Eurocentrism and Its Avatars

Indian Sociological Society
EUROCENTRISM AND ITS AVATARS: THE DILEMMAS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

Author(s): Immanuel Wallerstein
Source: Sociological Bulletin, Vol. 46, No. 1 (MARCH 1997), pp. 21-39
Published by: Indian Sociological Society
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EUROCENTRISM AND ITS AVATARS:
THE DILEMMAS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
Immanuel Wallerstein
Social Science has been Eurocentric throughout its institutional history,

which means since the time that there have been departments teaching
social science within university systems. This is not in the leas
surprising. Social science is a product of the modern world-system, and
Eurocentrism is constitutive of the geoculture of the modem world.
Furthermore, as an institutional structure, social science originated
largely in Europe. We shall be using Europe here more as a cultural than
as a cartographical expression; in this sense, in the discussion about the
last two centuries, we are referring primarily and jointly to Western
Europe and North America. The social science disciplines were in fact
overwhelmingly located, at least up to 1945, in just five countries
France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and the United States. Even
today, despite the global spread of social science as an activity, the large
majority of social scientists worldwide remain Europeans. Social science
emerged in response to European problems, at a point in history when
Europe dominated the whole world-system. It was virtually inevitable
that its choice of subject matter, its theorizing, its methodology, and its
epistemology should reflect the constraints of the crucible within which
it was bom.
However, in the period since 1945, the decolonization of Asia and

Africa, plus the sharply accentuated political consciousness of the
non-European world everywhere, has affected the world of knowledge
just as much as it has affected the politics of the world-system. One
major such difference, today and indeed for some thirty years now at
least, is that the 'Eurocentrism' of social science has been under severe
Immanuel Wallerstein is on the faculty of Fernand Braudel Center, Binghampton

University, Binghampton, New York, N. Y. 13902-6000. He is also the president of the
International Sociological Association.
SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN, 46 (1), March 1997
22 Sociological Bulletin
attack. The attack is of course

question that, if social scien
century, it must overcome the
its analyses and its capacity
contemporary world. If, how
careful look at what constitutes
hydra-headed monster and h
slaughter the dragon swiftly. In
trying to fight it, we may in f
premises and thereby reinforce
There are at least five different ways in which social science has been
said to be Eurocentric. These do not constitute a logically tight set of
categories, since they overlap in unclear ways. Still, it might be useful to
review the allegations under each heading. It has been argued that social
science expresses its Eurocentrism in (1) its historiography, (2) the
parochiality of its universalism, (3) its assumptions about (Western)
civilization, (4) its Orientalism, and (5) its attempts to impose the theory
of progress.
Historiography
This is the explanation of European dominance of the modern world by
virtue of specific European historical achievements. The historiography
is probably fundamental to the other explanations, but it is also the most
obviously naive variant and the one whose validity is most easily put in
question. Europeans in the last two centuries have unquestionably sat on
top of the world. Collectively, they have controlled the wealthiest and
militarily most powerful countries. They have enjoyed the most
advanced technology and were the primary creators of this advanced
technology. These facts seems largely uncontested, and are indeed hard
to contest plausibly. The issue is: what explains this differential in power
and standard of living with the rest of the world? One kind of answer is
that Europeans have done something meritorious and different from
peoples in other parts of the world. This is what is meant by scholars
who speak of the 'European miracle' (e.g. Jones 1981). Europeans have
Eurocentrism and its Avatars 23
launched the industrial revolution

launched modernity, or capitalism,
liberty. Of course, we shall need t
carefully and discover whether it
whatever each of these novelties a
when.
But even if we agree on the definit

so to speak on the reality of the phe
very little. For we must then explai
others, launched the specified phe
certain moment of history. In seekin
most scholars has been to push u
antecedents. If Europeans in the 18th
be probably because their ancestor
ancestry may be less biological than
or were, y in the 11th century, or in
back. We can all think of the mult
established or at least asserted some
the 16th to 19th centuries, procee
points in European ancestry for the tru
There is a premise here that is not
time undebated. The premise is that
Europe is held responsible in the 16th
good thing, something of which Eur
which the rest of the world should
This novelty is perceived as an achie
bear testimony to this kind of evalua
There seems to me little question t
world social science has expressed su
large degree. This perception of c
grounds, and this has been increasin
can challenge the accuracy of the
Europe and in the world as a whole
can certainly challenge the plausi
antecedents of what happened in th
of the 16th to 19th centuries in a lon
longer to tens of thousands of yea
24 Sociological Bulletin - i
arguing that the European 'achievements' of th

centuries thereby seem less remarkable, or more l
or less like achievements that can be credited
Finally, one can accept that the novelties were rea
were less a positive than a negative accomplishmen
This kind of revisionist historiography is often
and certainly tends to be cumulative. At a certain
or deconstructing, may become pervasive, and per
can take hold. This is, for example, what seems to
already happened) with the historiography of th
where the so-called social interpretation that had do
for at least a century and a half was challenged an
toppled in the last thirty years. We are probably e
so-called paradigmatic shift right now in the ba
modernity.
Whenever such a shift happens, however, we o
breath, step back, and evaluate whether the altern
indeed more plausible, and most of all whether they
crucial underlying premises of the formerly domi
is the question I wish to raise in relation to th
European presumed achievements in the moder
assault. What is being proposed as a replacement? A
this replacement? Before, however, we can tackle
we must review some of the other critiques of Euro
Universalism
Universalism is the view that there exist scientific truths that are valid
across all of time and space. European thought of the last few centuries
has been strongly universalist for the most part. This was the era of the
cultural triumph of science as a knowledge activity. Science displaced
philosophy as the prestige mode of knowledge and the arbiter of social
discourse. The science of which we are talking is Newtonian-Cartesian
science. Its premises were that the world was governed by determinist
laws taking the form of linear equilibria processes, and that, by stating
such laws as universal reversible equations, we only needed knowledge
in addition to some set of initial conditions to permit us to predict the
state of the system at any future or past time.
What this meant for social knowl

might discover the universal proce
and whatever hypotheses they coul
time and space, or were to be state
across time and space. The persona
scholars were operating as value-ne
empirical evidence could be essentia
handled correctly, since the proces
consequences were not too differ
scholars whose approach was more
one assumed the existence of a
development. All stage theories (wh
to choose only a few names fr
theorizations of what has been called
the presumption that the present is
led inevitably to the present. And ev
however much it proclaimed ab
nonetheless to reflect subconsciously
Whether in the ahistorical time-re
social scientists or the diachronic s
European social science was resolu
whatever it was that happened in E
represented a pattern that was appl
was a progressive achievement of
because it represented the fulfillm
removal of artificial obstacles to th
Europe was not only good but the fa
Universalizing theories have alw
grounds that the particular situation
seem to fit the model. There have a
that universal generalizations were
last thirty years a third kind of
universalizing theories of modern s
these allegedly universal theories ar
presentation of the Western his
universal. Joseph Needham quite
'fundamental error of Eurocentrism
science and technology, which

is universal and that it follow
Abdel-Malek 1981: 89).
Social science thus has been accused of being Eurocentric insofar as
it was particularistic. More than Eurocentric, it was said to be highly
parochial. This hurt to the quick, since modern social science prided
itself specifically on having risen above the parochial. To the degree that
this charge seemed reasonable, it was far more telling than merely
asserting that the universal propositions had not yet been formulated in a
way that could account for every case.
Civilization
Civilization refers to a set of social characteristics that are contrasted
with primitiveness or barbarism. Modern Europe considered itself to be

more than merely one 'civilization' among several; it considered itself
(uniquely or at least especially) 'civilized'. What characterized this state
of being civilized is not something on which there has been an obvious
consensus, even among Europeans. For some, civilization was
encompassed in 'modernity', that is, in the advance of technology and
the rise of productivity as well as the cultural belief in the existence of
historic development and progress. For others, civilization meant the
increased autonomy of the 'individual' vis-a-vis all other social
actors—the family, the community, the state, the religious institutions.
For others, civilization meant non-brutal behaviour in everyday life,
social manners in the broadest sense. And for still others, civilization
meant the decline or narrowing of the scope of legitimate violence and
the broadening of the definition of cruelty. And of course, for many,
civilization involved several or all of these traits in combination.
When French colonizers in the 19th century spoke of la mission

civilisatrice, they meant that, by means of colonial conquest, France (or
more generally Europe) would impose upon non-European peoples the
values and norms that were encompassed by these definitions of
civilization. When, in the 1990s, various groups in Western countries
speak of the 'right to interfere' in political situations in various parts of
the world, but almost always in non-Western parts of the world, it is in
the name of such values of civilization that they are asserting such a
right.
This set of values, however we

values, secular-humanist values—m
as one might expect, since soci
historical system that has eleva
hierarchy. Social scientists hav
definitions of the problems (th
problems) they consider worth pu
values into the concepts they hav
problems, and into the indicators
Social scientists no doubt have insi
seeking to be value-free, inso
intentionally misreading or d
socio-political preferences. But to
all mean that values, in the sen
significance of observed phenom
central argument of Heinrich Ric
of what he calls the 'cultural s
'values' in the sense of assessing s
To be sure, the Western and s
'civilization' were not entirely
multiplicity of 'civilizations'. W
origin of civilized values, how it
(or so it was argued) in the moder
inevitably was that they were the
trends in the past of the Western
heritage of Antiquity and/or of t
of the Hebrew world, or the com
sometimes renamed and respecifie
Many objections can and have
presumptions. Whether the mo
world, is civilized in the very
discourse has been challenged. T
Gandhi who, when asked, 'Mr. Ga
civilization?', responded, 'It wo
assertion that the values of ancien
were more conducive to laying
values than were the values of oth
contested. And finally whet

either Greece and Rome on the one hand or ancient Israel on the other as
its civilizational foreground is not at all self-evident. Indeed, there has

long been, a debate between those who have seen Greece or Israel as
alternative cultural origins. Each side of this debate has denied the
plausibility of the alternative. This debate itself casts doubt on the
plausibility of the derivation.
In any case, who would argue that Japan can claim ancient Indie
civilizations as its forerunner on the grounds that they were the place of
origin of Buddhism, which has become a central part of Japan's cultural
history? Is the contemporary United States closer culturally to ancient
Greece, Rome, or Israel than Japan is to Indie civilization? One could
after all make the case that Christianity, far from representing continuity,
marked a decisive break with Greece, Rome, and Israel. Indeed
Christians, up to the Renaissance, made precisely this argument. And is
not the break with Antiquity still today part of the doctrine of Christian
churches?
However, today, the sphere in which the argument about values has
come to the fore is the political sphere. Prime Minister Mahathir of
Malaysia has been very specific in arguing that Asian countries can and
should 'modernize' without accepting some or all of the values of
European civilization. And his views have been widely echoed by other
Asian political leaders. The 'values' debate has also become central
within European countries themselves, especially (but not only) within
the United States, as a debate about 'multiculturalism'. This version of
the current debate has indeed had a major impact on institutionalized
social science, with the blossoming of structures within the university
which have brought together scholars who deny the premise of the
singularity of 'civilization'.
Orientalism
Orientalism refers to a stylized and abstracted statement of the

characteristics of non-Western civilizations. It is the obverse of the
concept 'civilization', and has become a major theme in public
discussion since the writings of Anouar Abdel-Malek (1972 [1981]) and
Edward Said (1978). Orientalism was not too long ago a badge of
honour (see Smith 1956). Orientalism is a mode of knowledge that
claims roots in the European Mi

Christian monks set themselves
non-Christian religions, by lear
carefully their religious texts. Of
premise of the truth of Christian f
the pagans, but nonetheless they took these texts seriously as
expressions, however perverted, of human culture.
When Orientalism was secularized in the 19th century, the form of
the activity was not very different. Orientalists continued to learn the
languages and decipher the texts. In the process, they continued to
depend upon a binary view of the social world. In partial place of the
Christian/pagan distinction, they placed the Western/Oriental, or
modern/non-modern distinction. In the social sciences, there emerged a
long line of famous polarities: military and industrial societies,
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, mechanical and organic solidarity,
traditional and rational-legal legitimation, statics and dynamics. Though
these polarities were not usually directly related to the literature on
Orientalism, we should not forget that one of the earliest of these
polarities was Maine's status and contract, and it was explicitly based on
a comparison of Hindu and English legal system.
Orientalists saw themselves as persons who diligently expressed their
sympathetic appreciation of a non-Western civilization by devoting their
lives to erudite study of texts in order to understand (verstehen) the
culture. The culture that they understood in this fashion was of course a
construct, a social construct by someone coming from a different culture.
It is the validity of these constructs that has come under attack, at three
different levels: it is said that the concepts do not fit the empirical
reality; that they abstract too much and thus erase empirical variety; and
that they are extrapolations of European prejudices.
The attack against Orientalism was however more than an attack on
poor scholarship. It was also a critique of the political consequences of
such social science concepts. Orientalism was said to legitimate the
dominant power position of Europe, indeed to play a primary role in the
ideological carapace of Europe's imperial role within the framework of
the modern world-system. The attack on Orientalism has become tied to
the general attack on reification, and allied to the multiple efforts to
deconstruct social science narratives. Indeed, it has been argued that
some non-Western attempts to create a counter-discourse of

'Occidentalism', for example, and 'all elite discourses of anti
traditionalism in modern China, from the May Fourth movement to the
1989 Tianenmen student demonstration, have been extensively
orientalized,' (Chen 1992: 687), therein sustaining rather than under
mining Orientalism.
Progress
Progress, its reality, its inevitability, was a basic theme of the European
Enlightenment. Some would trace it back through all of Western
philosophy (Bury 1920, Nisbet 1980). In any case, it became the
consensus viewpoint of 19th century Europe (and indeed remained so for
most of the 20th century as well). Social science, as it was constructed,
was deeply imprinted with the theory of progress.
Progress became the underlying explanation of the history of the
world, and the rationale of almost all stage theories. Even more, it
became the motor of all of applied social science. We were said to study
social science in order better to understand the social world, because
then we could more wisely and more surely accelerate progress
everywhere (or at least help remove impediments in its path). The
metaphors of evolution or of development were not merely attempts to
describe; they were also incentives to prescribe. Social science became
the advisor to (handmaiden of?) policy-makers from Bentham's
panopticon to the Verein fur Sozialpolitik, to the Beveridge Report and
endless other governmental commissions, to Unesco's postwar series on
racism, to the successive researches of James Coleman on the U. S.
educational system. After the Second World War, the 'development of
underdeveloped countries' was a rubric which justified the involvement
of social scientists of all political persuasions in the social and political
reorganization of the non-Western world.
Progress was not merely assumed or analysed; it was imposed as
well. This is perhaps not so different from the attitudes we discussed
under the heading of 'civilization'. What needs to be underlined here is
that, at the time when 'civilization' began to be a category that had lost
its innocence and attracted suspicions (primarily after 1945), 'progress'
as a category survived and was more than adequate to replace
'civilization', smelling somewhat pr

to serve as the last redoubt of Euroc
The idea of progress of course h
although the vigour of their resis
dramatically in the 1850-1950 perio
of the idea of progress have burs
among the conservatives, and with
There are however many different
of progress. One can suggest that w
progress, but. that a true progress
was a delusion or an attempt to delu
be no such thing as progress, bec
cycle of humanity. Or one can sug
progress but that it is now trying to
rest of the world, as some non-West
have argued.
What is clear, however, is that f
become labeled as a European idea,
attack on Eurocentrism. This atta
contradictory by the efforts of oth
progress for part or all of the non-
the picture, but not progress.
II
The multiple forms of Eurocentr

critique of Eurocentrism do not nec
What we might do is try to assess
social science started as an activity
been charged with painting a f
misreading, grossly exaggerating, an
Europe, particularly its historical ro
The critics fundamentally mak
somewhat contradictory) kinds of c
that Europe did, other civilizations
up to the moment that Europe used
process in other parts of the world
did is nothing more than a con

doing for a long time, with th
foreground. The third is tha
incorrectly and subjected to
had dangerous consequences
The first two arguments, wide
I would term 'anti-Eurocentric
to me to be undoubtedly corr
kind of curious animal could 'anti-Eurocentric Eurocentrism' be? Let us
take each of these arguments in turn.

There have been throughout the 20th century persons who have
argued that, within the framework of say Chinese, or Indian, or
Arab-Muslim 'civilization', there existed both the cultural foundations
and the socio-historical pattern of development that would have led to
the emergence of full-fledged modern capitalism, or indeed was in the
process of leading in that direction. In the case of Japan, the argument is
often even stronger, asserting that modem capitalism did develop there,
separately but temporally coincident with its development in Europe.
The heart of most of these arguments is a stage theory of development
(frequently its Marxist variant), from which it logically followed that
different parts of the world were all on parallel roads to modernity or
capitalism. This form of argument presumed both the distinctiveness and
social autonomy of the various civilizational regions of the world on the
one hand and their common subordination to an overarching pattern on
the other.
Since almost all the various arguments of this kind are specific to a
given cultural zone and its historical development, it would be a massive
exercise to discuss the historical plausibility of the case of each
civilizational zone under discussion. I do not propose to do so here.
What I would point out is one logical limitation to this line of argument,
whatever the region under discussion, and one general intellectual
consequence. The logical limitation is very obvious. Even if it is tme
that various other parts of the world were going down the road to
modernity/capitalism, perhaps were even far along this road, this still
leaves us with the problem of accounting for the fact that it was the
West, or Europe, that reached there first, and was consequently able to
'conquer the world'. At this poin

originally posed, why modernity/ca
Of course, today there are some
deep sense did conquer the world o
been resistance, but this seems to
reality. There was after all real c
portion of the globe. There are a
European strength. No doubt th
resistance, both active and passive,
formidable, there would be nothin
too much on non-European agency
all of Europe's sins, or at least most
the critics were intending.
In any case, however temporary w
we still need to explain it. Most
argument are more interested in e
indigenous process in their part of
was that Europe was able to do
attempting to diminish Europe's
'achievement', they reinforce the th
theory makes Europe into an 'evil h
a hero in the dramatic sense of the
final spurt in the race and crossed
there is the implication, not too far
chance, Chinese, or Indians, or A
have, done the same—that is, launc
world, exploit resources and people
hero.
This view of modern history se

anti-Eurocentrism, because it accep
of the European 'achievement' in
defined it, and merely asserts that
doing it too. For some possibly
temporary edge on the others and
forcibly. The assertion that the o
seems to me a very feeble way of
reinforces the worst consequ

knowledge.
The second line of oppositio
there is anything really new in
starts by pointing out that, as
long time before that, Western
of the Eurasian continent, whose historical role and cultural
achievements were below the level of various other parts of the world
(such as the Arab world or China). This is undoubtedly true, at least as a
first-level generalization. A quick jump is then made to situating modem
Europe within the construction of an ecumene or world structure that has
been in creation for several thousand years (see various authors in
Sanderson 1995). This is not implausible, but the systemic meaning
fulness of this ecumene has yet to be established, in my view. We then
come to the third element in the sequence. It is said to follow from the
prior marginality of Western Europe and the millennial construction of a
Eurasian world ecumene that whatever happened in Western Europe was
nothing special and simply one more variant in the historical
construction of a singular system.
This latter argument seems to me conceptually and historically very
wrong. I do not intend however to reargue this case (see Wallerstein
1992a). I wish merely to underline the ways in which this is
anti-Eurocentric Eurocentrism. Logically, it requires arguing that
capitalism is nothing new, and indeed some of those who argue the
continuity of the development of the Eurasian ecumene have explicitly
taken this position. Unlike the position of those who are arguing that a
given other civilization was also en route to capitalism when Europe
interfered with this process, the argument here is that we were all of us
doing this together, and that there was no real development towards
capitalism because the whole world (or at least the whole Eurasian
ecumene) was always capitalist in some sense for several thousand
years.
Let me point out first of all that this is the classic position of the
liberal economists. This is not really different from Adam Smith arguing
that there exists a 'propensity [in human nature] to truck, barter, and
exchange one thing for another' (1937 [1776]: 13). It eliminates essential
differences between different historical systems. If the Chinese, the
Egyptians, and the West Europeans

historically, in what sense are they
historical systems? (per contra, see
Europe, is there any credit left to a
But again worst of all, by appropr
the balance-sheet of the Eurasi
essential ideological argument of
capitalism) is miraculous, and wo
everyone has always been doing it
European credit, we deny Europe
Europe's 'conquest of the world' if i
ongoing march of the ecumene? Far
is critical of Europe, it implies a
'marginal' part of the ecumene, at l
(and elders) and applied it successfu
And the unspoken clincher fol
ecumene has been following a singl
the capitalist world-system is nothi
is there that would indicate that th
at least for an indefinitely long tim
16th (or the 18th) century, it
twenty-first. Personally, I simply
the case in several recent writin
Wallerstein 1996). My main point, h
is in no way anti-Eurocentric, since
have been put forward by Europe i
thereby in fact denies and/or unde
were, or are, in honour in other parts
I think we have to find sounder b
in social science, and sounder ways
third form of criticism—that wh
incorrectly and subjected to inap
had dangerous consequences for bo
indeed true. I think we have to star
what Europe did was a positive ach
ourselves in making a careful
accomplished by capitalist civiliz
assess whether the pluses are i

something I tried once, and
Wallerstein 1992b). My own
therefore I do not consider the
human progress. Rather, I cons
breakdown in the historic barr
exploitative system. I consider
world and other regions did no
they were better immunized aga
To turn their credit into some
me the quintessential form of E
Let me be clear. I believe th
('civilizations'), there have always been a certain degree of
commodification and hence of commercialization. As a consequence,
there have always been persons who sought profits in the market. But
there is a world of difference between a historical system in which there
exist some entrepreneurs or merchants or 'capitalists' and one in which
the capitalist ethos and practice is dominant. Prior to the modem world
system, what happened in each of these other historical systems is that
whenever capitalist strata got too wealthy or too successful or too
intmsive on existing institutions, other institutional groups (cultural,
religious, military, political) attacked them, utilizing both their
substantial power and their value-systems to assert the need to restrain
and contain the profit-oriented strata. As a result, these strata were
frustrated in their attempts to impose their practices on the historical
system as a priority. They were often crudely and rudely stripped of
accumulated capital, and in any case made to give obeisance to values
and practices that inhibited them. This is what I mean by the anti-toxins
that contained the vims.
What happened in the Western world is that, for a specific set of

reasons that were momentary (or conjunctural, or accidental), the
anti-toxins were less available or less efficacious, and the vims spread
rapidly, and then proved itself invulnerable to later attempts at reversing
its effects. The European world-economy of the 16th century became
irremediably capitalist. And once capitalism consolidated itself in this
historical system, once this system was governed by the priority of the
ceaseless accumulation of capital, it acquired a kind of strength vis-a-vis
other historical systems that enable

absorbed physically the entire glob
achieve this kind of total expansion
The fact that capitalism had th
European arena, and then expanded
mean that this was inevitable, or d
In my view, it was none of these. A
must start by asserting this.
I would prefer, therefore, to recon
universalist doctrines that have eme
is capitalist, our modern world-sys
developed structures of knowledge
previous structures of knowledge. It
the development of scientific thoug
true, however splendid modem s
thought long antedates the mode
civilizational zones. This has been m
the corpus of work that Joseph Ne
What is specific to the structu
world-system is the concept of the
system has instituted a fundam
philosophy/humanities, or what I t
the separation of the quest for the t
beautiful. Indeed, it was not all that
the geoculture of the modem wo
before the split was institutionaliz
to the geoculture, and forms the bas
This conceptual split has enabled t
the bizarre concept of the value
assessments of reality could form
decisions (in the broadest sense
choices as well. Shielding the scient
in effect merging them into the c
scientists from the dead hand of in
simultaneously, it removed them
decisions we have been taking for
(as opposed to technical) scientific
here and socio-political decisions

sustains Eurocentrism, since the
been acceptable are those whic
reinforces this separation of the
If ones denies the specificity of
way of arguing for the recons
therefore no plausible way of ar
rational alternatives to the existi
In the last twenty years or so,
challenged for the first time in
the ecology movement, for exam
issue in the public attack on Eur
in so-called science wars and cult
been obscurantist and obfuscatin
and thereby non-Eurocentric, st
essential that we not be diverted
issue. If we are to construct an al
today in grievous crisis, we mus
the issues of the true and the goo
And if we are to do that we ha
was indeed done by Europe in th
transform the world, but in a d
upon us today. We must cease try
on the deluded premise that we a
credit. Quite the contrary. We m
of Europe's reconstruction of
possible to transcend it, and to
universalist vision of human p
difficult and imbricated problem
tandem.
NOTE
This paper constitutes the keynote address delivered at ISA East Asian Regiona
Colloquium, 'The Future of Sociology in East Asia', November 22-23, 1996, Seoul,
Korea, co-sponsored by the Korean Sociological Association and Internation
Sociological Association (ISA).
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Indian Sociological Society

EUROCENTRISM AND ITS AVATARS: THE DILEMMAS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

Social Science has been Eurocentric throughout its institutional history,

However, in the period since 1945, the decolonization of Asia and

Immanuel Wallerstein is on the faculty of Fernand Braudel Center, Binghampton

SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN, 46 (1), March 1997

attack. The attack is of course

launched the industrial revolution

But even if we agree on the definit

arguing that the European 'achievements' of th

What this meant for social knowl

science and technology, which

with primitiveness or barbarism. Modern Europe considered itself to be

When French colonizers in the 19th century spoke of la mission

This set of values, however we

contested. And finally whet

its civilizational foreground is not at all self-evident. Indeed, there has

Orientalism refers to a stylized and abstracted statement of the

claims roots in the European Mi

some non-Western attempts to create a counter-discourse of

'civilization', smelling somewhat pr

The multiple forms of Eurocentr

did is nothing more than a con

take each of these arguments in turn.

'conquer the world'. At this poin

This view of modern history se

reinforces the worst consequ

Egyptians, and the West Europeans

assess whether the pluses are i

What happened in the Western world is that, for a specific set of

other historical systems that enable

here and socio-political decisions

Abdel-Malek, Anouar. 1972. La dialectique sociale. Paris: Seuil. [English: Civ

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