriculturist II, qualifies his disability as a Permanent Total
Disability, though he lost no use of any particular anatomical
ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to part of his body.
permanent total disability benefits.
 Also, no less than five doctors certified that private

HELD: YES.
respondents illness disabled him from performing any gainful
Permanent Total Disability Permanent Partial occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days. Well
Disability
settled is the rule that a physicians report of sickness or
If as a result of the injury or If as a result of the injury or
sickness the employee is sickness the employee accident substantiates the disability claim.
unable to perform any gainful suffers a permanent partial
occupation for a continuous loss of the use of any part of
period exceeding 120 days his body.  It is then beyond cavil that the sickness of the private
except as otherwise provided respondent made him unable to perform any gainful
for in Rule X of these Rules. occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days, thus
entitling him to permanent total disability benefits.

 Clearly, the position taken by the GSIS and the ECC runs
counter to the avowed policy of the State to construe social
legislations liberally in favor of the beneficiaries. Section 18,
Article II of the Constitution, provides:
Sec. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social

economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare.
 All things studiedly considered, we are of the ineluctable

conclusion that the Court of Appeals erred not in granting
private respondents claim for Permanent Total Disability
benefits.

12. IJARES v. CA, ECC & GSIS evaluated medically compensable he was only granted
Permanent Partial Disability compensation, equivalent to a
FACTS: period of nineteen (19) months beginning June 1, 1985 to
December 31, 1986. His subsequent request for an award of
 Petitioner was employed by the government on March 16,
his original claim was denied by the System on the ground
1955 as a Researcher in the Institute of National Language of
that the petitioner was already awarded the maximum benefits
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). In
commensurate to the degree of his disability at the time of
1983, he was diagnosed by Dr. Merlin B. Consing, a
retirement. The matter was elevated to the Employees
Phthisiologist, to have PTB Minimal and Emphysema. Since
Compensation Commission (ECC) which, in due, time affirmed
then, he has undergone medical treatment.
the finding of the GSIS, ratiocinating thus:
 From May 1 to 31, 1985, petitioner went on sick leave due to

o After going over the records of the case under
chronic emphysema. On June 1, 1985, he availed of early
consideration, we agree with the decision of the
retirement under Presidential Decree No. 1146 bringing to a
respondent System in denying appellants claim for
close thirty (30) years of public service. He was sixty (60)
additional compensation. Under the ECC Schedule of
years old at the time of his retirement.
Compensation, appellant was already awarded the
maximum benefits commensurate to the degree of his
 Sometime in 1988, petitioner was confined at the Philippine
disability at the time of his retirement from the service.
General Hospital (PGH) due to Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary
The confinement of appellant at the Philippine General
Diseases, Emphysema, PTB class IV and S/P Pneumothorax,
Hospital sometime in January, 1988 due to PTB,
Right. He underwent a Pulmonary Function Test which
minimal with Pulmonary Emphysema, Bilateral, could
indicated Severe Obstructive Ventilatory Pattern unresponsive
not be attributed to his employment considering that he
to Bronchodilator. Dr. Leon James Young of the UP-PGH
retired from the service on June 1, 1985, hence, the
Medical Center found petitioner to be suffering from
risk of his employment aggravating his PTB was
Permanent Total Disability.
unlikely. For any progression of a retired employees
condition after the date of his retirement is no longer
 On January 5, 1989, petitioner filed with the Government
within the compensatory coverage of P. D. 626, as
Service Insurance System (GSIS) a claim for Permanent Total
amended, since severance of an employee-employer
Disability benefits under P. D. No. 626. After his ailment was
relationship results to the release of the State  On the other hand, the respondent Commission contended
Insurance Fund from any liability in the event of that the mere inability to perform gainful occupation for a
sickness and resulting disability or death after such period exceeding 120 days due to his illness or injury does not
retirement or separation from the service. Thus, claim entitle him (petitioner) to the benefits claimed. Respondent
of appellant for additional compensation benefits could Commission also seeks to deny further liability to the petitioner
not be given favorable consideration. on account of the non-compensable nature of the illness of the
latter, alleging that the confinement of petitioner at the PGH
 Court of Appeals came out with the assailed decision sometime in 1988 due to the same ailment could not be
affirming the disposition of the respondent Commission. attributed to his employment considering that he retired from
the service on June 1, 1985.
ISSUE: Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in not adjudging him
entitled to his original income benefits claim for Permanent Total
 It is abundantly clear that petitioner’s disability cannot be
Disability and not Permanent Partial Disability as found by the
considered as anything less than permanent and total. As
respondent Commission.
attested to by the declaration of his physician and his medical
HELD: YES. history, it does not appear that petitioner comes within the
coverage of Rule X which should, in effect, only provide for
 Petitioner anchors his position on the fact that he was unable
entitlement to temporary total disability benefits. The early
to perform any gainful occupation for a period exceeding 120
retirement of an employee due to work-related ailment proves
days by reason of his illness. It is his submission that his
that indeed the employee was disabled totally to further
illness was acquired during his employment with the
perform his assigned task, and to deny permanent total
government, the same illness which caused him to avail of an
disability benefits when he was forced to retire would render
early retirement in 1985 and to be confined in 1988 at the
inutile and meaningless the social justice precept guaranteed
Philippine General Hospital. Further, petitioner theorizes that
by the Constitution.
the diagnosis by his physician, Dr. Leon James Young,
declaring him to be permanently and totally disabled should
 No amount of dodging by the respondent System will alter the
have prodded the Commission to grant his original claim.
undeniable fact that the illness of petitioner was contracted
while he was still in the service. This much is established as a
result of the grant to him by the System of permanent partial

disability, after inevitably ruling on the compensable nature of reason therefor his inability to continue working as a result of
said illness. his physical disability.
 The Court finds as devoid of any basis on record the  The petitioner likewise filed with the Government Service
conclusion of the Court of Appeals that modern medicine can Insurance System (GSIS) an application for "income benefits
easily heal petitioner’s particular ailment if he is really taking all claim for payment" under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 626, as
the care of a diligent patient. While it may be true that the law amended. Both applications were accompanied by the
on disability benefits does not preclude the possibility that one necessary supporting papers, among them being a
who receives benefits under a permanent total disability may "Physician's Certification" issued by the petitioner's attending
eventually be gainfully employed or recover from his doctor at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center.
permanent total disability, thus suspending the benefits, such
possibility however does not justify the denial of a claim for a  Petitioner was diagnosed suffering from: Osteoarthritis,
permanent total disability which rightfully pertains to the multiple; Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease; Cardiomegaly;
claimant. The petitioner is hereby declared entitled to benefits and Left Ventricular Hypertrophy; and classified him as being
under Permanent Total Disability. No pronouncement as to under "permanent total disability."
costs.
 The petitioner's application for income benefits claim payment
was granted but only for permanent partial disability (PPD)
13. Vicente vs ECC compensation or for a period of nineteen months.
Facts:
 Domingo Vicente, was formerly employed as a nursing  The petitioner requested the General Manager of the GSIS to
attendant at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center in Quezon reconsider the award given him and prayed that the same be
City. extended beyond nineteen months invoking the findings of his
attending physician, as indicated in the latter's Certification.
 At the age of forty-five, and after having rendered more than
twenty-five years of government service, he applied for  As a consequence of his motion for reconsideration, and on
optional retirement (effective August 16, 1981) under the the basis of the "Summary of Findings and Recommendation"
provisions of Section 12(c) of Republic Act No. 1616, giving as of the Medical Services Center of the GSIS, the petitioner was

granted the equivalent of an additional four (4) months attending physician is not binding on the GSIS, nor on the
benefits. Still unsatisfied, the petitioner again sent a letter to Commission, as the proper evaluation of an employee's
the GSIS Disability Compensation Department Manager on degree of disability exclusively belongs to the GSIS medical
November 6, 1986, insisting that he (petitioner) should be experts who have specialized on the subject.
compensated no less than for "permanent total disability."  Hence, this petition.
 The said manager informed the petitioner that his request had ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner suffers from permanent
been denied. Undaunted, the petitioner sought reconsideration total disability.
and as a result of which, on September 10, 1987, his case was
elevated to the respondent Employees Compensation HELD: YES. The decision of the respondent Employees’
Commission (ECC). Later, or on October 1, 1987, the Compensation Commission (ECC) was set aside.
petitioner notified the respondent Commission that he was
confined at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center for "CVA  The petitioner’s permanent total disability is established
probably thrombosis of the left middle cerebral artery." beyond doubt by several factors and circumstances.
Noteworthy is the fact that from all available indications, it
 ECC—affirmed the decision of GSIS Disability Compensation appears that the petitioner’s application for optional
and denied the appeal of petitioner. retirement on the basis of his ailments had been
approved. Considering that the petitioner was only 45
 Petitioner’s Contention: petitioner maintains that his disability years old when he retired and still entitled, under good
is "permanent total" and not "permanent partial" as classified behavior, to 20 more years in service, the approval of his
by the respondent Commission. In support of his position, the optional retirement application proves that he was no
petitioner points to the clinical evaluation and certification longer fit to continue in his employment. For optional
earlier adverted to issued by his attending physicians at the retirement is allowed only upon proof that the employee-
Veterans Memorial Medical Center. applicant is already physically incapacitated to render
sound and efficient service.
 Respondent’s Contention: argues that the petitioner only
suffers from "permanent partial disability" and not from  Court's pronouncements that while "permanent total disability"
"permanent total disability." The findings of the petitioner's invariably results in an employee's loss of work or inability to

perform his usual work, "permanent partial disability," on the to continue in his employment. For optional retirement is
other hand, occurs when an employee loses the use of any allowed only upon proof that the employee-applicant is already
particular anatomical part of his body which disables him to physically incapacitated to render sound and efficient service.
continue with his former work. Stated otherwise, the test of
whether or not an employee suffers from "permanent total 14. Manila Railroad Co vs Perez
disability" is a showing of the capacity of the employee to FACTS:
continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he  That claimant Daniel Perez was first employed by the
incurred. Thus, if by reason of the injury or sickness he respondent company as a sixth class assistant conductor in its
sustained, the employee is unable to perform his customary transportation department on September 1, 1959; that since
job for more than 120 days and he does not come within the then, he was assigned to different positions until he was made
coverage of Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees second class assistant conductor on May 10, 1946 with an
Compensability (which, in a more detailed manner, describes annual salary of P1,800.00;
what constitutes temporary total disability), then the said
employee undoubtedly suffers from "permanent total disability"  That as a second class assistant conductor, his work
regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his consisted of: (1) attending to the tickets of the passengers, (2)
body. helping lift the baggages of old passengers boarding the train,
and (3) sometimes giving signals as requested by his
 In the case at bar, the petitioner's permanent total disability is superiors. The evidence also shows that because the
established beyond doubt by several factors and schedules of the train were not the same, he sometimes
circumstances.1âwphi1 Noteworthy is the fact that from all worked seven (7) or eight (8) hours a day and that he started
available indications, it appears that the petitioner's application his tour of duty sometimes at 3:00 o'clock a.m. or 3:00 o'clock
for optional retirement on the basis of his ailments had been p.m.
approved. The decision of the respondent Commission even  The records further reveal that because of prolonged absence
admits that the petitioner "retired from government service at due to his pulmonary tuberculosis, the claimant was dismissed
the age of 45." Considering that the petitioner was only 45 from the service on November 16, 1944; that on May 10, 1946,
years old when he retired and still entitled, under good he was again allowed to work and assigned as second class
behavior, to 20 more years in service, the approval of his assistant conductor
optional retirement application proves that he was no longer fit

 October, 1950 claimant met with an accident while acting on aggravated by the same, and that, even if so aggravated, it is
the advice of his superior, Chief Conductor Silva, claimant not compensable.
applied for retirement which was approved effective January 1,
1951, the reason of Chief Conductor Silva in advising the HELD:
claimant to seek retirement being the latter's poor health due  Respondent started working for petitioner on September 1,
to serious pulmonary tuberculosis. 1939, and there is no evidence that he was then submitted to
medical examination.
 Respondent filed his claim for compensation, which was
controverted by petitioner herein. After due hearing, the Chief  He appeared to be suffering from tuberculosis, for he then
Hearing Officer of the Workmen's Compensation Commission spat two spoonfuls of blood. There was a recurrence of this
rendered a decision, dated February 6, 1962, holding that it incident in 1943 and again in 1945. He was given artificial
had not been shown that respondent had contracted his pneumothorax in 1944 and, also, in 1946. Thereafter, the
disease "in the course of his employment and by reason of illness admittedly went from bad to worse.
factors traceable to the nature of his employment" and that
"the aggravation of his sickness was due to the natural  In other words, the records do not show clearly that
development thereof", and, accordingly dismissing the claim respondent's illness was contracted in the course of the
upon the theory that it is not compensable. employment, and the fact that he spat blood several months
after he had begun to work for petitioner suggests that he
 Elevated to the Commission, said decision of the Chief probably had it then in a latent or mild condition; but we are
Hearing Officer was reversed by the Acting Chairman of the satisfied, as the Commission was, that the illness was
Commission, who rendered the appealed decision, which, on aggravated by the nature of his employment.
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner herein, was
upheld by the Commission en banc.  In this connection, it should be noted that our Workmen's
Compensation Law is patterned after similar laws in the
 Hence, this petition. United States, under which compensation for disability
resulting from the aggravation of a pre-existing illness has
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s disability has neither invariably been granted despite the absence of a specific
arisen out of the nature of his employment nor been provision to this effect we held the employer liable for

compensation, despite the fact that the aggravation of a pre-  In private respondents case, the SSS reckoned the three-year
existing illness and the consequent disability had taken place prescriptive period on 21 September 1991 when his PTB first
before June 20, 1952. (Before Workmen’s Compensation Act became manifest. When he filed his claim on 9 November
became effective) 1994, the claim had allegedly already prescribed.
15. ECC vs Sanico  On appeal, petitioner affirmed the decision of the SSS. Private
FACTS: respondent then elevated the case to the CA, which reversed
 Private respondent was a former employee of John Gotamco petitioners decision and granted private respondents claim for
and Sons. compensation benefits.
 He worked in said company as wood filer from 1986 until he  CA reconciled Article 201 of the Labor Code with Article
was separated from employment on 31 December 1991 due to 1144(2) of the Civil Code. Under the latter provision of law, an
his illness. His medical evaluation report, dated 31 September action upon an obligation created by law must be filed within
1991, showed that he was suffering from pulmonary ten (10) years from the time the cause of action accrues. Thus,
tuberculosis (PTB). Subsequent chest x-rays taken on 9 while private respondents illness became manifest in
October 1994 and 3 May 1995 diagnostically confirmed his September 1991, the filing of his compensation claim on 9
illness. November 1994 was within, even long before, the prescriptive
period.
 Private respondent filed with the Social Security System (SSS)
a claim for compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626, as ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents claim for
amended. compensation benefit had already prescribed when he filed his
claim on 9 November 1994.
 The SSS denied private respondents claim on the ground of HELD: NO.
prescription. The SSS ruled that under Article 201 of the Labor  In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is
Code, a claim for compensation shall be given due course only compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in
when the same is filed with the System three (3) years for the the impairment of ones earning capacity.
time the cause of action accrued.  Petitioner thus seriously erred when it affirmed the decision of
the SSS denying private respondents claim on the ground of

prescription. In determining whether or not private respondents same had been increased by the conditions under which he
claim was filed within the three-year prescriptive period under was working and accordingly ordered GSIS.
Article 201 of the Labor Code, petitioner and the SSS 1) to pay the petitioner the sum of P12,000.00 as death
reckoned the accrual of private respondents cause of action benefits;
on 31 September 1991, when his PTB became known. This is 2) to reimburse petitioner medical, surginal and hospital
erroneous. expenses duly supported by proper receipts;
3) to pay petitioner the sum of P700.00 as funeral expenses;
 The prescriptive period for filing compensation claims should and
be reckoned from the time the employee lost his earning 4) to pay the petitioner attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the
capacity, i.e., terminated from employment, due to his illness death benefits.
and not when the same first became manifest. Indeed, a
persons disability might not emerge at one precise moment in  GSIS then filed a MR alleging that: I As the ailment of the
time but rather over a period of time. In this case, private deceased is not a listed occupational disease, proof should
respondents employment was terminated on 31 December have been shown that the cause of the ailment was the
1991 due to his illness, he filed his claim for compensation working conditions. This Honorable Court only found a case of
benefits on 9 November 1994. Accordingly, private aggravation which is different from proof of increased risk of
respondents claim was filed within the three-year prescriptive contracting the ailment. II. Assuming that the ailment is
period under Article 201 of the Labor Code. compensable under the new law, the benefits awarded to
petitioner are not in accordance with said law. III. The grant of
attorney's fees in the sum equivalent to ten (10%) percent of
the death benefits is not proper.
16. L.G. CRISTOBAL v. ECC
 ECC (Employee’s Compensation Commission) filed a MR
FACTS: alleging that: I. The illness of rectal malignancy which caused
the death of Fortunato S. Cristobal is not compensable under
 On 1980, a decision was rendered finding that Luz G. the theory of increased risk as provided in PD 626, as
Cristobal, widow of the deceased Fortunato Cristobal, has amended. II. The amounts awarded as death benefits, funeral
shown by clear and convincing evidence that her husband expenses and attorney's fees are not in accordance with law.
contracted rectal cancer or at least the risk of contracting the III. The cause of death not being a compensable illness, the

order for reimbursement of medical, surgical and hospital for 5 dependent children, observing the limitation. ln
expenses has no basis. summation, petitioner should be receiving a monthly income
benefit of P270.57 plus P117.65 or a total of P388.22. In a
 With respect to the award of death benefits in the amount of year's time, this would amount to P4,658.64 and in 5 years’
P12,000.00, GSIS and ECC argue that the same is not in time, the total would be P23,293.20. This Court in compliance
consonance with Articles 193 (a) and 191(a) of the Labor with the proviso set forth in Article 193 (a) “that total payment
Code, as amended by PD 891. They also questioned the shall in no case exceed twelve thousand pesos [P12,000.000]"
award of attorney’s fees. limited its award to P12,000.00.
ISSUE: WON the award of death benefits and attorney’s fees were
properly computed? As to the attorney’s fees:
RULING:  Under Art 203 of the Labor Code, A close examination of the
aforequoted provision reveals that the intent of the law is to
As to the death benefits:
free the award from any liability or charge so that the claimant
 A computation of the death benefits in accordance with the who is exempt from liability for attorney's fees. The defaulting
underlined procedure would disclose that the amount, employer or government agency remains liable for attorney's
awarded by this Court is well within the limitations provided fees; because it compelled the claimant to employ the services
therein. To illustrate: The husband of petitioner received an of counsel by unjustly refusing to recognize the validity of the
annual salary of P11,904.00. His average monthly salary, claim of petitioner. This actually is the rationale behind the
therefore, is P992.00. prohibition. Nothing is wrong with the court's award of
attorney's fees which is separate and distinct from the other
 Consequently, the monthly income benefit (115 % of P235.28) benefits awarded.
would amount to P270.57.
 In addition, the law grants an additional 10%, of the basic  Besides, in the instant case, the participation of petitioner's
benefit (P235.28) for each dependent child not exceeding 5. counsel was not limited to the preparation or filling of the claim
The deceased left, at the time of his death, 7 dependent but in appealing petitioner's case before this Court
children. Petitioner would therefore be entitled to an additional necessitating submission of pleadings to establish his cause of
grant of P23.53 (rounded) for each child or a total of P117.65 action and to rebut or refute the arguments of herein
respondents. Fairness dictates that the counsel should receive  Mendoza was advised by the SSS to pay the above-said
compensation for his services; otherwise, it would be entirely amount, he proposed to settle it over a period of 18 months
difficult for claimants, majority of whom are not learned in the which proposal the SSS approved by Memorandum of
intrecacies of the law, to get good legal service. To deny September 12, 2000.
counsel compensation for his professional services, would
amount to deprivation of property without due process of law.  Despite the grant of Mendoza’s request for several extensions
of time to settle the delinquency in instalments, Mendoza
 Petitioner appealed to this Court in forma pauperis. failed, hence, his indictment.
Respondents are of the mistaken belief that such manner of
appeal is incompatible with the award of attorney's fees. It  Mendoza sought to exculpate himself by explaining that during
must be pointed out that Section 22, Rule 3 of the Rules of the questioned period, SATII shut down due to the general
Court merely exempts a pauper litigant from the payment of decline in the economy.
legal fees and from the filing of appeal bond, printed record
and printed brief, but does not exempt him from the payment  Mendoza maintains, inter alia, that the managing head or
of attorney's fees. Therefore, the award of attorney's fees in president or general manager of a corporation is not among
the instant case is proper. those specifically mentioned as liable in the above-quoted
Section 28(f). And he calls attention to an alleged congenital
17. MENDOZA v. PP
infirmity in the Information in that he was charged as proprietor
FACTS: and not as director of SATII. It further claims that the lower
courts erred in penalizing him with six years and one day to
 For failure to remit the SSS premium contributions of eight years of imprisonment considering the mitigating and
employees of the Summa Alta Tierra Industries, Inc. (SATII) of alternative circumstances present, namely: his being merely
which he was president, Romarico J. Mendoza was convicted vicariously liable; his good faith in failing to remit the
of violation of Section 22(a) and (d) vis--vis Section 28 of R.A. contributions; his payment of the premium contributions of
No. 8282 or the Social Security Act of 1997 by RTC of Iligan SATII out of his personal funds; and his being economically
City, Branch 4. His conviction was affirmed by the CA. useful, given his academic credentials, he having graduated
from a prime university in Manila and being a reputable
businessman.

ISSUE: WON Remittance of contribution to the SSS under Section payments by force of law.
22(a) of the Social Security Act is mandatory?
 Failure to comply with the law being malum prohibitum, intent
RULING: YES.
to commit it or good faith is immaterial.
 No discretion or alternative is granted respondent Commission

 The provision of the law being clear and unambiguous,
in the enforcement of the laws mandate that the employer who
petitioners interpretation that a proprietor, as he was
fails to comply with his legal obligation to remit the premiums
designated in the Information, is not among those specifically
to the System within the prescribed period shall pay a penalty
mentioned under Sec. 28(f) as liable, does not lie. For the
of three 3% per month. The prescribed penalty is evidently of a
word connotes management, control and power over a
punitive character, provided by the legislature to assure that
business entity.
employers do not take lightly the States exercise of the police
power in the implementation of the Republics declared policy
 The term managing head in Section 28(f) is used, in its
to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security
broadest connotation, not to any specific organizational or
system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people
managerial nomenclature. To heed petitioners reasoning
throughout the Philippines and (to) provide protection to
would allow unscrupulous businessmen to conveniently
employers against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age
escape liability by the creative adoption of managerial titles.
and death.[Section 2, Social Security Act; Roman Catholic
Archbishop v. Social Security Commission, 1 SCRA 10,
 While the Court affirms the appellate court’s decision, there is
January 20, 1961]
a need to modify the penalty imposed on petitioner.
 In this concept, good faith or bad faith is rendered irrelevant,

since the law makes no distinction between an employer who
professes good reasons for delaying the remittance of 18. PANLILIO v. HON. ROSALES
premiums and another who deliberately disregards the legal
FACTS:
duty imposed upon him to make such remittance. From the
moment the remittance of premiums due is delayed, the  On 2004, Jose Marcel Panlilio, Erlinda Panlilio, Nicole Morris
penalty immediately attaches to the delayed premium and Marlo Cristobal (PETITIONERS) as corporate officers of
Silahis International Hotel, Inc. (SIHI), filed with RTC Manila
Branch 24 petition for Suspension of Payments and
Rehabilitation in SEC Corp. Case No. 04-111180.
ISSUE: WON the suspension of all claims as an incident to a
corporate rehabilitation also contemplate the suspension of
 RTC Branch 24 – issued an Order staying all claims against
criminal charges filed against the corporate officers of the
SIHI upon finding the petition sufficient in form and substance.
distressed corporation?

 At the time, however, of the filing of the petition for RULING: No.
rehabilitation, there were a number of criminal charges
pending against petitioners in RTC of Manila Branch 51.  Rosario v. Co is at fours with the case at bar. Petitioners
These criminal charges were initiated by SSS and involved are charged with violations of Section 28 (h) of the SSS
charges of violations of Section 28 (h) of RA 8282, or the law, in relation to Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal
Social Security Act of 1997 (SSS law), in relation to Article 315 Code, or Estafa. The SSS law clearly criminalizes the non-
(1) (b) of the RPC, or Estafa. Consequently, petitioners filed remittance of SSS contributions by an employer to protect
with the RTC of Manila a Manifestation and Motion to Suspend the employees from unscrupulous employers. Therefore,
Proceedings. Petitioners argued that the stay order issued by public interest requires that the said criminal acts be
Branch 24 should also apply to the criminal charges pending in immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection
Branch 51. Petitioners, thus, prayed that Branch 51 suspend of society.
its proceedings until the petition for rehabilitation was finally
resolved.  The rehabilitation of SIHI and the settlement of claims
against the corporation is not a legal ground for the
 RTC Branch 51 – dismissed the motion to suspend extinction of petitioner’s criminal liabilities. There is no
reason why criminal proceedings should be suspended
 CA - discussed that violation of the provisions of the SSS law during corporate rehabilitation, more so, since the prime
was a criminal liability and was, thus, personal to the offender. purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in
As such, the CA held that the criminal proceedings against the order to deter him and others from committing the same or
petitioners should not be considered a claim against the similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and
corporation and, consequently, not covered by the stay order rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. As
issued by Branch 24. correctly observed in Rosario, it would be absurd for one

who has engaged in criminal conduct could escape after trial. However, any civil indemnity awarded as a result
punishment by the mere filing of a petition for rehabilitation of their conviction would be subject to the stay order issued
by the corporation of which he is an officer. by the rehabilitation court. Only to this extent can the order
of suspension be considered obligatory upon any court,
 The prosecution of the officers of the corporation has no tribunal, branch or body where there are pending actions
bearing on the pending rehabilitation of the corporation, for claims against the distressed corporation.
especially since they are charged in their individual
capacities. Such being the case, the purpose of the law for
the issuance of the stay order is not compromised, since
the appointed rehabilitation receiver can still fully discharge
his functions as mandated by law. It bears to stress that
the rehabilitation receiver is not charged to defend the
officers of the corporation. If there is anything that the
rehabilitation receiver might be remotely interested in is
whether the court also rules that petitioners are civilly
liable.
 Such a scenario, however, is not a reason to suspend the

criminal proceedings, because as aptly discussed in
Rosario, should the court prosecuting the officers of the
corporation find that an award or indemnification is
warranted, such award would fall under the category of
claims, the execution of which would be subject to the stay
order issued by the rehabilitation court.
 The penal sanctions as a consequence of violation of the

SSS law, in relation to the revised penal code can
therefore be implemented if petitioners are found guilty

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LABOR LAW I –November 11, 2017  The San Miguel Sales Forces Union (PTGWO), representing

the salesmen and helpers within Metro Manila, filed a

 The Union filed a second complaint with the Labor Arbiters

 It registered itself and its employees with the Social Security

DINO - LAPEZ - MANGUERA - MORALES, C. - MORALES, I. – UMANGAY

DINO - LAPEZ - MANGUERA - MORALES, C. - MORALES, I. – UMANGAY

3. Raro vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission  RULING:

 A claim for disability benefits filed by her husband with the

DINO - LAPEZ - MANGUERA - MORALES, C. - MORALES, I. – UMANGAY

Citing Nitura v. Employees Compensation Commission[3] and

deceased SPO2 Alegre who was a police officer assigned to

DINO - LAPEZ - MANGUERA - MORALES, C. - MORALES, I. – UMANGAY

 In the absence of such prior authority as in the cases of

DINO - LAPEZ - MANGUERA - MORALES, C. - MORALES, I. – UMANGAY

DINO - LAPEZ - MANGUERA - MORALES, C. - MORALES, I. – UMANGAY

DINO - LAPEZ - MANGUERA - MORALES, C. - MORALES, I. – UMANGAY

DINO - LAPEZ - MANGUERA - MORALES, C. - MORALES, I. – UMANGAY

Whether or not the claim for compensation benefit on account of

DINO - LAPEZ - MANGUERA - MORALES, C. - MORALES, I. – UMANGAY

DINO - LAPEZ - MANGUERA - MORALES, C. - MORALES, I. – UMANGAY

DINO - LAPEZ - MANGUERA - MORALES, C. - MORALES, I. – UMANGAY

DINO - LAPEZ - MANGUERA - MORALES, C. - MORALES, I. – UMANGAY

DINO - LAPEZ - MANGUERA - MORALES, C. - MORALES, I. – UMANGAY

 Disability should not be understood more on its medical

DINO - LAPEZ - MANGUERA - MORALES, C. - MORALES, I. – UMANGAY

 A person’s disability may not manifest fully at one precise

DINO - LAPEZ - MANGUERA - MORALES, C. - MORALES, I. – UMANGAY

 Also, no less than five doctors certified that private

DINO - LAPEZ - MANGUERA - MORALES, C. - MORALES, I. – UMANGAY

Sec. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social

 All things studiedly considered, we are of the ineluctable

DINO - LAPEZ - MANGUERA - MORALES, C. - MORALES, I. – UMANGAY

 From May 1 to 31, 1985, petitioner went on sick leave due to

DINO - LAPEZ - MANGUERA - MORALES, C. - MORALES, I. – UMANGAY

DINO - LAPEZ - MANGUERA - MORALES, C. - MORALES, I. – UMANGAY

DINO - LAPEZ - MANGUERA - MORALES, C. - MORALES, I. – UMANGAY

DINO - LAPEZ - MANGUERA - MORALES, C. - MORALES, I. – UMANGAY

DINO - LAPEZ - MANGUERA - MORALES, C. - MORALES, I. – UMANGAY

DINO - LAPEZ - MANGUERA - MORALES, C. - MORALES, I. – UMANGAY

DINO - LAPEZ - MANGUERA - MORALES, C. - MORALES, I. – UMANGAY

DINO - LAPEZ - MANGUERA - MORALES, C. - MORALES, I. – UMANGAY

 No discretion or alternative is granted respondent Commission

 In this concept, good faith or bad faith is rendered irrelevant,

DINO - LAPEZ - MANGUERA - MORALES, C. - MORALES, I. – UMANGAY

 Such a scenario, however, is not a reason to suspend the

 The penal sanctions as a consequence of violation of the

DINO - LAPEZ - MANGUERA - MORALES, C. - MORALES, I. – UMANGAY

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