534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

*
G.R. No. 128567. September 1, 2000.

HUERTA ALBA RESORT, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and SYNDICATED MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC.,
respondents.

Mortgages; Judicial Foreclosures of Mortgage; Redemption; Words

and Phrases; “Equity of Redemption” and “Right of Redemption,”
Distinguished.—From the various decisions, resolutions and orders a quo it
can be gleaned that what petitioner has been adjudged to have was only the
equity of redemption over subject properties. On the distinction between the
equity of redemption and right of redemption, the case of Gregorio Y.
Limpin vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, comes to the fore. Held the Court
in the said case: “The equity of redemption is, to be sure, different from and
should not be confused with the right of redemption. The right of
redemption in relation to a mortgage—understood in the sense of a
prerogative to re-acquire mortgaged property after registration of the
foreclosure sale—exists only in the case of the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the mortgage. No such right is recognized in a judicial foreclosure except
only where the mortgagee is the Philippine National Bank or a bank or
banking institution. Where a mortgage is foreclosed extrajudicially, Act
3135 grants to the mortgagor the right of redemption within one (1) year
from the registration of the sheriff’s certificate of foreclosure sale. Where
the foreclosure is judicially effected, however, no equivalent right of
redemption exists. The law declares that a judicial foreclosure sale, ‘when
confirmed by an order of the court, x x shall operate to divest the rights of
all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser, subject
to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law.’ Such rights
exceptionally ‘allowed by law’ (i.e., even after confirmation by an order of
the court) are those granted by the charter of the Philippine National Bank
(Acts No. 2747 and 2938), and the General Banking Act (R.A. 337). These
laws confer on the mortgagor, his successors in interest or any judgment
creditor of the mortgagor, the right to redeem the property sold on
foreclosure—after confirmation by the court of the foreclosure sale—which
right may be exercised within a period of one (1) year, counted from the
date of registration of the certificate of sale in the Registry of Property.
 Same; Same; Same; Banks and Banking; General Banking Act (R.A.
337); Where a party failed to assert a right to redeem under the Section 78
of R.A. 337 in several crucial stages of the proceedings invoke, it is too late

_______________

* THIRD DIVISION.

535

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Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

in the day for it to subsequently invoke such right in opposition to a motion

for issuance of a writ of possession after confirmation by the court of the
foreclosure sale and the registration of the certificate of sale.—Petitioner
avers in its petition that the Intercon, predecessor in interest of the private
respondent, is a credit institution, such that Section 78 of Republic Act No.
337 should apply in this case. Stated differently, it is the submission of
petitioner that it should be allowed to redeem subject properties within one
year from the date of sale as a result of the foreclosure of the mortgage
constituted thereon. The pivot of inquiry here therefore, is whether the
petitioner seasonably invoked its asserted right under Section 78 of R.A.
No. 337 to redeem subject properties. Petitioner theorizes that it invoked its
“right” in “timely fashion,” that is, after confirmation by the court of the
foreclosure sale, and within one (1) year from the date of registration of the
certificate of sale. Indeed, the facts show that it was only on May 2, 1995
when, in opposition to the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession, did
petitioner file a Motion to Compel Private Respondent to Accept
Redemption, invoking for the very first time its alleged right to redeem
subject properties under to Section 78 of R.A. No. 337. In light of the
aforestated facts, it was too late in the day for petitioner to invoke a right to
redeem under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337. Petitioner failed to assert a right
to redeem in several crucial stages of the proceedings.

Same; Same; Same; Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Counterclaims;

The claim that a mortgagor is entitled to the beneficial provisions of Section
78 of RA. No. 337 is in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim which
should be averred in the answer to the complaint for judicial foreclosure.—
Indeed, at the earliest opportunity, when it submitted its answer to the
complaint for judicial foreclosure, petitioner should have alleged that it was
entitled to the beneficial provisions of Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 but again,
it did not make any allegation in its answer regarding any right thereunder.
It bears stressing that the applicability of Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 hinges
on the factual question of whether or not private respondent’s predecessor in
interest was a credit institution. As was held in Limpin, a judicial
foreclosure sale, “when confirmed by an order of the court, x x shall operate
to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in
the purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by
law,” which confer on the mortgagor, his successors in interest or any
judgment creditor of the mortgagor, the right to redeem the property sold on
foreclosure after confirmation by the court of the judicial foreclosure sale.
Thus, the claim that petitioner is entitled to the beneficial provisions of
Section 78 of R.A. No. 337—since private respondent’s predecessor-in-
interest is a credit institution—is in the nature

536

536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

of a compulsory counterclaim which should have been averred in

petitioner’s answer to the complaint for judicial foreclosure.

Counterclaims; The rules of counterclaim are designed to enable the

disposition of a whole controversy of interested parties’ conflicting claims,
at one time and in one action, provided all parties be brought before the
court and the matter decided without prejudicing the rights of any party.—
The very purpose of a counterclaim would have been served had petitioner
alleged in its answer its purported right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337:
“x x x The rules of counterclaim are designed to enable the disposition of a
whole controversy of interested parties’ conflicting claims, at one time and
in one action, provided all parties be brought before the court and the matter
decided without prejudicing the rights of any party.”

Estoppel; Estoppel may be successfully invoked only if the party fails to

raise the question in the early stages of the proceedings.—The failure of
petitioner to seasonably assert its alleged right under Section 78 of R.A. No.
337 precludes it from so doing at this late stage of the case. Estoppel may be
successfully invoked if the party fails to raise the question in the early stages
of the proceedings. Thus, “a party to a case who failed to invoke his claim in
the main case, while having the opportunity to do so, will be precluded,
subsequently, from invoking his claim, even if it were true, after the
decision has become final, otherwise the judgment may be reduced to a
mockery and the administration of justice may be placed in disrepute.”

Courts; It is error for a trial court in still allowing a party to introduce

evidence to accomplish what the latter failed to do before the Court of
Appeals, that is, to invoke its alleged right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337
although the said appellate court already found that said question was
never brought before it squarely.—All things viewed in proper perspective,
it is decisively clear that the trial court erred in still allowing petitioner to
introduce evidence that private respondent’s predecessor-in-interest was a
credit institution, and to thereafter rule that the petitioner was entitled to
avail of the provisions of Section 78 of R.A. No. 337. In effect, the trial
court permitted the petitioner to accomplish what the latter failed to do
before the Court of Appeals, that is, to invoke its alleged right under Section
78 of R.A. No. 337 although the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 35086
already found that “the question of whether the Syndicated Management
Council Group, Inc. is a bank or credit institution was never brought before
(the Court of Appeals) squarely.” The said pronouncement by the Court of
Appeals unerringly signified that petitioner did not make

537

VOL. 339, SEPTEMBER 1, 2000 537

Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

a timely assertion of any right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 in all the
stages of the proceedings below.

Actions; Judgments; Law of the Case; Whether or not the “law of the
case” is erroneous is immaterial—it still remains to be the “law of the
case.”—There is, therefore, merit in private respondent’s contention that to
allow petitioner to belatedly invoke its right under Section 78 of R.A. No.
337 will disturb the “law of the case.” However, private respondent’s
statement of what constitutes the “law of the case” is not entirely accurate.
The “law of the case” is not simply that the defendant possesses an equity of
redemption. As the Court has stated, the “law of the case” holds that
petitioner has the equity of the redemption without any qualification
whatsoever, that is, without the right of redemption afforded by Section 78
of R.A. No. 337. Whether or not the “law of the case” is erroneous is
immaterial, it still remains the “law of the case.” A contrary rule will
contradict both the letter and spirit of the rulings of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 35086, CA-G.R. CV No. 39243, and CA-G.R. 38747,
which clearly saw through the repeated attempts of petitioner to forestall so
simple a matter as making the security given for a just debt to answer for its
payment.

Mortgages; Equity of Redemption; Words and Phrases; Equity of

redemption is simply the right of the mortgagor to extinguish the mortgage
and retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt within the
90-day period after the judgment became final.—In conformity with the
ruling in Limpin, the sale of the subject properties, as confirmed by the
Order dated February 10, 1995 of the trial court in Civil Case No. 89-5424
operated to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their
rights in private respondent. There then existed only what is known as the
equity of redemption, which is simply the right of the petitioner to
extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the
secured debt within the 90-day period after the judgment became final.
There being an explicit finding on the part of the Court of Appeals in its
Decision of September 30, 1994 in CA-G.R. No. 35086—that the herein
petitioner failed to exercise its equity of redemption within the prescribed
period, redemption can no longer be effected. The confirmation of the sale
and the issuance of the transfer certificates of title covering the subject
properties to private respondent was then, in order. The trial court therefore,
has the ministerial duty to place private respondent in the possession of
subject properties.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

Appeals.

538

538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.           Benjamin C.

Santos & Ofelia Calcetas-Santos Law Offices; Santos, Parungao,
Aquino & Santos and Oben, Ventura, Defensor, Abola & Associates
for petitioner.
          Atienza, Tabora, Del Rosario & Castillo Law Office for
private respondent.

PURISIMA, J.:

Litigation must at some time be terminated, even at the risk of

occasional errors. Public policy dictates that once a judgment
becomes final, executory and unappealable, the prevailing party
should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge
devised by the losing party. Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a
judgment sets at naught the role of courts in disposing justiciable
controversies with finality.

The Case

At bar is a petition assailing the Decision, dated November 14, 1996,

and Resolution, dated March 11, 1997, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 38747, which set aside the Order, dated July 21, 1995,
and Order, dated September 4, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, in Civil Case No. 89-5424. The aforesaid orders of the
trial court held that petitioner had the right to redeem subject pieces
of property within the one-year period prescribed by Section 78 of
Republic Act No. 337 otherwise known as the General Banking Act.
 Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 provides that “in case of a
foreclosure of a mortgage in favor of a bank, banking or credit
institution, whether judicially or extrajudicially, the mortgagor shall
have the right, within one year after the sale of the real estate as a
result of the foreclosure of the respective mortgage, to redeem the
property.”

The Facts

The facts that matter are undisputed:

In a complaint for judicial foreclosure of mortgage with
preliminary injunction filed on October 19, 1989, docketed as Civil
Case No. 89-5424 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
the

539

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Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

herein private respondent sought the foreclosure of four (4) parcels

of land mortgaged by petitioner to Intercon Fund Resource, Inc.
(“Intercon”).
Private respondent instituted Civil Case No. 89-5424 as
mortgagee-assignee of a loan amounting to P8.5 million obtained by
petitioner from Intercon, in whose favor petitioner mortgaged the
aforesaid parcels of land as security for the said loan.
In its answer below, petitioner questioned the assignment by
Intercon of its mortgage right thereover to the private respondent, on
the ground that the same was ultra vires. Petitioner also questioned
during the trial the correctness of the charges and interest on the
mortgage debt in question.
On April 30, 1992, the trial court, through the then Judge now
Court of Appeals Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero, came out with
its decision “granting herein private respondent SMGI’s complaint
for judicial foreclosure of mortgage,” disposing as follows:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay

plaintiff the following:

(1) P8,500,000.00 representing the principal of the amount due;

(2) P850,000.00 as penalty charges with interest at 6% per annum,
until fully paid;
(3) 22% per annum interest on the above principal from September 6,
1998, until fully paid;
(4) 5% of the sum total of the above amounts, as reasonable attorney’s
fees; and,
 (5) Costs.

All the above must be paid within a period of not less than 150 days
from receipt hereof by the defendant. In default of such payment, the four
parcels of land subject matter of the suit including its improvements shall be
sold to realize the mortgage debt and costs, in the manner and under the
1
regulations that govern sales of real estate under execution.”

Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of

Appeals, the appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 39243 before the
Sixth Division of the appellate court, which dismissed the case on
June 29, 1993 on the ground of late payment of docket fees.

_______________

1 Rollo, pp. 87-88.

540

540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Dissatisfied with the dismissal of CA-G.R. No. 39243, petitioner

came to this Court via a petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
112044, which this court resolved to dismiss on December 13, 1993,
on the finding that the Court of Appeals erred not in dismissing the
appeal of petitioner.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of its
petition in G.R. No. 112044 was denied with finality in this Court’s
Resolution promulgated on February 16, 1994. On March 10, 1994,
leave to present a second motion for reconsideration in G.R. No.
112044 or to submit the case for hearing by the Court en banc was
filed, but to no avail. The Court resolved to deny the same on May
11, 1994.
On March 14, 1994, the Resolution dated December 13, 1993, in
G.R. No. 112044 became final and executory and was entered in the
Book of Entries of Judgment.
On July 4, 1994, private respondent filed with the trial court of
origin a motion for execution of the Decision promulgated on April
30, 1992 in Civil Case No. 89-5424. The said motion was granted on
July 13, 1994.
Accordingly, on July 15, 1994 a writ of execution issued and, on
July 20, 1994, a Notice of Levy and Execution was issued by the
Sheriff concerned, who issued on August 1, 1994 a Notice of
Sheriff’s Sale for the auction of subject properties on September 6,
1994.
On August 23, 1994, petitioner filed with the same trial court an
Urgent Motion to Quash and Set Aside Writ of Execution ascribing
to it grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned Writ of
Execution. To support its motion, petitioner invited attention and
argued that the records of the case were still with the Court of
Appeals and therefore, issuance of the writ of execution was
premature since the 150-day period for petitioner to pay the
judgment obligation had not yet lapsed and petitioner had not yet
defaulted in the payment thereof since no demand for its payment
was made by the private respondent. In petitioner’s own words, the
dispute between the parties was “principally on the issue as to when
the 150-day period within which Huerta Alba may exercise its
equity of redemption should be counted.”

541

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Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

In its Order of September 2, 1994, the lower court denied

petitioner’s urgent motion to quash the writ of execution in Civil
Case No. 89-5424, opining that subject judgment had become final
and executory and consequently, execution thereof was a matter of
right and the issuance of the corresponding writ of execution became
its ministerial duty.
Challenging the said order granting execution, petitioner filed
once more with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction, docketed as C.A.-G.R.
SP No. 35086, predicated on the same grounds invoked for its
Motion to Quash Writ of Execution.
On September 6, 1994, the scheduled auction sale of subject
pieces of properties proceeded and the private respondent was
declared the highest bidder. Thus, private respondent was awarded
subject bidded pieces of property. The covering Certificate of Sale
issued in its favor was registered with the Registry of Deeds on
October 21, 1994.
On September 7, 1994, petitioner presented an Ex-Parte Motion
for Clarification asking the trial court to “clarify” whether or not the
twelve (12) month period of redemption for ordinary execution
applied in the case.
On September 26, 1994, the trial court ruled that the period of
redemption of subject property should be governed by the rule on
the sale of judicially foreclosed property under Rule 68 of the Rules
of Court.
Thereafter, petitioner then filed an Exception to the Order dated
September 26, 1994 and Motion to Set Aside Said Order, contending
that the said Order materially altered the Decision dated April 30,
1992 “which declared that the satisfaction of the judgment shall be
in the manner and under the regulation that govern sale of real estate
under execution.”
 Meanwhile, in its Decision of September 30, 1994, the Court of
Appeals resolved the issues raised by the petitioner in C.A.-G.R. SP
No. 35086, holding that the one hundred-fifty day period within
which petitioner may redeem subject properties should be computed
from the date petitioner was notified of the Entry of Judgment in
G.R. No. 112044; and that the 150-day period within which

542

542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

petitioner may exercise its equity of redemption expired on

September 11, 1994. Thus:

“Petitioner must have received the resolution of the Supreme Court dated
February 16, 1994 denying with finality its motion for reconsideration in
G.R. No. 112044 before March 14, 1994, otherwise the Supreme Court
would not have made an entry of judgment on March 14, 1994. While,
computing the 150-day period, petitioner may have until September 11,
1994, within which to pay the amounts covered by the judgment, such period
has already expired by this time, and therefore, this Court has no more
reason to pass upon the parties’ opposing contentions, the same having
2
become moot and academic.” (Italics supplied).

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Decision of the Court of

Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 35086. In its Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 18, 1994, petitioner theorized that
the period of one hundred fifty (150) days should not be reckoned
with from Entry of Judgment but from receipt on or before July 29,
1994 by the trial court of the records of Civil Case No. 89-5424
from the Court of Appeals. So also, petitioner maintained that it may
not be considered in default, even after the expiration of 150 days
from July 29, 1994, because prior demand to pay was never made on
it by the private respondent. According to petitioner, it was
therefore, premature for the trial court to issue a writ of execution to
enforce the judgment.
The trial court deferred action on the Motion for Confirmation of
the Certificate of Sale in view of the pendency of petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 35086.
On December 23, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 35086. Absent any
further action with respect to the denial of the subject motion for
reconsideration, private respondent presented a Second Motion for
Confirmation of Certificate of Sale before the trial court.
As regards the Decision rendered on September 30, 1994 by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35086 it became final and
executory on January 25, 1995.
________________

2 Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 93.

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Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

On February 10, 1995, the lower court confirmed the sale of subject
properties to the private respondent. The pertinent Order declared
that all pending incidents relating to the Order dated September 26,
1994 had become moot and academic. Conformably, the Transfer
Certificates of Title to subject pieces of property were then issued to
the private respondent.
On February 27, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals
a Motion for Clarification seeking “clarification” of the date of
commencement of the one (1) year period for the redemption of the
properties in question.
In its Resolution dated March 20, 1995, the Court of Appeals
merely noted such Motion for Clarification since its Decision
promulgated on September 30, 1994 had already become final and
executory; ratiocinating thus:

“We view the motion for clarification filed by petitioner, purportedly signed
by its proprietor, but which we believe was prepared by a lawyer who
wishes to hide under the cloak of anonymity, as a veiled attempt to buy time
and to delay further the disposition of this case.
Our decision of September 30, 1994 never dealt on the right and period
of redemption of petitioner, but was merely circumscribed to the question of
whether respondent judge could issue a writ of execution in its Civil Case
No. 89-5424 x x x.
We further ruled that the one-hundred fifty day period within which
petitioner may exercise its equity of redemption should be counted, not from
the receipt of respondent court of the records of Civil Case No. 895424 but
from the date petitioner was notified of the entry of judgment made by the
appellate court.
But we never made any pronouncement on the one-year right of
redemption of petitioner because, in the first place, the foreclosure in this
case is judicial, and as such, the mortgagor has only the equity, not the right
of redemption x x x. While it may be true that under Section 78 of R.A. 337
as amended, otherwise known as the General Banking Act, a mortgagor of a
bank, banking or credit institution, whether the foreclosure was done
judicially or extrajudicially, has a period of one year from the auction sale
within which to redeem the foreclosed property, the question of whether the
Syndicated Management Group, Inc., is a bank or credit institution was
never brought before us squarely, and it is indeed odd and

544
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

strange that petitioner would now sarcastically ask a rhetorical question in

3
its motion for clarification.” (Italics supplied).

Indeed, if petitioner did really act in good faith, it would have

ventilated before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 35086 its
pretended right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 but it never did so.
At the earliest opportunity, when it filed its answer to the
complaint for judicial foreclosure, petitioner should have averred in
its pleading that it was entitled to the beneficial provisions of
Section 78 of R.A. No. 337; but again, petitioner did not make any
such allegation in its answer.
From the said Resolution, petitioner took no further step such
that on March 31, 1995, the private respondent filed a Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Possession with the trial court.
During the hearing called on April 21, 1995, the counsel of
record of petitioner entered appearance and asked for time to
interpose opposition to the Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Possession.
On May 2, 1995, in opposition to private respondent’s Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Possession, petitioner filed a “Motion to Compel
Private Respondent to Accept Redemption.” It was the first time
petitioner ever asserted the right to redeem subject properties under
Section 78 of R.A. No. 337, the General Banking Act; theorizing
that the original mortgagee, being a credit institution, its assignment
of the mortgage credit to petitioner did not remove petitioner from
the coverage of Section 78 of R.A. No. 337. Therefore, it should
have the right to redeem subject properties within one year from
registration of the auction sale, theorized the petitioner which
concluded that in view of its “right of redemption,” the issuance of
the titles over subject parcels of land to the private respondent was
irregular and premature.
In its Order of July 21, 1995, the trial court, presided over by
Judge Napoleon Inoturan, denied private respondent’s motion for a
writ of possession, opining that Section 78 of the General Banking
Act was applicable and therefore, the petitioner had until October

_______________

3 Resolution, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 366-367.

545

VOL. 339, SEPTEMBER 1, 2000 545

Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
21, 1995 to redeem the said parcels of land, said Order ruled as
follows:

“It is undisputed that Intercon is a credit institution from which defendant

obtained a loan secured with a real estate mortgage over four (4) parcels of
land. Assuming that the mortgage debt had not been assigned to plaintiff,
there is then no question that defendant would have a right of redemption in
case of foreclosure, judicially or extrajudicially, pursuant to the above
quoted Section 78 of RA 337, as amended.
However, the pivotal issue here is whether or not the defendant lost its
right of redemption by virtue of the assignment of its mortgage debt by
Intercon to plaintiff, which is not a bank or credit institution. The issue is
resolved in the negative. The right of redemption in this case is vested by
law and is therefore an absolute privilege which defendant may not lose
even though plaintiff-assignee is not a bank or credit institution (Tolentino
versus Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 513). Indeed, a contrary ruling will lead
to a possible circumvention of Section 78 because all that may be needed to
deprive a defaulting mortgagor of his right of redemption is to assign his
mortgage debt from a bank or credit institution to one which is not.
Protection of defaulting mortgagors, which is the avowed policy behind the
provision, would not be achieved if the ruling were otherwise.
Consequently, defendant still possesses its right of redemption which it may
exercise up to October 21, 1995 only, which is one year from the date of
registration of the certificate of sale of subject properties (GSIS versus
Iloilo, 175 SCRA 19, citing Limpin versus IAC, 166 SCRA 87).
Since the period to exercise defendant’s right of redemption has not yet
expired, the cancellation of defendant’s transfer certificates of title and the
issuance of new ones in lieu thereof in favor of plaintiff are therefore illegal
for being premature, thereby necessitating reconveyance (see Sec 63 [a], PD
1529, as amended).
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby rules as follows:

(1) The Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession is hereby denied;

(2) Plaintiff is directed to accept the redemption on or before October
21, 1995 in an amount computed according to the terms stated in
the Writ of Execution dated July 15, 1994 plus all other related
costs and expenses mentioned under Section 78, RA 337, as
amended; and
(3) The Register of Deeds of Valenzuela, Bulacan is directed (a) to
reconvey to the defendant the following titles of the four (4) parcels
of land, namely TCT Nos. V-38878, V-38879, V-38880, and V-
38881, now in the name of plaintiff, and (b) to register the
certificate of sale dated October 7, 1994 and the Order confirming
the sale dated February 10, 1995 by

546

546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

 Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

a brief memorandum thereof upon the transfer certificates of title to

be issued in the name of defendant, pursuant to Sec. 63 (a) PD
1529, as amended.

The Omnibus Motion dated June 5, 1995, together with the Opposition
4
thereto, is now deemed resolved. SO ORDERED.”

Private respondent interposed a Motion for Reconsideration seeking

the reversal of the Order but to no avail. In its Order dated
September 4, 1995, the trial court denied the same.
To attack and challenge the aforesaid order of July 21, 1995 and
subsequent Order of September 4, 1995 of the trial court, the private
respondent filed with this court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 121893, but absent any
special and cogent reason shown for entertaining the same, the Court
referred the petition to the Court of Appeals, for proper
determination.
Docketed as G.R. No. 387457 on November 14, 1996, the Court
of Appeals gave due course to the petition and set aside the trial
court’s Order dated July 21, 1995 and Order dated September 4,
1995.
In its Resolution of March 11, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision promulgated
on November 14, 1996 in CA-G.R. No. 38747.
Undaunted, petitioner has come to this Court via the present
petition, placing reliance on the assignment of errors, that:

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED GRAVELY IN

HOLDING THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS (TWELFTH DIVISION)
IN CA G.R. SP NO. 35086 HAD RESOLVED “WITH FINALITY” THAT
PETITIONER HUERTA ALBA HAD NO RIGHT OF REDEMPTION
BUT ONLY THE EQUITY OF REDEMPTION.

________________

4 Rollo, pp. 14-15.

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Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

II
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED GRAVELY IN
IGNORING THAT PETITIONER HUERTA ALBA POSSESSES THE
ONEYEAR RIGHT OF REDEMPTION UNDER SECTION 78, R.A. NO.
337 (THE GENERAL BANKING ACT).

III

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED GRAVELY IN

HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT SYNDICATED
MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC. IS ENTITLED TO THE ISSUANCE OF
5
A WRIT OF POSSESSION OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.

In its comment on the petition, private respondent countered that:

“A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

CORRECTLY HELD THAT IT RESOLVED WITH
FINALITY IN C.A.-G.R. SP NO. 35086 THAT
PETITIONER ONLY HAD THE RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION IN RESPECT OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES.
B. THE PETITION IS AN INSIDIOUS AND
UNDERHANDED ATTEMPT TO EVADE THE
FINALITY OF VARIOUS DECISIONS, RESOLUTIONS
AND ORDERS WHICH HELD THAT PETITIONER
ONLY POSSESSES THE EQUITY OF REDEMPTION IN
RESPECT OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES.
C. PETITIONER IS BARRED BY ESTOPPEL FROM
BELATEDLY RAISING THE ISSUE OF ITS ALLEGED
‘RIGHT OF REDEMPTION.’
D. IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONER HAD THE
‘RIGHT OF REDEMPTION’ OVER THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES, THE TRIAL COURT MADE 6
A
MOCKERY OF THE ‘LAW OF THE CASE.’ ”

And by way of Reply, petitioner argued, that:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 35086 COULD NOT

HAVE POSSIBLY RESOLVED THEREIN—WHETHER WITH
FINALITY

_______________

5 Rollo, p. 4.
6 Rollo, p. 390.

548

548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

 Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

OR OTHERWISE—THE ISSUE OF PETITIONER HUERTA ALBA’S

RIGHT OF REDEMPTION UNDER SECTION 78, R.A. NO. 337.

II.

THERE IS NO ESTOPPEL HERE. PETITIONER HUERTA ALBA

INVOKED ITS RIGHT OF REDEMPTION UNDER SECTION 78, R.A.
NO. 337 IN TIMELY FASHION, i.e., AFTER CONFIRMATION BY THE
COURT OF THE FORECLOSURE SALE, AND WITHIN ONE (1) YEAR
FROM THE DATE OF REGISTRATION OF THE CERTIFICATE OF
SALE.

III.

THE PRINCIPLE OF ‘THE LAW OF THE CASE’ HAS

ABSOLUTELY NO BEARING HERE:

(1)

THE RIGHT OF REDEMPTION UNDER SECTION 78, R.A. NO. 337 IS IN

FACT PREDICATED UPON THE FINALITY AND CORRECTNESS OF THE
DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 89-5424.

(2)

THUS, THE RTC’S ORDER RECOGNIZING PETITIONER HUERTA ALBA’S

RIGHT OF REDEMPTION UNDER SECTION 78, R.A. NO. 37 DOES NOT IN
ANY WAY HAVE THE EFFECT OF AMENDING, MODIFYING, OR SETTING
ASIDE THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 89-5424.

The above arguments and counter-arguments advanced relate to the

pivotal issue of whether or not the petitioner has the one-year right
of redemption of subject properties under Section 78 of Republic
Act No. 337 otherwise known as the General Banking Act.
The petition is not visited by merit.
Petitioner’s assertion of right of redemption under Section 78 of
Republic Act No. 337 is premised on the submission that the Court
of Appeals did not resolve such issue in CA-G.R. SP No. 35086;
contending thus:

(1)

BY NO STRETCH OF LOGIC CAN THE 20 MARCH 1995

RESOLUTION IN CA G.R. SP NO. 35086 BE INTERPRETED TO MEAN
THE COURT

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VOL. 339, SEPTEMBER 1, 2000 549

Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
OF APPEALS HAD RESOLVED WITH FINALITY’ THE ISSUE OF
WHETHER PETITIONER HUERTA ALBA HAD THE RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION WHEN ALL THAT THE RESOLUTION DID WAS TO
MERELY NOTE THE MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION.

(2)

THE 20 MARCH 1995 RESOLUTION IN CA G.R. SP NO. 35086 IS

NOT A FINAL JUDGMENT, ORDER OR DECREE. IT IS NOT EVEN A
JUDGMENT OR ORDER TO BEGIN WITH; IT ORDERS NOTHING; IT
ADJUDICATES NOTHING.

(3)

PETITIONER HUERTA ALBA’S RIGHT OF REDEMPTION UNDER

SECTION 78, R.A. NO. 37 WAS NOT AN ISSUE, AND COULD NOT
HAVE POSSIBLY BEEN AN ISSUE, IN CA G.R. SP NO. 35086.

(4)

THE 30 SEPTEMBER 1994 DECISION IN CA G.R. SP NO. 35086

HAVING ALREADY BECOME FINAL EVEN BEFORE THE FILING
OF THE MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION, THE COURT OF APPEALS
NO LONGER HAD ANY JURISDICTION TO ACT OF THE MOTION
OR ANY OTHER MATTER IN CA G.R. SP NO. 35086, EXCEPT TO
MERELY NOTE THE MOTION.

II.

IN STARK CONTRAST, THE ISSUE OF PETITIONER HUERTA

ALBA’S RIGHT OF REDEMPTION UNDER SECTION 78, R.A. NO. 337
WAS DIRECTLY RAISED AND JOINED BY THE PARTIES, AND THE
SAME DULY RESOLVED BY THE TRIAL COURT.

III.

THE RIGHT OF REDEMPTION UNDER SECTION 78 OF R.A. NO.

337 IS MANDATORY AND AUTOMATICALLY EXISTS BY LAW. THE
COURTS ARE DUTY-BOUND TO RECOGNIZE SUCH RIGHT.

IV.

EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS WEIGH HEAVILY IN FAVOR OF

PETITIONER HUERTA ALBA, NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH IS THE
WELL-SETTLED POLICY OF THE LAW TO AID RATHER THAN
DEFEAT THE RIGHT OF REDEMPTION.

550

550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

 Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

V.

THEREFORE THE 21 JULY 1995 AND 04 SEPTEMBER 1995 ORDERS

OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE VALID AND PROPER IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE MANDATE OF THE LAW.

From the various decisions, resolutions and orders a quo it can be

gleaned that what petitioner has been adjudged to have was only the
equity of redemption over subject properties. On the distinction
between the equity of redemption and right of redemption,
7
the case
of Gregorio Y. Limpin vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, comes to
the fore. Held the Court in the said case:

“The equity of redemption is, to be sure, different from and should not be
confused with the right of redemption.
The right of redemption in relation to a mortgage—understood in the
sense of a prerogative to re-acquire mortgaged property after registration of
the foreclosure sale—exists only in the case of the extrajudicial foreclosure
of the mortgage. No such right is recognized in a judicial foreclosure except
only where the mortgagee is the Philippine National Bank or a bank or
banking institution.
Where a mortgage is foreclosed extrajudicially, Act 3135 grants to the
mortgagor the right of redemption within one (1) year from the registration
of the sheriff’s certificate of foreclosure sale.
Where the foreclosure is judicially effected, however, no equivalent right
of redemption exists. The law declares that a judicial foreclosure sale,
‘when confirmed by an order of the court, x x shall operate to divest the
rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser,
subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law.’ Such rights
exceptionally ‘allowed by law’ (i.e., even after confirmation by an order of
the court) are those granted by the charter of the Philippine National Bank
(Acts No. 2747 and 2938), and the General Banking Act (R.A. 337). These
laws confer on the mortgagor, his successors in interest or any judgment
creditor of the mortgagor, the right to redeem the property sold on
foreclosure—after confirmation by the court of the foreclosure sale—which
right may be exercised within a period of one (1) year, counted from the
date of registration of the certificate of sale in the Registry of Property.

_______________

7 166 SCRA 87.

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Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
But, to repeat, no such right of redemption exists in case of judicial
foreclosure of a mortgage if the mortgagee is not the PNB or a bank or
banking institution. In such a case, the foreclosure sale, ‘when confirmed by
an order of the court. x x shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to
the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser.’ There then exists only
what is known as the equity of redemption. This is simply the right of the
defendant mortgagor to extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the
property by paying the secured debt within the 90-day period after the
judgment becomes final, in accordance with Rule 68, or even after the
foreclosure sale but prior to its confirmation. Section 2, Rule 68 provides
that—
‘x x If upon the trial x x the court shall find the facts set forth in the
complaint to be true, it shall ascertain the amount due to the plaintiff upon
the mortgage debt or obligation, including interest and costs, and shall
render judgment for the sum so found due and order the same to be paid into
court within a period of not less than ninety (90) days from the date of the
service of such order, and that in default of such payment the property be
sold to realize the mortgage debt and costs.’
This is the mortgagor’s equity (not right) of redemption which, as above
stated, may be exercised by him even beyond the 90-day period ‘from the
date of service of the order,’ and even after the foreclosure sale itself,
provided it be before the order of confirmation of the sale. After such order
8
of confirmation, no redemption can be effected any longer.” (Italics
supplied)

Petitioner failed to seasonably invoke its purported right under

Section 78 of R.A. No. 337.
Petitioner avers in its petition that the Intercon, predecessor in
interest of the private respondent, is a credit institution, such that
Section 78 of Republic Act No. 337 should apply in this case. Stated
differently, it is the submission of petitioner that it should be allowed
to redeem subject properties within one year from the date of sale as
a result of the foreclosure of the mortgage constituted thereon.
The pivot of inquiry here therefore, is whether the petitioner
seasonably invoked its asserted right under Section 78 of R.A. No.
337 to redeem subject properties.

________________

8 Ibid., pp. 93-95.

552

552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Petitioner theorizes that it invoked its “right” in “timely fashion,”

that is, after confirmation by the court of the foreclosure sale, and
within one (1) year from the date of registration of the certificate of
sale. Indeed, the facts show that it was only on May 2, 1995 when,
in opposition to the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession, did
petitioner file a Motion to Compel Private Respondent to Accept
Redemption, invoking for the very first time its alleged right to
redeem subject properties under to Section 78 of R.A. No. 337.
In light of the aforestated facts, it was too late in the day for
petitioner to invoke a right to redeem under Section 78 of R.A. No.
337. Petitioner failed to assert a right to redeem in several crucial
stages of the proceedings.
For instance, on September 7, 1994, when it filed with the trial
court an Ex-parte Motion for Clarification, petitioner failed to allege
and prove that private respondent’s predecessor in interest was a
credit institution and therefore, Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 was
applicable. Petitioner merely asked the trial court to clarify whether
the sale of subject properties was execution sale or judicial
foreclosure sale.
So also, when it presented before the trial court an Exception to
the Order and Motion to Set Aside Said Order dated October 13,
1994, petitioner again was silent on its alleged right under Section
78 of R.A. No. 337, even as it failed to show that private
respondent’s predecessor in interest is a credit institution. Petitioner
just argued that the aforementioned Order materially altered the trial
court’s Decision of April 30, 1992.
Then, too, nothing was heard from petitioner on its alleged right
under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 and of the predecessor in interest
of private respondent as a credit institution, when the trial court
came out with an order on February 10, 1995, confirming the sale of
subject properties in favor of private respondent and declaring that
all pending incidents with respect to the Order dated September 26,
1994 had become moot and academic.
Similarly, when petitioner filed on February 27, 1995 a Motion
for Clarification with the Court of Appeals, seeking “clarification” of
the date of commencement of the one (1) year redemption period

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Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

for the subject properties, petitioner never intimated any alleged

right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 nor did it invite attention to
its present stance that private respondent’s predecessor-in-interest
was a credit institution. Consequently, in its Resolution dated March
20, 1995, the Court of Appeals ruled on the said motion thus:

“But we never made any pronouncement on the one-year right of

redemption of petitioner because, in the first place, the foreclosure in this
case is judicial, and as such, the mortgagor has only the equity, not the right
of redemption x x x. While it may be true that under Section 78 of R.A. 337
as amended, otherwise known as the General Banking Act, a mortgagor of a
bank, banking or credit institution, whether the foreclosure was done
judicially or extrajudicially, has a period of one year from the auction sale
within which to redeem the foreclosed property, the question of whether the
Syndicated Management Group, Inc., is bank or credit institution was never
brought before us squarely, and it is indeed odd and strange that petitioner
would now sarcastically ask a rhetorical question in its motion for
9
clarification.” (Italics supplied).

If petitioner were really acting in good faith, it would have

ventilated before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 35086 its
alleged right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337; but petitioner never
did do so.
Indeed, at the earliest opportunity, when it submitted its answer
to the complaint for judicial foreclosure, petitioner should have
alleged that it was entitled to the beneficial provisions of Section 78
of R.A. No. 337 but again, it did not make any allegation in its
answer regarding any right thereunder. It bears stressing that the
applicability of Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 hinges on the factual
question of whether or not private respondent’s predecessor in
interest was a credit institution. As was held in Limpin, a judicial
foreclosure sale, “when confirmed by an order of the court, x x shall
operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest
their rights in the purchaser,
10
subject to such rights of redemption as
may be allowed by law,” which confer on the mortgagor,

________________

9 Rollo, pp. 366-367.

10 Limpin vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, p. 94.

554

554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

his successors in interest or any judgment creditor of the mortgagor,

the right to redeem the property sold on foreclosure after
confirmation by the court of the judicial foreclosure sale. Thus, the
claim that petitioner is entitled to the beneficial provisions of Section
78 of R.A. No. 337—since private respondent’s predecessor-
ininterest is a credit institution—is in the nature of a compulsory
counterclaim which should have been averred in petitioner’s answer
to the complaint for judicial foreclosure.
“x x x A counterclaim is, most broadly, a cause of action existing in favor of
the defendant against the plaintiff. More narrowly, it is a claim which, if
established, will defeat or in some way qualify a judgment or relief to which
plaintiff is otherwise entitled. It is sometimes defined as any cause of action
arising in contract available against any action also arising in contract and
existing at the time of the commencement of such an action. It is frequently
defined by the codes as a cause of action arising out of the contract or
transaction set forth in the complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff’s
11
claim, or connected with the subject of the action.” (italics supplied)
“The counterclaim is in itself a distinct and independent cause of action,
so that when properly stated as such, the defendant becomes, in respect to
the matters stated by him, an actor, and there are two simultaneous actions
pending between the same parties, wherein each is at the same time both a
plaintiff and a defendant. Counterclaim is an offensive as well as a
defensive plea and is not necessarily confined to the justice of the plaintiff’s
claim. It represents the right of the defendant to have the claims of the
parties counterbalanced in whole or in part, and judgment to be entered in
excess, if any. A counterclaim stands on the same footing, and is to be tested
12
by the same rules, as if it were an independent action.” (italics supplied)

The very purpose of a counterclaim would have been served had

petitioner alleged in its answer its purported right under Section 78
of R.A. No. 337:

“x x x The rules of counterclaim are designed to enable the disposition of a

whole controversy of interested parties’ conflicting claims, at one

________________

11 The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Volume I, Francisco, Vicente J., p. 462
citing: 47 Am. Jur. 709-710.
12 Ibid., p. 464 citing: 47 Am. Jur. 717.

555

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Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

time and in one action, provided all parties be brought before the court and
13
the matter decided without prejudicing the rights of any party.”

The failure of petitioner to seasonably assert its alleged right under

Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 precludes it from so doing at this late
stage of the case. Estoppel may be successfully invoked if the party 14
fails to raise the question in the early stages of the proceedings.
Thus, “a party to a case who failed to invoke his claim in the main
case, while having the opportunity to do so, will be precluded,
subsequently, from invoking his claim, even if it were true, after the
decision has become final, otherwise the judgment may be reduced
to a mockery15
and the administration of justice may be placed in
disrepute.”
All things viewed in proper perspective, it is decisively clear that
the trial court erred in still allowing petitioner to introduce evidence
that private respondent’s predecessor-in-interest was a credit
institution, and to thereafter rule that the petitioner was entitled to
avail of the provisions of Section 78 of R.A. No. 337. In effect, the
trial court permitted the petitioner to accomplish what the latter
failed to do before the Court of Appeals, that is, to invoke its alleged
right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 although the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 35086 already found that “the question of
whether the Syndicated Management Council Group, Inc. is a bank
or credit institution was never brought before (the Court of Appeals)
squarely.” The said pronouncement by the Court of Appeals
unerringly signified that petitioner did not make a timely assertion of
any right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 in all the stages of the
proceedings below.
Verily, the petitioner has only itself to blame for not alleging at
the outset that the predecessor-in-interest of the private respondent is
a credit institution. Thus, when the trial court, and the Court of
Appeals repeatedly passed upon the issue of whether or

________________

13 Ibid., p. 463 citing: Kuenzel vs. Universal Carloading and Distributing Co.,
(1939) 29 F. Supp. 407.
14 Corona vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 378, 392.
15 Applications of Estoppel in Litigation, 216 SCRA 826, 834 citing: Tuazon vs.
Arca, 23 SCRA 1308, 1312.

556

556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

not petitioner had the right of redemption or equity of redemption

over subject properties in the decisions, resolutions and orders,
particularly in Civil Case No. 89-5424, CA-G.R. CV No. 39243,
CAG.R. SP No. 35086, and CA-G.R. SP No. 38747, it was
unmistakable that the petitioner was adjudged to just have the equity
of redemption without any qualification whatsoever, that is, without
any right of redemption allowed by law.

The “law of the case” holds that petitioner has the equity of redemption
without any qualification.

There is, therefore, merit in private respondent’s contention that to

allow petitioner to belatedly invoke its right under Section 78 of
R.A. No. 337 will disturb the “law of the case.” However, private
respondent’s statement of what constitutes the “law of the case” is
not entirely accurate. The “law of the case” is not simply that the
defendant possesses an equity of redemption. As the Court has
stated, the “law of the case” holds that petitioner has the equity of
the redemption without any qualification whatsoever, that is, without
the right of redemption afforded by Section 78 of R.A. No. 337.
Whether or not the “law of the case” is erroneous is immaterial, it
still remains the “law of the case.” A contrary rule will contradict
both the letter and spirit of the rulings of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 35086, CA-G.R. CV No. 39243, and CAG.R.
38747, which clearly saw through the repeated attempts of petitioner
to forestall so simple a matter as making the security given for a just
debt to answer for its payment.
Hence, in conformity with the ruling in Limpin, the sale of the
subject properties, as confirmed by the Order dated February 10,
1995 of the trial court in Civil Case No. 89-5424 operated to divest
the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in
private respondent. There then existed only what is known as the
equity of redemption, which is simply the right of the petitioner to
extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by
paying the secured debt within the 90-day period after the judgment
became final. There being an explicit finding on the part of the Court
of Appeals in its Decision of September 30, 1994 in CAG.R. No.
35086—that the herein petitioner failed to exercise its equity of
redemption within the prescribed period, redemption can

557

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Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

no longer be effected. The confirmation of the sale and the issuance

of the transfer certificates of title covering the subject properties to
private respondent was then, in order. The trial court therefore, has
the ministerial duty to place private respondent in the possession of
subject properties.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals, declaring null and void the Order
dated 21 July 1995 and Order dated 4 September 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Civil Case No. 89-5424,
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

     Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban and Gonzaga-Reyes,

JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment affirmed.

 Notes.—A mortgagee who exercises the power of sale contained
in a mortgage is considered a custodian of the fund, and, being
bound to apply it properly, is liable to the persons entitled thereto if
he fails to do so—as far as concerns the unconsumed balance, the
mortgagee is deemed a trustee for the mortgagor or owner of the
equity of redemption. (Sulit vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 441
[1997])
The issuance of a writ of possession is not a judgment on the
merits, and the issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an
extra-judicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial function. (A.G.
Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 155
[1997])
The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an
extrajudicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial function—the Court
neither exercises its official discretion nor judgment. (Suico
Industrial Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 212 [1999])

——o0o——

558

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