Ben Bass at 2015
Ben Bass at 2015
Ben Bass at 2015
Abstract
This article analyses the historical and cartographical understanding of the creation of the border between Egypt and Ottoman Palestine e Israel’s current
southern border e by examining Ottoman maps from the period between the mid nineteenth century and World War I. These maps deal with different
stages of the border’s definition and demarcation, and shed light on the Ottoman view of the region and its borders, which differs considerably from the
more widely known British perspective. Most of these maps were not produced to deal directly with the issue of the border, but when embedded within
the broader Ottoman cartographic and geopolitical framework, provide crucial information which allows us to trace the process of border definition.
Ó 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
The aim of this article is to amend the historical and cartographic pressure from the European colonial powers throughout the
understanding of the setting of the border between British- nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The maps, moreover,
controlled Egypt and Ottoman Palestine in 1906, which later reveal differences in the ‘cartographic cultures’ between the Eu-
became the border between Israel and Egypt. It does so by pre- ropeans, in this case the British who ruled Egypt, and the Ottomans.
senting eight Ottoman maps recently located at the Turkish Prime Modern Ottoman cartography was virtually non-existent before the
Minister’s Ottoman Archive in Istanbul (the Başbakanlık Osmanlı turn of the twentieth century, which helps explain the state of
Arşivi, henceforth BOA). These maps, some of which were official Ottoman cartography in the Sinai desert before that time. Unlike
and others not, help trace the process of defining this border and efforts by Western cartographers at the time to produce profes-
shed light on the Ottoman viewpoint on its creation. This viewpoint sionally accurate maps reflecting the physical characteristics of a
has largely been ignored by researchers and is much less well- given territory as well as human activity there, Ottoman cartogra-
known than the British perspective. The maps in the set dis- phers were for the most part mainly interested in producing
cussed here were mainly produced prior to 1906 and deal with the schematic maps that only represented certain features such as
internal administrative borders between the Ottoman provinces of prominent natural characteristics, major settlement localities,
Egypt, the Hijjaz and Syria (the southern part of which became the infrastructure, roads and railroads, and administrative borders. The
Province of Jerusalem in 1872). These internal administrative bor- first major surveying project in the Empire that included tri-
ders later influenced the creation of the border between British- angulations and careful modern map making took place only in the
held Egypt and Palestine under Ottoman rule. 1910s.1 At that time the Young Turk regime, which took over the
The Ottoman maps presented in this article confirm that this Empire in 1908, commissioned the Ottoman army’s mapping
Empire had relatively few reliable maps on which to base its department to systematically map the Empire’s territories, starting
geopolitical and territorial claims as it came under increasing with its core regions.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: [email protected], [email protected].
1
See Harita Genel Müdürlügü, Haritacı Mehmet Şevki Paşa ve Türk Haritacılık Tarihi [Mehmet Sevki Pasha the Cartographer and History of Turkish Cartography],
Ankara 1980.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhg.2015.04.022
0305-7488/Ó 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
26 Y. Ben-Bassat, Y. Ben-Artzi / Journal of Historical Geography 50 (2015) 25e36
Prior to this date, Ottoman maps were not drawn by profes- particularly since it became an international problem during the
sional cartographers using modern mapping techniques. These peace negotiations between Israel and Egypt at the end of the 1970s.6
maps could not have been used for definitively marking boundaries At that time, these two states were engaged in a tense standoff over
as they were too general and imprecise.2 Nonetheless they still the demarcation of several specific points along their future border,
represent Ottoman approaches to the issue of the Empire’s borders most notably the shoreline of Taba on the Red Sea, some 12 km south
e as vague as this concept was given that the Empire’s borders were of the Israeli port town of Eilat, a dispute which was eventually
not themselves precisely fixed. Thus, even though some of the resolved by international arbitration between the two sides in 1986.7
maps discussed here were obviously not official documents, they Historically, Ras Taba shore was the southernmost point held by
reveal a great deal about the Ottoman perception of political space. the Ottomans on the Red Sea shores of Sinai after their 1906 agree-
Moreover, during the rule of Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876e1909), ment with Britain to mark the border between Egypt and Palestine,
maps were used frequently by the Ottomans for ideological pur- which was reached under heavy British pressure and following skir-
poses. During this sultan’s rule, maps were produced for the first mishes between British/Egyptian and Ottoman forces earlier that
time to show the borders of the whole Empire e which extended year. For the Ottomans it was a key strategic point that they insisted on
over parts of three continents e to be used in classrooms and maintaining sovereignty over given its vantage point close to the head
elsewhere.3 These official maps often ignored changes in the actual of the Gulf of ʿAqaba and their interests in keeping ʿAqaba and the
borders of the Empire and continued to treat territories lost in entire head of the Gulf beyond the reach of British cannons. The town
previous years, including the Sinai desert, as though they were still of ʿAqaba was not only an important strategic garrison but was also
under Ottoman rule.4 This ideological choice was part of an effort to located on a historical pilgrimage route from Egypt to the holy Islamic
create a shared national agenda among Ottoman subjects at a time cities in the Hijjaz. The British, for their part, wanted to keep the
when the Empire was rapidly losing many of its territories, and to Ottomans as far as possible from the Suez Canal, while leaving no
project an image of unity under Ottoman rule. doubt about British sovereignty over the Sinai desert, and eliminating
After 1882, when the British occupied Egypt, and up to WWI, the the last Ottoman presence on the western shores of the Gulf of ʿAqaba
importance of the border region between Ottoman Palestine and Sinai (see Fig. 1).
increased considerably. Not surprisingly, as a result, at the turn of the By contrast, the Ottoman approach to Sinai was based on the
century there was extensive Ottoman investment in the southern part line defined in the 1841 Inheritance Firman granted by Abdülmecid
of Palestine (which was included in the District of Jerusalem), whose (r. 1839e1861), the Ottoman sultan at the time, to the governor of
strategic importance vis-à-vis the frontier with Sinai was growing. This Egypt, Muhammad ʿAli (r. 1805e1848). In the 1830s, Egyptian
included the establishment of Beersheba in the early twentieth cen- troops led by Muhammad ʿAli’s son Ibrahim had stormed the Levant
tury as an administrative centre around which the Bedouin tribes were and reached central Anatolia, thus threatening the very existence of
to be settled; the founding of the border town of ʿAwja al-Hafir and the the Ottoman Empire. In 1840e1841, following European and above
new administrative sub-district of al-Hafir near the border between all British intervention, the crisis was resolved and Muhammad
the Negev and Sinai deserts; investment in infrastructure (telegraph ʿAli’s army withdrew back to Egypt. In return, on February 13, 1841
lines, bridges, roads and railroads); and a reorganization of the region’s (and again on June 1 of the same year) he was granted an imperial
administrative units along with efforts to register tribal land. Ottoman decree (the Inheritance Firman) which authorized him
Despite these strategic considerations, and actual steps taken on and his descendants to rule Egypt on behalf of the Ottomans.
the ground, the Ottoman Empire was ill-prepared for the tough As of 1892, however, Evelin Bering, the British Consul in Egypt
negotiations with the British in 1906 over the demarcation of the who later became Lord Cromer, made efforts to discredit the fact
230 km-long border between Sinai and Palestine. They had no that from 1841 on, when the Inheritance Firman was issued, the
adequate cartographic information on this region, and during the eastern border of Egypt stretched from Rafah on the Mediterranean
negotiations they had to rely on British maps to which annotations shore directly to Suez, leaving almost all of Sinai in Ottoman hands.
in Ottoman Turkish were added. Although it is speculative to as- Instead he promoted a line which went from ʿAqaba at the head of
sume that better maps would have helped the Ottomans withstand the Gulf of ʿAqaba in the Red Sea to Rafah and worked to gain the
British pressure, at least tactically it could perhaps have improved British full control over Sinai (see Fig. 1).
their position when delineating the final border by insisting on the The Red Sea shores of the Hijjaz up to ʿAqaba were of lesser
inclusion of important water sources and strategic points near the importance to the British at that time. Direct steamboats carrying
border within their territory.5 pilgrims from the port town of Suez to Jedda had minimized the need
to keep fortresses along the Red Sea in this region to protect the
Politics, maps and the Sinai-Palestine border pilgrimage land routes. Thus, the fortresses built there by Egyptian
forces in the preceding decades were evacuated in the 1890s, and the
The history of the border between Ottoman Palestine and the Sinai region, including ʿAqaba, was once more subordinated to the
Peninsula has attracted the attention of several previous researchers, Ottoman administration in the Hijjaz. Nevertheless, the Sinai
2
For more on Ottoman mapping in the pre-modern era, see P. Emiraliog lu, Geographical Knowledge and Imperial Culture in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire, Burlington,
VT 2014.
3
B. Fortna, Imperial Classroom: Islam, Education and the State in Late Ottoman Empire, Oxford 2002, 186e191.
4
Fortna, Imperial Classroom (note 3), 198e199; B. Fortna, Remapping Ottoman Muslim identity in the Hamidian era: the role of cartographic artifacts, Yearbook of the
Sociology of Islam 3 (2000) 45e56; B. Fortna, Change in the school maps of the late Ottoman Empire, Imago Mundi: The International Journal for the History of Cartography 5
(2004) 29e30.
5
See M. Brawer, Israel’s Boundaries, Tel-Aviv 1988, 74.
6
For instance, see N. Kadmon, Delineation of the international boundary between Israel and Egypt in the Taba area: a cartographic evaluation, Studies in the Geography of
Israel 14 (1994) 50e70 which is a study of the demarcation of the Israeli-Egyptian border between 1906 and 1982 based on 107 maps in which there were divergences from
the 1949 armistice line between Israel and Egypt; Brawer, Israel’s Boundaries (note 5); G. Biger, Land of Many Boundaries: The First Hundred Years of the Delimitation of the New
Boundaries of Palestine-Eretz Israel 1840e1947, Sde Boker, 2001 [in Hebrew]; H. Srebro, International boundary making, FIG Report 59 (2013) which is a theoretical and
methodological article about the delineation of international borders in which the 1906 border is used to illustrate the problems involved in setting international borders, the
technical skills required, how to measure points along the border and how to mark them on the ground.
7
Reports of international arbitral awards: case concerning the location of boundary markers in Taba between Egypt and Israel, 29 September 1988, Vol. XX (2006) 1e118.
Y. Ben-Bassat, Y. Ben-Artzi / Journal of Historical Geography 50 (2015) 25e36 27
Peninsula in general, and Qalaʿt al-Nakhl in its centre on the land road Sinai in an unusual way, thus leaving more territory in Ottoman
from Suez to ʿAqaba, in particular, became vital for the protection of hands than was eventually agreed upon by both sides. Another
the Suez Canal. These strategic considerations increased in impor- interesting line on this map goes from Rafah to the southern part of
tance after 1899 when the Ottomans founded the town of Beersheba the Dead Sea. This is the line suggested by Jennings Bramly at the
in southern Palestine, and commenced operations to strengthen beginning of the negotiations between the British and the Otto-
their sovereignty among the Bedouin tribes in the region. In addition, mans, when he was sent to Mrashash (more commonly known as
in 1904 the Hijjaz railway stretching from Damascus to Medina Umm Rashrash, today Eilat). Such a line, if adopted, would have
reached Maʿan in southern Transjordan, not very far from ʿAqaba. The given the British control not only of the Sinai desert but also of large
British authorities in Egypt observed these developments with much parts of Palestine (see Fig. 1).
concern. Eventually, the Ottoman initiatives as well as the increasing The second map in Rushdi Pasha’s booklet is called ‘ʿAqaba and
importance of the canal led to a clash between the British and the its Environs’, and is at a scale of 1:100,000. It shows the head of the
Ottomans in 1906 over the issue of the border of Sinai with Palestine Gulf of ʿAqaba and the border region between Egypt and Palestine
and resulted in a stern British demand to draw the border on a which Rushdi Pasha calls ‘the line of separation’. Notably, the line
straight line from Rafah to the Gulf of ʿAqaba.8 this officer marked does not coincide in several places with the
The contemporary maps of the Sinai-Palestine border that re- border eventually agreed upon in the negotiations between the
searchers have used are, for the most part, at a very small scale British and the Ottomans in 1906.
which makes it impossible to examine details or identify important Another Ottoman source used by researchers is a map of the
geographical data.9 Even more crucially, most research on the Inheritance Firman which was first published by the Israeli geog-
setting of this border has been based on Western, and primarily rapher Gideon Biger.13 The firman was accompanied by a general
British, sources. For instance, several major studies deal with a map delineating the borders of the newly created Ottoman Egypt
detailed survey conducted by Jennings Bramly, the governor (from under the House of Muhammad ʿAli, which was sent to Egypt but
1904) of the area under Egyptian control in the Sinai Peninsula (the was then lost for many years.14 In the text of the firman itself,
triangle between Suez, al-ʿArish and Port Saʿid, see Fig. 1). Bramly however, there is no written description of the borders of the
surveyed eastern Sinai to map the spread of Bedouin tribes in this Province of Egypt. The Egyptian authorities apparently knew where
region, water sources and other points of interest.10 His work was the borders of their province were situated, but did not possess the
part of the British preparations to enhance their control of the Sinai original map. A map depicting the official borders of Egypt ac-
desert, which they saw as a critical buffer zone between the Suez cording to the 1841 Inheritance Firman was only published by the
Canal and the Ottoman Empire to the north. The British efforts British in 1926, after a border crisis between Egypt and Libya
reached their peak in 1906 when the new border, favourable to prompted by the Italian occupation. The British ambassador to
British interests, was forced on the Ottomans. There are also studies Turkey is said to have found the original map in the Turkish Prime
based on Bramly’s diaries in which he recorded the events leading Minister’s Archive in Istanbul. The Turkish authorities then pre-
to 1906, as well as later interviews with him.11 pared a reliable copy for the British which has Ottoman notes in the
By contrast, there are very few studies of the Sinai-Palestine margins. Biger found this copy in the British archives.15
border based on Ottoman sources. One such source that has been The discussion above shows that the strategic importance of the
cited in several studies is a booklet called The ʿAqaba Question Sinai region grew tremendously at the end of the nineteenth cen-
(ʿAqaba meselesi), published by Rushdi Pasha, the Ottoman officer tury. Located between British-controlled Egypt and Ottoman
who headed the garrison in ʿAqaba and played a major role in the Palestine, this border region became the focus of British interests
skirmishes with the British in the region in 1906. Rushdi Pasha’s and they made concerted efforts to take it from the Ottomans.
booklet was published in Istanbul in 1908, some two years after the Research thus far on the border that resulted has almost completely
events took place, and includes two maps.12 The first is titled ‘A been based on British sources. Rarely have Ottoman sources been
map of the Sinai Peninsula’, in which the line of the Inheritance used to explain the conflict and as a result the Ottoman conception
Firman from 1841 is marked as going from Suez to some point on of this border has been ignored. Based on Ottoman maps, our
the coastal plain of the Mediterranean Sea close to modern-day research demonstrates how the Ottomans perceived the border
Rafah. This obviously places the Sinai out of Muhammad ʿAli’s dispute and the border region in ways that significantly differed
reach, a point we discuss in detail below. from the British. In particular, the Ottomans continued to base their
The 1906 line from Rafah to Taba, which eventually became the considerations on the 1841 Inheritance Firman, which leftmost of
basis for the border between Egypt and Palestine, is also marked on Sinai under their sovereignty. They thus perceived the 1906 line as
Rushdi Pasha’s map, although in one region it goes deep into the a line that was forced upon them and found it hard to accept as the
8
Biger, Land of Many Boundaries (note 6), 35e39.
9
For instance, see International boundary study IsraeleEgypt (United Arab Republic) boundary, US Department of State 46 (1965) which includes a 1:125,000 scale map
produced by the British War Ministry, a map made in 1950, as well as newer maps, mostly by the Israel Defense Forces [IDF] Survey Department and the Survey of Israel.
10
For instance, see M. Brawer, Geographic elements in the formation of the Egyptian Palestinian boundary, Studies in the Geography of Israel 7 (1970) 125e137 [in Hebrew]
which is based on a survey conducted by Jennings Bramly. The map that accompanies the article is a compilation of lines taken from British maps and others which are not
included in the article; M. Brawer, The international boundaries of the Negev, in: A. Shmueli and Y. Grados (Eds), The Land of the Negev: Man and Desert, Part I, Tel-Aviv, 1979,
368e379 [in Hebrew].
11
M. Brawer, The international boundaries of the Negev (note 10), is based on the diaries of Jennings Bramly. The map accompanying the article is based on a compilation of
several lines from British maps; M. Brawer, Israel’s Boundaries (note 5), the main sources for which are also Western, and mainly British, including notes by Bramly whom
Brawer met personally dozens of years after the events took place. Brawer presents a schematic map that was prepared for the book as well as two historical maps: one taken
from the report prepared by the British-Egyptian delegation in 1907, after it returned from its mission to mark the border, and the second by the Ottoman officer Rushdi
Pasha taken from his documentation.
12
Rushdi [Pasha], ʿAqaba meselesi, Dersaʿadet [Istanbul], 1326 [1908]; see also U. Heyd, The Gulf of Elath crisis of 1906, The Israel Exploration Society (1963) 194e206 which
describes the Ottoman perspective on the ʿAqaba incident in 1906 and the way the border was set, including references to material by Rushdi Pasha.
13
G. Biger, Mohammed Ali’s firman and the map of 1841, Middle Eastern Studies 14 (1978) 323e325.
14
Biger, Mohammed Ali’s firman (note 13) 323.
15
Biger, Land of Many Boundaries (note 6), 39e40 refers to the map produced by the joint Egyptian/British and Ottoman delegation to mark the Sinai-Palestine border.
Y. Ben-Bassat, Y. Ben-Artzi / Journal of Historical Geography 50 (2015) 25e36 29
border. During the negotiations they made reference to other po- Ottoman Palestine in the Province of Acre. Had Muhammad ʿAli
tential borders which were all more convenient for them than the accepted this offer, these territories would have been administered
Taba-Rafah line suggested by the British (such as the border of the by the Egyptian ruler but under Ottoman sovereignty.18
Province of Jerusalem). The British, however, had the upper hand in Even though the Ottomans acknowledged only the line drawn
this affair and their suggested border was accepted, as we know in the Inheritance Firman of 1841 as the northeastern border of
from plenty of British sources. the Province of Egypt, and saw the bulk of the Sinai desert as a
region under their full control, two maps illustrate the problem-
atic nature of their actual sovereignty on the ground in all or parts
Ottoman maps of the Sinai-Palestine border of the Sinai desert. One of the maps, from the end of the nine-
teenth century, depicts what are called ‘foolish Egyptian attempts
Eight Ottoman maps of the border area have been located in the to establish fortifications along the Red Sea shores’, and the Sinai
Ottoman archives in Istanbul. They are in the digitized map is labeled as under Egyptian control.19 Interestingly, the same map
collection which is gradually being opened to researchers (marked designates areas in Arabia which were previously under Ottoman
in the Ottoman archive as Haritalar). The maps are for the most part rule as ‘areas taken from the justice-pursuing Ottoman Empire.’ In
written in Ottoman Turkish, although at times they are bilingual addition, in Fig. 2 ʿAqaba is called ‘Egyptian ʿAqaba,’ another
and are in Arabic or Ottoman Turkish along with English. In one indication of the de-facto recognition of the Egyptian presence in
case the map is in German. It should be noted that since no cor- this region. On this official map the line of the Inheritance Firman
respondence accompanies the maps it is at times hard to determine of 1841 does not appear at all. Thus, instead of drawing the border
the exact context in which they were produced, or even to date of the Province of Egypt from Suez to al-ʿArish on the Mediter-
them. Some of them seem to be part of different map series of ranean and leaving control over the Sinai in Ottoman hands, in
which we do not possess other elements, but these may be found in this map the Sinai Peninsula (other than the triangle which be-
the future. It is evident that some of the maps were not originally longs to the Province of Syria and extends to Qalʿat al-Nakhl) is
designed to deal with borders or administrative matters, but that included within the borders of the Province of Egypt. Ignoring the
borders were subsequently drawn onto them. Here we present the lines of the Inheritance Firman of 1841 may thus reflect the situ-
content of all eight maps, but concentrate on the four most ation on the ground in Sinai as it developed after 1841. This was
important ones (see Figs. 2e5 and the appendix). de-facto control by the Egyptian house of Muhammad ʿAli over the
These maps clearly indicate that as far as the Ottoman Empire Sinai, Egyptian guarding of the pilgrimage route through this
was concerned the northeastern border of the Province of Egypt desert, and even a permanent Egyptian presence in ʿAqaba in the
was the line defined in the Inheritance Firman of 1841, according to Province of Hijjaz. Officially, Egyptian forces were only allowed by
which Muhammad ʿAli and his descendants were to continue ruling the Ottomans to enter the Sinai to secure the Hajj caravans.20 A
Egypt under formal Ottoman sovereignty. Everything in the Sinai problem arose when the Egyptian forces tried to establish them-
beyond this line was still perceived in Ottoman eyes as Ottoman selves there permanently and even crossed to the Hijjaz. No
territory. On most maps the administrative borderline of the wonder that on the map in Fig. 3, which shows the proposals for
Province of Egypt went from al-ʿArish to Suez (see Fig. 1).16 borders between British-ruled Egypt and Ottoman Palestine
Some Ottoman maps from the mid-nineteenth century, before around 1906, the Ottomans insisted on an annotation on the map
the British occupation of Egypt, mark the Sinai as belonging to the that the Sinai had only been given to the khedivate of Egypt as a
Province of Hijjaz, which also included the southern part of Ottoman temporary holding and not as a legitimate permanent possession.
Palestine up to a line between the Dead Sea and Rafah, including Thus, again, as far as the Ottomans were concerned, when they
access to the Mediterranean Sea (see Fig. 1).17 Later maps include negotiated the border with the British in 1906, the Sinai fully
parts of Sinai in the Province of Syria (see Fig. 2) or the Province of belonged to them.
Jerusalem. The map in Fig. 3, for instance, while indicating the Another key aspect of these Ottoman maps is that the southern
British/Egyptian demands in the negotiations in 1906, shows that border of Ottoman Palestine varies considerably from map to map:
the Ottomans adhered to the Inheritance Firman which left Sinai in from Gaza to the Dead Sea, al-ʿArish to the central Negev and from
their hands. In addition, as another way to oppose the ʿAqaba to there to the Dead Sea, Rafah to the Central Negev and from there to
Rafah line proposed by the British they clearly emphasized the the Southern Dead Sea, Khan-Yunes to Qalʿat al-Nakhl in central
administrative borders of the Province of Jerusalem as including Sinai and from there to the ʿArava valley (see Fig. 2), or even Rafah
large segments of central Sinai. The southern border of this province to the 1841 Inheritance Firman line and from there towards the Gulf
is marked in a yellow dashed line going from Rafah to central Sinai of ʿAqaba (see Fig. 3).21 One map that deals with the changing
(where it almost meets the Inheritance Firman line) and from there borders of Egypt in the nineteenth century reflects a proposal that
to Taba (see Fig. 3). Another map in the set which deals with the never materialized, and shows the Sinai and Ottoman Palestine as a
changing borders of Egypt shows that a short-lived offer by the single entity.22
European Empires and the Ottomans to Muhammad ʿAli to solve the Nevertheless, out of all these borders e which together illustrate
Egyptian crisis during the London Conference in July 1840 e a the fluidity of the Ottoman understanding of what a ‘border’ might
proposal that he rejected out of hand e was to include the Sinai and
16
For instance, see BOA, HRT 147, a map of the Levant and Egypt, circa 1897, presenting the regions of the Arabian Peninsula, Tur Sina [Sinai] and the Hijjaz, where ‘the
Egyptians made foolish attempts to build fortifications in the Gulf of Sharem [Ras Nazrani] on the shores of the Red Sea upon the death of Ibn al-Rashid’.
17
For instance, see BOA HRT 0150, an Ottoman demarcation of the administrative borders of the Provinces of Damascus, Egypt and the Hijjaz on a German map from 1835 of
the Nile Valley, Arabia and the eastern shores of Africa, based on work by the zoologists L.G. Ehrenberg and E. Rüppell who explored Ethiopia and the Red Sea shores, and the
travels of Carsten Niebuhr.
18
BOA HRT 0656, a map dated hijjri year 1335 [1917] showing the changes to the borders of Ottoman Egypt during the nineteenth century.
19
BOA HRT 0147.
20
Brawer, Israel’s Boundaries (note 5), 61.
21
For the first three examples, see BOA HRT 0150, 0520 which shows the southern border of Ottoman Palestine with Egypt as it appears on a map of the Province of Sayda
in the year 1265 hijjri [1849], and 0147.
22
BOA HRT 0656.
30 Y. Ben-Bassat, Y. Ben-Artzi / Journal of Historical Geography 50 (2015) 25e36
Fig. 2. The Border of Ottoman Palestine and Egypt on a map from the year 1299 of the Mali Calendar [1884]. Source: BOA. HRT. 0655
be e there is no line that resembles the one that was eventually representatives suggested a line that penetrated deep into the Sinai
drawn in 1906 during the negotiations with the British. For the and left part of the peninsula, particularly the important water
Ottomans, this was a line with no historical precedent that the sources along the Rafah to ʿAqaba route, including the road itself, in
British were forcing them to accept. As a result, there were differ- Ottoman hands (see Fig. 3). This line was already a concession from
ences of opinion between the two sides during the negotiations the Ottoman standpoint since it was far removed from the border of
concerning the demarcation of the actual border. The Ottoman the District of Jerusalem as the Ottomans had drawn it (see Figs. 2
Y. Ben-Bassat, Y. Ben-Artzi / Journal of Historical Geography 50 (2015) 25e36 31
Fig. 3. The Border region between Ottoman Palestine and Egypt in 1906. Source: BOA. HRT. 0660
32 Y. Ben-Bassat, Y. Ben-Artzi / Journal of Historical Geography 50 (2015) 25e36
Fig. 4. Part of a series of five blueprint maps depicting the border region between Ottoman Palestine and Egypt dated 1906. Source: BOA. HRT. 0612
and 3), not to mention the line of the Inheritance Firman, which English that covers the entire Sinai-Palestine border from ʿAqaba to
was their starting point. The Egyptian officials, who in fact worked Rafah, is the best testimony to the Ottoman difficulty in producing
for the British, suggested a line that was very similar to what was reliable maps of the border region. The handwritten notes in
eventually decided upon in 1906 (see Fig. 3). Another map shows Ottoman Turkish on the original English/Arabic map suggest that
that there were at least three lines that the parties were consid- this was probably a working draft that the Ottoman side used during
ering (see Fig. 4): the line suggested by the Ottomans which left meetings of the joint BritisheOttoman delegation which worked for
parts of the Sinai in their hands; the line suggested by the Egyptian forty days in the border region itself in the summer of 1906, after the
officials; and a different adjusted line also proposed by the Egyp- political decision about the borderline had already been made,
tians. Hence there was bargaining between the sides, and the line marking the line on the ground with wooden poles that were later
that was eventually approved did not match any of the proposals, replaced by piles of stones.24 These five maps provide the best and
although it was much closer to the Egyptian/British position than most accurate geographical description of the border region from
the Ottoman one. this period available today. They demonstrate how the Ottoman
Overall, the maps confirm the view from the literature that when conception of the status of the Sinai as still being part of their im-
the British and the Ottomans wanted to delineate the border be- perial domains differed from the British one during the negotiations
tween the Sinai and Ottoman Palestine, the Ottoman side found it in 1906. Hence, despite discussing the new Rafah to ʿAqaba (in fact
very hard to produce reliable maps of the region and lacked reliable Taba) border suggested by the British, as marked on the map, the
information about the border region, except for the crucial and well- Ottoman officials still made reference to several other lines which
studied head of the Gulf of ʿAqaba.23 The map in Fig. 4, an official were all more convenient for them. The latter included the border of
Ottoman map which is one of a series of five written in Arabic and the Province of Jerusalem which went deep into Sinai, the line where
23
See the map in Rushdi [Pasha], ʿAqaba meselesi (note 12); see also Fig. 5.
24
Rushdi [Pasha], ʿAqaba meselesi (note 12), 69e72.
Y. Ben-Bassat, Y. Ben-Artzi / Journal of Historical Geography 50 (2015) 25e36 33
Fig. 5. The head of the Gulf of ʿAqaba and the border between Ottoman Palestine and Egypt. Source: BOA. HRT. 0611
34 Y. Ben-Bassat, Y. Ben-Artzi / Journal of Historical Geography 50 (2015) 25e36
the Ottoman officials wanted to place the border during its marking, assume that better Ottoman cartographic abilities would have led
and the line initially proposed by the Egyptians (see details of Fig. 4 to a different final outcome. What they do clearly show is the scale
in the Appendix). The fact that the Ottomans had to use this map of the Ottoman defeat given what they understood as their sover-
shows once more that they lacked credible, reliable maps of their eignty in the Sinai.
own of this region at the time. Concomitantly, it shows that they did More generally, the Ottoman maps presented here indicate the
not hesitate to use European maps for their purposes, when this extent to which the issue of borders in the Ottoman Empire at the
served their interests. The literature amply illustrates this charac- time was fluid and not fixed. There was no official, definitive and
teristic of Ottoman cartography from its very early stages; namely, exact map that marked the border of Egypt and Palestine. The
the ability (and need) to borrow mapping techniques and knowl- Ottomans apparently refused to acknowledge developments taking
edge from other cultures.25 place on the ground and kept on treating territories long under
Detailed Ottoman maps of the border region were probably only foreign control as though they were still parts of their domain.27 This
produced after the final border was set, as shown in Fig. 5. This map ideological approach appears in the notations added to maps which
is a detailed Ottoman map of the region east of the head of the Gulf defined the enemy in a derogatory way (such as ‘foolish Egyptian
of ʿAqaba which, according to its numbering, is part of a larger se- attempts’), and presented the Empire in a completely different light
ries of maps (currently not available in the Ottoman archives). This (‘areas taken from the justice-pursuing Ottoman Empire’).
map is very different from the other maps discussed here and Finally, the maps presented here were not used during the
represents a new phase in Ottoman mapping. It is very precise and Israeli-Egyptian negotiations on the border between the two states
accurate compared to previous maps, includes topographic data, from the late 1970s to the mid 1980s. Although it is not clear at all
heights and various topographic features. We know it was drawn whether they would have made a difference, one can only spec-
after 1906 since the border between Sinai and Palestine is already ulate how different the Israeli-Egyptian border negotiations,
marked.26 This map is thus the first ‘modern’ Ottoman map of the which were mainly based on British sources, might have been if
Sinai-Palestine border we have been able to locate. some of the Ottoman maps had been known at the time, or if the
Overall, the maps surveyed here indicate the extent to which the general Ottoman point of view had been taken into account. At any
Ottoman perception of the status of the Sinai was different from the rate, after years of writing histories (and setting borders) in the
British one, and shed light on the Ottoman predicament during the Middle East with little attention to sources and people from the
negotiations engendered by their poor cartographical skills and region, it is worthwhile examining how these borders were
inability to produce accurate maps of the border region. This, imagined and drawn by the major Islamic power at the time.
however, does not mean that accurate maps would have changed Clearly, the Ottoman conception of the status of the Sinai, as seen
the end result. in these maps, was different from the British one, a fact which
deserves our attention, even if the Ottomans did not have enough
political capital and ability at the time to change the delineation of
Conclusion
the border drawn under British pressure between the Sinai and
Palestine.
To date, most research on the historical geography of the border
between Ottoman Palestine and Egypt has been based on British
documents and maps, with almost no reference to Ottoman sources.
This article highlights the opportunities provided by Ottoman Acknowledgments
sources now available to researchers to achieve a more balanced and
nuanced picture of these border negotiations. Taken together, the We would like to thank Prof. Gideon Biger for reading and com-
newly discovered Ottoman maps presented here provide a clearer menting on an earlier version of this article. We would also like to
view of the Ottoman perception of the border between Sinai and thank Orit Ben-Artzi for preparing the map in Fig. 1. Finally, we
Palestine, which differs from the better-known British perspective. would like to thank the three anonymous referees for their
The Ottoman maps confirm that before the 1910s the Ottomans thoughtful comments and the editor Prof. Miles Ogborn for the way
lacked the ability to map the border with British-ruled Egypt in a in which he handled our paper and for all his insights and
professional, modern way and had to revert to British maps for suggestions.
knowledge of the region. Such borrowed maps were adjusted to fit
Ottoman needs and ideology. Only one of the maps surveyed here, Appendix
which was probably drafted sometime in the 1910s (Fig. 5), clearly
illustrates the development of Ottoman mapping capability during Details of Figure 2
the Empire’s final period. This coincides with what we know about
the concentrated effort to systematically map the Empire’s territory Map Title and Characteristics:
after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. Prior to this time there Title is missing in the original. Map of the administrative borders
were many Ottoman maps of various kinds which were not drawn delineating the Ottoman provinces of Egypt, Syria and the Hijjaz.
in a systematic and unified way, or using modern cartographical
methods. This situation hindered the Ottomans when, in 1906, they Year:
came to negotiate the border with the British in this strategically 7 Kanunusani 1299 [19 January 1884]
important region. The line eventually drawn in 1906 was very
similar to the line the British promoted and very different from Cartographer:
what (and where) the Ottomans wanted it to be, although given the ‘Your [the Sultan’s] servant who works in the Ministry of War’, seal
BritisheOttoman balance of power at the time one cannot really added of a person named ʿAbd al-Hamid.28
25
Fortna, Imperial Classroom (note 3), 172e174.
26
See Müdürlügü, Haritacı Mehmet Şevki Paşa.
27
Fortna, Imperial Classroom (note 3), 190e199.
28
For more on the critical role of the Ministry of War in the development of Ottoman mapping, see Fortna, Imperial Classroom (note 3), 166, 173.
Y. Ben-Bassat, Y. Ben-Artzi / Journal of Historical Geography 50 (2015) 25e36 35
29
A large spring is located at the mouth of Wadi Gharandal, where it descends from the Edom Mountains to the ʿArava Valley, today on the Jordanian side of the border,
some 100 kilometers from the Gulf of ʿAqaba. Remains of a Roman fortress and an ancient road from ʿAqaba to Petra were discovered nearby.
30
Brawer, Israel’s Boundaries (note 5), 67.
36 Y. Ben-Bassat, Y. Ben-Artzi / Journal of Historical Geography 50 (2015) 25e36
telegraph line, cultivated land, trees [in Arabic, ‘dates and trees’], Cartographer:
hills, water sources and camps. Not known
The Ottoman side added three lines below the original table:
Dashed red line: ‘the leftmost [western] line proposed by your [the Printing House:
Sultan’s] loyal slaves’ Not mentioned
Dashed yellow line: ‘the separation line proposed by the Egyptian
officials initially [at the beginning of negotiations]’ Scale:
Dashed brown line: ‘the rectified separation line proposed by the 1:40,000
Egyptian officials’
Black and White/Colour:
Description of the Map: Colour
This Ottoman official series has five parts, all of which are available
today, along the ʿAqaba to Rafah road. Map Legend and Indicators:
Not provided on this specific sheet
Details of Figure 5
Description of the Map:
Map Title and Characteristics: Topographic map of the head of the Gulf of ʿAqaba. The border
An Ottoman official map of the head of the Gulf of ʿAqaba, which is between the Sinai and the Negev is marked on this map by a broken
part of a larger series of maps we do not currently possess (this is red line which starts at Ras-Taba on the shore of the Red Sea and
Map 2 in the series). goes toward the northwest. Along the borderline topographic fea-
tures are designated which at times have names, as well as per-
Year: manent and temporary military outposts, water sources, the names
Not known, not before 1906 of the major wadis, and detailed information on the town of ʿAqaba.