Suu Kyi's Burden
Suu Kyi's Burden
Suu Kyi's Burden
Ziauddin Choudhury
In a remarkable piece in the New Yorker magazine recently the article reveals the inner conflicts of
Myanmars de facto leader Suu Kyi, both internal and external, in facing the current Rohingya crisis. The
article appropriately titled Fallen Idol chronicles the rise of a rather unknown foreign educated woman
from a non-political background to a world hero for her championship of democracy and human rights
in a country long dominated by military dictatorship. She was identified as an icon of freedom of speech
and democratic rights of people alongside such figures as Nelson Mandela of South Africa, Vaclav Havel
of Czechoslovakia, Corazon Aquino of Philippines, leaders who had faced long imprisonment and
sufferings in the hands of their countries dictators.
Suu Kyi earned sympathy and support of all freedom and democracy lovers of the world for bold stand
against the dictatorial regime. Indeed, the ground swell of support for her cause and that of her country
would lead her first to win the Nobel Prize for peace and finally force the hands of her oppressors to
release her from captivity. Her subsequent role in changing the political landscape of Myanmar with first
ever free elections in many years would make her the de facto head of the government albeit not in
title. And that is the main contention now. Does Suu Kyi have the real power in Myanmar or is she is a
simply a front for the junta that allowed her back in politics?
The question has become more forceful with the Rohingya crisis with hundreds of thousands of innocent
civilians hounded out of their hearth and homes in Myanmar for ethnic reasons and Suu Kyis reticence
or seeming inability to sop this human rights violation. How can a person who was once identified as an
icon of democratic and human rights, one who had suffered long years in captivity because she
demanded these rights for her country not speak out against repression of a religious minority in her
own country and under own watch? Why she never asked her own military to stop this violence but
instead blamed militants for the violence? Does she really control her own government?
People point out that despite Suu Kyi winning handily the elections of 2013 and her party having the
majority of Parliamentary seats, the Army has an oversize influence in her government. Under the
provisions of the new constitution written by the Army, the Army retains the portfolios of defense,
home affairs, border guards, and a quarter of the seats in the parliament. The army has also a sizeable
control of several other ministries of the government (such as finance, foreign affairs) through holdovers
from the previous military regimes. Viewed from this perspective one can speculate that Suu Kyi may
not be the actual key to her government. Her reticence and apparent unwillingness to stop the Rohingya
exodus may be more because of her weak position in the government than her actual feeling about the
issue.
But is that the reality? The article I referred to above attempted to answer some of these questions by
delving into the upbringing and background of Suu Kyi. It is ironic but true; Suu Kyi is the daughter of the
founder of Burmese Independence Army, the predecessor of modern Burmese Army. According to her
own statement she feels great attachment to the armed forces because as a child she was cared for by
my fathers soldiers. In fact, the love and hate between Suu Kyi and the Army is captured by the
Armys overall treatment of Suu Kyi during her long captivity when her life was never put in danger. Her
subsequent release by the Army and allowing of a quasi-democratic process in Myanmar was a product
of the military juntas desire to open the country to western investment and rapprochement with
western countries by letting her party to contest the elections. The junta found in Suu Kyi, the new
western idol, a bridge to connect the country with the West. And Suu Kyi settled with the junta even
though the junta drafted constitution debarred her from becoming officially the Head of the Country.
She remained satisfied as a de facto ruler with the vague title of State Counsellor.
Suu Kyis acceptance of the terms of endearment offered by the junta can be explained in two ways.
One, this was a compromise to usher a democratic government in Myanmar even though it meant some
personal sacrifice for her (in that she could not become President). Second, it would afford her to
exercise power that she would otherwise not have. In accepting the terms she wanted to retain the
Armys support in the parliament because she wants ultimately the office of the President.
Does the strange title of Suu Kyi in the governance of Myanmar or the control of vital organs of the
government by Burmese Army absolve of her responsibilities to stop the violence against an ethnic
group in her country? Definitely not. Despite this vague title of State Counsellor, Suu Kyi is both symbolic
and real head of the government to her country and the world. She is in reality head of the cabinet and
the principal coordinator of all ministries in her cabinet. That is why a statement coming from her is to
be treated as the final official word of her government.
The biggest puzzle therefore is how much of the atrocity against the Rohingya is being executed with her
consent or ignorance. In her own statement to her nation a few weeks ago Suu Kyi admitted for the first
time that there were acts of violence in Rakhine state but she also blamed Rohingya militants for
initiating the violence. She addressed the issue not to actually ask the military to stop the atrocities but
to placate international outcries against the violence and oppression against the Rohingyas. She said she
would restore peace, but her assurance was too little and too late. Over a million refugees have left
Myanmar and will not return unless Suu Kyi and her military provide a safe haven for the Rohingyas by
giving them citizenship.
In reality, Suu Kyis hands are not tied by the military as much as some would like to think. She is tied by
her own desire to retain power and change the constitution to allow her become President, none of
which can happen without the Armys support. The New Yorker article mentions how her own party
follows a military like hierarchy (it is full of ex-army personnel) and Suu Kyi values discipline and loyalty
above everything.
Suu Kyis failure to condemn the Armys action against the Rohingyas is because she does not want to
displease the army. Her burden for now is the international criticism of her conduct, not the Rohingyas.
She is hoping that with support from China and passive reactions from Russia and India she will be
successful in deflecting the criticism against her by stubbornly referring to the violence as anti-terrorism
action by her government, but not for long. She will have to do more than rhetorically address the
Rohingya issue as a mere law and order situation arising from terrorism which includes accepting the
Rohingyas back and giving them safe haven. Otherwise the burden on her shoulder will turn her from
an icon of democracy to an icon of hypocrisy.
Ziauddin Choudhury is a former World Bank staff member and a civil servant.