Plato Apology 27E

Author(s): Paul Shorey

Source: Classical Philology, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Jan., 1928), pp. 68-70
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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Classical Philology

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 68 NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

did. Yes, it is almost certain, for we must remember that Quintilian gives
Varius as authority for Vergil's daily rate of composition (x. 3. 8, quoted
above); and what work of Varius can Quintilian be using here if not his book
entitled How I Edited Vergil? But this is the Vergilian magic again. Such a
monograph, though fully as plausible as those of Aly and Ribbeck noticed
above, is plainly without warrant. In fact, there is positive probability that
Varius did not publish anything of the kind, for if he had, we should expect
Suetonius to use it as his authority for the omission of the initial four lines
(11. 160 if. [Brummer]) instead of making us depend on what the little-known
Nisus had heard from his seniores. We had better be satisfied with the proba-
bility that Varius gave out the verses privately to those who wanted them.

CLARENCE P. BILL
WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY

PLATO APOLOGY 27E

o7rwSo & a0v .TrvLa 7r'Oov 'a KafL cT/LKpOV VOVV EXovTa acvpWrWy (US ov
aTTLV KaL &aLqLVL4 KaL OCLa '`ydacOaL, KaL av TOV aVToV LT 8aqhov
IT L Ka X"r ca' , , ,'1
lklT' flpOaLg, OV/4"a / Xxavt, ecTTLV.
The correct, I-think the certain, interpretation of this passage was clearly
stated by Keck in Neue Jahrbiucher fiur Philologie und Padagogie, LXXXIII,
407-8, in 1861, and, after him, by Miinscher in 1865 in the same journal. But
as mistaken interpretations are still current in nearly all editions and have the
support of Adam (?) and now of Burnet, it may be worth while to recur to the
topic, especially as I have some new arguments and, I think, some not hitherto
cited illustrations of the idiom that supplies the clue. The key, as Keck
argued, and as I recently stated in Classical Philology, XXI, 287, is that ToV
avrov in the second clause is not an anaphoric reference to the person sup-
posed in the first. There are two supposititious persons. And the meaning
is that it belongs to one and the same person to believe in both demons and
gods and by parity of reasoning to one and the same (different) person to
believe in neither. It does not and cannot mean that "this same man who
believes in both should believe in neither." Each TO?J avTov merely asserts
the identity within its own clause in relation to the beliefs marked by KaL ....
KaL and 4T1.... /LfTC. Strictly speaking, Socrates' argument requires only
the first clause. If you believe in &Luo'vla you must believe in OdZa. But
by a common Greek and Platonic usage he adds for completeness the cor-
responding complementary negative, and if you don't believe in the one you
don't believe in the other. The variation &,uovas and 'pwas is of course of
no significance. The TOV avrov in the second clause merely expresses the con-
junction of the two disbeliefs, as that in the first clause did the conjunction of

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 NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 69

the two beliefs. It does not identify the supposed persons in the two clauses.
It obviously cannot do so if we retain the negative ovt, which applies to both
clauses.
Professor Burnet's paraphrase, "It is out of the question that this same
man should disbelieve," virtually ignores the ov', which he now retains in his
text, though he formerly rejected it. That is not the only confusion. He says
he owes his interpretation mainly to Mr. Garrod (CR, XX, 212). But Mr.
Garrod's translation simply repeats without reasons Keck's interpretation.
What perhaps misled Professor Burnet is a strange misprint in Mr. Garrod's
comment, "i.e., one must disbelieve (sic; read, of course believe) in both
SLa/LOvL and Oe2a if one believes in either," etc.
There are doubtless many illustrations of Tov avrov. I have noted Lucian
Philopseudes 47 and Halieus 20. - ov VOLLteLs TOv avrov eLvaL KaL& 7rL7TE/7rELv,
717rLXoVs .... E J Kfy (7taroTrE7reLv 8vvaTov avTw^. TOv yap avTov KaL Ta'8 c/aa-LT
KaL Ta8e. Cf. also Lysias xix. 56: OTL OV Tov avTov fTTLv avopos avev avayK?71 TE
7roXa avaXLcaKav KaL /LETa KLV&VVOV TOV /.LC7LcTOV 67rL0V/A-VoaL C XELV TL TOzW KOLVWV.
If my argument is sound, it is superfluous to discuss the other interpreta-
tions that have been proposed.
Jowett translates: "But no one who has a particle of understanding will
ever be convinced by you that the same men can believe in divine and super-
human things, and yet not believe that there are gods and demigods and
heroes."
Schleiermacher's translation runs as follows: "Wie du aber irgend einen
Menschen, der auch nur ganz wenig Verstand hat, uiberreden willst, dass ein
und derselbe Mensch Daimonisches und Gottliches glaubt, und wiederum
derselbe doch auch weder Daimonen noch Gotter noch Heroen, das ist doch
auf keine Weise zu ersinnen."
And Muller renders: ". . . . irgend Jemanden aber, der nur einiges
Nachdenken besitzt, zu tiberreden, dass wer Damonisches annimmt, nicht
auch Gottliches annehmen mtisse, und nicht zugleich das Dasein der Damonen
und G6tter und Heroen leugnen konne, Das ist auf keine Weise ausfiihrbar."
The Bud6 translation of Croiset thus translates: " Quant a faire admettre
par une personne tant soit peu sens6e qu'un homme peut croire a des d6mons
sans croire aux dieux, et que le meme homme n6anmoins peut nier l'existence
des d6mons, des dieux et des h6ros, voila qui est radicalement impossible."
Fowler, in the Loeb translation, thus renders: ". . . . but there is no
way for you to persuade any man who has even a little sense that it is possible
for the same person to believe in spiritual and divine existences and again for
the same person not to believe in spirits or gods or heroes." But he does not
keep ov'.
Hirschig, in the old Didot edition, brackets ov' and the second TOV aVTOV,
and translates: ". . . . .tu vero ut persuadeas alicui vel minime sanam men-

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70 NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

tem habenti, ejusdem esse viri et daemonia et divina esse putare, et contra
neque daemones neque deos, neque heroas, fieri prorsus non potest."
Riddell, in his edition of the Apology (Oxford, 1877), retains ov', but
interprets: "The ov is not simply pleonastic, as in the case of two negatives
in the same clause, but it is irrational. It is a confused anticipation of the
coming negative ov'&,uta." In section 264 of his " Digest" he quotes the
sage along with Laws 747D, and Antipho vi. 10 (p. 142), and "perhaps"
Thucyd. iii. 36, to illustrate pleonasm and the irrational repetition of a nega-
tive.
J. Adam, in his edition (Cambridge: "Pitt Press Series," 1910), accepts
the emendation of Wecklein (Rh. Mus., XXXVI, 145) with the observation:
"The alternative (less good) is to bracket ov' after &;, and 7O0v avTOv after
KaL av (so Kral): the text cannot be defended as it stands. Translate 'But
you cannot possibly persuade any one who has the smallest understanding,
that one and the same individual will not believe in things supernatural and
divine and in daemons and gods, or again, that one and the same individual
will not disbelieve in things supernatural and divine and in daemons and
gods.' Socrates sums up the argument of the chapter somewhat loosely but
emphatically in a sentence which amounts to this: Belief (or disbelief) in
&8u/aouvLa and in Octa implies belief (or disbelief in a4,uoves and cow."
The little edition of W. Wagner (Boston, 1878) brackets ov', with the re-
mark: "ov' is a manifest interpolation, and should be disregarded in transla-
tion, as Socr. here repeats Meletus' assertion in all its glaring inconsistency."
Dyer (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1895) also rejects otv and misinterprets the
argument. See his note and the Appendix. He seems to share Riddell's view.
See also the long note of Purves on the passage in his Selections from Plato
(Oxford, 1883). He recapitulates many interpretations that are important,
but concludes by bracketing ovt.
PAUL SHOREY

PLATO TIMAEUS 48D

7reTLpa00o/laL IA7&)O.v0 rT7oV EIKOTca, /uMLov 8e, KaLt Il7rpoaOOEv a7r

EKaWT7JV Kat -v,u7raVT7V Xytv.
In Hermes (1922), LVII, 72-73, E. Howald, discussing an emendation of
Wilamowitz, says that it renders a7r' apXr)s bedeutungslos, whereas es muss
betont sein. He asks then: "Kann denn 4&vrpooaev d7r' acpI nicht zusam-
mengelesen werden und heissen: ganz von vorne an, so dass also der Sinn
des Satzes ware: Ich werde versuchen, so gut wie ein anderer ELKOTa uiber
die Einzelheiten und das All zu sagen und zwar ganz von vorne an, d. h.
beginnend bei der yeveavs der Elemente, die bis jetzt keiner untersucht hat?"
It has escaped his notice that in AJP, X, 62, I wrote of the same pas-

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