CULTURAL

TRANSMISSION
AND SOCIAL
NORMS
WORKSHOP

15-17 DECEMBER 2016

 CONTENTS
Welcome 3

Thursday 15 December 5

Friday 16 December 6

Saturday 17 December 7

Speakers 8

Getting to UEA 19

UEA Campus & Norwich 20

Campus Map 21

2
 WELCOME
We are very excited to welcome to you to the School of Economics at the University
of East Anglia, and our first workshop on Cultural Transmission and Social Norms.

The School of Economics has a reputation as a centre of research excellence, and

has been ranked among the top six UK Economics departments in the latest CHE
Excellence Group for outstanding research. The Research Excellence Framework
(2014) ranks the School of Economics 8th among economics departments for research
outputs, with 91.8% of the Schools research scored as either world-leading or
internationally excellent. The School is a leading partner in two research centres;
The Centre for Competition Policy, and the Centre for Behavioural and Experimental
Social Science.

This workshop brings together leading researchers from a range of disciplines,

including economics, history and psychology, to share perspectives on how social
norms are transmitted within societies, at both macro and micro levels.

Social norms are an important social cement, allowing people to cooperate in areas
that legal sanctions and contract enforcement cannot reach. Norms are typically
internalized over the life course, beginning in childhood, and are transmitted by
formal and informal institutions, including families, schools, media, firms and the
state.

We are very much looking forward to the workshop, and would like to wish you all an
enjoyable and productive stay in here in Norwich.

David Hugh-Jones Jinnie Ooi Ying Sze

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4
THURSDAY 15 DECEMBER
HELD IN ARTS 01.06

9:00 - 9:30 Registration and Opening Speech

Erin Krupka
9:30 - 10:30 Promise-keeping Norms and Renegotiation
Behavior
10:30 - 11:00 Coffee Break
Xueheng Li
TBA
11:00 - 12:30
Pete Richerson
The Evolution of Norms and Institutions
12:30 - 14:00 Lunch at the SCVA
Michael Muthukrishna
Innovation in the Collective Brain: The
Transmission and Evolution of Norms and Culture
14:00 - 15:30 Manuel Eisner
From the Savannah to the Magistrates Court:
The Roots of Criminal Justice in Evolved Human
Psychology
15:30 - 16:00 Coffee Break
Fabian Winter
Normative change and culture of hate: a
randomized experiment in online communities
16:00 - 17:30
Erez Yoeli
Harnessing Observability to Promote Large-scale
Cooperation

5
 FRIDAY 16 DECEMBER
Bob Sugden
9:00 - 10:30
Mutual Benefit as Norm
10:30 - 11:00 Coffee Break
Nicholas Bardsley
Food Norms in Schools: Probing Pluralistic
Ignorance with Behavioural Games
11:00 - 12:30
Emily Wyman
Team Reasoning and fairness in chlidrens
cooperative decision-making
12:30 - 14:00 Lunch at the SCVA
Zvonimir Basic
The Development of Egalitarian Norm
Enforcement in Childhood and Adolescence
14:00 - 15:30 David Hugh-Jones
Where do fairness preferences come from?
An experiment on norm transmission in an
adolescent social network
15:30 - 16:00 Coffee Break
Roi Zultan
Corrupt Norms and Corrupt Collaboration
16:00 - 17:30
Johannes Abeler
Preferences for Truth Telling

6
SATURDAY 17 DECEMBER
Felix Warneken
The Origins of Cooperation and Fairness
9:30 - 11:00
Moti Michaeli
TBA
11:00 - 11:30 Coffee Break
Katrin Schmelz
Control Aversion in East and West Germany:
Evidence from a Large-Scale Internet Study
11:30 - 13:00 Marcella Veronesi
Social Identity, Attitudes Towards Cooperation,
and Social Preferences: Evidence from
Switzerland

7
 JOHANNES ABELER UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

Johannes Abeler is Associate Professor in Economics at the University of Oxford. He applies

insights from behavioural and experimental economics to questions in labour and public
economics. His research has studied the economic effects of honesty, disappointment, fairness,
complexity, and fungibility.

Preferences for truth-telling

Private information is at the heart of many economic activities. For decades, economists have assumed that individuals
are willing to misreport private information if this maximizes their material payoff. We combine data from 72
experimental studies in economics, psychology and sociology, and show that, in fact, people lie surprisingly little. We
then formalize a wide range of potential explanations for the observed behaviour, identify testable predictions that
can distinguish between the models and conduct new experiments to do so. None of the most popular explanations
suggested in the literature can explain the data. We show that only combining a preference for being honest with a
preference for being seen as honest can organize the empirical evidence.

NICK BARDSLEY UNIVERSITY OF READING

Nick Bardsleys research is mainly in two fields, ecological economics and behavioural economics.
For example, a recent research project used a field experiment to study household energy
use, aiming, for example, for insight into the rebound phenomenon. Secondly, he has been
conducting experimental investigations of decision making, and has also addressed related
methodological issues. For example, Nick has been looking at evidence contradicting received
theories of economic behaviour and testing alternative theories, particularly ones positing social
preferences or collective rationality. The methodological work has concerned both the concepts
involved in such enquiries, and issues for the conduct and interpretation of experiments involving
human subjects.

Food Norms in Schools: Probing Pluralistic Ignorance with Behavioural Games

We study children aged 14-15 at a secondary school in the North of England, using behavioural games to identify social
norms concerning food, and contrast norms to preferences and beliefs about others preferences. We find misperceptions
of preferences, with pupils under-rating attractiveness of healthy, and over-rating that of unhealthy, foods. The bias
is generally consistent with a perceived influence of social norms for less healthy items. Pluralistic ignorance, whereby
individuals privately reject a norm but believe that others mostly accept it, would explain our results. The results suggest
potential for modifying the norm to favour healthier options, for example by making public the distribution of pupils stated
preferences.

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 ZVONIMIR BAI UNIVERSITY OF BONN

Zvonimir Basics primary research focus is on the development of preferences with children and
adolescents. In particular, he is interested in the domain of other-regarding behaviour, where
he has investigated the development of third-party punishment, as well as the development
of influence of self and social image concerns on other-regarding behaviour. Secondly, he is
interested in self and social image concerns in a broader way. More specifically, in how the two
concerns impact various behaviours, how the two concerns connect, and which type of individuals
are influenced by them. For these purposes, he has investigated the influence of self and social
image concerns with adults in the domain of other-regarding behaviour and lying behaviour.

The Development of Egalitarian Norm Enforcement in Childhood and Adolescence

Equal division of goods is a long-existing social norm. It is present in societies around the world, influencing the way
people function throughout their lives. To ensure that the egalitarian norm is maintained and followed, people commonly
enforce it. In particular, they engage in costly punishment of those that violate the norm. Despite its importance, we
do not know much about the emergence of this enforcement and how it develops over time. In order to investigate
this, we use the most commonly used third-party punishment game, where a third-party punisher is added to a regular
dictator game. We adapt it for children and run an experiment with 635 children and adolescents, ages 9-18. We show
that children start enforcing the egalitarian norm at the age of 11-12. In addition we show that: (i) as the egalitarian norm
enforcement emerges, a non-negligible proportion of punishers also disapproves of overly generous transfers which
exceed the norm, (ii) the punishers behavior only changes until 13-14 years of age, indicating that egalitarian norm
enforcement is fully developed by that period, and (iii) the dictators increase their behavior in direction of the egalitarian
norm primarily at the same time as norm enforcement develops. Our results have multiple implications for the literature
on the development of other-regarding preferences.

MANUEL EISNER UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE

Manuel Eisner is Professor of Comparative and Developmental Criminology at the Institute of

Criminology, University of Cambridge. He studied history and sociology, and completed his PhD
in sociology. Manuels current work revolves around three main areas, namely a) research on
macro-level historical patterns of violence, including the examination of evolutionary theories
about effects of social contexts on interpersonal violence.
b) research on individual development and the causes of violent behaviour, which entails some
psychological work on human development, comorbidity, and developmental cascades.
c) work on the prevention of violence and aggressive behaviour, including several randomised
controlled trials and meta-analyses.

From the Savannah to the Magistrates Court: The Roots of Criminal Justice in
Evolved Human Psychology
Recent research claims that criminal justice institutions have universal features that are rooted in psychological
mechanisms shaped by human evolution. In this paper we review three core questions related to this perspective: We first
examine the notion that our evolved psychology has led to cross-culturally shared intuitions about what constitutes a
crime. We then assess the extent to which arguments based on behavioral game theory and evolutionary psychology can
account for the emergence of centralized punishment in complex societies. Finally, we examine procedural fairness as a
pivotal normative element of criminal justice across the world.
We show substantial cross-cultural variability in what is considered a crime and propose a theoretical perspective that
recognizes change in the normative bases of co-operative behavior. Second, we also argue that seeing criminal justice
primarily as a system that imposes costs on free-riders may be incomplete. In particular, we highlight fair procedure and
legitimacy as core characteristics that distinguish institutionally anchored justice from mere punishment.

9
 DAVID HUGH-JONES UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA

David Hugh-Jones is a Senior Lecturer at the School of Economics. He holds a PhD in

Government from the University of Essex where he was based as a Lecturer in the Department
of Government before joining UEA. His research interests include Experimental Economics,
the Economics of Conflict and Public Economics. He has published his work in top journals in
Economics (like Games and Economic Behavior) and Political Science (like the Journal of Conflict
Resolution).

Where do fairness preferences come from? An experiment on norm transmission in

an adolescent social network
We ran an experiment on transmission of fairness norms in a UK school. Participants chose an allocation of money
between two others, which could be meritocratic (based on task performance) or egalitarian; they then observed another
persons allocation choice, before making a second allocation themselves. Participants behaviour, and their stated
attitudes about fairness, were influenced by the choice they observed. Our results show that children and adolescents
can learn social norms from each other.

ERIN KRUPKA UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Erin Krupka is an assistant professor at the School of Information. Krupka is an experimental

behavioral economist who explores the ways in which social and environmental factors influence
behavior, using both laboratory and field experiments. Her research on social norms suggests why
individuals might engage in behaviors that appear inconsistent with self-interest and suggests why
trivial modifications to a decision context can change behavior significantly. Broadly, her work
contributes to the emerging literature that models the sway of non-wealth factors on choice, by
using social norms to raise the psychological cost of selfishness. This work is directly relevant
to the incentive-centered design of information systems, an approach pioneered by faculty at
the School of Information. She is also an affiliate of the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
Her work has appeared in journals that speak to multiple audiences; most notably to audiences
in economics, business and management as well as in computer science and information science.
She has received funding from the NSF, the Donoghue Foundation, the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation as well as numerous grants from the University of Michigan.

Promise-keeping Norms and Renegotiation Behavior

We use a trust game to test the impact of promises on behavior in the presence of uncertainty where the source of the
uncertainty stems from acts of nature. Second, we test whether promise-keeping norms affect subsequent decisions
about whether to renegotiate the terms of the initial agreement once the uncertainty is resolved. We find that second
movers frequently make promises, and that these promises affect their subsequent decisions. We demonstrate that
a utility model in which actors have preferences over outcomes as well as social norms is able to account for the
pronounced effect of promises on behavior, explain why a second mover would make the promise in the first place and
why a first mover would be willing to enter the game. For policies written against the backdrop of strong norms, we
address implications and guidelines.

10
 XUEHENG LI UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM

Xueheng Lis research interests include the evolution of social norms, network analysis, and
applied game theory.

Title TBA
We analyse how the norms of cooperation emerge and evolve in societies. The standard assumption on the evolution
of cooperation in the literature is that behaviour that yields higher material payoffs tends to spread. However, this
biologically evolutionary view fails to explain the dramatic variation in cooperation across human societies. We deviate
from the standard approach and examine the process of social evolution. We assume that individual behaviour is
influenced by resentment -- an emotion that may trigger punishment against defectors if, and only if, it is believed that
the majority of the society is cooperative. Two strict Nash equilibria arise: in one everyone cooperates while in the other
everyone defects. Social norms are defined as the self-fulfilling beliefs to support an equilibrium. Then, we construct a
stochastic dynamic to examine the evolution of the norms of cooperation and show that the cooperation equilibrium is
stochastically stable if the gain from cooperation is greater, the temptation to defect is lower, the cost of conducting
punishment is lower, and punishment is more effective. Also, we show that, consistent with existing evidence, norm
selection is independent of the scope of interactions (i.e., global versus local interactions); this property differentiates
our model from previous evolutionary models of cooperation.

MOTI MICHAELI UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA

Moti Michaeli is an Assistant Professor of economics at the University of Haifa. He obtained a

Ph.D. in economics and the study of rationality from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem in 2014
and was a Max Weber postdoctoral fellow in economics at the European University Institute (EUI)
in Florence, Italy, in 2014-2016.

He has published in top field journals such as the Journal of Public Economics, the American
Economic Journal: Micro and Economic Theory.

His main research interests are Behavioral Economics, Political Economy and Law and Economics.
In particular, he studies the underlying psychological and behavioral mechanisms that drive social,
political and legal phenomena.

Title TBA
We study the aggregate distribution of actions and the conditions allowing the existence of a social norm when
heterogeneous individuals make the trade-off between being true to their private tastes and conforming to peer
pressure. Our models characterize the conditions under which a social norm exists in equilibrium and the patterns of
norm compliance. We further shed light on the sustainability of norms that are biased compared to the average taste in
society and on how various sanctioning regimes induce conformity and by whom.

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 MICHAEL MUTHUKRISHNA LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS

Michaels research focuses on the psychological and evolutionary processes that underlie culture
(norms, beliefs, values, behaviors, etc) and how culture is transmitted, maintained, and modified.
He uses a two-pronged methodological approach in his research, combining mathematical and
computational modeling (primarily evolutionary models), and experimental psychology and
experimental economics. These interests lead to three broad questions: (1) What explains human
uniqueness? This is the starting point for Michaels research and a necessary question to derive
a Theory of Human Behavior from first principles. (2) How does culture evolve? He tests the
predictions made by evolutionary models of human behavior using experiments and where
possible, large datasets. (3) How can a psychology built up from first principles allow us to explain
the modern world? Michael is interested in how these emerging theories and data can be used
to make the world a better place. This is a fairly new focus and these efforts have been primarily
through private consulting and engagement with industry and government.

Innovation in the Collective Brain: The Transmission and Evolution of Norms and
Culture
Humans arent particularly bright. But we are good at copying each other. And often without really understanding why what
were copying works. Were like the kids in class who get good grades by getting a copy of last years exam and cribbing
the rest from the top students in the class. Ill introduce the underlying theories behind the evolution of the capacity for
culture, the evolution of culture itself, and its implications for norms, innovation, and intelligence. For example, innovation
is often assumed to be the work of a talented few, whose products are passed on to the masses. I argue that innovations
are instead an emergent property of our species cultural learning abilities, applied within our societies and social networks.
Our societies and social networks act as collective brains. I will outline how many human brains, which evolved primarily
for the acquisition of culture, together beget a collective brain. Within these collective brains, the three main sources
of innovation are serendipity, recombination, and incremental improvement. I argue that rates of innovation are heavily
influenced by (1) sociality, (2) transmission fidelity and (3) cultural variance. I will discuss some of the forces that affect
these factors. These factors can also shape each other. I will present preliminary evidence that transmission efficiency is
affected by socialitylanguages with more speakers are more efficient. Collective brains can make each of their constituent
cultural brains more innovative. This perspective sheds light on traits, such as IQ, that have been implicated in innovation.
A collective brain perspective can help us understand otherwise puzzling findings in the IQ literature, including group
differences, heritability differences, and the dramatic increase in IQ test scores over time.

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 PETER J RICHERSON UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA - DAVIS

Peter J. Richerson Is Distinguished Professor Emeritus in the Department of Environmental

Science and Policy at the University of California Davis. His research focuses on the processes
of cultural evolution. His 1985 book with Robert Boyd, Culture and the Evolutionary Process,
applied the mathematical tools used by organic evolutionists to study a number of basic problems
in human cultural evolution. His later books with Boyd include Not By Genes Alone: How Culture
Transformed Human Evolution, an introduction to cultural evolution aimed at a broad audience
and The Origins and Evolution of Cultures, a compendium of their more important papers and
book chapters. He has recently co-edited a book Cultural Evolution with Morten Christiansen
reporting the results of a Strngmann Forum. His recent publications used theoretical models
to try to understand some of the main events in human evolution, such as the evolution of the
advanced capacity for imitation (and hence cumulative cultural evolution) in humans, the origins
of tribal and larger scale cooperation, and the origins of agriculture. He and his colleagues also
investigate cultural evolution in laboratory microsocieties.

The Evolution of Norms and Institutions

There are many definitions, but one is that norms are the individual level manifestations of institutions. Institutions, in
turn, are the rules that govern expected behaviour in a society. They typically define roles and have a system of rewards
and punishments that provide incentives to behave according to the institution. The norms of different roles differ and in
complex institutions no one person may know all the norms necessary to make the institution function. The concept of
norms and institutions (N&I) are important in psychology, economics, sociology and political science but various scholars
have diverse approaches to them. The formidable complexity of systems of N&I makes the study of their evolution hard.
A theory of the evolution of N&I has to start with a low resolution map. Norms have an innate component in which an
ancestral ape social psychology was modified by gene-culture coevolution. N&I have an economic component. They
organize a cooperative production system that produces goods and services and allocates them for consumption. N&I
have a socio-political component. Duties on the production side of the economy and rights and the consumption side
are based on individual performance and social role. Rights and duties are often contested by individuals and organized
groups political factions, parties, and movements. The power to control institutional change is usually not equally
distributed, but even the relatively powerless have some influence on the system, the power to shirk on the production
side of the economy and to steal on the consumption side. Norms in different roles may include an element of resistance
but also norms of dominance and self- interest. Very crudely, institutions are liable to change when the power weighted
sum of opinion favours change. Collective change decisions are fraught with uncertainty. Participants usually how the
understand to current system works and predicting the performance of a new system is harder. Even an N&I system that
works well in another system may fail in another that tries to adopt it due to a poor fit with other N&Ls. From such a low
resolution but comprehensive picture of the evolutionary process affection the N&I system we may be able to navigate
the complexities of human social systems.

13
 UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ &
KATRIN SCHMELZ
THURGAU INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS

Katrin Schmelz is particularly interested in how culture and institutions affect our behavior. In
terms of behavior, she has mainly studied the interaction between extrinsic incentives and intrinsic
motivation from various perspectives. Methodologically, Katrin relies on economic experiments,
while her research lies at the intersection between economics and psychology.

Do politico-economic systems influence how control affects motivation?

We hypothesize that control aversion, meaning crowding-out of intrinsic motivation due to enforcement, has evolved
less under the coercive regime of East Germany than under the liberal regime of West Germany. We test this hypothesis
in a large-scale internet study. The core is a repeated principal-agent game where the principal can control the agent by
implementing a minimal effort requirement before the agent chooses an effort costly to her but beneficial to the principal.
Indeed, we find that control aversion is largely stronger among West than among East Germans. The differences are
significant and systematic for graduates born before 1980 but only in specific cases for students and never for graduates
born in the 1980s.

Our findings suggest that for East Germans who have been socialized under a coercive regime, the experience of a liberal
regime does not make them abandon completely the control preferences they have acquired earlier. Differences in control
aversion are vanishing in younger generations of East and West Germans who essentially grew up in reunified Germany.

ROBERT SUGDEN UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA

Robert Sugden is a Professor in the School of Economics, University of East Anglia.

His research uses a combination of theoretical, experimental and philosophical methods to
investigate issues in behavioural economics, normative economics, choice under uncertainty, the
foundations of decision and game theory, the methodology of economics, and the evolution of
social conventions. He currently holds a European Research Council Advanced Grant for a project
on reconstructing normative economics on a foundation of mutual advantage.

Mutual benefit as a norm

In the modern literature of social preferences, reciprocity is usually interpreted as rewarding other people for intentions
that are kind or fair, and punishing them for intentions that are unkind or unfair. I will consider a different concept
of reciprocity: playing ones expected part in mutually beneficial interactions. I will argue that intentions for reciprocity
can induce trust, trustworthiness and voluntary contributions to public goods, while also being expressed in ordinary
market behaviour. Reciprocity can be a social norm, and the members of a society have a common interest in propagating
this norm.

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 MARCELLA VERONESI UNIVERSITY OF VERONA & ETH ZURICH

Marcella Veronesi is an Associate Professor at the Department of Economics, University of Verona

(Italy), and a Research Affiliate at the Center for Development and Cooperation (NADEL) of the
Swiss Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich (Switzerland). Marcella received her Ph.D. and M.S.
from the University of Maryland and has been a senior researcher and lecturer at ETH Zurich.
Her research focuses on applied microeconomics, and in particular, on topics ranging from the
economics of identity to health and environmental economics.

Social Identity, Attitudes towards cooperation, and social preferences: Evidence from
Switzerland
We investigate the role of social identity in explaining individual variation in social preferences in the domain of
cooperation. We combine measures of social identity at both extensive and intensive margins with measures of social
preferences elicited using a public goods game in the strategy method among a representative sample of Swiss
households. We document a strong association between social identity and social preferences, which becomes stronger
with the degree of social identity. Our results are not driven by differences in national or even local institutions,
geography, historical, and economic conditions. Additional analyses show that grandparental and parental background
shapes social identity, as well as social preferences. Our design allows us to go beyond behavior and disentangle social
preferences from beliefs, highlighting the importance of social identity for deeper social preferences in a natural field
setting.

FELIX WARNEKEN HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Dr. Felix Warneken is the John L. Loeb Associate Professor of the Social Sciences and Director of
the Social Cognitive Development Group in the Psychology Department at Harvard University.
He uses developmental, cross-cultural, and comparative methods to understand human
psychology, with a focus on the social-cognitive underpinnings of cooperation and fairness. He
has received several awards, most recently the Janet Taylor Spence Award for Transformative
Early Career Contributions from the Association for Psychological Science and the Boyd
McCandless Award by the American Psychological Association.

The Origins of Cooperation and Fairness

Humans are able to cooperate with others in sophisticated, flexible ways: sharing valuable resources, assisting others who
need help, and working collaboratively in teams. These behaviors are regulated by norms of fairness about the best way
to distribute resources and how to treat uncooperative individuals. However, the origins of these behaviors are contested.
Here I present experimental studies that aim to determine the developmental and evolutionary origins of our cooperative
behaviors and how they are shaped by social norms. By studying how childrens cooperation and fairness emerge in
development and then comparing their behaviors to those of chimpanzees, these studies show which aspects are species-
unique and which have deeper evolutionary roots. This is complemented by studies comparing childrens behaviors across
cultural groups, providing insight into the role of cultural practices in guiding childrens development.

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 FABIAN WINTER MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR COLLECTIVE GOODS

Fabian Winter is head of the research group Mechanisms of Normative Change at the Max
Planck Institute for Collective Goods. He is a social scientist working at the intersection of
sociology, economics, and sometimes social psychology. Fabian heads a research group at the
MPI for Collective Goods in Bonn, studying the Mechanisms of Normative Change. He is an
experimentalist by training, but is constantly expanding his methodological quiver to use the
necessary methods to answer the questions he has.

Normative change and culture of hate: a randomized experiment in online communities

There are concerns about an increasing permissiveness in society in the level of hate speech one is allowed to display
publicly. The wide availability of online social media amplifies this phenomenon to the point that there is a demand to
tackle hatred content. Most common interventions are community-driving approaches and censoring. The former relies
in the feedback (counter-speak) produced by peers to reduce hate speech through peer punishment. The latter implies
directly deleting hate speech content. This censoring intervention assumes that behaviour of the social media users
changes as a function of beliefs about general levels of norm compliance. In short, we expect individuals to condition
their compliance on others compliance. Nevertheless there is a lack of empirical evidence.

To test these two different approaches we have designed a large-scale online randomized experiment that allows us
to compare both interventions and to advance in the theory of social norms change: if beliefs about norm compliance
guide individual behaviour, modifying these beliefs will be a way to create social change. The experiment was designed
to resemble an online social network where participants were asked to engage in discussion about pictures of selected
topics. The participants were divided into three groups, one for each intervention and the control group. We measure
the resulting level of hate speech in every condition. Our empirical results show broad differences between the two
interventions. Participants were significantly less likely to engage in hate speech in the experimental conditions compared
with the control group. This work presents some of the first large scale experimental evidence investigating the social
and structural determinants of hate speech in social networks. The results could advance the understanding of the micro-
mechanisms that regulate hate speech. Also such findings can guide future social network interventions to prevent the
spread of a hate culture.

EMILY WYMAN UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM

Emily Wymans professional interests lie in the realm of cooperative behaviour and decision-
making: She uses economic game-theory models to investigate when and how individuals
cooperate under experimental conditions. She explores psychological adaptations for
cooperation, focusing in particular on how these emerge over development (experimental work
with children), and how they are unique to humans (comparative work with our primate relatives).
Emilys applied work involves developing methods for applying the basic science of cooperation
to real-world cooperative challenges outside the lab. This focuses particularly on applications in
business contexts.

Team Reasoning and fairness in childrens cooperative decision-making

The cooperative challenges that norms apply to, and the psychology of cooperative norm adherence are matters of some
debate. Some accounts conceptualize norms as emerging from both coordination problems and social dilemma contexts
(producing coordination norms and social dilemma norms, Ullmann Margalit, 1978). Others argue that cooperation
norms emerge more exclusively out of social dilemma contexts (e.g. Bicchieri, 2006), in which rules prescribing conditional
cooperation, reciprocity and fairness enable sustained cooperation (e.g. Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Henrich et al.,
2010). The psychological mechanisms underlying norms adherence also remain unclear, that is, whether people follow
cooperative norms to avoid the negative emotions associated with violation, due to preferences for cooperating, or in
virtue of normative expectations of compliance in the community (see Elster, 1989; Gaechter, Nosenzo & Sefton, 2013;
Bicchieri, 2006, respectively). These theoretical issues are not resolved here, but act as general background to an empirical
study conducted with children. The cooperative decision-making of 8-10-year-olds was assessed on both social dilemma
problems and coordination problems, and a number of norm relevant phenomena were explored: group membership; team
reasoning; and fairness concerns. Results showed that, on social dilemma problems, in-group partners were more likely to
cooperate than out-group partners, and the difference appeared to be driven by higher levels of team reasoning, and more
frequent fairness concerns. Cooperation on coordination problems, however, turned out to be robust to the effects of
group membership: In-group partners were no more likely than out-group partners to cooperate, and team reasoning and
fairness concerns were fairly common to both. Overall, the results suggest that, in children, in-group membership triggers
team reasoning and fairness concerns, leading to increased chances of cooperation on social-dilemma problems. However,
when children have aligned preferences for cooperating (on coordination problems), this enables team-reasoning and
fairness concerns to emerge, regardless of group affiliation.
16
 EREZ YOELI HARVARD UNIVERSITY PROGRAM FOR EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS

Erez Yoeli is a research scientist at Harvards Program for Evolutionary Dynamics (PED). He uses
game theory to study puzzling aspects of peoples sense of rights, ethics, and altruism, then applies
the lessons from this work to addressing real-world problems like increasing energy conservation,
improving antibiotic adherence, and reducing smoking in public places. Before joining PED, Erez
was an economist at the Federal Trade Commission.

Harnessing Observability to Promote Large-scale Cooperation

How can we best promote large-scale cooperation--to conserve resources or promote sustainable farming and fishing?
In a review of field experiments that promote large scale cooperation, we found that one method stands out: increasing
observability. Ill present two field experiments of I coauthored and several from other researchers, in which observability
is increased using sign up sheets, collection boxes, newsletters, and even follow-up calls. Ill discuss where observability
works best, and some limitations.

ROI ZULTAN BEN-GURION UNIVERSITY OF THE NEGEV

RoI is an experimental economist with a background in cognitive and experimental psychology.

He is mainly interested in understanding how groups shape cognitions and behaviour as well as in
more broad issues of cooperation and behaviour in teams. RoI uses the experimental laboratory to
study innate human tendencies that emerge even in context and history free worlds.

Corrupt Norms and Corrupt Collaboration

Recent evidence shows that when the moral cost of lying can be offset by engaging in a normatively acceptable behaviour,
such as collaborating, people lie much more than in comparable settings in which they work alone. This increase, however,
can be attributed to two factors: the exposure to the others lies or the desire to collaborate in order to obtain the desired
benefit. Here, we report the results of an experiment that tests the role of norm exposure vs. collaboration in shaping
peoples lies and ethical behavior. It further explores whether an exogenous manipulation of the feeling of bonding with
others through oxytocin vs. placebo administration amplifies this effect.
In our design two players privately roll two dice each and report their outcomes. Reporting rolling the same number
secures profit. Reporting rolling different numbers does not. In the exposure setting, both observe each others reports,
but only ones reports determine this persons profit. In the collaborative setting, both observe each others reports, and
profits are determined by the joint outcomes the two players report.
Results suggests that lying in both settings is higher than it would be expected if participants are honest. We find a significant
difference on individual level lying behaviour. Specifically, the frequency of dyads where both players are honest is lower
in collaboration than in the exposure setting. Oxytocin (vs. placebo) administration did not moderate the result. It seems
collaboration plays a key role in spreading corrupt norms.

17
 NOTES

18
 GETTING TO UEA
How to get to UEA

The University and the city of Norwich are well BY CAR From London take the M11/A11;
served by road, train, and air connections from all just outside Norwich take the A47 (Southern Bypass)
regions of the UK. Regular links with the continent in the direction of Swaffham; the University is
by sea and air are also available. signposted off at the next exit. If you are driving from
Distances from Norwich: the North or the Midlands, you can use the A47 via
London ................................................115 miles Kings Lynn, or the A14 as far as Newmarket and
Birmingham ..........................................175 miles then take the A11 to Norwich. UEA is situated on
Harwich ................................................60 miles the outskirts of Norwich, around two miles west of
Glasgow..............................................383 miles the city centre, just off the Earlham Road (B1108)
Leicester...............................................116 miles which is one of the main roads out of the city.
Manchester ..........................................185 miles
Newcastle............................................257 miles
Stansted.................................................65 miles

By air
Norwich International Airport has
regular flights to and from Aberdeen,
CR
OM

Edinburgh, and Manchester, and international

ER

The main site for UEAs School of connections to 200 cities worldwide through
RD

NORWICH
Nursing and Midwifery is at the AIRPORT regular direct flights to and from Schipol Airport
DR

Edith Cavell Building, adjacent to

AY

A140 in Amsterdam. The easiest way to reach UEA

TO

The Norfolk and Norwich University from the airport is by taxi.

N
HI

Hospital on Colney Lane Flight enquiries: (+44) (0) 1603 428800

HG
RD

A1067

To Swaffham
and the Midlands
OUTER RING RD
A1074
AY

OUTER RING RD
LS
HA
M

DER
RD

EHA
MR
D

A47
NORWICH
CITY CENTRE
UEA CASTLE
RD
ENTRANCE EARLHAM C of E
CATHEDRAL YARMOUTH
RD
NS
PHE
STE ST.

NORWICH
RC STATION
CATHEDRAL
BUS &
COACH
B1108 WATTON RD STATION
CO
BLUEBELL RD

LA LN
N EY INNER
NRP E To Great Yarmouth
NORWICH RING RD
entrance RESEARCH UNIVERSITY OF NORWICH CITY
FOOTBALL
PARK EAST ANGLIA D CLUB
KR A47
AN
TH
UN
A47
NORFOLK EDITH
AND NORWICH CAVELL RD
UNIVERSITY BUILDING ET
RK
The Norwich Research HOSPITAL W MA
NHS TRUST NE
Park, which includes the A11 To Lowestoft
John Innes Centre and A47
A146
Sainsbury Laboratory
RD

and the Institute of Food

IPSWICH

Research, is situated off

the Watton Road, adjacent
to the UEA campus. A47

By train
A11
Norwich is less than two hours from
To London A140
By bus and coach London by train and there is an InterCity link with the
To Ipswich Midlands, the north of England and Scotland via
National Express coaches run from all major cities in
Great Britain to the Surrey Street Bus Station in the city Peterborough. Trains run from London Liverpool Street
centre. Buses 25, 26 and 27 run regularly from approximately every half hour. You can reach UEA
Castle Meadow and the Bus Station in the city centre from the station by taxi, which takes approximately
to the University campus. 15 minutes. There are regular buses direct to the
Bus and coach enquiries: (+44) (0) 870 608 2608 University from the station forecourt (number 25).
National Express enquiries: (+44) (0) 8705 808080 Rail enquiries: (+44) (0) 8457 484950

19
 UEA CAMPUS
Accomodation is available on campus at our hotel, Broadview Lodge (13), breakfast is
served at the INTO Cafe (5), and lunch at the SCVA Cafe (29).
The Workshop will be held in Arts 01.06, which is located in the Teaching Wall (9), opposite
the central square (15).
A range of amenities are also available on Campus including cash points, cafes and shops
(17)
WIFI LOGIN
UEA has two wireless networks available, Eduroam and The Cloud. If you are coming from
an instituion which is part of eduroam, you should connect to the network automatically.
However it is possible that you may need to manually enter your login information

If you do have any issues using Eduroam, or are not from an institution which uses it,
then you will be able to connect your devices to The Cloud. Simply select _The Cloud
from the list of available wireless networks, then open your browser. This will take you
to a registration page where you will need to enter your details, including your choice of
username and password.

The Cloud is free to use and is also available in areas of central Norwich.

NORWICH
Norwich is a friendly and diverse city, both vibrant and attractive. A hotbed for the
arts, culture and tourism, it is a city full of stunning architecture. Norwich has a
Norman Cathedral and a 12th Century Castle, as well as an open-air market, a range of
independent shops in the Norwich Lanes, and restaurants, cinemas, galleries, theatres,
cafes and pubs.

The Citys medieval centre of cobbled streets remains largely intact, but there is still space
for modern buildings such as the Forum, a stunning piece of contemporary architecture.
Its glass front overlooks the colourful six-day market and reflects the city in all its diversity.

For further information about Norwich;

http://www.visitnorwich.co.uk/

http://www.visitnorfolk.co.uk/explore/Norwich.aspx

LOCAL TAXI FIRMS

ABC Taxis - 01603 666333 | Courtesy Taxis - 01603 446644 | Green Frog - 01603 744747

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 Co-sponsored by the Economic & Social
Research Council

School of Economics
University of East Anglia
Norwich Research Park
Norwich
NR4 7TJ
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