Turkey's Foreign Policy Shifts Towards Syria

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Volume: XXII 2015 ISSN: 0975-086X
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Dr.Dr. Tareak A. Afzal
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Contents
Contributors
i-iii
Turkey’s Foreign Policy Shifts Towards Syria
M. Thowhidul Islam
1-22
Connect Central Asia Policy And Indian Outfoxing

Bawasingh
23-34
Revisiting Al-Farabi’s Legacy
Engaging with the Culture of Political Islam
M. Maroof Shah
35-72
Caspia
Genesis Of Energy Politics
R. G. Gidadhubli
73-81
Scope and Feasibility of Islamic Banking And Finance Model

Kazakhstan & Indian Perspective
Bilal A. Malik
G. N. Khaki
83-98
Human Rights At Jeopardy

The Central Asian Context
Govind Kumar Inakhiya
99-108
New Maritime Silk Route

Challenges and Opportunities for India
Imtiyaz A. Mailk
G. M. Mir
109-117
Indo - Kazakhstan Nuclear Partnership Agreement

Harmeet Singh
119-126
Afghanistan
Democracy and Ethnic Paradox
Tareak A. Rather
Nurgiss Nazir
127-136
Food Shortages In Kashmir

Response of Society
Danish Mehran
137-156
Central Asian Water Resources

Crises and Management
Hamid Rasool
157-167
Energy Consumption And Economic Growth

An Analysis of Central Asian States
M. Ibrahim Wani
M. Afzal Mir
169-178
Peace And Conflict Studies

Need and Evolution
S . Showkat Dar
179-196
Role Of Labour Migration In The Development Of Former

Soviet Republics And Russian Federation
Sergey V. Ryazantsev
197-208
India’s Afghan Policy

Pakistan Perspective and China Factor
Tabasum Firdous
Tajalley Nazir
Ashfaq M. Ali
209-220
Contributors
Prof. Sergey V. Ryazantsev (Sociologist)
Corresponding Member of RAS; Head, Centre for Social Demography and
Economic Sociology, Institute for Socio-political Research
Moscow, Russian Federation
e-mail: [email protected]
Dr. Mohammad Thowhidul Islam (IR Analyst)

Assistant Professor
Center for University Requirement Courses (CENURC)
International Islamic University Chittagong (IIUC), Bangladesh
Dr. Bawasingh (Area Expert)

Assistant Professor
South and Central Asian Studies
Central University of Punjab, India
Prof. G. N. Khaki (Islamic Studies Expert)

Director
University of Kashmir, Srinagar, J&K, India
Prof. R. G. Gidadhubli (Economist)

Former Director
Center for Central Eurasian Studies
University of Mumbai, India
Prof. G. M. Mir (Geographer)

Director, ASC
Dr. Govind Kumar Inakhiya (Regional Analyst)

Assistant Professor
Department of Public Policy and Public Administration
Central University of Jammu, J&K, India
Hamid Rasool (Resource Manager)
Ph.D. Scholar
Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India
Muhammad Maroof Shah (Philosopher)

Jammu and Kashmir, Srinagar, India
Dr. Harmeet Singh (Area Expert)

Sr. Research Fellow
School of International Studies (SIS)
Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi, India
Dr. Tareak A Rather (Sociologist)

Associate Professor
[email protected]
Dr. Mohammad Afzal Mir (Economist)

Associate Professor
Dr. Tabasum Firdous (IR Specialist)

Sr. Assistant Professor
Dr. Shaheen Showkat Dar (Strategic Analyst)

Post Doctoral Fellow, ICSSR
Dr. Mohammad Ibrahim Wani (Economist)

Post Doctoral Fellow, ICSSR
ii
Imtiaz Ahmed Malik (Geographer)
Ph. D. Scholar
Danish Mehran (Historian)

Ph. D. Scholar
Department of History
Ashfaq Maqsood Ali (Political Scientist)

Ph. D. Scholar
Bilal Ahmad Malik (Isalmic Studies Expert)

Ph. D. Scholar
Tajalley Nazir (Educationist)

Department of Education
Government of J&K, India
Nurgiss Nazir (Sociologist)

Ph.D. Scholar
iii
M. Thowhidul Islam
Abstract
Being located at the crossroads of Asia, Europe and Africa, connecting
Middle East, Balkan and Caucasus alongwith its historical legacy of
Ottoman Empire, Turkey plays an important role in the regional and
global politics as well as determines its foreign policy accordingly. Justice
and Development Party (AKP) led by Erdogan with Islamic ideological
background entering to Turkish politics in 2001, got victory in the elections
of 2002, since then hitherto ruling the country. AKP government’s foreign
policy followed ‘zero problem’ and ‘strategic depth’ principles with
Turkish vicinity. Turkish-Syrian interactions had begun in the 8th century
under Umayyad caliphate. The Turks gradually occupied higher ranks
in Umayyad state and settled down at the territories today called Syria.
During Seljuk time, Turks captured Syria which replaced with Mamluks.
The Ottomans regained sovereignty in Syria at the 16th century which
continued till the end of First World War. Then, Turkish-Syrian relations
developed as mandate shaped by France. Since then, some conflicting
issues affecting Turkish-Syrian relations such as the Hatay (Sanjak)
issue, water sharing issues. During Syria’s independence in 1936, Turkey
demanded Hatay’s independence too, which was denied by France. On the
eve of Second World War in 1939, Hatay was ceded to Turkey. Since then,
it became an issue of conflict. The water sharing has also been another
issue of debate. Concerning security issues, both countries situated at
opposite sites. Syria supported PKK, which Ankara regarded as terrorist
group operating against Turkey. This hostile attitude gradually changed
under AKP’s soft foreign policy towards Syria. Potential Kurdish state risk
after Iraq war, common security perceptions after 9/11, compelled both the
countries to adopt collective security measures. This article is exclusively
aimed at discovering the factors which prompted Turkey to shift its policy
towards Syria during the crises caused by Arab Spring. It will also include
the nature and historical developments of Turkish-Syrian relations with a
view to understanding the driving factors behind shifting policy.
Keywords
Turkish-Syrian Relations, Foreign Policy, AKP, Arab Spring, Policy Shifts,
Hatay, Strategic Depth, Bilateral Relations.
Introduction
Being located at the crossroads of Asia, Europe and Africa, connecting trouble
zones of Balkan, Middle East and Caucasus, with a predominant Muslim
population and as a bridge between the West and Islam (Bagci & Kardas,
2003), Turkey occupies an important geopolitical and geostrategic position in
global politics, which plays a vital role in determining its foreign policy. As
the inheritor of Ottoman empire, Turkey plays a dominant role in the regional
politics. Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi-AKP)
was formed in 2001 with Islamic ideological background under the leadership
of Recep Tayyip Erdogan which swept victory in the general elections of
2002, while major political parties that ruled the country for decades failed
to secure 10% vote (Carkoglu, 2002). Since then, the AKP hitherto rules
the country with an increasing vote percentage. Turkey’s AKP government
has initiated diversified foreign policy prioritizing its Ottoman legacy and
geostrategic importance, which contradicts traditional Kemalist1 policy.
Proposing ‘zero problem’2 principle with Turkish vicinity, it developed close
ties with neighboring countries including the Middle East, Eurasia, Balkans
and Caucasus regions contrary to the secluded structure of Kemalist foreign
policy tendency (Aras, 2009). It called for an activist engagement with all
of the regions in Turkey’s neighborhood, specifically with Iran, Iraq, Syria,
Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf states (Davutoglu, 2001). The policy
emphasized on the importance of economic interdependency and need to
build strong economic linkages with all regional states and to eliminate all the
problems from her neighbor’s relationships.
Turkish-Syrian interactions had begun in the 8th century under the Umayyad
caliphate. The Turks gradually occupied higher ranks in the Umayyad state
and settled down at the territories today called-Syria. During Seljuk time,
Turks captured Syria which replaced with Mamluks. The Ottomans regained
sovereignty in Syria in the 16th century which continued till the end of 1st
World War. Then, Turkish-Syrian relations developed as mandate shaped
by France. Since then, some conflicting issues have been affecting Turkish-
Syrian relations such as the Hatay province of Turkey (Former Sanjak of
Alexandretta, Syria) issue, water sharing and security issues etc. During the
recognition of Syria’s independence by France in 1936, Turkey demanded
Hatay’s independence, which denied by France. But on the eve of 2nd World
War in 1939, Hatay was ceded to Turkey. Since then, it became an issue of
conflict between Turkey and Syria. The water sharing has also been another
issue of debate. Concerning security issues, both the countries situated at
opposite sites. Syria provided support to PKK, which Turkey regarded as
terrorist group operating against it. This hostile attitude gradually changed
under AKP’s soft policy towards Syria. After Iraq war, potential Kurdish
state risk, post 9/11 security perceptions created common threats which
compelled to adopt collective security measures. Assad’s visit to Turkey and
Erdogan’s visit to Syria in 2004 was a milestone for the prospect of Turkish-
Syrian relations. Syria cancelled supports to PKK and recognized Hatay as
an integral part of Turkey. The economic relations also bloomed. Regional
2
The Journal of Central Asian Studies, Vol. XXII, 2015
Cooperation Program was created and military cooperation agreement was

signed. Bilateral relations entered into a new phase with the removal of the
visa requirements between the countries in 2009.
All these positive developments were challenged due to the mass
upsurge against Assad regime with the emergence of Arab Spring. Ankara,
from the beginning warned Assad to undertake democratic reforms and
consistently called upon to stop violence. Turkey tried to negotiate between
Assad government and the opposition, but Damascus ignored all the steps,
rather expressed her determination to continue harsh crackdown. Realizing
the perspectives, Turkey started to shift her policy criticizing Syria publicly.
Finally, Turkey gave her full support to the opposition and demanded for
regime change in Syria. Indeed, several geo-political-strategic-economic and
regional-international perspectives and perceptions have driven Turkey to shift
its policy towards Syria. This article is exclusively aimed at discovering the
factors which prompted Turkey to shift its policy towards Syria during Arab
Spring. It also includes the nature and historical developments of Turkish-
Syrian relations with a view to understanding the driving factors behind
shifting policy.
Geopolitical and Strategic Importance of Turkey

Turkey possesses a highly important geostrategic location in the global
geography. It is located at the crossroads of three major continents Asia,
Europe and Africa, connecting Balkans, Middle East and Caucasus regions.
Turkey’s territories rest on Asia and Europe, while it borders with the Middle
East and post-Soviet states. It is surrounded on three sides by the Black Sea,
Aegean Sea and Mediterranean Sea that makes it a natural passage between
Europe and Asia. Having predominant Muslim population, it has culturally
been considered as a connecting bone between West and Islam. Threat
perceptions from the complex structures of Middle East, Caucuses and
Balkans pushed Turkey seeking allies to balance geopolitical disadvantage.
Another geostrategic importance of Turkey is her Straits,3 which constitute
a highly important place in terms of defense regarding air and sea attacks
(Aydin, 2003, p. 315). Thus, it certainly be said that Turkey occupied a highly
significant geopolitical and geostrategic position in world politics, which has
been playing an influential role in terms of shaping its foreign policy.
Historical Legacies of Turkish Foreign Policy

Turkey developed its foreign policy concept based on her identity and ideology
that inherited from internal dynamics and historical legacies. Ottoman heritage
and empire,4 which ruled the land for centuries left immense influences on its
foreign policy principles. As one of the most powerful empires of the world,
Ottoman’s applied an imperial and influential foreign policy on a vast territory.
The World War 1st ended the Ottoman Empire giving birth to the various nation
3
states. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk,5 the founder of modern Turkey, adopted west-
oriented foreign policy to cede it from Ottoman’s tradition. It represented a
break with the past aiming at renunciation of three strains which had been
important during Ottoman times: the imperial Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism, and
Pan-Turanism (Aydin, 2003, p. 318). Unlike Ottoman’s imperialistic policy,
Ataturk followed strict nationalization process within Turkey. Although
experiences of the Ottoman past, together with its geostrategic importance
influenced the subsequent foreign relations of Turkey, Ataturk’s theory and
practice has been the most important factor in shaping Turkey’s foreign policy
(Aydin, 2004, p. 30). With westernization, Turkey initialized positive relations
with its neighbors and signed a non-aggression treaty called Sadabad pact
in Tehran in 1937 with Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq (Zurcher, 2004). Turkey
viewed the Arab regimes with suspicion mainly because of Arab support for
dismembering the Ottoman Empire during the World War 1st (Lapidus, 2002)
and of Turkey’s revolutionary secular ideas. Instead of drawing benefits from
their shared culture, history, and religion, Kemalist Turkey chose a different
path. During the World War 2nd, initially Turkey followed an ‘active neutral’
policy (Deringil, 2004), but towards the end of war, approaching post war
conjecture, it declared war against Berlin and Tokyo (Aslan & Selcuk, 2014,
p. 139). After 2nd World War, international system developed through bipolar
structure clustering around the USA and USSR, with which Cold War begun.
During Cold War, Turkey developed close ties with the West, particularly
with the USA and became a member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) in 1952 (Aslan & Selcuk, 2014, p. 149). The dissolution of USSR
in 1991 set an end to Cold War and the global political system developed
through unipolar structure centering the US. In the unipolar structure, Turkey
developed close ties with the US (Muftuler-Bac, 1997). It developed strict
ties with the newly independent states of Central Asia providing long term
credits, military reconstruction supports, scholarships for the students, and
investments in many other spheres in order to enforce its existence in the
region and brought alternative dimensions to its foreign policy outlook
(Fuller, 1992). On the other hand, Turkey faced serious challenges with its
neighborhood because of increasing ‘Kurdistan Workers’ Party’ (PKK)6 terror
activities. Thus, Turkey had experienced dramatic shifts and transformations
in its foreign policy and structure.
Turkey’s AKP Government and its Foreign Policy Principles

With the dissolution of Caliphate in 1924, Ataturk implemented strict
secularization process in Turkey with harsh crackdown and banning the
activities of Islamists. In spite of this shock therapy (Gellner, 1995), the
Islamists continued their struggle advocating for an Islamic state. As a
result, ‘National Vision Movement’ (Milli Gorus Hareketi) was initialized
by Necmettin Erbakan, which founded ‘National Order Party’ (Milli
4
Nizam Partisi) in 1970 as the first Islamist political party in Turkey (Baran,
2010, p. 33). The party was immediately banned and Erbakan established
another political party- National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi) in
1972 (Baran, 2010, p. 34). Following the 1980 military coup, all political
parties of Turkey were banned. After restoration of political parties in 1983,
Erbakan established Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) (Baran, 2010, p. 35), with
which Political Islam got a real rise in Turkey. It won Istanbul and Ankara
metropolitan municipalities in 1994 and getting majority in the national
elections of 1995 as the first Islamist political party in Turkish history (Baran,
2010, p. 41), formed coalition government with True Path Party (Dogru Yol
Partisi). Because of some symbolic initiatives by Prime Minister Erbakan,
Turkish Military forced the government to resign and Welfare Party was
banned. A new-Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi) was formed, but destined similar
and dissolved (Baran, 2010, p. 44). Due to continuous hostility between
political Islam and secular elites, ‘an intense internal debate and rethinking
within the Islamic movement about the movement’s future political strategy
and agenda, and a growing philosophical and political rift emerged within the
movement between two different groups’ (Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008). The
Traditionalists centering Erbakan opposed any serious changes, while the
reformists argued that the party needed to rethink its approach led by Recep
Tayyip Erdogan.7 This rift finally resulted in the formation of a new political
party- Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2001 (Baran, 2010, p. 44).
AKP participated in 2002 general elections and achieved a dramatic victory in
the National Parliament securing 34.3% of general polls (Baran, 2010, p. 50).
It formed the government led by Abdullah Gul as Erdogan was banned from
politics due to 1998 conviction. With the removal of his political ban in 2002,
new government was formed headed by Erdogan in 2003. Vote percentage of
AKP gradually increased in 2007 46.6% which increased almost 50% in 2011
elections (Carkoglu, 2011, p. 48). AKP recorded in the history of Europe as a
political party being elected three times consecutively with an increasing vote
percentage (Carkoglu, 2011, p. 44). Since then, hitherto the AKP government
has been ruling the country.
Turkey’s AKP government developed multi-dimensional concepts in its
foreign policy principle. The concepts of ‘strategic depth’ and ‘zero problem’
principles theorized by Ahmet Davutoglu8 constituted the spine of AKP’s
foreign policy. Stressing on the historical legacy and geopolitical importance
of Turkey, Strategic Depth theory proposes that as a secular and democratic
nation-state with Muslim majority, Turkey is capable of playing crucial role
in Europe, Middle East, Caucasus, Balkans and Central Asia applying a
versatile, multiregional foreign policy which may turn Turkey to be regional
and gradually to be a global power (Walker, 2010). Turkey needs to create
multi-dimensional and multi-directional proactive foreign policy in order
to strengthen its position as a regional and global power. Strategic Depth
5
emphasizes Turkey’s potential role within the Muslim world, given that Istanbul
was the last seat of the Caliphate (Walker, 2010). The ‘zero problem’ principle
proposes a peaceful relationship with its neighborhood intending to develop
possible maximum economic relations with Turkish periphery (Davutoglu,
2010). The theory is based on three methodological and five operational
principles. The methodological principles are: ‘visionary’ approach to the
issues instead of the ‘crisis-oriented’ attitudes, to base on a ‘consistent and
systematic’ framework around the world, and the adoption of a new discourse
and diplomatic style. Five operational principles are: the equilibrium between
security and democracy, zero problems towards neighbors, proactive and pre-
emptive peace diplomacy, adherence to a multi-dimensional foreign policy and
rhythmic diplomacy (Davutoglu, 2010). AKP advocated the continuation of
Turkey’s strategic relations with the West, the US and developing constructive
relations with the Middle East, Russia, Caucasus, Central Asia, Balkans and
with the emerging global powers (AKP, n.d.).
Historical Developments of Turkish-Syrian Relationships

Turkish-Syrian interactions had begun shortly after the spread of Islam under
the Umayyad9 caliphate at the beginning of 8th century, when Damascus became
its capital and Turks were brought there as slaves (Burns, 2005). The Turks
gradually occupied higher ranks in the Umayyad state and settled down at the
territories today called-Syria. With the fall of Umayyad’s in 750, the glory
of Syria resumed as Baghdad became the new capital of Abbasid’s. But the
Turkish influence continued in the Abbasid’s administration, even sometimes
‘this (Turks) corps became too powerful for the caliph and at times held him
in abject submission to its will’ (Hitti, 1959, p. 160). During Seljuk time, Turks
captured Syria. ‘Turkish generals penetrated as far as the Hellespont…. For
the first time, Turks gained a foothold in that land a foothold that was never
lost’ (Hitti, 1959, pp. 174-175). Aftermaths, Turkish sovereignty in Syria
replaced with the Mamluks.10 The Ottomans regained sovereignty in Syria in
the 16th century (Hitti, 1959, p. 221). ‘Beginning modestly about 1300 as a
petty Turkish state in western Asia Minor, the Ottomans had gradually taken
over all Anatolia from the other heirs of the Seljuks’ (Hitti, 1959, p. 213). This
Ottoman rule continued till the 1st World War with some political confusion.
With the end of war, Turkish-Syrian relations developed as mandate shaped by
France, but the relation was never warm. Ataturk’s Modern Turkey developed
strong relations with the west rather than its former Ottoman territories, while
Syria projected the Ottomans as its historical enemy. Arab nationalism also
fueled the anti-Turkish sentiment throughout Syria. ‘The late 1930’s were
marked with even greater resentment because France, in violation of the
terms of the mandate…, granted Turkey privileges in the Sanjaq (Hatay) of
Alexandretta and finally ceded it in June 1939 to become incorporated in the
Turkish Republic’ (Hitti, 1959, p. 244). The Hatay (Sanjaq) issue since then
6
has been affecting Turkey-Syria relations until present day. Hatay was a part of
Syria under French Mandate, which refused by Turkey claiming it as ‘a Turkish
homeland for 40 centuries’ (History of Hatay, n.d.). During the recognition of
Syria’s independence in 1936, Turkey demanded Hatay’s independence, but
France denied it stating that it would jeopardize Syria’s unity. Turkey raised
the issue at the League of Nations, which approved new status for Hatay
in 1937 declaring it ‘distinct but not separated from Syria on the diplomatic
level, sovereign in internal affairs, linked to both France and Turkey for
defence matters’ (League of Nations, 1938). On the eve of 2nd World War, in
1939, France ceded Hatay to Turkey. Since then, Hatay became an issue of
conflict between Turkey and Syria. The loss of Hatay prompted Syrian calls
for a ‘Ba’ath’ or resurrection of Arab nationalism, which eventually led to the
formation of ‘Ba’ath’ party that has been ruling Syria since 1963. Since then,
the regime maintained its grievances with Turkey.
Apart from Hatay issue, the water sharing has been another conflicting
issue in Turkey-Syria relation. An agreement was signed to share water
between two states in 1921. But when Turkey initialized constructing dams on
the Tigris and Euphrates, controlling water flow to Syria for the development of
eastern Turkey, Syria complained it would cripple her agriculture.11 Regarding
security issues, both the countries situated at opposite sites. Syria sided with
the Eastern bloc, while Turkey allied with the US. Turkey became a member of
NATO while Syria received the most Russian military aid in the Middle East.
Syria backed Lebanese Hejbullah against Israel, while Turkey maintained
ties with Israel. Syria provided support to PKK, which Turkey considered
a terrorist group. Syria opened her territories for many terrorist groups like
ASALA,12 which committed many attacks against Turkish diplomats. Terror
bargains brought both the states to a war level in 1998 (Aykan, 1999). The
tension was calmed down with signing ‘Adana Accords’ due to diplomatic
efforts of Iran and Egypt. Syria cancelled all aids to PKK, closed its camps
within Syria and even conducted several military operations against PKK
(Milliyet, 2003, July 4). These positive developments marked the beginning
of an unexpected new chapter in the previously antagonistic relations between
the two neighbours.
AKP’s Foreign Policy Towards Syria and Turkey-Syria Relations Before

Arab Spring
Rising to power in 2002, at a critical juncture of international politics-the
aftermath of 9/11 terrorist attacks, the AKP initiated to redesign the policy
based on Davutoglu’s ‘strategic depth’ and ‘zero problems’ principles. It
developed closer ties with neighboring countries specially the former Ottoman
territories. The AKP envisioned a leading role for Turkey particularly within
the greater Middle East context adopting the soft power instruments such as
finance, trade, culture, ethnic and religious kinship, and diplomatic activities
7
(Aras, 2012, p. 44), which has been dubbed as ‘neo-Ottomanism’ (Mcdonald,

2012). This approach resulted in the dramatic progress of Turkish-Syrian
relations. The post 9/11 developments, increasing regional instability after
Iraq war and potential Kurdish state risk created common security perceptions
for both the countries. The US policy of isolation towards Syria induced it
to develop relations with Turkey, while Turkey needed Syrian support to
protect security threats of Kurdish nationalists. Changing different regional
and international circumstances also prompted Turkey to have closer ties with
Syria as a gate opening towards Middle East. Thus there was an eagerness at
both sides to develop relations.
The relations started to be improved with Adana Accord in 1998 and got
a new dimension with AKP’s rising to power. Turkey congratulated Bashar
al-Assad’s presidency and Assad made his historic trip to Ankara in 2004 as
the first Syrian president since the end of Ottoman Empire, which worked as
a milestone for the prospect of Turkish-Syrian relations (BBC News, 2004).
In July 2004, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan met Syrian Prime Minister
Naji Otri refusing to meet Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert who visited
Ankara on the same day (Hurriyet, 2004). Erdogan’s visit to Damascus in
2004 introduced consultations over the water-sharing issue and led to the
signing of Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Syria and Turkey (Turkish
Weekly, 2004). During the height of Lebanese Hariri assassination crisis
in 2005, Turkish president Sezar visited Damascus defying US opposition
(Moubayed, 2005). Assad signed on documents recognizing Turkey’s borders,
with which Syria officially affirmed Hatay as an integral part of Turkey
(Milliyet, 2004, January, 6). Turkey-US relations sometimes got tensed on
Syrian issue as Turkey argued the US should support reforms in Syria rather
isolation, while the US criticized Turkey calling its policy ‘unacceptable’
for harming international efforts to force Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon
(Milliyet, 2005, June, 9). Turkey played important role in breaking Syria’s
international isolation and mediated in Syria-Israel indirect peace talks in
2007-8 (Phillips, 2011, p. 37). Erdogan accompanied Assad in August 2008 to
meet French president Sarkozy and Qatar’s Amir Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa
al-Thani in Damascus to discuss about the peace process (Moubayed, 2008).
After the series bombing in the Green Zone of Baghdad in August 2009,
Syria was blamed by Iraq and Turkey mediated to resolve the crisis. These
Turkish efforts helped soften Syria’s international image. The EU ended the
diplomatic boycott of Syria in 2008, which helped the Obama administration
to end the boycott, though some Bush-era sanctions remained (Phillips, 2011,
p. 37). Turkey also benefited from its ties with Syria. It opened the gateway of
Arab world for Turkey and anti-Ottoman sentiment among Arabians gradually
soften, which helped Turkey to boost its regional influence and economic ties
with the region.
The relationship was also progressed in the economic field. Turkey
8
considered Syria as an entrance into wider Arab markets, while Syria considered
Turkey as a source of investments. Joint Economic Committee was formed
that sponsored trade agreements and events such as the industrial exhibition
in Damascus in January 2004 where 300 Turkish companies received $250
million worth of Syrian contracts (Tur, 2010, pp. 164-171). ‘Turkish-Syrian
Regional Cooperation Program’ was created to develop technical, economic,
cultural and scientific cooperation (Tur, 2010, pp. 167-168). With FTA, both
the countries agreed to reduce customs taxes until gradually they would
disappear (Ministry of Economy, Turkey, 2011). Syria’s exports to Turkey
rose from $187m in 2006 to $630m in 2010. Turkish exports rose from $608m
in 2006 to $1.64bn in 2010 with a trade volume of $1.84 billion (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Turkey, 2011). In 2011 alone, Turkish companies invested a
total of $223m in different Syrian industries. The number of Syrian tourists
visiting Turkey considerably increased from 154,000 in 2003 to 500,000
in 2010 (Today’s Zaman, October 03, 2011). Both the countries signed a
historic agreement for lifting visa restrictions on October 13, 2009. Davutoglu
addressed Syrian people ‘Turkey is your second country and Turkish people
are waiting for you with open arms without a visa’ (Today’s Zaman, September
17, 2009). It was also decided that the ministers of Foreign Affairs, Energy,
Trade, Public Works, Defense, Interior Affairs and Transportation will meet
at least twice every year to make a common action plan that will be executed
under the leadership of two Prime Ministers (Tur, 2010, p. 168). These steps
introduced a new phase in the bilateral relations.
Turkish-Syrian military cooperation was also developed. Three day long
joint military exercise was held in April 2009 (Tur, 2010, p. 174). Two countries
signed a technical military cooperation agreement to deepen collaboration
between their defense industries, ignoring Israeli concern (Tur, 2010, p. 166).
The water issue was commenced to be viewed as a technical detail between
the parts (Tur, 2010, pp. 164-171). During Erdogan’s visit, Syrian Prime
Minister Otri stated ‘Turkey and Syria were leaving the traditional water
problem back’ in the press conference, Erdogan responded, ‘We are aiming
development and cooperation, other issues are forgotten’ (Tur, 2010, p. 169).
Cultural cooperation was also remarkably developed. Turkish music, movies,
and other television series have won popularity in Arab societies. Many
Turkish soap operas have been broadcast in the Arab world and the finale of
the Turkish TV series Noor was watched by approximately eighty-five million
Arabians in 2008 and Sanawat-al-Dayaa was watched by sixty-eight million
Arabian viewers (Balli & Cebeci, 2013). Syrian production companies have
dubbed the Turkish dramas into Arabic for export to Arab satellite channels,
which worked as the gateway for Turkish culture into the wider Arab cultural
sphere.
Thus, Turkey-Syria relations have remarkably developed from enmity to
close friendship with AKP’s policy. Islamic ideological origins of AKP, realistic
9
approach of Turkey, ‘zero problems’ and ‘strategic depth’ principles, Turkey’s

regional influence and boosting economy are the principal factors behind this
development. For Syria, the friendship helped to face US-led international
isolation and to avoid any conflict with Israel. For Turkey, it opened a gateway
into the Arab world diplomatically, economically and culturally. Davutoglu
remarked, ‘We are lifting the borders which were artificially put and becoming
the people of one hinterland. We are turning the economic cooperation to an
economic unity’ (Tur, 2010, p. 173). Erdogan openly addressed Syrians as
brothers and sisters, (Tur, 2010, p. 164) while Assad described Turkey as
Syria’s best friend (Phillips, 2011, p. 34). The relations seemed extremely
rosy until the outbreak of the Arab spring in 2011.
AKP’s Foreign Policy Towards Syria During and after Arab Spring
The positive developments of Turkey-Syria relationships were seriously
challenged with the social unrests against Assad upon the emergence of
‘Arab Spring’. This widespread uprising against totalitarian regimes turned
into one of the most important transformational forces in the Arab World,
which created new dilemmas for Turkey’s foreign policy-whether it back up
authoritarian regimes or hear the demands of the society for change. From
the very beginning of ‘Arab Spring’ commenced in Tunisia in 2011, Turkey
warned Assad to undertake democratic reforms to prevent similar incidents
in Syria (Ilgit & Davis, 2013). Because of her strong friendship with Syria,
Turkey initially believed that it would be able to exert a positive impact
on Syria’s behavior. Though international community severely criticized
Assad for harsh crackdown against civilians, Turkey expressed cautious and
restrained concerns and urged Syria to take reform initiatives. Turkey had
hoped to maintain its ties with Syria, while promoting reform and dialogue
between the opposition and Assad regime that might help to resolve the
crisis. Turkey tried to influence Syrian government positively to stop harsh
crackdown against civilians. Erdogan several times called on Assad to stop
brutality and Davutoglu met him in August 2011 to convey Turkey’s final
message warning him to end military operations and enact democratic reforms
(Aljazeera, August 20, 2011). In August 2011, Erdogan warned that ‘we
reached at the end of our patience’ (World Bulletin, August 07, 2011) and
even threatened for military intervention if the regime continues its brutal
crackdown (Ilgit & Davis, 2013). Assad didn’t response to the Turkish calls
and all the Turkish initiatives were failed to stop Assad’s brutality. Turkey
realized that the Syrian government was unwilling to resolve the problems
through reforms and would continue to use force against civilians. With this
realization, Turkey’s AKP government gradually followed a shifting policy
towards Syria and decade-long good relationship between Turkey and Syria
has come to an end. Ankara started to criticize Syrian government publicly.
President Abdullah Gul proclaimed that ‘our trust for the Syrian government
10
has vanished’ (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, August 28, 2011).

Erdogan declared his endorsement for the Syrian oppositions in November
2011 (The New York Times, November 22, 2011), with which Turkey openly
sided with the oppositions. Thousands of refugees were leaving Syria for
Turkey including hundreds of military defectors (Al Arabiya News, July 03,
2012), who called themselves the ‘Free Syrian Army’. The AKP government
simultaneously hospitalized the refugees and pressured Syria to stop violence
against civilians. Ankara initiated to impose sanctions against Damascus, which
might include a buffer zone on Syrian territory (The Tripoli Post, November
30, 2011). A part of the Syrian National Council (SNC) was formed in Istanbul
in August 2011.13 The Syrian oppositions seem to have found a welcoming
haven in Turkey. In early 2012, Turkey tried to forge an international “Friends
of Syria” coalition to secure regime change. However, it failed to gain the
agreement of key players to any form of intervention, including the no-fly
zone idea. The summit recognized the SNC as the ‘legitimate representative’
of all Syrians (Aljazeera, December 12, 2012). The relationship turned into
complete enmity, when a Turkish F-4 jet was shot down by Syria in June
2012 (The Daily Telegraph, June 22, 2012). In reaction, Turkey called for an
emergency NATO meeting, during which Ankara intended to invoke Article IV
of the alliance’s charter and seek western backing for its response (The Daily
Telegraph, June 24, 2012). Turkish army prepared emergency action plans to
create a military buffer zone and no-fly zone over Syria (Hurriyet, June 28,
2012). Turkey deployed anti-aircraft guns and trucks carrying multiple rocket
launchers on the Syrian borders (The Daily Telegraph, June 28, 2012). Turkey
openly demanded the removal of Assad. Erdogan said “Syria’s president must
step down over the country’s crackdown on dissent” (The World Post, January
22, 2012). Turkey-Syria relation has clearly ended up. Thus, Turkey clearly
shifted her policy of friendship towards Syria to grievance on the emergence
of ‘Arab Spring’.
Major Reasons Behind AKP’s Shifting Policy Towards Syria

No doubt, several geo-political-strategic-economic and regional-international
factors and perceptions persuaded Turkey to follow the shifting policy
towards Syria on the emergence of ‘Arab Spring’. Turkey’s Shifting policy
has also been driven by domestic political needs merging with the values of
the AKP and Turkish national interests. The principal factors and perceptions
are described below:
Sense of Prestige and National Dignity

From the inception of ‘Arab Spring’ in Tunisia, Turkey, as a good friend,
requested Syria to be aware of the fact and to take reform initiatives to avoid
the possible similar unrest in Syria. Turkey strongly desired a peaceful end of
Syrian crisis without harming improved bilateral relations. With this belief,
11
Turkish government repeatedly called on Assad to initiate comprehensive

political reforms accommodating the demands of the opposition. Despite strong
international criticism of Syria for civilian crackdown, Ankara expressed her
concern cautiously prioritizing reforms and regional stability. Turkey tried to
negotiate between Assad and opposition with several initiatives. But, Assad
adamantly ignored all the requests and warnings of Turkish government,
and continued to use violence instead of reforms. Assad’s unresponsiveness
to Erdogan’s calls made Ankara angry. Moreover, Turkey views, by any
means politically-diplomatically or economically, Syria needs Turkey far
more than Turkey needs Syria. So, the Syrian attitude was considered to the
Turkish leadership as a dishonor to long-nourished friendship and Turkish
national-international dignity. This led to a dramatic shift in Ankara’s soft
attitude and Erdogan declared that Turkey cannot continue to support Syria
(Cornell, 2012). As Assad has refused to take steps towards liberalization,
Ankara has not only become harsher in its tune but also initiated a regime
change in Syria to dethrone Assad. Thus, the sense of national dignity and
self-respect prompted Turkey to shift her policy towards Syria evolving from
sole pressure, negotiating between Assad and the opposition, promoting
international sanctions against Syria and finally changing regime.
Massacre to the Civilians

The AKP government with its all kinds of views and principles could either
not support massacre to the civilians or remain silent wherever it happens
in the world. From the beginning of Syrian uprising, Turkey tried to resolve
the crisis convincing Assad to undertake reforms and stop brutality. But,
Assad refused the possibility of reforms rather expressed his determination
to continue fighting against the opposition. The use of chemicals against
civilians at the Halabaja massacre (CNN, September 17, 2013) indicated the
determination of Assad in using massive force against opposition. As it became
clear that Assad determined to resolve the conflict through harsh security
crackdown instead of negotiation, Turkey decided to shift her policy towards
Syria following her rational principle of peace. The ‘Virtuous Power’ policy
introduced by Abdullah Gul (Today’s Zaman, May 03, 2012), has become
one of the Turkish foreign policy doctrines, which focuses on Virtue is being
respected around the world. Thus, Turkey, from her ideological viewpoint of
opposing massacre, stood against Assad administration.
To Secure Turkey from Security Threats

Turkey shares 877 km. land border with Syria. Kurdish people mainly reside
in Syria-Turkey border region. PKK, a Kurdish rebellion group in Turkey, for
many years has been committing terror attacks inside Turkey. Until Adana
accord in 1998, Syria was PKK’s heaven. Abdullah Ocalan -the founder of
PKK received asylum in Syria. The unrest in Syria again brought the PKK
12
challenge in front of Turkey. It has been becoming very difficult for Turkey to
prevent PKK militants from entering Turkey along with hundreds of Syrian
refugees. Turkey fears it may convert the region again into a backdoor for
PKK. Syria’s reported support to PKK as retaliation to Ankara’s sheltering
the Free Syrian Army made the challenge more crucial for Turkey. In October
2011, the Syrian government warned that it would consider supporting PKK
if it perceived that Turkey was supporting the Syrian opposition. Assad stated
that ‘Turkey could fall into a state similar to ours if it opposed Damascus’
(Today’s Zaman, March 21, 2012). Besides Kurdish threat, Turkey fears the
sectarian conflict may cross the boundary if it continues for long time. Syria’s
attacking two Turkish military planes persuades Turkey to consider Syria itself
as a threat. Turkey also fears the unrest would gradually lead to a proxy war
between Russia-Iran axis and the US. The regional countries would also get
into conflict on sectarian basis. In sum, Turkey, as a frontier country, currently
seems to be fallen into serious security threats. With increasing radicalization
on its border, Turkey does not want to have difficulties in the Syrian crisis
similar to those that were experienced in Iraqi borders for years. The failure
of the oppositions in Syria to found a united front has also increased the
possibility of spreading unrest into Turkey. Thus, the Syrian crisis has presented
challenging security threats for Turkey. To avoid these threats, Turkey openly
sided with the opponents and followed cautious steps keeping all the options
such as a ‘safe-zone, buffer-zone, no-fly-zone, no-drive-zone, or humanitarian
corridor’ open rather than the militarization of the crisis.
Assad’s Reported Relationship with the Kurds and PKK

There is news that the Syrian government has rebuilt its relationship with
the Kurds granting some citizenship (Los Angeles Times, April 10, 2011),
permitting to open Kurdish schools, and allowing their entrance to Syria from
Iraq, in return for their support. There are also claims that Syria has been
trying to contact PKK as a way to find new ally inside Syria and as retaliation
against Turkey. There have also been rumors that Syrian support caused the
PKK’s recent attacks costing 24 Turkish soldiers (Today’s Zaman, August
06, 2012). Although no direct evidence was found against Syria, Davutoglu
warned that ‘Recalling the past, Syria should not even think of playing the
PKK card’ (Today’s Zaman, August 30, 2011). Syria’s ceding control of key
towns in northern Syria, such as Afrin, Kobani, and Rasulayn to the PKK-
aligned Democratic Union Party (PYD) emerged the long-term security threat
for Turkey (Yilmaz, 2013). It may create a territorial base for PKK. Thus, the
Syrian rekindled relationship with PKK would pose serious threats to Turkish
national security, simultaneously when the Kurdish people are inspired by the
successful model of Kurdish autonomy in the Kurdish Regional Government
(KRG) in Iraq (Guardian Weekly, 2012). The KRG provided training to Syrian
Kurdish forces defying the strong opposition of Turkey (Today’s Zaman, July
13
30, 2012). The efforts for unification of Iraqi-Syrian Kurdish regions may lead
to the secession of Turkish Kurdish regions from Turkey and the formation of
a sovereign Kurdistan consisting of all Kurdish territories. By supporting the
Syrian opposition forces, Turkey wants to secure the unitary of Turkish state.
Turkey’s Political Intention in Syria

Though Turkey has been developing relationship with Assad politically
and economically, but ideologically Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB),
which has been banned in Syria, is closer to AKP than the secular Ba’ath
party of Assad. Because of shared ideology and politics, Turkey desires to
see the SMB come to power, or at least share power with Assad regime.
Davutoglu, during his meeting with Assad in August 2011, proposed Turkey
would support Assad if the SMB, as an outgrowth of Syria’s majority Sunni
community, was given four ministries with approving their return to Syria,
after decades of exile. The idea was rejected by Assad on the ground that the
SMB, as an Islamist party, was incompatible with Syria’s secular character
(Aras, 2012, p. 48). The SMB held a conference in April 2011 in Istanbul,
where it denounced the Assad regime. In June, the SMB members and other
opposition groups signed a declaration in Turkey, which called for ‘freedom
of belief, expression, and practice of religion under a civil state’ (Zalewski,
2011). Four Muslim Brotherhood members and six independent Islamists
were selected among the nineteen members of the General Secretariat whose
names were published by the Syrian revolutionary committee (Spyer, 2011).
Even, SMB leader Muhammad Riad al-Shaqfa declared that Syrians would
accept Turkish military intervention rather than the West for protection from
Assad’s security forces (Reuters, November 17, 2011). Thus, Arab Spring
brought a golden opportunity for Turkey to establish an ideological ally and
more friendly government in Syria led by SMB. From this perception, Turkey
supported SMB-led oppositions against Assad.
Respect Towards Democracy

AKP’s Turkey has been developing very powerful democratic norms and
values in the country. It has set an example in the democratic history of Europe
being elected for three times consecutively with an increasing vote percentage.
Turkey, where military elite had a very powerful political role, now has turned
into a fully democratic country under AKP. As a democracy-prone country,
Turkey always respects democratic sentiments wherever and whenever it is.
On the contrary, Syria has developed as an authoritarian regime suppressing
democratic values. Though Turkey developed economic and regional ties with
Syria, but has been cultivating the intention to develop democracy compatible
with the Turkish foreign policy views of promoting democracy. The Arab
Spring provides Turkey the unique opportunity to promote democratic
regimes in Syria and thereby other Arab countries (Paul & Seyrek, 2011).
14
Though it suffered considerable economic loss in Syria, Turtkey views it as a

long overdue correction in the region to secure her ideological position with
the democracy and thereby with majority people of the land. Turkey judged
the Arab Spring was inevitable, and therefore gave her support to those who
demanding democratization despite short-run economic costs.
To Establish Turkey as a ‘Role Model’ for Islamization of Democracy

Turkey under AKP has been developing a ‘role model’ image for successfully
combining political Islam with modern democracy. Following the success of
AKP, the political Islamist movements across the world started to view Turkey
as a ‘role model’. Even prior to the Arab Spring Islamists in Egypt, Jordan,
Libya, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia viewed the Turkish AKP as a model for
Islamization (Taspinar, 2012). Many Islamist movements of the world started
to adopt their policy following AKP such as Tunisia’s An-nahda party adopted
the policies following AKP’s thinking (Torelli, 2012). AKP also wants the
Muslim world particularly the Arab world to follow Turkey’s ‘role model’
democratic system. Taking the credit of ‘Arab Spring’, Erdogan claimed that
the inspiration for popular uprisings in the Arab world was Turkey and its
“advanced democracy” (Today’s Zaman, May 18, 2011). During the protests
in Egypt, Erdogan was among the first who called on Hosni Mubarak to resign
(Today’s Zaman, February 2, 2011). An-nahda’s leader Rashid Ghannusi,
stated that he was interested in ‘Turkish model’, which allowed for an Islamic
government to operate in a secular society (Democracy Digest, 2014). He
stressed that the best model coinciding to Tunisia is Turkey and AKP as a
sample coinciding democracy within an Islam majority population (Cagaptay
& Pollock, 2013). The electoral victory of Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated
parties, such as An-nahda in Tunisia and the Freedom and Justice Party in
Egypt, provided Turkey with an opportunity of creating a belt of moderate
Islamist regimes in the region following ‘Turkish model’. This ‘role model’
image of Turkey has also been fuelled by her growing economic power and
international prestige. In the courses of Arab Spring, Turkey tried to influence
the newly established Arab regimes to follow ‘Turkish model’ as a Muslim
predominant country that combines Islam with democracy, even keeping good
relationship with the west particularly the US. In Syrian case, though Turkey
at the beginning was in a dilemma, but finally supported the movement against
Assad’s autocracy as the promoter of democracy and as a ‘role model’ of
Islamization of democracy.
Learning from Libyan Case

The AKP government also learned from Libyan case. Like Syria, Turkey had
very strong economic-strategic ties with Gaddafi’s Libya. It was a lucrative
market for Turkey, while Turkish companies invested multi-million dollars in
Libya. Until 2011 Turkish firms held and are holding 525 projects in Libya
15
with a total value of $26.3 billion (Ministry of Economy, Turkey, 2013). The
trade volume between the two countries was $2.36 billion in 2010 (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Turkey, 2010). Erdogan was awarded Gaddafi International
Prize for Human Rights in November 2010 (Today’s Zaman, December 1,
2010). When the uprising hit Libya, Turkey supported Gaddafi considering
its economic interests and insisted on solving the crisis through negotiations.
Turkey opposed international intervention and encouraged Gaddafi to initiate
reforms. While several states closed their diplomatic representations in
Tripoli and Benghazi, Turkey continued to run its diplomatic missions. Only
when NATO involved in the crisis in March 2011, Erdogan declared that
Turkey “wishes to see Libya’s leader step down immediately” (Cook, 2011).
Davutoglu visited Libya and declared opposition’s National Transitional
Council (NTC) as ‘the legitimate representative of Libyan people’ (Today’s
Zaman, July 4, 2011). Realizing the situation that Gaddafi regime would fall,
Turkey decided to withdraw support from Gaddafi and began supporting the
NTC. In this case, Turkey’s policy has undergone several dilemmas and it
took long-time for final decision. Unlike the Libyan case, in Syria Turkey
appears to be anticipating the fall of Assad immediately with a view to secure
its maximum interests and to establish a positive government in Syrian upon
which it can expand its influence.
To Reduce Influence of Iran in the Middle East

Though Turkey and Iran have some common grounds for cooperation in the
Middle East, They also have opposing interests there. In Iraq, they compete
to establish their influential control after geopolitical vacuum created by
the gulf war. Iran supports Shiite groups, while Turkey supports the secular
movements (Duman, 2012). Iran and Turkey compete for regional hegemony
and leadership in the Muslim world. Iran, as the leader of Shiite community,
has successfully been increasing its influence on the Shi’a-dominated
governments in the Middle East and Syria has been the most influential ally
of Iran there. The Iranian and Syrian governments have shared anti-western
and anti-Israeli positions, and both have been under international sanctions.
But Syria is ruled by a Shi’a leader, while its majority (59-60%) population
is Sunni and only 13% is Shi’a. It also neighbors Lebanon and Iran’s long-
time enemy Israel. It is therefore a crucial ally for Iran. A Sunni resurgence
in Syria could inhibit Iran’s ideological and political expansion in the Middle
East. On the other hand, SMB’s coming to power in Syria could be a political
gain for Turkey against its regional rival Iran. During the uprising in Syria,
Iran has continued to back Assad regime, while Turkey provided supports
to Syria’s opposition groups. The signs of strained Turkish-Iranian relations
were already manifested in September 2011 when Turkey agreed to install
NATO radar systems (Kabalan, 2012) which criticized by Iran. The SMB’s
willingness to adopt Turkish model in governance system also dissatisfied Iran.
16
Thus, Turkey-Iran competition demonstrated through the ongoing uprising in

Syria over regional leadership.
Shi’a-Sunni Conflict in the Middle East and the Stand of Turkey

Middle Eastern countries are almost divided into Sunni-Shi’a belt. Iran,
Shi’a-led Iraq, Syria, Lebanese Hezbollah together formed Shi’a alliance,
while Saudi Arabia, Gulf States, Turkey, Egypt and parts of North Africa are
the Sunni-dominated states. Sunni-dominated states are almost maintaining
friendly ties with the west, while Shi’a-dominated states having almost
enmity with them. In Iraq, Saddam’s Sunni regime was ousted by the US, a
Shi’a regime was installed and Iran is now believed to influence much of the
Iraqi events. In Syria, Assad family has been ruling the country since 1970’s
favoring Shi’a minority and repressing the Sunni majority, which created
a widespread dissatisfaction among the Sunni majority. Encouraged by the
Arab Spring, Syrian Sunni majority people revolted against Assad, which was
reacted with harsh crackdown by the regime. The conflict gradually turned
into armed struggle between the Shi‘a dictator Assad and growing Sunni-led
insurgence which was eventually characterized as Shi‘a-Sunni conflict. Many
foreigners also joined the conflict, Sunni people to fight against Assad and
Shi’a people in support of Assad. The Shi’a-led countries like Iran backed
Assad, while Sunni-led countries like Saudi Arabia reportedly supplied the
opposition with arms. Sunni Islamists blamed Iran for supporting Assad’s
brutal crackdown on Sunni population, while, Iran and Syria felt betrayed by
Sunni groups such as Hamas, which they had aided for many years. In that
conflict, Turkey, as a moderate Islamic state with Sunni majority, was forced
to choose either its long-days Shi’a ally Assad or her fellow Sunni Islamists
in Syria. After a period of indecision, Turkey and all of the regional Sunni
actors turned against Assad regime to reduce the rise of Shi’a influence in
the region. The Sunni states consider Iraq as lost to the Shi’a belt and turning
Syria to a Sunni one would be the best alternative to balance the loss. Thus,
the Syrian case brought the Shi’a-Sunni conflict in front and Turkey as a Sunni
majority country expressed its support for Sunni fellows in Syria thinking that
the downfall of Assad’s Shia regime could help to create a Turkish-influenced
Sunni belt of states in the region.
To Secure Turkish National Interests and Establish Regional Leading Role

Securing national interests has always been given priority in the foreign policy
of every country, so no exception for Turkey. The ‘zero problem’ and Strategic
Depth’ principles are also highly motivated by securing Turkish economic,
strategic, national interests with its vicinity. Since AKP came to power,
Turkish foreign policy aimed at establishing Turkey as a regional leader and
gradually securing a leading role in the global politics. Having Ottoman legacy,
Turkey hoped to revive the regional leading role. Turkey’s policies towards
17
Arab Spring also goaled to secure its maximum economic-strategic-national

interests together with establishing its leading role. In Tunisian case it applied
wait and see policy (Kujawa, 2011), while in Egypt it followed more decisive
stand calling Hosni Mubarek to step down. As for Libya, initially Turkey
preferred to stay neutral. But under the changed circumstances, it changed
its position supporting the opposition against Gaddafi. In the Syrian case,
Turkey stepped more cautiously, prioritizing stability in Syria, where Turkish
economic-strategic interests were substantial. The driving motive behind these
cautious steps was to secure Turkish interest. But when Turkey realized that
Assad would not take any reform initiatives and would fall within short, while
the international community stood against Assad, only then Turkey changed
its position to secure its regional leading role at the minimum trading cost. It
didn’t want to be isolated in this case, which may hamper its national interest
and regional leading role. So, for the future security of Turkish investments
in Syria and to establish its emerging regional leadership role, Turkey shifted
her policy.
Development of International Image

Assad’s harsh crackdown to the civilian severely hampered Syria’s international
image, while it has increasingly been isolated by the international society.
Damaged democracy, violations of human rights and poor governance in Syria
also fueled the dissatisfaction of international community. It became evident
when UN General Assembly voted condemning Syria’s repression to the
civilians (122 in favor, 13 against, 41 abstentions, including China and Russia
in 2011, and 137 in favor, 12 against, 17 Abstentions in 2012) (UN press
release, 2012). Many countries either deported Syria’s ambassadors or declared
as unwanted person such as Australia, France, Germany, Britain, Italy, Spain,
Canada and the US. Under these circumstances, Turkey wanted to be with
the international community cutting off its relationship with Assad regime to
develop its international image as a nation honoring democratic sentiment and
disfavoring human rights violation. Turkey also hosted thousands of Syrian
refugees as a humanitarian responsibility, which was also appreciated by the
international community. Though the crisis disturbed Turkey’s relations with
Iran and Russia- Turkey’s largest suppliers of oil and natural gas, it tried to
minimize the cost balancing its ties with Iran and Russia. Russian President
Putin’s visit to Turkey on December 3, 2012 indicated that Russia valued
its economic ties with Turkey. Turkey’s relations with the Gulf States have
improved as a result of its distancing from Assad. It has also contributed
to strengthen Turkey’s ties with the post-revolution governments in Libya,
Tunisia, Yemen, Egypt, as well as with civil society activists pressing for
democratic changes in Arab countries. Though Turkey and Saudi Arabia differ
over which Syrian opposition should be supported, but both are commonly
united to oppose Assad. The NATO deployment of Patriot missile batteries in
18
Turkey underscores the improvement of Turkish position in the west. Thus,

Turkey’s policy shifting towards Syria manifested its institutionalized and
improved relations with the international society very well.
Conclusion
Having located in an important geopolitical-strategic position, Turkey has been
playing a vital role in regional politics. After the foundation of modern Turkey
in 1924, Kemalist paradigm has become the official doctrine of Turkey’s
foreign policy. Coming to power in 2002, AKP adopted new foreign policy
concepts sharply different from the Kemalism based on ‘zero problem’ and
‘strategic depth’ theories of Davutuglu. Turkey developed good relationship
with the neighboring countries, while it became natural ally of the West as a
NATO member. As the inheritor of Ottoman Empire, AKP tried to expand its
influence in the Middle East, Caucasus, Balkan and Central Asia. As a result of
good neighborhood foreign policy of AKP, Turkish-Syrian relations improved
remarkably. While two countries were at the edge of war in 1998, a decade
later they turned into close friends. Different regional and global developments
such as the Iraq war, sectarian dynamics, post 9/11 perspectives contributed to
the warming of mutual relations. Syria’s recognition of Hatay as a sovereign
part of Turkey, cancelling support to PKK, increasing trade volume, lifting
visa requirements are the remarkable achievements of friendly relationships.
Cooperation also developed in cultural, economic, diplomatic and military
affairs. Turkey became the first NATO member to have joint military exercises
with Syria. All these positive developments lost its momentum on the emergence
of Arab Spring. From its inception in Tunisia, Turkey warned Assad to initiate
democratic reforms to avoid the similar unrest in Syria. When it ultimately hit
Syria in 2011, Turkey repeatedly called on taking reform initiatives and stop
violence against civilians. Turkey’s negotiation initiatives between Assad and
the opposition also failed. It applied all methods against Syria to resolve the
crisis keeping its friendly ties. But Syria responded negatively and continued
harsh treatment to the opposition. Rather Syria blamed Turkey to intervene
internal affairs of Syria. Realizing the perspectives, Turkey turned its support
from Assad to the opposition groups. With this shifting policy, the golden era
of Turkish-Syrian mutual relations ended up.
Indeed, there are several factors, perspectives and perceptions behind
Turkey’s shifting policy towards Syria. Turkish requests for reforms and
negotiation were repeatedly ignored by Syria, which Turkey’s leadership
didn’t take positively. It has been perceived as disrespect to Turkish dignity.
AKP with an Islamic religious background and humanitarian stand can’t
support harsh crackdown to the civilian or can’t remain silent to see the
massacre, which Assad is doing in Syria. Turkey shares longest land border
with Syria, while PKK- the biggest security threat for Turkey, is also based
in this border region. Mass influx of Syrian refugees into Turkey increased
19
the possibility of entering PKK militants together, which will pose serious
security threat for Turkey. The news of Assad’s rekindled relationship with
PKK fueled the Turkish threat perceptions. AKP always supports the political
Islamic movements across the world. Though Turkey has been developing
relationship with Assad’s Ba’athist Syria, but ideologically SMB was closer
to AKP, which has been banned by Assad regime. Turkey desires SMB to
come to power. The Shi’a-Sunni rivalry also worked as a driving factor behind
Turkey’s shifting policy. The Middle Eastern countries are almost divided into
Shi’a-Sunni groups. Turkey is a Sunni-dominated country, while Syria is ruled
by a Shi’a authority with its Sunni majority population. The opposition groups
in Syria are mainly of Sunni. So the social unrest created an opportunity for
Turkey to establish a friendly Sunni government in Syria. Turkey has been
characterized as a ‘role model’ for Islamized democracy. It recorded for
successive victory in the elections with increasing vote percentage. So the
democratic values have always been honored by the AKP government. During
Arab Spring, all the movements are mainly motivated by democratic spirit
against authoritarian regimes. Turkey, from its rational point of view sided
with the democratic demands of the Uprisings rather than autocratic rulers
despite short-run economic costs. Turkey, as Ottoman inherent, always tries
to establish an influential role in the region, where Iran has emerged as a rival
keeping Syria as it’s most important ally in the Middle East. The fall of Assad
would be a great loss for Iran, and thus Iran’s influence in the region will
reduce and that of Turkey will increase naturally. Turkey believed that Assad
government would fall within short. The future security of Turkish interests
and investments in Syria would be not in the hand of Assad but in the hand of
following government. So it has openly sided with the SNC to reap the future
material and ideological benefits. Following the Libyan case, Turkey doesn’t
want to walk on the wrong side of history again. Turkey also understood
the limits of only using soft power or to simply act as mediator rather hard-
power elements alongside soft power to be a regional leader. It now wants to
be a center of influence using hard and soft-power together. Turkey with its
fastest-growing economy, desires to play more significant role in dealing with
regional issues. All major global communities strongly condemned Syria’s
actions. So the standing beside Assad would reduce Turkish international
image, while its support for oppositions in favor of democracy and against
human rights violation would increase its international image. Turkey hopes
to see an inclusive democratic Syria emerge from the Arab Spring, which
would be its natural ally. Turkey wants to speed up its role as an economic
and political actor in the emerging new Middle East through Arab Spring. All
these factors, perceptions and perspectives prompted Turkey to shift its policy
towards Syria on the emergence of Arab Spring.
20
References & Notes

1. Kemalist refers to follow the Kemalism adopted by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk,
founder of modern Turkey. It was characterized by sweeping political-social-
cultural-religious reforms to disassociate Turkey from its Ottoman heritage
and embrace westernized lifestyle. The six fundamentals of Kemalism are
Republicanism, Populism, Secularism, Nationalism, Reformism and Statism.
‘Peace at Home, Peace in the World’ was the motto of Kemalist foreign policy.
Retrieved from http://www.allaboutturkey.com/ata_prensip.htm.
2. The discourse of “zero problem with neighbors” is a slogan summarizing
Turkey’s expectations with regards to her relations with neighboring countries.
Turkey wants to eliminate all the problems from her relations with neighbors or
at least to minimize them as much as possible. Policy of Zero Problems with our
Neighbours, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey. Retrieved from
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/policy-of-zero-problems-with-our-neighbors.en.mfa.
3. For detailed about Turkish Straits see: Nihan Unlu, The Legal Regime of the
Turkish Straits, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Kluwer Law International, Hague,
Netherlands, 2002.
4. Ottoman Empire, an empire created by Turkish tribes in Anatolia. One of the
most powerful states in the world during the 15th and 16th centuries, it spanned
more than 600 years and came to an end only in 1922, when it was replaced by
the Turkish Republic. At its height the empire included most of southeastern
Europe to the gates of Vienna, including modern Hungary, Serbia, Bosnia,
Romania, Greece and Ukraine; Iraq, Syria, Israel, and Egypt; North Africa as
far west as Algeria; and most of the Arabian Peninsula. The term Ottoman is
a dynastic appellation derived from Osman (Arabic:ʿUthmān), the nomadic
Turkmen chief who founded both the dynasty and the empire. Retrieved from
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/434996/Ottoman-Empire.
5. Kemal Ataturk: (Turkish: “Kemal, Father of Turks”), original name Mustafa
Kemal, also called Mustafa Kemal Paṣa (1881-1938), soldier, statesman, and
reformer who was the founder and first president (1923–38) of the Republic
of Turkey. He modernized the country’s legal and educational systems and
encouraged the adoption of a European way of life. Retrieved from http://www.
britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/40411/Kemal-Ataturk.
6. Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK): A militant Kurdish nationalist organization
founded by Abdullah Ocalan in the late 1970s. Although the group initially
espoused demands for the establishment of an independent Kurdish state, its
stated aims were later tempered to calls for greater Kurdish autonomy. Retrieved
from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/325238/Kurdistan-Workers-
Party-PKK.
7. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, (b.1954) Turkish politician, who served as prime minister
(2003–14) and president (2014–) of Turkey. Erdogan graduated from Marmara
University, where he became active in parties led by Erbakan. In 1994 he was
elected mayor of Istanbul on the ticket of the Welfare Party. Erdogan proved to be
a competent and canny manager. In 1998 he was convicted for inciting religious
hatred after reciting a poem, sentenced to 10 months in prison. Erdogan resigned
as mayor. Retrieved from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/913988/
Recep-Tayyip-Erdogan.
8. Ahmet Davutoglu (b. 1959), is a Turkish diplomat and politician who has been
the 26th Prime Minister of Turkey since 28 August 2014 and the leader of the
21
AKP since 27 August 2014. He previously served as the Minister of Foreign
Affairs from 2009 to 2014. He is also a political scientist, an academic. Retrieved
from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmet_Davuto%C4%9Flu.
9. Ummayyad Dynasty: great Muslim dynasty to rule the Muslim Caliphate from
661 to 750 A.D.
10. Mamluk, a member of the armies of slaves that won political control of several
Muslim states during Middle Ages. Mamluks established a dynasty that ruled
Egypt and Syria from 1250 to 1517. Retrieved from http://www.britannica.com/
EBchecked/topic/360799/Mamluk.
11. For details about Tyrkey-Syria water conflict, see Fathi Zereini & Wolfgang
Jaeschke, Water in the Middle East and North Africa, Springer, New York, 2004,
pp. 319-45.
12. ASALA (Armenian Secret Army to Liberate Armenia), a Marxist-Leninist group
formed in 1975 to force the Turkish government to acknowledge the Armenian
massacres of 1915 and pay reparations. Its activities, which have included acts of
terrorism, have been directed against Turkish government officials and institutions.
Retrieved from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1365040/ASALA.
13. For details see http://www.syriancouncil.org.
22
Connect Central Asia Policy And
Indian Outfoxing
Bawasingh
Abstract
With the breakup of Soviet Union in December 1991, the landscape of the
Eurasian heartland has been changed and Central Asia rediscovered itself
in the comity of nations with the dawn of the twenty first century. But after
the breakup, Central Asia did not remain in the priority of the Russian
foreign policy as Central Asia being considered as its natural backyard.
This vacuum gave birth to the ‘New Great Game’, thus, the major powers-
US, China, Russia and European Union (EU) involved in Central Asian
geopolitics was further substantiated by Zbigniew Brzezinski. Following
the geopolitical thinkers-Huntington and Mackinder, Zbigniew Brzezinski
in his book entitled “The Grand Chessboard: American Primary and its
Geostrategic Imperatives” (1997), renamed the Eurasian Heartland as a
Chessboard. According to him, five countries- France, Germany, Russia,
China, and India are as “pivots” to control the Eurasian landmass. For the
given rich mineral resources and its geostrategic location, the ‘pivots’ have
been making efforts to control Central Asia for their vested interests. Though,
India and Central Asia had been sharing historical and civilizational
relations, even after its independence, the fact is that Central Asia did not
find pivotal place in Indian foreign policy. Some perceptible scholars are
of the opinion that during the last decade, India has been outfoxed from
Central Asia because of the geopolitics of the region. In the very beginning
of the 21st century, India realized this diplomatic mistake and redesigned
its foreign policy under various frameworks vis-à-vis Central Asia. Connect
Central Asia Policy is one of them. Against this background, the main focus
of this paper is to find out how geopolitical and geostrategic interests of
India are being effected in Central Asia; how India is being outfoxed from
Central Asia; how and to what extent Connect Central Asia Policy be
helpful in engaging India more positively and constructively with Central
Asia to check its outfoxing?
Keywords
Geographical Proximity, Post-cold War, Pivots, Geo-politics, New Great
Game, Paradigm Shift, Outfox, Regional Organization, Connect Central
Asia Policy, Indian Foreign Policy, Soft Power, Asian Century, Security
Issues, Central Asian Republics.
Introduction
India and Central Asia had been enjoying civilizational and historical relations
since millennia. India has remained dormant to extend cordial and bilateral
Connect Central Asia Policy and Indian Outfoxing
relations with Central Asian republics after the breakup of the USSR. But the
endowed natural resources made it very crucial for India from geopolitical and
geo-economic perspective. Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, three of
the five Central Asian countries are sharing borders with Afghanistan which
further attaches strategic significance to the region for the Indian foreign
policy. Despite India’s geostrategic and geopolitical interests in this region,
unfortunately, the bilateral cooperation did not realize to the full potential.
In the 1990s, some important events took place in the international relations.
Withdrawal of USSR from Afghanistan, the end of the Cold War, breakup
of USSR– all left indelible ramifications for Indian security in the changing
geostrategic environment. Although, India had shared very deep relations
in the remote past with Central Asia but it failed to concretize its relations
with the regions in the post-Cold War era because of its internal political
and economic dynamics. With the onset of the New Great Game and some
drastic changes in the international politics such as withdrawal of USSR from
Afghanistan in 1989 and end of the Cold War brought India closer to Central
Asia. Geopolitical and geostrategic importance of Central Asia for India has
been enhanced by these internal and external dynamics. The geopolitical
and geostrategic salience of the region for the Indian foreign policy has been
highlighted in the Indian’s Ministry of Defence’s Annual Report (2009-10)
on account of its geographical proximity, historical and cultural links etc. The
Indian Prime Minister’s address to the Combined Commanders Conference
in October 2010 highlighted the importance of Central Asia in these words:
“.... The discovery of large reserves of hydrocarbons and other
resources needed for sustaining economic growth makes the Central
Asian region immensely attractive for forging a mutually beneficial
cooperative relationship.”1

India’s Geostrategic Interests in Central Asia
Central Asia holds a paramount strategic significance for India. It is lying
between the two nuclear powers of Russia and China. Afghanistan is falling
in the ‘Arc of Turbulence’ and Central Asia has been sharing long border with
Afghanistan. As pointed out by the some strategic commentators, Afghanistan
is known for its religious extremism in both the regions South and Central
Asia. From Kashmir point of view, it is a major cause of concern for India.
Similarly, many terrorist outfits from Afghanistan share ethnic and religious
proximity with the Central Asian terrorist groups. Thus, both the regions have
vital interests in each other’s political and strategic stability. Seeing Kashmir
problem, India cannot afford to be isolated itself from the geostrategic and
geopolitical dynamics of the regions. Central Asian experts have pointed out
that uncontrolled religious extremism in the CARs could invigorate the same
in Kashmir.2 Sharing geographical proximity, it is considered that India’s
strategic concerns are closely tied up with the regions bordering its north and
24
northwest parts. Under such circumstances, India cannot afford to remain

segregated from this region.3 Peace, stability and security are considered
important elements for the development of the economy of any region.
Afghanistan is a sharing geographical proximity with both India and Central
Asian countries. Instability in Afghanistan has adversely influenced peace and
security and is the potential threat to destabilize the whole region.4 India’s
major concern is that Taliban’s re-emergence in Afghanistan and support from
Pakistan would amplify the pressure on Kashmir and facilitate Pakistan’s
strategic outreach to South Asia.5 If both the regions do not cooperate with
each other, the security environment of both the regions which is already under
severe stresses, is likely to become more explosive.6 In order to control this
explosive strategic environment and protection of long-term strategic interests,
bilateral cooperation becomes paramount significant. After the end of the Cold
War and break up of USSR, the New Great Game has set in the Central Asia.
Some of the major powers and regional players are competing with each other
to spread their influence in Central Asia. The US is making efforts to weaken
the Russian and Iranian gains on the one hand whereas on the other hand,
China has extended magnificent economic aid for the development of oil
fields in Central Asia for its future demands. Exploiting the Afghan political
and strategic instability, EU has been extending its influence through NATO’s
Partnership for Peace (PFP) programme.
Drug trafficking is another problem, being faced by India and Central
Asia. Drug trafficking has become a money-making trade and posing a serious
security and social challenge for both the regions. Central Asia is also highly
vulnerable for smuggling of fissile material for Weapon of Mass Destruction
(WMD), as the custom checkpoints are lacking detection equipment for
intercepting such material. Though Kazakhstan has closed nuclear test range
after its independence and committed to be non-nuclear state under the
international regime, but still it has potential for nuclear power as it is richly
endowed with uranium.7 With the onset of economic reforms, Indian economy
has been metamorphosed to good growth rate but India lacks sources of energy
by which it can maintain this growth rate. Most of its energy requirements are
coming from the Middle East Asia but with the intervention of external powers
for their vested interests in this region, the strategic environment has been
very explosive. On account of this, India has to diversify its energy sources to
Central Asia that is rich in hydrocarbon resources.8
Central Asia in Indian Foreign Policy: Paradigmatic Shift

Soon after independence of CARs, both India and the CARs renewed their
contacts. The Presidents of CARs visited India in quick succession seeking
high order bilateral and multilateral cooperation. In the pursuance of the
comprehensive relationship, many MoUs and policy frameworks have
been put in place by both the sides. Both regions have been committed to
25
open democratic and secular polities. Both regions committed to heighten

cooperation to root out religious extremism and terrorism. Sharing many
commonalities of interests, Central Asia is being considered as a part of
Indian Extended Neighbourhood. Many official frameworks i.e. Immediate
and Strategic Neighbourhood and Look North Policy have been launched to
further heighten the cooperation with Central Asia.9 Having congruence of
geopolitical, geostrategic and geo-economic interests, unfortunately Central
Asia did not find pivotal position in Indian foreign policy. Most of the scholars
of the Indian foreign policy holding views that Indian foreign policy have
always been reactive rather than pro-active policy vis-à-vis Central Asia.10
India has failed to capitalize the amount of goodwill, enjoying in Central Asia
on account of its historical engagement and during the Cold War era. Whereas
on the other hand, Indian foreign policy had been largely remained obsessed
with Western world and primarily pre-occupied with Pakistan and China.
Other areas of the world such as Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia
did not figured prominently in Indian foreign policy. India’s concerns have
been rooted in Pakistan. Pakistan’s strategy is to spread the religious agenda
not only in South Asia but in Central Asia in order to form an Islamic State
from the arc of Islamic countries starting from Iraq to Pakistan was viewed
with tremendous circumspection and concern by Indian policy-makers and
strategists alongwith the Central Asian scholars.11
Throughout the Cold War, India and erstwhile USSR had been sharing
very strong relations. With the breakup of USSR, India lost a strong ally
that has always been supporting India in the international fora. The breakup
changed the Eurasian geopolitical landscape. About 16 countries emerged on
the Eurasian political map. However, after getting independence from Soviet
Union, this region still remained under the Russian influence and known
as backyard of Russia.12 Although India established diplomatic relations
with these countries in the very beginning but substance and constructive
cooperation were absent between both the regions. With the launch of the New
Great Game in the Central Asia, it has become chessboard of external powers.
Meanwhile, Indian economy was on higher trajectory and it has converted to
higher growth rate and in order to maintain this growth rate, it required a lot
of energy as itself is deficient in energy source whereas Central Asia is very
rich in the same. Against this background, Central Asia is a region where India
has geopolitical and geo-economic interests. Thus, India started giving prime
importance to Central Asia in its foreign policy.
The dawn of the twenty first century saw major changes in India’s strategic
thinking. With the end of the Cold War coinciding with lot of geopolitical and
geostrategic changes in the international politics, paradigmatic shift has been
witnessed in Indian foreign policy. Now it is not only loosening its obsession
with Pakistan and China, rather it is opening up to many other parts of the
world. India was willing to play a significant role in Asia alongwith the global
26
aspirations. Against this background, India reoriented and energized its foreign
policy by fortifying it with frameworks, such as, “Look East”, “Look Central
Asia” etc. In the beginning of the 21st century, India has been following two
pronged strategy- multilateral and bilateral engagements with Central Asia.
India has become observer of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
and also pursuing its goal to elevate its engagement as a full member. Except
Turkmenistan, all other Central Asia republics are members of this regional
organization. India is engaging with Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO) for its security interests. Central Asia countries have been strongly
advocating elevation of Indian observer status to full membership for checking
one country’s hegemony. India has also become the member of the Kazakh
initiative Conference on Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA).There
will be possibility of terrorism’s shifting bases from Afghanistan to Central
Asian republics and this will have drastic impact on the stability of the both
the regions.13 In view of this, both the regions have lot of scope in furthering
strategic cooperation.
Alongwith multilateralism, India is also concretizing bilateral relations
with the Central Asian republics. Bilateral relations between both the regions
are based on open, pluralism, and progressive societies. Both are committed
to secularism and democracy. Bilateral relations have been fortified because
of homogeneity in commitment to root out terrorism, drug smuggling, small
arms trafficking and other non-conventional security threats. Central Asian
republics have responded to Indian concerns very positively and brought India
out of claustrophobic confines of South Asia.14Look North Policy, Strategic
Partnership and Central Asia Connect Policy frame-works have been devised
to make Indian foreign policy vis-a-vis this region more proactive in the
region. But the fact is that India is being outfoxed from Central Asian geo-
economic and geostrategic dynamics. In addition to this, bilateral trade is at
very low ebb, FDI being very negligible. Because of these enervated bilateral
relations, India strategically and economically, has not become able to make
any indelible impressions in the region.
Outfoxing of India from Central Asia: Wake Up Call

Notwithstanding, strong historical and civilizational engagements alongwith
constructive policy frameworks, in the recent years, India is being outfoxed
from Central Asia. After the announcement of its ‘Connect Central Asia
Policy’, India has been taken up seriously by the Central Asian countries.
This policy was directed to enhance its cooperation in many potential sectors.
Concerns and connection on part of both sides provided vital strength and
urgency to the bilateral relations. Despite this urgency India, has been failed
to keep pace with external players, in general, and with China and Russia,
in particular.15 Economically, Central Asian countries are not in a good
position but their cooperation with India is holding paramount importance
27
in the evolving geostrategic and geo-economic environment for the mutual

economic development.These countries required a lot of economic assistance
for sorting out their socio-economic problems. India was not in a position to
bail out these countries from such crisis whereas, on the other hand, other
external players, particularly, China and Russia have been investing in the
Central Asian region to build road, railways, pipelines etc. Despite many
foreign policy initiative, Indian profile is declining in Central Asia on account
of the New Great Game. However, it was not completely out of race in game.
Energy security is a major concern of India whereas Central Asia is very
rich in energy. Thus, India and Central Asia are complementary to each other.
But the fact is that the major initiatives on part of India in Central Asia to
ensure energy security have been in limbo.Though roots of the Turkmenistan-
Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipe line project was laid in the 1990s
but yet has not taken off. Turkmenistan and Pakistan signed MoU in 1995.
Later on, India also joined this project. Afghanistan, India and Pakistan signed
a framework agreement in June 2008 to import gas from Turkmenistan.16
Contention regarding transit fees between India-Afghanistan and Pakistan-
India made the prospects of the realizing this project very dismal. Geopolitics
of the region further derailed the project. Following the visit of Chinese
President, Xi’s visit to Turkmenistan in September 2013, there is a speculation
that the TAPI project may be limited up to Pakistan only.
However, in a significant step towards achieving energy security, India
signed agreement with hydrocarbon-rich Kazakhstan in April, 2011, for
acquisition of 25 per cent stake in its Satpayev exploration block in the Caspian
Sea. But very shortly, the Kazakhstani state-owned energy firm KazMunaiGas
bought some stakes in the Kashagan field. The same stake about 8.33 percent
was sold to China’s CNPC for the same sum of US$ 5 billion. As reported,
India lost 8.4 percent stake in Kazakhstan’s Kashagan oil field to the CNPC.17
Half of the cost of financing of the second phase of Kashagan’s development
will be given by CNPC and because of this smart diplomacy, India met with
outfoxing in this project. China has shown smart energy and trade diplomacy
related to energy projects. It has become successful in making Turkmenistan’s
Galkynysh gas field, the world’s second-largest gas field operational. It is a
major accomplishment for China because this project was developed by a
CNPC-led consortium without any external participation from major Western
energy companies. Now, there is an indication on part of Turkmenistan that
the successful accomplishment of Galkynysh field, China will have more
control over the future of TAPI pipeline project.18
Lack of connectivity between India and Eurasia is also resulting in many
problems for both the regions. In order to enhance connectivity between both
the regions, India, Russia and Iran mooted an idea of a very important and
ambitious project known as International North-South Transport Corridor
(INSTC) in 2000. In this regard, nothing much has happened practically
28
but has become more complicated with the rapidly changing geopolitical
dynamics of the region. The ongoing problems of Afghanistan and geopolitics
over the involvement of Iran have been affecting the prospects of the project.
On the other hand,China and Russia are also creating the network of energy
and security relations in Central Asia through the SCO. According to one
perceptible scholar, Debidatta Aurobinda Mahapatra, this network would
have serious implications for INSTC. Michael Tanchum is also holding the
same opinion. According to him, concerns are growing in India that INSTC
probably may step into the shoes of SCO-managed trade and transport corridor
stretching from the Pacific to the Baltic. India’s poor maneuvering of proposed
projects will have serious implications for its next engagements in regional
cooperation in Central Asia. India may be sidelined by Chinese and Russian
assertiveness in energy-rich Central Asian republics.19
China has an edge over India in Central Asia. China has extended economic
aid to these countries at two levels – bilateral and through the mechanism of
the SCO by providing substantial loans to the five states. In addition to energy,
China is also expanding its footprints in many other sectors, such as, tungsten
and uranium mining sector. Meena Singh Roy, an expert on India-Central
Asian issues says that, “While India is accepted by all five Central Asian
Republics, India’s delivery mechanism is very slow. Indian private companies
do not take enough interest in this region, and China with its economic might
is, obviously, able to penetrate into the region faster than India. While India
invests in millions, Beijing invests in billions in Central Asia.”20 Indian trade
and investment in Central Asia is very insignificant.
Strategically, India and Central Asia shared same kind of threat perceptions.
However, strategically, the bilateral or regional engagements between India
and Central Asia are very weaker ones. Both the regions shared geographical
proximity with the highly terrorism infested country and the centre of drug
smuggling. Thus, strategic cooperation is holding paramount importance for
both the regions. Whatever the standing strategic cooperation is there between
both the regions are being outmaneuvered by Russia. India has renovated
Ayni Air Base in Tajikstan which was serving as a major military base for the
Soviet Union since its intervention in Afghanistan. But when Soviet Union
withdrew from Afghanistan, this Air Base lost it geostrategic importance for
Russia. Its infrastructure had been deteriorated seriously. India offered to
renovate it as Tajikistan per se is not interested in maintaining and repairing
it. Joshua Kocera, an eminent scholar on Eurasia argued in one of his papers
quoting some perceptible analysts that India’s strategic foray into base politics
was motivated by a desire to play the role of great power.21 India renovated
this Air Base by spending US$70 million during the 2002 and 2010. Though,
India and Central Asia have been looking toward Russia as a sole guarantor of
security in the Central Asian region but expanding strategic influence of India
in the region is disliked by Russia. Blocking of obtaining a military base in
29
Kyrgyzstan and renewing the lease of lease on Ayni Air Base in Tajikistan can
be seen in this direction.
The below table depicts the true picture of India and Central Asian
economic cooperation. In comparison with other powers, India is standing at
the lowest ebb. China, Russia and USA are the important trading partner of
Central Asia. In 2000, bilateral trade between USA and Central Asia stood at
US$ 8472.75 million followed by Russia, China and India with US$ 6472.75
million, US$ 1819.36 million, US$ 89.67 million respectively. By 2013, China
has emerged as the major trading partner of Central Asia, valuing at US$ 50
billion, followed by US, Russia and India at US$ 33 billion, US$ 31billion and
US$ 1.2 billion respectively. This comparison shows that economically India
is almost an insignificant player in Central Asia as compared to USA, China
and Russia.
Trade Trends of Central Asia with Big Powers
(Value in Millions $)
Years China Russia USA India
2000 1819.36 6472.75 8472.75 89.67
2005 8726.76 24358.57 26363.57 246.33
2006 11183.41 16765.97 18771.97 311.34
2007 12523.47 21718.69 23725.69 303.66
2008 30822.71 26752.72 28760.72 518.59
2009 23546.45 18488.95 20497.95 481.64
2010 24989.65 21437.18 23447.18 495.82
2011 39605.90 28342.41 30353.41 687.66
2012 45943.59 31988.00 34000.00 746.31
2013 50274.12 31415.03 33428.03 1241.44
Total Trade 263250.93 266794.25 294885.25 5692.9
Source: UN Comtrade Database (2013)
Central Asia is undergoing the influence of the New Great Game and the
US, China, Russia and NATO are the important players of this game. US’s
main interests are involving around checking China and Russia’s expanding
influence and vice versa. Out of this game, Indian interests are seriously being
affected. India has been out of many mutual beneficial economic and strategic
projects on account of these players intervention. Now, a question comes up,
how these interests can be protected and can India’s latest policy framework
Connect Central Asia Policy cope up with these challenges.
Connect Central Asia Policy and India’s Outfoxing

Though India and Central Asia had been enjoying relations since the recorded
history, but presently despite historical and civilizational bounds, these lacked
substance. Despite having lot of scope in economic relations, bilateral trade
30
did not take off. It still stood at US$ 1 billion which speaks the low volume
of multilateral and bilateral relations. Investment is also not encouraging
one. Both the regions having congruence of interests related to security but
failed to enhance their strategic partnership. Connectivity is one of the major
blocks for heightening the regional engagements. Central Asia is very rich in
mineral and energy whereas India is deficient in the same. Moreover, with
the onset of the New Great Game, India is being outfoxed from Central Asia
in mutual beneficial projects. Against this background, India started dialogue
with Central Asia in June, 2012, in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan). The objective of
this dialogue was to start a regular annual discussion among the academics,
scholars, government officials and business representatives from both
the sides to provide inputs to respective governments in order to heighten
comprehensive engagements. During the conference, Minister of State for
External Affairs, Mr. E. Ahmad, launched India’s new ‘Connect Central Asia’
Policy.22 E. Ahmad stating that India is now looking closely at the region
through the framework of its ‘Connect Central Asia’ Policy, which is based on
pro-active political, economic and people-to-people engagement with Central
Asian Countries, both individually and collectively.23 This policy got further
impetus giving emphasis on the four ‘Cs,’ namely ‘Commerce, Connectivity
and Community.’ While during the External Affairs Minister, S. M. Krishna’s
two-day visit to Tajikistan in the same year.
In order to speed up the bilateral cooperation, Connect Central
Asia Policy (CCAP), prioritized many areas for enhancing bilateral and
multilateral engagement which included strategic and security cooperation,
military training, joint research, counter-terrorism coordination, long term
partner in energy & natural resources, multilateral engagement, setting up
civil hospitals/clinics, IT, management, philosophy and languages, setting
up a Central Asian e-network, tele-education and tele-medicine connectivity
and developing banking infrastructure in the region.24 But in view of this
comprehensive policy many unwanted geopolitical incidents took place
which speaks about Indian profile and failures in the region. India has shown
its interests in heightening multilateral cooperation with the region. Its major
concern is extending cooperation with Central Asia as a long term partner in
energy and natural resources. Economically and strategically, India cannot
compete with Russia and China in the Central Asia region. Diplomatic
maneuvers can help out India. Through this policy, India has been stepping
up its diplomatic engagements with Central Asia and multilateral fora in
the Eurasian regions. India is already on SCO board as an observer. India
is focusing to elevate its engagement with SCO. This has been interpreted
by some scholars as India’s ability to check its outfoxing from Central Asia.
China is blocking its elevation whereas Russia is supporting this move in order
to balancing factor for Chinese and US’s influence. Salman Khurshid, Indian
External Affairs Minister visited Kyrgyzstan in September 2013 to attend the
Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO). He expressed Indian interest
31
to heighten security co-operation with the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorism

Structure (RATS).25 Moreover, Russia has negative perception of China and
US. Exploiting this, India using Connect Central Asia Policy, can check the
influence of many external powers. India is fortifying its bound with Eurasian
Economic Community (EEC) and the Custom Union and it is also moving
in this direction by proposing a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation
Agreement to integrate its markets with the unifying Eurasian space.26
In comparison to external powers, the economic cooperation between both
the regions comparatively is still dormant. Trade and investment are at very
low ebb. In 2013, bilateral trade stood at US$ 1.2 billion. In reciprocation, SCO
is proposing Free Trade Area which will be in place by 2020. It will integrate
economically all the members of the SCO. Scholars are of the opinion that it
will be more attractive to join SCO and FTA than the developed countries’
offer to include India in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
forum.27 Both the regions have geo-economic complementarities. Connect
Central Asia has focused upon in enhancing cooperation in terms of natural
resources; human resources and markets. Alongwith these sectors, there are
huge opportunities existing fo expanding cooperation in banking, insurance,
agriculture, IT and pharmaceuticals. Private sectors of India are doing well
over there in the steel and construction sector. Hydropower potential has lot
of scope and India is exploring the construction of small and medium sized
hydroelectric plants mainly in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.28
Under this policy, India has also been focusing to enhance its soft power in
Central Asia. Apart from India plans to set up Indian-Central Asia University
in Kyrgyzstan and military hospital in Tajikistan. IT centres of excellence
are working in Tashkent, Ashgabat, Dushanbe, Bishkek, Fruit Processing
Plant in Dushanbe and a Potato Processing Plant in Talas (Kyrgyzstan),
are worth mentioning. Computerization of post offices in Uzbekistan; an
EntrepreneurshipDevelopment Centre in Tashkent and a Tool Room in
Dushanbe were also some of the important projects undertaken by India in
Central Asia. About 645 slots under its ITEC programme were allotted to
Eurasia in 2012–13. Out of these slots, 435 were sanctioned to Central Asia.29
By these soft power projects, India has developed lot of goodwill fund by
which it can check its outfoxing from Central Asia. High level visits between
both the countries can contribute in strengthening the cooperation in many
sectors. As these diplomatic engagements become ideal forums for discussing
geopolitical issues and provided space for decision making regarding
heightening of bilateral cooperation. Joint research programs related to energy
and trade can fortify India’s engagements with the Central Asian countries.
Connect Central Asia Policy also emphasized on the people to people contact
alongwith humanitarian concerns, such as, opening hospitals and education
systems through which they can know about each other and win the political
favour.30 These diplomatic engagements ultimately will prove helpful in
checking Indian outfoxing from Central Asia.
32
Conclusion
India and Central Asia had been enjoying geo-cultural and civilizational
relations since the recoded history. These relations have become enervated
owing to the colonization of both the regions. After USSR breakup, Central
Asia emerged on the Eurasian map. Though, geopolitical and geostrategic
interests have been intertwined between India and Central Asia, even then
Indian foreign policy overlooked this region. This region also did not figured
prominently in Russian foreign policy. This lukewarm approach on part of its
colonial master Russia, gave a space for the power play for external powers,
known as the New Great Game. Against this background, India is expanding
its footprints in Central Asia to achieve its geo-economic and geopolitical
interests. Energy and security are the major interests. India has tried to
get energy projects in Central Asia. It is also trying to expand its strategic
infrastructure in the forms of air bases such as Ayni and Farkhor Air bases.
But because of external power great game, India is being outfoxed from these
energy and strategic projects. India launched Connect Central Asia Policy in
2012 to expand its engagements in various sectors such as energy, security,
land, air and sea connectivity, health, education and in many other sectors.
This policy will, hopefully, prove panacea to check the Indian outfoxing only
if proposed projects are translated into reality. The present Indian political
leadership should strive hard for improving its foreign relations with extended
neighbourhood i.e. Central Asian States, owing the fact that both the regions
are independent upon each other for manufacturing and market. In order to
supplement the market-manufacture dilemma and to realize the dream for
making 21st century as Asian Century, not only India and CAS but all the
major regional powers have to share a common platform for this purpose. In
this developmental game India’s Connect Central Asia Policy which also can
play a significant role, has to be translated into a reality.

References & Notes
1. For full reference see, Prime Minister Exhorts Armed Forces Modernisation, Oct
12, 2010, “Security Trends in South Asia,” India Defense on Security Risks.com.
2. Balci, Bayram (2010): China and India in Central Asia: A New Great Game, ed.,
Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 132.
3. Ibid.
4. Taliban’s Winter Offensive to Destabilise Region, BBC New, 7 March, 2011.
Accessed from -http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/world-south-asia-12664486.
5. Rashid, A (2010): Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central
Asia, (2nd ed), Yale University Press, New Haven, 187.
6 Blank, S (2003): “India’s Rising Profile in Central Asia,” Comparative Strategy,
22 (2), 141.
7 India Looking to Import Uranium From Uzbekistan, The Economic Times, 6
October, 2013.
8 Rao,V. Nagendra and Mohammad MonirAlam (2005): “Central Asia - Present
Challenges and Future Prospects,” Knowledge World, ed., New Delhi, 227.
33
9 Bal, Suryakant Nijanand (2004): Central Asia - A Strategy For India’s Look-
North Policy, Lancer Publishers, New Delhi, 29.
10 Hall, Ian (2014): The Engagement of India - Strategies and Responses, ed.,
Georgetown University Press, 91.
11 Ibid., p. 93.
12 Rashid, Ahmed (2002): Taliban - Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central
Asia, I. B Tauris, London, 156.
13 Singh, Ravi Shekhar Narain: Asian Strategic and Military Perspective, Lancer
International, New Delhi, 8.
14 Bhabani Sen Gupta (1997): “India in the Twenty-first Century,” International
Affairs, 73(2), 309.
15 Blank, S (2013): “India’s Strategic Failure in Central Asia,” The Diplomat; http://
thediplomat.com/2013/06/11/indias-strategic-failure-in-central-asia/?all=true.
16 BBC News South Asia (December 11, 2010): Turkmen Natural Gas Pipeline
TAPI to Cross Afghanistan; www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11977744.
17 India Loses $5 bn bid for Kashagan oil Field to China, The Economic Times, 2
July, 2013.
18 Dadwal, Shebonti Ray: “Now China May Play Spoiler to TAPI,” 31 July,
2012. Accessed from-http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/NowChinamay
playspoilertoTAPI_ShebontiRDadwal_310712.html, 2 January, 2015.
19 Tanchum, Michael: “India’s Central Asia Ambitions Outfoxed by China and
Russia, South Asia Masala,” 16 October, 2013. Accessed from- http://asiapacific.
anu.edu.au/blogs/southasiamasala/2013/10/16/indias-central-asia-ambitions-
outfoxed-by-china-and-russia/, 2 January, 2015.
20 Chaudhury, Dipanjan Roy: “Economic Relations with Central Asia - China Steals
a March, But India Undeterred,” Quoted in, The Economic Times, Oct. 13, 2013.
21 Kucera, Joshua: “Why is Tajikistan’s Ayni Air Base Idle?” 9 July, 2010. Accessed
from <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61503> 13 November, 2014.
22 Bisaria, Ajay: “India Reworking Its Strategy towards Central Asia Through
New Connect Central Asia Policy.” Accessed from- http://idsa.in/pressrelease/
IndiaReworkingItsStrategytowardsCentralAsia, 2 January, 2015.
23 Extracted from the Keynote Address by MOS Shri E. Ahamed at “First India-
Central Asia Dialogue - India’s ‘Connect Central Asia’ Policy.” Accessed from-
http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/19791/Keynote+address+b
y+MOS+Shri+E+Ahamed+at+First+IndiaCentral+Asia+Dialogue, 2 Jan., 2015.
24 Ibid.
25 Pant, Harsh V: “India on Central Asia’s Fringes,” The New Indian Express, 22
September, 2013.
26 Seethi, K.M: “India’s Connect Central Asia Policy.” The Diplomat, 13 December,
2013. Accessed from- http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/indias-connect-central-
asia-policy/, 2 January 2015.
27 Ibid.
28 Anita Sengupta (2012): Eurasia - Twenty Years After, ed., MAKAIS, Kolkata,
524-40.
29 Roy, M.S (2013): “India’s Connect Central Asia Policy - Building Cooperative
Partnership,” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, 8(3), July–September, 301-316.
30 Op.cit. 23.
34
Revisiting Al-Farabi’s Legacy
Engaging with the Culture of Political Islam
M. Maroof Shah
Abstract
Political Islam as a reaction to onslaught of colonization and aggressive
secularization sought to fight a political battle in the name of Islam. How
far is this project intellectually sustainable and integrally orthodox or
rooted in the Islamic tradition? Its rather depressing record so far at either
political or other cultural fronts in achieving the objective of establishing
the Ideal or Islamic State with all its cultural vibrancy and widespread
apprehensions within the Islamic intellectual elite or Muslim communities
as such calls for questioning both the construction of the project of political
Islam and its reading of Islamic tradition. One way of clarifying the issue
is considering how great thinkers of medieval Islam conceived the political
project of Ideal State in Islam and how they encountered the philosophical
and theological other in this connection. As it is certain dismissive reading of
Modernity or contradictory attitudes towards its key notions like technology
and democracy and an advocacy of what has been seen as essentialist
monolithic fossilized view of religion implicating a strong rejection of
both religious and political other (liberal democracy) in the ideologues of
political Islam, we need to see if we can get some insights into the genesis
and evolution and ideological stakes in the phenomenon by revisiting
parallel process of engaging with the intellectual and political challenge
during Middle Ages. Al-Farabi is here read as an exemplary Muslim thinker
of Medieval Islam who engaged with the question of the political and
religious and philosophical other that seemed to pose a challenge to the
identity of the religious tradition he inherited. Further narrowing the focus
to one key dimension of Al-Farabi’s response viz. philosophy, I propose to
explore the question of possibility of revisiting Al-Farabi in the backdrop
of modern Muslim culture’s (especially in the ideologues of political Islam)
amnesia of Muslim philosophers or opposition to philosophy as such and
argue why he is of seminal importance and needs serious consideration
from the Muslim world suffering from twin tensions of fundamentalism and
aggressive desacralizing secularism.
Keywords
Al-Farabi, Prophetology, Islamic State, Political Islam, Muslim Philosophy,
Islamic Traditions, Medieval Islam, Western Philosophy, Islamic Doctrines.
Al-Farabi, one of the greatest medieval philosophers, has been made famous
in modern political theory by Leo Strauss, an important modern political
Revisiting Al-Farabi’s Legacy: Engaging with the Culture...
philosopher who appropriated him but upheld certain views that traditional
religious consciousness of Muslims finds deeply disturbing. Through Ibn
Sina and Jewish philosopher Maimonides, who form vital links in Al-Farabi’s
reception by the West, Al-Farabi has been a significant thinker in the development
of medieval philosophy. His deep affinities if not influence on some important
Western philosophers have recently been noticed or emphasized. However, it is
strange that in the modern Muslim history, he has not received much attention
or its major thinkers have largely ignored him. His political philosophy hardly
generated the debate or significantly influenced modern political thought in
Islam. Even the perennialists in the Islamic world haven’t extensively written
of him, at least till few years ago. The question of appropriating or revisiting
his legacy by modern Islam remains only tangentially touched so far despite
a flurry of books and scholars now focusing on Al-Farabi. What he did for the
world of Islam is still hardly recognized despite some good work of Al-Farabi
scholars. What he meant to Maimonides, the greatest Jewish philosopher, he
hasn’t meant to Muslim thinkers and what he means to Leo Strauss in the
twentieth century he has not meant to most political philosophers and arguably
has been gloriously misunderstood as an elitist who wrote in codes and needs
to be read too esoterically. We need to approach and rediscover Al-Farabi for
the modern world or both political Islam and secular democracy are going
to destroy it. Paren’s point that “Although the Islamic world was incapable
for whatever reasons of assimilating Al- Farabi’s profound rationalism in the
medieval period, it may stand to benefit from his instruction now” (Parens,
2006: 4) is what this paper would attempt to substantiate by clarifying certain
notions that have been informing modernist and modern Muslim sensibility
to facilitate better reception of his work. We begin by exploring the concept
and role of philosophy that was central to ancients and medieval – and in
Al-Farabi – forgetfulness of which seems to be crucially responsible for
problematique of what goes by the name of political Islam today. We then
proceed to approach the question of relation between faith and philosophy or
Athens and Jerusalem /Medina and ask how to articulate prophetic viewpoint
to an audience wedded to rationalist or empiricist epistemology. The twin
challenges of fundamentalist and desacralizing secularism vying for space in
politics would then be addressed by engaging with what could be delineated
as Al-Farabi’s critique of the idea of what goes by the name of political Islam.
What is Philosophy for Al-Farabi?

Accustomed to modern notions regarding philosophy as conceptual or
linguistic analysis or problem solving enterprise or that raises questions and
synthesizes knowledge of other domains it looks extremely anachronistic to
assert little noticed functional definition of philosophy as preparation for death
that Al-Farabi upholds with his master, Plato’s Socrates. I wish to understand
this claim in its proper setting in ancient traditional cultures to make sense of
36
Socratic claim and ground his arguments in cross disciplinary fashion.

Philosophy for ancients and Plato whom Al-Farabi takes as a model of
a philosopher or more precisely a sage as the former term evokes in modern
times is not a mere theoretical rational inquiry but a realization, intellection
or noetic vision that transcends subject-object duality and demands something
like ethical discipline. For perennialists and other advocates of traditional
philosophy (that encompasses Indian, Chinese, Far Eastern, Islamic, Judeo-
Christian and widom traditions of primitives) philosophy in the primordial
sense of the term prepares one for death and assimilation to God as Plato said
and is not a rational logical abstract discipline only and is allied to gnosis, a
way of life or realization of the good. It is not a prerogative of ratio or mental
faculty of reason but of nous, the supraindividual universal faculty of intellect.
Philosophy, as Uzdavinys notes in his introduction to The Golden Chain (2005),
in the traditional Orphic-Pythagorean sense is wisdom and love combined in
a moral and intellectual purification in order to reach the “likeness to god.”
It involves contemplation of Beauty and Good. In fact all contemplation is a
form of death of self/mind. All meditation and contemplation, especially on
the void called death, leads to death of the will, the will of the Other or non-
self or what may be in theological terms called God is a sort of the death of the
willing self. Virtue becomes possible only after this death of the soul, the soul
as conative faculty. The Greek word nous covers, as Uzdavinys notes, both
spirit and intellect (intellectus, ‘aql) of Medieval Christian and Islamic lexicon.
Platonic philosophy should be understood as a spiritual and contemplative
way of life leading to illumination or enlightenment; an intellectual discipline
based on intellection culminating in union (henosis) with ideal Forms. This
concurs both with “Orphic”-Indian conception of philosopher as one who
seeks release from the wheel of cyclical term as with the view of perennialists
who represent all traditional philosophies against modern rationalistic one. It
is one of the key blunders of modern discipline called philosophy, according
to traditionalist critics, that it has been largely forgetful of the Pythagorean-
Platonic notion of philosophy as a pathway of communion with God. Indeed
post-Arsitoltlean philosophy in general and modern philosophy in particular
has been forgetful of the notion of what Heidegger calls thinking and Plato
would perhaps call attention to death, pure receptivity to Being that reveals
itself not to conceptual intellect but to intellection. Plato would dismiss much
of modern philosophy as occupation with trivialities as Heidegger dismisses
it from somewhat different though convergent angle. Receptivity to being
achieved by fana in Sufism or consent to become nothing after transcending
egocentric view in other traditions including Indian ones, is what is preparation
for death. This alone gives the view of the world as full of wonder and beauty.
Traditional aesthetics assumes that the joy of art arises from transcendence
of ego by contemplating art forms. Modern philosophy has vetoed mystery
and wonder and thus lost that great virtue of being humble and receptive
37
towards unrepresentable truth in phenomena. Plato’s or Al-Farabi’s insistence

on preparation for death is not invitation for speculating on our posthumous
states but achieving, with mystics across traditions, death in life, death to
memory so that one achieves primal innocence that Adam has lost after the
Fall that involves seeing objects as separate from subject or what amounts
to the same thing as seeing things egoistically, dualistically or outside God.
Sufis are supposed to die every moment so that they fully enjoy freshness of
revelations of Being. God consciousness is identified in different traditions
(especially in Zen and Sufism) with present moment or Eternal Now, achieved
by dying to both past memories and future anxieties. Simone Weil’s definition
of God as “attention without distraction” expresses this notion of philosophy as
cleansing and sharpening of perception. Philosophy in traditional sense gives
us eyes to see, to perceive without distraction or colouring from egocentric
desires and passions and ultimately to dissolve into objects so that only
seeing is there without a seer and that dissolves all epistemological problems,
so to speak. Philosophy has often or largely been reduced to epistemology
after Kant and this has taken it to an abyss from which nothing is rescuing it
today. It has been reduced to ontology after Aristotle and this too has proved
problematic. It is easy for the likes of Heidegger and Derrida to make serious
negative judgment of the history of philosophy and we see in the postmodern
world many obituaries to the “dead” discipline. We again need philosophy as
transformative practice that through rigourous ethical discipline (something
absent in modern armchair discipline of philosophy as if it is learning new
information or solving logical puzzles) results into a state of supreme clarity
of understanding and joy and peace that passeth understanding. Philosophy
as a practice of the self, as esoteric discipline allied to mysticism and needing
proper initiation and not a profane discipline, logic chopping or linguistic
analysis or calculus of abstractions or speculative exercises is what Plato stood
for and no wonder we find the notion of preparation of death so anachronistic
as we have forgotten what philosophy stood for in ancient times. Tolumin
has also observed in his Philosophers: East and West that only sage can be a
philosopher in oriental civilizations and in modern Western philosophy this is
not a required qualification and even ideally it is a hindrance. Schuon suggests
to reserve the name of philosophers for sages and to describe rationalists as
profane thinkers. Philosophy, our perennialist notes, is according to the best of
the Greeks, ‘to express by means of reason certainties “seen” or “lived” by the
immanent Intellect. I am tempted to quote from perennialists, much ignored
critics of modern philosophy but great advocate of Plato and traditional
philosophy. Perennialists, bringing in the witness of countless traditional
sages throughout the world regard ancient philosophy as
essentially a way of life: not only inseparable from “spiritual
exercises,” but also in accord with cosmological myths and sacred
rites. In the broader traditional sense, philosophy consists not simply
38
of a conceptual edifice (be it of the order of reason or myth); but of

a lived concrete existence conducted by initiates, or by the whole
theocenrtric community, treated as a properly organized and well
guided political and “theurgical body” attended to the principle of
maat -- “truth” and “justice” in the ancient Egyptian sense of the
word (Uzdavinys, 2005: xi).
Ancient philosophers tried to awaken the divine light through the noetic
vision (noesis) and to touch the divine Intellect. Perennialists reject the belief
that philosophy is an abstract philosophical discourse based on rationalistic
scientific method and its methodically obtained “truths.” Moksha centrism of
traditional philosophies, as Harsh Narain explains, serves to:
giver purpose and direction to philosophy and proved to be a
bulwark against battling in the clouds, which Sri Aurobindo calls the
‘besetting sin of metaphysics,’ and which is the bane of unbridled,
directionless thinking for thinking’s sake. Praxiological commitment
makes all the differences. Modern Western philosophy lacks such a
serious purpose, direction and orientation. Nobody knows what it is
out to do. Ancient philosophy aimed at enlightenment and felicity
with or without salvation at the great denouement, whereas current
philosophy aims at dry clarity and mechanical precision on their
own account (Narain, 1996: 94).
Perennialist perspective on philosophy foregrounds moksha-centrism of
different philosophies including premodern Western philosophy. Values are
not written off in any traditional philosophy. That explains close association
of religion and philosophy in traditional cultures. This explains ultimate
religious-mystical aim of philosophy as preparation for death in Plato, in Al-
Kindi and Al-Farabi.
Modern rationalist secularist orientation of philosophy finds it hard to
understand how come Al-Farabi lives a life of a Sufi which appears quite
ascetic from modern standards a philosopher normally enjoys or seeks.
Corbin’s description of Al-Farabi’s life style is worth recalling here: “This
great philosopher was profoundly religious in spirit, and a mystic. He lived
extremely simply, and he even wore the garb of the Sufis. By nature he was
essentially contemplative, and held himself apart from worldly things. On the
other hand, he liked taking part in musical gatherings” (Corbin, 1962: 158). A
philosopher in Islamic tradition is more akin to a mystic who lives the higher
truths or virtues; he is ideally a sage, a seer. Many great mystics in Islamic
history have been indistinguishable from philosophers; Sufi metaphysicians
have been intellectual giants. A philosopher is understood with reference
to key virtue of love of wisdom, a choice for certain life style, certain way
of life that we ordinarily would classify as both moral and contemplative.
He is allied to a poet than to a doubting ratiocinating, arguing “thinker”
or scientist. He is capable of thinking that Heidegger defines and to which
39
philosophy as ordinarily understood proves to be an obstacle. A philosopher

is not a dialectician, a disputant, an ideologue. His is not for unbridled use
of reason but uncompromising ability to be open to pursuit or experience of
truth. How a philosopher in the Islamic tradition engages with the central
issues of ethics and religion may be gleaned from a quick look at two most
important and influential philosophers Wittgenstein and Heidegger. This will
help us understand Muslim philosophers like Al-Farabi’s interest in ethics
and religion that one may easily miss if we grant usual emphasis on the
point that religion is only an imitation of philosophy and truths of religion
are reducible to certain political or moral postulates that are more opportune
than true as if deep existential aspect in the truth religion traditionally claims
can be dispensed with. Philosophy’s task is as an ally of religion and not a
replacement of it. Though one can grant that saints or Buddhas would not need
religion as Schuon has remarked but intellectual elite not knowing sublime
ethics can’t claim exemption and it is to noted that that saints and seers or
Buddhas have never belittled religion or refused to participate in its universe.
Wittgenstein’s view of Philosophy

Regarding Wittgnestein one may note his clear statements:
I am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing every problem from a
religious point of view.
My thoughts are one hundred percent Hebraic
And Kerr’s statement about his work:

Wittgenstein’s philosophical reflections are in large part, however
indirectly, readings between the lines of the story of the soul in the Western
metaphysical tradition.
Fergusson Kerr in Theology after Wittgenstein p.166

The mystics solve – for themselves at least – all important problems –
intellectual and existential. In fact experiencing God dissolves all problems.
For logical positivists what mattered most was what is in Tractatus but for
Wittgenstein himself what mattered most was what was not in there, the unsaid
part. That was not in the Tractatus because language could not handle that. That
something is neither linguistic nor representable in any other way. However
that shows itself and thus need not be spoken of or represented. Wittgenstein’s
most decisive move was thus away from linguistic representations and the
most important job for the philosopher was to delimit what can be represented
and thus related to what only shows itself. Ethics and aesthetics and the
mystical all belong to this second category. Man does not live by bread of
facts (science, instrumental rationality) alone but needs supernatural manna
embodied in ethical/aesthetical/mystical. It is ironic that what mattered most
to him has not been given due attention by his successors. All his endeavor
40
was to save the intelligence from the bewitchment of language. He was all
for transcendence so that man becomes himself and lives truly, joyfully. In
his search for happy life, life lived sub species aeternatatis he paid great
attention to working of language, how language fails to represent reality and
leads us astray by creating problems that are not there. It is how men lived that
interested him rather than their speculative exercises. This alone solves the
riddles of life. Language has no answers and answers can only be found when
we step outside language.
As Wittgenstein was more interested in what cannot be linguistically
represented his conclusions are radical. The most important things can’t be
talked about. Ethics, religion and aesthetics are transcendental. The very fact
that things exist is mystical or linguistically and conceptually unrepresentable.
We can only gaze at it and get lost in wonder. We can dissolve into this
primordial mystery, love and celebrate it. Wittgenstein lived almost like
a saint. He is the most mystical of the greatest philosophers of the modern
Western history. He tried to show exit to philosophy. He found no problems
once we let intelligence operate naturally and it shatters linguistic cobwebs.
He fought against pervasive bewitchment of intelligence by language.
If we understand that God is what is and is missed when we attempt to
think or imagine or make images of Him or attempt to comprehend the Mystery
we can understand Wittgenstein. According to mysticism God is the case. The
only thing is we don’t see. We verbalize and babble and create theologies and
metaphysics. Wittgenstein is a metaphysician in the same way Buddha is or
Krishnamurti is. God is above speech. The Absolute has never been defiled by
speech. But by metaphysics is here meant living or breathing the noumenal
world, dissolving into it and not speculating about it with conceptual schemes.
Metaphysics as the knowledge of the supraphenomenal reality is the soul of all
traditional cultures or “epistemologies.” Man is made for the Absolute, to die
in It and thus to eternally live. Certainty is the requirement of intelligence and
man is not absurdity. If man fails to access the most certain, the indubitable,
the absolutely safe in Wittgenstein’s terms, he has failed as a man. God is
the greatest certainty – the greatest and most palpable of the present facts in
Whitehead’s words –and a philosophy or epistemology that doesn’t account
for this does not deserve to be called a philosophy. It is failure and betrayal
of philosophy and of man and his intelligence if the real is not knowable
though of course not conceptually knowable. Modern philosophy that is
largely ignorant of God can’t qualify as a genuine philosophy, as Indians or
great traditional philosophers from other traditions understood philosophy as
darsana, as seeing or vision.
The real question for traditional philosophies is how we become Godlike
(theosis) or prepare for death in life (which is the same thing or means for it)
or live and move and have our being in God. All else is vanity. Wittgenstein
stood for this primordial heritage of man and that is why was misunderstood
41
by most of his friends and foes like. Needless to remark that he didn’t consider
Western civilization that refused to fully countenance the reality of the sacred
as something of a monstrosity and like Gandhi a laughable “interesting” idea.
He complained of Russell, the paragon of modern rationality or philosophy –
to have fatally misunderstood him. In fact what he considered most important
has been dismissed by many a modern thinker as folly. God (understood
mystically or more precisely metaphysically) is the meaning of life for all
religions including transtheistic one as for Wittgenstein. I wish to argue the
point that Wittgenstein is to be read alongside great traditional philosophers
that saw the Good above everything, had little use for fashionable pursuits
of today, considered ethics as first philosophy and metaphysical discoveries
as fruits or realizations of real ethical life, were centred on God rather than
man and saw quintessentially human in living up to the divine image in him,
in transcending himself. There is nothing new or original in Wittgenstein’s
mysticism as in fact there can’t be anything new in matters transcendental.
One can refer to many mystics while explicating central statements of him.
So far we have read – with few exceptions– Wittgenstein as a philosopher or
failed to appreciate how mysticism informs/grounds his philosophy.
Wittgenstein is not only a philosopher of mysticism but a mystic, a practical
mystic of great standing. All his work was dedicated to the “glory of God”
as he once said to his friend Dury (Rhees, 1984: 168) – an expression quite
unexpected from modern profane philosophers. He didn’t like philosophizing
as a speculative/analytical exercise, as an academic pursuit as is the case now
in modern academies or universities but something that Plato would appreciate
or other ancient traditional philosophers would prescribe as a way of life
and nothing short of preparation of death. That he wanted his legacy to c of
changed attitude towards ethics is hardly surprising. “I am by no means sure
that I should prefer a continuation of my work by others to a change in the way
people live which would make all those questions superfluous”(Wittgenstein,
1994: 61). Philosophy, as pursued by his contemporaries or today, is a disease
of modern form of life that needs cure. And that cure is ultimately provided by
seeing the futility of the game called philosophy. For ancients it was ethics and
a vision and had little to do with language or concepts. It was, most probably,
his deep conviction borne from experience regarding sacrality of the world
and thus the truth of the supernatural/eternal that made him loath modern
civilization that had banished the sacred. It is in light of mysticism that we can
understand his unconventional attitude towards secular carriers or vocations,
his renunciation of his property, his austerity in life and manners, his casual
attitude towards dress, his independence in thought and action, his nostalgia
for peasant life in Russia, his alienation from his times that he characterized as
dark ages and many puzzles in his biography. His view of philosophy’s aim,
his attempt at transcending it for getting the vision of the things as they really
are, his rejection of the claims of conceptual analysis or linguistic analysis
42
as explaining reality, his rejection of classical dualisms that have bedeviled

Cartesian and post-Cartesian thought, his plea for convergence of the ethical
and the aesthetic, his view that ethics is transcendental, his rejection of doing
science and mathematics as the ideals of philosophizing endeavor, his critique
of psychologism and rationalistic attempts at building a metaphysics and our
addiction to use metaphysical notions in ordinary discourse at rational plane
are all threads in the fabric of mystical tapestry that has so subtly woven. He
rejected theological representations as many others before have done but he
never rejected the symbolizandum.
Heidegger’s View of Philosophy

“There is a thinking more rigorous than the conceptual” Martin Heidegger
For Heideggger philosophy meant something that reminds us more of Arab
philosophers than modern Western post-Cartesean philosophers as he himself
once said. It appears that the view of aims and definition of philosophy he
approves of is more a kind of mysticism than philosophy as generally taken
by the moderns. It is Being, Mystery, Death, Poetry, innocence of becoming
or openness to experience or more precisely revelations of Being – the themes
that have traditionally characterized mystics and mystical philosophers that
occupied Heidegger. His central quest for Being is mystical project and the
ways to it – thinking (tafakkur), poetry. His key complaint against philosophy is
it has forgotten the true nature of being, the question of Being and this task has
to be carried out by the poet. Heidegger calls for a kind of thinking that echoes
what ancient Greeks and Muslim philosophers would call intellection. instead
of calculative thinking , he calls for a meditative thinking that “contemplates
the meaning which reigns in everything that is”(Heidegger, 1966: 46) and that
can consist simply in “dwell[ing] on what lies close to us and meditate[ing]
on what is closest…” (Heidegger, 1966: 47). He proposes for accessing the
Truth of Being something like “learned ignorance” of the mystics, attention to
something that is too close to require “building complicated concepts.” Instead
“it is concealed in the step back that lets thinking enter into a questioning
that experiences…” (Heidegger, 1977: 255). The problem occurs only for
representational thought to tackle such a primordial, prereflective encounter
with fundamentally simple Being. Heidegger requires a kind of will-less
waiting, or as he says, a kind of “releasement,” for this experiencing of Being
(Heidegger, 1966: 62, 66) His call is for opening up the human spirit, standing
naked before the Mystery, perfecting the faculty of attention, forgetting the
manipulating, willing, technological self that modern man has been reduced
to, to lose the self in doing, in work, and “letting the world light up, clear up,
join itself into one in manifold self-appropriations, letting us find in it a real
dwelling place instead of the cold, sterile, hostilery which we find ourselves”
(Hafstadter, 1971: xvii). Recalling the old mystical emphasis on being or
realizing the truth rather than just knowing it second hand, conceptually
43
or as if from a distance because truth was an ontological issue rather than

epistemological one. The Being Heidegger invites us to “is not conceived of
as a thing, but as that which ‘transcends’ things thinking and talking about it
in traditional terms becomes impossible.” Such a goal is strikingly similar to
the goals of many of the world’s most prominent mystical traditions , as Jeff
Guilford argues (Guilford, 2011). The metaphysics which Heidegger labels
as nihilism is concerned with representing Being instead of “thinking” it as
Being isn’t a being or a thing. As Marmysz paraphrases Heidegger’s point:
We are guilty of nihilistic thinking any time that we fail to recognize
the fact that language, and the rational and logical tools it utilizes,
necessarily chops up what “is” into fragments, and so falsifies and
“covers over” Being -itself. ..Heideggerian thought implores us to
accept everything that “is,” and simply to allow Being to speak to us
through its beings. Instead of actively rejecting and overturning the
way that things are, it asks us to open ourselves to the possibilities
of what might be. It requests that we listen to Being and come to
understand its full potential (Marmysz 2003: 77).
Al- Farabi as Hakeem

Al-Farabi’s central task of perfecting the virtues to remove veils that obstruct
intellection or vision that results in happiness. Al-Farabi’s description
of intellect is of immense value to help us approach Heidegger’s view on
understanding and thinking although it is not new in the NePlatonic framework.
Subdividing the human intellect into the theoretical or contemplative intellect,
and the practical intellect, Al-Farabi talks about, in Corbin’s paraphrase,
“the human intellect in a higher state, a state in which it is able to receive,
through intuition and illumination, the Forms which are irradiated into it by
the active Intelligence without passing through the intermediary of the senses.
This is what happens in the case of the philosopher, because this union is
the source of all philosophical knowledge. The union can also be effected by
the imagination, in which case it is the source of revelation, inspiration and
prophetic dreams.” What has traditionally been the prerogative of mystical and
prophetic consciousness, Al-Farabi connects to philosophical consciousness
and one can say poetic consciousness. This is what makes possible thinking as
Heidegger conceives and what gives light to the poets to guide lesser mortals
in destitute times. If it is not conceptual or discursive reason that undergrids
Heideggarian understanding he proposes for unconcealment, what is it?
Heidegger chose a remote space for living where virgin nature could be better
accessed as a revelation of Being. His appropriation of Holderlin’s romanticism
can be better explained with reference to the notion of the faculty of the heart
as used in Muslim philosophical and Sufi literature. The theory of Imagination
implicit in Al-Farabi but developed in great detail in Sufi authors such as
Ibn Arabi offers a powerful approach to critique empiricist and rationalist
44
epistemolgies on the one hand and engagement with theology on the other.
The use of symbolism in Sufism and its appropriation in Muslim philosophers
like Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina offers a possible exit from the morass of shallow
criticisms of prophetic or revelation centric religious tradition that we find
in abundance in modernity and to the dangers of which Leo Strauss has also
drawn attention in his defense of Maimonides and Al-Farabi. However Leo
Strauss’s own view of philosophy and his reading of esotericism in political
terms are formidable problems in reception of Al-Farabi in a secularized
political landscape of the modern world. Corbin’s “apolitical” interpretation
of Al-Farabi though quite briefly argued needs consideration as a corrective to
Leo Strauss’s interpretation. Corbin’s notion of prophetic philosophy is better
able to explain explicit allegiance of Al-Farabi to Islam and his attempted
Islamization of Plato.
The idea of esoteric or philosophical elite that can dispense with prophetic
dispensation or scripture is mostly vacuous as illustrated in the history of
serious engagement, both for personal or existential and socio-political
reasons, with scripture in case of Muslim philosophers. Al-Farabi rather than
rejecting or demythologizing religion secures for it a grounding in his theory
of imagination. In fact his view of philosophy is an argument for prophet
centric or prophetic philosophy. It rejects rationalist opposition of prophet and
philosopher. It situates both
in traditional understanding of intellect and imagination. He didn’t count
himself as a member of any elite group that can supplant or defy prophetic
authority. There is no such thing as authority imposed from without by any
genuine claimant of prophecy. The authority belongs to the Universal Intellect
that grounds the prophetic revelation. And the philosopher works hard on both
moral and intellectual planes to participate in the revelations of the Intellect.
If the highest degree of human happiness consists in union with active
Intelligence and that union is in fact the source of all prophetic revelation and
all inspiration, in Al-Farabi’s view, how come we can establish any opposition
between the prophet and the philosopher. In fact Al-Farabi’s philosopher is
more or less identifiable with Sufi sage. And Sufism we know has been seen
by both its great figures and great modern scholars as dimension of Islam,
of Revelation rather than fundamentally new or independent or autonomous
discipline with a different or divergent epistemology. Sufi tradition identifies
prophet’s dimension of willayat or friendship of God that identifies mystics in
Islam as more primordial one that even is required before he would qualify as a
prophet. This implies that philosopher who sees higher truths or contemplates
God who grounds all happiness necessarily “follows” the Prophet. Al-Farabi’s
prophetology subsumes philosophers in the larger or underlying background
of prophet centric spiritual and intellectual tradition rather than the converse
although it has often been thus misconstrued. It has mostly been philosopher
centricism that Al-Farabi’s approach has been seen without adequately
45
realizing the crucial significance of prophet to the whole enterprise of

philosopher who would require a political system in which masses cooperate
for general happiness of all or to use more familiar theological expression,
collective salvation. The prophet broadcasts more effectively and to larger
audience the truths philosopher sees only himself or with a narrow peer group
of philosophical elite. For Al-Farabi acquired intellect is “the human intellect
in a higher state, a state in which it is able to receive, through intuition and
illumination, the Forms which are irradiated into it by the active Intelligence
without passing through the intermediary of the senses” (Corbin, 1962: 162).
One might ask isn’t objective of the prophet, the saint, the philosopher (in
the traditional – Farabian – sense defended here) the vision of Forms and
isn’t it agreed by all the three that senses are somehow to be transcended for
achieving this vision? Corbin’s following remarks about Al-Farabi illuminate
the issue:
For al-Farabi, the Sage is “united with the active Intelligence
through speculative meditation; the prophet is united with it
through the Imagination, and it is the source of prophetism and of
prophetic revelation. This conception is only possible because the
Muhammadan archangel ‒ Gabriel, the Holy Spirit ‒ is identified
with the active Intelligence. As we have already observed here, this
is in no way rationalization of the Holy Spirit ‒ rather, the contrary is
the case. The identification of the Angel of Knowledge with the Angel
of Revelation is actually demanded by a prophetic philosophy: this is
the orientation of all al-Farabi’s doctrine. For this reason it would be
inadequate to say that he provided Revelation with a philosophical
basis, as it would be inaccurate to say that he placed the philosopher
above the prophet. Such a manner of speaking denotes ignorance
of the nature of prophetic philosophy. Philosopher and prophet are
united with the same Intelligence-Holy Spirit (Corbin, 1962: 164).
Al-Farabi’s explication of the doctrine of recollection in Plato is on
empiricist lines that empiricist epistemology would find hard to disagree with.
He grants Aristotelian critique of Plato on this point that is on empiricist lines
though he tries to defend Plato at the same time as well by noting that the
process of formation of ideas from sensory experiences is so fast as to give
to the soul an impression that it “it has had them all the time, so that thinking
of them would seem to the soul like recollecting or remembering them.
According to Al-Farabi, Plato held the same opinion when he said that to think
is to recollect, for the person who thinks tries to get at what experience has
written on his mind, and once he finds the object of his thought, then it looks
to him as if he had recollected (Hammond, 1947: xiv). Like Iqbal in modern
times, Al-Farabi’s explication of revelation is on what may be characterized as
rational or “naturalist” lines as he invokes intellect that is not so alien a notion
to philosophers including some modern philosophers. Al-Farabi’s prophet
46
is a philosopher who is also gifted in addition with what we may a poetic

symbolic faculty that couches philosophical truths in a language that better
appeals generality of people. Epistemologically philosopher and prophet have
no fundamental difference both make intellect the organ of perception of the
supraphenomenal.
The question of superiority or inferiority of religion vis-à-vis philosophy is
a product of modernist attitude that has been deeply suspicious of the religious.
Historically the two have been closely wedded in Indian, Greek, Chinese and
some other cultures. In the case of Islam we find religion and philosophy
so interwoven that many great Sufis can be described as philosophers and
vice versa. We need to note that it is prophets who have established, or
inspired establishment of, great cultures and civilizations. Al-Farabi would
reply that prophets speak to the multitude. Philosophers to the elite. This fact
only shows superiority of prophet over philosopher. Historically it appears
that philosophers and prophets have been, in some cases, one and the same
personalities. Buddha, Confucuis, LaoTzu, one can, probably, readily identify
with prophetic and philosophical figures. There has been a debate within some
Muslim circles regarding prophetic credentials of Socrates. No less a man than
Ibn Arabi called Plato, divine Plato. All this shows that the attempt to oppose
philosopher and prophet or philosophy and prophecy that is fashionable in
modern rationalism is unsustainable.
The true character of Greek wisdom championed by Al-Farabi, once
investigated, becomes almost identifiable with prophetic-mystical enterprise.
Schuon, a modern Sufi metaphysician, thus clarifies the point often missed
by those who oppose philosophy (especially ancient Greek philosophy) and
religion in each other’s name.
Fundamentally we have nothing against the word “philosophy”,
for the ancients understood by it all manner of wisdom; in fact,
however, rationalism, which has absolutely nothing to do with true
spiritual contemplation, has given the word “philosophy” a limitative
coloring so that with this word one can never know what is really
being referred to. If Kant is a “philosopher”, then Plotinus is not, and
vice versa.
With Sophia perennis, it is a question of the following: there
are truths innate in the human Spirit, which nevertheless in a sense
lie buried in the depth of the “Heart”- in the pure Intellect—and are
accessible only to the one who is spiritually contemplative; and these
are the fundamental metaphysical
truths. Access to them is possessed by the “gnostic”,
“pneumatic”,or “theosopher”- in the original and not the sectarian
meaning of these terms - and access to them was also possessed by
the “philosophers” in the real and still innocent sense of the word:
for example, Pythagoras, Plato, and to a large extent also Aristotle.
47
The very expression philosophia perennis, and the fact that those
who have used it were mostly Thomists, and so Aristotelians, raises
the question as to what, in this context, is the value of Greek wisdom,
all the more so since it is generally presented as a merely human
system of thought. In the first place, by Greek wisdom we mean, not
just any philosophy of Classical Antiquity, but essentially Platonism
with its Pythagorean root and its Plotinian prolongation; on this basis,
one can even accept Aristotelianism, but on the express condition
that it is combined - as in the spirit of the Muslim philosophers - with
Platonism in the widest sense, of which it is then like a particular
and more or less secondary dimension. Then one must take account
of the following, which is essential: Greek wisdom presupposes, on
the one hand, initiation into the Mysteries and on the other hand the
practice of the virtues; basically it pertains to gnosis—to the jñana of
the Hindus - even when it deals with things that have no connection
with knowledge; admittedly, Aristotelianism is not a jñana, but it
nevertheless derives from a perspective which specifically pertains to
this order. Aristotelianism is a metaphysics which made the mistake
of opening itself towards the world, towards the sciences, towards
experience, but which is no less logically valid for all that, whereas
Platonism contemplates Heaven, the archetypes, the eternal values.
If on the one hand the Greek spirit - through Aristotelianism but also
and above all through the sophists and the skeptics - gave rise to the
aberration of profane and rationalistic philosophy, it also provided
- especially through Platonism - elements that were highly useful
not only for the various theologies of Semitic origin, but also for
the esoteric speculations that accompany them and are superimposed
upon them; we should not forget that for certain Sufis, Plato enjoys
the prestige of a kind of prophet, and Meister Eckhart calls him “that
great priest” who “found the way ere ever Christ was born” (Schuon,
2007: 246-247).
A few remarks about the traditional understanding of the Prophet as a
teacher of hikmah that without necessarily contradicting Al-Farabi’s view
of prophet as a teacher of philosophical truths for the masses by means of
imaginative symbolism, complements it as it creates warrant or room for
philosophers proper. I think Guenon’s distinction between theology and
metaphysics largely corresponds to and illuminates Al-Farabian explication
of distinction between religion and philosophy although the former clarifies
terms like religion and philosophy as well but what he means by metaphysic
is closer to what Al-Farabi means by philosophy.
For Al- Farabi modern rationalistic philosophy pursued in secular contexts
and for mundane pursuits is not the philosophy proper of which prophets are
the teachers. The Prophet teaches hikmah among other things according to
the Quran (65:2). He, like traditional philosopher-sages, expressed by means
48
of reason certainties “seen” or “lived” by the immanent Intellect, as did the

best of Greeks. Regarding the Quranic foundations for seeing philosophy as
essentially Islamic discipline it is sufficient to note that the function of the
Prophet includes teaching hikmah. The Prophet’s prayer “O God! Show me
the things as they are in reality” is understood by the greatest modern Muslim
philosopher-mystic Iqbal as search for rational foundations in Islam or what
may be called an aspect of philosophy. From Hazrat Ali who can be called the
greatest metaphysician amongst the Companions to Iqbal and Guenon we find
great tradition of Islamic philosophers or philosopher-sages. Important names
generally held to be Mujaddids have been philosophers or used the idiom of
philosophy to carry out their mandate. Philosophers have been writing their
own exegeses and there is a lot of similarity between more influential and
prolific Sufistic exegeses of the Quran and philosophical exegeses. No one can
dispute that the Quran can’t be philosophically understood or philosophical
exegesis is illegitimate.
Philosophy is opposed on the ground that it is rationalistic and this is seen
to contradict emphasis on faith and intuition of the vision of the heart that is
emphasized in Islam. Now this objection is what philosophers like Al-Farabi
have been successfully refuting by their explication of the doctrine of intellect
that appropriates this vision of heart. Despite the persistence of Ghazallian view
of great Muslim philosophers as rationalistic thinkers who are to be sharply
distinguished from the Sufis, the people of unveiling following the school of
realization, the fact of deep convergence between Muslim philosophical and
Sufistic approaches remains and it has not gone unnoticed even in the case of
Al-Ghazzali himself whose essentially NeoPlatonic epistemology and whose
essentially philosophical (understood in the sense of ancient or Phythagorean-
Platonic sense of the term philosophy) exegesis of Islamic doctrines are too
evident to need elaboration. Al-Farabian project of showing philosophy as the
supreme science that grounds religion in a way or that is given imaginative
and symbolic colouring by the prophets stands essentially unquestioned if
we take care to clearly distinguish the precise meaning of reason, intellect,
heart, prophecy and symbolism of scriptural and theological language into
consideration. Philosophy that the Quran implicates, that great Muslim
philosophers have practised is not rationalistic but intellectualistic and there
is a hell of difference between reason that post-Cartesean Western philosophy
upheld and Intellect (that is intuitive intelligence, contemplative vision) that
Platonic-Muslim philosophical tradition has upheld. Even so-called rationalist
Ibn Rushd is not to be understood in terms of Western rationalism. And in fact,
even in the history of Western philosophy, we find very few crass rationalists
who deny God or transcendence altogether. So why oppose philosophy? Why
oppose philosophy if it is nothing but preparation for death? Why oppose
philosophy if it is clarification of intellectual content of religion? I reproduce
a few more quotes from Corbin to state my point.
49
In fact, were Islam nothing but the pure legalistic religion of the
shari’ah, the philosophers would have no role to play and would be
irrelevant. This is something they have not failed to recognize over
the centuries in the difficulties with the doctors of the Law. If, on the
other hand, Islam in the full sense is not merely the legalistic, exoteric
religion, but the unveiling, the penetration and the realization of a
hidden, esoteric reality (batin), then the position of philosophy and
of the philosopher acquires an altogether different meaning (Corbin,
1962: 21).
Further developing the same line of argument Corbin is able to present the
case for philosophy in convincing terms that no exoteric or legalistic authority
can ignore or question on its own terms.
Is Islamic religion limited to its legalistic and juridical interpretation,
to the religion of the law, to the exoteric aspect (zahir)? If the answer
is in the affirmative, it is pointless even to speak of philosophy.
Alternatively, does not this zahir or exoteric aspect, which, it is
claimed, is sufficient for the regulation of one’s behaviour in everyday
life, envelop something which is the batin, the inner, esoteric
aspect? If the answer is yes, the entire meaning of one’s everyday
behaviour undergoes a modification, because the letter of positive
religion, the shari’ah, will then possess a meaning only within the
haqiqah, the spiritual reality, which is the esoteric meaning of the
divine Revelations. This esoteric meaning is not something one
can construct with the support of Logic or a battery of syllogisms.
Neither is it a defensive dialectic such as that found in the kalam,
for one does not refute symbols and philosophical meditation were
called upon to ‘substantiate’ each other (Corbin, 1962: 25).
The significance and continuance of philosophical meditation in
Islam can be truly grasped only so long as we do not attempt to see
it, at any price, as the exact equivalent of what we in the West have
for our part called ‘philosophy’ over the last few centuries. Even the
terms falsafah and faylasuf, which derive from the transcription of
the Greek terms and go back to the Peripatetics and neo-Platonists of
the first centuries of Islam, are not the exact equivalents of our own
concepts of ‘philosophy’ and ‘philosopher’. The clear-cut distinction
which exists in the West between ‘philosophy’ and ‘theology’ goes
back to medieval scholasticism, and it presupposes a process of
‘secularization’ the idea of which could not exist in Islam, primarily
because Islam has never experienced the phenomenon of the Church,
with all its implications and consequences. (Corbin, 1962: xiv).
Philosophical enquiry (tahqiq) in Islam was most ‘at home’
where the object of meditation was the fundamental fact of prophecy
and of the prophetic Revelation, with the hermeneutical problems
50
and situation that this fact implies (Corbin, 1962: xiv).

Referring to the formulation that states “philosophy is the tomb in which
theology must perish in order to rise again as a theosophia, divine wisdom
(hikmat ilahlyah)or gnosis (‘irfan)” that Corbin quotes and builds upon (Corbin,
1962: 21) one may state the thesis on relationship between philosophy and
religion in these words: Philosophy deepens our understanding of religion. It
may even purify it. Philosophy helps identify and fight subtle forms of idolatry.
Al-Farabi devoted great deal of attention to logic and this calls for a
clarification in view of usually perceived fierce antilogicalism of mystics.
Osman Bakr’s work on Al-Farabi takes due note of this emphasis on logic
from a traditionalist viewpoint that Schuon sums up in these words:
It is not for nothing that “logic” (logikos) comes from “Logos,”
which derivation indicates, in a symbolical fashion at least, that
logic – the mental reflection of ontology – cannot, in its substance,
be bound up with human arbitrariness; that, on the contrary, it is a
quasi-pneumatological phenomenon in the sense that it results from
the Divine Nature itself, in a manner analogous – if not to the same
degree – to that of intellectual intuition. Let us admit that human
logic is at times inoperative; however, it is not inoperative because
it is logical, but because it is human; because, being human, it is
subject to psychological and material contingencies which prevent it
from being what it is by itself, and what it is by its origin and in its
source, wherein it coincides with the being of things (Schuon, 2013:
26-27).
While noting that “logic can either operate in accordance with
an intellection or on the contrary put itself at the disposal of an error,
so that philosophy can become the vehicle of just about anything”
Schuon explains why it is erroneous to take as “the point of departure,
not a direct cognition, but logic pure and simple and ; when man
has no “visionary”– as opposed to discursive – knowledge of Being,
and when he thinks only with his brain instead of “seeing” with the
“heart,” all his logic will be useless to him, since he starts from an
initial blindness.” (Schuon, 1959: 8). One can argue with Corbin,
Nasr, Baqr and others that Al-Farabi’s position on logic (that logic
inheres in Truth) and need of vision converges with the traditionalist
position upheld by Schuon. Al-Farabi isn’t a mere “thinker” who
“gropes alone through the darkness” (Descartes) but a visionary.
Platonism is fundamentally about vision and Aristoteliinism an
elaboration of that vision in logic rational terms. Al-Farabi does make
use of arguments like any philosophy but, as Schuon would note,
“an argumentation a man uses to describe to his fellow men what
he knows is one thing, and an argumentation a man uses on himself
because he knows nothing is quite another” (Schuon, 1959: 9).
51
Al-Farabi’s perfect philosopher or sage is the Prophet. Plato and Aristotle

are no doubt philosophers or sages for Al-Farabi but the qualities he requires
from a perfect ruler are fulfilled by prophet and not them. It appears quite
vain to privilege philosopher over the prophet or philosophy over religion that
prophet calls for if we keep in mind such explicit statements as the following:
or founder of religion.
This man holds the most perfect rank of humanity and has reached the
highest degree of felicity. His soul is united as it were with the Active
Intellect, in the way stated by us. He is the man who knows every
action by which felicity can be reached. This is the first condition for
being a ruler.
He should be able to lead people well along the right path to
felicity and to the actions by which felicity is reached (Al-Farabi, 247).
In these (post) modern times, philosophy is not wisdom as the Greeks
understood it. Ethics has hardly any role in approaching or appropriating truth.
Philosophers need not be sages and ideally should not be. Philosophy has nothing
to do with truth. Neither certainty nor truth is its aim. Philosophy can’t be an
aid in enlightenment. For many postmodernist thinkers philosophy is rhetoric,
mere opinion from which Plato vainly tried to distinguish real knowledge. It is
just a power complicit discourse or power game. In view of such a disturbing
scenario and extremely constricted estimate of philosophy’s scope, how are
we going to argue for philosophy and centrality of the philosopher-king in
Al-Farabi? A shift to prophetic view of philosophy that Corbin foregrounds
and whose essential point is affirmed by traditionalist scholarship in its own
way. It is what Heidegger’s critique of philosophy as representational thinking
doesn’t question. In fact he dimly invokes it and it is the object of what he calls
thinking. It is not what a Derrida could deconstruct. It is more an invitation
to openness to the Question, to the Call of the Transcendent than what any
propositional creedal formula or Gnostic possession. It is not what ordinarily
falls under religion but what traditionalists call metaphysics, the science of the
supraphenomenal, scientia sacra. Two clarifications regarding it follow.
Emphasizing, from the perennialist (more precisely the Guenonian
reading of it) point of view, the difference between religion and metaphysics,
Guenon points out the metaphysical point of view is purely intellectual while
as in the religious or theological point of view the presence of a sentimental
element affects the doctrine itself, which doesn’t allow of it complete
objectivity. The emotional element nowhere plays a bigger part than in the
“mystical” form of religious thought. Contrary to the prevalent opinion he
declares that mysticism, from the very fact that it is inconceivable apart from
the religious point of view, is quite unknown in the East (Guenon, 2000: 124).
The influence of sentimental element obviously impairs the intellectual purity
of the doctrine. This falling away from the standpoint of metaphysical thought
occurred generally and extensively in the Western world because there feeling
was stronger than intelligence and this has reached its climax in modern times.
52
(Guenon, 2000: 125). Modern theistic appropriations of mystical experience by

choosing to remain at the level of theology and not cognizing the metaphysical
point of view cannot claim total truth as theology itself cannot do so. And it
is not always possible to fully translate metaphysical doctrines in terms of
theological dogmas.
A metaphysical reading of religion as applied by perennialists dissolves
the major criticisms against religious thought or against religious basis of
philosophy in the East. From a metaphysico-mystical viewpoint religion
is not a narrative, a story, an explanation of things, belief in a set of
propositions, so postmodern inspired critique of it is unwarranted though of
course it may have certain relevance in critiquing exoteric literalist theology.
Fundamentalism that reduces religion to an ideology and presents it as if it
is a metanarrative could be critiqued on postmodern grounds but mysticism
and even metaphysics if properly understood in perennialist terms, escapes
postmodern critique because, ultimately in the vision of Nondual Reality, there
is no privileging and marginilization of any term whatsoever, no binaries, no
categorical conceptual linguistic vocabulary at all, no propositions with which
the logician or rationalist dabbles. In the perennialist perspective metaphysics
constitutes an intuitive, or in other words immediate knowledge, as opposed
to the discursive or mediate knowledge which belongs to the rational order.
Explaining the difference between rational and metaphysical knowledge,
Shahzad Qaisar writes:
Metaphysical knowledge is attained by intellect alone. Intellect has
a direct knowledge of the principles for it belongs to the universal
order. Strictly speaking, intellect is not an individual faculty otherwise
metaphysics would not have been possible. How is it possible for
an individual to go beyond himself. The attainment of effective
individual consciousness of supraindividual states - the objective
of metaphysics is only possible through a non individual faculty.
The metaphysical truth is not external to intellect but lies in its very
substance. Knowledge is identified with the object itself resulting in
the identity of knowing and being. A reciprocity is thus developed
between thought and reality. The process of reaching the heart of
Reality is by virtue of intellectual intuition for it is not obstructed
by the yawning chasm of subject-object duality. Intellectual intuition
is supraindividual as compared to intuition of certain contemporary
philosophers which is infra-rational. The former is above reason
imparting knowledge of the eternal and immutable principles
whereas the latter is below reason tied to the world of change and
becoming. Intellectual intuition is contemplation whereas the
rational capacity is logical. The infallibility of intellect is derived
from its own nature with absolute metaphysical certainty. Religion is
existential formulation of metaphysical thought. From metaphysical
point of view it binds man to a superior principle. Religion comprises
53
a dogma, a moral law, and a form of worship. Dogma belongs to

the intellectual order and it does not divest itself from its essential
metaphysical character. Feeling has a cognitive content and deepens
intelligence and establishes a unique form of certitude. Moral law is
dependent on the religious doctrine and has both metaphysical and
social character. The form of worship is symbolic expression of the
doctrine (Qasiar: 33-34).
This makes it amply clear that oftenly highlighted contrast between
religion and philosophy and privileging of the latter more distorts than
illuminates the issue in Muslim philosophy. /If by rationalism is meant an
attempt to build a closed system embracing the whole of reality and based
upon human reason alone, then this begins, as Nasr points out, not with
Aristotle (in whose philosophy there are metaphysical intuitions which cannot
be reduced to simple products of the human reason) but with Descartes, since
for him the ultimate criterion of reality itself is the human ego and not the
Divine Intellect or Pure Being. This is rightly critiqued by both perennialists
and postmodernists. If philosophy is defined as rational inquiry, staying
within the limits of reason and not accepting any other faculty beyond reason
(called intellect up to the 17th century) then certain developments in modern
philosophy and postmodern turn has indeed discredited it. Metaphysics as
Kant correctly perceived is riddled with antimonies as long as we approach it
by means of reason. Traditional metaphysics is not the rational metaphysics.
It is vision, illumination. That explains how Al-Farabi’s prophetology presents
itself and is not a rationalization of angelology. The active intelligence
not concerned with the phenomenal world or even Being but invisibles or
Unmanifest.
The most important task for philosophy, according to Ananda
Coomaraswamy, is understanding comparative religion (Coomaraswamy,
1989). I think that Al-Farabi’s approach to prophecy anticipates current
discussion in a key area in comparative religion. Perennialists reread entire
philosophical/metaphysical tradition, especially the Western tradition which
they accuse of unforgivable sin of oblivion of true metaphysics and thus
philosophy proper. Their rereading is challenging, provocative and seems
to throw light on certain otherwise irresolvable debates in Western thought.
They claim transcendent unity of religions (apparently divergent traditions
of Buddhism and Islam are ingeniously interpreted to demonstrate this
transcendent unity) and thus unity of all orthodox traditional philosophies.
The concept of universal orthodoxy propounded by Schuon integrates and
juxtaposes otherwise quite diverse and divergent trends in philosophical
traditions of the world. Coomaraswamy has forcefully argued for the essential
unity between Platoniosm and Vedanta. Taoism and Sufism are admirably
integrated in a common paradigm by Izatsu. Semitic and nonSemitic
traditions in religion are reconciled with great conviction by such masters
54
of Sophia perennis as Schuon. Although Al-Farabi does none of these things

and he possessed, because of his times, little knowledge of different religious
traditions but he does give us key insights that help us to see him anticipating this
perennialist reading. His three points in this connection may be worth noting
– “that religions differ only on their surface...discerning few could appreciate
in higher form,” religion is an imitation of philosophy and philosophy is one
because essence is one, but religions are necessarily many because there is
no one, true image. And as Sweeney puts it: “The natural inability of the vast
majority of human beings to know essences forces the philosopher not only
to tolerate the existence of religions but to rule the multitude through religion.
Tolerance of religion follows upon the almost universal limitation of human
beings to imaginative knowledge (Sweeney 2011). And “The particularity,
mutability, and contingency of images can only produce an approximation of
the unity rooted in the universality, immutability, and necessity of essence”
(Sweeney, 2011). Al-Farabi’s explicit condition regarding need for common
religion in his virtuous cities as stated at the end of his The Book of Religion
can’t be met except on the premise of a development of a hermeneutic like that
of traditionalists who can demonstrate transcendent unity of religion.
It is clear, in addition, that all of this is impossible unless there is
a common religion in the cities that brings together their opinions,
beliefs, and actions; that renders their divisions harmonious, linked
together, and well ordered; and at that point they will support one
another in their actions and assist one another to reach the purpose
that is sought after, namely, ultimate happiness. (Al-Farabi, 2001)
Religions will necessarily vary amongst people as they are symbolic
representations only, not truth pure and simple. When he maintains complete,
universal and unconditional reality or truth of philosophy he maintains
something similar like Guenon or Schuon who distinguish limiting and partial
formal universes of religions from what they call metaphysics though it
remains to be shown if there are significant differences between the tools and
objectives and cognitive claims of the traditionalists and philosophers like
Al-Farabi. However the characterization of the First Principle, nous centric,
transformative or realizational endeavour involving focus on actualizing access
to the supraphenomenal and eschatological through knowledge and virtue in
both will make prima facie case of similarity between them quite a strong
one. In our times, it is traditionalists who have so strongly upheld the rights of
“philosophy” or metaphysics – of the Absolute, of Intelligence, of objectivity
– against all kinds of detractors from existentialists to postmodernists and
dependence of religious or theological discourse on metaphysical intuition of
the prophet-sage. Schuon calls himself a sage, takes heavily on Ghazzali for
inveighing against Muslim philosophers and doesn’t lose sight of relativity
of forms and even suggests distortion caused by human receptacle of the
prophetic figure. Religions as symbolic representations is currently the most
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widely accepted view amongst philosophers of religion, mystical thinkers

and theologians and we can almost fully agree with Al-Farabi on the need
of metaphysics or philosophy in grounding and clarifying true meaning of
religion. Religion is directed, so argues Schuon in his various works including
the magnum opus The Transcendent Unity of Religions, not to narrating truths
of higher order but saving people and it invokes various upayas including
elliptical language of scripture and graphic evocative symbolism for this
end. This distinction between religion directed to salvation of masses and
philosophy or metaphysics for appealing to the intellectual elite has been
cogently defended b almost all the Muslim philosophers and perhaps most
eloquently Ibn Rushd to be revived with great force and battery of arguments
by the traditionalists.
As religions can’t but be many as Al-Farabi knew too well, the Quran
itself also concedes because forms are contingent upon diversity of cultures,
geographies, histories we encounter, we can only assert that common
philosophical or metaphysical core of religions can be shown to be the case.
Al-Farabi says at the beginning of his Book of Religion, “religion is opinions
and actions, determined and restricted with stipulations and prescribed for a
community by their first ruler, who seeks to obtain through their practicing it a
specific purpose with respect to them or by means of them” (Al-Farabi, 2001:
93). This clearly show how different is his conception of religion from his
predecessor Al-Kindi who argued for a more intellectual view of religion or
seeing it one with philosophical metaphysics and standard view of theologians
who emphasized more cognitive view of religion or philosophical theology.
Even if Al-Farabi believed that philosophy was superior over religion or
“purer” than religion in its claim to access to pristine truth, it needn’t follow
that he is somehow playing the card of philosophy against religion or rejecting
any claim that religion has made for itself with regard to access to the depths
and heights of the Real. His contribution was to distinguish between the two,
identify their separate though somehow overlapping domains, reconcile their
cognitive claims, recognize the role of both in respective spheres. Religion
was not dispensable, even for the philosophical elite living in a community.
Religion makes philosophical concepts understandable to the masses through
the science of symbols. Noting that “each culture employed its own symbols to
interpret the same philosophical truths” he opens up the space for intercultural
and inter-religious dialogue. His prophet is a philosopher and a poet of
extraordinary imagination who is able to give his philosophical understanding
an imaginative colouring. Al-Farabi’s synthetic genius with which he is able
to harmonize Plato and Aristotle helps reconcile two divergent orientations
as he is able to present the common essence of wisdom linked to perfection
of virtues and unfolding of intellect or the correspondence between the
intellectual and the moral or the affective and the cognitive. Tendency to
emphasize disagreement between Plato and Aristotle has been the business
of historians of philosophy despite the great names from medieval period to
56
Whitehead and Voegelin in the twentieth century. Al-Farabi belongs to this

tradition of creative appropriation and assimilation. In fact Al-Farabi, as
Corbin argues, conceives his mission to revive ancient wisdom that has been
lit from the lamp of prophecy and that preceded Greeks. He believed this
wisdom had begun with the Chaldeans in Mesopotamia; that from there it had
passed to Egypt, then to Greece, where it had entered history through being
written down;” (Corbin, 1962: 157)
Modern thought began as a rebellion against traditional thought of the
world and gave rise to hitherto unknown problems. Woeful limitations of
rationalism and empiricism and attempt to construct a rational metaphysics and
failure of such attempts and more recent cynicism with respect to the whole
philosophical enterprise show how problematic has been the modern Western
project. Sentimentalism, moralism, irrationalism, subjectivism and a host of
other one sided ideologies that have flourished during the modern period are
a sad comment on modern man’s attempt to philosophize in the absence of
intellection and intelligence capable of objectivity and certitude. It is difficult
to see genuine basis for unity among philosophies in the framework of modern
presuppositions and prejudices. In such a context perennialist discomfort
with modern project and search for alternative foundations for philosophy is
better appreciated. In the absence of moral purification there can be no pursuit
of wisdom, no true knowledge according to traditional philosophers from
different civilizations. The tragic divorce of fact and value, of phenomena and
noumena, of samsara and nirvana, of knowing and being we find in modern
philosophies necessitate search for such alternative perspectives such as the
one provided by perennialists and decipherable in Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, Isharaqi
thinkers and others in the Islamic tradition.
Al-Farabi’s argument that “Since essence is one, philosophers must be
in agreement with each other; since images can only be like but never be the
essence, there is no one, true image, and the necessary plurality of images
means that nonphilosophers can never reach the consensus of philosophers”
(Sweeney, 2011) clarifies the charge of mutually exclusive schools and
consequent failure of unreliability in philosophy against philosophical
enterprise. Sages are in agreement as Al-Farabi showed in the case of two
great sages Plato and Aristotle. Philosophy wedded to ethics or philosophy as
a way of life that has goal as a preparation for death, that involves something
more than ratiocination or logic chopping by achieving vision or clarity of
perception clouded by desires or passions and erroneous opinions or chain of
reasoning based on merely sensory or rational means that ignore primary data
from intellectual intuition. Mere thinkers who don’t know the third eye, the
eye of the heart, do disagree and would end up in either killing God or man
and despair of life and philosophy. Love of wisdom that constitutes the essence
of traditional philosophies is not dependent on this or that epistemological
or linguistic or political debate that have become current in modern times.
Philosophy is not epistemology pursued for its own sake or representational
57
thinking or what can serve as handmaiden of science or politics. Philosophy

is seeking happiness, a preparation for death, a therapy against linguistic and
other ideological cobwebs that cloud the vision. It is a quest for the most
important “things,” the most enduring, the most beautiful, the most enjoyable
“things.” Its goal largely converges with art, religion and mysticism. There
has not been a question regarding object of art or religion or mysticism. They
have been central to culture and civilization. And so has been philosophy in
traditional cultures. Evolution of an autonomous discipline emasculated from
twin sources of intellection and revelation, pursuing or serving something
lesser than the Absolute, not getting hold of what intelligence demands by its
very nature – objectivity and certitude, is a modern heresy in the history of
thought. Al-Farabi considered the Platonic view of philosophy the true view
and that view, contrary to impression given by many histories of philosophy,
has not been refuted but set aside. As traditionalists have pointed out, Western
philosophy having severed its ties with the pursuit of wisdom and substituted
thought for intellection has been reduced to linguistic analysis and analysis of
concepts and handmaiden of science and in fact is claimed to be dead by many
postmoderns.
The dichotomy between religion and philosophy and Al-Farabi’s plea for
the significance of philosophy and his attempt to explain religion as a copy of
or translation of its truths in imaginative and symbolic terms has been often
understood by modern critics to downplay essentially religious and mystical
inspiration of what Corbin called Al-Farabi’s prophetic philosophy. Al-Farabi
can’t be claimed as their own by rationalists who “use reason to destroy religion
or explain it away. He expressed his vision in rational philosophical terms, no
doubt but was at heart a Neoplatonist and Sufi who practized philosophy as an
art of preparation for death, a way of life in which virtue is central and towards
essentially a religious end of eudomonia.(Refuting the contrary interpretation
that presents him as shrewd political thinker who uses religion as a means
for political ends ignores his life style which is more ascetic than political or
ambitious, his categorical references to the eschatological, his emphasis on
immaterial and therefore immortal intellect, knowledge and virtue and never
reducing the idea of eudemonia or sa‘adah to merely worldly happiness and
emphasizing its distance from hedonistic idea of pleasure.) Even the arch
critic of philosopher, Al-Ghazzali, titled his great work Alchemy of Felicity
thus essentially acknowledging philosophical formulation of the goal of life,
both individual and social, as pursuit of happiness. In fact it has been argued
that Ghazali has modeled his great Ihya on the Aristotelian model of practical
and theoretical knowledge and it is not difficult to see essential convergence
in aims of preparation for felicity in hereafter or science of knowledge of God
in Al-Ghazzali and that of philosophy a pursued along essentially NeoPlatonic
lines by Al-Farabi.
Nothing can be farther from truth than pitting philosophy against religion
in Al-Farabi. On the contrary, philosophy is the inner truth of religion
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using mythological and symbolic language. Philosophy thus provides an

interpretation of religion. To claim that for Al-Farabi religion was only half
truth or philosophy was purer than religion is to forget that his primary aim
is to provide for a model state that is based on cooperation in virtues by all
and sundry and ideally he would extend his ideal state to the whole world
under one ruler. Achieving this end would require understanding religion
rather than wishing it or explaining it away. Symbolic expression of truth
is universal and primordial mode of cultural life. Not only art or poetry but
even certain traditional sciences like, astrology, use it. In fact culture is mostly
symbolic use of language. Ritual is central to only religion but some other
cultural formations as well. Philosophers haven’t been so significant in history
as prophets. It is a Buddha or a Christ or a Muhammad who are central to
their respective cultures. Philosophy is as aspect of religion if we understand
the later in Iqbalian terms as involving the whole man. Man is affective and
aesthetic creature and if religion preeminently caters for those aspects without
denying the cognitive that in fact is inseparable from integral religion. “Put
reason into life and life is gone” as Tolstoy observed in his epilogue to the War
and Peace. Although ideally philosophy does take into consideration heart’s
reasons, passions, relationships and even art and religion but then it is idle to
propose religion-philosophy binary. Philosophy as understood in the sense Al-
Farabi proposes in distinction from religion would eschew use of symbolism
and talk about truth pure and simple without any disguise in mythology or
symbolism.
Is it possible, for the Muslim world at least, to return to Plato or to the best
of Greeks or to the original formulations of wisdom in ancient cultures without
any apprehension of loss of authenticity, of the heritage and legacy centred on
Revelation it has bequeathed to humanity in what has been called Secular
Age? Is it possible to philosophize with all the freedom. courage and boldness
of spirit, in the best sense of philosophizing, in a world living under the threat
of fundamentalisms? How are Muslims to take modernity in the postmodern
age? Given the twin challenges of secularization and fundamentalism, how
might a Muslim thinker respond with urgency? I think an affirmative or
simple answer to all these questions is possible by revisiting Al-Farabi. (His
importance in fighting fundamentalism hs been underscored by many Muslim
intellectuals.) It is strange that he has been so far overshadowed by other
philosophers like Ibn Sina (whom he influenced decisively) and Ibn Rushd
(who was appropriated by Latin Averrorism)) and Ghazzali’s polemic in the
public imagination and philosophical world although he did impact on Shiite
philosophy.
Dawah Work
Al-Farabi’s legacy may be invoked in engaging with the phenomenon of
missionary spirit of Islam that has two aspects: Dawah work and Jihad. Dawah
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work is aimed at preaching the Word and Jihad at removing the obstacles that
prevent human response to the Divine Call and thus thwart full realization of
potential for happiness or knowledge/gnosis. As Dawah work requires bearing
witness to the Truth today in an age singularly known for confusion of tongues
or proliferation of ideologies and conflicting narratives and relativism, it
becomes rather tricky to present the truth of the Absolute to a vast disbelieving
modernity. As the world considers itself post-theological and philosophers
have increasingly abandoned their claim to membership of elite “people of
demonstration” group who are capable of certain knowledge or access to the
Absolute, as Al-Farabi and Ibn Rushd present their claim against dialectical
class of theologians and other opinionated people, how does Al-Farabi speak
to us today?
Despite widespread skepticism the calls for wisdom are heard respectfully
by the postmodern man. The need for wisdom as distinguished from what
Eliot called knowledge and information has never been so desperate as
today. Philosophy understood as thinking in Heideggarian sense, as ethics
in Levinasean sense, as critique of the establishment or ideology in left
inspired philosophies, can’t be dispensable. Al-Farabi’s sublime view of
philosopher and philosophy would never be more relevant than today if we
could convince ourselves that such an entity does exist. How significant is
the place of philosophy in Islam and in explicating its much debated, much
misunderstood, doctrine of jihad as understood by Muslim philosophers like
Al-Farabi needs to be underscored.
In Islam one is converted by proper use of intelligence. Proper use of aql
leads to tawhid and salvation is linked to right use of intelligence. So every
thinking person is converted by using philosophical acumen in the broad
sense of the term. Only those established in knowledge or Ulama fear God,
the Quran declares. Who are Ulama? What is knowledge in Islam? Isn’t it
inclusive of what goes by the name of intellectual or what I call philosophical
disciplines as well? How can we ignore or reject Al-Farabi’s claim, elaborated
and more eloquently argued by Ibn Rushd, that philosophers, as the people of
demonstration, have the primary claim to the class of true knowers or truly
knowledgeable on whom the title of aalim applies? Who is best capable of
interpreting the Prophet’s word? Philosophers, according to both Al-Farabi and
Ibn Rushd. Are not the greatest names in Muslim history largely classifiable
as philosophers or philosophical theologians? Sufis have been preeminently
claiming the qualification as urafa, as knowers. We know that the notion of
hikmah has both prophetic and philosophical connotations. The Prophet is
described as teacher of hikmah and given the position adopted by Muslim
philosophers as enunciators of hikmah, we can safely assert that philosophy
and prophecy are allies. Corbin’s explication of the term is strongly arguing
the case of the Prophet as a teacher of philosophy understood in the sense
defended here. To quote him:
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the term hikmah is the equivalent of the Greek sophia, and the term hikmat
ilahlyah is the literal equivalent of the Greek theosophia. Metaphysics is
generally defined as being concerned with the ilahiyat, the Divinalia. The
term ‘ilm ilahi (scientia divina) cannot and should not be translated by
the word theodicy. Muslim historians, from al-Shahrastani in the twelfth
century to Qutb-al-Din Ashkivari in the seventeenth, take the view that
the wisdom of the ‘Greek sages’ was itself also derived from the ‘Cave of
the lights of prophecy’ (Corbin, 1962: xiv).
If we can claim for philosophers as sages a pre-eminent place that has
been reserved to scholars (theologian-jurist) and saints in Muslim imagination
we can take a great leap forward for facing multiple challenges that Muslim
community has been facing. If theologians adopting dialectics or jurists have
such an influential place in the Muslim community and problems facing faith
in its encounter with modernity are far from being effectively tackled through
theological method as the audience is committed to more philosophical than
theological orientation in approaching issues, isn’t it expedient to turn again to
philosophers than to theologians who helped appropriate the Greek challenge
in early Islam and put it to great use in development of Islamic intellectual
and spiritual culture? If modern man has privileged philosophical idiom as the
mode of expressing its deepest thought currents in a host of disciplines, isn’t it
time to explore the power of this idiom for better introduction to Islam? Is the
huge project on preaching Islam to the world that is preoccupying thousands
of Muslim scholars and activists viable in absence of serious engagement
with (post)modern philosophical or critical discourse? If a sizeable number
of educated youth and ex-Muslims are expressing their reservations about
theological cum juristic corpus for its supposed failure to convince on rational
grounds, how can dawah workers avoid appropriating Muslim philosophers
who have used an idiom that communicates much better to modern secular
audience? To just give one example: Al-Farabi talks about seeking happiness
at individual level and cooperating for the same at social level as the problem
of man and proceeds to explain time tested contemplative and ethical teaching
handed from ancients through Plato and what Suharwardi calls “the light of
the cave of prophecy.”
One can sum up the reasons for study of philosophy in Islam, especially
today: Because “all creatures desire to know” as rational creatures, because the
Quran links salvation to right use of intelligence, because we have to live today
in the world that is shaped by philosophy and science, because the Prophet of
Islam (SAW) as a teacher of Hikmah called for learning or gaining knowledge
and called for love of wisdom, for perfection of virtues, for preparation for death.
Even seminaries or madrassahs need to teach philosophy as a subject. Today
dawah work needs philosophical approach, at least in certain parts of the world
or certain sections of addressees. If one doubts this it means one is living in
medieval age and has not heard of Nietzsche or Heidegger or Freud or Derrida.
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If philosophy or love of wisdom or preparation for death or perfection

of virtues are important for salvation (these are synonymous for traditionalist
historians of philosophy and for those who have cared to read ancient
philosophers of any tradition with any seriousness), then how come one can
deny it as part of Islam? If Islam endorses Hikmah and even if we grant it a
moral-spiritual aspect only but not the intellectual one as usually understood
in terms of philosophy, one opens the room for philosophy.
Why thinking or tafakkur is needed to understand scripture is lucidly
answered by Mulla Sadra thus: “The Quranic revelation is the light which
enables one to see. It is like the sun which casts light lavishly. Philosophical
intelligence is the eye that sees this light and without this light one cannot
see anything. If one closes one’s eyes, that is, if one pretends to pass by
philosophical intelligence, this light itself will not be seen because there will
not be any eyes to see it” (Qtd in Nasr, 2006).
One needs to note an important qualification while seeking to appropriate
Al-Farabi for dawah work. Al-Farabi would not be interested in conversions
but inviting people through various means to work for virtuous state or at least
their perfection or happiness, both this worldly and eschatological. His call
for justice and ethic centric life would remind one of a Derrida or Levinas
rather than any modern missionary of Islam. His commitment to Islam would
be somewhat like that of Schuon who was more interested in Sophia perennis
he thought expressing the esoteric/metaphysical core of Islam as of other
traditions and addressing the world as a sage rather than a sectarian preacher
or in the name of piety or some political ideology.
Political Islam: Al-Farabi’s Critique
Political Islam is premised on certain assumptions

• That sovereignty belongs to a transcendent God whose will has been
received through the last revelation that overrides previous revelations.
• That prophets are the best legislators and we have been vouchsafed
by not only general principles underlying laws but also many concrete
exemplifications or models that need to be emulated in letter and spirit.
• That there is a world of Islam and a world of Jahilliya. Much of what is
central to modern outlook is rejected as complicit with the latter.
• That religious other is to be subjugated politically and it represents
a degeneration rather than a possibly valid mode of responding to the
Divine Call.
• That States need to be Islamized either by democratic or violent means.
• That it is the Laws of Islam rather than the principles underlying them
that need to be implemented because it is the divine commandment.
Now before a few critical remarks on political Islam from Al-Farabian
point of view, it needs to be clearly noted that against secular and democratic
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prejudice that is premised on sovereignty of people, Al-Farabi’s Platonic

model is theocracy. In fact the traditional theory of politics is theocratic.
Modernist Muslim thinkers have, in some cases, been led to opt for such
extreme strategies as to declare corpus of Medinan verses as retrograde step.
Orthodoxy of Muslim philosophers is seen in the case of Al-Farabi who has
appropriated the model of Medinan State in light of Plato or vice versa.
Al-Farabi, despite his theocentrism and theocentric Platonic State
and sharing the key assumption that God is the be all and end all of every
endeavour and Divine Writ holds absolutely because it corresponds to our
deepest or theomorphic constitution,would be poles apart from the project of
political Islam for the following reasons or qualifications and criticisms he
would suggest to the above mentioned points characterizing political Islam.
Sovereignty belongs to God but the notion of sovereignty need not be
necessarily or primarily understood in politico-legal terms as implying
recourse to any arbitrary or capricious will of a Despotic Lawgiver who takes
humans as subjects to be disciplined and punished for reasons that enlightened
rational minds can’t comprehend. It is not to be reduced to hakim-mahkoom
relationship but other modes of relationship between God and man like Roab-
marboob,(Sustainer-sustained) Beloved-lover, Merciful- mercy seeking
creatures, co-partners in creatorship that are also there. The whole notion
of divine sovereignty as constructed in political Islam primarily rests on an
interpolation or manipulation of a verse taken out of context and subject to
philological trampling as cogently argued by many scholars including Meddeb
in The Malady of Islam. Al-Farabi’s primary condition for virtuous city is
knowledge of God in the subjects. Now the very idea of God presupposed in
ideologues of political Islam would be far from the idea of the same in the
Muslim intellectual and spiritual tradition by Muslim philosophers and Sufis
and most of the well known theologians. The idea of God as Being upheld by
Al-Farabi makes all the difference in the world to the idea of God upheld in
voluntarist theology of Asharites and cosmic policeman of fundamentalists.
For Al-Farabi, as for Guenon, the immediate metaphysical truth “Being
exists” gives rise to another proposition when expressed in the religious or
theological mode “God exists.” But as Guenon says the two statements would
not be strictly equivalent except on the double condition of conceiving God
as Universal Being, which is far from always being the case in fact (Tillich
comes close to holding this view of God), and of identifying existence with
pure Being or what the Sufis call Zat or Essence which is metaphysically
inexact. The endless controversies connected with the famous ontological
argument are a product of misunderstanding of the implications of the two
formulae just cited. It is the inadequate or faulty metaphysical background
that contributes a lot to controversies on either side of the debate on religious
experience in modern discourses of philosophy of religion.
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For Al-Farabi Plato’s philosophy was the standard or true philosophy. He

accommodates both Aristotelean and NeoPlatonic current. This point changes
the contours of his theocratic or “Islamic” state. I think we need to distinguish
islam from Islam to better understand what Al-Farabi would plead for in his
virtuous city. Lumbard has succinctly formulated the distinction between the
two that is often glossed over.
Today, as for the past 1200 years or more, the word “Islam” is taken
to indicate a particular set of beliefs and practices adhered to by a
certain segment of humanity. But when the Quran was first revealed
what did the word mean? As Toshiko Izatsu has demonstrated in his
masterful books God and Man in the Quran and Ethicio-Religious
Concepts of the Quran, the original meaning of this word in pre-
Islamic poetry is not only to “to submit,” but moreover to give
over something that is particularly precious to oneself and which
is painful to abandon, to somebody who demands it. So when the
Prophet Muhammad first presented a “message” that claimed to be
“islam”, the words would have been understood far differently than
what we understand today.
Moreover, the way this word is used in the Quran actually
provides the raw material for a very eloquent understanding of
religious pluralism, one wherein all revelations are seen as different
ways of giving to God which is most difficult to give – our very
selves (Lumbard, 2005: 101).
Many Quranic verses present Islam every previous revelation as a way
of submitting, a way of life rather than a particular creedal system. Noah,
Abraham and others declared themselves to be Muslims. But once “islam
becomes Islam, an institutional definition or conception is formed and such
verses become more problematic”( Lumbard, 2005: 102).
From a metaphysical or philosophical conception as formulated in Al-
Farabi, Sufi metaphysical translation of Islamic Shahadah is ‘There is no truth
but truth,’ ‘There is no reality but Reality.’ Islam invites everyone neither to a
creed that it dogmatically asserts, nor to a proposition that could be doubted
or approached in terms of truth / falsehood binary, nor to a belief that rational
cum empirical inquiry could invalidate. Islam is not a totalistic or totalizing
ideology or thought construct. To put in simple terms Islam is an invitation to
take life seriously, to decipher its truth, to realize God or the ideals of truth,
goodness and beauty, to be concerned with the ground of life, to enjoy life
at the highest level or ananda – all these could be related to the notion of
eudemonia or happiness Al-Farabi upholds. Philosophy for Al-Farabi and Sufi
path for Sufis asks one to leave everything that obstructs our cognizance or
perception of truth – the world of ego and slavery to passions that obfuscate
heart’s eye that perceives the essences, the whatness of things. Islam asks to
discover truth, the truth of life, of being and becoming and this truth can’t be
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attained as long as man is not willing to sacrifice everything including his soul
for its sake. It demands transcendence of everything that stands in the way of
truth – ego, desires and passions. Islam is not an ideology, a metanarrative, a
system of creedal propositions but existential response to the mystery of being,
a vision of things as they are in their essences, “attention without distraction.”
Islam stands for Justice and seeks to preserve the earthily reflection of
Divine Justice. It may necessitate taking arms against those who wish to
perpetrate fasad, who disturb peace, who terrorize people, who enslave men,
who take sovereignty in their own hands, who believe that the other, whether
it be nature or other men are an object to be manipulated at will, who pollute
environment, who create obstacles in realizing or perusal of such values as
truth and goodness – in short all forces that alienate men from themselves and
from others.
The distorted sense of jihad as war against other religious communities
pursued primarily to establish supremacy of certain religion formulations or
a certain community follows from the ideology that is antitraditional, anti-
intellectual, nonspiritual, literalist and exclusivist and must not be confounded
with the universal and primordial religion of Islam. For Al-Farabi’s the popular
theological version of Islam pitted against other religions is subsumed under
the wider philosophical truth that is itself amenable to varying formulations
and the plurality of religions is demanded by the very structure of prophetic
consciousness or imagination as deployed in prophecy.
Al-Farabi holds God as the center of the universe. For him the goal of
man is to return to God. Thus far we see his theocentricism clearly emerging.
However immediately the differences from theocratic system based on
theocentrism as understood in the ideologues of political Islam as we note
how this return or ascent to God is to be accomplished. For him this is to
be accomplished by virtue and philosophical discrimination. He requires
acquaintance with the natural sciences before study of philosophy and grants
to mathematics a very significant place for training the mind of the young
philosopher. Mathematics, we are made to note, familiarizes his mind with
exact demonstrations and helps the student to pass easily from the sensible to
the intelligible. Logic, being an instrument for distinguishing the true from the
false, is also required for later undertaking study of philosophy (Hammond,
1947: xiv). Now comes the training of character through cultivation of virtues
to help transcend the attachment to senses and passions that cloud the mind so
that higher philosophical truths could be apprehended or received (Hammond,
1947 xiii-xv). If we closely attend to the following key passage from Al-
Farabi’s Political Regime we find that elite vs. masses distinction breaks down
and philosophy’s privilege appears hardly of significant value in comparison
with religion as the task before man is felicity or salvation and it is virtues that
help on this way and all people are alike in need of felicity and punishment
can’t be averted.
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The end of human actions is happiness. Happiness is something all

men desire. The voluntary actions by which man attains the end of his
existence are called good, and from them proceed the habits of doing
good, known as virtues; while the voluntary actions which prevent
man from attaining his end are called evil, and from them flow the
habits of doing evil, known as vices. Good actions deserve reward,
whereas bad actions deserve punishment. (Hammond,1947: 66-67).
Another point to be noted is calling Aristotle and Plato sages which
constitutes honorific intellectual-spiritual title that is privileged over the title
saint that is primarily restricted to spiritual qualification. One recalls Schuon’s
verses that makes this distinction while also substantiating Al-Farabi’s
treatment of philosopher-prophet binary.
The saint is rooted in will and love;

The sage, in knowledge and intelligence.
Certainly, the saint also can have wisdom -
There are many paths in the Spirit‘s land.
(Schuon, 2007a)
The prophet brings a form of faith - a religion;
The saint lives it; the sage opens
A luminous realm of Pure Spirit
Beyond form. Prophets are also wise men,
Yet about the highest Truth they speak softly;
To the sage, holiness bestows light.
God and our heart are united in eternity.
(Schuon, 2007b)
As Febri Renaurd puts it:
The personality of a saintly man is dominated by the will and the
emotional element. Reason operates only a posteriori to canalize the
celestial influx. On the contrary, in the case of the sage, the - driving
force‖ of mystical inspiration is replaced by reason if he is only an -
earthly sage‖ like Aristotle or by intellectual intuition if he is a - true
sage‖ like Plato. This intuition, leading to transcendent knowledge,‖
springs from an inward and more or less independent source, from
that immanent divine spark that is the Intellect (Renaurd, 2007).
Al-Farabi’s linking of philosopher and prophet/imam implies overturning
of the conventional religious privileging of the prophet over the philosopher. If
the modern West has valued its philosopher-sages Al-Farabi would be happy.
He would not dismiss great names in Western thought as pagan thinkers,
arrogant rationalists. We do have many examples of approximating if not quite
achieving the lofty standards of ethics required by Al-Farabi for a philosopher.
If Plato and Aristotle qualify as sages, so would Aquinas and one can say, with
some confidence, a number of great modern minds who shared a spiritual
66
orientation and largely the same view of objectives of philosophy. Two

philosophers who shared some important things with him were Wittgenstein
and Heidegger whom the West has taken seriously though their mystical ethics
is largely underexplored but their almost mystical view of philosophy and key
importance of death and contemplation in their philosophies would allow us
to take their appropriation of the “light from the cave of prophecy” seriously.
Al-Farabi’s Plato is somewhat of a mystical figure, as is Voegelin’s,
Coomaraswamy’s and Weil’s. This move helps to appropriate mystical
philosophy as such into a tradition that has well recognized mystical aspect. If
Sufis are authentically Muslim, so is Plato, the mystic of somewhat comparable
character assimilable in the Sufi framework and that explains invoking the
name of him and his teacher Socrates in initiation ceremony in some Sufis. He
has no difficulty in squaring Plato’s philosopher- king with an Imam whose
“understanding of truth is intuitive, who knows not only theoretical virtues
but also the practical ones.”If his musical compositions are sung among some
Sufi orders in Turkey and the Indo-Pakistani continent it means how deep is
the connection between Sufism and traditional artistic expressions like music
and how different a character of the Islamic state modeled on the Platonic-
Farabian vision as distinguished from certain models that political Islam
threw where there is hardly any scope for the great culture for philosophy, arts
like music, natural sciences, mathematics that Al-Farabi requires and no room
for such daring adventures as juxtaposing prophet and imam/philosopher,
making room for the religious other and abandoning monopoly over salvation
for a particular religion and talking in terms of existential categories (like
happiness) instead of theological ones (like some creedal proposition) for
approaching basic issues.
A few remarks about Al-Farabi’s thesis of compulsion to virtue in his
ideal City are in order. Given the point that “Political rule and religion are
inseparable because the many cannot grasp the good as noble apart from
religious authority; virtue must be enforced through religion” and explicit
engagement in both Plato and Al-Farabi with the question of coercion for
ensuring establishment of virtuous city in which people cooperate for virtue
thanks to his theocratic state, Al-Farabi would like to have compulsion to
virtue – not conformity to law. His key terms are virtue, happiness, intellection
rather than terms from juristic lore. It is perhaps not accidental that he has
not written any book on juristic science. Despite the centrality of Prophet or
Imam in his “system” he isn’t keen to impose a religious order. He focuses on
transforming people from within and it is only in such a transformed elite that
one can find a ruler he demands.
Al-Farabi has a conception of virtuous city not Muslim or Islamic city;
he divides the world into virtuous and nonvirtuous cities rather than dar-al-
islam and dar-al-harb. The compulsion to virtue thesis would hardly have
anything resembling the fundamentalist State that are wedded to the necessity
67
of Shariah imposition identified with historical legal construction rather than a

transhistorical quest for fundamental values of Ad-Din that evolving Shariah
formulations seek to approximate and this quest can never fully succeed or
must fail in some sense as Justice can never be done and evil never fully wished
away. Plato’s Laws or Muslim Law both are attempts to capture the Ideal
and can never be absolutized in themselves. Modern philosophical attempts
by Muslims to formulate increasingly sophisticated theories of justice in the
face of so many totalitarian and other perversions that have marred modern
social and political institutions are, generally speaking, all attempts to theorize
Shariah for contemporary times.
Plato argued for orienting man and his communal institutions toward
God and need for true constitution we can call divine or revealed constitution
and dangers of those constitutions in which one part dominates against others
and society is no longer an integrated whole governed by Justice that is God,
although one can always see its ideal character in the sense that it will only
be approximated and as Derrida would note justice is yet to come and justice
can never be done. The question is why has the academic world has not duly
appreciated this Platonic echo in any argument for Islamic State? Isn’t it
the case that so far ideologues of Islamic State have adopted a theological
language that seems alienating or intimidating to many? In fact the dogma
of separation of Church and State that has been enshrined in secular political
theory has prevented appreciation of the argument put forth across traditional
cultures and echoed in Plato, Evola and Voegelin in modern times in case of
the Western world and among others Al-Farabi in case of the Muslim world.
Voegelin’s following passages succinctly sum up the essence of the argument
for a theocratic State.
The Republic is written under the assumption that the ruling stratum
of the polis will consist of persons in whose souls the order of the idea
can become reality so fully that they, by their very existence, will be
the permanent source of order in the polis; the Laws is written under
the assumption that the free citizenry will consist of persons who
can be habituated to the life of Arete under proper guidance, but who
are unable to develop the source of order existentially in themselves
and, therefore, need the constant persuasion of the prooemia as well
as the sanctions of the law, in order to keep them on the narrow path
(Voegelin, 2000: 275)
The political form is designed to serve the actualization of the
spirit in the life of the community. The spirit lives in the laws. Hence
the highest magistracy is devisedas the boardof the Guardians of the
Law (Voegelin, 2000: 307).
Only when the divine spirit of the nous lives in the nomoi
will obedience to the laws result in the eudaimonia of man and the
community. Ofﬁce in the polis of the nomoi thus becomes a “service
68
to the gods” (ton theon hyperesia), and the high magistrates are
servants of the gods insofar as they are servants of the laws (hyperetai
tois nomois (Voegelin, 2000: 307).
Plato’s standing challenge to secular history and politics is calling attention
to the point that the order of the community can’t be achieved unless there
is harmony with the divine Measure. Political Islam has a point and that is
restating this thesis. However it is thinkers like Al-Farabi and not ideologues
of political Islam who are able to translate this insight in the language that
modern man would better understand. What constitutes the Divine Measure
has been almost forgotten by Modernity. And this contributes, among other
things, to tremendous ugliness of the modern city, its art and architecture. What
it does in the political and social sphere is known to everyone who has cared
to read the history of twentieth century totalitarianism, holocaust, countless
ethnic, communal and other sectarian conflicts and wars, genocides, broken
families and fragmented relationships, enormous growth in the number of all
kinds of social and psychological pathologies. Alienation that is everywhere
and so poignantly described in twentieth century literature is to a great extent
traceable to this loss of Divine Measure. All those who call for Islam today
or return to Tradition or to philosophy in the traditional sense of the terms are
responding this mess occurring from the loss of Divine Measure. What needs
to be debated is whether one is called to a merely human interpretation or
ideology in the name of return to the Divine Measure.
If we can agree – and I think neither great figures in religion nor in
philosophy, East and West will object – that “We can achieve happiness only
then when we have a beauty; and we have a beauty thanks to philosophy.
The truth is that only because of philosophy we can achieve happiness. A
man becomes a person thanks to the intellect” the essence of Al-Farabi’s
philosophy may be stated to be a version of perennial philosophy that proposes
the objective of human life to be happiness or felicity in all the worlds that
may be there (in Buddhist terms one can put it as deliverance from suffering
and thus felicity of nirvana, even secular humanist and other modernist
thinkers who would not countenance transcendence as understood in classical
or traditional religio-philosophical paradigm, one can phrase it as search for
abundant living, deeper living, more meaningful living or less alienated life
that is more joyful or happier). True happiness is the final goal of human life
and it is unqualified good.
For achieving this objective its method is the old one, received from
ancients – sages and prophets – the practice of virtue. Leo Strauss, one of
the influential political philosophers who pioneered resurgence of Al-Farabi
in political theory, argued for too esotericist a reading of him to allow for
a serious consideration of him today. Strauss himself sided ultimately with
Athens against Israel to be of much help in revisiting or appropriating Al-
Farabi legacy in the world of Islam that can’t relinquish Medina in favour
69
of modern New York or ancient Athens. Al-Farabi’s genius was to reconcile

Athens and Medina as he identified the philosopher and the prophet in
a manner that is wrought with great significance even today when we are
struggling to engage with a Modernity that appears Faustian and Promethean
bent upon desacralizing the world in the name of what can be called (post)
modern secular missophic cults or ideologies of progress, development and
other ideological thought currents. We can oppose the mess let loose today in
academic thinking of modern sophists in the name of Socrates and the Prophets
who upheld the rights of the Absolute or Truth above everything. We can
question, with Voegelin, Strauss’s view of revelation pitted against philosophy
in the name of Al-Farabi’s prophetology or more mystical understanding of
revelation. In Straussian view the universalist claim of Revelation – Ad-
Din-ul-Qayyim – continuing from Adam to Muhammad that traditionalist
writers are able to link to Sophia Perennis, gets reduced to the thesis of “one
particular divine code is accepted as truly divine; that one particular code of
one particular tribe is the divine code. But the divine character of all other
allegedly divine codes is simply denied, and this implies a radical rejection of
mythology” he sees Judaic tradition as upholding. According to him Socrates
maintains openness to the experience and eschews readymade answers that
he sees revelation or faith forcing on us. Voegelin contests this reading and
points out that revelation is best understood as approaching in all humility and
seriousness the Quest/Question or “as man’s loving and open-ended reply to an
experience of transcendence.” Al-Farabi’s upholds mystical view of religion
when he defends it in philosophical terms while Strauss didn’t recognize
esoteric view of religion while recognized mystical view of philosophy. This
makes it possible to embrace both Athens and Medina for him while Strauss
is compelled to say goodbye to Israel for the sake of Athens. Al-Farabi by
embracing the Medina and the Prophet who is described as “Mercy for the
Worlds” ensures dignity of every individual and his or her participation in
revelatory/mystical experience available through inculcating the love of the
prophet and saints and in fact the whole institutional structure that transmits
the sacred or grace. He is true to the Semitic insight that preserves dignity of
every individual and what Voegelin sees as Christian insight that informs also
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is really Judeo-Christian-Islamic
insight. Elitism is a heresy that Prophet centric tradition can’t countenance.
Muslim philosophers and Sufis have especially guarded against this tendency
by refusing to belittle the Law and fully participating in public religious
life. Sufis have been intimate with the masses and guarded against elitism
by emphasizing humility as key virtue. Ibn Arabi famously said that sharia
is haqiqa and any esotericism that rejects literal sense of scripture is heresy.
Esotericism transcends rather than rejects literalist exoteric understanding.
Masses have not been ridiculed but their limited and more or less literalist
or mythological understanding respected. This explains how Sufis became
70
popular in public imagination and philosophers were warning against public

debate on deeper philosophical or esoteric sciences. It is true that masses can’t
entertain pure truth that esotericism discovers or philosophers preach but that
doesn’t imply they are denied entry into heaven for that matter. Even the most
literalist of believers in ensured a share in beatitude. Faith alone is enough
for salvation. Schuon clarifies the question of revelation versus “philosophy”/
mysticism/metaphysics binary in these words in an interview. “The religious,
dogmatic or theological perspective is based on revelation; its main purpose is,
not to explain the nature of things or the universal principles, but to save man
from sin and damnation, and also, to establish a realistic social equilibrium.”
Although religion is enough for saving people, “metaphysics satisfies the
needs of intellectually gifted men.” In connection with Voegelin’s critique
of elitism implicated by Strauss, a critic has well remarked: “If insight into
truth is only possible for a select few, on the other hand, and the traditional
beliefs of the many and of the world’s religious traditions stand as the radical
opposite of that philosophical quest for insight into the truth, then political
philosophy does not concern itself with the dignity of all human beings except
as an instrumental, inner-political.”
References & Notes

1. Al-Farabi. The Political Writings: “Selected Aphorisms” and Other Texts.
Translated by Charles E.
2. Butterworth. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001.
3. Al-Farabi. 1985. On the Perfect State: Abu Nasr al-Farabi’s Mabadi’ Ara Ahl
al-Madina al-Fadila.Trans. Richard Walzer. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
4. Al-Farabi. 1963. Political Regime. In “Medieval Political Philosophy.” Ed.
Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi. Ithaka and New York: Cornel University Press.
5. Al-Farabi, What Must Precede the Study of Philosophy, in Collection of various
treatises, 1 Arabic ed., Cairo, 1907, Muhammad Ismail, Qtd. In Hammond, op.cit.
6. Coomaraswamy. A. K., “On the Pertinence of Philosophy” in What is Civilization,
Oxford University Press, 1989.
7. Fabbri, R., The Milk of the Virgin: The Prophet, the Saint and the Sage, Sacred
Web, 20. 2007.
8. Fakhry, Majid, Al-Farabi: Founder of Islamic Neoplatonism. Oxford: Oneworld,
2002.
9. Bakr, O., R.S. Al-Farabi: Life, Works and Significance, The Islamic Academy of
Science. Kuala Lumpur, 1988.
10. Corbin, H., History of Islamic Philosophy, Trans. Liadain Sherrard & Philip
Sherrard, London: Kegan Paul International , 1962.
11. Guenon, R., 2000. An Introduction to the Study of Hindu Doctrines, Munshiram
Manoharlal Publishers, New Delhi.
12. Guilford, J., 2011, Was Heidegger a Mystic? Explorations, 6
13. Hammond, R., The Philosophy of Alfarabi and Its Influence on Medieval
Thought, The Hobson Book Press: New York, 1947.
14. Heidegger, M., 1971. Poetry, Language, Thought, Trans. & Introd. Albert
Hofstadter Herper Perennial.
71
15. Heidegger, Martin. “Letter on Humanism.” Basic Writing: from Being and
Time to The Task of Thinking. Krell, David Farrell. New York: Harper & Row
Publishers. 1977.
16. Heidegger, Martin. Discourse on Thought. New York: Harper & Row Publishers.
1966.
17. Marmysz, J., 2003, Laughing at Nothing: Humour as a Response to Nihilism,
New York, SUNY.
18. Lumbard, J.,“Quranic Inclusivism in an Age of Globalization,” in Iqbal Review
Apr-Oct.2005.
19. Narain, Harsh, Daya Krishna on Indian Philosophy,” in The Philosophy of Daya
Krishna,, Eds. Bhuvan Chandel, K.L. Sharma, ICPR, New Delhi, 1996.
20. Nasr, S.H., Islamic Philosophy from its Origin to the Present, New York: SUNY,
2006.
21. Parens, J., An Islamic Philosophy of Virtuous Religions: Introducing
Alfarabi, State University of New York Press, 2006.
22. Qaisar, Shahzad, Of Intellect and Reason, Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture,
Lahore, 1990.
23. Schuon, F., “The Perennial Philosophy” The Underlying Religion: An
Introduction to the Perennial Philosophy Ed.Martin Lings & Clinton Minnaar,
Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2007.
24. Schuon, F., World Wheel I / XXXVII, Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2007a.
25. Schuon, F., Songs without Names XII / XVI, Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2007.
26. Schuon, F., 2013. From Divine to the Human, Bloomington: World Wisdom,
2013.
27. Schuon, F., 1959. Language of the Self, Madras: Ganesh and Co.1959.
28. Schuon, F., Frithjof Schuon: Questions and Answers (www.frithjof-schuon.com/
interview.htm accessed on 14/2/2014).
29. Sweeney, M., Essence and Islamic Tolerance: Al-Farabi, Al-Ghazali, Ibn Rush’d
The Review of Metaphysics , 65:1.2011.
30. Uzdavinys, Algis, (Ed.), The Golden Chain: An Anthology of Phythagorean and
Plationic Philosophy, Pentagon Press,2005
31. Voegelin, E., Order and History: Plato and Aristotle, Ed. Dante Germino, Volume
III of The collectedworks of Eric Voegelin; v. 16ouri University of Missouri
Press, Missouri, 2000.
32. Wittgenstein, L., Culture and Value, trans, Peter Winch, G.H. von Wright (ed.)
Oxford: Basil, 1994.
72
Caspia
Genesis Of Energy Politics
R. G. Gidadhubli
Abstract
The Central Asian region has become a scene of Great Game Rivalry after
the breakup of the former Soviet Union. Looking into contemporary history
of Central Asia, the Caspian Sea which is richly endowed with hydrocarbon
energy resources ̶ has played an important role in the regional development.
In this context several questions arise ̶ What are the causes for the rivalry?,
What is the status of Caspian with regard to sea / ocean delimma?, Who are
the major players involved? How are the Central Asian States of the former
Soviet Union responding to these rivalries? An effort has been made in this
paper to examine these and related issues concerning the Caspian region.
Keywords
Caspian Sea, Legal Status, Hydrocarbon Energy Resources, Great Game,
Resource Rivalry, Pipeline Politics, Global Energy Market, Energy
Cooperation, Energy Balance, Geo-politics.
Caspian Energy Resources

During the Soviet era energy resources of the Caspian Sea Region were known
but were not fully explored nor exploited. At that time resources of Siberia,
Ural, Volga regions in Russia and resources in Azerbaijan were considered
to be more significant than those in Central Asia. Moreover, inadequate
investment capital, lack of modern technology, deteriorating infrastructure
facilities were major causes for insufficient development of energy sector of
the Soviet Union as a whole including that of the Caspian region. Hence credit
has to be given to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to have taken
greater initiatives in bringing the Caspian region in the forefront of the global
energy market.
The Caspian Sea Region is richly endowed with hydrocarbon resources.
The US Energy Administration reported in July 2001 that the Caspian Region
possessed about 34 billion barrels of proven oil reserves and 235 billion
barrels of possible oil reserves. Estimates of proven oil reserves, however,
have changed over the years as explorations are still in progress. For instance,
in 2006 the British Petroleum experts estimated that oil reserves could be
about 47.1 billion barrels. Proven oil estimates have been estimated to be
about one-fourth of that of the Middle East and much larger than 22 billion
barrels of estimated reserves of the USA. Apart from oil, the Caspian Region
Caspia: Genesis of Energy Politics
also has substantial quantity of natural gas reserves estimated at about 243-
248 billion cubic feet as compared to about 300 billion cubic feet of natural
gas in North America.
Two Central Asian States, namely, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan share
the inland Caspian Sea along with Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran. The main
oil and gas fields of Kazakhstan are Tengiz, Karachagansk, Kurmangazy,
Kashgan etc. The Kasgan oil field is said to be 5th largest in the world. After
gaining independence Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have made intensive
efforts to undertake exploration activities to determine their energy resources.
In November 2006 Turkmenistan reported that one of the fields in its region
has natural gas reserves are larger than that in Russia’s Shtokman gas field in
the North Sea, which has created great news in the world energy market.
After the Soviet break-up, the Central Asian countries were in dire need
of hard currency resources for their economic survival and oil and gas were
commodities that could find easy market abroad. Equally important is the fact
that several international oil companies including Chevron, Exxon, British
Petroleum etc. were keen to enter the Central Asian energy sector. They
were attracted to Central Asia partly because of the hype initially created by
energy experts about huge reserves in the region. Some experts opined that
Turkmenistan would be the ‘Kuwait of the 21st Century’. While initial hype
was rather exaggerated, sober estimates made subsequently did confirm that
Central Asian States did possess large energy reserves, which were an additional
source for meeting the energy needs of the Western countries. Kazakhstan
has been able to attract more foreign investment than Turkmenistan since it
is endowed with more oil resources than the latter. This is mainly because
Kazakhstan has pursued policies more actively than Turkmenistan to make
progress in its economic reforms.
Legal Status of Caspian

In the aftermath of the Soviet break-up, the Caspian Sea region has witnessed
conflicting situations due to various factors. Firstly, while there were only two
countries namely the Soviet Union and Iran sharing the Caspian Sea in the past,
now there are five countries-Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan
and Iran – independent and sovereign, which are sharing the Sea. This has
added a new dimension to the situation. Secondly, energy resources are
unevenly distributed among the littoral states. By 2005, the combined share of
Russia and Iran in the Caspian region was estimated to be less than 20 percent
while the other three states namely, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan
have about 80 percent of energy resources of the Caspian Sea. Thirdly,
presumably arising out of this situation, Russia and Iran initially contended
that the Russo-Iranian Treaty of 1921 and Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1940 be
adhered to for sharing the Caspian without dividing the sea into the national
sectors. Iran even suggested that the sea be divided into five equal zones.
74
This was not acceptable to new members since they would be the losers.
Subsequently, different proposals were made over the years—Russia proposed
‘Condominium Principle’, Azerbaijan advocated “Lake Variant’ and so on.
There was also a proposal to divide the Sea on the ‘Middle Line Principle’.
In 1998 Russia and Iran proposed the principle of ‘Modified Middle Line
Principle’ to divide the bottom of the Sea. In 2001 Azerbaijan president and
the Russian deputy foreign Minister met and suggested that five littoral states
should reach an agreement to divide the Sea into ‘National Sectors’. While
bilateral talks and agreements have been worked out from time to time, there
was no acceptable multilateral consensus of the five member states on the
issue even over one and half decades after the Soviet break-up.
In view of this there was no final consensus on the legal status of the
Caspian Sea, differences cropped up from time to time on the issue of
ownership of oil deposits, which are particularly lying on the border zones.
For instance, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have disputes over 3 oil fields.
Turkmenistan made claim over what are called Osmen, Lhager and Altyn
Asyn, which Azerbaijan called Chirag, Azeri and Sharg. In 2001 Azerbaijan
even went ahead with giving contracts to an international consortium led
by the British Petroleum (BP) for $ 8-9 billion to develop Azeri-Chirag oil
field. Turkmenistan called it ‘illegal’ and even wanted to take the issue to
international court for arbitration. Similarly, Turkmen deputy prime minister
stated that Azerbaijan’s SOCAR oil company had no right to develop
Turkmenistan’s Serdar oil field which Azerbaijan called Kyapaz.
As assertion and disputes over the ownership of oil fields continued there
were a few instances of threat of military conflict among contending states. In
July 2001 an Iranian military boat threatened to stop exploration work being
carried out by Azerbaijan at Chirag oil field. Thus oil fields have great economic
significance for each Caspian state and lack of consensus among member states
occasionally led to potential military conflicts giving international dimension.
In 2001 there was an important development when the US leaders even said
that they would render political support to Baku in case conflict arise. Russia
was against any outside intervention and was against military involvement of
the USA in such conflicts. The Russian leadership appealed to both Azerbaijan
and Iran not to use force in solving the problem. In fact Russia and Kazakhstan
also have disputes with regard to Kurmangazy oil field and Khvalynskow Oil
field. But both the countries have avoided any serious confrontation and have
even proposed to jointly develop some oil fields.
Thus even after one and half decades after the CAS gained independence,
there was no solution in sight on the sharing of the Caspian Sea. Ongoing
talks over one and half decade among the five Caspian littoral states could
not produce a comprehensive agreement on delimitation of the Caspian
Sea. Efforts were made by the members at bilateral levels to work out some
piecemeal agreements. For instance, in the statement on 13th December 2006,
75
Turkmenistan’s Foreign Ministry proposed high-level talks at the level of

the presidents of the two countries with Azerbaijan over the division of the
Caspian seabed, but only in the context of existing agreements of 1991.
Politics of Pipeline
The CAS being landlocked countries face major hurdles in exporting oil and
natural gas to foreign countries. During the Soviet era this was not a problem
for them since oil and natural gas produced in these former Soviet republics
were transported through pipelines built by the Central planners and linked to
the national pipeline network. Decisions regarding the laying of the pipeline-
network were taken by the Soviet leaders in Moscow. To retain control over
the energy sector, main pipeline for exporting oil and natural gas was laid
through the Russian Federation. Oil and natural gas pipeline from the Central
Asian countries and Azerbaijan were linked to the pipeline passing through
Russia known as the ‘Northern Route’ and there was also a pipeline route via
Trans-Caucasia known as the ‘Southern Route’.
After the break-up of the Soviet Union even as the CAS became
independent and sovereign, they became dependent on the Russian pipelines
for exporting oil and natural gas to world markets. This situation gave rise
to a new situation of politics of pipelines. For instance, in the early 1990’s
there were speculations and even reports that Russia would give preference to
Rosneft and Lukoil for exporting oil and gas produced in Russia to protect its
domestic producers. This would put the CAS and Azerbaijan at a disadvantage
as they found it difficult to export oil and natural gas. Occasionally conflicting
situations emerged as each independent state tried to safeguard its own national
interest. Some analysts also argued that there were also objective factors since
there was capacity constraint on the pipeline network when demand for export
increased over the years. In the early 1990’s a pipeline was constructed linking
Baku with Novorussisk port of Russia. This enabled Azerbaijan to export oil
through Russia to world markets. But there was a need felt for additional
pipelines so far the CAS and Azerbaijan were concerned giving rise to politics
of ‘Multiple Pipeline Policy’.
Since the 1990’s the western countries and particularly the USA took
advantage of the situation to push forward the ‘Multiple Pipeline Policy’. The
economic consideration was at least partly to capture the energy resources of
the Caspian and the Central Asian region to meet their own growing demand.
Equally important was the Western geo-political interest to bypass Russia.
Hence during the one and a half decade several project proposals were initiated
by the western countries and the international oil companies.
One of the earliest projects was the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC)
linking the Tengiz oil field in Kazkahstan with Novorussisk port on the Black
Sea of Russia stretching over 1,580 kms. The USA supported the CPC pipeline
project to enable Kazakhstan to export oil to the West. Several private firms
76
including some foreign companies such as Chevron, EXXON had share in this
project. Russia has 24 percent share in the CPC project, while Chevron has 15
percent, Mobil 7.5 percent. Under the then prevailing conditions of low prices
for oil in the international market in the 1990’s, some analysts opined that this
project was considered to be not very profitable.
There were also delays in the completion of this project even as it was
crucial for Kazakhstan’s economy. For instance, the Kazak prime minister
Q. Tokayev stated in May 2001 that Russia was taking a ‘negative attitude’
which caused this delay. It appears that Russia and Kazakhstan had to sort out
some differences on matters relating to customs duty to be paid to Russia, on
the quantum of oil transported through the pipeline and so on. But with rising
demand for oil in the world market since 2002 and consequent rise in price
for oil from below $ 48 per barrel to over $ 90 per barrel by 2006, the CPC
pipeline became profitable. This pipeline had initial capacity of transporting 28
million tons of oil, which could be enhanced to 67 million tons per year. This
pipeline became operative in 2001 and about one-third of exports of Kazakh
oil were handled by this pipeline. It is important to know that in March 2006
the Russian president Vladimir Putin as a part of political diplomacy offered
the Kazakh president that Russia will increase the quota of oil to 67 million
tons to be exported by the CPC.
Even as this offer made the Kazakh president immensely happy,
Kazakhstan faced some problems. This pipeline passing through North
Caucasus had been affected by volatile Chechen militant activities. Moreover,
the Black Sea was facing heavy traffic problems as tankers had to pass through
the congested Bosphorus Strait. The CPC pipeline also catered to the Kashgan
oil field of Kazakhstan. As opined by Starr and Levante, Kashgan oil field
would produce about 450,000 barrels of oil per day by 2010, which could
eventually increase up to 1.2 million barrels per day. Hence even as CPC has
assumed great importance, Kazakhstan required an additional pipeline. In the
opinion of western energy experts Kazakhstan could even consider a parallel
pipeline to CPC.
In 2003 the former president of Turkmenistan Sapramurad Niyazov entered
into an agreement with Russia under which he committed to export through
Russian pipelines significant quantity of its natural gas over the next 25 years.
This became known as the ‘Deal of the Century’. Similarly, Russia’s Gazprom
company was able to enter into agreement with Uzbekistan to export natural
gas through Russia’s pipelines. These agreements enhanced Russia’s position
in the global energy market. This was particularly important for Russia since
there was some decline in the production of oil and gas in its own fields. Russia
was increasing its co-operation with Uzbekistan in energy sector. Over the
years Russia had increased its imports of gas from 7.114 billion cubic meters
of Uzbek gas in 2004 to 8.15 billion in 2005, and was expected to import 10
billion in 2006. Moreover during the meeting of Gazprom chief Alexei Millar
77
with Islam Karimov in December 2006 it was noted that Gazprom would also
participate in the modernization of Uzbekistan’s gas-transport system, with
Gazprom’s total planned investment in the Uzbek economy set to exceed $1.5
billion.
There was a joint agreement to construct the pipeline signed on 20th
December 2007 between the Russian president Dmitry Medvedev with the
leaders of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The pipeline from the Caspian coast
of Kazakhstan was expected to transport an estimated 30 billion cubic meters
of gas from Turkmenistan and up to 10 billion cubic meters from Kazakhstan
for further transportation to Europe.
Notwithstanding these developments for sustaining and expanding
cooperation with Russia, the leaders of the Central Asian countries pursued
their own national interest in promoting alternative pipelines for exporting oil
and natural gas to world markets. Thus Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline
of 1,800 Kms. was initiated, which connected Baku in Azerbaijan on the
Caspian Sea passing through Georgia linking the Turkish port of Ceyhan.
Initially some critics considered that this BTC pipeline project was not viable
on various grounds. Firstly, as this project would cost about $ 4 billion, it was
considered to be economically not sound at the prevailing low prices for oil
in the international markets. Secondly, the pipeline passed through several
mountainous regions and hence technically hazardous. Thirdly, the pipeline
which passed through autonomous regions inhabited by ethnic groups which
were politically sensitive -Meshketia, Javkati etc. in Georgia and the region
was facing ethnic violence and conflicts and hence unsafe. Despite such
criticism the contentions of which were not fully convincing to the initiators
of the project, it was implemented. The BTC pipeline was not only bypassing
Russia, but that it would link the Caspian Sea with the Mediterranean Sea and
hence providing direct access to world energy markets. The BTC pipeline was
inaugurated in May 2005 and Kazakhstan foreign minister Kasymzhomart
Tokayev evinced considerable interest in transporting oil through this
pipeline initially through tankers up to Baku, which later to be exported to
world markets. This proposal was supported by the president of Kazakhstan
Nazarbaev in June 2006, which enhanced the importance of the BTC pipeline.
He even supported the proposal of constructing underwater pipeline linking
Kazkhastan’s port of Atyrau and Baku.
Besides the BTC pipeline, there was a proposal to construct Trans-
Caspian pipeline under the Caspian Sea. While the western countries had
been supportive of this project, Russia objected to it on issues relating to
environment claiming that the region being prone to seismic activity.
Energy Co-operation Between Central Asia and China

Since the Soviet break-up co-operation in the energy sector had been playing
an important role in the economic relations between the CAS and China. The
78
extent of increase in energy import demand of China was evident from the fact
that while in the year 2000 China was hardly importing oil, in 2006 it emerged
as the second largest importer of oil in the world after the USA. To meet
its rapidly growing demand, apart from sustaining its interest in traditional
sources of supply in the Middle East and some African countries, China started
paying particular attention to the neighboring countries of Central Asia. The
active policy of the state in the energy sector of Central Asia had been further
reinforced by some oil companies of China that have made investment in
the energy sector of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Chinese
leaders even at the highest levels visited the Central Asian countries under
mutual exchange arrangements, which strengthened political and economic
ties between China and Kazakhstan and other CAS. For instance, during the
visit of the former Turkmen president late Niyazov in April 2006 to China,
an agreement was signed with the then Chinese president Hu Jintao under
which China would receive 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually. To
achieve this objective China seriously started working out pipeline proposals
linking Central Asian energy centers with Chinese industrial centers. Equally
important was that China extended economic support to the CAS under the
CAREC program. Moreover, China jointly with Russia had been extending
co-operation to the Central Asian countries through the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization.
Thus China has succeeded in laying a pipeline from Kazakhstan to
western region of China. Oil from this new Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline
was delivered to China since May 2006, tripling the amount of Kazakh oil
China imports. Beijing hoped to further increase the amount of petroleum the
Kazakhstan-China pipeline from approximately 95,000 bpd in 2005 to 160,000
bpd by the end of 2007. In June 2006, a subsidiary of CNPC announced plans
to spend $ 210 million to look for oil and gas in Uzbekistan over the next five
years. In October 2006, China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) concluded
a $4.18 billion takeover of PetroKazakhstan Inc. It is important to note that
China also entered into an agreement with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan for
construction of a pipeline for taking natural gas from Turkmenistan. This
pipeline was ‘priority’ for China and was to be completed in 2009. As stated
by the ambassador of China to Uzbekistan Yu Hongjun on the 12th December
2006 only on some issues compromises were to be worked out on the pipeline
project.
Political and Economic Issues

For Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan energy resources are primarily a source
of revenue and hence their interest is to maximize economic gain. Equally
important was the fact that they got an opportunity to assert their independence
to interact with the Western powers for geo-political and geo-economic
interests. For the USA and western countries, the break-up of the Soviet Union
79
gave a historic opportunity to enter Central Asia. Even as the initial hype about
the huge energy resources of the Caspian Sea was short-lived, there has been
a realization that the Central Asian region did provide an additional source
of energy for the West. Spurt in the world market price for oil since 2002
enhanced the economic importance of the CAS. But more than economic
interest, political and geo-political significance of the CAS is dominant for the
West and that was a part of Great Game in Central Asia. Moreover according
to the US experts, revenues generated by energy resources have helped some
political stability in the CAS. But the main objective of the West has been
that the CAS should undertake political reforms to bring about western type
of democracy. Because the western leaders and analysts are critical of the
authoritarian regimes of the Central Asian states, human right violations,
lack of transparency, lack of freedom of press etc. in these countries. Hence
expectation of the West could be far from reality in the near future.
At the same time the Western powers have pursued aggressively ‘Multiple
Pipeline Policy’ in Central Asia to contain the hold and influence of Russia
in Central Asia. Thus a new Great Game is being played by both the West
and Russia in the Central Asian Region. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have
positively responded to the initiatives of the western countries and oil giants,
which have offered large opportunities for selling their energy resources to
world markets. This is important to Caspian Sea states. Moreover, Uzbekistan,
which has abundant natural gas reserves, has also come closer to Russia
during the last few years. The interest of the CAS is also partly political
since western countries help them in reducing their dependence on Russia.
Even more important is that the Western countries have been offering modern
technology for the development of energy sector and other related branches of
economy of the CAS. The leaders of the CAS rightly decided to continue their
close relations with Russia, which was also important for their oil and natural
gas exports. Hence the CAS have also sought co-operation with Russian
companies such as Gazprom, Lukoil etc which have made huge investment in
exploration, exploitation and transportation of oil and gas in their countries.
Thus, after initial neglect Russia revived its interest and involvement in
Central Asia since 1995-1996 giving a boost to ‘Near Abroad’ policy. Because
there was a perception that growing western influence in the Central Asian
region will affect Russia’s own interest and security. The Russian policy
makers were convinced that energy resource potentials of Central Asian
countries will add to Russia’s political objective to emerge as a global energy
power. Hence apart from enhancing its control over Central Asia’s pipeline
net work, Russia’s energy firms made huge investment in the energy sector
of the CAS. Russia also considered that it was in Russia’s own geo-political
interest to contain the influence of the Western powers in Central Asia by
establishing close strategic co-operation with China and by strengthening the
role of the Shanghai Co-operation Organization in the Central Asian region.
80
Hence, it can be safely concluded that Caspian energy sector has indeed been
the genesis of geo-politics and geo-economics leading to Great Game being
played by major powers in Central Asia .
References & Notes

1. U.S Information Administration Department of Commerce, ‘Caspian Sea
Region’, July 2001.
2. Gidadhubli, R.G., ‘Oil Politics in Central Asia’, Economic and Political Weekly’,
Mumbai January, 30, 1999.
3. Menon, Rajan, ‘Treacherous Terrain: The Politics and Security Dimension of
Energy Development in the Caspian Sea Zone’, NBR Analysis, USA, 1999.
4. Gizzatov V. Kh., ‘Legal Status of the Caspian Sea’, Kommersant Moscow (in
Russian), 26th July, 2005.
5. Ariel Cohen, ‘The New Great Game: Oil Politics in the Caucasus and Central
Asia’ , Backgrounder, The Heritage Foundation, Washington, 25th January, 1996.
6. Economic Intelligence Reports Russia and Central Asia 1995-2005.
7. Gidadhubli, R.G., ‘Politics of Energy Resources of Central Asia’, Central Asia-
The Great Game Replayed - An Indian Perspective, Ed. Nirmala Joshi, New
Century Publications, Delhi, 2001.
8. Radio Free/Radio Liberty Reports, Daily Reports Part I Russia and Central
Asia, for the period 1995 to 2006
81
Scope and Feasibility of Islamic Banking
And Finance Model
Kazakhstan & Indian Perspective
Bilal A. Malik
G. N. Khaki
Abstract
More than five decades ago, banking and finance based on the principles of
Islamic Commercial Law (fiqh al-mu’amalat) was just a wishful thinking.
However, since it’s commencement in early 1960s, Islamic finance industry
remained at constant momentum in and outside the Muslim world. Making
space among the leading financial service providers like Hong Kong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation(HSBC, London), Deutsche Bank (DB,
Germany), Bank National Paris (BNP, France), Citi Group (U.S),Union
Bank of Switzerland(USB, Switzerland), Merrill Lynch and Barclay’s (UK),
etc., the ‘nascent’ industry has now become a practical reality. As such, the
developing Asian economies like India and Kazakhstan -(countries under
study)- being home to large Muslim populations, are expected to offer a
promising growth market to Islamic finance industry. The overview of socio-
economic factors like demography, religious participation, behavioral
finance and demand for a robust financial structure after experiencing the
worst consequences of global financial crisis, have led experts to expect a
‘perception shift’ in customer choice in general and Muslim customers in
particular. Regardless of India being home to 177 million Muslims, and
Kazakhstan, a Muslim majority state (70.2%), much has not been done to
materialize the concept of Islamic banking and finance on practical grounds.
The major impediment in the development of shari’ah compliant banking in
both the countries is generally and genuinely ascribed to their respective
secular constitutions. Although, felt heavy with customer interest, the
government of Kazakhstan reformed the banking constitution in 2009, just
to become the first country to facilitate the development of Islamic finance
in the Common Wealth of Independent States (CIS).Currently, Kazakhstan
has one full-fledged Islamic bank- Al Hilal Bank (established 2010), which
offers both corporate and retail services. By now she has also the (Islamic)
legal framework for sukuk (securities), takaful (insurance), and ijarah
(leasing). Being the largest democracy of the world, the government of
Indiais yet to introduce such type of constitutional change. However, one of
her states in the South - Kerala State was the first to allow the Kerala State
Industrial Development Corporation (KSIDC) to offer shari’ah compliant
financial services to the Muslim community. It is with this background that
the present paper will attempt to examine the feasibility and challenges
of Islamic finance industry from Indian and Kazakhstan perspective by
Scope and Feasibility of Islamic Banking and Finance Model...
applying SWOT analysis method.

Keywords
Islamic Banking, India, Kazakhstan, Feasibility, Emergence, Development,
Islamic Commercial Law, Islamic Finance Industry, Legal Models, Potential
Investors.
Introduction
Asia is home to 62% Muslims of the world, and therefore, the demand for
shari’ah compliant financial products has always been felt across the region
with a greater supportive strength.1 Kazakhstan and India, being part of that
Continent, lag behind as compared to other neighbouring economies like
Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Iran. The development of
Islamic finance industry is negligible in case of India and relatively weak
in case of Kazakhstan. The main reason behind this stalled growth in these
countries is generally ascribed to the secular structure of the constitution.
Being secular in socio-political disposition and much reluctant to religious
developments, they have no state religion except that Muslims in India have
‘Muslim Personal Law’ to govern (certain) family matters, while Kazakhstan
has a state sponsored apolitical religious board called the ‘Muftiate’ for
the said purpose.2 The inclusion of fundamentals of any religion in state
formation is contextualized as a potential threat to the prevailing secular
democracy and nation building. As for the Islamic financial institutions, the
shari’ah compliance is a primary requirement which in turn persistently
demands the incorporation of Islamic standards of doing business. Since most
of the shari’ah based financial operations like musharakah, mudarabah,
murabaha, istisna, salam, ijarah and wadiyah, objectively different from
the conventional structures, don’t fall under prevailing banking and finance
regulations in Kazakhstan and India. Therefore, there are some general and,
certainly, some regional challenges for the industry to operate and expand
its services. Despite being a secular state, Kazakhstan, so far, has introduced
gradual amendments in its constitution (2009, 2011, and 2015) to facilitate
Islamic financial services in order to attract both local customers as well as
capital rich foreign Muslim investors in the country.3 However, India, with a
large Muslim population, has not introduced any such constitutional change
except allowing Al-Barakah Financial Services Ltd., a non-banking finance
company (NBFC), to operate in Kerala in August 2013.4
Foundations of Islamic Banking and Finance

Needless to say that Islam has a set of goals and values encompassing all
aspects of human life including social, political and economic. Since
all the aspects of life are interdependent and Islamic way of life being a
consistent whole, its goals and values in one field determine the goals and
values in the other fields as well. Consequently, the said interdependency
84
is to be put into consideration when it comes to economic participation

and financial engagements.5Therefore, responding to the need, scholars of
shari’ah developed an alternate system of banking and finance under the
guiding principles of fiqh al-ma’amalat (Commercial Jurisprudence) which,
considerably, differs from the Western or conventional system. The former is
strictly engrossed in the shari’ah and latter is purely a human workout.6 As
such, Muslims are expected to engage with banks and financial institutions
that offer products which are in line with Islamic principles. The Islamic
finance industry is based on four major principles, explicitly referred to in
the Qur’an, hadith and fiqh (jurisprudence).These principles are: La-Riba
(no-interest), La-Gharar (no-uncertainty), La-Maisir (no-speculation), and
La-Haram (no-unlawful).7
It would not be out of place to mention that in the economic philosophy of
Islam money (paper currency) in actuality has no value and it becomes ‘actual
capital’ only when it is invested in a productive activity. Thus, in contrast
to conventional theory of money, selling of money for money, for example,
US$100 for US$110 is not same as selling a bag of rice (commodity) costing
US$100 for US$110.Islam adopts characteristic differences between money
and commodity and considers money as ‘potential capital’.8 It must be noted
that increment in the price of a commodity in any sale contract to be paid at a
future date is not prohibited in shari’ah. According to the objectives of Islamic
law (maqasid al-shari’ah),the rate of increment implies that incorporation of
time value of money is a necessary component for the growth and development
of a (particular) business. It also ascertains that essentially shari’ah only
prohibits making money’s time value as a justification of interest claimed as a
predetermined value.9
Legal Modes of Banking and Financing in Islam

• Profit sharing (mudarabah): It is a financial method in which one partner
(rabb al-mal) finances the project, while the other party (mudarib)
manages it. Under mudarabah principle Islamic banks offer savings
and time deposits in the form of investment accounts. The profit made
through this business venture is shared as per pre-agreed ratio and in case
of genuine failure the financer has to bear the loss.10
• Non-interest bearing demand deposits: (wadiah al-dhamanah): It is
basically a contract (‘aqad) between the owner of goods (depositor)
and the custodian of the goods (Islamic bank). Islamic bank takes the
responsibility to safeguard the goods or money from being damaged,
destroyed, stolen, etc.11
• Joint Venture (musharakah): It is a partnership agreement entered by at
least two parties (Islamic bank and depositor) for a particular business
venture. Here the bank not only participates in the supply of capital to
the venture, but also in its management --thus playing the role of an
85
entrepreneur as well as that of a financier. Profit is shared as per the

agreement between parties while the loss is shared in proportion to their
shares of capital in the enterprise.12
• Cost Plus (murabaha): It is defined as a cost-plus sale, where the
seller (Islamic bank) expressly mentions the cost he has incurred on the
commodities to be sold and sells it to another person (customer) by adding
some profit or mark-up thereon which is known to the buyer.13
• Leasing (ijarah): An agreement whereby the Islamic bank (lessor)
purchases or constructs an asset for lease (customer) according to his/
her request (lessee), based on his/her promise to lease the asset for a
specific period and against certain rent installments. Ijarah could end by
transferring the ownership of the asset to the lessee known as ijarah wa
Iqtina.14
• Securities and Bonds (sukuk): It is a financial certificate and an (Islamic)
equivalent of conventional bond. These are securities that comply with
the Islamic law (shari’ah) and its investment principles, which prohibit
the charging or paying of interest. Financial assets that comply with the
Islamic law can be classified in accordance with their tradability and non-
tradability in the secondary markets.15
Global Outlook of Islamic Finance Industry

Islamic finance industry has received global acceptance. Today, more than 500
shari’ah compliant financial institutions are operational in 75 countries of the
world.16 The impressive performance of this industry has greatly benefited
many economies, irrespective of religion or race, by fostering significant
growth and increased employment opportunities. Many developed non-
Muslim countries like Germany, UK, USA, Russia, France, and China are
embracing Islamic finance industry as an alternative to satisfy the growing
customer demand. The geographic expansion of Islamic finance industry
accelerated after the worst consequences of global financial crisis which
exposed the instability of centuries old conventional banking system. By the
end of 2014, the total assets of the Islamic finance industry surpassed US $
2.1 trillion milestone and the figure is expected to hit US $ 3.4 trillion by the
end of 2018.17 In terms of market penetration, Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region is the centre of Islamic finance market contributing 74%
share in global assets followed by East Asia with 17% and rest of the world
with 9%. In terms of services, the share of banking assets is estimated about
80% followed by equity funds 5% and the rest are others in the global volume
of assets under Islamic finance.18
Relative Development of Islamic Finance Industry in Kazakhstan and

India
Although, the emergence and development of Islamic finance industry is an
86
outcome of a long tradition but its introduction in both countries under study
viz. Kazakhstan and India is a very recent trend. Consequently, the official
approval of shari’ah compliant tools of financial intermediation has even a
very short but relatively a different history.
Kazakhstan
Until the dissolution of Communist Russia (1991), Kazakhstan19 was deeply
secular in outlook, but soon after getting independence,20 the whole Central
Asian region witnessed a dramatic rise in Muslim identity, a call “back to Islam”
which did not go unheeded in Kazakhstan.21 From the regional perspective,
Kazakhstan emerged as a pioneer in terms of introducing Islamic finance into
practice.22Initiating the process, in January 1992, Albaraka (Kazakhstan) was
established by the Decree No. 5 of the President of the Republic. The founder
of Albaraka, Sheikh Saleh Kamel, became the first foreigner Muslim investor
to invest US $100 million into the Kazakh economy.23 In November 1995,
Kazakhstan became a member of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), the
largest financial entity of Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and in
1998 IDB opened its Regional Office in Almaty. At present, this Regional
Office covers Central Asia and the Caucasian region. Since the operations of
IDB began, it has spent around US$700 million in Kazakhstan, which puts the
republic ahead of its neighbours in terms of ‘received funding’. 24
Today, there are more than a dozen Islamic financial institutions operating
in Kazakhstan. These included: an Islamic Bank, an Investment Fund, a Takaful
Company, the Hajj Fund, and Brokerage and Consulting Companies.25In
2003, Kazakhstan’s largest bank, Bank Turan Alem (BTA), became the first
Central Asian financial institution to draw on an Islamic-backed line of credit
when it borrowed US$250 million from Arab, UK and Malaysian Muslim
lenders (Sadiq, 2013).26 In a historic move, Kazakhstan became (2009) the
first Central Asian country to adopt laws on Islamic banking and finance after
President Nursultan Nazarbayev ordered a bill on Islamic financing. The
2009 amendment to the Kazakhstan Banking Law allowed Islamic banking
activities, established a separate license for these banks and stipulated the
(Islamic) financing products.27
Kazakhstan’s first full-fledged Islamic bank al-Hilal was established
in 2010 only after an agreement between the governments of the Republic
of Kazakhstan and the United Arab Emirates.28 In July 2011, the Kazakh
President signed into law the amendment “On alteration and addition to
some legislative acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the organization
of Islamic finance,” paving the way for issuance of sukuk (Islamic Bond), an
equal of conventional bonds and certificates. In November 2011, the National
Bank of Kazakhstan was admitted as an Associate Member of the Islamic
Financial Services Board (IFSB), based in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.29 In the
follow up of amendments in Kazakh banking laws, the first company based
87
on principles of Islamic lease (ijarah) was Kazakhstan Ijarah Company

established April 2013Acting in concordance with principles of Shari’ah it
offers financing from 2014 for companies in the SME and corporate sector.
In May 2013, the Islamic Corporation for Development (ICD) announced its
initiative to convert Zaman Bank into Islamic Bank with an investment of
up to 35% of capital. The local Bank will be the second Islamic Bank in the
country.30
In order to enhance the development of Islamic finance industry, the
Government of Kazakhstan approved (29th March, 2012) 41 point “Road
Map for Development of Islamic Finance by 2020.” This programme
determines the directions and procedures to be taken by governmental bodies
and businesses to achieve the mutual objectives, by creating conditions
for the stable development of the Islamic finance industry, promoting the
establishment of new Islamic banks, Islamic securities issuers, investors,
and market participants.31 In order to make the country “financial center of
the new Silk Road” by facilitating the conversion of conventional banks
into shari’ah compliant ones, the government of Kazakhstan under the
leadership of Nursultan Nazarbayev, introduced another set of amendments
(November 2015) to the recently approved law in April 2015. With adopting
the amendments, Islamic finance industry is expected to grow progressively in
the next few years as competition is likely to increase when more sophisticated
products and customer friendly services are introduced in the market. These
developments are driven by Presidential and governmental reforms to create
an enabling environment for Islamic finance, which will make the country’s
financial markets more competitive and attractive to shari’ah-compliant
investment capital from major Islamic financial markets The National Bank of
Kazakhstan (NBK) is also engaged with different projects to spur development
in Islamic banking sector. It mainly works on three areas; firstly, to improve
local expertise on Islamic finance through education, seminars, conferences and
lectures across the country; secondly, to improve the legislation framework;
and lastly, to attract Islamic finance players, both institution and investors,
from the Middle East and Southeast Asia.32
India
Historically, the concept of Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) is not new
to India or her Muslim population in particular. Records reveal that IFIs in
the shape of bait-ul-maal (treasury house) came into existence in India after
the advent of Islam and establishment of the Muslim rule. The functions
of the bait-ul-maal included collection and distribution of wealth through
zakah (poor due), sadaqah (charity) and qard-e-hassan (benevolent loans).
However, IFIs as economic units were first created during the first half of the
20th century with the establishment of Patni Co-operative Credit Society Ltd.
(1938) followed by the creation of first Muslim Fund in 1941at Tada Bavli in
88
UP. The fund was created to mobilize the savings of poor formers on daily and
weekly basis on wadiyah or amanah deposits and extend interest free loans
against the security of gold ornaments. In 1961, the Muslim Fund Deoband
(MFD) was established and is still working. In 1971, another institution named
Muslim Fund Najibabad (MFN) was created on the model of MFD. In 1990,
MFN floated a subsidiary, Al-Najib Milli Mutual Benefits Ltd.33
Inspite of strong historical links with the institutional framework of
Islamic economy, the growth of contemporary Islamic finance industry in
India is at halt. In June 2005, Government of India asked Reserve Bank of
India (RBI) to examine Islamic banking instruments from an investment and
money generating avenue. Finally, a Committee was constituted which was
headed by Mr. Anand Sinha, then Deputy Director of RBI, with senior bankers
and experts from State Bank of India (SBI) and Oman International Bank,
as its members. In 2006, the committee submitted its report and made two
major observations: first, appropriate modification should be made in banking
regulation act 1949 along with separate rules and regulations; second, taxation
proposition have to be examined. But unfortunately, the idea of Islamic
banking was rejected by RBI saying that it is not feasible for Indian banks to
undertake it or to allow their branches to carry out Islamic banking operations
abroad without amendments in current related banking and other laws.34
In August, 2007, the idea of an interest free mechanism in India again
became a hot debate when the government under the Planning Commission
constituted a high-level Committee on Financial Sector Reforms (CFSR).
The Committee’s Chairman Dr. Raghuram Rajan (former Chief Economist
at IMF) and other eleven members were asked to look into the feasibility
and practical adoption of Islamic banking under the prevailing banking and
financial laws. In September, 2008, the Committee submitted its report to the
Prime Minister with specific recommendations of interest-free banking in the
country.35 In 2010, Kerala State Industrial Development Corporation (KSIDC),
a fully owned Kerala state government company, signed an agreement with
Al-Barakah group to offer shari’ah compliant financial services to the local
Muslim community. In the proposed Islamic financial institution, KSIDC holds
11% stake. However, the government order was challenged by Bhartia Janata
Party (BJP) leader Subramanian Swami in the Kerala High Court arguing
that association of government agencies in setting up Islamic investment
company goes against secular principles preserved in Indian constitution and
was stayed on grounds of violation of Article 14, 25, and 27. In February
2011, Kerala High court dismissed the petition filed by Subramanian Swamy
and maintained setting up of an Islamic investment company.36In 2012, the
arguments for Islamic banking received a boost when the National Minorities’
Commission under Chairman Wajahat Habibullah, made a case for it with the
Finance Ministry. In 2013, another non-banking company named Al-Barakah
Financial Services Ltd. received a “green” signal which came from the Reserve
89
Bank of India (RBI) itself.37 India has some well-established Islamic finance
centers like Indian Centre for Islamic Finance (ICIF) and Institute of Islamic
Banking and Finance (IIBF). The IIBF is incorporated with the Government
of Andhra Pradesh (Hyderabad) under Public Societies Registration Act 1995.
It is the county’s major institute that strives to institutionalize education at all
levels in the field of Islamic economics, banking and finance. Apart from these
centers, Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) and Malappuram based Ma’din
Academy also started a number of courses (bachelors, masters, diploma, etc.)
in Islamic banking and finance.38 Despite all these academic developments till
date there isn’t any full-fledged Islamic bank in India.
Islamic Banking in Kazakhstan and India-SWOT Analysis

Kazakhstan and India are two growing banking economies of Asia. The banking
and finance sector significantly adds to their GDP percentage. But compared
to the developed nations, the level of their development in the concerned
sector is still weak in terms of access and expansion. Apart from problem of
expansion, there is another specific one related to the ‘behavioral finance’ as
both the countries have a large Muslim population. With the colonial era gone
once for all, the consciousness regarding approved (halal) and disapproved
(haram) has stopped millions of Muslims to get involved in interest based
banking practices. Apart from religiosity, the benefits of Islamic banking in
a growing economy like India and Kazakhstan cannot be overemphasized.
It will significantly contribute to the overall development of the country by
developing micro-credit schemes aimed at improving the job prospects for the
poor and the downtrodden. Therefore, both countries need large investments in
order to boost the overall process of economic development; Islamic banking
can be used as vital tool to attract petro-dollar economies to invest their
capital in Kazakhstan and India. With the help of SWOT (Strength, Weakness,
Opportunity and Threat) scale analysis the position of Islamic finance industry
in Kazakhstan and India is examined hereunder:
Strengths
• The products and services offered by Islamic finance industry are
becoming increasingly popular, not only in the Gulf countries and far
eastern Muslim countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Iran but
also in other developed markets such as the United Kingdom, Germany,
USA, France, Hong Kong and Singapore.
• Islamic banking adheres to strict credit rating system and prohibits
indebted economic agents to avail more debt finance which in turn could
save financial and economic enterprises from bankruptcy.
• Under Islamic banking, equity finance needs cost yield and pre-rating
analysis of projects. Thus it considerably subdues the mindless competition
in financial sector to get more credit shares and tends to provide stability
90
in the financial market.

• Islamic banks, though not untouched, were least affected by the subprime
mortgage crisis. In fact, many non-Muslim countries are turning up to
Islamic banking as they are immune against such crisis due to inherent
business ethics within Islamic banking.
• Islamic banking helps the weaker and hapless section of the society
through various financial products like micro financing, joint ventures,
partnerships and leasing. This helps even the indigent and vulnerable
to get finance at a no risk and cost basis, but definitely requires other
credits like strong business proposal, rational planning, skilled hands and
specialized art to attract the financier.
• Better business proposals succeed in fetching funds as opposed to the
projects with comparatively poor propositions. Such inclusive growth
will boost the Kazakh and Indian economy.
• A bank in Kazakhstan and India cannot raise deposits without promising
a specified rate of return to depositors, but under shari’ah, returns can
only be determined post-facto depending on profit. Also, banks have
to maintain a Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR), which involves locking
up a substantial portion of funds either as cash, gold or in government
securities. Such cash will not get any return, keeping it in gold is risky
as it could depreciate and government securities come with interest.
Moreover, Islamic banking can eliminate unaccountable economic
activities, as every economic activity has to be financed through legal
contract and physical verification of real assets under contract. There is
no room for diversion of funds. Therefore, investment in consonance
with Islamic banking principles will surely boost the engine of economic
growth in the country.
Weaknesses
• The prevailing banking laws in Kazakhstan and India do not explicitly
support Islamic banking and finance instruments. For example, Banks in
India are governed through Banking Regulation Act 1949, Reserve Bank
of India Act 1934, Negotiable Instruments Act 1881, and Co-operative
Societies Act 1961.Section 5 (b) and 5 (c) of the Banking Regulation Act,
1949 – prohibiting the banks to invest on Profit Loss Sharing basis -the
very basis of Islamic banking.
• Islamic finance industry needs to introduce corporate governance with
transparent accounting standards. It needs to perform a detailed evaluation
before embarking Profit Loss Sharing Scheme. It demands a pool of
highly trained professionals which of course is very costly.
• It is observed that inability to evaluate a project’s profitability has tended
to act against investment financing. Some borrowers frustrate the banks
appraisal efforts as they are reluctant to provide full disclosures of their
91
business. Moreover, the borrowers do not observe business ethics which

make it difficult to establish close bank-client relationship - a prerequisite
for success.
• The other impediment from the borrower’s point of view is the need to
disclose his/her accounts to the bank, if he/she were to borrow on the
Profit Loss Sharing basis. Similarly, even most of large conglomerates do
not like to disclose their real accounts to anybody. This widespread lack
of business ethics among business community is another major hurdle in
the path of Islamic banking in India and Kazakhstan.
• The practices in use by the Islamic banks have evoked questions of
morality. Some critics view sukuk (Islamic bond) as non-Islamic in
nature. Others criticize that financing through the purchase of client’s
property with a buy-back agreement and sale of goods to clients on a
markup, involved the least risk and are closest to the old interest-based
operations.
• The usage of Arabic terminology makes it more religious activity than
business.
• Lack of professional finance experts and well qualified shari’ah experts
is another weakness of Islamic finance industry in Kazakh and Indian
context.
Opportunities
• Kazakhstan with 70.2% and India with a 15% Muslim population promise
a potential market to Islamic finance industry.
• Islamic banking is an effective mechanism to subjugate the liquidity
and inflation problems along with allowing inclusive growth. For real
inclusive growth, both Kazakhstan and India have to ensure increase in
income and employment status of workers in all segments.
• If Islamic banking is introduced, the inadequate labor capital ratio, for
informal sector workers associated with agriculture and manufacturing
industries could be resolved through equity finance, which might be a
revolution in Kazakh and Indian agriculture and unorganized sector. Thus
Islamic Banking may financially empower majority of Kazakh and Indian
workers.
• Islamic banking may induce the Kazakh and Indian political leaders
to substitute grants and subsidies with equity finance schemes through
specialized financial institutions because equity finance allows access to
credit without debts of borrowers.
• By introducing Islamic banking, the governments of Kazakhstan and
India will certainly gain diplomatic advantages to make financial dealings
with Muslim nations to attract millions and trillions of dollars of equity
finance. This is more important because the fall of the banking giants like
Lehman Brothers, reflects the economic downturn in the west and the need
92
of alternative sources of FDI for both the economies under discussion.

• Another opportunity that Kazakhstan and India could materialize is the
concept of mutual fund which is based on 100% equity. These funds could
be invested indifferent sectors like IT, automobile telecommunication,
and cement. In fact, Tata Mutual Fund made a pioneering attempt when,
at the instance of the Barakat and some other Islamic financial group,
it launched Tata Core Sector Equity Fund in 1996.This scheme was
specially tailored keeping in view the Muslims’ inhibition of dealing with
interest bearing and haram investments.
• Moreover, a large number of Muslims considered unworthy of credit
by commercial banks would welcome Islamic banking. Some Islamic
societies in India accept deposits and lend money, but can’t make a
business out of it because of the sharia’s prohibition of interest. And they
are not able to convert themselves into banks because the government
will not permit any form of banking without interest.
Threats
• Introduction of Islamic banking would tantamount to politicization of
religion and certain parties might abhor the use of the word “Islamic” and
could term it an up-shoot of Islamization project.
• Some scholars argue that the very concept of shari’ah compliant banking
would go against the secular fabric of the country. For example, India is
already facing problems pertaining to Muslim Personnel Law and is trying
to implement Uniform Civil Code. Therefore, some scholars suggest that
at this juncture, introduction of Islamic banking in India will create more
problems than solving the issue.
• It may bring financial segregation in the economy. The compartmentalization
of shari’ah compliant and non-shari’ah compliant banking might be
used by certain vested interest to communalize the finance sector.
Conclusion
The potential of Islamic finance industry is higher in Kazakhstan as compared
to India. The geo-political position of Kazakhstan’s Islamic finance industry
has all prerequisites to develop as the main centre of attraction for foreign
capital in the CIS. Despite Kazakhstan being a Muslim majority country, its
Constitution declares it a secular republic. The religious policy of Kazakh
President Nazarbayev has been to build good relations with all religious
affiliations. Unlike his other CIS neighbours, he has been the driving force
behind all efforts to make Astana International Financial Center (AIFC)
as a regional hub of Islamic finance activities. He organized a number of
international and national conferences, workshops and forums dedicated to
promote Islamic banking and finance industry. For example, the conferences
like Seventh World Islamic Economic Forum held in June 2011, Second
93
Islamic Finance Forum held in September 2011, Kazakhstan International

Halal Expo in 2012, Third Kazakhstan Islamic Finance Conference held
in October 2012, the signing of Memorandum of the Long-Term Cooperation
between the National Bank of Kazakhstan and the Association for Development
of Islamic Finance in February 2015 and very recently the 12th Summit of
Islamic Financial Service Board (IFSB) in May 2015 underline Kazakhstan’s
declared goal to develop the country and make it the regional center for Islamic
finance. Today, Kazakhstan indisputably shares its own experience in the field
of Islamic financial services industry and experts are hopeful that by the end of
year 2020 its 5% banking will turn Islamic. It worth to note, that Islamic finance
model in Kazakhstan has some structural similarities with the UK model. The
key principle adopted by the British government towards the formation of
its Islamic finance industry is “no obstacles, no special favours.” It is worth
noting that Kazakhstan’s Law does not include any Arabic terminology of
Islamic finance such as riba, musharakah, ijarah, takaful, shari’ah, etc. Only
the term “Islamic” together with the descriptions of Islamic financial products
are used to identify Islamic modes of financing. This is a unique approach
among secular states which keeps connections with the nature and principles
of Islamic finance, and at the same time this approach places emphasis on the
substance of the products through their definitions.
In contrast to Kazakhstan, India is relatively well exposed to economic
terminology of Islam like riba, waqaf, zakat, and bait-ul-maal. However, it is
still very far from considerable practical developments. In order to develop
favourable ecosystem for introducing Islamic banking in India, RBI formed
different committees under supervision of reputed economists and banking
experts. The recent reports submitted by Committee on Financial Sector
Reforms headed by Dr Raghuram Rajan (2008) and Medium term Path for
Financial Inclusion headed by Mr. Deepak Mohanty (2015), are obviously
some positive signs as for as inclusion of Islamic banking in India is concerned.
Although, RBI, within its capacity, is inclined towards experiencing this
alternate system of banking but changing political landscape of the country
doesn’t allow it to make any practical effort in this regard. It is perhaps the
same political pressure that even State bank of India Mutual Fund (SBIMF)
felt forced to stop the launch of its shari’ah compliant mutual fund at the
last moment. Unlike Kazakhstan, the government of India is proving ultra-
suspicious towards opening up a pilot project based on Islamic principles,
which according many economists is not a genuine strategy.
Recommendations
The present study has the following recommendations for both potential
investors and authorities:
1. In both countries, the newly opening Islamic banks (Joint Stock companies)
or non-banking financial companies should initially focus on small and
94
medium enterprises (SME) and agricultural sector. The application of

instruments like Murabaha, Salam and Istisna in agriculture sector of
both Kazakhstan and India could attract a large customer base. Moreover,
the selective utilization of Islamic micro-finance and micro-takaful could
also prove as fast deriving agents.
2. Human capital and awareness remains a serious challenge to be tackled.
To increase public awareness and expertise about Islamic finance
industry; its tools and techniques and its products and services, local
Islamic institutions operating in Kazakhstan and India should conduct
comprehensive marketing and educational programmes. Technical and
professional assistance, in this regard, could be sought from leading
Islamic financial players and institutions like Islamic Development Bank
(IDB), Islamic Research and Training Institute (IRTI), Islamic Finance
Service Board (IFSB), Accounting and Auditing Organization of Islamic
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), International Islamic Financial Market
(IIFM), and International Islamic Rating Agency (IIRA).
3. Both countries can attract large investments from capital rich Muslim
countries, provided there are local shari’ah-compliant financial institu-
tions. Thus, further enhancement of the legislation relating to the different
areas of Islamic finance including the opening up of “Islamic Windows”
is needed.
3. The stock market development in Kazakhstan and India should be a pri-
ority for the ‘regulators’. Effectively operating capital market with long-
term, higher-return and higher-risk equity instruments can be supportive
for Islamic banking industry, providing liquidity and promoting risk-shar-
ing culture.
4. The Government of India should take efforts (in consultation with Ka-
zakhstan) to know how Islamic banking laws can be adopted without
hurting the secular fabric of the country.
5. India must take advantage of Islamic financial services by giving Mus-
lims, the largest minority, access to banking industry which doesn’t vio-
late their religious beliefs. This in turn, would surely add to India’s over-
all economic development.
References & Notes

1. Kettani, Hussein. (2010): “Muslim Population in Asia: 1950-2020,” International
Journal of Environmental science and Development, Vol. 1, No. 20, pp. 143-153.
2. Maggs, Peter B. (2011): “Islamic Banking in Kazakhstan Law,” in Review of
Central and East European Law. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp. 369-396.
Also see, The Muslim Personal Law (Shari’ah) Application Act, 1937 [PDF
downloaded from https://www.msz.gov.pl].
3. Please see Baker & Mackenzie Legal Alerts Introduction of Islamic Finance in
Kazakhstan dated 29 May 2009, Kazakhstan Adopts Legal Framework for Issuance
of Sovereign Islamic Securities dated December 2001, and Islamic Finance in
95
Kazakhstan: New Amendments dated 12 May 2015 at www.bakermckenzie.com
4. Khan, Khurram Ajaz. (2014): “Emerging Islamic Banking: Its Need and Scope
in India,” Pacific Business Review, International Vol. 5, Issue 7, pp. 84-90.
5. Mawdudi, Syed Abul A’ala. (2009): The Islamic Way of Life, (Tr.), Khurshid
Ahmad and KhuramMurad, New Delhi: Markazi Maktaba Islami Publishers,
pp.9-58.
6. Siddiqi, Muhammad Nejatullah. (1983): Issues in Islamic Banking. Leicester:
The Islamic Foundation.. Also see Wilson, Rodney. (1997). Islamic Finance,
London: FT Financial Publishing and Khan, Muhammad. (1994). An Introduction
to Islamic Economics, Islamabad: International Institute of Islamic Thought and
Institute for Policy Studies.
7. Warde, Ibrahim. (2000): Islamic Finance in the Global Economy, Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press. Also see Muslehuddin, Mohammad. (2009):
Economics and Islam, New Delhi: Markazi Maktaba Islami Publishers.
8. In an interest based financial system the process of interest from client to bank
and bank to client is profoundly supported by an apparently genuine factor
referred to as time valuation of money. Islam does not negate the time value of
money rather it recognizes its importance but only when it acts as capital, not
when it is “potential” capital.
9. Ahmad, Ausaf. (2010): Contemporary Practices of Islamic Financing Techniques,
Jeddah: Islamic Research and Training Institute (IDB), pp. 25-26. Also see
Ahmad, Sheikh Mahmud. (2010). Towards Interest-Free Banking, New Delhi:
Adam Publishers and Distributors and Usmani, Muhammad Taqi. (2010). An
Introduction to Islamic Finance, New Delhi: Adam publishers and distributors.
10. Mirkhor, Abbas., Khan, Mohsin S. (1987): Theoretical Studies in Islamic Banking
and Finance, Texas: Institute for Research and Islamic Studies.
11. Ayub, Muhammad. (2007). Understanding Islamic Finance, Asia: John Wiley &
Sons Ltd.
12. Op.cit., 9.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Jobst, et al. (2008): Islamic Bond Issuance—What Sovereign Debt Managers
Need to Know, International Monetary Fund, PDP/08/3. Also see Godlewski,
C., Turk-Arsis, R., & Weill, L. (2013): “Sukuk vs conventional bonds: A stock
market perspective,” Journal of Comparative Economics, 41, pp. 745–76.
16. Cihak, Martin., Heiko, Hessel. (2008): Islamic Banks and Financial Stability:
An Empirical Analysis, International Monetary Fund, Working Paper, WP/08/16.
Also see Islamic Banking at Aman Bank’s official website http://amanbank.eu/
[retrieved on 13-02-2015]
17. See Standard and Poor’s (S & P) Islamic Finance Outlook-2014 report,
Islamic Financial Service Board’s (IFSB). Islamic Financial Service Industry
Stability Report-2015, and Ernest & Young’s (E & Y) World Islamic Banking
Competitiveness Report 2014-15.
18. Kuwait Finance House (KFH) Annual Report June 2014. https://www.kfh.bh.
[retrieved on 24-02-2015]
19. In its “Islamic Growth Markets Investment Outlook in 2015,” report published by
Thomson Reuters, Kazakhstan, was ranked 5th out of 57 OIC-member countries.
20. By the end of the 19th century, the Russian Empire had won control of Central
96
Asia. In the 1920s, the Soviet Union took control and governed the region until
1991. After the breakup of Soviet Union all Central Asian republics became
independent.
21. Smagulov, Kadyrzhan. (2011): “The Religious Situation Today In Kazakhstan,”
Central Asia and the Caucasus, 12 (3), pp. 45-64. Also see Edelbay (2012):
“Traditional Kazakh Culture and Islam,” International Journal of Humanities
and Social Science, Vol. 3 No. 11, pp. 122-133.
22. Gresh, Geoffrey F. (2007): “The Rise of Islamic Banking and Finance in Central
Asia,” The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia
and Islamic Civilization, Al Nakhlah, Fall 2007, pp. 1-12. Also see Wolters,
Alexander. (2013): Islamic Finance in the States of Central Asia: Strategies,
Institutions, First Experiences, Private Hochschule Gottingen, Forschungspapiere
Research Papers. No.2013/01.
23. IRTI.(2016). Kazakhstan Islamic Finance 2016. (PDF available at IRTI official
website http://www.irti.org)
24. Malik, Bilal Ahmad. (2015): “Islamic Banking and Finance in Emerging
Countries: A Study of Post-Soviet Central Asian Republics,” Proceedings,
26th Annual International Islamic Banking Conference, “Global Experience of
Islamic Banking: Financing Modes, Instruments, Services and Products,” Jointly
organized by Iran Banking Institute (IBI), Tehran, Iran and Central Bank of The
Islamic Republic Of Iran, Tehran, Iran, Vol. 3, pp. 406-439, ISBN: 978-964-
6239-1.
25. Al-Hilal Bank. 2012 Annual Report [ PDF available at http://www.alhilalbank.
ae/ ]
26. Sadiq, B. B. (2013): “Islamic Banking in the Financial Market of Kazakhstan,”
Young Scientist, No. 6, pp. 415-418.
27. Maggs, Peter B. (2011). “Islamic Banking in Kazakhstan Law” in Review of
Central and East European Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp. 369-396. Also
see Ken, Charman., Golib, Kholjigitov. (2012): “The Development of Islamic
Finance in Emerging Markets: The Republic of Kazakhstan,” Social Science
Research Network, http://www.ssrn.com/ [retrieved on 12-09-2013]
28. Zhabatayeva, Z. (2014). Islamic Finance Development in Kazakhstan; Growth,
Prospects, and Challenges. Business School, Kazakh-British Technical
University, KBS Working Paper Series, pp. 1-10.
29. Islamic Development Bank Group (IDBG). (2012): Member Country
Partnership Strategy for the Republic of Kazakhstan (2012-2014) Strengthening
Competitiveness for Growth & Diversification.
30. The Islamic Corporation for the Development of the Private Sector goes
into a strategic alliance with Zaman Bank of Kazakhstan, http://zamanbank.
kz/en/islamskaya-korporatsiya-po-razvitiyu-chastnogo-sektora-vstupaet-v-
strategicheskij-soyuz-s-kazahstanskim-zaman-bankom/, 2013, May 23 [retrieved
on 31-05- 2014]
31. Akmambet, Mahdi. (2012): How Attractive is Setting up an Islamic Bank in
Kazakhstan?,” Cass Business School, London: City University. Also see IRTI
(2016): Kazakhstan Islamic Finance 2016 (PDF available at IRTI official website
http://www.irti.org )
32. Op.cit., 3. Also see IRTI (2016): Kazakhstan Islamic Finance 2016 (PDF
available at IRTI official website http://www.irti.org and www.nationalbank.kz]
33. Bagsiraj, M.G.I. (2002a): Islamic Financial Institutions of India: Progress,
97
Problems and Prospects, Islamic Economics Research Centre, Scientific

Publishing Centre, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Also see
Bagsiraj, M.G.I. (2002b): “Islamic Financial Institutions of India: Their Nature,
Problems and Prospects in Islamic Banking and Finance,” in: M. M. Iqbal and
D. T. Llewellyn (Eds.), Islamic Banking and Finance: New perspectives on profit
sharing and risk, , USA: Edward Elgar Publishing Northampton.
34. Shamshad, A. (2011): “Interest Free Islamic Banking in India for Inclusive
Growth and Social Uplift: Scopes and Challenges,” International Journal of
Business, Humanities and Technology Vol. 1 No.1. Also see Khan, Manzar Ali.,
Hussin, Nazimah. (2013): “Islamic Banking in India: Developments, Prospects
and Challenges,” Vol. 4, Issue. 01, pp. 24-29. and Mazhar, Shabana., Tripati,
Nishi. (2013): “Islamic Banking: Inclusion in the Indian Banking Sector,”
Journal of Business and Management, Vol. 12, Issue 6, pp. 01-07.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37 Ibid. Also see Bohra, Murtuza. (2013): “Islamic Banking too Big to Ignore:
Indian Banking System,” The Practical Lawyer, September S-28 and Ahangar,
Gowhar Bashir., Padder, Mohd Ummer Jan. (2013): “Islamic Banking and its
Scope in India,” International Journal of Commerce, Business and Management,
Vol. 2, No.5.pp. 266-269.
38. The detailed account about these institutions can be accessed through their
official websites. http://www.islamicbankinst.com , http://icif.in/index.php.
98
Human Rights At Jeopardy
The Central Asian Context
Govind Kumar Inakhiya

Abstract
Problems related to violation of human rights are common in the present
world. The efforts of the state governments in the direction of protection
of human rights vary from state to state. The factors playing key role in
safeguarding and protecting human rights are: constitutional provisions,
acts and statutes. Endeavors of world organizations such as UNO, Amnesty
International, UNHRC, US Aid etc. are mightier than those of states. States
seem to cut a sorry figure in providing some essential mechanism, and at
the same time, due to proper implementation of the provisions and lack of
protection of human rights, citizens suffer in the region. The Central Asian
countries, more often than not fail to provide the space to citizens for their
rights. Since 1991, the citizens of this region seem to have developed an
apprehension for their rights. Authorities are reluctant to provide safeguard
to the rights of the citizens. The region seems to be infested with problems
of freedom of expressions, censorship on media and on formation of the
political parties and associations, ethnic conflicts, rights for the workers,
cotton picking by the students during vacation, are common phenomena
in the region. The objective of this article is to focus on the problems faced
by the republics in the path of the protection and effective implementation
of human rights. At the same time, it would try to throw some light on the
solutions available to promote and protect Human Rights in the region.
Structurally, the research paper in three parts argues that the state of affairs
in the Central Asian counties is not commendable as far as the protection
of human rights is concerned. The first part pertains to the understanding
of concepts of Right and Human rights, the second part is about the
depiction of historical development and current state of affair of human
rights in Central Asian countries, the third part dwells upon national and
international efforts directed towards the protection of the human rights.
Keywords
Human Rights, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Central Asia,
Constitution, Constitutionalism, Civil Society, World Organization,
Freedom of Expression, Natural Rights.
Introduction
To begin with, human rights besides being a national issue does possess an
immensely pertinent relevance in the debates across the length and breadth
of the world. It could justifiably be argued that the development of human
Human Rights at Jeopardy: The Central Asian Context
rights as the next step of natural rights is the byproduct of the twentieth
century vocabulary. The rights of an individual provided by the state are the
conditions and circumstances for a thorough development of a nation and its
populace. The concept of rights, it can be safely assumed, emanated from
various sources such as Magna Carta of 1215 A.D, The Bill of Rights of 1687,
the American Revolution of 1776, French Revolution of 1789, provisions of
various constitutions in different nations that strove towards implementation
of rights and human rights. In 1948, United Nations’ “Universal Declaration
of Human Rights” also made a special effort which is included in the Preamble
of the Declaration as well as in all the thirty articles of the same.1 Today,
various international agencies and civil society institutions have contributed
largely in the protection of the human rights.
Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
are the countries which came into existence as independent nations after
disintegration of Soviet Union. Prior to 1991, these nations were ruled by
Socialist – Communist System for seventy years. The Central Asian states,
rampant in violation of human rights also pose a serious threat in the protection
and promotion of human rights. These states are going through the phase
of transition after having been ruled by single party dominance and human
rights based on Marxist-Leninist ideology. Despite multi-party system (except
single party system in Turkmenistan) and westernized Liberal (open market
economy) - Democratic Government models, they have not been able to solve
the problems in these states for human rights almost for the past twenty five
years.
Regarding the conceptual aspects of human rights, Ernest Barker rightly
pointed out that rights are the byproducts of just system which is based on that
state and its laws. Rights of the individual in the state are meant to determine
the dignity of a person and ensure its recognition. A state that does not accept
the dignity of the person, the individual in that state is deprived of rights.
However, in some states individuals and some classes are deprived of these
rights. For example, in the ancient Greek city-states only ‘free men’ had civil
rights, while the slaves, women and other aliens were denied the same. There
is no doubt that these structures were not based on a sense of justice and order.
The persons who are not subjected to any restrictions on their activities
by the state, are often placed under the category of negative rights. A positive
approach towards the implementation of rights acts as a strong booster for
the development of an individual whereby the state supports and takes care of
his Right to Health, Right to Education, Right to Employment, Legal Rights
etc. Negative rights are seen at work in a liberal democratic set up, whereas
positive rights are the parts of mainstream Socialist state. One can trace the
history of Human Rights to a distant past. Intellectual notions started getting
divided into the following two discourses with regard to the requirement and
implementation of Human Rights, and the appropriateness of the same.2
100
Emmanuel Kant, a German philosopher founded trigonometric structure

to understand human rights: Citizens rights, International rights, and
homogeneous rights. According to Kant, people have rights because they
live together on earth. It clearly reflects Kant’s idea of integration of the
human race.3 While defining the term “Rights”, Harold J .Laski (1940) said
that “Rights are those conditions of social life without which no man can
seek, in general, to be himself at his best4.” There are three below principles
explaining the different types of rights, namely, Liberal individualist principle;
Laski’s principle and The Marxist theory.
The first principle could be elaborated in terms of the theories propounded
by three major scholars in this area - 1. Locke’s natural rights theory, 2. Hobs-
Austin’s legal theory and 3. Greene’s moral theory.
Laski’s theory is a combination of historical, social-welfare and
democratic-socialist views. The interpretations on the Marxist theory of
Rights are based on dialectical, historical- materialistic, revolutionary and
homogenous entity. Marx believes that Rights have gradually evolved through
the class-struggle. These rights were limited to the elite, slave-owners and
only to select people in places like Greek city-states, Roman empire, medieval
European states etc. Thereafter, the sixteenth century witnessed the rise of
merchants and industrial bourgeoisie in the European society. Gradually, after
the Civil War of England and the French-American Republican revolution,
bourgeoisie class attained its economic domination along with an attainment
of social and political hegemony. As the masses contributed in a remarkable
manner to the bourgeois revolution, especially with the help of peasants and
urbanites, it hammered the voice of “ Human Rights” to its peak.
Kautilya, an Indian thinker, too, talks in detail about the economic rights
as well as the legal and civil rights of humans. Kautilya emphasises that a
king should provide economic assistance to orphans, impoverished people
and old people and that it should also support helpless mothers and their
children for their survival. This is a part of duties of the state and king for
some philosophers, but one could see a glimpse of human rights enveloped in
the form of duties.
The conceptual aspect of human rights is only a reflection of forging the
ground for citizens to enjoy their rights but its practical aspect is completely
dependent on the nations as to how they implement it effectively.
Present State of Affairs of Human Rights in the Central Asian Republics

Central Asian States were members of the Soviet Union in different phases
starting from 1917 to 1991. The history of these nations clearly shows how
these nations were governed by the socialist and communist ideas. It was
focused on Social rights, worker class welfare, against the capitalist and profit
making class and concentrated on the interests of the proletariat. Through the
various constitutions of 1918, 1924 and 1936, Rights were declared for these
101
nations. However, Joseph J. Stalin, the ruler of USSR denied these rights to
the citizens all through his reign from 1932 to 1952 . Civil liberties and human
rights were subjected to major threats from the ruling system. In 1985, Mikhail
Gorbachev of the communist party became the general secretary of the Soviet
Union and he implemented the policies of Glasnost and Perestroika in an
effort to reconstruct liberal order and increased openness and views.5 This
effort initiated the multi-candidate system which gradually developed into
multi-party system. Later, it paved the way for political and economic rights
which were in tune with the struggle of independence of the member nations
which resulted in the formation of 15 new states including five Central Asian
states. These nations made their constitutions and started striding towards the
strengthening of human rights.
Kazakhstan adopted its Constitution on September 5, 1995. Chapter 2 of
this Constitution provides with provision for individual rights and freedom
as enshrined in a fairly good number of Articles (Articles 10 to 39) of the
constitution.6 Kazakhstan has very less human rights problems vis-a- vis
Central Asian countries. The strike in may 2011, by oil workers repressed by
the government machinery is not only related to their livelihood but also a
gross violation of human rights.7 These workers wanted to have negotiations
on minimum wages with the oil company management. But government
registered a case of criminal conspiracy against the agitating workers and
imprisoned them for 6 years. It is convenient to allude to Natalia Shokoliva
and a union advocate who were imprisoned, but later on they were released.
The group of 2000 workers expelled by the oil company was against the rules
and policies of international labour organization.8 The story does not end
here. However, what seem more threatening and hazardous is Kazakhstan
government’s action against opposition leaders. Valadmir Kozlon was thrown
behind the bar which is against the individual freedom of expression. However,
Kazakhstan moved towards progressive paths in respect of restoration and
preservation of human rights by agreeing in 2008 to establish an annual human
rights dialogue with the European Union.9
Kyrgyzstan enacted its Constitution on the 5th of May 1993. In part 2
of the constitution article 16 to 20 provides for Human Rights and freedom.
Articles 21 to 49 of the constitution deal with full elaboration of Human
Rights.10 Kyrgyzstan, an important Central Asian country, is known for its
proclivity towards protection of Human Rights compared to other nations of
the region. The first President of Kyrgyzstan named Asker Akayev is popular
as “An Island of Democracy” but Tulip Revolution took place during his reign
which shows the reality of conserving democratic values and protection of
Human Rights after change of regime in Kyrgyzstan in June 2010. A close
observation reveals that the report on the much debated ethnic conflict that
surfaced at Osh and Jalalabad and presented by Bnund Taphij Zabi, around
300 people were people of Kyrgyzstan origin and Kyrygz police over ran the
102
Uzbek Republic.11 However, the Uzbek ethnic groups presented a list of 19

demands from businessman, students and local administration in April-May
2010. The struggle from 10 to 14 June 2010, is a reactionary movement.12
Many national and international human rights organizations believe that such
incidences have happened in the past 20 years. Freedom of expression has
been a problem for many years.13 Umida Andamdava, who is documentary
photographer was arrested in June 2010 and imprisoned. Her crime was that
she covered the issue of inequality, labor unrest and poverty in her photography.
Freedom to profess and propagate the religion is also restricted. For example
in 2010, 114 people were imprisoned for 6 to 12 years.
The Constitution of Tajikistan was enacted on the 6th of November 1994
and it contains 10 sections and 98 articles. Chapter two of the Constitution
from Article 14 to 47 deals with fundamental duties and fundamental rights
of the citizens14. There is no denying the fact that Tajikistan is a home to
gross human rights violation as evidenced by various reports, records and
documents. Post independence Tajikistan witnessed the killing/ missing
of dozens of journalists. The Government of Tajikistan during the 2005
parliamentary elections closed down independent and opposition newspapers
and encouraged attacks on journalists. Even use of Internet and YouTube was
brought under government censorship in 2003 and 2014 respectively. Religious
activities were subjected to restriction and registration with the government.
For instance, Committee on Religious Affairs, Islamic pilgrimages were
restricted, and proselytizing groups such as the Jehovah’s Witness suffered
occasional persecution. On 24th October 2012, the courts of Tajikistan passed
a judgment to prohibit the human rights organizations in Khuzak Vadar , in
which an estimated 40 activists were working. They were spreading awareness
regarding human rights among youths. But government considered that this
organization was abating anti-national sentiments. According to Global
Voices Online (June 2014) the practice of systematic violence against military
conscripts (referred to as dovshina) increased following a recent increase in
incidences of manslaughter and suicides. Akmal Davlatova was beaten to
death by his lance sergeant, Farrukh Davlatov. Incidences of Kidnapping were
also rampant in Tajikistan.
Turkmenistan adopted its Constitution on the 18th of May 1992. It
enshrines 8 chapters and 116 articles. Chapter 2 of this Constitution and
precisely Articles 16 to 44 deal with various rights.15 Turkmenistan, known
for single party rule16 is also experiencing human rights problems. Only single
party is ruling and other opposition parties are not allowed to rise which has
an implication on the fact that citizens are denied political rights. Ethnic
minorities face discrimination in Turkmenistan. Abrogation of dual-citizenship
agreement with Russia in 2003 led to the fleeing of many citizens from the
country. Foreign travels were restricted, As the Soviet era diplomas were set
aside by the government, the job opportunities got drastically curtailed, even
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the ethnic Russians were disallowed university admissions. It deserves mention

that with the passage of time and in an effort to fall in line with countries
promoting human rights, Turkmenistan is also trying to espouse positivity
about the rights of its citizens. The U.S. Department of State’s 2005 Annual
Report on International Religious Freedom (released November 8, 2005) states
“significant improvements in the promotion of religious freedom.” But Chris
Smith opposes the report and states that there has not been much improvement
in the state of affairs in the country with respect to human rights. Journalism
and media does not enjoy the required freedom. Journalist Sona Chuli Kuli
was interrogated and compelled to sign a statement agreeing not to collaborate
with the international media.17 The Government stands supreme and it cannot
be opposed in any form. Quite a good number of Opposition Leaders such
as Batyr Berdiýev, Ýazgeldi, Gündogdyýev, and Boris Şyhmyradow had to
end up as political prisoners. More than 1600 students are waiting for further
studies in the neighboring countries. But the government is not giving them
permission to leave the country. Some of media people and political leaders
are put in jail without any reason or allegation. For instance, a reporter of
Radio Free Europe is in jail for five years.
The constitution of Uzbekistan was enacted on the 8th of December 1992.
There are 22 chapters and 128 articles in the Constitution where Article 24 to
article 42 of Chapters Seven to Nine are about the various rights. Chapter ten,
which deals with the rights and freedoms guaranteed to its citizens find their
manifestation in Articles 43, 44,45 and 46.18 Andijjan massacre of 13th May
2005 perpetrated by the government machinery resulted in the casualty of
1500 protesters. This is vociferous of the serious violation of human rights in
the country. This heinous act of brutal killing of people amounts to strangling
of human rights in the history of Uzbekistan. In 2008, one of the activists of
the Protection of Human Rights in Uzbekistan, Mr. Turugnov was arrested
from his own house by the local police. Later, he was tortured and harassed
by throwing boiling water. There were many other instances of leaders
and intellectuals being detained on false charges. For example Abdualev
Ishaq, Ajmat Ajimov, Mohammed Bakjanov, Bkrtyarbak Iskixav, Maluba
Krimova, Rustam Usmanauv and many other people are still behind the bar.
Moreover, the Uzbek government have imprisoned thousands of boys who
believe in religion on the ground that they are spreading religious fanatics
and encouraging illegal religious texts. In 2011, the Uzbek government
commanded Bnund Taphij Zabi to close the office in Tashkent and put stay
on the registration of independent human rights groups.
Every year on 8th December i.e. the Constitution Day, some old people
who are above 60 years, some women and small children with lower criminal
charges, are released. However, on December 8, 2012, while re-replicating
such a program, the Uzbek government tried to get praise from the Western
media. In July 2012, two human rights activists were arrested by the Uzbek
104
government and announced seven year jail term. Yuldasna, who is just 26
years is accused of human trafficking which is completely wrong. Uzbekistan’s
notoriety as a nation indulging in practices of child labour and forced adult
labour attracted international attention. For instance, Cotton Campaign, a
coalition of NGOs and human rights activists in Uzbekistan, as many as 11
people died during cotton picking season in 2013. They were between the
age group of 6 years to 63 years. Mansur Mirovalev and Andrew E. Kramer
reported that, the government established its monopoly on the industry, paying
remarkably low wages to the labourers, but reaping extraordinary profits from
cotton which helped them balance the budget.19
However, there seem to be a faint improvement in the debacle of
human rights as registered by Carey L. Biron on the use of school children
in harvesting crops. Biron maintains that even minors of seven years of age
were forced to work in the cotton fields during the annual sowing, weeding
and harvest cycles. This was done primarily to fulfill the harvest quotas fixed
by the government enforced on farmers and local administrators. In the year
2013, coinciding with an observation mission from the United Nations, the
number of children in the fields was drastically reduced. That progress now
appears to have extended to this fall.
The Central Asian countries are on the throes of poverty, shockingly low
per capita income and unemployment problem (except Kazakhstan) which
point to the region’s deplorable state of affairs. The tables 1 to 3 indicate
details of unemployment, poverty and per capita income. In the report of
United Nation on Human Development Index 2014, Uzbekistan stands at 114th
position among 169 nations. Kazakhstan is on 56th, Turkmenistan is on 109th,
Kyrgyzstan on 120th and Tajikistan is on 129th place.20 Except Kazakhstan,
all other Central-Asian countries are placed on medium level which is not
a good indicator reflecting promotion of human rights. The judiciary is not
independent, remains dominated by the executive branch and is vulnerable
to political pressure.21 This negatively affects on all parts of society, including
the fairness of election and the business environment.
Table-1
Unemployment in Central Asian Countries
S. Total
Name of Country
No. Unemployment
1 Kazakhstan 5.17%
2 Kyrgyzstan 8.07%
3 Tajikistan 10.71%
4 Turkmenistan 10.59%
5 Uzbekistan 10.67%
World 5.8%
Source: Global Employment Trends 2014: the Risk of Jobless Recovery http://www.ilo.org/
global/research/global-reports/global-employment-trends/2014/lang--en/index.htm
105
This alarming problem of unemployment stems from paucity of job

opportunities, restriction on foreign investment and discouraging attitude
towards receiving liberal education abroad etc.
Table- 2
Poverty in Central Asian Countries (2013)
S. Total
Name of Country Source
No. Poor people
1 Kazakhstan 2.9% UNDP
2 Kyrgyzstan 37.0% UNDP
3 Tajikistan 38.3% UNDP
4 Turkmenistan 24.8% ADB
5 Uzbekistan 16 % UNDP
Transition from socialist system to open market economy, brought
in problems such as inadequate market for the products, want of skilled
professionals, gradual depletion of industries , minimal foreign aid, lack
of resources, improper utilization of available resources, economic crisis,
nepotism, and above all rampant corruption contribute to existing poverty
in the region.
Some of the most momentous factors responsible for drastically low
per capita income in the region (barring Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan ) are:
Unemployment, low production, export – import imbalances, minimums
foreign investment, declining trend of skill generating institutes. Overall
economic depression, corruption, negligible attention to raise the region’s,
climatic condition making it conducive to fertility and productivity.
Table- 3
Per Capita Income in Central Asian Countries (2014)
S.
Name of Country Income Per Capita ($)
No.
1 Kazakhstan 24228
2 Kyrgyzstan 3262
3 Tajikistan 2698
4 Turkmenistan 14217
5 Uzbekistan 5630
Source: International Monetary Fund, 2015.
The factors stated above for the alarming unemployment, poverty, low
per capita income, poor HDI index in the region point to lacuna in policy
formations and administrative inefficiency which in turn leave an impact on
human rights. All central Asian Countries are violating human rights in the
case of health care facilities, free trail, less number of hospitals and per capita
beds. Treatment of small diseases are too expensive, therefore the Central
Asian patients are looking towards India for their treatment. Violation of
human rights, as it becomes evident can be seen on almost all fronts including
106
child labor,22 old age labour, low wages, restriction on religious activities,
curtailed freedom of media, status of women, ethnic and minorities issues,
governmental brutality, restriction imposed upon opposition leaders and so
on and so forth. Besides these issues the Central Asian countries are infested
with varied socio-political stumbling blocks-corruption, continuation of
old practices, lack of infrastructure, fundamentalism, unwarranted political
interventions, biased bureaucracy, authoritarian regimes, want of awareness,
economic exploitation, lack of international exposure etc.
On the basis of above analysis it can be concluded that the Central Asian
countries are going through a phase of transition. Absence of democratic
culture and dearth of respect for human rights paralyses the region. No nation
can follow the idea of absolute liberal democracy and Declaration of Human
Rights by United Nation whether it is USA, Russia, Great Britain or China.
Therefore, it can be said that Central-Asian countries have to achieve political
stability, economic development, public awareness, education etc. At the same
time they have to implement the constitutional provisions in letter and spirit
which will promote protection of human rights. The international agencies
like Amnesty International Human rights watch, US Aid, UNDP and other
civil society institutions and NGO’s should be allowed to work to protect and
safeguard the human rights. This is a gradual process. Nearly 25 years of
existence of the Central Asian countries after independence calls for a constant
effort to strive towards the realization of the aims of the UN Declaration of
Human Rights. It is indeed quite premature to assert that the region is likely to
continue in the same vein, because international pressure and the region’s own
observation of changes taking place in the world with regard to human rights
would certainly leave an impact on the states.
References:
References & Notes

1. United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1948 at Palais de Chaillot,
Paris. The Declaration arose directly from the experience of the Second World
War and represents the first global expression of rights to which all human beings
are inherently entitled. It consists of 30 articles which have been elaborated in
subsequent international treaties, regional human rights instruments, national
constitutions and laws.
2. Robertson, David (2002), The Routhledge Disctionary of Politics(IIIrd Edtiton),
Routhledge, Landon and New York, pp.228-230.
3. Beck, Gunnar,(2006). Immanuel Kant’s Theory of Rights Ratio Juris, Vol. 19,
No. 4, pp. 371- 401, December 2006.
4. Laski, H, J ( 1940 ). The Rights of Man, Macmillan, Indiana University.
5. Mandel, Ernest, (1989). Beyond Perestroika : The Future of Gorvachev’s USSR,
New York.
6. Kazakhstan: Republic Constitution, published in the FBIS: Central Eurasia nos.
48-54, 19 April, pp-68-78.
107
7. Kramer, Andrew E. (2012, Septmber ,10)Kazakhstan Is Accused of Abusing Oil
Workers, The New Yourk Times on ttp://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/10/world/
asia/human-rights-watch-report-says-kazakhstan-abuses-oil-workers.html.
8. https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/09/10/striking-oil-striking-workers/violations-
labor-rights-kazakhstans-oil-sector.
9. http://www.eucentralasia.eu. External link in |website.
10. Kyrgyzstan, Republic Constitution, published in the FBIS: Central Eurasia, nos.
99-105,August 1993, pp.88-101
11. Schwirtz, Michael and Ellen Barry(2010, June 14) Russia Weighs Pleas to Step
In as Uzbeks Flee Kyrgyzstan, The New Yourk Times.
12. Reeves, Madeleine (2013), On The Time of The Border: Contingency, Conflict
and Popular Statism, at the Kyrgyzstan- Uzbekistan Boundary, In Judith
Beyer, Rasanayagam, Johan, Reeves, Madeleine, Ethnographies of the State
in Central Asia : Performing Politics, Bloomington : Indiana University Press.
pp 198-201.
13. Behles Cody (2012), Political and Identity Development in Kyrgyzstan: 2001—
2011: No. 85, Middle East Librarians Association pp. 56-57.
14. Tajikistan, Draft Republic Constitution, published in the FBIS: Central Eurasia,
nos. 52-56,18 May 1994, pp.92-103.
15. Constitution of Turkmenistan, 18 May 1992, no. 691-XII,pp.1-9
16. Badan, Phool(2001), Dynamics of Political Development in Central Asia, Lancer
Books, New Delhi. p.160.
17. “Alternative Report on the Human Rights situation in Turkmenistan for the
Universal Periodic Review” (PDF). FIDH. Retrieved 20100723. 30. “ONI
Country Profiles: Turkmenistan.
18. Uzbekistan, Republic Constitution, pp.9-136.
19. Mansur Mirovalev and Andrew E. Kramer (2013, December 13), on Uzbekistan,
the Practice of Forced Labor Lives On During the Cotton Harvest, The New York
Timesweb online http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/18/world/asia/forced-labor-
lives-on-in-uzbekistans-cotton-fields.html.
20. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2015_human_development_report_1.pdf,
273, acess on 29 November 2015.
21. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers
on Kyrgyzstan 2005, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G06/ 100/12/
PDF/G0610012. pdf? Open Element.
22. Saidazimova, Gulnoza, Central Asia: Child Labor Alive And Thriving, http://
www.laborrights.org/stop-child-labor/cotton-campaign/1464.
108
New Maritime Silk Route
Challenges and Opportunities for India
Imtiyaz A. Mailk
G. M. Mir
Abstract
Although the New Maritime Silk Route (MSR) proposal is an innovative
idea which aims to create opportunities and bring peace and stability in
Asia-Pacific Region, it is designed to improve China’s geostrategic position
in the world. In order to consolidate its economic and political posture in
the region, extricate itself from the Malacca dilemma and secure its Sea
Lines of Communication (SLOC) the MSR project is viewed by China as
an important strategic tool. For India, the entire proposal has to be seen
in the context of its national interest. As India’s relation with China has
never been hunky-dory, the entry of China in Indian Ocean Region (IOR)
will prove detrimental. Despite the China’s claim of using Maritime
Silk Route as a diplomatic artery between China and its neighbours for
strengthening regional connectivity, the unstated and underlying strategic
objectives of this project raise questions about Chinese intentions. No
doubt that ‘Make in India’ and ‘Start up India’ like initiatives launched by
present NDA Government will get boost if India joins the MSR project, but
at the same time it will have strategic compulsions that India will never
wish to compromise with. The fact that China is promoting two corridors
(continental and MSR) as part of its evolving regional geostrategy and that
‘India lies on both the Maritime Silk Route and the Southern Silk Route’
poses both opportunities as well as challenges for India. The present paper
discusses these opportunities that the proposed Maritime Silk Route will
offer and the challenges, it will pose to India.
Keywords
Marine Strategy, Indian Ocean Region, Soft Power, Strategic Balance,
Asian Security Plan, Ocean Littorals, Look East Policy, South China Sea
Dispute, Stand Up-Start Up Initiatives.
Introduction
The Silk Road represents a historical lesson of political, economic and cultural
integration due to inter-regional trade and cultural communications. It not only
carried people, goods, innovations and ideas among different civilizations and
cultures, as Rome, Levant, Persia, Central Asia, India, and China, but was also
a key factor in the development of these civilizations by providing political,
economic and cultural interactions among them. The Maritime Silk Route,
officially the 21st Century Maritime Silk Route Economic Belt is a Chinese
New Maritime Silk Route: Challenges and Opportunities for India
strategic initiative to increase investments and foster collaboration across the

historic Silk Road. It covers countries and regions with a total population of
4.4 billion (63 percent of world’s total) and total economic volume 21 trillion
U.S. dollars (29 percent of world’s total). The Maritime Silk Road initiative
was first proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping during a speech to the
Indonesian Parliament in October, 2013. Consequently in November 2014,
he announced plans to create a 40 billion USD development fund which would
help finance China’s plans to develop the New Silk Road and the Maritime Silk
Road. Xi’s thrust was on building a stronger China–ASEAN (Association of
South East Asian Nations) community, based on a strong political foundation
and economic cooperation between the two sides. In making this proposal,
Xi highlighted two aspects: first, the geographic proximity between China
and ASEAN members, and how cooperation and development should bring
them closer; and second, the economic potential of both China and ASEAN
as emerging markets in Asia, which are important not only for their bilateral
relations but also for regional economic growth and integration. The Silk
Road concept has a hoary ancestry in Chinese foreign policy planning. Beijing
has employed this concept traditionally to expand its overseas business, and
commercial deals and linkages. But Beijing’s orderly employment of this
notion in the maritime sector reflects fresh thinking in China’s foreign policy
in terms of overseas commercial as well as maritime interests.1 So far the
layout of MSR is concerned it will begin in Fujian province, and will pass
by Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan before heading south to the Malacca
Strait. From Kuala Lumpur, the route heads to Kolkata then crosses the rest of
the Indian Ocean to Nairobi. From Nairobi, it goes north around the Horn of
Africa and moves through the Red Sea into the Mediterranean, with a stop in
Athens before meeting the land-based Silk Road in Venice.
The official statement of Chinese government reads that “China proposed
to build the Maritime Silk Route of the 21st century with the aim of realizing
harmonious co-existence, mutual benefit and common development with 13
relevant countries by carrying out practical cooperation in various fields,
such as, maritime connectivity, marine economy, technically-advanced
environmental protection, disaster prevention and reduction as well as
social and cultural exchanges in the spirit of peace, friendship, cooperation
and development”. However an analysis of the Chinese motive behind this
‘grand strategic initiative’ reveals many possible explanations. Bargaining its
Locational Benefit and having vast coastline, China wants to directly connect
its 12 inland regions with almost 14 neighbouring countries which can serve
as new export markets for its industries in these regions. Since 2011, because
of South China Sea dispute, China’s relations became bitter with- Cambodia,
Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, and Japan. New Maritime Silk Route policy seems
to be aimed at defusing tensions- via soft power and economic offer. This will
also help China in countering the influence of USA and Russia and emerge as
110
a marine super power in the region. Malacca strait in Indian ocean connects
Indian and pacific ocean and worlds 25 percent of trade passes through this
strait and China is completely dependent on this strait for delivery of more
than 4 million barrel of crude oil per day.2 China fears that any hostile country
can choke its supplies at Strait of Malacca. The bottleneck feature of the strait
allows easy blockade. Therefore, China needs to secure this lane. Besides all
these motives the new MSR initiative will help China in gaining easy access
to Bay of Bengal and other Indian Ocean littorals.
Land and Maritime Silk Route
Source: wikimapia.com
Indian Perspective
If implemented, the initiative would bind countries in the Bay of Bengal and
the northern Indian Ocean much closer to the Chinese economy. Several
states in the region, including the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have
indicated an in-principle agreement to participate in the MSR and are keen
to encourage Chinese investment in port and transport infrastructure and
manufacturing facilities. India has been much more circumspect about the
proposal, and the visit of President Xi Jinping to Delhi in September 2014
failed to elicit an endorsement of the project from Prime Minister, Narendra
Modi. Although China has long claimed that its interests in the Indian Ocean
region are purely economic, it’s increasingly clear that the MSR could have a
major impact on the strategic balance in the Bay. For some years there have
been concerns in Delhi and Washington about the security cooperation between
China and various Bay states and the strategic significance of Chinese control
over port infrastructure in the region. We do see considerable maneuvering
111
among China, India, the United States and even Russia in building defense
relationships in the region.
Formal proposal to induct India into the MSR was made during the
17 round of talks between special representatives in New Delhi.3 So far
th
India has been somewhat reticent in its response primarily owing to lack
of clarity about the Chinese grandiose economic and trade designs, as also
infrastructural linkages and, above all, the larger strategic motivations. From
Indian perspective the entire proposal has to be seen in the context of broader
geo-strategic implications for Indian maritime politics in the region. The
strategic objectives of MSR raise questions of Chinese real intentions. The
Maritime Silk Road is an attempt to tie with India and other regional countries
at the regional level, especially, in Southeast Asia and IOR while steadily
raising the Chinese economic and maritime posture. As Beijing becomes more
involved in building infrastructure in the Indian Ocean, it will play a larger
part in the security and governance of the IOR, which could pose a challenge
to India’s stature as a ‘security provider’ in the region and also adversely
affecting New Delhi’s strategic purchase in its primary area of interest.4
Challenges
The challenges of MSR to India can be studied under three sub-headings:
a) Route Geopolitics
China and India continue to vie for maritime influence, as the influence over
the IOR remains both commercially and strategically advantageous.5 Both
the countries are competing for a similar strategic space in the IOR and the
South China Sea and are employing new methods to upgrade their reach in
these two strategically adjacent regions.6 Given Beijing’s increased access to
ports, airfields and gas pipelines, its modernised and ever-expanding navy,
and its investments in infrastructure development in the countries of this
region. India is concerned about the increasing Chinese foothold in the IOR.
Although China has been claiming that its interests in the Indian Ocean region
are purely economic, it is increasingly clear that the MSR could have a major
impact on the strategic balance in the bay. Many possible explanations exist
for China’s increased economic activity in South Asia. Normal profit-seeking
behaviour by Chinese firms and the Chinese state may explain the increase.
Geopolitical explanations are equally plausible, especially given the close
proximity of Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka to India.
Border disputes between China and India dating to the 1960s continue, and the
two countries are natural competitors for influence and resources in the region.
The maritime strategies of the Asian powers are designed primarily to defend
their homelands and associated vital national security interests on the oceans
and seas.7 A desire to project power in the region could motivate China’s
strengthening of economic ties with these countries surrounding India. For
112
some years there have been concerns in Delhi about the security cooperation
between China and various bay states and the strategic significance of Chinese
control over port infrastructure in the region.
The port facilities China is obtaining or building in Myanmar, Bangladesh,
Sri Lanka, Maldives and Pakistan, while justifiable from the Chinese point of
view to buttress its huge external trade flowing in large part through the Indian
Ocean, raise concerns about China encircling India physically and politically,
changing the bilateral equation further, thereby, making it still more difficult
for India to resolve its problems with China equitably. The core of this strategy
is based in the ruling Chinese elite’s belief to dominate the peripheral and
regional discourse through economic, cultural and political influence. China is
attempting to create trade and economic relationships with ASEAN countries
through trade, port and continental land bridges to countervail US influence
and draw ASEAN and littoral Indian Ocean within its sphere of influence.
b) Strings of Pearl
China will inevitably follow up with its commercial footholds in the Indian
Ocean with naval ones. The purpose of China’s naval expansion is precisely
to create strategic space for itself in western Pacific and then move into the
Indian Ocean gradually, in preparation for which China is learning to operate
far from its shores for quite some time. China has steadily expanded its
influence in the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea by building ports in Sri Lanka,
Pakistan and helping build Sandia Deep Sea port in Bangladesh, apart from
other Indian Ocean littoral engagements through a strategy generally referred
to as ‘String of Pearls’. China has never accepted or validated the so-called
‘String of Pearls’ theory projected by Western scholars. However, a view is
emerging in China that the Maritime Silk Road policy could be a response
to this postulation. The “String of Pearls” coinage has adduced the view that
China aims to militarily encircle India through robust maritime contacts and
cooperation with the other South Asian countries like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka,
and Pakistan. The Maritime Silk Road policy enables Beijing not only to
counter the String of Pearls theory but also to steadily and legitimately push
forward its maritime presence in the ASEAN region and the IOR. China has
long been the principal supplier of equipment and training to the Bangladeshi
armed forces and Dhaka’s plans to acquire two Chinese submarines has
already been a cause of considerable heartburn for the Indian Navy. The
military partnership between China and Pakistan, an arch rival of India, is well
known. Under these circumstances, the development and control of Gwadar
port in Pakistan by China will make India vulnerable in the Arabian ocean and
will pose problem if India tried to take step against Pakistan like it did in 1971
and 1999 to block Karachi port. Not only Pakistan and Bangladesh, it looks
now that Sri Lanka may be becoming China’s closest ‘strategic partner’ in
the Bay of Bengal. In October 2014, apparently as part of the MSR initiative,
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it was revealed that China has been invited to take over management of a
new and enlarged Phase II development of Hambantota port, which will
include berths dedicated for Chinese use. Port at Sri Lanka will prove handy
in reconnaissance of Indian navy while the port at Myanmar will cut down
China’s distance by 3000km from Bay of Bengal which is controlled by India.
Moreover it will make Strait of Malacca in easy reach of China. An airstrip
in Myanmar will provide effective air cover for its supplies and also in event
of blockade. Scenario is exacerbated by Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka
pledging support to President Xi Jinping’s MSR initiative as part of the overall
Asian Security Plan. Given the emerging scenario, concerns in New Delhi
are that countries like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka could be further drawn into
the Chinese orbit. One of the reasons for the regional outreach of the Modi
government should be to prevent such a potentially disturbing development
by restabilising Indian credibility with its neighbours.
c) Economy
Beijing’s Maritime Silk Route may be an illustration of cooperative maritime
politics; but this also creates conditions for China’s rise as an economic
maritime power, and also creates a challenge for India’s authority and
supremacy in the IOR, which has been impressive so far. Chinese economic
engagement in South Asia has grown quickly in recent years as trade expanded
from approximately $40 billion to $85 billion from 2006 to 2011, bilateral
investment grew even more quickly, rising from $500 million in 2005 to $2.8
billion in 2010. China is ASEAN’s largest trading partner while ASEAN is
China’s third largest trading partner. Bilateral trade has grown from USD 55
billion in 2002 to USD 400 billion in 2012 with a quantum jump of 600 per
cent.8 These developments create opportunities for growth and development
as a wider variety of exports flow from China into the region. China’s trade
volume with South Asian countries like Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives,
Nepal, and Sri Lanka grew roughly six-fold between 2003 and 2011, not to
talk of Pakistan with which its trade has increased manifold. As for China’s
geopolitical motives, the importance of trade flows for these South Asian
economies is even more pertinent to consider. Although the outward direct
investment of India in Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka is still higher than that
of China, and Pakistan is the only country in South Asia in which trade with
China, in terms of both exports and imports, has been more than trade with
India, but if China follows its trend line, it will surpass India by the next decade
in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal. The Maritime Silk Road initiative will
further boost China’s commercial engagement with both ASEAN and other
Indian Ocean littorals. This will have a huge impact in South Asia, where
Beijing is emerging as a vital power. India’s standing in South Asia is being
tested by China’s increasing influence in South Asia in recent years.
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Opportunities
The New Maritime Silk Route offers a number of opportunities for India
which suffers from technological gaps in its maritime infrastructure. It can
harness Chinese capability to construct high quality ships, build world class
ports, core technologies for marine bio-pharmaceuticals, seawater treatment &
utilization, offshore wind, sea water and tidal energy, capture and aquaculture
fisheries production and offshore equipment manufacturing.9 This will also
help India-ASEAN maritime connectivity initiative which is languishing due
to lack of infrastructure. China’s strategy of onshore and marine development
in parallel will not necessarily lead to maritime confrontation between China
and India. There is tremendous potential for collaboration for these two nations
in terms of marine economic development, marine resource exploration, sea
lane security, etc.10.The MSR could be a symbol of unity among nations and
a commitment to cooperation. Furthermore, this initiative could contribute to
greater connectivity and complementarities for the entire Asia. Cooperative
mechanisms and innovative approach through this scheme could help to
develop and improve supply chain, industrial chain, and value chain, and
would, thus, strengthen regional cooperation. This initiative is aimed to boost
infrastructure development and structural innovation, to improve business
environment of the region, to facilitate an orderly and unimpeded flow of
production factors and their efficient distribution, to accelerate development
of landlocked countries and the remote areas, to lower costs and barriers of
trade and investment, and to drive greater reform and opening-up by regional
countries. Conceptually, the upgrading of maritime connectivity between
Indo-Pacific and extending it further to East Africa and on to Mediterranean
are in tune with India’s own broader maritime economic vision. India’s
relations with the countries in South East Asia and Pacific regions have
witnessed a significant transformation in recent years. The expansion and
deepening of Look East Policy by Modi government, the steady trend of
economic growth and stability in the region and the continuing geopolitical
shift towards Asia, have imparted new momentum to its engagement, both
bilaterally with individual countries as well as regionally. Therefore, it would
be in India’s interest to respond positively to the Chinese invitation to join the
MSR. Moreover, India can also harness Chinese capabilities to improve its
maritime infrastructure, including the construction of high-quality ships and
world class ports. More importantly, it will also help India-ASEAN maritime
connectivity that has been languishing due to the lack of infrastructure. MSR
is an inevitable choice for both the countries to build a platform for win-
win cooperation, as it provides an opportunity to strengthen dialogue and
coordination in a bid to maximize common interests.11
115
Epilogue
Beijing has been careful to project the MSR as an exclusively commercial
venture, trying hard to dispel any impressions of it being a cover for maritime
military bases. Surprisingly, however, China has released no details about the
project, and this makes many countries doubt Beijing’s strategic intentions.
The lack of specifics not only make it hard to decipher the MSR’s real
purpose but it also gives credence to suspicions of geopolitical game play
by China. Indeed, for a project being touted as a critical enabler of regional
sea-connectivity, Chinese planners would have spent much time and effort
developing the fine-print. The lack of firm plans, proposals and timelines
then does lead to a suspicion that there may be something about the MSR
that Beijing is hesitant to share and reveal. Beijing’s economic and maritime
posture continues to emerge as a challenge for India. In fact, underlying
China’s Maritime Silk Road strategy is an orderly diplomatic, economic, and
maritime quest for power that India must take note of. Given the foregoing
analysis, India will need to take a hard look at the pros and cons of supporting
such a proposal. The dilemma for India is that a number of SAARC countries
have already approved the Chinese proposal. Since it has already shown its
approval for China’s Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) development
plan, chances are New Delhi will be favorably inclined to consider the MSR.
It is, however, certain to go over the details carefully before agreeing to
the development of Chinese infrastructure in Indian waters. Even though it
will be keen to start-off with Beijing on a positive note, the present NDA
government in New Delhi should not display undue haste in giving the MSR
its full approval. There should be no blanket support for the project, and it
should be only supported wherever the synergies of the two countries meet.
Consequently, India should also develop other alternatives to secure its own
space in the Indian Ocean Region, the recent development on Chabahar Port
in Iran between India, Iran and Afghanistan being an able example for that
type of ‘alternatives’. India’s appreciation of the MSR must be based on an
objective appraisal of these new realities. Even assuming the project delivers
on its economic promise, it could well turn out to be detrimental to India’s
geopolitical interests in the Indian Ocean Region .
References & Notes

1. Panda, J.,(2014): ‘Maritime Silk Road and the India-China Conundrum: From
the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean’, Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, Vol.
9, No. 1, pp. 23-32.
2. Lanteigne, M.,(2008): ‘China’s Maritime Security and the “Malaaca Dilemma”,
Asian Security, Vol. 4, No. 2 , 2008, pp. 143-44.
3. Singh, Z. D., (2014): ‘Indian Perceptions of China’s Maritime Silk Road Idea’,
Journal of Defence Studies, IDSA, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 133-48.
4. Chaturvedy, R.R., (2014): New Maritime Silk Road: Converging Interests and
Regional Responses, National University of Singapore, pp. 12.
116
5. Singh, A., (2014): ‘China’s Maritime Silk Route: Implications for India’, Journal
of Defence Studies, IDSA, New Delhi, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 133-48.
6. Kahangma, I., (2014): India, Srilanka and Maldives: Tripartite Maritime
Security Agreement and Growing Chinese Influence, Institute of Peace and
Conflict Studies, New Delhi, pp. 12.
7. Singh, T., (2014): ‘China and Southeast Asia: The Strategy Behind the Maritime
Silk Road’, The Maritime Great Game, IPSC, New Delhi, p. 5.
8. Bernard, D. C., (2013): Asian Maritime Strategies: Navigating Troubled Waters,
Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, p. 1.
9. Op.cit, 7, p. 9.
10. Sakhuja, V.,(2014): ‘Increasing Maritime Competition: IORA, IONS, Milan
and the Indian Ocean Networks’, The Maritime Great Game, IPCS, New Delhi,
2014, p. 6.
11. Lan, G.,(2014): ‘Reconstructing Maritime Silk Road and China’s Marine
Diplomacy with Neighboring Countries’, History Research, Vol .2, No.3, pp.
11-14.
117
Harmeet Singh
Abstract
The signing of Indo - Kazakhstan Nuclear Co-operation Agreement is one of
the historic agreements among India and Central Asian Republics. The State
visit of Kazakh President Nazarbayev as the chief guest of India on Republic
day parade from 23rd -26th January 2009 in Delhi, adopted the declaration
of Strategic Partnership Agreement. In this declaration both sides had taken
pledge for comprehensive cooperation in the spheres of political, economic,
technological, human resource development and counter-terrorism. During
Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh‘s visit to Astana on 18th April 2011 a deal
was struck between Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh and Kazakh
President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, for supplying of uranium to India and
a comprehensive co-operation in civil nuclear energy programme.This
agreement is one of the most important agreements which encourage the
bilateral trade and transactions between the two countries.
Keywords
Nuclear Co-operation, Strategic Location, Bilateral Agreement, Uranium
Reserves, Nuclear Partnership, Technical Co-operation, Diplomatic Ties.
Historical Background
Among the Central Asian Republics, Kazakhstan occupies an important
position lying in the heart of Eurasia. Being the largest of five Central Asian
republics, Kazakhstan is the 9th largest country of the world in terms of its
territory. Within a short span of 24 years Kazakhstan emerged as a most
significant political and economic actor in the Central Asian region. The
geostrategic location of Kazakhstan lying in the centre of Eurasian heartland
makes it a centre of gravity.1 Kazakhstan serves as the land bridge between
Europe and Asia providing a vital linkage between the civilizations that have
prospered and flourished in these two continents. The ethnic composition of
Kazakhstan consists of Kazakhs - 58%, Russians - 30%, Ukranians - 2.9%,
Uzbeks - 2.8%, Uyghur - 1.5% , Germans - 1% , Tatar - 0.9% and other
groups- 2.5%.2
India and Central Asia both are partaking deep historical ties, having
common cultural and political values as well as facing the similar terrorism
and drug trafficking problems. After the Soviet collapse in 1991, Kazakhstan
emerged as the largest and the richest country in the region. India recognized
the independence of Kazakhstan and established diplomatic relations. Both

India and Kazakhstan are sharing similar views on long-term economic and
political partnership, promotion and development of prosperity in both the
regions.3
Kazakhstan is significant for Indian foreign policy due to three main
reasons and the first and foremost is the geostrategic location of Kazakhstan
is as such, it lies in the “Heart of Eurasia” thereby, increases the importance
of this region tremendously. Secondly, the vast energy and mineral resources
of Kazakhstan, which remains a centre of attraction for the great powers and
India, is imperative for the energy hungry country like India to engage there.
Thirdly, the secular and composite identity and social structure of Kazakhstan
which brings India close to Kazakhstan. India recognized Kazakhstan as an
independent nation following after its independence and established Indian
embassy in Kazakhstan. The Kazakh embassy in India was also inaugurated in
the year 1993. All these developments led to the formation of new beginning
and new relationships. In the year 1992 president Nazarbayev visited India,
his first such official trip after assuming office, is one of the most important
visit in terms of foundation of bilateral ties.4 His visit to India signifies the
importance of India for Kazakhstan. In this visit both sides made declarations
on bilateral cooperation. The co-operation agreements in various fields of
trade and economic relations, science and technology, culture, arts, education
and mass media were also signed. For strengthening economic co-operation
and avoidance of double taxation, the India-Kazakhstan Intergovernmental
commission established in 1992.5
India reciprocated with visit by Indian Prime Minister Narsimha Rao in
May 1993. During his visit, both sides signed agreements on technical co-
operation in the fields of science and technology. For the further development
of trade cells, both sides also signed agreements on the establishment of a joint
Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Commerce and Science. There is
establishment of credit agreement and India offered a credit line of $20million
to Kazakhstan. In this way both India and Kazakhstan stand towards the
more dynamic and vibrant phase. Then in the following years, several issues
were discussed pertaining to the defense co-operation and joint ventures in
business and one of the important agreements signed in the year 1994 was, the
agreement to start a regular flights between Almaty and Delhi.6
During the visit of President Nazarbayev again in the year 1996 both
sides agreed on signing of energy related trade pacts, as there was an oil
boom in Kazakhstan. Both sides penned agreements related to oil and gas,
bio-informatics, defense cooperation and pharmaceuticals etc.In the year
2002, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Kazakhstan for a first
CICA summit and bilateral talks were held for diverse engagement. Later on,
the agenda of bilateral co-operation in the fields of joint working group on
hydrocarbons and joint working group on terrorism was materialized. Now,
120
both sides realized the importance of trade and regional co-operation and by
taking this into consideration a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was
signed in IT sector, according to this MoU India was to provide IT services to
Kazakhstan.7
Strategic Partnership Agreement

The India-Kazakhstan strategic partnership agreement was signed on January
2009. It was during the state visit of president Nazarbayev as the chief guest on
the India’s republic day. This shows the importance of Kazakhstan for India,
a joint declaration on strategic partnership was signed which puts emphasis
on a comprehensive co-operation. Kazakhstan has a twofold motive on the
development of economic relations with India. Firstly, this region provides a
sizeable consumer market for the Kazakh goods. Secondly, there are reserves of
gold, silver and chromium which caters the domestic needs of the Kazakhstan.
Besides this, Kazakhstan is looking towards India as a leading software player
that will provide technical help and services to Kazakhstan.
India Kazakhstan relations got impetus with signing of this “Strategic
Partnership Agreement” between Kazmunaigaz and ONGC Videsh limited,
for exploration of oil in the Satpayev oil block. The India Kazakhstan
strategic co-operation agreement is also dealing with providing assistance
and technical co-operation. The Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO)
and the National Space Agency of Kazakhstan both have been working on
joint programmes. Kazakhstan hosts the famous Baikonur Cosmodrome space
research expecting technology transfers from India.
India-Kazakhstan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

The Indo-Kazakhstan nuclear co-operation agreement needs to be viewed in
the context of India’s growing energy needs. In the 12th Five year plan there
is a mention that the growing energy needs can be tamed through nuclear
energy as an alternative, for that India needs to bring additional nuclear plants.
According to Planning Commission’s estimate India needs an additional
100,000 megawatt power during the 12th Plan (2012-2017).8
The strategic partnership agreement of 2009 provided an MoU signed
during the visit of president Nazarbayev on 26th January 2009. One such
clause of this MoU deals with the supply of uranium to India. During the
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Kazakhstan on 15th-16th
April 2011, ‘India-Kazakhstan Nuclear Co-operation Agreement’ was signed
in the Kazakh capital Astana.9 According to this agreement Kazakhstan will
supply uranium to India. This agreement covers the supply of uranium and
a comprehensive co-operation in civil nuclear energy programme. Nuclear
energy pact concerning collaborative exploration and research of uranium
through joint construction and operation of power plants and a commitment
by Kazakhstan to supply India with over 2,100 tons of uranium by 2014.10
121
Kazakhstan had to supply uranium to India for civilian energy purposes

under the proposed agreement between the NPCIL and Kazatomprom.
This agreement was significant owing to the fact that Kazakhstan possesses
the second largest deposits of Uranium around 1.5 million tons. Recently
Kazakhstan holds number one position in the world in uranium production.
In 2012 the country produced 21,317 tons of uranium (Tengri News, 2013).11
The future planning of Astana is to increase the uranium production up to
30,000 MTU (Metric tons of Uranium) by the end of 2018. The main uranium
producing sites of Kazakh are shown in the map.
Source: http://www.world-nuclear.org/
The Indo-Kazakhstan nuclear cooperation agreement provides a legal

structure for the mutually beneficial uses of nuclear energy, which includes
the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes including the use of nuclear
energy in fuel supply, nuclear medicine, and use of nuclear radiations for
health care, exploration and joint mining of uranium, design, construction and
operation of joint nuclear power plants. The most important aspect of this
deal was the exchange of scientific and research information. This nuclear
agreement was most important owing to the fact that this agreement opened
up avenues for India in Kazakhstan and there is a quantum jump in Indo-
Kazakhstan trade.12 Kazakhstan is a fifth such country which supplies nuclear
fuel to India. U.S.A, France, Mongolia, and Russia are the other countries
which are supplying uranium to India for civilian energy purposes. In the year
2010 NPCIL imported 868 tons of Uranium of which 300 tons of uranium
was from Kazakhstan.13 This will fulfill India’s energy deficits to a large
extent. The depreciation of Indian rupee could be largely attributed to the
huge demands of energy resources. If these demands can be fulfilled with the
supply of nuclear energy, there would be stability in our economic growth.
At present India is having 20 operating nuclear units and six under
construction which have an installed capacity of 4780 Mega Watt. India is
planning to expand its nuclear energy generating capacity totaling 63,000
122
MW by the year 2032.14 Kazakhstan is having 15% of the world’s uranium

reserves and one of the leading uranium producing country. Article 1 of the
Indo-Kazakhstan Nuclear co-operation agreement states the main objective
of this agreement is to establish mutual beneficial cooperation between the
two countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The areas of cooperation
between the two countries are mentioned under Article 3 of the Indo-
Kazakhstan nuclear cooperation agreement which are as under:
• The supply of nuclear material and equipment for use in civil

nuclear power through long term contracts.
• With regard to nuclear fuel cycle, exchange of scientific and
technical cooperation with mutual agreement.
• The joint exploration and mining of uranium and other useful
natural resources which are relevant to the exploitation of
nuclear energy.
• The implementation of joint projects on the uses of nuclear
energy in the fields related to industry, agriculture, medicine and
nuclear power.
• The joint marketing research of the uranium market and fuel
for the nuclear power reactors and the exchange of marketing
research also.
• Special attention on nuclear and radiation protection and
environmental monitoring.
• Training and exchange of experts from both sides.
• Implementation of projects based on mutual interests with joint
technical support and research.
• Regular organization of joint scientific conferences, symposia,
seminars and workshops.
• The maintenance, construction, designs and decommissioning
of nuclear power plants with proper systematic channels and
supply of fuel. The parties shall effect cooperation here under
solely for the peaceful purposes and not for manufacturing
explosive devices.15
This agreement puts special emphasis on the “enrichment and
reprocessing,” with the result, uranium produced and transferred shall not be
enriched more than 20% in U-235 unless there is a written consent given by
the supplying party. The use of nuclear material and equipment transferred
under this agreement comes under the International atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) safeguards.16
In March, 2013, India and Kazakhstan agreed to carry forward one more
agreement, which supports the view that the nuclear cooperation agreement
will go beyond the year 2014,as a result, the uranium rich nation assured India
123
to meet its “uranium demands”. In this meeting the Indian external affairs
minister Salman Khurshid and his Kazakh counterpart Erlan Idrissov held
comprehensive talks on various issues related to international and regional
security. They revived the status of the bilateral ties in key areas related to
defense, civil nuclear energy and hydrocarbons.
Revival of Indo-Kazakhstan Nuclear Co-operation Agreement

India and Kazakhstan revived nuclear co-operation agreement on 8th July
2015 during the Prime Minister, Narendra Modi’s visit to Kazakhstan. In
an agreement signed between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and
Kazakh President, Nursultan Nazarbayev for the continuous supply of
Uranium with 5000 tons of uranium to India during 2015-19. After signing
this deal Kazakhstan will emerge as the biggest source of uranium for India
besides Canada and Australia. Kazakhstan’s uranium supplying company
KazaAtomProm supplied 600 metric tons of uranium in the year 2010-11, 350
metric tons in 201-12, 402.5 metric tons in 2012-13 and 460 Metric tons in
2013-14. The five year contract of uranium expired last year.
The Prime Minister, Modi in his joint statement with Kazakh President
indicated that nuclear cooperation is a key pillar of partnership with Kazakhstan
and mentioned that, “Kazakhstan was one the first countries with which we
launched civil nuclear cooperation through a uranium purchase contract. We
are pleased to have much a larger second contract now”. The MoU also signed
which further deepen the scope of bilateral defense cooperation between the
two countries including ; regular exchange of visits, joint exercises, training
of military personnel, special forces exchanges and co-operation including
military technical co-operation. A join statement “Tej Kadam” was also
released after a talk which deals with the rising challenge posed by terrorism
in their neighborhood.17
Conclusion
The domestic uranium reserves of India are very meager and the country is
dependent on uranium imports to fuel its nuclear plants. India has signed
nuclear energy cooperation agreements with several countries including;
France, United States, United Kingdom, South Korea, Mongolia, Argentina,
Australia, Namibia, Canada and Russia. The Indo- Kazakhstan stronger ties on
nuclear cooperation and other areas are because of the common interests and
mutual desire of both the countries to expand their partnership. In a changing
geopolitical environment Kazakhstan considers India as a bridging power that
will bring regional peace and stability. On 22 February 2012 Kazakhstan and
India celebrated the 20th anniversary of the establishment of the diplomatic
ties between the two countries. Kazakh Ambassador Doulat Kuanyshev
during his visit to India, while celebrating 20th anniversary of the relations
mentioned that Kazakhstan, India partnership is developing dynamically in
124
all spheres of life which includes political, cultural and economic spheres.
There are some of the major impediments in the India Kazakhstan relations
like the non-availability of hard currency and lack of conversion facilities
in India as well as in Kazakhstan. Additionally, the language barrier is also
creating hurdles for Indians who went there in Kazakhstan as they are not
able to talk because most of Kazakhstani peoples know only Russian and
Kazakh language. There is no proper marketing through main newspapers by
the respective governments that also restricts the development of tourism and
business between the two major giants. Therefore, we must formulate suitable
strategies and policies to tackle these important issues for strengthening the
ties between these two countries for achieving targeted growth rates and
harvesting mutual benefits.
References & Notes

1. Mondira Dutta (2011): “International North South Corridor Promoting Economic
Integration and Regional Co-operation” in Aijaz A. Bandey (ed.), Silk Route &
Eurasia - Peace and Co-operation, Art Printers Press, New Delhi, pp.427-40.
2. http://www.advantour.com/kazakhstan/people.htm.
3. Gulshan Dietl (2005): “Gas Pipelines - Politics and Possibilities” in I.P Khosla
(eds.) Energy and Diplomacy, Konark Publishers, New Delhi, p.74-90.
4. Kairat Umarov (2009): “Contemporary Kazakhstan - Building Strategic
Partnership with India” in Arun Mohanty & Sumant Swain (eds.), Contemporary
Kazakhstan the Way Ahead, Axis Publications, New Delhi: p.85-95.
5. Dipanjan Roy Choudary (2009): Contemporary Kazakhstan - Success Story of
Nation Building, Haranand Publishers, New Delhi, p.22-55.
6. Government of India (2013): Energy Statistics 2012-13, Ministry of Statistics
and Program Implementation, New Delhi.
7. Angira Sen Sharma (2009): “India-Kazakhstan Relations, 1991-2008 - An
Assessment”, in Arun Mohanty & Sumant Swain (eds.), Contemporary
Kazakhstan the Way Ahead, Axis Publications, New Delhi, p.182-200
8. http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/.
9. h t t p : / / w w w . i d s a . i n / i d s a c o m m e n t s /
PrimeMinisterManmohanSinghsVisittoKazakhstan_msroy_270411.
10. http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/4776/Joint+Declaration+on+Str
ategic+Partnership+between+India+and+Kazakhstan http://mea.gov.in/Portal/
ForeignRelation/Kazakhstan_July_2014.pdf.
11. h t t p : / / e n . t e n g r i n e w s . k z / m a r k e t s / K a z a k h s t a n - l e a d s - i n - u r a n i u m -
production-23252/.
12. P. S. Tibb (2009): “Indo-Kazakhstan Trade and Economic Relations” in Arun
Mohanty & Sumant Swain (eds.), Contemporary Kazakhstan the Way Ahead,
Axis Publications, New Delhi, p.200.
13. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-07-06/news/64143073_1_
india-and-kazakhstan-uranium-resources-kazatomprom.
14. Government of India (2007): Report of Working Group on Power for 11th plan
2007-2012, Ministry of Power, New Delhi.
125
15. Kazakhstan-India Business Journal, “Connecting Two Vibrant Economies” Issue

2010, published in Kazakhstan, p.12-29.
16. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an international
organization which looks towards the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including
nuclear weapons. It was established on 29th July 1957. Its H.Q is located in
Vienna (Austria).
17. http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/pm-modis-visit-to-
central-asia-india-and-kazakhstan-ink-deals-on-uranium-supply-defence/
articleshow/47996585.cms.
126
Afghanistan
DEMOCRACY AND ETHNIC PARADOX
Tareak A. Rather
Nurgiss Nazir
Abstract
Throughout the ages Afghanistan remained, “a country without state”.
The toppling of one regime, dominated by one ethnic group by the other
remains the perennial problem of Afghanistan. This ethnic conflict also
leads to inter-alia to an epoch in the post-Soviet era where Taliban quickly
gained public support in the vast majority of the country, who sought to
stabilize the country through a policy of ferocious repression. The old
socio-political fault lines, enmeshed with divergent interests of various
internal and external forces involved, however, continue to grow. And this
confrontation between ethnic groups and different state apparatus, external
and internal, became a vicious cycle. Even after the collapse of Taliban
and deployment of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and The
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and introduction of democratic
elections, things are not looking good. This paper tries to highlight the
deep-rooted ethnic identity and its impact upon the emerging democratic
state of Afghanistan.
Keywords
Ethnic Groups, Democracy, Northern Alliance, Taliban, Warlords, Ethnic
Conflict, Fault Lines, Afghanistan, Post-Soviet Era, External Forces.
Introduction
Most societies are split along one or more lines. Often these splits, or
cleavages, become the society’s fault lines along which political views form.
Important social cleavages, in addition to ethnicity, are: social class, religion,
rural-urban, and geographic region. Almost any social cleavage or category
can become politically relevant. In Afghanistan Ethnicity appears to be an
especially salient cleavage.1 Therefore ethnic conflicts are considered crucial
challenges to national politics and are often accompanied by a gradual collapse
of state authority. Furthermore, these conflicts appear to undermine identities
are generally defined by the belief in a common origin and are expressed by a
common language, historical consciousness, religion, etc. however, labeling
violent conflicts as ethnic involves the risk of oversimplifying complex issues.2
At the dawn of modern times, the territory of what is now Afghanistan was
inhibited by a variety of ethnic groups which apart from the Muslim faith, had
Afghanistan: Democracy and Ethnic Paradox
little in common.3 The Afghan society is the land of much ethnic diversity with
Pashtun 40 percent, Tajik 33 percent, Hazara 11 percent, Uzbek 9 percent,
Aimak 1 percent, Turkmen 2 percent, Baloch 1 percent and others 3 percent.4
The 1964 constitution of Afghanistan ended ethnic preference by
awarding all the ethnic groups equal treatment but just after one and a half
decade or so soviet’s occupied it, which led to the decline in the domination of
Pashtun’s and resulted in the alliance of non-Pashtun resistance and military
commanders. The communists encouraged other languages like Uzbeki,
Balochi, Turkmani and Nuristani by giving them the official status.5 In rural
areas the movement against the Communist regime was spearheaded by the
ulema and the Islamists, where as political parties and groups dominated
the urban space.6 Historically there were no dominant elements that would
distinguish the Islamists from the communists. The political parties and
factions within them exhibited communal divisions based on tribal loyalties,
religion and regional loyalties that have fragmented the Afghan politics.7
Once the Communist regime was toppled, the various political factions
could no longer justify mobilization on the basis of jihad and thus looked for
alternative recruiting tools. The largely Uzbek-based Junbeshi-milli (political
party), although initially conceived as a group encompassing all of northern
Afghanistan, became more and more Uzbek while alienating and losing
its Pashtun and Tajik commanders. Jamiat-i-Islami, in turn, was becoming
increasingly the Tajik in composition. Hizb-e-Wahdat defined itself as the
official representative of ethnic Hazaras, with little controversy or opposition.8
Political leaders often used group identity in their pursuit of power and
resources by reinterpreting history around symbols of ethnic or religious
differences, especially during civil wars. The homogeneity of the Taliban and
Ahmad Shah Massoud’s forces, as well the historically rooted anti-Pashtun
sentiments among Hazaras, Uzbeks, and Tajiks, were all useful to various
political factions during times of civil war. Likewise, Pashtun aversion to
acceptance of a Tajik dominated central government proved convenient to the
Taliban’s quest for power.9 A couple of historical events can be quoted when
a non-Pashtun assumed power but was challenged by the Pashtun leadership
and ousted eventually. Habibullah (‘Bachai-Saqao’ Tajik), who overthrew
Amir Amanullah Khan in (1929) and ruled for nine months, was overthrown
by the combined might of the Pashtuns and thus Pashtun rule was restored.10
Burhanuddin Rabbani, a Tajik, according to the provisions of the Peshawar
Accord (1990) assumed leadership of the central government in 1992, igniting
the bloody civil war in which Pashtuns under the leadership of Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar fought pitched battles against a non-Pashtun president and his
military commander, Ahmed Shah Masoud.11
The Taliban regime further strengthened the ethnic divide through its
policy of excluding from power political forces other than Pashtuns and, in
some cases, followed a policy of elimination of minorities. There was a fear
128
that the Taliban might convert Afghanistan into an ethnic state at the cost of
diverse ethnic minorities in the country.12 The rise of the Taliban constituted yet
another serious step towards ethicizing conflict in the country. The movement
rose from Kandahar, the conservative heart of Pashtun lands, and remained
completely dominated by Pashtuns. It’s initial, amazingly rapid spread -
explained by its missionary zeal, but slowed significantly as it reached non-
Pashtun areas. And Taliban’s take-over of Kabul in 1996 ‘clearly changed the
conflict into an ethnic power struggle of Pashtuns against non-Pashtuns’.13
Historically rulers of Kabul have adopted a strategy of patronage which
has been extended to all tribes in return for loyalty to the ruler. It became
more evident and visible after the Soviet withdrawal. The roots of the chronic
instability lie mainly in the nature of the Soviet strategy, which encouraged
minority ethnic politics to supersede national politics. The years of Soviet
occupation (1979-89) were characterized not simply by an assault on the
Afghan state, but more importantly an attack on Afghan identity. With the
realization that Communist ideology was no match for the solid front of
Islamic resistance in Afghanistan, the Soviets redefined Afghanistan as a
country of diverse and distinct ethnicities, rather than as a unitary state with
a single religious belief system. Their goal was to weaken potentially the
most resistant of the ethnic groups, the Pashtun majority - the traditionally
dominant group in the Afghan armed forces, a majority among the Afghan
resistance groups, and the cultural core of Afghanistan’s “national” identity.14
The post-soviet withdrawal phase only confirmed the existing fragmentation
of political classes along the lines of ethnicity, tribal affinity and the ideological
underpinnings of their movements.15
Afghanistan has undergone several phases of failed transition and conflict
cycles. By 1992, the Northern Coalition (later renamed Alliance) was formed,
in which the prominent ethnic minorities in the north were united against
the Pashtuns. Thus on the eve of the centennial of the Durand Line that had
divided Afghanistan in 1893, a deep chasm was created in the ethno-linguistic
mosaic of Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance’s first mission was to bring
down the Communist government in Kabul.16 The national minorities of
northern Afghanistan close their ranks to resist domination by the Pashtuns.
The Uzbeks being a major ethnic group, together with other small national
groups of the north fought unitedly against the Central Pashtun authority.
However, their revolts were ruthlessly suppressed by Kabul.17
Brutalities against Pashtuns in the North and targeting of Hazaras in
the south posed great challenges for both the Afghan Government and the
International security Assistance Force (ISAF). The Hazarajat region had seen
a series of reprisal killings over the years. In 1997 alone, the Taliban killed
over 6,000 Hazara Muslims in retaliation for the execution of thousands of
Taliban prisoners in Northern Afghanistan.19 The relatively weaker socio-
economic status of the non-Pashtun ethnic groups was the direct result of the
129
government’s practice of Pashtun favoritism, the concentration of economic

development projects in Pashtun areas and the appointment of Pashtuns to help
administrative posts in non-Pashtun areas which antagonized the minorities,
particularly the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen in the north and the Hazaras in the
central parts of the country.19
Ethnicity and Political Elite

The Afghan war led to major changes in the way space was perceived. On
the one hand the national territory progressively lost significance as a frame
of reference for the activities of political and military actors this was above
all because the state and its functions were eroded in the course of the war.20
One consequence of this collapse of the state was that power became de-
territorialized, particularly in 1990s, Afghanistan collapsed into hundreds of
petty empires that could scarcely be fixed in spatial terms and which were
ruled by a myriad of warlords and local rulers whose power was based on
client networks and personal loyalties.21 Militia leaders attempted to carve
out what Schetter, borrowing from Appadurai, calls Ethnoscapes, imagined
political territories that are mythically connected to the genesis of specific
ethnicities.22
The power of warlords and their private military network, including private
security firms, presented the biggest challenge to the country’s rehabilitation
as a functioning state. War criminals were trying to maintain their criminal
militias and keep the state weak. The warlords have also cultivated political
patronage and are connected to the higher officials in the government. In the
process some of them have developed a sense of impunity for violations of
human rights and are engaged in retribution of their opponents. Government
functionaries have patronized them to secure themselves from extortion and
attacks by criminal elements and the Taliban. Security and stability being
keywords for western countries that wanted to exit from Afghanistan; these
militias have emerged as new associates in enforcing security, gathering
intelligence and also helping NATO convoys to pass dangerous terrain. Due
to this role there is an increasing criminalization and a nexus between drug
dealers, militias and arms smugglers.23
When president Karzai (2001) took office, he had considerable support
over the south and west. Karzai has had difficulty in limiting the power of the
Shura-I nazar in the national government and in successfully challenging local
warlords elsewhere in the country. The President’s popularity among Pashtuns
rose in October 2002 when he announced the dismissal of 30 middle-level
commanders throughout the country. However, compliance with the order was
unseen.24 Serious clashes with warlords have since taken place in the north
and west. Karzai continued the policy of appeasement with warlords.25 Nazif
Shahrani, a foremost expert on Afghanistan, relates the country’s communal
tensions to the type of government in effect since Abdur Rahman (1880-1901).
130
Shahrani argues that transformation of tribal structures and ethnic differences

into groups, fragmented along ethnic, linguistic, and sectarian cleavage,
was the direct consequence of the policies of centralizing government. State
structure and policies have been the problem in breeding communal violence
and conflicts in multiethnic societies.26
Democracy: Prospects and Challenges

The post-Taliban political situation was quite disappointing for the Pashtuns.
On the one hand the Taliban were ousted, and on the other, the new
dispensation was dominated by their rivals from the Northern Alliance. They
were expecting that the Loya Jirga (tribal councils) would redress the concerns
of the Pashtuns. The reinstatement of the existing cabinet for a two-year
transitional period added to the disillusionment of the Pashtuns.27 However,
formulation of a centralized constitution as a result of deliberations during the
constitutional grand assembly restored some of the lost hopes of the Pashtuns.
The Pashtun majority struggled hard for a centralized constitution and the
minorities forcefully argued for the federal one but the majority’s view won
the day. Stalwarts of the ethnic minorities are still struggling to substantially
modify the constitution according to their desire.28
Afghanistan went to elections without political parties. Most of the
presidential candidates lacked a well-defined agenda or vision for the future
of Afghanistan. They were either offshoots of some factional group or had
the support of one of them. Though political parties were restrained from
fighting elections, they were, however, allowed to register themselves. It
is noteworthy that ‘article 35’ of the new constitution clearly states that the
citizens of Afghanistan have the right to form political parties provided the
“organizational structure and financial sources of the party are made public,”
“the party does not have military or paramilitary aims and structures,”
and that the “party is not affiliated to foreign political parties or sources.”
It further states, “Formation and functioning of a party based on ethnicity,
language, Islamic school of thought (mazhab-e-fiqhi) and region shall not be
permissible.”29 Now, if any of these clauses were applied, then most of the
political formations in Afghanistan would not have qualified to be registered
as political parties.
The post-Taliban political process was fragile and the position of Hamid
Karzai was delicate, the west was keen on holding the first presidential election
as early as possible. Because different factions of the Northern Alliance were
fielding their own candidates, which made it increasingly difficult for Karzai
to consolidate his support among the minority ethnic groups .Who together
formed a substantial chunk of the Afghan population. His limited authority,
absence of local support base, and dependency on the west, stood in stark
contrast to those of factional commanders and leaders, particularly from
the former Northern Alliance, in the fray.30 Before the presidential election,
131
some crucial measures of the incumbent president, Hamid Karzai, against

the warlords such as the dismissal of thirty, mostly Pashtun, warlords and
removal of defence minister Qasim Fahim from his position, upheld Karzai’s
position in the public, particularly among the Pashtuns and so he won the
overwhelming support of his co-ethnics all over the country.31
With the new constitution ratified by the Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ)
in January 2004, attention turned towards Afghanistan’s first democratic
elections. Afghanistan’s emergence as a democracy was one of the key
achievements of the Bonn process that conclude with the successful completion
of the first round of presidential and parliamentary elections in 2004-05.32
However, keeping in view the parliamentary and local elections of September
2005, Karzai didn’t completely marginalize the Northern Alliance leadership
especially the Panjshiri faction. He appointed Uzbek leader Dostum as chief-
of-staff to the commander-in-chief of the Afghan armed forces,33 and granted a
life time special privilege to the leader of the Tajik militia, Mohammad Qasim
Fahim, allowing him to retain his military rank of a Marshall throughout
his life.34 It was clear from the presidential election that the parliamentary
elections too would also be fought along ethnic lines, with several alliances,
combinations and permutations emerging.35
In 2009 the Obama administration and NATO allies have scaled back
expectations for a democratic form of government in Afghanistan, at least
for the time period in which the international presence might be sustained
at its current level.36 Nonetheless, despite renewed emphasis on security
and a downplaying of Afghanistan’s prospects for democracy in 2009,
intense preparations for the 2015 presidential elections demonstrate that the
international community had not discarded its intent to leave behind at least
the seeds of participatory government.37 However, according to the Kabul-
based Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, an independent research
organization, in the eyes of most Afghans, “elections are being used to
legitimize or ‘rubber stamp’ the control of the powerful”, and “elections are
compounding a distrust of institutions.”38
Preliminary election results released by the Independent Electoral
Commission (IEC) in October, 2010 revealed that, despite the fact that Pashtuns
are the majority ethnic group in Ghazni Province, not a single Pashtun was
elected; all of the Wolesi Jirga seats went to Hazara candidates. This is due at
least in part to the fact that most of the polling stations that remained closed
on election day were in communities in which Pashtuns were the majority.
Many of the people Democracy International (DI) interviewed say also that
intimidation by the Taliban kept them away from the polling stations that
remained open.39 President Karzai called for a re-vote in the province, but
the IEC resisted this measure.40 The Hazara candidates selected in the initial
tally claimed that a re-vote was tantamount to ethnic discrimination and stated
that any change in results not only would be illegal, but also would be met
132
with serious resistance.41 Meanwhile, candidates from Ghazni who had not
won seats staged protests in Kabul, decrying the elections as illegitimate and
fraudulent.42 Ultimately, the IEC excluded Ghazni Province when it announced
the final election results due to the controversy.43 The ongoing conflict became
a symbol of many of the social and ethnic tensions facing the country.
Ghani and Abdullah signed an agreement on 21 September (2014),
promising a “genuine and meaningful partnership” that would allow them to
govern together.44 Later the same day, the IEC announced Ghani as the winner,
although it declined to officially publish results.45 The only information the
IEC formally released was inscribed on an engraved wooden plaque given to
Ghani, congratulating him for receiving 55.27per cent of the 7.12 million valid
votes.46 The conflicts and compromises of Afghan political and tribal heads
are obvious and the recent post-presidential election is a case in point. The
Abdullah team protested the IEC’s decision to inscribe the tally on the wooden
plaque, among other complaints, and threatened to boycott the inauguration
ceremony.47 The inauguration proceeded smoothly, however, with Ghani
sworn in as president and immediately appointing Abdullah, a Tajik, as chief
executive officer.48 Reaction among ordinary Afghans was mixed, with some
expressing relief that the process had finally reached a conclusion and others
worrying about the durability of the new government.49
Violence between the presidential camps remained comparatively rare
throughout 2013-2014, although armed clashes increased during the second
round; however, as ethnic and tribal groups supporting different camps
became visible, Abdullah’s slate was dominated by Tajik figures and support
from Mohaqeq’s powerful Hazara faction, the Ghani camp emerged as heavily
Pashtun and Uzbek in character, along with some Hazara support.50 Afghans
were apprehensive that this election may lead to full blown ethnic conflict. But
once the deal was struck with Abdullah things started looking normal.
Ethnic conflicts which we are witnessing in Afghan society are
considered crucial challenges to national politics and are often accompanied
by a gradual collapse of state authority. Regardless of ethnicity, many Afghan
politicians and policymakers from across the country favor a strong central
state in order to curb powerful local figures, as well as to reduce the danger
of criminal influence over the structures of local government. Research has
also consistently shown that many Afghan citizens favor a strong central
government as a means to undermine the power of local commanders at
whose hands they suffered for so many years.51 Although there is now growing
disillusionment with the corruption and criminalization of central government,
current structures reflect the understanding that a strong central state can act
as a countervailing force to local power holders. One of the ironies of the
situation in Afghanistan is that, despite the strong power influences exercised
at the local level, the country is not only politically centralised, but also, in
theory, fiscally and administratively one of the most centralised countries in
133
the world. All budgetary and most staffing decisions are made in Kabul, and
provincial departments of line ministries, as well as the governor’s office, have
virtually no discretionary spending power and limited input into planning.52
A country which had been at war for three decades, with hardly any
functional state institution in place and ethnically highly diverse country
cannot be transformed into a stable thriving democracy in a short span of time.
Progress on all fronts, social, economic and political is bound to be gradual,
fragmented, restricted and strained by severe challenges from within and
without. The strength of nascent democracy in Afghanistan is being clearly
put to test. How indispensible or dispensable is the current political system
and the constitution for various stakeholders in the Afghan politics, would
largely determine the future of democracy in the country.
References & Notes

1. Carol J. Riphenburg, 2005, “Ethnicity and Civil Society in Contemporary
Afghanistan”, The Middle East Journal, Vol. 59(1), Winter, p. 36.
2. Christian Wagner, Ana Devic, Ulrike Joras, Mario Kramer, Conard Schetter, and
Andreas Wimmer,2002, “Prospects and Limits of Ethnic Mobilization”, ZEF
News, No. 10, July, pp. 1-2.
3. Amin Saikal, 2006, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival,
New York: Faith Avenue, pp. 17-18.
4. “Afghanistan in 2012- A Survey of the Afghan People,” Kabul, Afghanistan:
The Asia Foundation, pp. 181-182, at http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdf/
surveybook2012web1.pdf (accessed on 30 December 2015).
5. Anwar ul Haq Ahady, (1995), “The Decline of Pashtuns in Afghanistan”, Asian
Survey, Vol. 35 (7), July, p. 623.
6. Carol J. Riphenburg, 2007, “Electoral Systems in a Divided Society: The Case of
Afghanistan”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 34(1), April, p. 6.
7. Gilles Dorronsoro, 2005, RevolutionUnending: Afghanistan, 1979 To The
Present, London: CERI & Hurst, p. 72.
8. Antonio Giustozzi, 2005, “The Ethnicisation of an Afghan Faction: Junbesh-i-
Milli from its Origins to the Presidential Elections.” Crisis States Programme,
Working Paper Series Nr. 1, London: Overseas Development Institute, pp 11-12.
9. Op.cit, 1.
10. Ralph H. Magnus, Eden Nabi, 2002, Afghanistan, Mullah, Marx and Mujahid,
Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 43-44.
11. Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady, 2002, “Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Conflict in Afghanistan”
William Maley (ed.), Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan And The Taliban,
Lahore: Vanguard Books, p. 123.
12. Rasul Bakhsh Rais, 2008, Recovering The Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and
State in Afghanistan, Karachi: Oxford University Press, p.47
13. Amin Saikal, ‘Afghanistan’s Ethnic Conflict’, Survival, 40(2), 1998, pp. 114–126
14. Zaman Stanizai, 2009 “From Identity Crisis to Identity in Crisis in Afghanistan”,
The Middle East Institute Policy Brief, No. 27, December, pp. 2-3.
15. Rasul Bakhsh Rais, (1993), Afghanistan and Regional Powers”, Asian Survey,
September, p. 908.
134
16. Zaman Stanizai, 2009 “From Identity Crisis to Identity in Crisis in Afghanistan”,
The Middle East Institute Policy Brief, No. 27, December, p. 4.
17. R. Karimov, 2000, “The Myth and Reality of The Northern Alliance in
Afghanistan,” Contemporary Central Asia, Vol. IV, No. 1-2, April- August, p. 43.
18. Musa Khan Jalalzai, 2011, Civil War and The Partition of Afghanistan, Karachi-
Pakistan: Royal book Company, p. 9.
19. Hafizullah Emadi, 1990, State, Revolution and Superpowers in Afghanistan,
New York: Praeger, p. 14.
20. A. Wimmer, C.Schetter, (2003) “Putting State- formation First: Some
Reconstruction and peace- Making in Afghanistan,” Journal for International
Development 15, pp. 525-39.
21. C. Schetter, 2002, ‘the “Bazaar Economy” of Afghanistan’, Ch. Noelle-Karimi,
et al. (eds.), Afghanistan A Country Without A State? Frankfurt: IKO Verlag, pp.
109-27.
22. Conrad Schetter, 2005,”Ethnoscapes, National Territorialisation, and the Afghan
War.” Geopolitics 10: p 51.
23. “Nato Turns to Militias inAfghan Battle”, online at: www.channe14.com/news/
articles/world/asia_pacifif/nato+turns+militias+in+afghan+battle/3651297. html
(accessed on 15/10/2015).
24. International Crisis Group (ICG), 2003, “Afghanistan: The problem of Pashtun
Alienation,” ICG Asia Report, No. 32, August 5, pp. 1-36.
25. Kate Clark, 2004,“Of Aid and Arms”, Middle East International, No. 731,
August 6, p. 24.
26. Nazif M. Shahrani, “War, Factionalism, and the State in Afghanistan,” American
Anthropologist, Vol. 104, NO. 3 (2002), pp. 715-21.
27. Special Report, 2003, “unfinished Business in Afghanistan: Warlordism,
Reconstruction and Ethnic Harmony”, United States Institute of Peace, April, p.
6, ICG Reports: www.crisisgroup.org.
28. Barnett R. Rubin, Amin Saikal and Julian Lindley-French, “The Way Forward in
Afghanistan: Three Views”, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 51, no.
1, February-March 2009, p. 89.
29. “The Constitution of Afghanistan,” Unofficial Translation, p. 7, at http://
www.swisspeace.org/uploads/ACSF/GeneralDocuments/final%20new%20
constitution.pdf.
30. Vishal Chandra, “The Unfinished War in Afghanistan: 2001-2014”, 2015, New
Delhi: Pentagon Press, p. 42.
31. International Crisis Group Report, ‘Afghanistan: The Problem of Pashtun
Alienation’, p. 10.
33. Golnaz Esfandairi, “Powerful Commander Gets High-Ranking Military Post,”
RFE/RL Afghanistan Report, 4 (8) March 07, 2005, at http://www.rferl.org/reports/
afghan-report/; Amin Tarzi, “Afghan President Appoints Northern Warlord as
his chief of Staff,” at http://www.azadiradio.org/en/dailyreport/2005/03/02.asp
(accessed on 10/09/2015).
34. “Former Defense Minister Gets Special Privileges,” RFE/RL Afghanistan
Report, 3 (46), December30, 2004, at http://csmonitor.com/2005/0728/
dailyupdate/2004/12/30.asp#241572(accessed on 27/09/2015).
135
36. Karen De Young, “Obama Seeks Narrower Focus in Afghan War” Washington
Post,February 4, 2009; Peter Walters, “No Western-style democracy in
Afghanistan: Angus Houston” The Australian February 26, 2009; “NATO can’t
beat Afghan insurgents alone: Harper” The Canadian Press March 1, 2009
37. http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canadaafghanistan/ progress-progres/elections.
aspx?lang=eng.
38. Noah Coburn and Anna Larson, “Undermining Representative Governance:
Afghanistan’s 2010 Parliamentary Election and Its Alienating Impact,”
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Kabul, Afghanistan, February
2011:http://www.areu.org.af/ (accessed September 17, 2015).
39. “Survey on Political Institutions, Elections, And Democracy In Afghanistan”,
Final Report November 2012,Democracy International,p. 24 [http://www.
democracyinternational.com].
40. National Democratic Institute, the 2010 Wolesi Jirga Elections in Afghanistan,
p. 35.
41. Tolo TV, “Afghan Winners in Eastern Province Warn Against Tampering with
Poll Results,” BBC Monitoring South Asia, November 27, 2010.
42. Tolo TV, “Failed Candidates Demand Annulment of ‘Illegitimate’ Afghan
Election,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, December 12, 2010.
43. National Democratic Institute, the 2010 Wolesi Jirga Elections in Afghanistan,
p. 35.
44. Agreement on the Structure of a National Unity Government, 21 September
2014. Text signed by Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, then witnessed by UN
Special Representative of the Secretary-General Jan Kubis and U.S. Ambassador
James Cunningham, and released by the U.S. embassy on 21 September.
45. “Ghani named Afghan president-elect after deal to end election dispute”, Reuters,
21 September 2014.
46. “IEC presents President-elect with winner certificate”, Tolo News, 26 September
2014.
47. “Dr. Abdullah threatens to boycott the presidential inauguration”, Khaama Press,
28 September, 2014.
48. “Ahmadzai, Abdullah sworn in as prez, CEO”, Pajhwok Afghan News, 29
September 2014.
49. Crisis Group interviews, Kandahar, 21 September 2014.
50. Crisis Group interview, senior Afghan politician, Kabul, 1st June 2014.
51. A. Evans, N. Manning, Y. Osmani, A. Tully, and A. Wilder, 2004,A Guide to
Government in Afghanistan, Kabul and Washington DC: AREU/World Bank.
52. Sarah Lister, 2009, “Changing the Rules?State-Building and Local Government
in Afghanistan”, Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 45, No. 6, July, p. 994.
136
Food Shortages In Kashmir
Response of Society
Danish Mehran
Abstract
This paper aims at explaining the food crisis that ravaged the life and
conditions of the people of Kashmir during pre-modern times. It focuses
on a variety of causes behind food shortages with a view to broaden our
understanding about the present and to provide a guideline for the future.
Besides analysing the philosophy of food shortages, it also dwels upon how
the various sections of the society from the ‘landlords’ through galladars
(grain merchants) and waddars (money-lenders) to peasants and workers
responded to the situation and the web of consequences that followed from
it impacting polity, economy, mentality and culture of the society.
Keywords
Famine, Food Stock, Survival, Crises, Surplus, Peasant, Migration,
Vagabondage, Landlords, Money Lenders.
Introduction
The valley of Kashmir situated in the bosom of the western Himalayas at an
average elevation of 6000ft1, encircled by an unbroken chain of heaven high
mountains and presenting an interesting morphology, witnessed tremendous
devastation on account of food shortages of various natures. In fact, like other
agrarian societies of the world, food crisis had also been the pre-dominant
feature of the Kashmir society caused by a wide range of factors both natural
and artificial. However, it is pertinent to highlight that there prevailed in the
valley two-types of shortages, apikaal or subsistence crisis and drag or famine.
Apikaal (Subsistence Crisis)

Apikaal is a local name of the recurrent almost annual, food shortage faced
by the masses effected not less than 90% of the population of the valley and
having no parallels in the annals of the history of the Indian subcontinent.
This type of food shortage was faced by the people during the spring and
early months of summer as the food available at their command could suffice
their needs only for five to six months. For the remaining part of the year the
peasant had to battle for survival. Though apikaal was not responsible for
death en masse but it certainly made the people vulnerable to death as they had
to forcibly depend on sub-standard foods or those foods which were not good
Food Shortages in Kashmir:Response of Society
for health making them vulnerable to diseases.
Oral Evidence
As per the unanimous version of the octogenarian people, the produce left with
the peasant by the state machinery could suffice his needs only for four to five
months of the year. The rest of the year they survived on rice gruel, vegetables
(both green and dried) and different seasonal fruits, among which the first one
was mulberry fruit, others that followed were apricot, apples, pears, etc. to
help the people to survive upon. Wild produce (both vegetables and fruits) was
another substitute for the people. Besides the peasant’s sustenance on these
eatables for the major part of the year, he sometimes sold his property in lieu
of paltry quantity of food.2
Muhammad Naji Munawar (resident of Kapran Shopyian) says:

The period from spring to autumn used to be the toughest period
of the year in terms of food availability. During these months we
used to feed mostly on wild fruits like mulberry, chanch, strawberry,
etc. Fruit trees of soar apples (cheuk choent) and a variety of pears
locally called as ‘Bata Tang’ (consumed in place of rice), were
planted to support life during the period of food shortages.
Quoting Abdul Gani Baba (resident of Tral Pulwama):

During the cultivating season (June to August) when the peasant
sweat his brow his staple food was already exhausted. The only food
available to him at that time used to be raw fruits, bottle guards
(aleh), beans (Rajmah-hembeh), knoll-kohl (hakh), and some other
vegetables.
Ghulam Ahmad Khanday (resident of Parganam Phak) says:

Rice was not cultivated in the pargana Phak for the lack of irrigation
facilities till 1950s. It was only from the time when Shalteng Canal,
popular as Bakshi Kuhl, was constructed that this area was able to
produce rice and the people tasted the staple food to the satisfaction.
Till then maize was the staple food. The scarcity of food almost for
half-a-year forced the people to survive on coarse food-grains [buck
wheat - trombeh; kangni – shol; chena – pingeh; barley – vishkeh;
beans (mung and peas); boiled maize – whaat and half grinded maize
(satu) with tea)]. Once a lady (named Tajeh) in our neighbourhood
felt unconscious during day time and we all ran to their house. After
enquiring about the cause it was found that she had not taken food
for the past nine days. At times the raw and unhygienic food on
which the people survived was the cause of many diseases.
138
Abdul Karim Wagay (resident of Padgampur, Awantipur, Pulwama)

while recollecting his father’s (who had died at the age of 102 in
2010) experiences, with whom he had shared a major period of his
life, Wagay narrated that the other options available to the people for
survival after the depletion of their stocks, usually after six months,
were satu (roasted and grinded maize) and wat (a preparation made
of half grinded and boiled maize) as maize was the only food crop
grown in the area till 1950s.
Haji Abdul Rahman Mir (resident of Shadipora Pattan Baramulla says:

Till the construction of Sumbal Canal (Official name) popular as
Shiekh Kuhlas it was constructed by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah in
the Sumbal-Sonawari area of district Baramula the people cultivated
only maize. During the scarcities people survived up on berries of
mulberry (tul) during spring season, on fish during summer and
barley (wishkeh) during autumn.
Quoting Haji Aziz Parray (resident of Chodus Awantipora Pulwama):

The winters used to be long and harsh but the people were acclimatized
with such conditions. We used to feed on dry vegetables like dried
guards (al-hatchi), dried brinjal (wangan Hatchi), dried knoll-khol
(hukh hakh), handh, etc.
Hamid-ullah Bhat (resident of Arrah Kulgam) says:

During winters, people mostly used to go to Punjab in search of
manual job or physical work (mazuer) to eke out living. I myself had
gone to Punjab twenty five times to earn livelihood. Those people
who stayed in the valley took to spinning and weaving and survived
upon dried vegetables, kachniel handh, hakeh kandh, posh-handh
and wild produce mainly different varieties of knoll-khol (pambeh
hakh, dij dij hakh, shranzal hakh, yendurtul hakh) and van pran (wild
spring onion or shallot).
The distressing economic condition faced by the valley people gave birth
to the following proverbs:
‘Doh Kadun Go Koh Kadun’
In the period of scarcity and starvation, passing a day without food and
meals was equivalent to passing a year.
‘Wathiv Kuthav Khayew Shikaar Maaz
Wathiv Nai Teh Khayev Panun Maaz’
In strife and struggle a person was compelled to live on the hunting of
wild animals and birds, otherwise, he had the only option to die in starvation.
‘Bujeh Lob Kujeh Tul Cheont
Doh Dish Gai Teh Haptan khay’
139
In the time of starvation; the people used to go to jungles in search of

wild grown fruits and vegetables. In the strife; an old woman found a fruit
(an apple) under a tree and continued to visit the spot to collect the fruits for
some days for her survival. Finally she fell victim to a wild bear as one day
she encountered with the animal in this strife; the food was basically the food
of that animal.
‘Bata Thoda Toh Bismillah Bechara Kya Karay’
Muslims believe that to begin the eating of meals they shall begin it with
the name of Allah which spiritually suffices their bodily need. Since the people
had too scanty food, the proverb took its origin that when food is too less; how
Bismillah (the name of Allah) will suffice the need.
‘Batah Dadeh Chai Wateh Wil Gachan’
For want of meals (Rice) the people would lose their way, country and
relations as the search for the same would take them to distant lands unheard
and unknown to them.
Recorded Evidence
Thewritten evidence mentions only acute food crisis due to crop failures
leaving out the food shortages the poor sections, who constituted the largest
segment of the society, faced invariably for most of the year. However, we
have produced whatever little evidence the written sources provided to support
that food shortages existed even during normal times in the valley.
The peasants lived for the most part of the year on sub-standard diet like,
rice gruel, vegetables, wild fruits tea, and grass or without food for days.3 In
fact according to the 19th and 20th century observers the condition of Kashmiri
peasantry was worse than that of the peasants living in elsewhere in India.4 This
is also substantiated by the fact that even in normal times the peasant could
not dream of having a food-stock which could suffice his basic necessities
till he could harvest his crops.5 This was due to the fact that in Kashmir the
state demand from the peasant was far in excess of his surplus produce (i.e.,
the produce over and above that required for his subsistence). It is, therefore,
no wonder to come across a decline in the number of Kashmiri peasants6 and
to see them roving from place to place.7 Moorcraft noted the heart rending
condition of the people:8
The number of Kashmirians.....and their appearance, half naked and
miserably emaciated, presented a ghastly picture of poverty and starvation.
G.T. Vigne, who visited Kashmir in 1835, found exactly the same
situation:9
…not a day passed when traveling in the valley, that I didn’t see the
bleached remains of some unfortunate wretch who had fallen a victim
either to sickness or starvation; and principally, as I had afterwards
reason to believe, to the consequences of the dreadful scarcity with
which Kashmir was afflicted...
140
During the six months when the food was deficient the common masses
in the absence of any relief from the state were forced to sell whatever little
property in terms of trees, cattle or blankets they had produced during the
year or exchanging the land for a few seers (seer is less than one kilogram)
of rice to appease their hunger. Vagabondage or itinerant begging was largely
the outcome of food shortages. Either they were migrating from rural homes
to urban centres where they hoped to beg for their food or they wandered out
from towns and cities into the open country-side in a last ditch attempt to find
anything to eat. As per Joseph Wolff:10
The country is so completely subjugated, that the natives except a few
traders in shawls, are nothing better than so many beggars.
B.C. Hugel narrates his encounter with a Brahmin, who stopped his horse,
seized the bridle and demanded alms. Hugel remarks:11
The manner in which charity to sometimes is asked here shows the degree
of misery and despair.
To quote Bazaz:12
...a Muslim peasant presents the appearance of a starving beggar.
The people during winters survived on pulses, dried vegetables (obtained
from kitchen gardens, forests and grazing fields) and dried fruits for their
survival.13 In the absence of any substantial means to earn livelihood the
inhabitants starving at home were driven in great numbers to the plains of
Hindustan during winters in search of labour, save some of their wages and to
return in early spring.14However, the condition of the people who visited the
plains during winters for earning livelihood was not better than the beggars as
is revealed by Shiekh Mohammad Abdullah:15
...I saw Kashmiri Muslims in big bands leaving their beautiful land
for the hard plains of Punjab in search of livelihood....Many a time I
found some Kashmiris begging for meals. I felt ashamed and asked
one of them, “Why are you begging? Don’t you get any work?” the
labourer replied, “Yes Sir! We definitely get it. We earn about 12 to
16 annas a day but we have to collect and save this amount because
on our return we have to pay land revenue to the state, buy clothes for
our children and carry some food items for our families. If we spend
this money on our meals, we can’t make both ends meet.
The graveness of the scarcity can be imagined by the fact that in 1643
the valley people engulfed with scarcity took to violence and set ablaze the
dwelling of Pandit Mahadev16 (the then peshkar)for the reason that the official
had turned to be a hoarder.17 Similar incident of popular uprising which led
to the killing of mir ‘adl and daroga-i-adalat and setting ablaze the houses
of the grain dealers, is detectable during the deputy governorship of Ihtiram
Khan (1731-32).18 In I93I there were serious riots in the State as a result of
which the Muslim Conference was formed. In particular the clamour was for
agrarian reform.19
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Next to the peasantry, the most discontented segment of the population of

Kashmir was the shawl-weavers and workers of other cottage industries. These
workers mostly hailed from urban areas especially Srinagar and exclusively
belonged to the Muslim community. Like peasantry the shawl-weavers also
lived in chronic poverty because of their exploitation by the state as well as
its officials. The officials of the Dagshawl were sucking the life-blood of this
class by exacting the usual nazrana. The shawl-baf and his family were often
reduced to a state of semi-starvation.20 Madusuden Ganju has also highlighted
the pitiable condition of the shawl weavers:21
the standard of living of workers engaged in the woollen industry, as a
whole, is very low. Their food is poor..... Their staple food in Kashmir province
is rice which they eat with an ordinary kind of cooked vegetable leaves called
hak (knoll-kohl). Some of them cannot afford even that much.
The people dwelling around the lakes especially Wular survived upon
Sinharas (water-nuts) for nearly 2/5part of the year showing the scarcity
people were facing. As per Moorcraft:22
Another principal article of the food of the common people, the Sinhara
or water-nut, grows abundantly in the different lakes in the vicinity of the
capital and especially in the Wular Lake…it constituted the almost only food
of at least 30,000 persons for five months in the year.
The heavy taxation policy of the state as well as the official oppression had
forced the shawl-bafs of Srinagar to revolt against the government earlier in
1865.23 But the agitation lacked the organized character that accounted for its
failure. Again in 1924, the labourers of the silk factory, Srinagar, had launched
an agitation against the corruption and atrocities of the Pandit officialdom
and the payment of the extremely low wages.24 The government took swift
measures to suppress this uprising, which was portrayed in official records
as the Muslim community’s attempt at pressurizing the darbar to grant them
political concessions.25
Famines (qahat or drag)

Besides the permanent shortage of food, there occurred occasionally severe
food crisis called qahat or drag in local parlance. This severe crisis was the
result of crop failures owing to untimely floods, early snowfall and other such
reasons. Till 1950s Kashmir history witnessed a number of famines causing
a crescendo of death, misery, forcible flights and impoverishment of the
peasantry and other poor sections of the society. The famines that occurred in
the history of Kashmir are as:
Famine of 1831
During the governorship of Sher Singh, a serious famine occurred in the
valley, which was given the name of governor itself.26 The terrible famine
namely Sher Singh was caused by the early autumn snow of 1831 which
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destroyed the paddy crop on a large scale.27 The famine had devastating
effects and it has been calculated that the population of Kashmir was reduced
from eight lakh to two lakh.28 The famine was followed by a flood which
destroyed many important irrigation works and permanently submerged large
areas of valuable cultivation.29 The problems of the people were increased by
the revenue collectors as they embezzled much public money and hoarded
grain.30Jamadaar Khushal Singh was sent by Ranajit Singh from Lahore to
Kashmir to watch events.31 Before giving the hungry masses the food Khushal
Singh took more interest in harassing and torturing the revenue collectors,
which ultimately gave rise to a mass protest by marching down to Lahore and
Amritsar in batches in order to excite the sympathy of the Maharaja.32 In this
way due to his unwise methods, Khushal Singh deepened the famine resulting
in the migration of a number of Kashmiris to Punjab.33 The total picture was a
devastating famine. An eyewitness account of the general devastation caused
by the severity of cold, extortions by Khushal Singh and the great famine
which followed, is contained in one of the most touching musnavis written by
Khazir Shah, resident of Bijbehara, nom de plume, “Muqbil”. He says:34
Owing to the famine cereals became scarce having been secreted by the
‘godless’ hoarders. The prices of eatables went up10-15 times their normal
prices…all were bundled in one shroud of hunger. To survive, therefore, they
started hunger-marches to the Punjab, many having died on the way, unwept,
unburied and unsung.
Another eyewitness, Khalil Mirjanpuri, Adds,35
Whatever has been stated above (by Muqbil) actually many times worse
was the condition. Parents even sold their children for food.
Famine of 1877-79
The disaster of 1877 was caused by continuous rains which fell from October
1877 till January 1878.36 According to an eyewitness, the sky had been
overcast for full five months.37 In this famine there was an enormous loss of
life. The loss in terms of crops would have been much lesser had the people
been allowed to cut their crops on time.38 The reaping operations had been
delayed due to procedural difficulties.39 As per the existing system of revenue
collection the cultivators were allowed to cut their crops only after the revenue
assessment had been made by Govt. officials. This system had always stood
in the way of timely harvest. Thus the un-harvested crop was damaged by the
rain.40 After rice and maize were destroyed by the rains, an order was issued
to sell the state stocks of Barley at Rs. 1.4.0 per Kharwar to the city people.
However the self seeking middlemen took the advantage of the situation and
bought up barley and wheat at once at this rate and afterwards retailed it at
Rs. 19 per Kharwar.41 In the spring of 1878, the new Rabi crops (wheat and
Barley) and the fruits were also damaged by the heavy rains. This demoralized
the people. Most of the people starved to death. Corpses were scattered
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everywhere. Wells and holes were choked with dead bodies and prowling
dogs played on human carcasses.42 The Gujjars of the mountains were the
heaviest sufferers. Many orphan girls were sold to the city ‘Amjis’.43 The
people who survived were terror-stricken and never shared their scanty stock
of food with anybody. When the vegetables were finished, the hungry people
took to oil-cakes and rice-chaff and this diet soon hastened the work of death.44
After much devastation, some half hearted and feeble attempts were made
to organize famine relief. A few almshouses were established and grain was
imported from Punjab.45 The imported grain was adulterated with dirt and the
agency for its distribution was often corrupt. There by retailing the adulterated
grain to the wealthy people at Rs. 25 per kharwar.46 During the famine, the
state added the troubles of the cultivators by issuing an order to search their
houses for seed grain, there by totally demoralizing the cultivators as they
knew that the state policy was to save the city at all costs from the horrors of
famine.47 Thus they preferred to hide their scanty grain in the damp earth or
in water.48 Even in the next season the starving cultivators were given only
a small share of the produce as the heavy rains had once again damaged the
harvest.49 Thus the cultivators were not able to overcome famine in the second
year also. During the famine many people tried to escape to the Punjab but
were prevented by the troops to do so. However, some succeeded to migrate
by bribing the troops at the passes while leaving their wives and children to
starve in Kashmir.50 The mortality was greatest among villagers, while shawl
weavers were the chief victims of famine in the city.51 According to Muslims,52
Hindus being a privileged class used their official power to seize all available
grain and thus there was little mortality among them from starvation. However,
Lawrence states that in reality the Hindus of Kashmir consume less food than
the Muslims and were used to fasts and this helped them to survive during the
famine.53 One authority has stated that the population of Srinagar was reduced
from127400 to 60,000 and others say that of the total population of the valley
only 2/5th survived54 as the famine took away 67,400 persons from the city and
1,74,220 from the villages.55
Famine of 1893
During Pratap Singh’s reign,56 in the year 1893, a great calamity struck the
state in the form of two consecutive floods. As the floods approached Srinagar,
the country to the south of Srinagar was converted into a vast lake.57 In the
month of July 1893,58 the spring crops of wheat, Barley and rape-seed had
been harvested but were still lying on the threshing floor. The expectations
were that the autumn harvest would be that of a bumper one. But to their
dismay a great flood occurred and destroyed both, harvested spring crops
and standing autumn crops simultaneously. The Jehlum River flooded with
water broke through the gate which protects the Dal Lake from floods and
submerged the vegetable gardens in the lake,59 thus destroying the vegetable
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marrows, cucumbers, tomatoes, and melons which formed an Important of the

citizen’s diet in the month of July.60 The area of radhs (floating gardens) thus
destroyed was estimated at forty acres.61 In the Wular area, rice and maize
crops laid rotting in the flood waters.62 The area of cultivable land submerged
under water was estimated at 25,426 acres.63 Houses along with the spring
crops were carried off by the flood and the country presented a pitiable sight.
In these floods 2,225 houses were wrecked and 329 cattle were killed.64 It cost
the state Rs. 64,804 in land revenue under crops.65 The flood caused a great loss
to both grain as well as the fodder.66 The State started the construction of the
road from Baramula to Srinagar as a famine relief measure after 1892. Ample
work was provided to the people in the neighbourhood of Srinagar who had
lost their crops in the 1892 flood. The Mir Bahri cultivators were exempted
from beggar (forced labour) for one month to enable them to raise a fresh crop
of vegetables and Mr. Nethersole, In-charge, Water Works Department, was
instructed to offer them employment.67 The tehsildars were issued orders to
repair the irrigated channels so as to save the remaining rice crop which was
almost in ears.68 The state provided work for the common masses in the form
of repairs of embankments and construction of water works. In every way the
state acted with greatest liberality and consideration.69
Famine of 1901
During the first years of 20th century (1901), the insensitiveness and carelessness
of the state and the realization of entry tax (Chongi) octroi fee on every edible
commodity entering the city had its adverse impact, the effects of the famine
surfaced, every kind of corn/grain especially rice went into extinction from the
market. People of the city were drenched into extreme difficulty and calamity.
The grain dealers became totally inhuman and the prices of rice went from
one rupee to one rupee four anna and fluctuated to Rs. four a kharwar. The
administration did not pay any attention. The continuous rains for one week
led to the flood which added to the miseries. Flood unleashed a worst spell
across river Jhelum, Dal, Wular, etc. and thereby the people living around.
The situation led to great famine. The flood consumed a heavy toll of cattle.
One seer of rice was not available for the rate of one rupee. The grain dealers
and hoarders were selling one or two seer of paddy behind the curtain even on
higher price twice or four times than the actual price. People were sustaining
themselves on tea, grass, sag (knol-kohl) or without food for day. The
situation reached to the extent that they began to sell their properties, houses,
jewellery on throw away prices for their survival. The careless government
was not moved at all. They only imposed restriction on export of grain and just
issued an advisory to the wealthy grain dealers to arrange grain from villages
and peripheries and to distribute the same among the needy on reasonable
prices. However, the water logged lands was exempted from revenue. These
steps hardly mitigated the sufferings and thus were forced by the situation
145
to opt for begging. People resorted to the intake of ripe and raw fruits. On
the recommendations of Manager Carpet Weaving, Mr. Michel, rationing of
paddy was fixed for nine months and maize four trak was facilitated to per
individual at one rupee. The unconcerned corrupt government officials with
their cunningness took the rationing in their own hands and acted as per their
sweet will of favourtism against considerations. Poor people had to suffer
despite the all concessions and efforts of the government. People under the
leadership of Molvi Hussain Zerak Shah raised their voice of protest near
Shergadi on the banks of river Jhelum. The establishment did not like the
move, termed it as a rebellion and took preventive measures and action. The
army and police resorted to senseless arrests. About one thousand protestors
were arrested and about three hundred people including Molvi Hussain Zerak
Shah were sent for judicial trail and they were convicted after a summary
trail and sent to jail. Only after a few days revenue minister Gh. Ahmed Khan
Munshi passed away and Zerak Shah wrote a marsia (mourning song) and
send it to his home which is translated as under,70
The suppression raised its voice that the suppressor and killer of Kashmiris
has reached to his destination.
Famine of 1929
On 29th August 1929, the villages situated near the river banks and the whole
area below Srinagar around Sonawari was submerged under water because
of continuous rains. Whatever crops like paddy, maize, pulses, etc., stand
devastated. On 4th September, a public meeting was held at Hazooribagh. The
sincere efforts, performance and sympathy of Maharaja Bahadur in difficult
times was appreciated. Thanks giving resolutions were passed for the role
of Maharaja to rescue the people hit by the calamity and for taking flood
preventive measures.71
To make it clear we have attempted to separately highlight the causes
of apikaal (subsistence crisis) and drag (famine). Nevertheless, it would not
be out of place to mention that while as due respect has been shown towards
the different theoretical perspectives on the causation of food crisis especially
famines, as mentioned above; and insights have been drawn from them,
however, we have not let ourselves to be over swayed by any of them. Indeed
our attempt has been to rationally and objectively analyse the causes of the
food crisis on the basis of available evidence.
Societal Response
The perpetual problem of food shortages and the occasional but inevitable
crop failures, which the valley faced for centuries, produced expected response
from the people to survive the challenges of extinction though the response
had the limitations of the time underlined by poor technology and poverty.
The social responses of common folk that undoubtedly suffered the most
146
from famine or batta sakhti (scarcity of rice meal) including thievery, flight,
vagabondage, religious prayers and processions and above all consumption of
alternative food stuff.
Certainly, every Kashmiris first priority was to have rice meal but when
it became scarce, the people would leave no stone unturned to obtain it even
if it meant selling their land or they would work in some rich peasant family
in lieu of two times meals. Thus the term ‘batta mohnu’ i.e., the one who
sold his labour in lieu of meals. However, when obtaining rice would become
absolutely impossible the people had to unwillingly raise and survive on
substitute cereals or purchase them in exchange of goods. The rearing of cattle,
sheep, planting of walnut, poplar and willow trees collectively called maal
(wealth) was considered muhimuk yar (friend in need or problem).It is only
to be expected that when faced with desperate circumstances, to either steal
or starve, humans will opt for the choice that preserves their lives. There are
some indications that crime was on the uprising during the famines. During
the famines or scarcity of food, people used to indulge in crimes mostly related
to theft of rice from the store houses (kucheh).72
Vagabondage or itinerant begging was largely the outcome of
food shortages. People took to the road during famines under two main
circumstances; either they were migrating from rural homes to urban centres
where they hoped to beg for their food or they wandered out from towns and
cities into the open country-side in a last ditch attempt to find anything to eat.
As per Joseph Wolff:73
The country is so completely subjugated, that the natives except a few
traders in shawls, are nothing better than so many beggars.
B.C. Hugel’s narrates his encounter with a Brahmin, who stopped his
horse, seized the bridle and demanded alms. Hugel remarks:74
The manner in which charity to sometimes is asked here shows the degree
of misery and despair.
During the scarcity of 1901, the government issued an advisory to the
wealthy grain dealers to arrange grain from villages and peripheries and to
distribute the same among the needy on reasonable prices. However, the water
logged lands was exempted from revenue. These steps hardly mitigated the
sufferings and thus were forced by the situation to opt for begging75. For a
Kashmiri peasant his life was a battle for survival, i.e., how to manage two
times ordinary meals for himself and his family. For the cause of survival
large-scale migrations to Indian Plains76 used to take place. The sufferers
flocked in thousands to Punjab and to Hindustan, numerous “dying on the
road, the others selling their children for a morsel of bread.77” Lawrence
gives a heart rending condition of the people of valley, who tried to escape the
1878 famine conditions. He writes:78
many attempted to escape to the Punjab…and harrowing tales are
told of the fathers of families getting past the barrier by bribing the
147
guardians of the passes, while the wives and children were left to die
in Kashmir.
Communities led by the Ulama organized prayers and processions too
entreat God for better weather. Supernatural explanations for atmospheric
disturbances of course go back to very beginning of human civilization,
as did the notion that appeasing or supplicating the God in question gave
humans some means of indirect control over the elements. In Kashmir, the
causation and remedy of famine, plague, etc, considered by the folk exactly
the same as we find in Europe. A London chronicler wrote that in 1315, the
city’s Churchmen to avert the famine, processed in bare feet every Friday
and carried on display the host and other relics. In Paris and elsewhere in
northern France similar processions occurred in which the participants were
not only barefoot but completely nude, likewise carrying holy relics. Prayers
and parading of relics also occurred in the region of Xanten on Germany’s
western border with France. Prayer unions to spiritually intercede with God
on behalf of the community were established during the famine.79The peasants
of Kashmir, too, were deeply steeped in conservatism and tradition. Indeed,
remedy for the prevalent deficiency of irrigation was sought by the peasants
in the ‘Supernatural’ powers of the Sayyids and Saints80. They attributed all
natural and manmade calamities to the curse of God. The droughts, earth
quakes, cholera, famines and the cruelty of rulers were all attributed to God.
In order to get relief from these calamities, though temporarily, the peasants
were made to part with their cattle wealth and the surplus amount of produce,
in the shape of offerings by these Sayyids and Saints81.
How the people fought the food crisis, we have pieced together the
information from oral and written sources which is reproduced below:
During famines people used to survive upon inferior food items like
the coarse food grains (pingeh, shoel). The crops could be cultivated
in a short span of time for personal use. At some rare places the
peasants would also cultivate Bajra and Jawar. The wild produce
was also consumed like, wild Brinjal (van vangan), hapat-bazin,
trumboh, kaneyat, fruit berries, nuts, etc.82
During the famine of 1877-79, when the vegetables were
finished, the hungry people took to oil-cakes and rice-chaff 83 and
saffron bulbs.84
During famines people used to flee their villages and would
migrate to other areas with their cattle. The people would survive
on barley (vishkeh), Ganhar, Shoel, milk, fish, berries of Mulberry,
apricots and almonds during such harsh conditions. Also the domestic
animals used to be the alternative source of food for survival.85
However, after the establishment of Sikh rule, the slaughter of cow was
forbidden and people found guilty of this practice were put to death.86
Wild fruits would be the only food to feed upon during famines.87
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I have heard from my mother that once in a famine a person brought

five kilograms of rice in exchange of sheep.88
During my childhood, there was a period when people had nothing
to eat for a year and survived on tubers of a wild grass locally known
as ‘Maagmuesh’.89
During the cultivating season (June to August) when the peasant
sweat his brow his staple food was already exhausted. The only food
available to him at that time used to be raw fruits, bottle guards
(aleh), beans (Rajmah-hembeh), knoll-khol (hakh), and some other
vegetables.90
As per the unanimous version of the octogenarian people whom I
interviewed during the field study, the produce left with the peasant by the
state machinery could suffice his needs only for four to five months of the year.
The rest of the year they survived on different seasonal fruits, among which
the first one was mulberry fruit91. To substantiate it, there goes a proverb:
Tula aaw teh draag drav
[With the appearance of mulberry, famine petered out]
Other fruits that followed the mulberry were apricot, apples, pears, etc.
to help the people to survive upon. Kitchen garden was another substitute for
the people92.
The Shadipora Canal was constructed during the Prime Minister-
ship of Mr. G.M. Bakshi for irrigation purposes. From that period
onwards rice began to be cultivated in the area. Till then only maize
was cultivated and that too occasionally because of recurrent floods.
So during the scarcities people survived up on berries of mulberry
(tul) during spring season, on fish during summer and barley
(wishkeh) during autumn.93
While recollecting his father’s (who had died at the age of 103
in 2005) experiences, with whom he had shared a major period of his
life, Wagay narrated that the area used to face recurrent floods. Then
the people used to consume milk, roasted and grinded maize (Satu)
as well as Wat (a preparation made of half grinded and boiled maize)
as maize was the only food crop grown in the area.94
Although milk was abundantly available to the peasant but he consumed
very small part of it. The poor peasant used to make ghee out of the major
share of milk and handed it over to the money-lender so as to come out of the
vicious circle of indebtedness.95
The period from spring to autumn used to be the toughest period
of the year in terms of food availability. During these months we
used to feed mostly on wild fruits like mulberry, Chanch, strawberry,
etc. Fruit trees of soar apples (cheuk choent) and a variety of pears
locally called as ‘Bata Tang’ (consumed in place of rice), were
planted to support life during the period of food shortages.96
149
The people dwelling around the lakes especially Wular survived upon
Sigharas (water-nuts) for nearly 2/5part of the year showing the scarcity
people were facing. As per Moorcraft:97
Another principal article of the food of the common people, the Sinhara
or water-nut, grows abundantly in the different lakes in the vicinity of the
capital and especially in the Wular Lake… it constituted the almost only food
of at least 30,000 persons for five months in the year.
Somehow, the people living in and around Dal Lake would manage to get
fish from the waters as ban had been imposed on fishing.98 As per the version
of elderly people living near forests around the Dal Lake:
they used to pluck the raw tubers of a herb locally known as ‘Assud’
from the forests in spring for consumption during scarcity of food.
However, it could not be consumed during autumn as it released
toxins on ripening
Apart from food grains received by the people living in Dal from
state, fish and water chest-nuts (Guer Gul-harvested mostly from
WularLake in autumn season when the water level would be very
low), was transported by the boatmen of Srinagar and supplied the
same to Srinagar people.99
The stem of the Nymphaea Lotus (Nadru in local dialect) was an important
source of food derived from the lakes. It supported 5000 persons in the city
for nearly eight months100. The floating gardens also provided a rich source of
survival to the people of city.
Besides the peasant’s sustenance on rice gruel, vegetables, wild fruits and
other sub-standard kind of diet for the major part of the year, he sometimes
sold his property in lieu of paltry quantity of food101.
The winters used to be long and severe. There used to be heavy snowfalls
and it was too hard to go out. No production was possible as the land used
to remain under cover by snow up to four to five feet. So the only food to
survive up on during winters for a peasant was whatever he had stored during
summers. The food during the winters mainly constituted of pulses, dried
vegetables (obtained from kitchen gardens, forests and grazing fields) and
dried fruits102.
The winters used to be long and harsh but the people were acclimatized
with such conditions. We used to feed on dry vegetables like dried
guards (al-hatchi), dried brinjal (wangan Hatchi), dried knoll-khol
(hukh hakh), handh, etc.103
During winters, people mostly used to go to Punjab in search of
manual job or physical work (mazuer) to eke out living. I myself had
gone to Punjab twenty five times to earn livelihood. Those people
who stayed in the valley took to spinning and weaving and survived
upon dried vegetables, kachniel handh, hakeh kandh, posh handh
and wild produce mainly different varieties of knoll-khol (pambeh
150
hakh, dij dij hakh, shranzal hakh, yendurtul hakh) and Van Pran
(wild spring onion or shallot).104
No less important means adopted by the people to survive the food
crisis was to migrate to plains. Drew records his personal observation in this
regard;105
When a bad year comes they (people of the valley) are put to great straits
and will perhaps leave the country in number for the isolation of the place
such that it is exceedingly difficult for any great importation of corn to be
made to redress the failure of the harvest.
Lawrence also says that the agricultural wage labourers were engaged in
agricultural pursuit only for a specific period of five months a year. Therefore,
they migrated to the plains during winter months to earn their sustenance106.
Girdlestone also states that very few supplemented their income by taking to
weaving of woollen blankets and baskets while staying at home107. However,
the condition of the peasants, labourers, or others, who visited to plains during
winters for earning livelihood, was not better than the beggars as is revealed
by Shiekh Mohammad Abdullah:108
My stay at Lahore, for other reasons, awakened me from the
slumber and made me familiar with new spirits. I saw Kashmiri
Muslims in big bands leaving their beautiful land for the hard plains
of Punjab in search of livelihood. These labourers had to cross on foot
the snowy mountains of Mari and Banihall and had to face thousands
of odds in their way. Sometimes, while crossing the mountains, these
people were perishing as a result of difficult passes, snowstorms,
etc. these unfortunate people were dying unwept and unsung. It was
not easy once reaching the plains; there they had to face numerous
odds and worries. During the day they wandered through the streets
in search of work. Some worked as wood cutters, some as helpers
to the shopkeepers, some carried heavy loads on their backs while
some of them did grinding. After doing hard work during the day,
they earned very little money of which maximum was spent on their
meals. They passed their nights either in any inn or mosque, where
they were harassed like dumb driven cattle. Many a time I found
some Kashmiris begging for meals. I felt ashamed and asked one of
them, “Why are you begging? Don’t you get any work?” the labourer
replied, “Yes Sir! We definitely get it. We earn about 12 to 16 annas
a day but we have to collect and save this amount because on our
return we have to pay land revenue to the state, buy clothes for our
children and carry some food items for our families. If we spend this
money on our meals, we can’t make both ends meet.
The nineteenth century sources are replete with references that the
sufferers flocked in thousands to Punjab and to Hindustan, numerous:109
dying on the road, the others selling their children for a morsel of bread.
151
Though for crossing the passes ‘rahdari’ (pass) was required110, yet the
oppressed peasantry managed to escape through by-passes or by bribing the
troops stationed at passes111. And when any famine occurred the state observed
leniency and let the people to leave the land for eking out their existence
elsewhere in plains112. The non-availability of food and the forced migrations
during the famine of 1831 is contained in one of the most touching musnavis
written by Khazir Shah, resident of Bijbehara, nom de plume, “Muqbil”:113
Owing to the famine cereals became scarce having been secreted by the
‘godless’ hoarders. The prices of eatables went up 10-15 times their normal
prices…all were bundled in one shroud of hunger. To survive, therefore, they
started hunger-marches to the Punjab, many having died on the way, unwept,
unburied and unsung.
Another eyewitness, Khalil Mirjanpuri, Adds:114
Whatever has been stated above (by Muqbil) actually many times
worse was the condition. Parents even sold their children for food.
The great famine of 1877-79 had compelled the state to abolish the
rahdari system,115 though temporarily as we find strict orders being issued by
the state government even as late in 1926-27, prohibiting the migration and
those who disobeyed were fined and even their private property, if any, was
auctioned.116 As the system was abolished peasants flocked towards the plains,
which is borne by these words:
The lifting of the ban witnessed a stampede, it appeared as if a bund
had suddenly collapsed, for a sea of humanity, drawn from every town and
village, was moving towards the snow clad passes, on their way to the land of
hope – the British India117”, and therefore, “the migration was so extensive
that according to the 1891 census Report of Punjab, 1,11,775 Muslims born
in Kashmir were counted as having settled in the Punjab118.” The number
would have been much more had the information regarding other parts been
available.
In Kashmir the sale of children had been purely an economic problem.
The horrors of starvation consequent on famines had in the past compelled
parents to sell their beloved children in order to save them from imminent
death119. Moore’s poem had given the impression that Kashmir was a land
of smouldering dark-eyed beauties. Jacquemont explained this that the lack
of pretty women in Kashmir was undoubtedly because all little girls who
promised to turn out pretty were120 sold at eight years of age and conveyed
into the Punjab and to India. Their parents sell them at from twenty to three
hundred francs, most commonly fifty to sixty. The orphan girls were sold to
the city Amjis121 during the famine of 1877-79.
References & Notes

1. Fredrick Drew, TheJummoo and Kashmir Territories, Delhi: Oriental Publishers,
repr. 1971, p. 162.
152
2. It is common to hear in the villages of Kashmir that, “this piece of land has been
sold or purchased in lieu of one trakh of rice or one seer of tea.”
3. Saadat, Mufti Mohammad Shah, Taarikh-i-Kashmir ki Rozana Dairy- 1846-1947
(Daily Dairy of the History of Kashmir), Srinagar: Noor Mohammad Ghulam
Muhhamad, 1997), pp. 632, 33, 34.
4. Wingate, A., Preliminary Report of Settlement Operations in Kashmir and
Jammu (Lahore: W. Ball & Co., 1888, p. 61; INA, Peasant Position, pp. 1-6;
INA, For. Deptt., K.W, Sec. E. Nos. 106-10, Progs. Feb, 1890; Younghusband,
Francis, Kashmir, Srinagar: Gulshan Publishers, first published 1908, repr. 1996,
p. 174;. Neve, E.F., Beyond the Pir Panjal: Life among the Mountains and Valleys
of Kashmir, London: T.F. Unwin, 1912, pp. 264-65.
5. Ibid.
6. Wingate, A., op.cit., p. 78.
7. INA, Peasant Position, p. 1-2; See also, Census of 1931, pp. 94-95.
8. Moorcraft, W. and George Trebeck, Travels in the Himalyan Provinces of
Hindustan and the Punjab; In Ladakh and Kashmir, In Peshawar, Kabul, Kunduz,
and Bokhara, (New Delhi: Sagar Publications, 1971), p. 293.
9. Vigne, G.T., Travels in Kashmir, Ladak, Iskardo, the countries adjoining the
mountain-course of the Indus, and the Himalaya, north of the Panjab, London:
Henry Colburn, 1842, vol. I, p. 257.
10. Keenan, B., Travels in Kashmir: A Popular History of its People, Places and
Crafts, Permanent Black, 1989, p. 124.
11. Ibid, p. 134.
12. Bazaz, P.N., Inside Kashmir, Srinagar; Gulshan Publishers, 2002, pp. 252-53.
13. Lawrence, Walter R., The Valley of Kashmir, London, 1895, Sgr., 1967, p. 254.
14. Wingate, A., op.cit., p.16; Girdlestone, Charles, Memorandum of Cashmere
and Adjacent Territories, Calcutta: Foreign Dept. Press, 1874, p.30; Lawrence,
Walter. R, op.cit., p.253; Gupta, J.B. Das, Jammu & Kashmir, Calcutta, 1967, p.30.
15. S.M. Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar (Atish-i-Chinar), (New Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1993) p. 940.
16. Fazl, Abul, Akbar Nama, Ed., Nawal Kishore, Lucknow, 1867; Eng. Trans.,H.
Beveridge, Delhi, 1973,vol. III, pp. 830-32.
17. Khalil, Mirjanpuri, Ta’rikh-i-Kashmir, (C. 1846-57), Per ms., Research &
Publication Department Srinagar, ff. 169-71.
18. Azam,Muhammad, Waqi’at-i-Kashmir, Urdu Trans., Munshi Ashraf, Ali, Delhi,
1846, pp. 514-15.
19. Lord Birdwood, Kashmir, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International
Affairs 1944), Vol. 28, No. 3 (July, 1952), p. 301.
20. Throp, Robert, Cashmere Misgovernment, Calcutta: Wyman Brothers, 1868, p. 34.
21. Ganju, Madusuden, Textile Industries in Kashmir, (Delhi: Premier Publishing
Company, 1945) p. 109.
22. Moorcraft, W., op.cit., vol. II, p. 136.
23. Throp, Robert, op.cit., pp. 52-65.
24. Sadaat, Mufti Mohammad Shah, op.cit., p. 678.
25. Khan, G.H., Freedom Movement in Kashmir1931-40, DelhiLight and Life
Publishers, 1980, p. 87. The Dogra state’s administrative records suggest that
the government could not afford to brook such pressure and had to take effective
steps to quell the disturbance. See, for instance, Administration Report of Jammu
and Kashmir State, 1925-26.
26. Lawrence, Walter R., op.cit., p 213.
153
27. Ibid, p. 200. See also, Kachru,Birbal, op.cit., p. 257a; Ram, Diwan Kripa, Gulzar-
i-Kashmir, Per. text, Lahore, 1877, p. 254.
28. Lawrence, Walter R, op.cit., p. 213.
29. Ibid.
30. Parmu, R.K., A History of Sikh Rule in Kashmir, 1819-46, Govt. press Srinagar,
1977, p. 162.
31. Lawrence, Walter R., op.cit., p. 200. See also, Parmu, R.K., op.cit., p. 163.
32. Ibid, p. 164.
33. Lawrence, Walter. R., op.cit., p. 200; Parmu, R.K. op.cit., p. 165.
34. Masnavi, Available in the Research Department Library Srinagar.
35. Mirjanpuri, Khalil, Wajiz ut- Tawarikh, (nd), f. 180b.
36. Lawrence, Walter R., op.cit., p. 213.
37. Shah, Peer Hassan, op.cit., vol. II, p. 862. See also, Kual, Pandit Anand, Geography
of Jammu and Kashmir State. Reprint, Delhi: Light and Life Publishers, 1978,p. 40.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid, p. 215.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid, pp. 214 & 216.
48. Ibid, p. 214.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid, p. 215.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid, p. 213.
55. Ibid, p. 224.
56. Ibid, p. 205.
57. Ibid, p. 209.
58. Ibid, pp. 208-211.
59. Ibid, p. 209.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid, p. 214. See also, Government of India, National Archives, New Delhi,
Foreign External A. January 1894, Nos. 360-62.
62. Ibid. See also, Lawrence, Walter R., op.cit., p. 210.
63. G.O.I. Fgn. Extl. A. January 1894, Nos. 360-62.
64. Ibid. See also, Lawrence, Walter R., op.cit., p. 205.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid, p. 211. See also, G.O.I. Fgn. Extl. A. January 1894, Nos. 360-62.
67. The Jammu and Kashmir Government Records (State Repositories of Jammu
and Srinagar) Political No. 28 of 1893.
68. G.O.I. Fgn. Extl. A. January 1894, Nos. 361.
70. Sadaat, Mufti Mohammad Shah, op.cit., pp. 632, 33, 34.
71. Ibid, p 688.
72. Interview based information conducted with octogenarian people.
154
73. Keenan, B., op.cit., p. 124.
74. Ibid, p. 134.
75. Sadaat, Mufti Mohammad Shah, op.cit., pp. 632, 33, 34.
76. Neve, Arthur, Thirty Years in Kashmir, London, 1913, pp. 139-40. Also see,
Lawrence, Walter R., op.cit., pp. 412-15; Saif-ud-Din, Dairies, Vol. IV, f. 77;
Wingate, A., op.cit., p. 54.
77. Kachru,Birbal, op.cit., ff. 257-58. Also see, Vigne, G.T., op.cit., vol. I, p. 257.
79. Aberth, John, From the Brink of the Apocalypse: Confronting Famine, War,
Plague and Death in the Latter Middle Ages, Routledge: Taylor and Francis
Group, London and New York, Second ed., 2010.
80. Vigne G.T, op.cit., vol. II, p. 171.
81. Jacqouemont, Victor, Letters from India Describing A Journey in the British
Dominions of India, Tibet, Lahore, and Cashmir (Original in French), London,
1835, p. 328.
82. Mohammad Aziz Mir (88 years old in 2012), a resident of Dadasara (Tral
Pulwama).
83. Lawrence, Walter. R, op.cit., p. 215.
84. Ibid, p. 343.
85. Ab. Gani Mir (90 years old in 2012), a resident of Kanzikul (Yaripora Islamabad).
86. Ferguson,J.P, A Historical Introduction, Ed. 2009, p. 46.
87. Gh. Hassan Shiekh (98 years old in 2012), a resident of Hurpur (Shopyain).
88. Ahmad Lone (101 years old in 2012), a resident of Kapran Shopyian.
89. Haji Ab. Rahman Mir (96 years old in 2012), a resident of Shadipora (Pattan
Barramula).
90. Abdul Gani Baba (88 years old in 2012), a resident of Tral (Pulwama).
91. Lawrence ,Walter, R, op.cit., pp. 82 & 254.
92. Ibid, p. 254.
93. Mr. Haji Abdul Rahman Mir (93 years old), a resident of Shadipora (Pattan
Baramulla).
94. Mr. Abdul Karim Wagay (85 years old in 2012) a resident of Padgampur (near
Awantipora Pulwama).
95. Wreford, Census, 1941, XXII, p. 19.
96. Muhammad Naji Munawar (85 years old in 2012), a resident of Kapran
(Shopyian).
97. Moorcraft, W. and George Trebeck, Travels in the Himalyan Provinces of
Hindustan and the Punjab; In Ladakh and Kashmir, In Peshawar, Kabul, Kunduz,
and Bokhara, (New Delhi: Sagar Publications, 1971), vol. II, p. 136.
98. Hugel, Baron Charles, Travels in Kashmir and the Punjab, (London: John
Petheran, 1845), p. 133.
99. Mr. Aziz Tuman (83 years old in 2012), a resident of Srinagar (Dal Lake).
100. Moorcraft, W., op. cit., pp. 132-62.
101. It is common to hear in the villages of Kashmir that, “this piece of land has been
sold or purchased in lieu of one trakh of rice or one seer of tea.” And the like.
102. Lawrence, Walter. R, op.cit., p.254.
103. Haji Aziz Parray (99 years old in 2012), a resident of Chodus (Awantipora
Pulwama).
104. Hamid-ullah Bhat (91 years old in 2012), a resident of Arrah Kulgam.
105. Drew, Frederic, The Jummoo and Kashmir Territories, (Delhi: Oriental
Publishers, repr. 1971) p. 176.
155
106. Lawrence, Walter. R, op.cit., p. 253.
107. Girdlestone, Charles, Memorandum of Cashmere and Adjacent Territories,
(Calcutta: Foreign Department Press, 1874) p. 30.
108. S.M. Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar (Atish-i-Chinar), (New Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1993) p. 940.
109. Kachru, Birbal, op.cit., ff. 257-58; Peer Hassan Shah, Tarikh-i-Hassan, Urdu
Trans., Moulvi Ibrahim, Tarikh-i-Kashmir (Srinagar: 1957) Vol. I, pp. 462-63;
Vigne, G.T., op.cit.,vol. I, p. 257.
110. Lal,Ganesh, op.cit., p. 32; Ram, Dewan Anant, The Collective Report for the
years 1878-79, p. 41; See also, Lawrence, Walter. R, op.cit., p. 434.
111. Ibid, p. 215.
112. Indian National Archives, Foreign Department Section E, Nos. 81-82, Progs,
March, 1883; See also, Lawrence,Walter R., op. cit., pp. 419-20.
113. Masnavi, Available in the research department library Srinagar.
114. Mirjanpuri, Khalil, op.cit., f. 180b.
115. Lawrence, Walter. R, op. cit., p. 215.
116. Jammu Kashmir Archives, Foreign. and Political Department., File No. 34/R-3
of 1927.
117. Saraf, M.Y., op.cit., vol. I, p. 297.
118. Indian National Archives, Imperial Gazetteer of India, vol. XV, p. 37.
119. Moorcraft, W., op.cit., vol. I, p. 15.
120. Jacquemont, Victor, op.cit., vol. II, p. 91.
121. Lawrence, Walter. R, op. cit., p. 215.
156
Central Asian Water Resources
Crises and Management
Hamid Rasool
Abstract
Water has long been a major cause of conflict in Central Asian States.
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have a surplus while the other three states
strive for their share from the region’s great rivers i.e. Syr Darya and Amu
Darya, which slice across it from the Tien Shan, Pamir Mountains, and the
Hindu Kush to the Aral Sea. The population in the region has increased by
almost ten million since 2000, and limited arable land is being depleted
by over-use and outdated farming methods. Extensive corruption and
failing infrastructure take further toll, while climate change is likely to
have long-term negative consequences. As economies become weaker and
states more fragile, heightened nationalism, border disputes, and regional
tensions complicate the search for a mutually acceptable solution to the
region’s water needs. A new approach that addresses water and related
issues through an interlocking set of individually more modest bilateral
agreements instead of the chimera of a single comprehensive one, is urgently
needed. The root of the problem is the disintegration of the resource-sharing
system, the Soviet Union imposed on the region until its collapse in 1991.
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan provided water to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan in summer and received Kazakh, Turkmen and Uzbek coal, gas
and electricity in winter. The system had broken down by the late 1990s, and
a plethora of bilateral and regional agreements and resolutions concluded
in that decade, failed to fix it. The inadequate infrastructure, poor water
management and outdated irrigation methods remain unaddressed, while
the security of environment is bleaker. The unresolved water disputes
accumulating day by day, if not addressed properly and promptly, can
lead to almost a virtual water war in the region having its far reaching
consequences. This imbalanced regional water resource endowment which
make states highly interdependent, and being a cause of conflict, can be
converted into a conflict resolution measure as well, if stakeholders adopt a
positive approach with similar thinking frequency.
Keywords
Water Disputes, Conflict Resolution Measures, Infrastructure Projects,
Water Crises, Central Asian States, Irrigation Season, Hydro-carbon
Resources, Water Management, Water Energy Cooperation, River Basins,
Poverty and Pollution, International Players, Cooperative Formula,
Upstream-downstream Dilemma, International Trans-boarder Water Law.
Central Asian Water Resources: Crises and Management
Historical Background
In Central Asia, water, so far, has been more a source of tension than
cooperation. While there have been joint efforts to save the Aral Sea, as well
as a flood of internationally introduced technical projects, states in the region
have spent most of the past two decades squabbling over the use of water. The
region is muddling on with outdated allocation quotas from Soviet times, and
the creation of new infrastructure projects like the Rogun Dam in Tajikistan
has led to diplomatic saber rattling. During the Soviet period, central planning
created a “cotton belt” in the lowlands of what is now Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
and Turkmenistan, irrigated through a complex system of dams, pumps, and
channels using water coming from mountains in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
However, the breakup of the Soviet Union left the emerging republics of
Central Asia without a regional water management strategy.
The two major regional rivers of Amu Darya and the Syr Darya discharge
into the Aral Sea. During the Soviet Union era, a large part (73 percent) of
the Amu Darya run-off was formed in the territory of one country, with the
remaining part of the run-off coming from the territories of Afghanistan and
Iran.1 The Syr Darya basin was completely located within the Soviet Union.
Therefore, the rivers were managed as national rivers, as the administrative
borders between the Central Asian Soviet republics (Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik,
Turkmen and Uzbek) were considered to be provincial. Large dams and
associated reservoirs were constructed in the mountainous upper reaches of
the Kyrgyz and Tajik Soviet Republics to accumulate the flow of those rivers
during the non-irrigation season. At the same time, irrigation systems were
developed on millions of hectares of land in the lower reaches, i.e. in the
Uzbek, Kazakh and Turkmen Soviet Republics. The primary goal of regulating
the flow of the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya was to provide a reliable water
supply for agriculture during the irrigation season (April - September). In total,
60 reservoirs with a total storage volume of 64.5 km3 are found in the Aral Sea
basin. The Syr Darya runoff is almost completely regulated and the flow of
Amu Darya is regulated to about 80 percent. The generation of electricity at
the hydropower stations of the main dams upstream (the Toktogul Dam on the
Naryn, the major tributary of the Syr Darya in the Kyrgyz Soviet Republic,
and the Nurek Dam on the Vaksh, one of the two major tributaries of the Amu
Darya, in the Tajik Soviet Republic) played a secondary role. The electricity
was generated mostly during the irrigation season, when large volumes of
water were released. The bulk of the generated electricity was supplied to an
electricity grid connecting Central Asia and other regions of the Soviet Union.
The Amu Darya is not as regulated as the Syr Darya, but the construction of
the Rogun Dam on the Vaksh, designed in the 1960s to be the highest in the
world and with a large water reservoir, would allow providing a multi-year
runoff regulation of this river. However, the construction of the Rogun project
was not completed during Soviet times.
158
Water resources of the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya were allocated
between many irrigation projects, some of which extended over the
administrative territories of several Soviet republics, according to the
quotas established by the USSR Ministry of Water Management and Land
Reclamation (USSR Minvodkhoz) and the USSR State Planning Committee
(USSR Gosplan) in consultation with the five republics. In 1986, basin water
management organizations (BVOs) were set up for the Amu Darya and the
Syr Darya basins. The BVOs were in charge of allocation of water resources
in accordance with the water release schedules agreed by the republics and
approved by USSR Minvodkhoz. The allocation schedules were adjusted
twice a year to reflect the projected availability of water in both river basins
over the next six months. At the same time, the provision of energy supplies
(electricity, coal, gas, oil) arranged for by the central government to the
Kyrgyz and Tajik Soviet Republics made it possible to accumulate river flow
in the reservoirs during autumn and winter and not use it for hydropower
generation. Water allocation arrangements in Central Asia were, thus, based
on two complementary components:
i) Water allocation quotas for each republic and every irrigation
project established and strictly controlled by the USSR Government,
and
ii) Planned deliveries of energy to the Kyrgyz and Tajik Soviet Republics
for use in winter.
The geopolitical situation in Central Asia changed in 1991 when the
USSR collapsed and former Soviet republics proclaimed their sovereignty.
As a result, the basins of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya were divided between
the respective co-basin countries, and previously national rivers became
trans-boundary – changing a domestic matter into an international issue.
A few months after declaring their sovereignty, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan entered into their first regional
agreement termed “Agreement on Cooperation in Joint Management, Use
and Protection of Interstate Sources of Water Resources” signed in February
1992. This agreement confirmed the status quo of the Soviet water allocation
arrangements between the countries until new modalities for water cooperation
could be agreed upon. The Interstate Commission for Water Coordination
(ICWC) was established to implement the Agreement and has since been a
stabilizing factor and focal point in the water allocation discussions on the
Amu Darya and Syr Darya. However, this agreement, did not stipulate the
provision of the energy supplies to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for their use
over the winter, when the energy needs there in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are
highest. Therefore those countries could not afford to accumulate the winter
flow in the dam reservoirs, which later became the principal source of the
current water problems in Central Asia. As Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have lost
the previously delivered winter supplies of energy, they started to rely on their
159
only readily available source of energy (hydropower). In order to generate

electricity at their hydropower stations, they are releasing large amounts of
the water from their reservoirs during the winter. The water released in the
winter cannot be used productively by the downstream countries and may
cause negative effects. Winter flooding is a regular threat in the lower reaches
of the Syr Darya in Kazakhstan. Flooding is also common in the Arnasai
lowland in Uzbekistan as the result of spillover from the Chardarya Reservoir,
located on the border between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The water stored
in the Arnasai depression becomes saline and cannot be used further for any
purpose.
As a result of winter water releases, much less water is available for
the irrigation season, thus, jeopardizing water supply to the population and
irrigated agriculture. The shortage of water in the spring-summer season has
led to reduced acreages of irrigated land in the downstream countries, and
a negative impact on their economy. In this situation the 1992 Agreement
becomes less relevant. The water situation in Central Asia is unique,
determined in particular by the fact that the main river basins were previously
used and developed as national within a single state (USSR) but are presently
trans boundary and shared by independent nations. In this situation, it is not
easy to provide a straightforward answer as regards the determination and
interpretation of the rights and obligations of upstream and downstream
countries. “Helsinki Rules” the UNECE Convention on the Protection and
Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, in force since
1996, and the global United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, not in force. International
water law does provide a general legal framework for transboundary water
cooperation, based on the two principal but somewhat conflicting norms:
equitable and reasonable utilization of transboundary water resources and the
obligation of one State not to cause significant harm to another State through
its use of shared water resources. It also requires that cooperation between
watercourse States, with a view of attaining optimal and sustainable utilization
of the shared resources, should involve consultations between the countries
concerned. But if consultations do not result in an agreement, a State can in
exceptional cases undertake an action without the explicit consent of its co-
basin States. Should significant harm arise, various means of peaceful dispute
settlement and possible compensation should be considered.
Relief and Rivers

The physical geography of Central Asian states dictate its water quantity.
The overall topography of the region resembles a bowl consisting of elevated
grasslands surrounded by high mountain ranges that act as climatic barriers
which help to create an arid climate. In the north, modern day Kazakhstan
gives way to Siberia, Turkmenistan in the Southwest gives way to the deserts
160
of Persia, while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan bound the mountains of China and
Afghanistan to the East and South. The Pamir Mountains in the Southeast are
some of the highest and most formidable mountains in the world. Limited
precipitation in the plains, combined with high temperatures and low humidity
create a “high degree of evaporation and transpiration” which draws away
most of the rain that falls in the plains.2 Because the bulk of the precipitation
occurs in the mountains, the main water source for the entire region is runoff
from melting snow and glaciers in the mountains. The Amu Darya is the longer,
over 1,500 miles long, and takes in four tributaries. The river encompasses
a catchment area of almost 120,000 square miles. Because melting snow
provides most of its flow, the heaviest runs occur in the summer. The river’s
rapid descent from the heights of the Hindu Kush produces a quick flow rate
which causes erosion, delivering loads of fertile sediment all along its path.
These deposited silt beds support fruitful fields along the Amu Darya’s banks
which invigorate farming and irrigation. The Syr Darya, although not much
smaller than the Amu Darya, catches much less water. Just over 1,400 miles
long, the Syr Darya’s catchment area includes 57,950 square miles; less than
half of the catchment of the Amu Darya. As with the Amu Darya, the Syr
Darya originates in the mountains and flows to the plains and eventually into
the Aral Sea.
The problems of increasing demand and declining supplies have been
compounded by the failure of the region’s nations to work together. Under
the Soviet Union, water and energy resources were exchanged freely across
what were only administrative borders, and Moscow provided the funds and
management to build and maintain infrastructure. Rising nationalism and
competition among the five Central Asian states, has meant they have failed
to come up with a viable regional approach to replace the Soviet system of
management. Indeed, linked water and energy issues have been second only
to extremism as a source of tension in recent years. Competition for water
is increasing in Central Asia at an alarming rate, adding tension to what is
already an uneasy region. Agriculture is the mainstay of the region’s economy,
and thirsty crops such as cotton and rice require intensive irrigation. Water use
has increased rapidly since the Central Asian states became independent in
1991 and is now at an unsustainable level. Irrigation systems have decayed so
severely that half of all water never reaches crops, and several years of drought
have cut available water by a fifth even as demand continues to soar. The Amu
Darya and its tributaries form part of the border between the Central Asian
states and Afghanistan and Afghanistan stakes a claim over water sharing.
Challenges and Opportunities

Water management has suffered from the Soviet legacy of top-down control
and general rivalries between the states. The Interstate Coordinating Water
Commission (ICWC) that was set up in 1992 has failed to take into account
161
changing political and economic relations. It is an intergovernmental body

with little transparency that focuses almost exclusively on the division of
water. There is no representation from agricultural or industrial consumers,
non-governmental organizations or other stake holders. Management is
dominated by officials from Uzbekistan, leading to suspicions that it favours
that country’s national interests. This has contributed to a lack of political
commitment by other countries to the commission, resulting in a serious
shortage of funds. In the meantime, the individual countries have done little to
contribute to the maintenance of water systems that benefit the region. Shortly
after independence, the five countries agreed to maintain the Soviet-era quota
system, but this has become unworkable. The civil war in Tajikistan and the
decay of Kyrgyzstan’s economy has meant that water-monitoring facilities
have fallen into disrepair. Control and enforcement mechanisms no longer
function and the various countries now often accuse each other of exceeding
quotas. Turkmenistan is using too much water to the detriment of Uzbekistan,
which in turn has been accused by Kazakhstan of taking more than its share.
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan say that the three downstream countries are all
exceeding quotas. Even within Uzbekistan, provinces have accused one
another of using too much water.
Some of the most serious tensions have centered around barter
agreements and payments. The upstream countries trade water to Uzbekistan
and Kazakhstan for energy in the form of gas, coal or power. Since energy
deliveries have been unreliable, Kyrgyzstan has responded by releasing more
water through its hydropower dam in winter, which results in downstream
flooding and less water for summer irrigation. Attempts by Kyrgyzstan to
demand payment for water have been resisted by the downstream countries.
As each country has started to view the problem as a zero-sum game, it
has taken steps to increase control over water, often to the detriment of the
others. There is increasing uncertainty in Central Asia over plans to build new
reservoirs and dams or to expand irrigation. There has been little consultation
over most of these projects, leading to intensified suspicions between states.
Since the fall of the Taliban in November 2001, there has been concern about
the implications of efforts to rebuild agriculture in Afghanistan. Currently that
country uses very little of the water from the Amu Darya but reconstruction
of irrigation systems will put additional pressure on the river. Tensions over
water and energy have contributed to a generally uneasy political climate
in Central Asia. Not only do they tend to provoke hostile rhetoric, but they
have also prompted suggestions that the countries are willing to defend their
interests by force if necessary. Uzbekistan has carried out exercises that look
suspiciously like practice runs at capturing the Toktogul Reservoir. The gas
shortages and winter flooding that Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have inflicted
on each other have a direct and widespread impact on the peoples of those
countries and have the potential to inflame ethnic tensions in the Ferghana
162
Valley. Competition for water can only increase, and tensions will rise unless
better mechanisms are put in place to manage the problems.
i) Hydropower VS Agriculture
Upstream-downstream antagonisms are likely to sharpen to the extent that
Tajikistan and Afghanistan succeed in boosting their hydropower capacity
which could be a major source of income for these poverty stricken countries.
With ample hydropower potential, Tajikistan could produce almost 20 times
much electricity as it currently does. The government wants to complete
unfinished Soviet-era hydropower projects at Rogun and Sangtuda on the
Vakhsh River, with Russian and Iranian investment. Uzbekistan worries
about these developments, not only because of the potential direct impact on
summer irrigation water flows (it has objected to the planned height of the
Rogun dam), but also because it stands to lose income (and leverage) from
selling natural gas to Tajikistan. In addition, Tajikistan’s reduced dependence
on imported energy could make it even less interested in coordinating water
flows.
ii) Poverty and Pollution

Central Asia is home to a significant amount of natural resources like natural
gas, oil, minerals etc. but also to great poverty. The five countries house over
53 million people, of whom at least 50% earn less than PPP$2.15 per day.
Particularly, concentrated in both population and poverty is the Ferghana
Valley the small, fertile nexus of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan,
which experiences poverty levels between 60 to 80%. Agriculture employs
67% of Tajikistan’s, 53% of Kyrgyzstan’s, and 45% of Uzbekistan’s labor force
nationally, and much of the agriculture occurs in heavily and unsustainably
irrigated land. Because the region’s economy is so reliant on agricultural
production, it means that the coming water troubles are all the more important
to economic security. Even within the Ferghana Valley, there are significant
differences in productivity by country. Much of this has to do with differences
in government policies in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. In
Uzbekistan, there are also government-mandated production targets for cotton
and wheat that farmers even some of those not on government owned farmland
are forced to grow and sell to the government. Refusal to grow the mandated
crops can lead local mayors to cut off water supply to the farmers or farmers’
land being taken away. Further, the Uzbek government pays such a low price
for the cotton, that it sometimes does not even cover farmers’ costs to grow it,
and some farmers in the Ferghana Valley have taken to attempting to smuggle
the cotton into Kyrgyzstan, just to earn a “living wage,” causing escalation
in regional tensions. Lack of economic opportunities and crackdowns on
democratic freedoms that have occurred in the region encourage not only
unrest. But lead to the development of fundamentalist terrorist groups. Over
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the past decade Central Asian leaders and security experts worldwide have
become worried about the rise of militant groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the latter of which is particularly active
in the Ferghana Valley. As a result, the Government of Uzbekistan has cracked
down fairly hard on perceived Islamic extremism in the Valley and there is a
heavy police presence in all parts. Thus, despite the stresses on the population
listed above, there is also an inhibiting force in the fact that Uzbekistan is a
police state and the population is subject to strong controls on its behavior.
iii) Climate Change

Climate change will dramatically raise the water challenges in Central and
South Asia through rising temperatures and drought, more variable rainfall
and glacier melt, sea-level rise, as well as changes to the monsoon cycle.
As per an estimate, the middle of the century, increasing temperatures and
growing water stress may lead to a 30% reduction in crop yields in the region.
In Central Asia, climate impact will be felt in terms of reduced rainfall and
runoff, leading to increased heat stress, drought and desertification, thus,
amplifying the region’s existing problems. A 2009 Asian Development Bank
Report bleakly concludes: “It is difficult to see anything other than an increase
in migration in the region as climate change adds to economic, social, and
political pressures.”Yet no mitiga-tion and adaptation strategies are in place
which can tackle the weather variability and its drastic consequences. The
melting of the Hindu Kush-Karakorum-Himalaya glaciers will have serious
consequences for hundreds of millions of people. The warming trend in these
mountain ranges has been much greater than the global average. As a result of
rising temperatures, more precipitation falls as rain instead of snow, will lead to
shrinking of glaciers. Two-thirds of the Himalayan glaciers are reported to be
receding. Glaciers in Tajikistan have shrunk by a third in the second half of the
20th century. The International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development
(ICIMOD) a regional knowledge development and learning centre warns: “It
is not unlikely that this will appear as a positive, comforting sign, deterring and
delaying required emergency initiatives.” However, receding and eventually
disappearing high-altitude reservoirs of snow and ice will over time reduce
downstream runoff, and increase its variability. As the water flow declines, it
compromises hydropower generation. In the agricultural sector, the result is
falling production of foodstuffs and commodities like cotton, which in turn
may lead to growing poverty and social disparities, escalating rural-urban
migration, and rising food prices in cities. There is also potential for conflict
between up and downstream states.
Climate change is also expected to cause significant changes to monsoon
patterns and increase unpredictability. While much of South, East, and South-
East Asia may see increased intensity of these storms and greater rainfall
by century’s end, for most parts of Pakistan and southeastern Afghanistan a
164
reduction in precipitation of up to 20% is projected.
iv) Water Energy and International Players

Central Asia’s hydropower resources are the object of ongoing great power
rivalries among Russia, the United States, China, and India. The United
States has sought to turn Central Asia into a supplier of electricity in South
Asia, limiting Russian influence; India is keen to secure energy supplies
from Central Asia. Within the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) that
dominates, Russia, attempted to create a Central Asian hydropower consortium
to govern the region’s inter-connected water and energy problems. However,
Uzbekistan’s withdrawal from the EAEC in 2008 undermined these plans.
Because it groups together Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan,
Russia and China (with India and Pakistan as observers and Afghanistan as an
invited guest). The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), in principle,
could play an important role in addressing the water and energy challenges
of Central and South Asia. At the October 2008 SCO summit the issue was
overshadowed, however, by efforts to address the impacts of the world financial
crisis. In relations between Pakistan and India, the bilateral Indus Water Treaty
represents a valuable core mechanism for consultation and conflict resolution.
When the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation was established
in the 1980s, contentious topics like water were excluded from its mandate.
But the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD)
does address water issues in the context of transborder environmental problems
in the Hindu Kush-Himalayas region (including, among others, Afghanistan,
China, India, and Pakistan).
v) Facilitation of Water-energy Cooperation

Most of Central Asian sub-region is embedded in the Aral Sea basin,
stretching from what is left of the Aral Sea in the west to the melting glacial
“water towers” in the east. The two main rivers of the region, which flow
from east to west, are the Syr Darya to the north and the Amu Darya to the
south. The former runs from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan through Uzbekistan
to the northern Aral Sea in Kazakhstan; the latter flows from Kyrgyzstan to
Tajikistan, along the latter’s border with Afghanistan, through Turkmenistan
and finally into the southern Aral Sea in Uzbekistan. These two rivers provide
the main source for drinking water, irrigation, and hydropower in the region. A
major legacy of the Soviet era in Central Asia was the creation of an electricity-
water nexus, whereby the generation of electricity from hydropower in
upstream countries was linked to the water needs of those downstream. This
system operated in the context of a common management system and shared
energy arrangements through regional energy grids and networks. However,
this system ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the overnight
emergence of international borders. Water was increasingly seen as a national
165
asset rather than a common resource, and the transition to commercial prices
for the supply of hydrocarbons to upstream countries (formerly delivered
freely as compensation for irrigation water) presented major difficulties for
their economies.
There are several organizations involved in the development of water
cooperation in the region. The International Fund for the Saving of the Aral Sea
(IFAS) founded by the regional Presidents, is the only cooperative structure
that includes all five countries. It is a well established structure with branches
in each member country, and enjoys the political support at the highest
level as the President of each member country serves in turn as Chairman
of the body. IFAS provides all its officials with diplomatic privileges and its
funding comes from the national budgets of the participating countries. The
member countries have pledged to allocate a proportion of their respective
GDP to IFAS. In facilitation of Water-energy Cooperation there are several
organizations involved in the development of water cooperation in the region.
Conclusion
Central Asian states play a key role in Eurasian geopolitics, because the
region is located between East and West, Islam and Christianity, so any
small conflict in the region has the potential to spread into more widespread
conflict. Resource distribution and allocation exists as a potential catalyst to
a conflict; one that could explode into much larger war. The United States
policy to prevent regional conflict and state failure applies directly to this
situation; however, the possibility of conflict surrounding access to water has
not received the attention it deserves. By detailing the Tsarist water policies
followed by Soviet and now independent Central Asian policies the unfilled
gapes in proposed arrangement have led to a series water disputes. The
international community particularly the United Nations, the OSCE, and the
European Union has sought to mediate the dispute and find ways to balance
the power and water needs of the region. Potential solutions have involved
rebuilding cooperative management arrangements, increasing efficiency
initiatives in water use, water pricing, and the development of alternative
means to generate electricity through a series of much smaller dams. But
most of these efforts have shown few results. While de-escalation is needed
in the short term, a new comprehensive and fair agreement for sharing water
resources that includes Afghanistan also is badly needed. Public participation
in the formulation of agreements, as well as new, more inclusive forms of
governance PDF, could lead to a long-term settlement. But in the end, it will
depend on the political will and readiness of Central Asia’s leaders to find a
common solution. The Aral Sea cannot be revived, but a more sustainable
use of water for drinking and irrigation, to generate energy as well as to better
support water ecosystems can be achieved by improving water management
even in a perspective of a possibly decreasing access to water due to climate
166
change. To achieve this, improved cooperation and trust between the countries
of the region is essential. The water and energy conflicts in the region cannot
be resolved without a willingness from all sides to review their respective
positions. Water and energy issues are tightly interconnected in Central Asia.
The shortage of alternative energy supplies over the winter in the upstream
countries leads to excessive use of water for hydropower. As a result there is a
shortage of water over the irrigation period in the downstream countries. Only
when the upstream countries have enough energy supplies to at least partly
substitute their hydropower generation over the winter season, this vicious
circle is likely to be broken. The hydrocarbon resources downstream are, at
least in theory, a positive factor, as there are some resources available for
investment to improve efficiency of water use and to diversify the economy,
as well as to use for exports on favorable terms to upstream countries. Given
political view, the imbalanced water resource structure endowed by CAS
often leading to inter-state as well as intra-state conflict, can be converted into
effective conflict resolution measure which will be in the interest of all stake
holders. The basic principle involved in this cooperative formula sounds a
genuine humanitarian approach.
References & Notes

1. Bo Libert, Erkin Orolbaev, and Yuri Steklov (2008): “Water and Energy Crisis in
Central Asia,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, 6(3), 9-20.
2. Peter Sinnott, (1992): “The Physical Geography of Soviet Central Asia and the
Aral Sea Problem,” Geographic Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia, Ed., Robert
A. Lewis, (London and New York: Rutledge, 82-83.
167
Energy Consumption And Economic Growth
AN ANALYSIS OF CENTRAL ASIAN STATES
M. Ibrahim Wani
M. Afzal Mir
Abstract
Energy is critical, directly or indirectly, in the entire process of evolution,
growth and survival of all living beings and plays a vital role in the socio-
economic development and human welfare of a country. It is seen as a
‘strategic commodity’ and any uncertainty about its adequate availability
can threaten normal functioning of an economy, predominantly those
which are developing. Realizing the energy security in its strategic sense,
is of fundamental importance not only to economic growth but also for
the human development objectives that aims at the alleviation of poverty,
unemployment and meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
Thus, energy is thought ‘the lifeblood of modern economies’ as there exists
a strong link between the energy consumption and economic growth.
Central Asian countries comprising Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are among those countries which are blessed
with significant energy resources. In view of their existing potential, the
harnessing of energy wealth in these Central Asian countries will not only
fulfill their domestic demand but also leave a large share for export. In
order to sustain the long run growth, the Central Asian Countries known
for inefficient energy consumption pattern have to bring efficiency and
spend judiciously the earnings realized through surplus energy exports.
For maintaining and enhancing energy exports, they should also invest
in areas of renewable energy like solar and wind. Importantly , in view
the vital and crucial role of energy in the process of economic growth,
and the link between energy consumption and real output for five Central
Asian countries suggests that inefficient energy consumption pattern, if
continues, may negatively effects their economic growth which eventually
would results a fall in income and employment. Thus, according to the
results, Central Asian countries would be in large profit by adopting energy
conservation policy to avoid any kind of energy shortages. In this backdrop,
the present study has been undertaken to study the energy consumption
pattern of Central Asian countries and suggest for the pattern, which is
efficient and sustainable. However, the study is delimited to hydrocarbon
and hydropower of five Central Asian States.
Keywords
Energy Conversation, Energy Consumption, Energy Supply and Demand,
Economic Growth, Labour, Capital, Land, Strategic Commodity, Central
Asian States, Hydrocarbon, Hydropower.
Energy Consumption and Economic Growth...
Introduction
Energy is the engine of economic growth, as all production and consumption
activities involve energy as basic input1. On the production side, conventionally,
economists since Adam Smith have talked about land, labor, and capital as
major inputs for economic activity. These inputs were significant ingredients
of agrarian economies of 18th and 19th centuries. However, in 20th century, the
growth of industrial nations has observed a fourth major input i.e., energy.
On consumption side, in the John Maynard Keynesian framework where
consumption and income are significantly correlated, similarly energy
consumption in all forms drives economic productivity. It leads to economic
growth and prosperity which ensures expansion of the economy in terms
of higher Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and GDP per capita. Economic
growth and prosperity, however, does not simply depend upon the availability
of energy input, but how energy be utilized. In the current global competitive
atmosphere, it is the judicious use of resource which matters and same is true
of energy input.
Conspicuously energy consumption and economic growth are interrelated
in two respects as energy is consumed for two purposes. One, it is a production
input and the other, is one of the important means of human comforts. As a
production input it is a causeway to development process. An increase in its
consumption means a higher level of economic activity and greater production
of goods and services and vice versa. As a means of providing comforts it
is necessary fallout/outcome of development2 process. Such a relationship
between energy use and economic growth are often exposed in terms of the
relations between energy consumption to gross domestic product or E/GDP
ratio or energy intensity. However, the main aim of this study is to testify
whether energy consumption (EC) leads to economic growth or economic
growth causes the energy consumption.
Importantly the growing pattern of global economic development has
influenced the whole world so much so that energy security has emerged as one
of the major developmental goals of any nation whether it is in the economic
Take off Stage3 or has reached the Stage of High Mass Consumption(Walt
Whitman Rostow).4 Without having sufficient energy resources “nations can
neither initiate the process of economic growth and development nor sustain
it for long”.5 It is because of this realization of the importance of energy
security that nations all over the world are now developing sophisticated and
appropriate technology to harness both the renewable and non-renewable
sources of energy. While doing so these nations are not only involved
domestically but also externally through bilateral and multilateral ties in their
immediate and extended neighborhoods as well as in the far off regions and
continents. However, nearer the source of energy to a country, the greater is
comparative advantage in actualizing that resource potential.6
In recent years, as the list of countries among the emerging economies
170
category are increasingly characterized by high rates of economic growth,

which has also led to difficulties in achieving a sound balance between
demand and supply of energy resources necessary to maintain their national
economic growth and development. Although, they are trying hard to arrive
at an appropriate energy mix, increase in their energy efficiency and diversify
their sources of supply and the question of maintaining a stable supply of
fossil fuels continue to pose several security challenges. One is to boost one’s
own production, another to diversify one’s sources of import, and a third to
secure the transportation of hydrocarbons (oil and natural gas) on vulnerable
sea routes or overland through pipelines that depend on long-term strategic
relationships with the producing countries. This may result in the formation of
such a system of mutual relations in the world that in totality of its volume and
scope may most effectively serve the interests of both the manufacturers of
energy resources as well as their consumers.7 However, Central Asia,8 a land
locked region, bestowed with vast energy resources especially hydrocarbon
reserves. It also possesses a significant and diversified resource base for its
power industry although resources are unevenly spread throughout the region.
Apart from vast volumes of proven recoverable resources of hydrocarbon
raw materials, the region has huge hydropower capacity, large deposits of
uranium and favorable conditions for the development of nonconventional
renewable energy. A large part of proven recoverable oil reserves are found
in Kazakhstan, natural gas in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan while Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan is the hub of hydropower resources. The energy sector holds an
important place in the economies of this region as it provides required fuel to
the respective economies and surplus energy for export.9
Notably energy plays an important role both on the demand and the supply
sides of the economy. On the demand side, energy is one of the products
which a consumer decides to buy to maximize his utility. On the supply side,
energy is the critical factor of production in addition to labour, capital and
other raw materials. Energy is considered to be the crucial element in the
socio-economic development of a country as it helps to improve the living
standards of the society through the increase in economic growth. This implies
that there is a causal link running from energy consumption to economic
growth. However, the 1970s energy crisis attracted the analysts to investigate
the relationship between the energy consumption and economic growth, as
it was argued that energy consumption directly causes GDP growth. Since,
the end of 1970s, many studies10, 11, 12 have been conducted to support the
arguments which suggest that energy use was positively correlated with GDP
growth. But empirical evidence is varying and conflicting about direction of
causality, whether economic growth leads to energy consumption or energy
use boosts up the GDP growth.
Predominantly, if causality runs from energy consumption (EC) to
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) then it implies that an economy is energy
171
dependent and hence energy is a stimulus to economic growth.13 Shortage

of energy may negatively affect the economic growth or may cause poor
economic performance leading to a reduction of income and employment.
On the other hand, if causality runs from Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to
energy consumption (EC), this implies that economy is not energy dependent,
and hence energy conservation policies may be implemented without adverse
effects on economic growth and employment.14 Bidirectional causality indicates
that both energy consumption and high level of economic activity mutually
persuade each other. If there is no causality between energy consumption and
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), implies that energy conservation policies
may pursue without affecting the economy.15 The existence of relationship
between real output, energy consumption, capital and labour, has now been
implementing autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model to examine
the long-run and short-run relationship between the real output, energy
consumption, capital and labour of all the Central Asian countries.
Database and Methodology

The present work is primarily based on secondary sources of data; therefore,
the data has been collected from publications of the prestigious international
organizations such as, International Energy Agency (IEA), Energy Information
Administration (EIA), British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy
(BP), Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank (IBRD). Also
the information has been used from various reliable journals, international
reports and published books. The data thus, collected has been analyzed
and interpreted and inferences have been drawn with the help of following
statistical tool of analysis know as Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL)
Model. This model has been applied to examine the long-run and short-run
relationship between the real output, energy consumption, capital and labour
by the given equation of the model for all the Central Asian countries:
𝑘𝑘 𝑘𝑘 𝑘𝑘 𝑘𝑘
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = ∅𝑜𝑜 + ∅1 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1 + ∅2 𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡−1 + ∅3 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1 + ∅4 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡

𝑖𝑖=1 𝑖𝑖=0 𝑖𝑖=0 𝑖𝑖=0
Results and Discussion

Long-run estimates
Kazakhstan
0.19𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 + 0.05𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 + 0.37𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 + 0.07𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑.
* (1.56) The (8.43)* results (table-1) reported in the case of Kazakhstan suggest that energy,
(11.33)*
capital and labourestimates
Short-run exerted positive impact on real output. However, the
relative
∆𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 0.09𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔 𝑡𝑡 + impact
0.05∆𝑘𝑘 𝑡𝑡 + of labour
0.37∆𝑙𝑙 and capital
𝑡𝑡 + 0.03∆𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 is more𝑡𝑡−1on the output. The magnitude
− 0.79𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚
(4.31)* (1.53) (4.69)* (5.29)* (-6.01)*
of energy is equal to (0.19) which is low as compared to the magnitude of
0.89 labour (0.37),𝐹𝐹 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐
but higher = 13.17than the magnitude of capital (0.05) in the long-
𝑆𝑆. 𝐸𝐸. = 0.07𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 − 𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛 = 5.37
cant at 5% levelrun. The short-run impact of energy growth is significant and more in terms
of significance
of size as compared to capital, while the short-run impact of energy is less
Long – run estimates 172

0.39𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 + 𝟎𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟏𝒍𝒍𝑡𝑡 + 0.75𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 + 0.07𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑
(5.53)* (2.62)** (1.31)
Short-run estimates
than that of labour. This implies that in the short-run labour and energy
are the key factors playing a dominant role in enhancing economic growth
in Kazakhstan. The error-correction coefficient is -0.79 which is highly
significant suggesting the existence of long-run causality running from energy
to economic growth. Furthermore, in the short-run the coefficient of energy is
positive and significant, indicating that the presence of causality running from
energy to economic growth. This result has important policy implications that
Kazakhstan’s economy is energy dependent and the shortage of energy would
adversely affect its economic growth and employment. Presently, Kazakhstan
faces the wastage of energy given their technologic knowhow. In June 2015 its
demand for primary energy was equal to 58.1(BP Statistical Review of World
Energy June 2015, p. 41) million tons of oil equivalent(mtoe) while supply
has been equal to 157.8(BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2015, pp.
3-32) mtoe and the surplus stood the republics at 99.7 mtoe respectively. This
surplus could give more push to the sustainable growth process if the wastage
could be controlled through the energy efficiency.
Table-1
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = ∅𝑜𝑜 + ∅1 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1 + ∅2 𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡−1 + ∅3 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1 + ∅4 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡

Long – run and Short – run Estimates𝑖𝑖=1of Energy 𝑖𝑖=0 Consumption 𝑖𝑖=0 𝑖𝑖=0
and Real GDP of Kazakhstan

Long-run estimates
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 0.19𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 + 0.05𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 + 0.37𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 + 0.07𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑.
(5.05)* (1.56) (8.43)* (11.33)*
Short-run estimates
Kazakhstan
∆𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 0.09𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 + 0.05∆𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 + 0.37∆𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 + 0.03∆𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 − 0.79𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡−1
(4.31)* (1.53) (4.69)* (5.29)* (-6.01)*
𝑅𝑅2 = 0.89 𝐹𝐹 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 = 13.17
Note: * indicate significant at 5% level of significance
Turkmenistan
Long – run estimates
In the case of 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡Turkmenistan
= 0.39𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 + 𝟎𝟎. both
𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟏𝒍𝒍𝑡𝑡 +energy
0.75𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 +and capital has been positively
0.07𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑
related to real output in the long-run(table-2).
(5.53)* (2.62)** (1.31) However, capital remained the
dominant
Turkmenistanfactor∆𝑦𝑦in=determining theShort-run
output estimates
in the long-run as indicated by the
0.89∆𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 + 0.57∆𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 + 0.002𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 + 0.007∆𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 − 0.79𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡−1
𝑡𝑡
size of the coefficients
(4.33)* of (3.83)*
the energy (0.97)(0.39)(-3.04)and capital (0.75). However, in
the short-run energy 𝑅𝑅 2 = 0.77(0.89) has positive and strong impact
𝐹𝐹 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 = 6.13 on growth and the
relative impact of energy consumption
Note: *, ** Indicate significant at 5% level of significance
has more than the real capital stock.
The key ingredient of economic growth in Turkmenistan has been the energy
and capital stock (0.57). But, labour plays a minor role in the economic growth
Long-run estimates
process in Turkmenistan.
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 3.89𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 + The error–correction
0.69𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔 (-0.79) term was negative and
𝑡𝑡 + 0.32𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 − 0.17𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 + 0.05𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑
significant supporting
(2.20)* (4.84)** the evidence(3.84)* of long-run
(-2.81)** (7.77)*causality between economic
Short-run estimates
growth and the
Uzbekistan energy. The coefficient of energy is positive and significant
∆yt = 1.01∆inpt + 0.37∆enrgt + 0.33∆k t + 3.15∆lt + 0.11∆trend − 0.71Ecmt−1
in the short-run (2.03)** also (2.81)**
support the presence
(6.58)** (3.41)*of (3.88)*
short-run (-3.90)*
causality between
energy and growth.𝑅𝑅 2 = 0.89 This result suggests F – that Turkmen
Statistic = 19.71 economy is heavily
S.E. = 0.17 Durbin – Watson Test = 3.34
energy
Note: *,dependent. In fact,
** Indicate significant thelevel
at 5% gapof significance
between energy consumption and energy
production has been consistently increasing. 1
173
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 0.19𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 + 0.05𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 + 0.37𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 + 0.07𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑.
(5.05)* (1.56) (8.43)* (11.33)*
Short-run estimates
Kazakhstan
(4.31)* (1.53) (4.69)* (5.29)* (-6.01)*
𝑅𝑅2 = 0.89 𝐹𝐹 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 = 13.17
Note: * indicate significant at 5% level of Table-2
significance
Long – run and Short – run Estimates of Energy Consumption
and Real GDP of Turkmenistan
Long – run estimates
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 0.39𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 + 𝟎𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟏𝒍𝒍𝑡𝑡 + 0.75𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 + 0.07𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑
(5.53)* (2.62)** (1.31)
𝑌𝑌 = ∅ +
Short-run estimates
𝑡𝑡 𝑜𝑜 ∅ 1 𝑦𝑦 𝑡𝑡−1 + ∅2 𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡−1 + ∅3 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1 + ∅4 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡
Turkmenistan 𝑖𝑖=1 𝑖𝑖=0 𝑖𝑖=0 𝑖𝑖=0
∆𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 0.89∆𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 + 0.57∆𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 + 0.002𝑙𝑙 𝑡𝑡 + 0.007∆𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 − 0.79𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡−1
(4.33)* (3.83)* (0.97) (-3.04)
𝑅𝑅 2 = 0.77 𝐹𝐹 −estimates
Long-run 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 = 6.13
𝑆𝑆. 𝐸𝐸.+=0.37𝑙𝑙
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 0.19𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 + 0.05𝑘𝑘 0.09𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
+ − 𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛 = 7.23
0.07𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑.
𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡
Note: *, ** Indicate
(5.05)*significant
(1.56)at 5% level of (11.33)*
(8.43)* significance
Short-run estimates
Kazakhstan
Uzbekistan (4.31)* (1.53) Long-run
(4.69)* estimates (-6.01)*
(5.29)*
𝑦𝑦𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 2== 3.89𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 + 0.69𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 +𝐹𝐹0.32𝑘𝑘 𝑡𝑡 − 0.17𝑙𝑙 𝑡𝑡 + 0.05𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑
The results (table-3) suggest
0.89
(2.20)* (4.84)**
that(3.84)*
both energy consumption
− 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐
(-2.81)** −(7.77)*
= 13.17 and capital exerted
𝑆𝑆. 𝐸𝐸. = 0.07𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛 = 5.37
positive
Note: impact on real output and
* indicate significant at 5% level of significance the impact of
Short-run estimates energy is relatively higher. This
Uzbekistan
result suggests ∆y that t = real GDP+ and
1.01∆inpt 0.37∆enrg energy consumption
t + 0.33∆k t + 3.15∆lt + has been significantly
0.11∆trend − 0.71Ecmt−1
(2.03)** (2.81)** (6.58)** (3.41)* (3.88)* (-3.90)*
interrelated and𝑅𝑅2the shortage of energy may
= 0.89
retard economic growth process.
F – Statistic = 19.71
Surprisingly labour S.E. = 0.17 effect on real Long output –Durbin
run was negative
– Watson
estimates Test =in3.34
the long-run. This
couldNote:
be *,due to𝑦𝑦the
** Indicate large proportion
𝑡𝑡 = significant
0.39𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡at
+5% level𝑡𝑡of+of
𝟎𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟏𝒍𝒍 old𝑡𝑡 +
significance
0.75𝑘𝑘 and underage population not able
0.07𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑
(5.53)* (2.62)** (1.31)
to work. Although, labour plays a Short-run significant estimates role in Uzbekistan’s 1 economic
Turkmenistan
development, but ∆𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡the large share
= 0.89∆𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔 of children
𝑡𝑡 + 0.57∆𝑘𝑘 𝑡𝑡 + 0.002𝑙𝑙 and old people−offset
𝑡𝑡 + 0.007∆𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 the
0.79𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡−1 positive
(4.33)* (3.83)* (0.97) (-3.04)
impact of labour.
𝑅𝑅 2 = 0.77 𝐹𝐹 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 = 6.13
Table-3 − 𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛 = 7.23
𝑆𝑆. 𝐸𝐸. = 0.09𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
Long
Note: – run significant
*, ** Indicate and Short at 5%–level runofEstimates
significance of Energy Consumption
and Real GDP of Uzbekistan
Long-run estimates
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 3.89𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 + 0.69𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 + 0.32𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 − 0.17𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 + 0.05𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑
(2.20)* (4.84)** (3.84)* (-2.81)** (7.77)*
Short-run estimates
Uzbekistan
∆yt = 1.01∆inpt + 0.37∆enrgt + 0.33∆k t + 3.15∆lt + 0.11∆trend − 0.71Ecmt−1
(2.03)** (2.81)** (6.58)** (3.41)* (3.88)* (-3.90)*
𝑅𝑅 2 = 0.89 F – Statistic = 19.71
S.E. = 0.17 Durbin – Watson Test = 3.34
1
In the short-run energy, capital and labour play a positive role in boosting
the real output. The coefficient of energy(0.37) has been relatively low as
compared to the coefficient of labour (3.15) and capital stock(0.33), implying
that labour play dominant role in the process of development in the short-
run. This result has very important implications for Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan
reconsiders its employment policy and concentrates not only on the
development of energy sector but also takes necessary measures to improve
the quality of labour force. The error-correction coefficient(-0.71) is found
negative and significant supporting the evidence for the existence of long-run
causality between real output, energy consumption and other factors entering
in the model the causality has been running from energy to real output. The
174
significance of the coefficient of energy consumption in the error-correction

equation implies the existence of causality running from energy consumption
to real output in the short-run. Thus, in order to enhance economic growth, the
authorities need to further develop the energy sector and improve the quality
of labour force.
Tajikistan
In case of Tajikistan, it has been found that there has been positive evidence
with respect to the relationship between real output and energy consumption,
capital and labour(table-4). The impact of labour is higher than the impact
of energy and capital on real output in the long-run. In short-run, energy
and labour growth play a significant role in the promotion of domestic
productivity. The significance of the error- correction term and the energy
consumption coefficient in the error-correction equation supports the evidence
of long-run as well as short-run causality between economic growth and
energy consumption. Development of the energy sector is seen very vital for
the enhancement of economic growth in Tajikistan.
Table-4
and Real GDP of Tajikistan
Long-run estimates
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 0.79𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 + 0.81𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 + 𝟓𝟓. 𝟏𝟏𝟔𝟔𝒍𝒍𝒕𝒕 + 0.51𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑
(3.07)* (6.52)* (10.03)* (2.39)**
Short-run estimates
Tajikistan
∆𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 0.73∆𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 + 0.17∆𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 + 𝟐𝟐. 𝟕𝟕𝟖𝟖𝒍𝒍𝑡𝑡 + 0.11∆𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 − 0.69𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡−1
(2.84)* (0.91) (3.98)* (2.15)* (-4.22)*
𝑅𝑅 2 = 0.79 F – Statistic = 7.59
S.E. = 0.07 𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 − 𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 = 3.67
Kyrgyzstan
In case of Kyrgyzstan (table-5), it hasLong-run been found estimates
that there has been positive
evidence with 𝑦𝑦respect
𝑡𝑡 = to
0.53𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔 the
𝑡𝑡 + relationship
0.27𝑘𝑘 𝑡𝑡 + 𝟑𝟑. 𝟏𝟏𝟐𝟐𝒍𝒍 𝑡𝑡 + between
0.15𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 real output and energy
consumption, capital and labour.
(2.04)* (5.34)* The (8.07)* impact of labour is seen higher than
(1.27)**
Short – run estimates
the Kyrgyzstan
impact of energy and capital on real output in the long-run. In short-
∆𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 0.71∆𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 + 0.32𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 + 𝟏𝟏. 𝟔𝟔𝟗𝟗𝒍𝒍𝑡𝑡 + 0.03∆𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 − 0.59𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡−1
run, energy and labour (2.13)* growth (0.19) play (3.79)*a significant
(2.75)* role in the promotion of
(-3.32)*
domestic productivity.
𝑅𝑅 2 = 0.61 The significance of =
𝐹𝐹 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 the5.59
error-correction term and the
energy consumption coefficient in=the
𝑆𝑆. 𝐸𝐸. error-correction
0.39𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 − 𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛 = equation
5.31 supports the
evidence of long-run as well as short-run
Note: *, ** Indicate significant at 5% level of significance causality between economic growth
and energy consumption. Development of the energy sector seems very vital
for the enhancement of economic growth in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
175
2
𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 𝒕𝒕
(3.07)*(6.52)* (10.03)* (2.39)**
Short-run estimates
Tajikistan
∆𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 0.73∆𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 + 0.17∆𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 + 𝟐𝟐. 𝟕𝟕𝟖𝟖𝒍𝒍𝑡𝑡 + 0.11∆𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 − 0.69𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡−1
(2.84)* (0.91) (3.98)* (2.15)* (-4.22)*
𝑅𝑅 2 = 0.79 F – Statistic = 7.59
S.E. = 0.07 𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 − 𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 = 3.67
Table-5
and Real GDP of Kyrgyzstan
Long-run estimates
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 0.53𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 + 0.27𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 + 𝟑𝟑. 𝟏𝟏𝟐𝟐𝒍𝒍𝑡𝑡 + 0.15𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑
(2.04)* (5.34)* (8.07)* (1.27)**
Short – run estimates
Kyrgyzstan ∆𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 0.71∆𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 + 0.32𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 + 𝟏𝟏. 𝟔𝟔𝟗𝟗𝒍𝒍𝑡𝑡 + 0.03∆𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 − 0.59𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡−1
(2.13)* (0.19) (3.79)* (2.75)* (-3.32)*
𝑅𝑅 2 = 0.61 𝐹𝐹 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 = 5.59
Conclusion
Energy, no doubt, has attained the status of a ‘strategic commodity’ and any
uncertainty about its supply can threaten the functioning of the entire world
economy, including economies like Central Asian countries. Central Asia’s
substantial and sustained economic growth is, however, placing enormous
demand on its energy resources. The demand and supply imbalance in energy
sources is pervasive requiring serious efforts by government of these countries
to augment energy supplies as Central Asia may face possible2 severe energy
supply constraints given their consumption pattern. Energy requirements in
this region has been increasing at a very rapid rate. Achieving energy security
in this strategic sense is of fundamental importance not only to their economic
growth but also for their human development objectives that aim at alleviation
of poverty, unemployment and meeting the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs).
In view of the vital and critical role of energy in the process of economic
growth, it was revealed proved that there is strong link between energy
consumption and real output for five Central Asian countries including
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. The
overall results suggest that the economy of each country is energy dependent
and the apprehensions of energy shortage may negatively effect the economic
growth which eventually results a fall in income and employment. Thus,
according to the results, Central Asian countries would be largely benefited
to adopt energy conservation policy to avoid the energy shortage. Shortfall
in energy would otherwise seriously endanger the growth and development
of these economies in the long run. Thus, it is quite important that along with
high energy consumption, the energy production raises to that extent to ensure
sustained economic growth.
From the above analyses and discussion, it could be safely concluded that
in order to achieve rapid and stable economic growth, Central Asian countries
should devise and adopt a sound policy of energy sector development. Besides,
they should also look at other strengths of their economies. For instance,
176
Uzbekistan having large young population should take care of labour force
upgradation. In Turkmenistan labour plays a little role in the development
process. Hence, Turkmenistan being rich in hydrocarbons, should take
necessary measures to utilize cheap and surplus labour in most efficient
way in the process of economic development, besides the development
of energy sector. Kazakhstan and Tajikistan should accelerate their rate of
capital accumulation. All these initiatives and policies should be pursued in
a systematic manner so as to bring economic growth and development in all
these Central Asian countries on sustainable basis.
References & Notes

1. Energy is an important production factor and, therefore, should be managed
in parallel with land, labour and capital. Here, energy refers two types, i.e.
hydrocarbons and hydropower of Central Asian countries, namely, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. It is known as bedrock
of modern development. The successful deployment of energy carriers in the
services of humanity since the last part of the 18th century has greatly altered
the way. There is hardly any aspect of modern life that does not have the imprint
of energy input, be it entertainment, recreation, agriculture, commerce, industry,
transport, education, communication, health, architecture etc. As the very basis
of development, energy use is closely related to the level of productivity in the
industry, commerce, agriculture and even in office activities. Energy consumption
per capita is one of the indicators or benchmarks for measuring the standard
of living. The unprecedented use of energy which began with the industrial
revolution certainly brought about massive increase in productivity and change
in lifestyle.
2. Development implies that the standard of rising is rising and people live in
greater comfort (if not happiness) than before. Unless more energy is allowed to
be consumed, the objective of providing a comfortable living cannot be fulfilled.
3. This is the crucial stage which covers a relatively brief period of two to three
decades in which the economy transforms itself in such a way that economic
growth subsequently takes place more or less automatically. “The take-off” is
defined as “the interval during which the rate of investment increases in such
a way that real output per capita rises and this initial increase carries with it
radical changes in the techniques of production and the disposition of income
flows which perpetuate the new scale of investment and perpetuate thereby the
rising trend in per capita output.” Thus, the term “take-off” implies three things:
first the proportion of investment to national income must rise from 5% to 10%
and more so as to outstrip the likely population growth; secondly, the period
must be relatively short so that it should show the characteristics of an economic
revolution; and thirdly, it must culminate in self-sustaining and self-generating
economic growth. Thus, during the take-off stage, the desire to achieve economic
growth to raise the living standards dominates the society. Revolutionary changes
occur in both agriculture and industry and productivity levels sharply increase.
There is greater urbanization and urban labour force increases. In a relatively
short period of a decade or two, both the basic structure of the economy and
social and political structure is changed so that a self-sustaining growth rate can
be maintained. It is worth noting that in the opinion of W. W. Rostow, the rise of
177
new elite (i.e. new entrepreneurial class) and establishment of a nation state are
crucial for economic development.
4. In this stage of development per capita income of country rises to such a high
level that consumption basket of the people increases beyond food, clothing
and shelters to articles of comforts and luxuries on a mass scale. Further, with
progressive industrialization and urbanization of the economy values of people
change in favour of more consumption of luxuries and high styles of living.
New types of industries producing durable consumer goods come into existence
which satisfies the wants for more consumption. These new industries producing
durable consumer goods become the new leading sectors of economic growth.
5. Chandra Amiya (2015): “Energy Cooperation”, India-Central Asia Relations-
The Economic Dimension, Pentagon Press, p.41.
6. Shah G. M. (2013): “Economic Cooperation Between Central Asia - Prospects
and Challenges” in R. Malhotra et al. (eds.), Perspectives on Bilateral and
Regional Cooperation: South and Central Asia, CRRID, Chandigarh, p.101.
7. SojidaUrazdoboeva (2007): “Some Aspects of Indian Energy Interests in Central
Asia”, in Bakshi, Jyotsna (ed.), India’s Engagement with Central Asia with Focus
on India-Uzbekistan Relations, University of World Economy and Diplomacy,
Tashkent, p.178.
8. Refers here the republics of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan
and Kyrgyzstan.
9. Energy is one of the Central Asia’s crucial resources and the region intends
to harness this potential as an integral part of its economic development. The
development of energy sector is expected to usher in huge economic benefits in
the form of infrastructure development, industrialization and huge revenue. With
the increase in hydrocarbons and generation of hydropower and improvement
in energy efficiency in Central Asia, the republics of the region aims not only
to provide domestic energy at affordable cost; but also turn into a net energy
exporter in near future. These energy rich republics of the Central Asia have a
large scope to transform their economies with the proper development and use of
then energy sector.
10. Kraft. J., and Kraft. A (1979): “On the Relationship Between Energy and GNP”,
Journal of Energy and Development, Vol.3, pp. 401-403.
11. Akarca, A. T., and Long, T. V. (1979): “Energy and Employment - A Time Series
Analysis of the Causal Relationship”, Resources and Energy, Vol. 5, pp. 326-31.
12. Akarca, A. T. and Long, T. V. (1980): “On the Relationship Between Energy and
GNP - A Reexamination”, Journal of Energy & Development, Vol. 5, pp.336-51.
13. Jumbe, C.B.L. (2004): “Co-integration and Causality Between Electricity
Consumption and GDP - Empirical Evidence from Malawi”, Energy Economics,
Vol. 26, pp. 61-68.
14. Masih, A. M. M., and Mash, R. (1996): “Electricity Consumption, Real Income
and Temporal Causality - Results from a Multi-country Study Based on Co-
integration and Error Correction Modeling Techniques”, Energy Economics, Vol.
18, pp. 165-83.
15. Yu, S. H and Choi. J.Y. (1996): “The Causal Relationship Between Energy and
GNP - An International Comparison”, Journal of Energy and Development, Vol.
10, pp. 249-72.
178
Peace And Conflict Studies
Need and Evolution
S . Showkat Dar
Abstract
Peace is needed to perform pacific deeds for blooming truth, love, harmony,
happiness, and cooperation among humans across the ethnic, racial,
religious, and national borders to work with each other. While as war is
needed to feed the greed of political gods and to serve their emotional utopia
by pouring human blood in conflicts and wars. In this response, the evolution
of peace and conflict studies (PACS) as an academic discipline isto explore
knowledge associated with the causes of war, conflict and sustainability of
peace. The foundational objectives of the subject is to search for peaceful,
profitable and dignified approaches through pedagogy, research and
practice, by using appropriate methods and diverse stance in preventing,
transforming, managing and resolving conflicts among citizens and states.
In this general line of analysis, the article outlines the disciplinary evolution
of peace and conflict studies in the broader context. In particular, it explores
the need as well as situations and scenarios through which the discipline
has emerged and has developed its scholarship through various phases.
Keywords
Conflict Analysis, Conflict Resolution, War, Violence, Pacifisms,
International Relations, Peace Research, Misuse of Scientific Knowledge,
Peaceful Co-existence, Non-violence.
The gravity of sufferings and painful life experienced by living generations

after war, is evident in the war effected areas. Wars drain huge regional budgets
towards defence at the cost of social security. some of the shadows of pain as
a result of war is visiualised as:
Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies,
in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who
are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money
alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists,
the hopes of its children. The cost of one modern heavy bomber equates a
modern brick school in more than 30 cities (Dwight, D. Eisenhower,1963).
It is our responsibility to stand for projection of peace, train our minds, and
encourage civilized and dignified approaches of peace and conflict based
on the description of reality rather than the convenience of our hearts. For
centuries, democracy achieved something and has replaced the dictatorship,
Peace and Conflict Studies: Need and Evolution
but has failed in bringing peaceful international relations. Social and political
thinkers have explored a catalogue of theories and concepts to understand
the conflict, its causes, consequences, and contexts during pre-war situations
but still none have worked effectively in the abolition of wars. Peace is
in transition, and has not replaced the wars and those who are engaged to
develop scholarship in the universe of peace are actually working against
conflicts and wars. However, wars are still on the top priorities of states;
investment in strategizing wars through scientific knowledge for killing of
life and destruction of its survival is still recognized as an admired profession.
There are more people engaged in the development of the weapons of mass
destruction rather than peace construction at institutional and organizational
level. The war followers put efforts and build nuclear weapons for destruction
which has rendered peace in the poor construction in the 21st century. It is high
time to employ the knowledge for propagation of peace and conflict studies
to divorce the conflicts and wars by investing in peace fair and development
rather than warfare and destruction, particularly, keeping in view the imminent
risk of a nuclear war.
Since the creation of the nation state system in 1648, there have been
hundreds of wars in human history with immense loss happening in the form
of millions of human deaths and damage of property worth billions. We have
survived two World Wars - 1914 to 1918 and 1939 to 1945, and have lost more
than 60 to 70 million people. The massive killings and destruction of these
wars was expressed in the growth of peace and anti-war sentiments which
appealed to the intellect of many scholars across the disciplines to initiate
peaceful international relations. Their main drive was to spread the culture of
peace through research and develop new perspectives on peace and conflict
and explore the causes and consequences of various forms of conflict. In
addition, they devised the means for constructively addressing conflict with
nonviolent approaches. This has brought out a new academic discipline, known
by various names as peace research, conflict analysis, conflict resolution, but
commonly called peace and conflict studies PACS. In this context, the term
peace is used as a basic or minimum condition for cooperation and conflict as
the primary level of causes of war and violence.
Peace and conflict studies is one of the fast emerging interdisciplinary
subjects in the academic universe of the 21st century. The subject is the
outcome of sagacity that it is not necessary that human decisions and resources
should be invested in mutual destruction by engaging millions of humans in
fighting wars and killing one another. The decisions and resources should be
devoted for mass construction by peaceful means of dialogues, negotiations
and reconciliations. This approach is effective and productive in converting
hostility into a peaceful society in national and international relations. It is a
challenging issue before the world community that how to encourage states
to use the decisions for peace in warlike situations. It is not a new concern
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as peace and war are born twins in human relations and one is as old as the
other. But war is a greater threat to the human life and has swallowed millions
of lives throughout the course of human history. This discourse has directed
the intellectuals to develop scholarship on the issues of peace and conflict in
national and international relations. This approach has led to the emergence
of peace and conflict studies as a subject of the essence in the Western
world. The main intention of developing this cross-disciplinary subject is to
promote understanding of the disastrous consequences of war and violence by
evaluating and measuring the sufferings of war. In this context, it is essential
to put the discipline in a conceptual framework to figure out the phases of
evolution of the subject in an organized structure.
Origin and Evolution of Peace and Conflict Studies

There are various narratives about the evolution of peace and conflict studies
as how it emerged as an academic discipline across the globe. All narratives are
integrated in developing the scholarship of the discipline of peace and conflict
studies. The primary considerations of the discipline are rooted in religious
texts, diverse ideas of “pacific philosophy” and other catastrophic wars of
the twentieth century. Together all these factors have created a cognizance
to construct a body of knowledge for making peace superior than the wars in
pursuit of a dignified life at societal and global level. In this debate, wisdom
dictates that peace being the total wellness and conflict as illness of life should
be communicated loudly to discharge violence though institutionalization. It
is evident that peace is good and one of the most cherished human values,
which although difficult to attain, but yet important for biological and cultural
survival. Consequently, this leads to the emergence of peace and conflict
studies.
In this understanding, peace is viewed as a perception towards the
surroundings, primarily focusing on happiness, harmony, safety, and goodness
as well as tension free state of affairs in every facet of life. On the contrary,
active conflict replaces peace, and produces deaths and destruction of life.
Therefore, work for peace and development exclusively indicates ‘work
against conflict’ and destruction1. In this context, peace and conflict studies, as
an academic discipline, is more inclined towards the philosophy of pacifism
with the belief that wars are bad and destructive, and the affirmation that
peace is good which is not difficult to attain. Peace and conflict are two
different and opposite state of affairs with different physical, material and
cultural outcomes. Their existence is like light and shadow, day and night.
I would prefer to relate peace and conflict with two opposite conditions and
situations as wellness and illness.2 Peace is societal wellness and conflict is
societal illness with one eliminating the other. The key argument arises here
that peace and conflict are two different and opposite situations but then why
should we study them together? This intellectual query can be responded with
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the fact that peace as societal wellness and conflict as societal illness, are
inseparable in understanding its causes, effects and subsequent consequences
thereafter. Therefore, the study of peace without understanding the causes
and consequences of conflict is a disorganized and unproductive approach.
Similarly, a study of conflict without aspirations for peace is thoughtless.
Hypothetically, the two situations are integrated and mutually dependent
on theoretical and empirical methods of assumptions, observations and
experiments. In times of peace (wellness), society needs to build knowledge
for its sustainability and prevent the causes of conflict (illness) or if conflict
(illness) occurs, the peaceful methods of conflict prevention, transformation,
management and resolution should be available before it will turn to war and
produce violence. The fact is that understanding of conflict will deter the
disputants from breaking the peace and making wars or what British strategic
thinker Basil Liddell Hart once wrote that ‘if you want peace, understand war’.3
Therefore, the two situations cannot be thought-out separately which make it
important for diagnostic reasons to study them together in one discipline. The
discipline of peace and conflict studies is known by various names including
conflict analysis and resolution, peace and human rights etc. Keeping in view
this analytical context, the emergence of the subject and its academic evolution
is divided into four phases related to the international developments:
1. Evolutionary Phase (1648-1914).
2. Post-evolutionary Phase (1914-1945).
3. Institutional Developments (1945-1990).
4. Contemporary Phase (Post 1990).
Evolutionary Phase
The evolutionary phase of peace and conflict studies refers to the period from
the creation of the nation state system upto the First World War (1648-1914).
During this period, many wars took place in Europe and in other parts of
the world, including religious wars between Protestants and Catholics that
plunged Europe into a destructive war situation which lasted for thirty years
(1618-1648). It was one of the most destructive and the longest conflicts in the
history of Europe which forever changed the way nation-states interact with
each other. At the end of this longstanding conflict, a novel sense prevailed
among the longest standing conflicting parties in the form of Westphalian
treaties of peace in 1648.4 One of the major outcomes of these treaties was
to retain peace and devise social and political mechanism for abolishing war.
Therefore, the end of thirty years war is recognized as a pre-developmental
phase of peace and conflict studies, in a sense, that thinking about peace and
conflictbegins by means and methods of peace treaties and approaches.
Europe followed by North America, were the centers of 17th and 18th
century wars, which resulted in an overwhelming debate and documentation
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among the Europeans on the writings pertaining to the significance of peace

and conflict. The philosophical and political writings could be traced from the
times of Thomas Hobbes’ work Leviathan (1651) which explores the causes
of war and the conditions of peace. Before Hobbes, Plato and Thucydides
wrote of war among city-states in the context of peace and justice.5 Even, John
Locke has philosophized the theme of peace through tolerance. He published
a series of works from 1689-1692 ̶ “A Letter Concerning Toleration, I, II,
and III”. Toleration and peace are central to his political philosophy.6 Then
after fifty years, the Spanish war of succession occurred (1701-1714) in the
land of Europe among several states. It was a large scale European war since
thirty years war, which was fought from 1618 to 1648. During this period, the
most influential work was carried out by Abbe De St. Pierre in 1712, titled
as “Project for Perpetual Peace”. He stated “my design is to propose means
for settling an everlasting peace among all the Christian states”. His project
for perpetual peace went through several modifications and revised editions.7
Therefore, this project is considered as a landmark for peace and conflict
studies.
After the efforts of Abbe De St. Pierre, the new wave of conflicts occurred
in the late 18th century, mainly during the American Revolution (1775-1783)
and French Revolution (1789-1799) which sparked a series of wars called
Napoleonic Wars in Europe (1799-1814), Congress of Vienna (1814 1815), the
Vienna System (1815-48), Crimean War (1853-56), War of Italian Unification
waged by Cavour and Garibaldi (1859-61), the Wars of German unification
(1864-71), the Bismarckian System in Operation, (1871-90), Imperial Wars
(1890-1907) and all these disasters culminated in the First World War. These
wars were highly destructive in nature that resulted in the emergence of a new
scholarship on the study of peace and conflict in various disciplines. The main
objective was to construct a theoretical and conceptual framework intended to
reshape the behaviour of conflicting parties by means and methods of peaceful
dialogue.
This process was analysed by various scholars and philosophers
including Voltaire (1694-1778), a French historian and philosopher, who
talked of peace through tolerance. He projected perpetual peace and wrote
“perceptual peace can only be established and achieved through tolerance”.8
Rousseau (1712-1778), a political Philosopher, opposes war and tyrannies.
His analysis of violence is very different as he emphasizes on the roots or
causes of conflicts than its manifestations in pursuit of peace.9 Adam Smith
(1723-1790), a pioneer of political economy, talks of peace and war through
the principles of war economies, deaths and debts, and peace by means of
economic wellbeing and trade among nations.10 Thomas Jefferson, a sincere
pacifist and politician, described “peace as a natural state of humanity and war
as an artificial institution”.11 All of them have focused on ethical and practical
issues concerning with various kinds of conflicts by developing a calculated
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reasoning. The classical reference is of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). He spells

out ‘perpetual peace’ in 1795 which is a comprehensive model of peace for
future of the world in which more favourable conditions had emerged since
last 200 years.12 John Stuart Mill wrote about peace through liberty of free
discussions of ideas. According to him, liberty means “liberty of thought and
feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical
or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological”.13 These basics of liberty can
survive only in peaceful conditions.
These scholarly efforts did not absolutely stop or abolish the occurrence
of conflicts, suppressions and wars. Since the time of these thinkers, new
issues of conflict have taken birth and devastated the peace, and consequently,
many explanations have been put forward to address the societal illness. In this
response, the influential works of Karl Marx (1818-1883) which emphasized
on the issues of class conflict and capitalist manifestation are significant.
Later on, the same theme was followed by Vladimir Lenin (1870-1934); by
elaborating Marxism, he put capitalism and imperialism as the main cause of
conflicts and wars for radical societal transformation. But the path of progress
was so clear that wars and violence still occurred and finally, religious thoughts
and practice were also incorporated in maintaining peace and resolving the
conflicts. There are strong evidences to relate these arguments as the peaceful
teachings and obligations had long existed in Christianity, Islam, Hinduism
and other religions. All religions encourage peace and lay emphasis on pulling
out from the worldly conflicts. During the 19th and early 20th Centuries, several
engagements became evident in North America, Britain and other parts of
Europe. The anti-war religious organizations and peace societies began to put
efforts to end the conflicts. All religions have almost same approaches against
the violence and pacifists believe that any form of violence and war is against
the wish of God and hence a sinful act.14 Keeping in view these facts, the
evolution of peace and conflict studies have roots in philosophy and theology
and then other modalities of social sciences.
Post Evolutionary Phase

The first half of the twentieth century was one of the most turbulent periods in
the world history. The foundational period of peace and conflict studies refers
to the developments from the First World War 1914 until the Second World
War 1945. During these three decades, world has survived two major global
wars, First World War (1914-1918) and Second World War (1939- 1945).
The consequences of the Second World War are briefly discussed in the next
section of this paper. In this section, we will only focus on the period ranging
from the beginning of the First World War to the end of the Second World
War. The First World War or once called the ‘Great War’ involved most of the
major European powers. At the end, it destroyed millions of lives and property
worth billions. Almost every region of the world was directly and indirectly
184
involved in this war. According to one estimate, the total deaths in all nations
who fought in this war are estimated to have been 8.5 million deaths with
21 million being wounded.15 These mass killings with huge economic loss
resulted in an innovative growth of pacific appearance among various social,
political and economic organizations to initiate peace movement organizations.
The objective of these movements was to generate an anti-war expression
and encourage the peaceful conduct of national and international relations.
According to Ishiyama and Breuning “the calamity of World War I and the
horrifying human toll it brought about led to the new efforts to understand,
prevent and ultimately eliminate war”.16 In the years of post-World War I, the
most important development in the peace and conflict was the organizational
approach to outcrop peace and put efforts to construct institutions to reduce
the causes of war.17 The First World War concluded with a series of talks
called Treaties of Paris, (1919-1920) to ensure the world peace. A number of
treaties were signed at the end of World War I. These treaties include Treaty
of Versailles (June 28, 1919), Treaty of Saint-Germain (Sept.10, 1919), Treaty
of Neuilly (Nov. 27, 1919), Treaty of Trianon (June 4, 1920), and Treaty of
Sevres (Aug. 10, 1920).18 These treaties inspired many governments for the
institutional creation of the League of Nations in 1920 which was the first
international effort to maintain world peace and prevent the occurrence of
future wars.
The alarming consequences of World War I have also alerted the other
societal organizations of Europe to stick together for peace and project anti-
war culture. These organizations include the formation of Dada Art Movement
as an anti-war movement in Europe and New York from 1915 to 1923. The
religious non-governmental organizations and groups have also mobilized to
stop wars. In 1914, the inter-faith Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) was
organized at a gathering in Cambridge, England to spread the message of
peace and anti-war culture. The progress led to the foundation of American
FOR in 1915 and finally, the International Faith Fellowship of Reconciliation
(IFOR) was established in 1919.19 The main motive of IFOR was to promote
methods of non-violence, reconciliation, and educate and empower the
youth for projection of peace making. The union of these organizations
with European and North American societies worked as force to foster the
respective governments in 1928 for Kellogg-Brand pact to outlaw wars.
According to the Article I of this pact, “the Parties agree that the settlement or
solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin,
they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by
pacific means”.20
The institutional or academic efforts to explore new methods of peace
and conflict studies include the issues of arms race, revolutions, wars and
peace making. The scholarly research was conducted by a Russian sociologist,
Pritim Sorokin, who wrote a classical book “The Sociology of Revolution”,
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1925. After years, a group of American psychologists, John Dollard, Leonard

William Doob and others, contributed to peace and conflict research by writing
a book on “Frustration and Aggressionin”, 1939. Both the books had given an
in-depth sociological and psychological analysis of conflicts, that wars and
violence are harming the human efforts in pursuit of peaceful existence and
survival at individual and social level. Then, Quincy Wright published first
edition of a monumental book “A Study of War”, 1942, the product of his
15 years of inter-disciplinary research project. In this project, Quincy Wright
investigated the history and causes of war from pre-emptive conflict onwards
and in a subsequent edition in 1965, the project went on to look over the
evolution of nuclear weapons.21 This book is marked as the foundation of
what we call at the present times ‘Peace Research’22 or peace and conflict
research study. This is a strong evidence that peace and conflict studies is
an interdisciplinary field of study, and its evolution can be traced before the
World War Second.
Institutional and Academic Phase

The era from 1946 to 1990 is the most important phase in the academic history
of peace and conflict studies. The majority of the scholars are of the same
opinion that peace and conflict studies, as a distinct field of study, has its
proper and institutional evolution in the post-World War Second or the years
of 1950’s.23 The massive killings and disastrous consequences of World War
Second have invited the attention of the world community to develop war
free international relations. The historical lesson learnt from the suicidal use
of scientific knowledge against Japan at the final stage of World War Second,
has rationalized the thinking about life and its survival. The massive killings
of World War Second in which 1 in 22 Soviet citizens were killed, 1 in 25
Germans, 1 in 46 Japanese, 1 in 150 Britain’s, and 1 in 500 Americans have
lost their lives,24 rekindled the pro-peace thoughts and anti-war sentiments
on academic fronts. The discourse begins with the idea that research should
be conducted distinctively on issues of peace and conflict independent of
each other. This led to the developments at institutional level in Europe and
America with global acceptance.
After World War Second, many governmental and non-governmental
schedules were initiated to prevent the future wars by building international
institutions and organizations to promote the culture of peace by means of
reconciliation between adversaries. In this regard, the first global development
was the cooperation for peace among nations which led to the formation of
United Nations in 1945 to prevent the future generations from scourge of war.
In 1946, in Caux, Switzerland, a series of conferences was held under the
patronage of an international conference for the reconciliation of European
states and people who had been in the midst of an intense conflict. They held
many workshops and brought together people at many levels of government
186
and society to develop mutual understanding and sense of amnesty. This

philosophy of peace through reconciliation was encouraged and carried out
by a non-governmental movement, an interfaith peace organization known
as Moral Re-Armament.25 These establishments and developments were the
primary contribution to the peace and conflict research in Europe and North
America.
The other important related developments in the peace and conflict
studies were the various conflicts and crises associated with global conflict
called Cold War. Those conflicts were dangerous because of the nuclear threat,
but were managed without shooting a single fire and violating international
law. The classical reference is of the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962, which
had the potential of causing a nuclear war but was managed through effective
negotiation without any military action. In this process, non-official high
level meetings of the Pugwash and the Dartmouth conferences (1957,
1960) provided a kind of aid in US-USSR negotiations on issues of arms
control. Many scholars endure the years of 1950s and 1960s as the academic
foundation of peace and conflict studies, mainly in the United States. The
research and theories were very much focused to devise the methodology, if
not to completely eliminations of wars, but to prevent and demoralize wars
because of nuclear consequences.
The years from 1946 to 1960 yielded a small amount of research and
writings on issues of peace and conflict. In 1951, a group of scholars from
various fields established an organization to promote research on the issues
of peace and war. In 1952, they began publishing the Bulletin of the Research
Exchange and Prevention of War. Within years, the Research Exchange and
Prevention of War organized group discussions at the academic convention
which included Quincy Wright and Pittirim Sorokin. In 1954-55, a group
of scholars established the Center for Advanced and Behavioral Sciences
(CASBS) at Stanford, to conduct research on various social conflicts. They
include Kenneth Boulding, an economist, Anatol Raproport, a mathematical
biologist, and Stephen Richardson, a sociologist. Richardson brought
two unpublished books of his father, Lewis Richardson, “Statistics of
Deadly Quarrels” and “Arms and Insecurity”, which became important for
mathematical models in the study of issues of war and peace. The CASBS
founders led the decision to start a cross-disciplinary journal that would replace
the Bulletin of the Research Exchange. This new publication was named as the
“Journal of Conflict Resolution: A Quarterly for Research Related to War and
Peace” at the University of Michigan. The journal began publication in 1957
as the first journal in the newly emerging field of peace and conflict and was
guided by an interdisciplinary board headed by Kenneth Boulding. Then in
1959, the group established Center for Research on Conflict Resolution at the
same University. The “Journal of Conflict Resolution and Center for Research
on Conflict Resolution” jointly focused on issues of peace and conflict which
187
gave rise to national and international peace associations in various parts of

the world.
In 1960, “Journal of Peace Research” was purposely established to
develop scholarship of peace research and the Council on Peace Research
in History (CPRH) in United States was established in 1963.The Japan
Peace Research Group (JPRG) and Canadian Peace Research and Education
Research (CPREA) were formed in 1963 and 1964 respectively. In 1964,
“The Journal of Peace Research” came up with typologies of peace in
scientific context. In this founding edition, the founder of peace thinking,
Johan Galtung, proposed two situations of peace i.e. Positive and Negative
peace. He conceived “negative peace as the absence of violence, absence of
war while positive peace as the integration of human society”.26 Then, Peace
Research Institute, Oslo, Norway, which initially began as part of the Institute
of Social Research, became independent in 1966. The main focus of these
Institutes and the Journals was predominately theorizing and broadening the
concepts of peace and conflict articulated by Johan Galtung, particularly, on
‘positive’ and negative peace. The other institute established around this time
was the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPARI, 1966)
which remains concerned with the core issues of peace and conflict studies
and prevention of biological weapons and disarmament.
During the 1970s and 1980s, peace and conflict studies got impetus from
two different international developments. One was the independence of Indian
subcontinent in 1947 from British by practicing Gandhian philosophy of non-
violence. In 1970s, the Gandhian philosophy of non-violence (Ahimsa) and
truth (Satyagraha) got a space in teachings of peace and conflict studies.
Another was the anti-Vietnam War movements which gave rise to the right
to protest against wars and other associated social evils in the practice and
pedagogy of peace and conflict studies. Resultantly, these movements aided
new ideas that resistance conflicts could be conducted constructively without
producing much violence and developing confidence building measures
among conflicting states. In summing, up these developments, the growth
of peace and conflict studies at national and international stage is explored
comprehensively.
Contemporary Phase
In 1990s, two related developments took place with global impacts, one was
the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, and another was the breakup of
Soviet Union in December 1991. These developments led to the emergence
of an era called post-cold war world order. In this era, the discipline of peace
and conflict studies was also under shadows of various divided discourses
among thinkers in the West and other parts of the world. The end of cold
war conflict was projected as an end of the conflict and the questions about
the significance of peace and conflict studies were in decline. The arguments
188
were raised through different contexts, as post-cold war era is unipolar and
issues of conflict related to the study of peace and conflict like arms race,
disarmament, arms control, and nuclear confrontation/proliferation will be
of least importance in need of study or research. Therefore, the reverence
of peace and conflict studies in post-cold war era was under the optimistic
influence in which conflict belonged to the history.
It was evident that a new world order was emerging with peace and
harmony. This whole euphoria was described by Francis Fukuyama in
1989 within “The End of History”. In his view, the ideological components
would mostly disappear and there would be an end of ideological conflicts
and wars.27 In the same vein, President George W Bush announced a “New
World Order” in September, 1990, which purposefully meant that in post-
cold war world order, war is obsolete.28 However, this post-cold war optimism
was short lived and shattered when conflicts and wars proliferated in various
regions of the world with global consequences. At the beginning of the post-
cold war era, UN witnessed a revival in addressing the issues of disputes
and conflicts at the national and international level, but after the Gulf War
of 1990, the situation turned into pessimism. And the UN was no longer in
a position to sustain international peace and security, but rather to represent
the desire of the major powers and consequently, it lost its significance.29 The
weakness of the international collective approach shattered the optimism
with new changing scenarios and situations of conflicts and wars of the “third
kind.” These included the use of asymmetric methods of terror without a
specific front, campaigns and even strategies. The main objective of these
conflicts and wars is high casualties (especially civilian casualties) and a little
distinction between armed forces and the civilian population. This perspective
was popularized by Samuel Huntington who projected a different theory
called Clash of Civilizations, which is contrary to the Fukuyama’s “End of
History”. Huntington’s central argument in his seminal book “The Clash of
Civilizationsis” that the ideological conflicts of the cold war would be replaced
by the post-cold war conflicts of ethnicity, religion and nationalism, and these
would be the dominating factors in the post-cold war international relations.30
The conceptual and theoretical construction of post-cold war optimism
was yet in its infancy when the situation turned into absolute chaos in August
1990 when 34 nations led by the United States attacked Iraq in response to
Iraq’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait, thus, shattering the post-cold war
optimism. Since the fall of Berlin war (1989 to 1992), 82 armed conflicts and
79 civil conflicts took place across the globe. In 1993, 42 countries in the
world were beset with 52 major conflicts, with another 37 countries facing
political violence. Of these 79 countries, 65 were in the developing world.
There have been conflicts in all regions, including Europe - Bosnia, Georgia,
Turkey and the United Kingdom, in West Asia - Iraq, Israel and Lebanon,
in Latin America - Colombia and Guatemala, in Asia - Bangladesh, India-
189
Pakistan, Indonesia, Iran, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar,

the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Tajikistan, in Africa - Angola, Chad, Ethiopia,
Morocco, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, Zaire and Zimbabwe. These
conflicts and wars have had different causes, ranging from ethnic, religious,
socio-political and other identity-based causes. As ‘global chaos’ and ‘ethnic
cleansing’ and renewed meaning of ‘genocide’ found a place in the lexicon
of the 1990s in which people were killed for what they were, less than who
they were. This was evident in Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Iraqi Kurds, Sri-Lankan
Tamils, Indian Kashmiris and other parts of the world. In total, the 20th century
is described as the “Bloodiest” with an estimate of 187 million deaths due to
the occurrence of various conflicts and wars around the world.31
At the end of the 20th century, eighty years out of hundred years were
dominated by prolonged wars, including two world wars, hot-cold wars and
other conflicts. According to SIPRI year book, in the first decade of post-
war era (1990-2001), there were 57 major armed conflicts in 47 countries,
and according to the conflict database of International Institute for Strategic
Studies London, six million people were killed in armed conflicts during
1990s.32 This implies that the end of the cold war does not mean the end of
conflict or the end of the history, but in reverse, conflicts and wars are at our
doorsteps.
In the beginning of the twenty-first century, new thoughts became
necessitated in order to understand the occurrence of asymmetrical and
violent attacks on American military and trade Icons (Pentagon and World
Trade Centre) on September 11, 2001 and other series of attacks across the
globe. These attacks, including Indonesia (Bali, 2002), Spain (Madrid, 2004),
UK (London, 2005) and other number of violent attacks in India, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and other parts of the world. The drivers of these
violent activities are often multi-faceted and multi-dimensional with various
narratives. The substantial causes of these conflicts were generalized as socio-
economic disparity that causes social hostilities between different ethnic,
religious and linguistic groups. Presence of state-sponsored violence, such
as extra judicial killings, gross human rights violations and other forms of
violence, including deaths and disappearance in various conflict zones across
the globe, has troubled the peace and security scenario of the 21st century.
The asymmetrical and volatile attacks have induced a new generation
of ideas in all the five continents to think of peace and conflict studies in
an inclusive perspective. These perceptions, include issues of emerging
geopolitics, geo-economics, environmental conflicts, and their conversion
from warfare to welfare or peace-fare, and societal illness to its wellness.
Within this framework, the pedagogy and research in peace and conflict
studies emerged as inclusive and open ended multidisciplinary subject in post-
cold war era. It covers the whole range of causes of conflict and methods of
sustainability of peace. It is open-ended in a sense that from space to earth
190
and sea, there are various issues of conflicts, and if ignored, they may lead to
war and violence. Peace and conflict studies explores and invents the doors
of new opportunity for prevention, transformation, resolution, mitigation, and
management of these conflicts in an acceptable way. It binds the professionals
across the disciplines to work against the enemies of peace. In this process,
peace and conflict studies emerges as a major domain of all disciplines. It
includes, moral, mental, and social sciences, legal studies, and even natural,
material and medical sciences. In brief, themes and theories of peace and
conflict studies includes every facet of human intervention that can cause
conflict and would have an adverse influence on peace and security.
Paradigm Shift
A chronology of publications right from 1940 till date, infer a positive side
of the picture which clearly indicates a fast changing mood of scholars and
writers in favour of peace. In view of this growing trend of opinions based
on sound methodologies perpetuating non-violent policy with “live and let
live” approach, the foreign relation, defence, strategic and conflict resolution
measures etc., are being adopted in tune with peaceful co-existence. The
global political and economic, giants instead of confronting with each other,
have started to co-operate, compete and compliment each other. Hopefully,
this positive development in discipline of PACS will continue to replace
warfare by welfare. This paradigm shift towards soft politics is possibly due to
the lesson learnt by the people after waging wars and observing that peace can
be more powerful than war. Consequently, the scope, objectives, direction and
related institutional developments of PACS as a growing discipline, changes
in tune with the requirements.
The subject of PACS has extended its area of study beyond the
limitations of its traditional engagements on arms races, arms control and
nuclear confrontation. It is a transformative interdisciplinary academic
field; analytical in nature, nonviolent in actions, theoretical and a-theoretical
in methodological approaches, and global in scope. It provides a range of
nonviolent actions to address the complex issues of conflicts faced by current
and future generations. The main motive of the discipline is whether conflict
is at the micro, meso, macro, or mega levels of analysis. It is almost dedicated
to createpositive change and establish just peace. It has widened its areas
to include issues of gender, race and ethnicity, issues of non-proliferation,
risks of nuclear conflicts, geopolitical conflicts, environmental conflicts,
energy and resource conflicts, and conflicts caused by health and poverty on
earth. Besides this, peace and conflict studies also includes maritime, space
and cyber conflicts. The fundamental to the objectives of the discipline is an
organised study of the conflicts, their causes and consequences in exploring the
conditions of peace.33 To maintain the wide-ranging pedagogy and demands of
interdisciplinary scholarship methods of education, it primarily addresses the
191
issues of conflicts rather than simply countering them. In the broader context,
it strives to produce a new generation of ideas to transform the warfare into
welfare. The methodological orientation is more about incentives of being
in a war and disincentives of being in conflict by exploring the cost benefit
analysis of life and property. The main area of focus is to emphasize more on
nonviolent approaches of prevention, management and resolution of conflicts
rather than coercive approach. It also addresses various concerns to reform
and transform the existing structures in order to sustain peace and suspend
violence.
So far the academic developments of PACS are concerned, it has developed
its teachings on “transformation of violence into peace and harmony through
spirituality” in the classrooms of Manchester College, Indiana in 1948.34 The
major developments in the teachings of PACS in classrooms of colleges and
universities took place only after the Vietnam War of 1955-75. The teachings
at undergraduate and postgraduate level in 1970s and 1980 in the US and
then in European countries were a thoughtful reaction against the Vietnam
War. The programmes were titled as “Problems of War and Peace” and “Peace
Research” under the Church of Brethren Institute.35 The liberal programme
was started at Uppsala University by establishing the Department of Peace
and Conflict Research in 1971.36 In Britain, the first Peace Studies department
was established in 1973 at the University of Bradford.37 The department sets
its main aim as to study peace as a condition of social and political systems,
in conjunction with attendant concepts such as justice, war, dignity and so on.
In this process, the two organizations-- the World Policy Institute (formerly
Institute for World Order) and COPRED played very significant role in
developing new programs and curriculum of PACS in the North and South
Atlantic.
In the post-Cold War set-up, PACS is more applicable for Global South
than Global North, where most of the countries are struggling for social
injustice, economic disparities that not only aggravate unemployment and
poverty, but indeed instigate and drive social problems and proto-type conflicts.
In this regard, one of the most important development took place in the recent
past as a number of peace and conflict centres, departments and institutions
have been established in Global South states, mainly in sub-Saharan Africa
and Latina America. Besides,South Asian region has also introduced the
subject of peace conflict studies in different Universities and Colleges. In June
1999, Bangladesh introduced peace and conflict studies at the University of
Dhaka, Bangladesh. The department commenced with only Masters’ Program
and conclusively fixed the purpose of advancing interdisciplinary study and
research into the conditions of peace and the causes of war and other forms
of violence.38 The key issues of the department are to make a contribution to
the advancement of peace and conflict studies alongwith non-violent conflict
management processes.
192
At the beginning of the 21st century, University of Jammu founded the

Gandhian Center for Peace and Conflict Studies (GCPCS) in 2004, with an aim
to bring conflicting relationships down through to the non-violent teachings
of the Gandhian philosophy.39 However, as a research institute, the Institute of
Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), a premier think tank that has a mission of
developing an alternative and independent framework for peace and conflict
issues in South Asia, was founded in New Delhi, India in 1996.40 The Nelson
Mandela Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (NMCPCR), the first
Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution among the Indian universities, was
established in 2004 at the Jamia Millia Islamia University, New Delhi. Since
2007 the NMCPCR centre has started Masters course and Doctoral Degree in
Conflict Analysis and Peace Building (CAPB), and Conflict and Peace Studies
(CAPS) sequentially.41
In 2007, Nepal initiated a two-year multi-disciplinary Masters programme
in Conflict, Peace and Development Studies (CPADS) at the University of
Tribhuvan.42 In 2012, the subject of PACS was introduced in National Defence
University (NDU) of Pakistan.43 In Bangladesh University of Professionals
(BUP), Mirpur, have introduced a Masters programme in Peace and Human
Rights Development Studies (PAHRDS). The programme was started with an
aim to not only benefit both Bangladeshi armed forces but civilians to develop
a vibrant civil-military relationship that would effectively contribute to the
development of the country.44 In the present context, peace and conflict studies
is a full-fledged subject being taught under different titles such as Peace
and Conflict Studies (PACS), Peace Studies and Research (PSR), Conflict
Resolution (CR), and Peace and Human Rights Studies (PHRS). The subject
is a newcomer, but is a fast growing one which is corroborated by the fact that
it is now taught in more than 50 countries of the world. In the United States
alone, there are 450 academic programs functioning at various levels.45
Conclusion
In light of the above analysis of facts and figures, it could be inferred that the
most common character of humans is to cherish for peace and alleviation from
war. It is evident that peace is popular for building welfare, and war is famous
for destruction of biological and cultural survival of life. Therefore, peace and
conflict studies, as an interdisciplinary academic subject, sets about to explore
knowledge associated with sustainability of peace and the causes of war and
conflict. There are various narratives about the evolution of peace and conflict
studies as an academic discipline. But, most of the scholars are of opinion
that the emergence of the subject has roots in Post-World War Second era of
1950s and 1960s. However, in this study, the subject is contextualised from
its evolution in different disciplines to its place as an independent domain,
and also to the contemporary phase of its practicality in the universe of global
academics as a full-fledged subject. The main agenda of peace and conflict
193
studies has been and would be to understand the dimensions of human conflict,
and to explore peaceful solutions through pedagogy, research and practice, by
using appropriate methods and diverse stances. The primary considerations of
the discipline are rooted in religious texts, diverse ideas of “pacific philosophy”
and other catastrophic wars of the twentieth century. The key issues of the
subject are to prevent, transform, manage, and resolve conflicts by peaceful
means and methods.In the contemporary world milieu, peace and conflict
studies have a greater role to play in tackling the new threats and challenges
of the twenty first century. The study of peace and conflict studies is dedicated
to secure the present and future generation from the scourge of conventional
and nuclear wars through power of knowledge. The research, pedagogy and
practice of peace and conflict studies is a main instrument of transformation
from violence to peace, destruction to construction and warfare to welfare
across the globe.
References & Notes

1. Galtung, J. et al.(2000): Search for Peace: The Road to Transcend, London,
Pluto Press, 13.
2. Galtung. J. (1996)” Peace by Peaceful Means - Peace and Conflict, Development
and Civilization. London, Sage Publications,1-2.
3. Brian, H. Reid. (2014): “The Legacy of Liddell Hart - The Contrasting Responses
of Michael Howard and André Beaufre”, British Journal for Military History,
1(1) , 69.
4. Two treaties were signed, one in the city of Münster, was formally an agreement
between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France; the second, signed in
the city of Osnabrück, was between the Emperor and the King of Sweden.
5. Carolyn, M. Stephenson (1999): “Peace Studies Overview”, in Encyclopedia of
Violence, Peace and Conflict, (2), London, New Academic Press, 812.
6. Locke, John. (1689): Letter Concerning to Toleration, (translated by William
Popple), 1-12. http://socserv.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/locke/
toleration.pdf.
7. Patrick, Riley. (1975): “The Abbe DE ST. Pierre and Voltaire on Perpetual
Peace in Europe”, World Affairs, 137(3),186.
8. Ibid, 191-93.
9. Stanley, H. (1963): “Rousseau on War and Peace”, The American Political
Science Review, 57(2), 317-33.
10. Hancock, W. (1961): Four Studies of War & Peace in this Century, Cambridge
University Press, UK, 20- 21.
11. Reginald, C. Stuart Thomas Jefferson (1977): “The Origins of War”, Peace &
Change, 4(2), 92.
12. Benjamin, Solomon (2003): “Kant’s Perpetual Peace - A New Look at this
Centuries-Old Quest”, The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution.
5(1), 106-07.
13. Mill, J. Stuart (2001): On Liberty’ 1859, Ontario - Batoche Books Limited, 15.
14. Jorgen, Johansen (2007): “Nonviolence More than Absence of Violence”, in
Charles Webel, & Galtung, Peace & Conflict Studies, Routledge, London, 144-45.
194
15. Adam, Hochschild (2011): To End All Wars A Story of Loyalty and Rebellion,
1914–1918, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, New York, 347.
16. Ishiyama, J and Breuning. M. (1994): 21st Century Political Science - A Reference
Handbook. California: Sage Publications, 321.
17. Kriesberg, L. (2009): “The Evolution of Conflict Resolution”, in Jacob
Bercovitich and et al, Handbook of Conflict Resolution, Thousand Oakas, Sage
Publication, 17-18.
18. William, E. Rappard (1927): “The Evolution of League of Nations”, The
American Political Science Review, 21(4) ,793-95.
19. Ishiyama, J (1994). 18.
20. See Kellogg-Briand Pact 1928, http://www.uni-marburg.de/icwc/dateien/
briandkelloggpact.pdf.
21. Peter, Lawler (2008): “Peace Studies”, in Paul D. Williams, (ed.), Security
Studies - An Introduction, Routledge, London, 77.
22. Karl, W Deutsch (1970): “Quincy Wright’s Contribution to the Study of War - A
Preface to Second Edition”, Journalof Conflict Resolution, 14(4), 474.
23. Carolyn, M. Stephenson (1999): “Peace Studies Overview”, in Encyclopedia
of Violence, Peace and Conflict, (2), 809. Also See Paul D Williams, Security
Studies an Introduction, 73.
24. Neal Riemer, Douglas W. Simon, and Joseph Romance (2003): The Challenge of
Politics, CQ Press, Washington DC, 351.
25. Michael Henderson. (1996): The Forgiveness Factor - Stories of Hope in a World
of Conflict, Grosvenor Books, USA.
26. Johan Galtung.(1964) : “An Editorial”, Journal of Peace Research, 1(1), 2.
27. Fukuyama, Y. Francis (1989): “The End of History”, The National Interest,
see also Fukuyama. (1992) : The End of the History and the Last Man, The Free
Press, New York.
28. George H. W. Bush (1990): Address Before a Joint Session of Congress, http://
millercenter.org/president/bush/speeches/speech-3425 .
29. Michael, N Barnett (1998): “The Limits of Peacekeeping, Sphere of Influence,
and the Future of the United Nations”, in Joseph Lepgold and Thomas G Weiss,
Collective Conflict Management and Changing World Politics, State University,
New York Press, 83-84
30. Huntington, Samuel (1996): The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of
World Order, Simon Schuster, New York, see also Huntington (1993): The Clash
of Civilizations, Foreign Affairs, 72(3), 22-49.
31. Hobsbawm, Eric (23 February, 2002): “War and Peace”, The Guardian,
http://.www.theguardian.com/education/2002/feb/23/artsandhumanities.
highereducation.
32. International Institute for Strategic Studies (22 November, 2002): Conflict
Database Project, London.
33. Elias, R and Jennifer Turpin (1994): “Introduction: Thinking About Peace”,
in Robet Elias and Jennifer Turpin Rethinking Peace (ed.), Lynne Rienner
Publishers, London, 5.
34. Johan Galtung (1996): Peace by Peaceful Means - Peace and Conflict,
Development and Civilization, Sage Publications, London 13-15.
35. Paul Rogers (2013)” “Peace Studies” in Alan Collins, Contemporary Security
Studies (3rd edition), Oxford University Press, UK, 56.
195
36. About the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, http://www.pcr.uu.se/
about/
37. Ian M. Harris, M. and Larry J., Carol Rank (1998): “A Portrait of University
Peace Studies in North America and Western Europe at the End of Millennium”,
The International Journal of Peace Studies, 3(1), 91.
38. Profile of the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies University of Dhaka,
http://www.du.ac.bd/academic/department_item/PCE.
39. Gandhain Center for Peace and Conflict Studies (GCPCS), “Profile of the
Gandhian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies”, University of Jammu, www.
jammuuniversity.in/centre/gandhi_centre.doc.
40. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), “About Us”, http://www. ipcs.org/
about-us.
41. Introduction of Nelson Mandela Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution,
University of JamiaMilliaIslamia”, http://jmi.ac.in/aboutjamia/centres/conflict-
resolution/ introduction.
42. Department of Conflict, Peace and Development Studies, “Message from the
Program Co-coordinator”, http://dcpds-tu.edu.np/content/23/message-from-
theprogram-co-ordinator.html
43. ‘Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, National Defense University (NDU)’,
http://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/pakistan/peacebuilding-
organisations/ ndu
44. see Bangladesh University of professional, Faculty of security and strategic
studies prospects for master of Peace and Human Rights development studies
(MPHRDS) program. http://www.bup.edu.bd/prospectus/MPHRS-Prospectus.
pdf.
45. Smith, D. (2007): “A Map of Peace and Conflict Studies in U.S. Undergraduate
Colleges and Universities”, Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 25, 145.
196
Role Of Labour Migration In The Development Of
Former Soviet Republics And Russian Federation
Sergey V. Ryazantsev
Abstract
This research paper presents an analysis and interpretation vis-à-vis the
contribution of labour migration in the development of Russian Federation
and former Soviet Union republics. Altogether, it is demonstrated that labour
migration fills an important niche in economic and political integration of
the region, however, this alliance could be even stronger, if the undocumented
and illegal migration is prevented and a common consensus is made among
partner countries to view labour migration as a strategic resource.
Keywords
Labour Migration, Russian Federation, Central Asian Countries, Former
Soviet Union Republics, Immigration Policy, CIS, Illegal Migrants,
Vocational Structure, Pull-Push Factor, Remittance, Host Country, Allowing
Documents, Migratory Research Centre.
Introduction
The Russian Federation accepts a significant amount of temporary migrant
workers, particularly, from neighbouring Central Asia countries. Here
departure of a significant number of able-bodied population is stimulated by
the typical “pushing-out” factors: output gap, low level of salary, high level
of unemployment, lack of workplaces, poverty, surplus of workforce etc.
Given these factors, and the Russia’s need of workers for many industries,
there is a large migratory subsystem, which centres the Russian Federation,
and the Republic of Kazakhstan attracting labour migrants from the countries
of Central Asia, Transcaucasia, China, Vietnam, Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea and some countries of Eastern Europe. On May 29, 2014,
the agreement on the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) was
signed, which became effective on January 1, 2015. Five countries comprising
Republic of Armenia, Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the
Kyrgyz Republic and the Russian Federation are a part of EEU. Indeed, the
president of Tajikistan, E. Rahmon, in 2014 also declared need of studying
economic basis and legal documents of EEU for the purpose of possible entry
into this integrated consolidation.
EEU is created for the purpose of comprehensive modernization,
cooperation and creating conditions for stable development and increasing
Role of Labour Migration in the Development of...
living standards of people in member states. With free movement of goods,

services, capital, and labour power, EEU also provides visa-free movement
for the citizens of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. In
fact, the visa-free entry into the Russian Federation also stands for citizens of
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Moldova, while the working
visa and the work authorization in Russia is necessary for citizens from the
countries including Georgia, Turkmenistan, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.
Central Asian countries, however, provide large flows of migrant workers into
Russia and in near future, will remain probable donors of migrant workers
for Russia and Kazakhstan. Many of these migrants have become permanent
residents of Russia as between 2001-2011 more than 1.6 million people from
the countries of Central Asia became owners of the Russian nationality. But
this includes also other categories of migrants like students etc. About 40%
of the Central Asian migrants who have obtained citizenship of the Russian
Federation in 2001-2011, come from Kazakhstan, with majority of them being
the ethnic Russians. Nevertheless, in recent years Uzbeks (25%), Kyrgyz
(23%), Tajik (9%) and Turkmen (3%) having obtained Russian citizenship,
shows an increasing trend. Such a trend among Central Asian migrants in
Russia could be considered as one of the signs of their aspirations to integrate
into the Russian society. However, on account of a number of socio-political
issues, amendments to the Russian legislation on citizenship rights in
2002 and 2010, considerably toughened requirements for this right, which
significantly reduced the number of permanent labour migrants from Central
Asian republics.
Official Number of Migrant Workers in Russian Federation

The official number of migrant workers in the Russian Federation is based on
the allowing documents issued by the Federal Migration Service (FMS).
Fig.-I
Number of the allowing documents issued to migrant workers in the
Russian Federation in 1994-2014 (thousand units)
198
In 2014, 3690 thousand allowing documents, including 2387 thousand patents

and 1303 thousand work authorizations were issued. While from January to
July 2015, 1406 thousand allowing documents were issued to migrant workers,
including 1265 thousand patents and 141 thousand work authorizations.
The system of allowing documents for migrant workers in the Russian
Federation, amended almost annually, and as of September 1, 2015, includes
three types of procedures for obtaining these documents, depending on
nationality of migrant workers (Table-1).
Table-1
Types of procedures of receipt of allowing documents of migrant
workers in the Russian Federation depending on their nationality
(as of September 1, 2015)
Type of
Nationality Documents allowing
of migrant for entry documents Key procedures
workers into Russia for work in
Russia
EAEC Foreign Not necessary 1) Registration of the migrant
countries Passport, worker on residence (within
(Armenia, migration 5 working days after entry
Belarus, card into Russia);
Kazakhstan, 2) The notification of the
Kyrgyzstan)
employer about the
conclusion (termination) of
the contract with the migrant
worker (within 3 working
days from the moment of the
end of the contract)
The countries Foreign Patent 1) Registration of the migrant

of the former passport, worker on residence (within
USSR with a migration 5 working days after entry
visa-free card into Russia)
regime 2) Receipt of the patent by the
(Azerbaijan,
Moldova, migrant worker (within 30
Tajikistan, days from the moment of
Ukraine, entry into Russia)
Uzbekistan) 3) The notification of FMS
employer about the
worker (within 3working
end of the contract)
199
The Countries Foreign Work 1) Registration of the migrant

of the former passport, authoziation worker on residence (within
USSR with a visa, 5 business days after entry
visa regime migration into Russia)
(Georgia card 2) Obtaining permission the
Latvia,
Lithuania, employer on involvement of
Turkmenistan, the foreign worker to Russia
Estonia) and 3) Receipt of the work
other States authorization by the migrant
worker (within 30 days from
the moment of entry into
Russia)
4) The notification of FMS
employer about the
worker (within 3working
end of the contract).
In 2014, the majority of work authorizations were issued to the migrant

workers from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, China and Kyrgyzstan, whereas
in 2014-15 majority of work authorizations in Russia were issued to the citizens
of Kazakhstan (362 hundred thousands) and Belarus (19 hundred thousands)
while Armenian received 46 hundred thousand work authorizations. Taking
into account the vocational structure of these migrant workers, data provided
by FMS in 2012 reveals that, a half (51%) are consisted as skilled workers.
Approximately, the third part (31%) of them was unskilled workers. Nearly 8
percent comprised specialists of average qualification and only 5 percent were
qualified professionals.
By and large labour migration into Russia comprises unskilled workers.
From 2010 to 2012, only 257 thousand work authorizations were issued
to highly skilled specialists. Nevertheless, majority of these specialists
were working under the intra-corporate contracts i.e., with multinational
corporations operating in the territory of Russia. Nearly 28.1 percent of these
highly skilled specialists were engaged with real estate transactions, 21.5
percent with wholesale and retail trade, 13.7 percent with the processing
productions, 9.8 percent with construction, 8.6 percent with financial activities
and 7.6 percent were with mineral extraction. It is noteworthy here that in
2010-2012, majority of highly qualified specialist worker migrants in Russia
were from China, Turkey, France, Germany and Great Britain, while in 2014
China, Vietnam, Philippines, Turkey, Serbia were the top sending countries.
Strengthening of political and economic interaction of Russia with the East
and Southeast Asian countries is considered the possible backup for this trend.
200
Undocumented Migrant Workers in Russia

The issue of undocumented migrant workers in Russian Federation has
been widely debated and discussed both at political and academic levels.
In 2006, the Director of FMS, K. O. Romodanovsky stated in an address,
“we conducted research, thought up a formula that is based on the ‘illegality
coefficient’, increased by a number of legally working citizens, giving a figure
of 10.2 million illegal migrants in Russia.”1 At times, the Russian Ministry
of Internal Affairs (MIA) determines the number of ‘illegal migrants’ at 10
million, while some politicians put it at 15 million. However, these figures
raise serious doubts, as they are not based on results of scientific researches.
And may be, these figures could be much higher, because majority of the
influx of migrant workers into Russia is from visa-free CIS countries, which
don’t need a registration or allowing documents for work in Russia. At times
Russian government framed certain procedures to possibly reduce the number
of illegal migrant workers as the availability and simplification of registration
procedures and methods to issue work authorizations were brought in. In this
respect two campaigns were started to allow undocumented migrant workers
to legalize their stay in Russia. First campaign started in 2007, allowing
simplification of registration to foreign citizens through postal departments.
Second campaign of 2010 introduced issuing patents for work permissions
to migrant workers. In 2010-2013 about 3 million migrant workers from CIS
countries received patents in Russia.2
However, despite these efforts by government institutions, there are still a
huge number of undocumented labour migrants in Russia. By 2015 there were
nearly 3 million undocumented labour migrants in Russian labour market.3
Reasons for this phenomenon are many, but the dominant factors pertain to
corrupt government officials and irresponsibility on the part of employers,
who exploit unregistered migrant workers by paying them less than the fixed
wages. Indeed, report of the US State Department on human trafficking for
2012 included Russia in the category of the countries where ‘the absolute
number of the victims of malicious forms of human trafficking is very great or
significantly increasing.’ While the Centre for Migratory Research, estimates
that 1 - 1.5 million labour migrants in Russia work in slaves like conditions,4
assessments by non-governmental organizations in Russia put it at 4 million.5
The recent research findings for the year 2013 testify that the number of
labour migrants, who are in a situation of labour operation in the Russian
Federation can make 500 thousand to 1 million.6 Whatever the figures may
be, such cases are mostly reported with labour migrants from the countries of
Central Asia, who work in deteriorated conditions. Given such issues, Russian
authorities toughened the approach with 13 new laws framed to counteract
illegal migration. In 2014 around 600 thousand labour migrants were not
allowed to enter into Russia7 and by the mid 2015 this figure increased to
1.3 million. Obviously, this approach solved a problem of undocumented
201
migration to some extent. So far the percentage share of specialists, unskilled

and other professionals are concerned, it is clear from Fig.-II that about 82%
is dominated by only 2 vocational structure parameters.
Fig.-II
Vocational structure of migrant workers in the Russian Federation
(2012 / %)
Economic Effects of Labour Migration (Employment and GDP)

The influx of labour migrants has myriad and has made substantial effects
on Russian economy, especially by providing the required manpower for the
sustenance and development of industries, such as construction, housing and
comm. services, services industry, agricultural industry, transport etc. In fact,
in 2008, the Director, FMS, Russia, K. O. Romodanovsky, noted that migrant
workers played a significant role in increasing Russia’s GDP from 6 percent
to 8 percent.8 Though Romodanovsky’s statement circulated widely in the
Russian media and political discourses, but was exaggerated and didn’t escape
the criticism. To measure the role of migrant workers in Russian economy,
however, the technique offered by the American Scientist, F. Martin (2007) was
used.9 The calculations show that in 2013 the contribution of migrant workers
in the GDP of Russian Federation was around 1.4 trillion Rubles. While in
2008 it comprised 3.12 percent of GDP, it slashed down in 2011 reaching a
minimum of 2.53 percent, but again recovered in 2013 and increased to 3.12
percent.
Based on the available official statistics, the calculations were made to
show the impact of labour migration on the economy of Russian Federation
and was established that documented and undocumented migrant workers
contribute about 7 percent to the total Russian economy with maximum
contributions in construction industry (nearly 30 percent). According to V.
A. Iontseva and I. V. Ivakhnyuk though migrant workers actually carry the
subsidiary low-skilled works like cleaning residential accommodation and
repairing, subsidiary works in the trade and construction etc., which Russian
202
citizens reject as heavy, dirty or not prestigious works;10 but their contributions
are all the more important for Russian economy.
Fig.-III
Share of labour migrants in employment in the Russian Federation
(1995-2013 / %)
4
3,5 3,4
3,2
3,12 3,12
3
2,61 2,53
2,43
2,5
1,47
1,5
1,03
1
0,54 0,57 0,68
0,44 0,46 0,41 0,41 0,44
0,5 0,33 0,33
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
-0,5
In 2010, migrant workers contributed near about three trillion Rubles to

Russia’s GDP with 9, 467 million Rubles (33 %) in construction industry; 4, 329
million (15%) in trade and consumer services; 3, 041 (10%) in-house economy
and 1, 483 in the agricultural industry. These figures apply to documented
labour migration only, and if the financial transitions out of undocumented
labour migration are positively channelized, which the Director, FMS, Russia,
K. O. Romodanovsky, reports that from more than 8 billion dollars a year,
the overall contributions of labour migration in Russian economy could
swell much higher.11 So the prevalence of illegal and undocumented labour
migration results into considerable financial losses to Russian Federation as 4
to 5 million illegal migrant workers whose total earnings are around 150-200
billion rubles a year, don’t pay any taxes. While as of 2011, one and a half
million foreign workers who were officially working in Russia in 2011 paid
nearly 70 billion rubles as income tax.12
Impact of Labour Migration Through Consumption

Labour migrants are not only producers, but also comprise a class of
consumers for the host country. So a good chunk of the money that migrant
workers in Russia earn, is spent to meet out their everyday needs while in
Russia. Indeed, experts demonstrate that the cost of the goods and services
produced by labour migrants in Russia exceeds the amount they receive in
203
wages and the amount of remittances they sent back home.13 Even as of 2010,
the Director, FMS, Russia, K. O. Romodanovsky, reported that every dollar
earned by guest workers in Russia brings back about six dollars to the Russian
budget.14 Equally for sending countries, every dollar remitted back by migrant
workers increases the purchasing power among the respective families and,
thus, helps economic empowerment at household level. Data on cross-border
personal and private money transfers made through official channels i.e.
banks, postal departments, money transfer systems, and by transfer of cash
and material values, shows that major flow of remittances from Russia go
to CIS countries as in 2013, the volume of remittance by labour migrants
in Russia to Uzbekistan was around 7. 9 billion USD, 4.1 billion USD to
Ukraine and 3.9 billion USD to Tajikistan.
The personal transfers include net compensation and private transfers.
Net compensation represents part of earnings of family members abroad,
which they remit back to household in native country. It is equal to a
difference between wages received by migrant workers from temporary
employment abroad, and their expenses incurred in a host country. Polls of
migrant workers in Russia show that they usually prefer to save on everyday
required stuff and buy cheapest products (like bread, milk, rice, etc.), hardly
ever buy meat, fruit and vegetables, and mostly share rooms with fellow
workers for accommodation.15 Personal transfers include non-paid transfers
from household abroad for the benefit of the household in the native country
and vice-versa. In 2013, the volume of individual transfers of labour migrants
in the Russia amounted to 19. 8 billion USD.
Fig.-IV
Remittances from the Russian Federation to the CIS countries
(2013 / million US dollars)
Turkmenistan 35
Kazakhstan 377
Belarus 993
Azerbaijan 1378
Armenia 1747
Kyrgyzstan 2113
Moldova 2248
Tajikistan 3927
Ukraine 4090
Uzbekistan 7878
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000
204
The official data of Central Bank of Russia pertaining to the year 2013,
reveals that money transfers through various systems16 comprised 40 percent
of the total volume of transfers from Russia to abroad, standing at 27. 6 billion
USD. And out of this amount, about 20.8 billion USD were transferred to the
CIS countries alone i.e. 88 percent of the total volume of outgoing money
transfers from Russia.17 Country-wise distribution of money transfers show
that as of 2013, nearly 74 percent of the total volume sent from Russia is
received by five major countries: Uzbekistan (28%), Tajikistan (18%), Ukraine
(13%), Kyrgyzstan (9%) and Armenia (7%). These growing transfers of
remittances between Russia and CIS countries reflect a number of tendencies
i.e. close ties between migrant workers and their households in the native
countries, increase in wages in Russia and wider use of official channels for
money transfers etc.
On an average, the amount of money transfer from Russia to abroad
dwindled from 502 USD in 2012 to 487 USD in 2013. Nevertheless, for CIS
countries it increased from 458 to 929 USD. Some of the factors responsible
for this trend include, a high competition among operators of money transfer
systems in Russia, which results into a tendency of charging less fees for the
transaction. As per reports of the Bank of Russia, in 2013 an average size of
the fee charged from the client for money transfer abroad was 1.7 percent of
the total transferred amount, which is record minimum among the countries
of ‘Group 20’.18
The research findings conducted in 2008 by Institute of Socio-political
Surveys of the Russian Academy of Sciences about the use of money transfers
in the city of Khojend, reveals that nearly 65 percent of households in
Tajikistan receive money transfer from abroad, particularly, from Russia once
a month. However, despite comprehensive developments and availability of
money transfer systems, still every tenth migrant worker transfers money back
home through acquaintances. Moreover, the study demonstrated that majority
of families in Tajikistan and other countries of Central Asia are highly
dependent on labour migration remittances especially from Russia. Many
research surveys show that money remitted back by migrant workers are
mostly spent for the everyday consumption like food grains and construction
/ repairs of houses, which stimulates considerable growth in some industries
in sending countries. The research findings demonstrate that while 74 percent
of households in Khojend spend the money remitted back by their migrant
workers for purchasing food grains, about 34 percent bought clothes, and
31 percent spend it for medical services and drugs. Likewise 26 percent of
households invest in construction or repair of houses and about 45 percent
invest in education of their children.
The remittances transferred back home in Central Asian countries are
generally spent to meet-out everyday needs like purchasing food-grains,
cloths, education of children, acquisition and repairing of houses, weddings
205
and funeral etc. In very rare instances, the remitted money is invested in the
development of small scale businesses, entrepreneurship or in production of
goods and services. But need of the hour is that back home families of migrant
workers must think of either saving the remitted money or invest in business
and small scale production of goods and services, because owing to the
increasing involvement of migrant workers in “gray” and “black” economy in
Russia, labour migratory movements from Central Asian countries to Russia
will be more regulated and secured.
Table-2
The remittances of migrant workers from Russia to the CIS countries
made through money transfer systems in 2006-2013, millions of dollars
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2013
CIS countries 4674 8575 12609 8919 11080 15143 23589
Uzbekistan 866 1666 2978 2052 2845 4262 6633
Tajikistan 835 1632 2516 1725 2216 3015 4155
Ukraine 800 1377 1690 1339 1809 2360 3078
Kyrgyzstan 384 715 1157 894 1106 1547 2080
Armenia 531 943 1249 848 1018 1284 1597
Moldova 457 806 1114 746 845 1076 1261
Azerbaidzhan 378 653 887 661 794 1049 1232
Georgia 300 558 683 517 566 669 789
Belarus 37 71 100 96 165 151 …
Kazakhstan 73 124 187 159 247 363 …
Findings and Recommendations

Russian Federation is the centre of the Eurasian migratory subsystem, with
wider scales of economy and labour market. However, for its diverse economic
institutions to function properly, Russia is equally dependent on neighbouring
CIS countries for providing labour power. Concomitantly, Russia shows lot
of interests in strengthening ties with former Soviet Union republics with
a priority to the migration policy. However, emergence of the new centres
of gravity (e.g. Republic of Kazakhstan) for labour migrants testify that in
the near future the direction of migratory flows in the former Soviet Union
could be diversified, and Russia will have to face cuts in labour power. In
this context, development of strategically verified migration policy at the
national level, development of the regional integration processes and inter-
state mechanisms of migratory cooperation with CIS countries is the vital task
for Russia. In this context the first task is to bring some reforms in the system
of quoting and issuance of work authorizations. Specifically, the system needs
some transparency and a proper regulation in assigning quotas to employers.
206
Secondly, there is a need to conduct an objective assessment of the need of

foreign labour power in Russian Federation and it must be made explicit in the
concept note of the Russia’s migration policy that Russia needs foreign labour
power and the system of its attraction needs improvement with logically
taking into account the population policy of the state. Thirdly, for a viable
and strategic economic integration with Eurasian Economic Union (EEU),
Russian Federation needs to fully prevent the system of illegal migration.
Indeed, labour migration is a real form of social and economic interaction
between the countries of the former Soviet Union and promotes consolidation
(integration) of the states. However, for the protection of the rights of their
citizens abroad, there also needs a consolidation vis-à-vis the migration policy
among member states as well rather regulating it in personalized interests.
Such accentuation would lessen the chances of corruption, undocumented
migration and politicizing the issues of immigration.
Another area of concern pertains to the regulation of labour migration
and employment of the good number of people in goods and services sector
which has to be connected with commerce and investment cooperation, that
can help Russian Federation and the republic of Kazakhstan to overcome
illegal migration and generate employment. Since, majority of the Central
Asian illegal labour migrants in Russia are operational in agricultural industry
and for agricultural imports Russia is highly dependent on European Union,
Turkey, Israel etc., this twin issue could simply be resolved if Russia increases
and effectively makes investments in the agro-industrial fields of the main
donor countries of labour migrants in Central Asia and Transcaucasia, which
is a traditional sphere of employment for majority of inhabitants in these
regions, but diminished after the collapse of the Soviet Union. So possibly
this could reduce the inflow of illegal migrants into the territory of Russia
and Kazakhstan as well. Finally, it is necessary to define local opportunities
including possibility of absorption of unemployed and studying youth, re-
employment of pensioners, internal migration of manpower etc. and then
to designate priorities of migration policy with the partner countries in the
broader context of political and economic integration for the organized
delivery of labour power.
References & Notes

1. www.regnum.ru/news/753480.html[Date of the address: on December 15, 2014].
2. Ryazantsev S., Trafficking in Human Beings  for Labour Exploitation and Irregu-
lar Labour Migration in the Russian Federation: Forms, Trends and Countermea-
sures, Stockholm, ADSTRINGO, Baltic Sea States Council, 2015 (http://www.
ryazantsev.org/book1-16.pdf).
3. Ryazantsev S., Trafficking in Human Beings for Labour Exploitation and Irregu-
207
4. Life of slaves: as labor migrants become captives. – The statement the Message
of the Moscow bureau on human rights in connection with use of a slave labor of
migrants through REX news agency of November 26, 2012.
5. Kolesnichenko A. In Russia on almost slave provision there are 4 million mi-
grants from the CIS: Message of the Asia Center portal. (www.centrasia.ru/new-
sA.php?st=1075269840.
6. Ryazantsev S., Trafficking in Human Beings  for Labour Exploitation and Irregu-
7. Performance of the associate director of FMS of Russia of E. Yu. Egorova at a
scientific seminar “Actual egulatory issues of migration in Russia” in February,
2014 at Institute of social and economic problems of the population of the Rus-
sian Academy of Sciences.
8. Romodanovskiya K.O. Way in the future to pave affairs: http://www.fms.gov.ru/
press/publications/news detail.php? ID=26698 [Date of the address: On Decem-
ber 1, 2014].
9. Martin P., the Economic Contribution of Migrant Workers to Thailand: Towards
Policy Development, Bangkok, ILO, 2007, Page. 9.
10. Iontsev V.A., Ivakhnyuk I.V. Role of the international labor migration for eco-
nomic development of Russia: Research report KARIM EAST RR 2012/28. –
Florence: Center of migration policy, 2012. – Page 21.
11. Romodanovsky K.O. Expert Online (http://www.expert.ru/news/2007/07/10/mi-
granti/).
14. Romodanovsky K.O. Expert Online (http://www.expert.ru/news/2007/07/10/mi-
granti/).
15. Ryazantsev S. V.. Workers from the countries of Central Asia in housing-and-
municipal sector of Moscow (the working report). Working report, ILO: Sub
regional bureau for countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. – M.: The
ILO, 2010 – Page 12 (www.ilo.org/public/russian/region/eurpro/Moscow/proj-
ects/migr ation.htm).
16. Including: Anelik, BLIZKO, Coinstar Money Transfer, Contact, InterExpress,
Migom, MoneyGram, PrivatMoney, UNIStream, Western Union, Aziyaexpress,
the PACE, the Hummingbird, Fast Mail, Gold Corona, the LEADER, Russian
Post, Faster, Caspian Money Transfer.
17. Data of Central Bank of Russia (http://www.cbr.ru/statistics/print.
aspx?file=CrossBorder/Remcountries 11.htm&pid=svs&sid=TGO_sp_post)
[Date of the address: On January 25, 2015].
18. Data of Central Bank of Russia http://www.cbr.ru/statistics/print.aspx?file=
CrossBorder/Rem_countries_ 11.htm&pid=svs&sid=TGO_sp_post).
208
India’s Afghan Policy
Pakistan Perspective and China Factor
Tabasum Firdous
Tajalley Nazir
Ashfaq M. Ali
Abstract
India has adopted a pro-active Afghan policy since the fall of Taliban
regime in Afghanistan. The country has extended her financial assistance
covering economic, social, political and even cultural development of this
war-torn nation. US-decision of ISAF-withdrawal has necessitated the
resolve to strengthen Afghan security forces. India has extended her support
to train and equip the ANSF to deal with Taliban resurgence and other
security related aspects. However, there are some interpretations, especially
constructed by Pakistan think tanks regarding the suspicious role of India in
Afghanistan. These interpretations manifest India’s presence in Afghanistan
as a strategic design to encircle and destabilize Pakistan. Since the US-
NATO exit strategy, China too has become pro-active in relation to Afghan
issue. Besides her economic considerations, the country has mainly the
security concerns with increasing violence and instability of Afghanistan.
There is also ambiguity regarding China’s dual stand regarding terrorism
and Taliban. It is in light of these issues that the paper focuses India’s Afghan
policy in changing circumstances. Besides analyzing Pak perspective and
counter-responses regarding India’s Afghan policy, an attempt has been
made to underscore China as a factor for India in Afghanistan. The paper
also highlights the common concerns of India and China in Afghanistan
with the potential to push these nations for a joint workable strategy to deal
post-ISAF situation.
Keywords
Afghanistan, China, Extremism, India, ISAF, Pakistan, Exit Strategy,
Taliban, Terrorism, US, Think Tank, Cold War, Diplomatic Engagements.
Post-World War II era witnessed the ideological conflict between two power
blocs that was termed by Bernard Baruch as ‘Cold War’. This confrontation
inseminated the seeds of conflict at certain places in a way that, even after
twenty-five years of post-Cold war, achieving peace and stability has become
a complex task. Afghan conflict also represents the same legacy of Cold war
that has not only dismantled the country, but has emerged out as a most serious
threat to the regional and global peace. Thus, it is obvious for the world-
nations to dwell in for seeking a viable solution to assure peace. With the
India’s Afghan Policy: Pakistan Perspective and China Factor
NATO (Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization)-drawdown from Afghanistan

and designs to withdraw International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
completely in near future, the regional actors including Pakistan, Iran, India,
China, Central Asian Republics (CARs) and even Russia have to share the
burden for assuring stability and prosperity of the region. The main issues
of concern for these regional countries in relation to Afghanistan include
terrorism, religious extremism and drug trafficking. Besides it, there are better
prospects for enhancing inter-regional trade via Afghanistan as the country
has the geo-strategic advantage of connecting South, West, Central and East
Asia. The vital energy resources of the Central Asian region further adds to
the significance of regional economic ties with Afghanistan as a connecting
bridge. However, the ambiguities in the foreign policies of these regional actors
regarding their relative gains has enhanced the complexities for designing any
such regional cooperation.
India, being vulnerable to security threats and an energy-deficit nation,
also aspires for same in relation to Afghanistan. Thus, the country has invoked
a pro-active Afghan policy since the fall of Taliban regime. However, there are
certain disturbances regarding her interests and concerns that are preventing
the country to move smoothly for addressing her needs. The fundamental
challenge is the perspective constructed by Pakistan in relation to India’s
presence in Afghanistan. This has been accompanied by the pro-active
diplomacy of China in Afghanistan since 2012 and her support for Pakistan
regarding certain issues that does not augur well for the interests of India. In
this regard, it is significant to analyze India’s Afghan policy from Pakistan
perspective and subsequent stand of China.
India’s foreign policy aspirations are at securing a stable, secure and
prosperous neighbourhood and Afghanistan constitutes a road for such
design. Thus, India’s Afghan policy aims at promoting development, peace,
security and stability of the Afghan nation. Besides promoting commercial
relations, her investments in Afghanistan have been largely developmental.
The country is seeking to explore new opportunities in Afghanistan to address
her foreign policy aspirations. The country is helping this war-torn nation
to promote democracy, strengthen political institutions and ensure security.
Taking into consideration the changing circumstances at international scene,
India has some considerable interests in Afghanistan. The country has a strong
security interest in ensuring that Afghanistan remains a sovereign, stable,
united and free from external influences. There are certain economic interests
as well to explore the mutual benefits while connecting Afghanistan through
wider road networks within the region. Afghanistan too provides a space for
Indian companies currently engaged in the reconstruction process, and has
repeatedly expressed her will to enhance Indian business while developing the
manufacturing hubs in different sectors as cement, oil, gas, electricity, banking,
communications etc.1 India’s efforts are to gain strong foothold in the South,
210
West and Central Asia by strengthening trade ties with Afghanistan.2 The
country is also one of the fastest growing economies of the world and requires
external energy resources to sustain her economic growth. This demand for
energy has been growing at a rapid rate as expected to increase from 122
million tonnes in 2001-02 to 364 million tonnes in 2024-25.3 Importing energy
has thus become one of the important components of her foreign policy. All
this suggests a comprehensive relationship with CARs considered as energy
hub region of the contemporary times. Afghanistan can act as a transit route
for energy supply from the Central Asian region to the India territory. India
aspires to develop stronger economic relations and cooperation between
south and central Asia and acknowledges the need to promote inter-regional
economic integration. With the geo-strategic position of Afghanistan, India’s
major policy framework is to rebuild this country as a land bridge between
these regions. This requires a peaceful, stable and modernized Afghanistan
that esentially constitutes the basis for India’s Afghan policy.
Bearing the geographic barrier to access to the Central Asian region and
Afghanistan, Pakistan provides first-best option for India to reach therein.
However, Pakistan’s refusal to grant transit rights to India and the dynamism
of Indo-Pak bilateral relations act as a big obstacle for India’s ‘Afghan Policy’
and ‘Connect Central Asia Policy’.4 This pushes India to think of second-
best option. Thus, the assistance to build Chah Bahar Port on the Makran
coast in Iran and Zarang-Delaram highway in Afghanistan provides India an
alternative route for connecting the resource rich region of Central Asia. Such
developments and constructions assist the country to reach the CARs while
cutting off Pakistan.
As per her security aspect, India has an abiding interest in containing
and reversing the tide of religious fundamentalism and terrorism. Spread of
Islamic extremism being the major threat to her security,5 one of the objectives
of India’s Afghan Policy is to prevent the resurgence of radical Taliban. From
realistic perspective, nexus between the terrorist groups operating in Af-
Pak region would be hostile to her interests. Thus, rooting out terrorism and
weakening its sponsoring agencies constitutes significant aspect of India’s
foreign policy.6 It is under these security apprehensions that the country
has designed her Afghan policy to combat terrorism and contain religious
extremism. Illegal trade of drugs and opium production in Afghanistan are
again a matter of concern for India as it constitutes a major source for the
terrorist groups to generate money.7 Thus, fighting drug trafficking and Narco-
terrorism also forms a significant part of her Afghan Policy.
Thus, India’s interests and policy initiatives in Afghanistan constitutes
of the economic, political, social, cultural and strategic aspects. The country
has spent nearly $US 2.5 billion in some vital areas including infrastructure
development, health facilities, education and so on with the aim to promote
her interests in Afghanistan. However, there is suspicion regarding her
211
activities in this war-torn nation created by some international actors. This

necessiates a scrutiny to analyse India’s Afghan policy to check the validity of
this suspicion. Thus, Pakistan perspective regarding India’s Afghan policy is
significant in this respect to evaluate the validity of this apprehension.
Pakistan Perspective regarding India’s Presence in Afghanistan

India and Pakistan are two primary rivals in South Asia. Both the countries
have differences regarding their role in Afghanistan. The strategic triangle of
‘India-Pakistan-Afghanistan’ is evident with the observation that “Central aim
for Pakistan’s military tsars is to make sure that the future political make-up
in Afghanistan does not allow India to expand (her) security or even develop
footprint”.8 India’s pro-active role and presence in Afghanistan since the fall
of Taliban regime has created apprehensions within Pakistan.9 The conflict
between the two nations has moved beyond the traditional issues like Kashmir
and has become more complex in terms of economic competition, interna-
tional and regional status, regional alliances with divergent interests, access
to the unexplored natural resources within the regions adjacent and so on.10
Thus, resource rich Central Asia has also become a matter of concern among
the two.11 Pakistan perceives that India’s presence in Afghanistan has the aim
to marginalize the position of Pakistan in becoming a strong partner of Central
Asian resources.12 Thus, reducing India’s influence in Afghanistan is vital for
her strategic designs to prevent the country to reach Central Asia.13 The coun-
try also has the apprehension regarding alleged designs of India to encircle her
while maintaining foothold on Afghan soil,14 with the aim to encourage con-
flict in Baluchistan and other provinces.15 Various think tanks and observers in
Pakistan have interpreted India’s policy designs in Afghanistan with the aim
of destabilizing Pakistan.16 Refering to the building of hydropower projects on
the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab rivers, Pakistan claims that India has restricted
the flow of waters to this country. Now, the initiatives to build hydropower
projects on the Kabul River are certainly going to have severe consequences
for Pakistan.17 All this is being perceived as a strategic policy to undermine
Pakistan’s political stability, territorial integrity and economic viability.18 Re-
garding the Indo-Afghan Strategic Agreement, Pakistan has raised concerns
about her long-term interests in the region.19 The country also construes In-
dia’s Afghan policy as a design to counter-balance Pakistan’s support to the
insurgency movement of Kashmir.20 Thus, India is Pakistan’s primary target
to blame for increasing violence and terrorist attacks on Pak soil and suspects
her support for insurgencies in Baluchistan and Waziristan.21 Even, there is a
perception that India’s construction of Zaranj-Delaram highway on one side
and dams on the Kabul River on the other side aim at creating rift between
Afghanistan and Pakistan.22
Nevertheless, Pakistan has always seen Afghanistan as her backyard.
The country was among the only three countries that recognized Taliban
212
government in Afghanistan.23 There was a policy framework under the

designs of Strategic Depth whereby Pakistan used Afghan territory against the
interests of India.24 The country has again emerged out with strong resolve to
engage Taliban and Haqqani Network in peace talks with Kabul. Thus, there is
suspicion regarding Pak designs for reengaging strategic depth to limit India’s
role and presence in post-US Afghanistan.25 The country announced the end of
support to the Taliban immediately after the event of 9/11. Now, when the US
has announced to withdraw troops, and the new NATO-led mission “Resolute
Support” commenced her new task solely to train, advise and assist the Afghan
National Security Forces since 1st January, 2015. Pakistan has the designs to
map out the future arrangements in Afghanistan.26 This may prove harmful for
India’s regional interests. Thus, the long-standing objective of India has been
to support and strengthen a friendly democratic government in Afghanistan
with no external influence.27 Intrusing militant organizations in power sharing
at Kabul will help Pakistan reassure her influence in Afghanistan. Thus, the
country is trying hard to bring Haqqani Network into the negotiating table
with Kabul.28 Assessing that US is not capable of handling the Afghan war
properly; the Pak Army shows the interest for the workable exit strategy to set
the deal with Taliban.29
Resurgence of Taliban has been attributed to the operation grounds
mainly across the southern Afghanistan in the tribal areas of Pakistan.30 US
officials and intelligence reports also expressed the same concern that Taliban
resurgence intensifies because of the safe havens in Af-Pak region.31 India,
being the victim of state sponsored terrorism at domestic level since 1990s, is
now facing the same in abroad. This is evident with the attacks killing Indians
workers and targeting her official establishments in Afghanistan. Thus, India
is not at ease with direct involvement of Pakistan, backed by China, in the
process of reintegration and reconciliation of Taliban. Containing Pakistan
from playing such proxies is thus a crucial challenge for India’s Afghan Policy.
China Factor in Afghanistan

China has an interest in Afghanistan’s long-term stability. The deteriorating
security situation in Afghanistan with the drawdown of ISAF has pushed the
country for a pro-active role in seeking alternative designs. Her main objec-
tive is to ensure that instability doesn’t spread to the disturbed Xinjiang prov-
ince. Thus, the country abandoned her policy to remain totally passive about
post-NATO Afghanistan. Relying on her traditional strength of economic en-
gagement, the country is stepping up with a newly proactive diplomacy in the
region. Thus, it is imperative to understand China’s Afghan policy vis-à-vis
the changing circumstances.
China and Afghanistan are neighbours sharing 76-km border, though
it lacks the infrastructure required to connect the two countries. After the
formation of the People’s Republic of China, exchanges between the two sides
213
were low for a long time. However, due to the Soviet expansionist threat, it was
during 1970s when China started extending support to resistance groups, the
Mujahideen, even before Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.32 After the
Soviet withdrawal and its subsequent disintegration, there was again no formal
relation or involvement of China in Afghan conundrum. During Taliban era,
Pakistan proved crucial for China in facilitating the diplomatic meet between
Chinese representatives and Mullah Omar, the then Taliban leader.33 As an
outcome of this meeting, Mullah Omar assured the Chinese government that
Afghan territory will never be allowed for militant organizations which were
fighting for an independent Uighur province of Xinjiang. Following the event
of 9/11, Beijing was stuck in the middle to see the fall of Taliban on one side
and the US presence in Central Asia and Afghanistan on the other. In post-9/11
era, the country again remained less active in Afghan affairs with minimal
economic assistance up to US$ 250 million.34
Nevertheless, China has a policy resolve that economic development will
ultimately led to address the issues of terrorism and extremism in Afghanistan.
This is evident with the opinion of Foreign Minister Wang Yi during has Kabul
visit in February 2014 that: “We hope to see the development of Afghanistan.
Development is fundamental and only with economic growth can the poverty
problem be solved and the foundations of terrorism and extremism be
eliminated.”35 It was in 2007, that China won the tender for investment in the
Aynak copper mine.36 If the country will continue and enhance such economic
initiatives, this will provide her an easy access to the resources therein, taken
into account the technical and local expertise of Chinese firms. However, with
the strong resurgence of Taliban and violent activities of extremists since the
ISAF-drawdown, protecting economic assets and personnel in Afghanistan
has become a difficult task for all investors. For instance, the above refered
Chinese investment in Aynak copper mine was attacked more than 20 times
over the subsequent years, leading to the departure of 40 Chinese engineers
because of security issues.37 Thus, the basic concern of China is to shape post-
ISAF Afghanistan’s strategic environment for her own interests.
Internally, China is facing certain problems that made the country
vulnerable for religious extremism and terrorism. Ethnic unrest, terrorism and
Islamic extremism in Xinjiang province have been an ongoing concern for
Chinese authorities for decades. Tensions have been particularly heightened
since 2009, when nearly 200 people died in ethnic violence in the provincial
capital of Urumqi.38 More than 100 people died in violent incidents in
June 2014, including 59 ‘terrorists’ gunned down by police.39 Restrictions
on religious expression has also become a matter of concern in relation to
China and this has direct link with the Islamic extremism within the region.
For example, ‘Project Beauty’, launched in 2013, is a program aimed at
encouraging Uyhgur women to dress less conservatively.40 More recently,
the city of Karamay introduced rules to ban temporarily the people who are
214
sporting beards or wearing hijabs from catching the bus.41 Also, there have
been reports of Uyghur students or government officials being forced to break
their fast during Ramadan (Holy Month of fasting for Muslims).42 Thus, all
this is providing a ground for extremist organizations operating within the
region to influence the ongoing scission movement in Xinjiang province.
Threat of terrorism can not be ruled out in China with the existing terrorist
organizations in the region targetting the country. The Sunni Uyghur militant
groups based near the Af-Pak border have claimed responsibility for a small
number of attacks in China. Among them, the most prominent group, Turkistan
Islamic Party (TIP), claimed responsibility for several bus bombings in 200843
and also for an attack in Kashgar in July 2011 that killed three dozen people.44
In 2012, Abdullah Mansour emerged as the TIP’s leader, and since then the
group has issued frequent and more sophisticated videos with the media wing
of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) praising attacks in Xinjiang.45 In
2013, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri endorsed the right of militants to
fight Chinese in Xinjiang.46 In July 2014, Islamic State (ISIS) leader Abu Bakr
Al-Baghdadi said in a speech to rally global support that “Muslim rights are
forcibly seized in China, India, Palestine”,47 raising concerns among Chinese
authorities. Thus, there is an expert opinion regarding the unrest in Xinjiang to
be adopted as a cause by extremist groups operating within the region.
Beijing view all these security risks and the impact of consequences of
post-ISAF Afghan instability on the country’s security with utmost concern.
Thus, the policy-makers have designs to contribute to the stabilization
of Afghanistan. Hu Shisheng of the China Institutes of Contemporary
International Relations (CICIR) states, “Now with the US strategic focus
shifting, neighbouring countries cannot just let Afghanistan descend into
chaos.”48 Li Wei, also from CICIR, indicates that: “Although the US will leave
behind a level of military force, the pressure on terrorist forces in Central
and South Asia will inevitably be eased…in this upcoming period pressure
from terrorism in Xinjiang will be quite large.”49 Some Chinese analysts
argue that the drawdown of ISAF will provide Uyghur militant groups with
an opportunity to co-opt other terrorist groups to their cause. There is also
the fright regarding Afghan teritory being utilized by Uighur militants as a
operational grounds. For example, Hu Shisheng of CICIR argues that: “The
Pakistan and the Afghanistan Taliban are sympathetic towards the Uyghurs.
So we absolutely have to pay attention to this, in a way that perhaps we did not
before.”50 However, taking into consideration China’s foreign policy stance
of non-aggression and non-intervention, the experts suggest diplomatic and
economic engagements of China with Afghanistan, besides strengthening her
own immunity.
China’s diplomatic engagement with Afghan issue has strengthened
significantly since 2011. The country has deepened her bilateral relations with
Afghanistan while signing a new partnership agreement and sending the first
215
politburo-level visitor to the country in decades. Beijing has been reportedly

rebuilding the direct links it had with the Taliban prior to the US invasion in
2001.51 This may continue and perhaps strengthen after the ISAF withdrawal.
Re-engaging Taliban after its strong resurgence is in the interest of China as
the country wants to prevent Afghan territory from being used against her
interests. Thus, China is now-a-days active in facilitating peace talks between
the government of Afghanistan and Taliban. Besides US and Pakistan, China
was behind the peace talks initiated between Taliban and Afghan government
in the town of Murree on the outskirts of Pakistani capital Islamabad in July
2015.52
Beijing has been overwhelmingly proactive in Afghan affairs since
last few years. With the commitment to increase her economic footprint
in Afghanistan, both the countries declared a “strategic and cooperative
partnership” in June 2012. While appointing Sun Yuxi as the country’s special
envoy to Afghanistan in July 2014, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated
that, Sun was appointed “to step up the communication with Afghanistan and
all parties concerned and safeguard lasting peace, stability and development
of Afghanistan and the region.”53 Realizing that the US was not planning to
maintain ISAF presence in Afghanistan for a long-term, the country engaged
regional actors including Pakistan, Russia and India into bilateral and multi-
lateral dialogues to discuss what next? In addition, China and Russia hosted
a 6+1 (China, Russia, Afghanistan, India, Iran, Pakistan + United States)
Dialogue on the Afghanistan issue in Geneva in March 2014.54
Thus, China is committed to the stability of Afghanistan and has initiated
economic engagements and regional cooperation in this regard. Being unlikely
to make any meaningful security commitment to Afghanistan, Beijing will
continue to enhance its diplomatic and economic engagement with the
country. However, the security concerns of the country are much deeper than
the economic considerations. As per the Chinese concerns in Afghanistan, it is
indicative that the country has much more to share with India’s Afghan policy.
Both the countries are committed to establish peace and stability in this war-
torn nation. Both are seeking a pro-active role to deal with Afghan conflict. The
countries are also economically engaged with Afghanistan in terms of trade,
infrastructural development, investments and exploration of natural resources.
They have a common interest to enhance inter-regional trade links via Afghan
territory. Religious extremism and terrorism also concerns both the nations as
they are, in one way or other, the victims of terrorism and have security threats
within their territorial domains. The emergence of ISIS (Islamic State) at the
international scene and the reports regarding the presence of this group in
Afghanistan has intensified these security concerns within the region. Besides
it, both the nations are also concerned about the issue of drug trafficking within
the region. There are some differences on certain issues including Taliban
talks. However, both the nations have initiated bilateral and multilateral means
216
to deal with the Afghan issue. India’s permanent membership in Shanghai

Cooperation Organization (SCO) will strengthen the relations between the
two countries that can further enhance the cooperation to discuss Afghan issue
vis-à-vis the changing circumstances.
In terms of military engagements, both China and India have agreed
to support and train Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to deal with
post-ISAF situation. India is providing training to the Afghan forces under
the Strategic Agreement signed in 2011. China too has agreed in 2012 to
train around 300 Afghan police officers in China over four years.55 One of the
options discussed and debated among the analysts is that providing training
and equipment for ANSF would be a more direct way to shape the security
and stability of Afghanistan. Along with co-authors Raffaello Pantucci of the
Royal United Services Institute in London and Ravi Sawhney of New Delhi’s
Vivekananda International Foundation, Hu Shisheng proposed that China and
India could jointly train a “mineral-assets protection force” in Afghanistan.56
This joint mechanism can be further enhanced to assure a stable Afghanistan.
Finally, China trusted Pakistan during 1990s for engaging militant
organizations in a dialogue to assure her own national security. However, the
new generation of terrorist organizations in Af-Pak region are explicitly out of
control and are instead targetting Pakistan establishments. This indicates that
relying on Pakistan to deal with this new generation of terrorism is suicidal.
Thus, China has to engage India passionately with respect to the regional
terrorism and extremism. As discussed above, both the countries are vulnerable
for terrorist threats and the post-ISAF situation may demand Indo-China joint
mechanism to deal with the regional security scenario. Thus, there should be
no fundamental reliance on the good and bad boy theory of terrorism. China
has to follow the Indian and Russian stand regarding terrorism that all terrorists
are same requiring same treatment to be eliminated.
References & Notes

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Challenges”, World Focus, Delhi, Vol. XXIX, No. 11-12, November-December,
p.417.
2. Debata, Mahesh Ranjan (2011): “India’s Policy towards Afghanistan”, World
Focus, Delhi, Vol. XXXII, No.11-12, November-December, p.803.
3. Ahmed, Talmiz (2007): “Oil Diplomacy for India’s Energy Security”, Atish Sinha,
Madhup Mehta (Eds.), Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities,
New Delhi, p.1093.
4. Ali, Ashfaq Maqsood (2013):. “Indo-Afghan Relations Since 9/11”, M. Phil.
Dissertation (Unpublished), Submitted to the Centre of Central Asian Studies,
University of Kashmir, Srinagar (J&K), p.72.
5. Blank, Stephen (2003): “India’s Rising Profile in Central Asia”, Taylor and
Francis, pp.139-141.
6. Nair, Kirit K. (2015): “India’s Role in Afghanistan Post 2014: Strategy, Policy
and Implementation”, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi, No. 55, p.6.
217
7. Heine, Jorge & Ghosh, Partha (2011): “The Elephant in the War: India and the
Afghan-Pakistan Link”, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, Vol. 17, No. 01, p.55.
8. Chaudhuri, Rudra (2011): “Balancing US Interests in India and Pakistan”, The
International Spectator, Vol. 46, No. 2, p.85.
9. Ganguly, Sumit (2001): Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947,
New York, p.3.
10. Op.cit. 4, p.82.
11. Grare, Frederic (2010): “Pakistan”, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, Washington D. C., pp.18-19.
12. Baloch, Qadar Bakhsh & Niazi, Abdul Hafeez Khan (2009): “Indian Encroachment
in Afghanistan: A New Imperialism in the Making”, The Dialogue, Vol. III, p.19.
13. Randolph, Eric (2010): “India’s Afghanistan Dilemma”, The Guardian, January
05, 2010, p.8.
14. Tisdall, Simon (2011): “India May Pay Heavily in Future for Supporting the
Karzai Regime”, The Guardian, October 05, 2011, p.9.
15. Sudha, Ramachandran (2008): “Now it is War Against India in Afghanistan”,
Asia Times, July 2008, p.37.
16. Op.cit. 12, p.17.
17. Raja, W. (2010): “The Complicated Tussle: Competing Interests of Regional
Powers & Afghanistan’s Neighbours”, Master of Defence Studies Research
Project, Canadian Forces College, No. 38, p.37.
18. Baldauf, Scott (2003): “India-Pakistan Rivalry Reaches into Afghanistan”,
Christian Science Monitor, September 12, 2003, p.8.
19. Ahmad, Imtiaz (2011): “Pakistan Reacts Cautiously to India-Afghan Pact”,
Hindustan Times, October 06, 2011, p.17.
20. Op.cit. 12, p.18.
21. Young, Karen (2008): “Obama to Explore New Approach in Afghanistan War”,
Washington Post, November 11, 2008, p.9.
22. Op.cit. 17, p.39.
23. Newberg, Paula (2013): “Pakistan Taliban and Afghanistan: Implications for
Region and Options for International Action”, Special Report, accessible at:
www.usip.org, (accessed on March 03, 2013, at 22:27).
24. Mukhopadhaya, Gautam (2010): “Afghanistan: Is a Regional Strategy Viable in
Afghanistan”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D. C.,
p.27.
25. Op.cit. 13, p.8.
26. Barakat, Sultan and Smith-Windsor, Brooke (2015): “Post-ISAF Afghanistan:
The Early Months”, Policy Dialogue, Brookings Institution, USA: Washington,
February 2015, p.2.
27. Op.cit. 23.
28. Nooruzzaman, Syed (2010): “Pro-Pak Taliban Faction’s Bid for Power”, The
Tribune, June 19, 2010, p.9.
29. Anand, Vinod & Pamidi, G.G. (2010). “The State of Pakistan Today”, World
Focus, Vol. XXXI, No. 11-12, November-December, p.535.
30. Subrahmanya, K (2012): “Afghanistan: The Long Retreat of US”, Deccan
Herald, November 25, 2012, p.9.
218
31. “The Troubled Afghan-Pakistani Border”’ Council on Foreign Affairs, accessible
at:http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/troubled-afghan-pakistani-border/p14905,
(accessed on March 18, 2014, at 22:18)
32. Small, A. (2014): Afghanistan: The View from China. European Union Institute
for Security Studies, Paris, France, QN-AL-14-006-2A-N, ISSN: 2315-1129, p.1.
33. Ibid. p.2.
34. Martina, M. (2014): ‘China Will Not Fill U.S. Void in Afghanistan: Official’
Reuters, July 21, 2014, accessible at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/21/
us-china-afghanistanidUSKBN0FQ12I20140721, (accessed on July 29, 2014, at
22:00).
35. ‘FM: China Attaches Great Importance to Bilateral Ties with
Afghanistan’, CCTV News, accessible at: http://english.cntv.cn/program/
newsupdate/20140223/102556.shtml, (accessed on October 24, 2014, at 23:10).
36. Op.cit. 32, p.2.
37. Downs, E. (2012): China Buys into Afghanistan. SAIS Review, Washington D.C.,
Issue 32, no. 2, p.69.
38. Bristow, M. (2009): ‘Many Missing after China Riots’, BBC News, October 21,
2009, accessible at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8317644.stm (accessed on May
23, 2014, at 22:00).
39. ‘Xinjiang Unrest Leaves Nearly 100 Dead, Including 37 Civilians, China Says’,
[The Guardian, 03 August 2014], accessible at: http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/aug/03/xinjiang-100-dead-37-civilianschina, (accessed on August
05, 2014, at 23:50).
40. Traywick, C. (2013). Chinese Officials Ask Muslim Women to Unveil in the
Name of Beauty’. Foreign Policy (blog), November 26, 2013, accessible at:
http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/26/chinese_officials_ask_muslim_
women_to_unveil_in_the_name_of_beauty, (accessed on October 05, 2014, at
21:20).
41. Oleson, A. (2014): ‘In One Xinjiang City, Beards and Muslim Headscarves
Banned from Buses’. Foreign Policy, August 05, 2014, accessible at: http://
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/08/05/karamay_bans_beards_muslim_
headscarves_from_public_buses_xinjiang, (accessed on October 05, 2014, at
22:05).
42. Ma, H., and Chang, I. J. (2014): ‘Challenging Uyghur Muslim Identity: More
Enforcement, Worse Results’. China Brief, Volume 14, Issue 17, accessible at:
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42811&no_
cache=1#.VCEblfmSx5o, (accessed on: October 05, 2014, at 22:30).
43. Branigan, T. (2008): ‘China Plays Down Terror Link as Bus Explodes’. [The
Guardian, 29 July 2008], accessible at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/
jul/28/china1, (accessed on October 24, 2014, at 22:11).
44. Kley, D. (2014): China’s Foreign Policy in Afghanistan. Lowy Institute for
International Policy, Sydney, Australia, October 2014, p.4.
45. Ibid., p.3.
46. ‘Al-Qaeda Leader Ayman al-Zawahiri Sets Out His First Jihad Guidelines’.
South China Morning Post, September 18, 2013, accessible at: http://www.scmp.
com/news/world/article/1311795/al-qaeda-leader-ayman-alzawahiri-sets-out-
his-first-jihad-guidelines, (accessed on December 24, 2013, at 22:50).
47. Op.cit. 44.
219
48. Houreld, K., and Blanchard, B. (2014): ‘Anxious China Emerges as Dip-
lomatic Player in Afghanistan’. Reuters, April 14, 2014, accessible at: http://
in.reuters.com/article/2014/04/14/china-afghanistan-diplomacyidINK-
BN0D008520140414, (accessed on September 27, 2014, at 21:00).
49. County, S. (2014): ‘Xinjiang: Violent Gang Case Cracked – Details of Attacks
Come to Light’, [The Observer, 24 August 2014], accessible at: http://www.
guancha.cn/local/2013_12_17_193099.shtml, (accessed on September 27, 2014,
at 21:15).
50. Op.cit. 44, p.6.
51. Small, A. (2013): ‘Why is China Talking to the Taliban’. Foreign Policy, June
21, 2013, accessible at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/20/why_
is_china_talking_to_the_taliban, (accessed on July 02, 2015, at 23:10).
52. Borthakur, A. ‘Peace Talks with the Taliban: Progressing into Chaos’. Centre
for Studies in International Relations and Development (CSIRD), accessible at:
http://www.csird.org.in/oa/Afghanistan_CSIRD.pdf, (accessed on November 01,
2015, at 23:15).
53. Op.cit. 44, p.9.
54. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China, ‘China and Russia Co-Host 6+1 Dialogue
on Afghanistan Issue’, March 07, 2014, accessible at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
mfa_eng/wjbxw/t1136653.shtml, (accessed on March 23, 2015, at 23:10).
55. Byrd, W. A. (2014): ‘Who Will Pay for Afghan Security Forces’. Foreign
Policy, June 12, 2014, accessible at: http://southasia.foreignpolicy.com/
posts/2014/06/12/will_the_afghan_national_security_forces_fold_0, (accessed
on October 24, 2014, at 22:00).
56. Shisheng, H., Pantucci, R., and Sawhney, R. (2014): ‘A Roadmap for Sino-In-
dian Co-operation in Afghanistan’, Royal United Services Institute Occasional
Paper, accessible at: https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201407_OP_Sino-
Indian_Co-operation.pdf, (accessed on October 24, 2014, at 23:00).
220
International Advisory Board
Prof. Khurshid I. Andrabi Prof. Valeiry Khan
Vice Chancellor Institute of History
University of Kashmir Academy of Sciences
Srinagar, J&K, India Tashkent, Uzbekistan
Prof. Gregory Gleason Prof. Bolat Tatibekov
Department of Pol. Science Department of Employment and
University of New Mexico Labour Market
USA Institute of Economics
Prof. M. Ashraf Wani Ministry of Education and Science
Dean Academic Affairs Almaty, Kazakhstan
University of Kashmir
Srinagar, J&K, India Prof. Sattar Mazhitov
Ch. Ch. Valikhanov Institute of
Prof. Valeria Piacentini History and Ethnography
Universita Cattolica del Sacro Cuore / Almaty, Kazakhstan
Catholic University of the Sacred Heart
Milano, Italy Prof. Reuel Hanks
Department of Geography
Prof. Choi Han-Woo Oklahoma University
Korea University of International Studies USA
Seoul, Korea
Prof. Valdimir Boyko Prof. Ilhan Sahin
Centre for Regional Studies Institute of History & Turkic Civilization
Russia & Central Asia Kyrgyzstan -Turkey Manas University
Barnaul State Pedagogical University Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan
Barnaul, Russia

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THE JOURNAL

Centre of Central Asian Studies

No part of this Journal may be reprinted in original or translated

The views expressed in this volume of the Journal are opinions of

The Journal is peer reviewed, refereed and indexed in EBSCOhost

Scope of the Journal: The Journal welcomes original papers on

Print Year: 2016

Printed at Mehak Printing Press, New Delhi, India.

Connect Central Asia Policy And Indian Outfoxing

Scope and Feasibility of Islamic Banking And Finance Model

Human Rights At Jeopardy

New Maritime Silk Route

Indo - Kazakhstan Nuclear Partnership Agreement

Food Shortages In Kashmir

Central Asian Water Resources

Energy Consumption And Economic Growth

Peace And Conflict Studies

Role Of Labour Migration In The Development Of Former

India’s Afghan Policy

Dr. Mohammad Thowhidul Islam (IR Analyst)

Dr. Bawasingh (Area Expert)

Prof. G. N. Khaki (Islamic Studies Expert)

Prof. R. G. Gidadhubli (Economist)

Prof. G. M. Mir (Geographer)

Dr. Govind Kumar Inakhiya (Regional Analyst)

Muhammad Maroof Shah (Philosopher)

Dr. Harmeet Singh (Area Expert)

Dr. Tareak A Rather (Sociologist)

Dr. Mohammad Afzal Mir (Economist)

Dr. Tabasum Firdous (IR Specialist)

Dr. Shaheen Showkat Dar (Strategic Analyst)

Dr. Mohammad Ibrahim Wani (Economist)

Danish Mehran (Historian)

Ashfaq Maqsood Ali (Political Scientist)

Bilal Ahmad Malik (Isalmic Studies Expert)

Tajalley Nazir (Educationist)

Nurgiss Nazir (Sociologist)

Cooperation Program was created and military cooperation agreement was

Geopolitical and Strategic Importance of Turkey

Historical Legacies of Turkish Foreign Policy

Turkey’s AKP Government and its Foreign Policy Principles

Historical Developments of Turkish-Syrian Relationships

AKP’s Foreign Policy Towards Syria and Turkey-Syria Relations Before

(Aras, 2012, p. 44), which has been dubbed as ‘neo-Ottomanism’ (Mcdonald,

approach of Turkey, ‘zero problems’ and ‘strategic depth’ principles, Turkey’s

has vanished’ (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, August 28, 2011).

Major Reasons Behind AKP’s Shifting Policy Towards Syria

Sense of Prestige and National Dignity

Turkish government repeatedly called on Assad to initiate comprehensive

Massacre to the Civilians

To Secure Turkey from Security Threats

Assad’s Reported Relationship with the Kurds and PKK

Turkey’s Political Intention in Syria

Respect Towards Democracy

Though it suffered considerable economic loss in Syria, Turtkey views it as a

To Establish Turkey as a ‘Role Model’ for Islamization of Democracy

Learning from Libyan Case

To Reduce Influence of Iran in the Middle East

Thus, Turkey-Iran competition demonstrated through the ongoing uprising in