18.people V Malngan

4/24/2016 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 503
294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Malngan
*
G.R. No. 170470. September 26, 2006.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. EDNA

MALNGAN y MAYO, appellant.
Criminal Law; Arson; Homicide; There is no complex crime of

arson with (multiple) homicideArt. 320 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended, with respect to destructive arson, and
the provisions of PD No. 1613 respecting other cases of arson
provide only one penalty for the commission of arson, whether
considered destructive or otherwise, where death results therefrom.
The Information in this case erroneously charged accused
appellant with a complex crime, i.e., Arson with Multiple
Homicide. Presently, there are two (2) laws that govern the crime
of arson where death results therefromArticle 320 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7659,
and Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1613, quoted
hereunder, to wit: Revised Penal Code: ART. 320. Destructive
Arson.x x x x If as a consequence of the commission of any of the
acts penalized under this Article, death results, the mandatory
penalty of death shall be imposed. [Emphasis supplied.]
Presidential Decree No. 1613: SEC. 5. Where Death Results
from Arson.If by reason of or on the occasion of the arson death
results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be
imposed. [Emphasis supplied.] Art. 320 of the RPC, as amended,
with respect to destructive arson, and the provisions of PD No.
1613 respecting other cases of arson provide only one penalty for
the commission of arson, whether considered destructive or
otherwise, where death results therefrom. The raison d'tre is that
arson is itself the end and death is simply the consequence.
Same; Same; Same; In cases where both burning and death

occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were
perpetratedwhether arson, murder, or arson and
homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001544854bc8eb6339eb7003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/47
_______________
* EN BANC.
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People vs. Malngan
objective of the malefactor.In cases where both burning and

death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were
perpetratedwhether arson, murder or arson and
homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective
of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of the
building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion
of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is
absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a
particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is
resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime
committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to
kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already done
so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then
there are two separate and distinct crimes committed
homicide/murder and arson.
Same; Witnesses; The credibility given by trial courts to

prosecution witnesses is an important aspect of evidence which
appellate courts can rely on because of its unique opportunity to
observe them, particularly their demeanor, conduct, and attitude,
during the direct and crossexamination by counsels.All the
witnesses are in accord that accusedappellants agitated
appearance was out of the ordinary. Remarkably, she has never
denied this observation. We give great weight to the findings of
the RTC and so accord credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses as it had the opportunity to observe them
directly. The credibility given by trial courts to prosecution
witnesses is an important aspect of evidence which appellate
courts can rely on because of its unique opportunity to observe
them, particularly their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, during
the direct and crossexamination by counsels. Here, Remigio
Bernardo, Rolando Gruta and Mercedita Mendoza are
disinterested witnesses and there is not an iota of evidence in the
records to indicate that they are suborned witnesses. The records

of the RTC even show that Remigio Bernardo, the Barangay
Chairman, kept accusedappellant from being mauled by the
angry crowd outside of the barangay hall.
Same; Same; Where the defense failed to show any evil or

improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses, the
presumption is that their testimonies are true and thus entitled to
full faith and credence.Accusedappellant has not shown any
compelling reason why the witnesses presented would openly,
publicly and deliberately lie or concoct a story, to send an
innocent person to jail all the while knowing that the real
malefactor remains at large. Such proposition defies logic. And
where the defense failed to show any evil or improper motive on
the part of the prosecution witnesses, the
296
People vs. Malngan
presumption is that their testimonies are true and thus entitled

to full faith and credence.
Same; Same; Same; Circumstantial Evidence; Requisites;

Words and Phrases; Circumstantial evidence is that evidence
which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue
may be established by inferenceit is founded on experience and
observed facts and coincidences establishing a connection between
the known and proven facts and the facts sought to be proved.
While the prosecution witnesses did not see accusedappellant
actually starting the fire that burned several houses and killed
the Separa family, her guilt may still be established through
circumstantial evidence provided that: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and, (3) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or
series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by
inference. It is founded on experience and observed facts and
coincidences establishing a connection between the known and
proven facts and the facts sought to be proved. In order to bring
about a conviction, the circumstantial evidence presented must
constitute an unbroken chain, which leads to one fair and

reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of
others, as the guilty person.
Same; Rights of Suspects; Miranda Doctrine; Extrajudicial

Confessions; Requisites for Admissibility.We have held that the
abovequoted provision applies to the stage of custodial
investigationwhen the investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular
person as a suspect. Said constitutional guarantee has also been
extended to situations in which an individual has not been
formally arrested but has merely been invited for questioning.
To be admissible in evidence against an accused, the extrajudicial
confessions made must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it
must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and
(4) it must be in writing.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Arguably, the barangay tanods,

including the Barangay Chairman, may be deemed as law
enforcement officers for purposes of applying Article III, Section
12(1) and (3), of the Constitutionthe confession of accused, given
to the Barangay Chairman, as well as the lighter found by the
latter in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her as such
were obtained in violation of her constitutional rights.Arguably,
the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this
particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for
purposes of applying Article
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People vs. Malngan
III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused

appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2
January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in
the fire that destroyed several houses as well as killed the whole
family of Roberto Separa, Sr. She was, therefore, already under
custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by Article III,
Section 12(1), of the Constitution should have already been
observed or applied to her. Accusedappellants confession to
Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo was made in response to
the interrogation made by the latteradmittedly conducted

without first informing accusedappellant of her rights under the
Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason,
the confession of accusedappellant, given to Barangay Chairman
Remigio Bernardo, as well as the lighter found by the latter in her
bag are inadmissible in evidence against her as such were
obtained in violation of her constitutional rights.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It should well be recalled that the

constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not
apply to those not elicited through questioning by the police or
their agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused
verbally admits to having committed the offense as what happened
the Bill of Rights solely governs the relationship between the
individual on one hand and the State (and its agents) on the other,
and it does not concern itself with the relation between a private
individual and another private individual.Be that as it may,
the inadmissibility of accusedappellants confession to Barangay
Chairman Remigio Bernardo and the lighter as evidence do not
automatically lead to her acquittal. It should well be recalled that
the constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do
not apply to those not elicited through questioning by the police or
their agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the
accused verbally admits to having committed the offense as what
happened in the case at bar when accusedappellant admitted to
Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of Roberto Separa, Sr.,
to having started the fire in the Separas house. The testimony of
Mercedita Mendoza recounting said admission is, unfortunately
for accusedappellant, admissible in evidence against her and is
not covered by the aforesaid constitutional guarantee. Article III
of the Constitution, or the Bill of Rights, solely governs the
relationship between the individual on one hand and the State
(and its agents) on the other; it does not concern itself with the
relation between a private individual and another private
individualas both accusedappellant and prosecution witness
Mercedita Mendoza undoubtedly are. Here, there is no evidence
on record to show that said witness was acting under police
authority, so appro
298
People vs. Malngan
priately, accusedappellants uncounselled extrajudicial confession

to said witness was properly admitted by the RTC.
Same; Arson; Homicide; In the crime of arson, the identities of

the victims are immaterial in that intent to kill them particularly
is not one of the elements of the crime.In the crime of arson, the
identities of the victims are immaterial in that intent to kill them
particularly is not one of the elements of the crime. As we have
clarified earlier, the killing of a person is absorbed in the charge
of arson, simple or destructive. The prosecution need only prove,
that the burning was intentional and that what was intentionally
burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Again, in the case of
People v. Soriano, we explained that: Although intent may be an
ingredient of the crime of Arson, it may be inferred from the acts
of the accused. There is a presumption that one intends the
natural consequences of his act; and when it is shown that one
has deliberately set fire to a building, the prosecution is not bound
to produce further evidence of his wrongful intent.
Same; Same; There are two (2) categories of the crime of arson
(1) destructive arson, and (2) simple arson, which classification
is based on the kind, character and location of the property
burned, regardless of the value of the damage caused.There are
two (2) categories of the crime of arson: 1) destructive arson, under
Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659; and 2) simple arson, under Presidential Decree No.
1613. Said classification is based on the kind, character and
location of the property burned, regardless of the value of the
damage caused.
Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; What is controlling is

not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense
charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated,
but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts
therein recited.As stated in the body of the Information,
accusedappellant was charged with having intentionally burned
the twostorey residential house of Robert Separa. Said
conflagration likewise spread and destroyed seven (7) adjoining
houses. Consequently, if proved, as it was proved, at the trial, she
may be convicted, and sentenced accordingly, of the crime of
simple arson. Such is the case notwithstanding the error in the
designation of the offense in the information, the information
remains effective insofar as it states the facts constituting the
crime alleged therein. What is controlling is not the title of the

complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the
particular law or part thereof allegedly violate, x x x, but the
description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein
recited.
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People vs. Malngan
Same; Same; Damages; Moral damages cannot be awarded in

the absence of proof of mental or physical suffering on the part of
the heirs of the victims.Apropos the civil liabilities of accused
appellant, current jurisprudence dictate that the civil indemnity
due from accusedappellant is P50,000.00 for the death of each of
the victims. However, the monetary awards for moral and
exemplary damages given by the Court of Appeals, both in the
amount of P50,000.00, due the heirs of the victims, have to be
deleted for lack of material basis. Similarly, the Court of Appeals
award of exemplary damages to Rodolfo Movilla in the amount of
P50,000.00 for the destruction of his house, also has to be deleted,
but in this instance for being improper. Moral damages cannot be
award by this Court in the absence of proof of mental or physical
suffering on the part of the heirs of the victims. Concerning the
award of exemplary damages, the reason for the deletion being
that no aggravating circumstance had been alleged and proved by
the prosecution in the case at bar.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for the People.
Arthur K. Herman for appellant.
CHICONAZARIO, J.:
The Case
1
For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. CR HC No. 01139 promulgated on 2 2September 2005,
affirming with modification the Judgment of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 41, in Criminal Case

No. 01188424 promulgated on 13 October 2003, finding
appellant Edna Malngan y Mayo (Edna) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Arson with Multiple
Homi
_______________
1 Penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas with

Associate Justices Portia AlioHormachuelos and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.
concurring; Rollo, pp. 326.
2 Penned by Hon. Rodolfo A. Ponferrada, Presiding Judge, RTC Manila,
Branch 41; Records, pp. 296310.
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People vs. Malngan
cide or Arson resulting to the death of six (6) people, and

sentencing her to suffer the penalty of death.
The Facts
3
As summarized by the Court of Appeals, the antecedent
facts are as follows:
From the personal account of Remigio Bernardo, the Barangay

Chairman in the area, as well as the personal account of the
pedicab driver named Rolando Gruta, it was at around 4:45 a.m.
on January 2, 2001 when Remigio Bernardo and his tanods saw
the accusedappellant EDNA, one hired as a housemaid by
Roberto Separa, Sr., with her head turning in different directions,
hurriedly leaving the house of her employer at No. 172 Moderna
Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila. She was seen to have boarded a
pedicab which was driven by a person later identified as Rolando
Gruta. She was heard by the pedicab driver to have instructed
that she be brought to Nipa Street, but upon her arrival there,
she changed her mind and asked that she be brought instead to
Balasan Street where she finally alighted, after paying for her
fare.
Thirty minutes later, at around 5:15 a.m. Barangay Chairman
Bernardos group later discovered that a fire gutted the house of
the employer of the housemaid. Barangay Chairman Bernardo
and his tanods responded to the fire upon hearing shouts from the
residents and thereafter, firemen from the Fire District 1NCR

arrived at the fire scene to contain the fire.
When Barangay Chairman Bernardo returned to the Barangay
Hall, he received a report from pedicab driver Rolando Gruta, who
was also a tanod, that shortly before the occurrence of the fire, he
saw a woman (the housemaid) coming out of the house at No. 172
Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila and he received a call from
his wife telling him of a woman (the same housemaid) who was
acting strangely and suspiciously on Balasan Street. Barangay
Chairman Bernardo, Rolando Gruta and the other tanods
proceeded to Balasan Street and found the woman who was later
identified as the accusedappellant. After Rolando Gruta
positively identified the woman as the same person who left No.
172 Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila, Barangay Chairman
Bernardo and his tanods apprehended her and brought her to the
Barangay Hall for investigation. At the Barangay Hall, Mercedita
Mendoza, neighbor of Roberto Separa, Sr. and whose house was
also burned,
_______________
3 CA decision, pp. 25; Rollo, pp. 47.
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People vs. Malngan
identified the woman as accusedappellant EDNA who was the

housemaid of Roberto Separa, Sr. Upon inspection, a disposable
lighter was found inside accusedappellant EDNAs bag.
Thereafter, accusedappellant EDNA confessed to Barangay
Chairman Bernardo in the presence of multitudes of angry
residents outside the Barangay Hall that she set her employers
house on fire because she had not been paid her salary for about a
year and that she wanted to go home to her province but her
employer told her to just ride a broomstick in going home.
Accusedappellant EDNA was then turned over to arson
investigators headed by S[F]O4 Danilo Talusan, who brought her
to the San Lazaro Fire Station in Sta. Cruz, Manila where she
was further investigated and then detained.
When Mercedita Mendoza went to the San Lazaro Fire Station
to give her sworn statement, she had the opportunity to ask
accusedappellant EDNA at the latters detention cell why she did
the burning of her employers house and accusedappellant EDNA
replied that she set the house on fire because when she asked
permission to go home to her province, the wife of her employer
Roberto Separa, Sr., named Virginia Separa (sic) shouted at her:
Sige umuwi ka, pagdating mo maputi ka na. Sumakay ka sa
walis, pagdating mo maputi ka na (TSN, January 22, 2002, p. 6)
(Go ahead, when you arrive your color would be fair already.
Ride a broomstick, when you arrive your color would be fair
already.) And when Mercedita Mendoza asked accusedappellant
EDNA how she burned the house, accusedappellant EDNA told
her: Naglukot ako ng maraming diyaryo, sinindihan ko ng
disposable lighter at hinagis ko sa ibabaw ng lamesa sa loob ng
bahay (TSN, January 22, 2002, p. 7.) (I crumpled newspapers,
lighted them with a disposable lighter and threw them on top of
the table inside the house.)
When interviewed by Carmelita Valdez, a reporter of ABS
CBN Network, accusedappellant EDNA while under detention
(sic) was heard by SFO4 (sic) Danilo Talusan as having admitted
the crime and even narrated the manner how she accomplished it.
SFO4 (sic) Danilo Talusan was able to hear the same confession,
this time at his home, while watching the television program
True Crime hosted by Gus Abelgas also of ABSCBN Network.
The fire resulted in [the] destruction of the house of Roberto
Separa, Sr. and other adjoining houses and the death of Roberto
Separa, Sr. and Virginia Separa together with their four (4)
children, namely: Michael, Daphne, Priscilla and Roberto, Jr.
302

People vs. Malngan
4
On 9 January 2001, an Information was filed before the
RTC of Manila, Branch 41, charging accusedappellant
with the crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide. The case
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 01188424. The
accusatory portion of said Information provides:
That on or about January 2, 2001, in the City of Manila,

Philippines, the said accused, with intent to cause damage, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and deliberately
set fire upon the twostorey residential house of ROBERTO
SEPARA and family mostly made of wooden materials located at
No. 172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, this city, by lighting crumpled
newspaper with the use of disposable lighter inside said house
knowing the same to be an inhabited house and situated in a
thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof a

conflagration ensued and the said building, together with some
seven (7) adjoining residential houses, were razed by fire; that by
reason and on the occasion of the said fire, the following, namely,
1. Roberto Separa, Sr., 45 years of age

2. Virginia Separa y Mendoza, 40 years of age
3. Michael Separa, 24 years of age
4. Daphne Separa, 18 years of age
5. Priscilla Separa, 14 years of age
6. Roberto Separa, Jr., 11 years of age
sustained burn injuries which were the direct cause of their

5
death immediately thereafter.
When arraigned, accusedappellant with assistance of

counsel de oficio,pleaded6 Not7 Guilty to the crime
charged. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The8 prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely,
SPO4 Danilo Talusan, Rolando Gruta, Remigio Bernardo,
Mercedita Men
_______________
4 Records, pp. 12.

5 Id., at p. 1.
6 Id., at pp. 1213.
7 During the trial, accusedappellant Edna was assisted by Atty. Brian
S. Masweng of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples as she is a
member of Blaan ethnic tribe from Saranggani Province.
8 Also termed as SFO4 in some parts of the records.
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People vs. Malngan
doza and Rodolfo Movilla to establish its charge that

accusedappellant Edna committed the crime of arson with
multiple homicide.
SPO4 Danilo Talusan, arson investigator, testified that
he was one of those who responded to the fire that occurred
on 2 January 2001 and which started at No. 172 Moderna
St., Balut, Tondo, Manila. He stated that the fire killed
Roberto Separa, Sr. and all the other members of his
family, namely his wife, Virginia, and his children,

Michael, Daphne, Priscilla and Roberto, Jr.; the fire also
destroyed their abode as well as six neighboring houses. He
likewise testified that he twice heard accusedappellant
once while the latter was being interviewed by Carmelita
Valdez, a reporter of ABSCBN, and the other time when it
was shown on channel 2 on television during the airing of
the television program entitled True Crime hosted by Gus
Abelgasconfess to having committed the crime charged,
to wit:
Pros. Rebagay:
Based on your investigation, was there any occasion
when the accused Edna Malngan admitted to the
burning of the house of the Separa Family?
xxxx
Witness:
Yes, sir.
Pros. Rebagay:
When was that?
A: On January 2 she was interviewed by the media, sir.
The one who took the coverage was Carmelita Valdez of
Channel 2, ABSCBN. They have a footage that Edna
admitted before them, sir.
Q: And where were you when Edna Malngan made that
statement or admission to Carmelita Valdez of ABS
CBN?
A: I was at our office, sir.
Q: Was there any other occasion wherein the accused
made another confession relative to the admission of
the crime?
A: Yes, sir.
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People vs. Malngan
Q: When was that?

A: Last Friday, sir. It was shown in True Crime of Gus
Abelgas. She was interviewed at the City Jail and she
admitted that she was the one who authored the crime,
sir.
Pros. Rebagay:
And where were you when that admission to Gus
Abelgas was made?
A: I was in the house and I just saw it on tv, sir.
Q: What was that admission that you heard personally,
when you were present, when the accused made the
confession to Carmelita Valdez?
A: Naglukot po siya ng papel, sinidihan niya ng lighter at
inilagay niya sa ibabaw ng mesa yung mga diyaryo at
sinunog niya.
xxxx
Q: Aside from that statement, was there any other
statement made by the accused Edna Malngan?
A: Yes, sir. Kaya po niya nagawa yon galit po siya sa
kanyang amo na si Virginia, hindi siya pinasuweldo at
gusto na po niyang umuwi na (sic) ayaw siyang
payagan. Nagsalita pa po sa kanya na, Sumakay ka na
lang sa walis. Pagbalik mo dito maputi ka na. (sic)
Yon po ang sinabi ng kanyang amo.
Atty. Masweng:
That was a statement of an alleged dead person, your

Honor.
Court:
Sabi ni Valdes, ha?
Pros. Rebagay:
Sabi ni Edna Malngan kay Carmelita Valdez, Your
Honor.
Court:
Double hearsay na yon.
Pros. Rebagay:
No, Your Honor, the witness was present, Your Honor,
when that confession
9
was made by the accused to
Carmelita Valdez.
Rolando Gruta, the pedicab driver and one of the barangay

tanods in the area, testified:
_______________
9 TSN, 19 June 2001, pp. 2326.
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People vs. Malngan
Pros. Rebagay:
Mr. Witness, what is your profession?
A: Sidecar driver, sir.
Q: On January 2, 2001 at around 4:45 in the morning, do
you recall where were (sic) you?
A: I was at the corner of Moderna Street, sir.
Pros. Rebagay:
And while you were at the corner of Moderna St., what
happened if any, Mr. Witness?
A: I saw Edna coming out from the door of the house of
Roberto Separa, sir.
Q: Do you know the number of the house of the Separa
Family?
A: 172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, Manila, sir.
xxxx
Q: And you said you saw Edna coming out from the house
of the Separa Family. How far is that house from the
place where you were waiting at the corner of Moderna
and Paulino Streets?
A: About three meters from Moderna and Paulino Streets
where my pedicab was placed. My distance was about
three meters, sir.
xxxx
Q: And how did you know that the house where Edna
came out is that of the house of the Separa Family?
A: Mismong nakita po ng dalawang mata ko na doon siya
galing sa bahay ng Separa Family.
Q: How long have you known the Separa Family, if you
know them?
A: About two years, sir.
Q: How about this Edna, the one you just pointed (to)
awhile ago? Do you know her prior to January 2, 2001?
A: Yes, sir. I knew (sic) her for two years.
Court:
Why?
Witness:
Madalas ko po siyang maging pasahero ng aking
pedicab.
Pros. Rebagay:
How about the Separa family? Why do you know them?
A: They were the employers of Edna, sir.
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People vs. Malngan
Q: You said you saw Edna coming out from the house of
the Separa Family. What happened when you saw
Edna coming out from the house of the Separa Family?
A: Wala pa pong ano yan naisakay ko na siya sa sidecar.
Q: And what did you observe from Edna when you saw her
coming out from the house of the Separa family?
A: Nagmamadali po siyang lumakad at palingalinga.
xxxx
Q: After she boarded your pedicab, what happened, if any?
A: Nagpahatid po siya sa akin.
Q: Where?
A: To Nipa Street, sir.
Q: Did you bring her to Nipa Street as she requested?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: You said that you brought her to Nipa Street. What
happened when you go (sic) there at Nipa Street, if any?
A: Nagpahinto po siya doon ng saglit, mga tatlong minuto
po.
Q: What did she do when she asked (you) to stop there for
three minutes?
A: After three minutes she requested me to bring her
directly to Balasan Street, sir.
xxxx
Q: What happened after that?
A: When we arrived there, she alighted and pay (sic)
P5.00, sir.
Q And then what transpired after she alighted from your
pedicab?
Witness:
I went home and I looked for another passenger, sir.
Pros. Rebagay:
After that, what happened when you were on you way
to your house to look for passengers?
A Nakita ko na nga po na pagdating ko sa Moderna,
naglalagablab na apoy.
Q: From what place was that fire coming out?
A: From the house of Roberto Separa Family, sir.
xxxx
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People vs. Malngan
Pros. Rebagay:
After you noticed that there was a fire from the house of
Roberto Separa Family, what did you do if any?
A: Siyempre po, isang Barangay Tanod po ako,
nagresponde na po kami sa sunog. Binuksan na po ng
Chairman naming yung tangke, binomba na po naming
yung apoy ng tubig.
Q: After that incident, Mr. Witness, have you seen Edna
Again (sic).
A: No, sir.
Pros. Rebagay:
And after that incident, did you come to know if Edna
was apprehended or not?

xxxx
A: I was called by our Barangay Chairman in order to
identify Edna, sir.
10
xxxx
Remigio Bernardo, Barangay Chairman of the area where

the fire occurred, stated:
Pros. Rebagay:
On January 2, 2001, do you recall if there is a fire that
occurred somewhere in your area of jurisdiction,
particularly Moderna Street?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, where were you when this incident happened?
A: Kasi ugali ko na po tuwing umagangumaga po ako na
pupunta sa barangay Hall mga siguro 6:00 or 5:00 o
clock, me sumigaw ng sunog nirespondehan namin
iyong sunog eh me dala kaming fire.
Court:
You just answer the question. Where were you when
this incident happened?
Witness:
I was at the Barangay Hall, Your Honor.
Pros. Rebagay:
And you said that there was a fire that occurred, what
did you do?
Witness:
_______________
10 TSN, 15 August 2001, pp. 512.
308

People vs. Malngan
Iyon nga nagresponde kami doon sa sunog eh nakita ko

iyong sunog mukha talagang arson dahil napakalaki
kaagad, meron pong mga tipong . . . Iyong namatay po

contractor po iyon eh kaya siguro napakaraming kalat
ng mga pintura, mga container, kaya hindi po namin
naapula kaagad iyong apoy, nasunog ultimo iyong fire
tank namin sa lakas, sir.
Pros. Rebagay:
Now, will you please tell us where this fire occurred?
A: At the house of the six victims, sir.
Q: Whose house is that?
A: The house of the victims, sir.
xxxx
Pros. Rebagay:
You said that you responded to the place, what
transpired after you responded to the place?
A: Iyon nga po ang nagsabi may lumabas na isang babae
po noon sa bahay na nagmamadali habang may sunog,
me isang barangay tanod po akong nagsabi may
humahangos na isang babae na may dalang bag
papunta po roon palabas ng sasakyan, sir.
Q: And so what happened?
A: Siyempre hindi naman ako nagtanong kung sino
ngayon may dumating galing na sa bahay naming, may
tumawag, tumawag po si Konsehala Alfonso na may
isang babae na hindi mapakali doon sa Calle Pedro
Alfonso, ke konsehal na baka ito sabi niya iyong ganito
ganoon nirespondehan ko po, sir.
Q: Where did you respond?
A: At Balasan, sir, but its not the area of my jurisdiction.
xxxx
Q: What happened when you reached that place?
A: Siya po ang nahuli ko doon, sir.
Court:
Witness pointing to accused Edna Malngan.
Pros. Rebagay:
And what happened?
A: I brought her to the barangay hall, sir.
Q: And what happened at the barangay hall?
A: Inembestigahan ko, kinuha naming iyong bag niya, me
lighter siya eh. Inamin niya po sa amin na kaya niya

sinunog hindi siya
309
VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 309

People vs. Malngan
pinasasahod ng more or less isang taon na eh. Ngayon

sabi ko bakit eh gusto ko ng umuwi ng probinsya ang
sabi sa akin ng amo ko sumakay na lang daw po ako ng
walis tingting para makauwi, sir.
Atty. Herman:
We would like to object, Your Honor on the ground that
that is hearsay.
Pros. Rebagay:
That is not a hearsay statement, Your Honor, straight
from the mouth of the accused.
Atty. Herman:
Its not under the exemption under the Rules of Court,
Your Honor. He is testifying according to what he has
heard.
Court:
Thats part of the narration. Whether it is true or not,
thats ano ther matter. Let it remain.
Pros. Rebagay:
Now, who were present when the accused are telling
you this?
A: Iyon nga iyong mga tanod ko, mamamayan doon

nakapaligid, siy empre may sunog nagkakagulo, gusto
nga siyang kunin ng mga mamamayan para saktan
hindi ko maibigay papatayin siya gawa ng may
namatay eh anim na tao ang namatay, kaya iyong mga
tao kinokontrol siya madidisgrasya siya dahil pin
pointed po siya, Your Honor, iyong dami na iyon libo
iyong nakapaligid doon sa barangay hall napakahirap
awatin. Gustonggusto siyang kunin ng mga taong
bayan, nagalit
11
dahil ang daming bahay hong
nasunog.
For her part, Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of

the Separa Family and whose house was one of those

destroyed by the fire, recounted:
Pros. Rebagay:
Madam Witness, on January 2, 2001, do you recall
where were you residing then?
A: Yes, sir.
_______________
11 TSN, 21 April 2003, pp. 510.
310

People vs. Malngan
Q: Where were you residing at?

A: At No. 170 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, Manila, sir.
Q: Why did you transfer your residence? Awhile ago you
testified that you are now residing at 147 Moderna St.,
Balut, Tondo, Manila?
A: Because our house was burned, sir.
Q: More or less, how much did the loss incurred on the
burning of your house (sic)?
A: More or less, P100,000.00, sir
Q: Do you know the accused in this case Edna Malngan?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why do you know her?
A: She is the house helper of the family who were (sic)
burned, sir.
Q: What family?
A: Cifara (sic) family, sir.
Q: Who in particular do you know among Cifara (sic)
family?
A: The woman, sir.
Q: What is the name?
A: Virginia Mendoza Cifara (sic), sir.
Q: Are you related to Virginia Mendoza Cifara (sic)?
A: My husband, sir.
Q: What is the relationship of your husband to the late
Virginia Mendoza Cifara (sic)?
A: They were first cousins, sir.
Q: How far is your house from the house of the Cifara (sic)
family?
A: Magkadikit lang po. Pader lang ang pagitan.
Q: You said that Edna Malngan was working with the
Cifara (sic) family. What is the work of Edna Malngan?
A: Nangangamuhan po. House helper, sir.
Q: How long do you know Edna Malngan as house helper
of the Cifara (sic) family?
A: I cannot estimate but she stayed there for three to four
years, sir.
Q: Do you know who caused the burning of the house of
the Cifara (sic) family?
311
VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 311

People vs. Malngan
Witness:
Edna Malngan, sir.
Pros. Rebagay:
Why do you know that it was Edna Malngan who
burned the house of the Cifara (sic) family?
A: When the fire incident happened, sir, on January 3, we
went to San Lazaro Fire Station and I saw Edna
Malngan detained there, sir.
Q: And so what is your basis in pointing to Edna Malngan
as the culprit or the one who burned the house of the
Cifara (sic) family?
A: I talked to her when we went there at that day, sir.
Q: What transpired then?
A: I talked to her and I told her, Edna, bakit mo naman
ginawa yung ganun?
Q: And what was the answer of Edna?
A: She answered, Kasi pag nagpapaalam ako sa kanyang

umuwi ng probinsya, nagpapaalam po siyang umuwi ng
probinsya ang sinasabi daw po sa kanya ni Baby Cifara
(sic) na, (sic)Sige umuwi ka, pagdating mo maputi ka
na. Sumakay ka sa walis pagdating mo maputi ka na.
Pros. Rebagay:
What is the basis there that she was the one who
burned the house of the Cifara (sic) family?
A: I also asked her, Paano mo ginawa yung sunog? She
told me, Naglukot ako ng maraming diyaryo,
sinindihan ko ng disposable lighter at hinagis
12
niya sa
ibabaw ng lamesa sa loob ng bahay. (sic)
Lastly, the prosecution presented Rodolfo Movilla, owner of

the house situated beside that of the Separa family. He
testified that his house was also gutted by the fire that
killed the Separa family and that he tried to help said
victims but to no avail. 13
The prosecution presented other documentary evidence
and thereafter rested its case.
_______________
12 TSN, 22 January 2002, pp. 47.

13 Exhibit A and its submarkingspictures of the victims; Exhibit B
and its submarkingspictures of the victims; Exhibit C and its submark
312

People vs. Malngan
When it came time for the defense to present exculpatory

evidence, instead of doing so, accusedappellant 14
filed a
Motion to Admit Demurrer to Evidence 15
and the
corresponding Demurrer to Evidence with the former
expressly stating that said Demurrer to Evidence 16
was being
filed x x x without express leave of court x x x.
In her Demurrer to Evidence, accusedappellant asserts
that the prosecutions evidence was insufficient to prove
her guilt 17
beyond reasonable doubt for the following
reasons: (a) that she is charged with crime not defined
and penalized by law; (b) that circumstantial evidence was
insufficient to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and
(c) that the testimonies given by the witnesses of the

prosecution were hearsay, thus, inadmissible in evidence
against her.
The prosecution filed its Comment/Opposition to
accusedappellants Demurrer to Evidence.
On 13 October 2003, acting on the Demurrer 18
to
Evidence, the RTC promulgated its Judgment wherein it
proceeded to resolve the subject case based on the evidence
of the prosecution. The RTC considered accusedappellant
to have waived her right to present evidence, having filed
the Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court. In finding
accusedappellant Edna guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide, the RTC ruled
that:
_______________
ingspictures of the victims; Exhibit D and its submarkings

pictures of the burned houses; Exhibit E and its submarkingsSworn
Statement of Mercedita de los Santos Mendoza; Exhibit F and its
submarkingsSworn Statement of eyewitness Rolando Gruta; Exhibit
Gplastic package wherein the disposable lighter (Exh. G1) was
placed; Exhibit G1disposable lighter; Exhibit H and its
submarkingsCrime Report; Exhibit I and its submarkingsBooking
Sheet and Arrest Report of accused Edna Malngan; Exhibit Jsketch of
the house of the Separa Family; and Exhibit K and its submarkings
letter dated 3 January 2001.
14 Records, pp. 261262.
15 Id., at pp. 263281.
16 Id., at p. 261.
17 Demurrer to Evidence, p. 1; Id., at p. 263.
18 Id., at pp. 296310.
313
VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 313

People vs. Malngan
The first argument of the accused that she is charged with an act
not defined and penalized by law is without merit. x x x the
caption which charges the accused with the crime of Arson with
Multiple Homicide is merely descriptive of the charge of Arson
that resulted to Multiple Homicide. The fact is that the accused is
charged with Arson which resulted to Multiple Homicide (death of
victims) and that charge is embodied and stated in the body of the
information. What is controlling is the allegation in the body of

the Information and not the title or caption thereof. x x x.
xxxx
The second and third arguments will be discussed jointly as
they are interrelated with each other. x x x.
xxxx
[W]hile there is no direct evidence that points to the accused in
the act of burning the house or actually starting the subject fire,
the following circumstances that show that the accused
intentionally caused or was responsible for the subject fire have
been duly established:
1. that immediately before the burning of the house, the

accused hurriedly and with head turning in different
directions (palingalinga) went out of the said house and
rode a pedicab apparently not knowing where to go x x x;
2. that immediately after the fire, upon a report that there
was a woman in Balasan St. who appears confused and
apprehensive (balisa), the Barangay Chairman and his
tanods went there, found the accused and apprehended
her and brought her to the barangay hall as shown by the
testimony of Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo; and
3. that when she was apprehended and investigated by the
barangay officials and when her bag was opened, the same
contained a disposable lighter as likewise shown by the
testimony of the Barangay Chairman. [T]he timing of her
hurried departure and nervous demeanor immediately
before the fire when she left the house and rode a pedicab
and her same demeanor, physical and mental condition
when found and apprehended at the same place where she
alighted from the pedicab and the discovery of the lighter
in her bag thereafter when investigated indisputably show
her guilt as charged.
If there is any doubt of her guilt that remains with the

circumstantial evidence against her, the same is removed or
obliterated with the confessions/admissions of the commission of
the offense and the manner thereof
314

People vs. Malngan
that she made to the prosecution witnesses Barangay Chairman

Remigio Bernardo, Mercedita Mendoza and to the media,

respectively.
xxxx
[H]er confessions/admissions are positive acknowledgment of
guilt of the crime and appear to have been voluntarily and
intelligently given. These confessions/admissions, especially the
one given to her neighbor Mercedita Mendoza and the media,
albeit uncounselled and made while she was already under the
custody of authorities, it is believed, are not violative of her right
under the Constitution.
The decretal part of the RTCs Judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, the Demurrer to Evidence is hereby denied and

judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused EDNA
MALNGAN Y MAYO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Arson with Multiple Homicide or Arson resulting to the death
of six (6) people and sentencing her to suffer the mandatory
penalty of death, and ordering her to pay the heirs of the victims
Roberto Separa, Sr. and Virginia Separa and children Michael,
Daphne, Priscilla and Roberto, Jr., the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos for each victim and the amount of One
Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as temperate damages
for their burned house or a total of Four Hundred Thousand
(P400,000.00) Pesos and to Rodolfo Movilla the amount of One
Hundred [Thousand] (P100,000.00) Pesos.
Due to the death penalty imposed by the RTC, the case was
directly elevated to this Court for automatic review.
Conformably
19
with our decision in People v. Efren Mateo y
Garcia, however, we referred the case and its records to
the CA for appropriate action and disposition.
On 2 September 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed
with modification the decision of the RTC, the fallo of
which reads:
_______________
19 G.R. Nos. 14767887, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640; People v. Mateo,
case modified Sections 3 and 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124,
Section 3 of Rule 125 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and any
other rule insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the Regional
Trial Court to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
315
VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 315

People vs. Malngan
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed October 13,

2003 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41,
finding accusedappellant Edna Malngan y Mayo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Arson with multiple homicide and sentencing
her to suffer the DEATH PENALTY is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that she is further ordered to pay P50,000.00
as moral damages and another P50,000.00 as exemplary damages
for each of the victims who perished in the fire, to be paid to their
heirs. She is ordered to pay Rodolfo Movilla, one whose house was
also burned, the sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damage.
Pursuant to Section 13 (a), Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure as amended by A.M. No. 00503SC dated
September 28, 2004, which became effective on October 15, 2004,
the Court of Appeals, after rendering judgment, hereby refrains
from making an entry of judgment and forthwith certifies the case
and elevates the entire record of this case to the Supreme Court
20
for review.
It is the contention of accusedappellant that the evidence

presented by the prosecution is not sufficient to establish
her guilt beyond reasonable doubt as the perpetrator of the
crime charged. In support of said21
exculpatory proposition,
she assigns the following errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION IS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE
ACCUSED; and
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING AND

GIVING CREDENCE TO THE HEARSAY EVIDENCE AND
UNCOUNSELLED ADMISSIONS ALLEGEDLY GIVEN BY THE
ACCUSED TO THE WITNESSES BARANGAY CHAIRMAN
REMIGIO BERNARDO, MERCEDITA MENDOZA AND THE
MEDIA.
THERE IS NO COMPLEX CRIME OF ARSON WITH

(MULTIPLE) HOMICIDE.
_______________
20 Rollo, pp. 326.

21 As stated in appellant Ednas Brief, pp. 34; CA Rollo, pp. 4142.
316

People vs. Malngan
The Information in this case erroneously charged

accusedappellant with a complex crime, i.e., Arson with
Multiple Homicide. Presently, there are two (2) laws that
govern the crime of arson where death results therefrom
Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code
22
(RPC), as amended
by Republic Act (RA) No. 7659, 23
and Section 5 of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1613, quoted hereunder, to
wit:
Revised Penal Code:

ART. 320. Destructive Arson.x x x x
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts
penalized under this Article, death results, the mandatory penalty
of death shall be imposed. [Emphasis supplied.]
Presidential Decree No. 1613:
SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson.If by reason of or on
the occasion of the arson death results, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death shall be imposed. [Emphasis supplied.]
Art. 320 of the RPC, as amended, with respect to

destructive arson, and the provisions of PD No. 1613
respecting other cases of arson provide only one penalty for
the commission of arson, whether considered destructive or
otherwise, where death results therefrom. The raison dtre
is that arson24 is itself the end and death is simply the
consequence.
Whether the crime of arson will absorb the resultant
death or will have
25
to be a separate crime altogether, the
joint discussion of the late Mr. Chief Justice Ramon C.
Aquino and Mme. Justice Carolina C. GrioAquino, on the
subject of the crimes of arson and murder/homicide, is
highly instructive:
_______________
22 AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN

HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE THE REVISED

PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
23 AMENDING THE LAW ON ARSON.
24 See People v. Paterno, 85 Phil. 722.
25 Aquino, R. C. and GrioAquino, C. C. The Revised Penal Code, 1997
ed., Vol. II, pp. 589590.
317
VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 317

People vs. Malngan
Groizard says that when fire is used with the intent to kill a
particular person who may be in a house and that objective is
attained by burning the house, the crime is murder only. When
the Penal Code declares that killing committed by means of fire is
murder, it intends that fire should be purposely adopted as a
means to that end. There can be no murder without a design to
26
take life. In other words, if the main object of the offender is to
kill by means of fire, the offense is murder. But if the main
objective is the burning of the building, the resulting homicide
27
may be absorbed by the crime of arson.
xxxx
If the house was set on fire after the victims therein were
killed, fire would not be a qualifying circumstance. The accused
would be liable for the separate offenses of murder or homicide, as
28
the case may be, and arson.
Accordingly, in cases where both burning and death occur,

in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were
perpetratedwhether arson, murder or arson and
homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main
objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the
burning of the building or edifice, but death results by
reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply
arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the
other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person
who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to
as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed
is murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill
a particular person, and in fact the offender has already
done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the
killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes
committedhomicide/murder and arson.
Where then does this case fall under?

From a reading of the body of the Information:
That on or about January 2, 2001, in the City of Manila,

Philippines, the said accused, with intent to cause damage, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and deliberately
set fire upon the twostorey residential
_______________
26 Citing Burns, 41 Phil. 418, 432, 440.

27 Citing People v. Paterno, supra, note 24.
28 Citing Bersabal, 48 Phil. 439; Piring, 63 Phil. 546; Mones, 68 Phil.
46; Laolao, 106 Phil. 1165.
318

People vs. Malngan
house of ROBERTO SEPARA and family mostly made of wooden

materials located at No. 172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, this city,
by lighting crumpled newspaper with the use of disposable lighter
inside said house knowing the same to be an inhabited house and
situated in a thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof
a conflagration ensued and the said building, together with some
seven (7) adjoining residential houses, were razed by fire; that by
reason and on the occasion of the said fire, the following, namely,
1. Roberto Separa, Sr., 45 years of age

2. Virginia Separa y Mendoza, 40 years of age
3. Michael Separa, 24 years of age
4. Daphne Separa, 18 years of age
5. Priscilla Separa, 14 years of age
6. Roberto Separa, Jr., 11 years of age
sustained burn injuries which were the direct cause of their

29
death immedi ately thereafter. [Emphasis supplied.]
accusedappellant is being charged with the crime of arson.

It is clear from the foregoing that her intent was merely to
destroy her employers house through the use of fire.
We now go to the issues raised. Under the first
assignment of error, in asserting the insufficiency of the
prosecutions evidence to establish her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, accusedappellant argues that the

prosecution was only able to adduce circumstantial
evidencehardly enough to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. She ratiocinates that the following
circumstances:
1. That immediately before the burning of the house,

the accused hurriedly and with head turning in
different directions (palingalinga) went out of the
said house and rode a pedicab apparently not
knowing where to go for she first requested to be
brought to Nipa St. but upon reaching there
requested again to be brought to Balasan St. as
shown by the testimony of prosecution witness
Rolando Gruta;
2. That immediately after the fire, upon a report that
there was a woman in Balasan St. who appears
confused and apprehensive (balisa), the Barangay
Chairman and his tanods went there, found the
accused and ap
_______________
29 Id., at p. 1.
319
VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 319

People vs. Malngan
prehended her and brought her to the barangay

hall as shown by the testimony of Barangay
Chairman Remigio Bernardo; and
3. That when she was apprehended and investigated
by the barangay officials and when her bag was
opened, the same contained a disposable lighter as
likewise shown
30
by the testimony of the Barangay
Chairman.
fall short of proving that she had any involvement in

setting her employers house on fire, much less show guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, given that it is a fact that
housemaids are the first persons in the house to wake31
up
early to perform routine chores for their employers, one
of which is preparing and cooking the morning meal for the

members of the household; and necessity requires her to go
out early to look for open stores or even nearby
marketplaces to 32buy things that will complete the early
meal for the day. She then concludes that it was normal
for her to have been seen going out of her employers house
in a hurry at that time of the day and to look at all
directions to insure that the house is33 secure and that there
are no other persons in the vicinity.
We are far from persuaded.
True, by the nature of their jobs, housemaids are
required to start the day early; however, contrary to said
assertion, the actuations and the demeanor of accused
appellant on that fateful early morning as observed
firsthand by Rolando Gruta, one of the witnesses of the
prosecution, belie her claim of normalcy, to wit:
Q: You said you saw Edna coming out from the house of
the Separa Family. What happened when you saw
Edna coming out from the house of the Separa Family?
A: Wala pa pong ano yan naisakay ko na siya sa sidecar.
Q: And what did you observe from Edna when you saw her
coming out from the house of the Separa family?
A: Nagmamadali po siyang lumakad at palingalinga.
xxxx
_______________
30 Accusedappellant Ednas Brief, p. 4; CA Rollo, p. 42.

31 Id., at p. 43.
32 Id.
33 Id., at p. 44.
320

People vs. Malngan
Q: After she boarded your pedicab, what happened, if any?

A: Nagpahatid po siya sa akin.
Q: Where?
A: To Nipa Street, sir.

Q: Did you bring her to Nipa Street as she requested?

A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: You said that you brought her to Nipa Street. What
happened when you go (sic) there at Nipa Street, if any?
A: Nagpahinto po siya doon ng saglit, mga tatlong minuto
po.
Q: What did she do when she asked (you) to stop there for
three minutes?
A: After three minutes she requested me to bring her
directly to Balasan Street, sir.
xxxx
We quote with approval the pronouncement of the RTC in

discrediting accusedappellants aforementioned rationale:
[O]bviously it is never normal, common or ordinary to leave the

house in such a disturbed, nervous and agitated manner,
demeanor and condition. The timing of her hurried departure and
nervous demeanor immediately before the fire when she left the
house and rode a pedicab and her same demeanor, physical and
mental condition when found and apprehended at the same place
where she alighted from the pedicab and the discovery of the
lighter in her bag thereafter when investigated indisputably show
34
her guilt as charged.
All the witnesses are in accord that accusedappellants

agitated appearance was out of the ordinary. Remarkably,
she has never denied this observation.
We give great weight to the findings of the RTC and so
accord credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses as it had the opportunity to observe them
directly. The credibility given by trial courts to prosecution
witnesses is an important aspect of evidence which
appellate courts can rely on because of its unique
opportunity
_______________
34 RTC Judgment, p. 11; Records, p. 306.
321
VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 321

People vs. Malngan
to observe them, particularly their demeanor, conduct, and

attitude, during the direct and crossexamination by
counsels. Here, Remigio Bernardo, Rolando Gruta and
Mercedita Mendoza are disinterested witnesses and there
is not an iota of evidence in the records to indicate that
they are suborned witnesses. The records of the RTC even
show that Remigio Bernardo, the Barangay Chairman,
kept accusedappellant from being mauled by the angry
crowd outside of the barangay hall:
Pros. Rebagay:
Now, who were present when the accused are (sic)
telling you this?
A: Iyon nga iyong mga tanod ko, mamamayan doon
nakapaligid, siyempre may sunog nagkakagulo, gusto
nga siyang kunin ng mga mamamayan para saktan
hindi ko maibigay papatayin siya gawa ng may
namatay eh anim na tao ang namatay, kaya iyong mga
tao kinokontrol siya madidisgrasya siya dahil pin
pointed po siya, Your Honor, iyong dami na iyon libo
iyong nakapaligid doon sa barangay hall napakahirap
awatin. Gustonggusto siyang kunin ng mga taong
bayan, nagalit
35
dahil ang daming bahay hong
nasunog.
Accusedappellant has not shown any compelling reason

why the witnesses presented would openly, publicly and
deliberately lie or concoct a story, to send an innocent
person to jail all the while knowing that the real malefactor
remains at large. Such proposition defies logic. And where
the defense failed to show any evil or improper motive on
the part of the prosecution witnesses, the presumption is
that their testimonies
36
are true and thus entitled to full
faith and credence.
While the prosecution witnesses did not see accused
appellant actually starting the fire that burned several
houses and killed the Separa family, her guilt may still be
established through circumstantial evidence provided that:
(1) there is more than one circumstance;
_______________
35 TSN, 21 April 2003, pp. 910.
36 People v. Lizada, G.R. No. 97226, 30 August 1993, 225 SCRA 708,
713.
322

People vs. Malngan
(2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and, (3) the combination of all the circumstances37
is
such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a
fact or series of facts from
38
which the facts in issue may be
established by inference. It is founded on experience and
observed facts and coincidences establishing a connection
between the known
39
and proven facts and the facts sought
to be proved. In order to bring about a conviction, the
circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an
unbroken chain, which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the40 accused, to the exclusion of
others, as the guilty person.
In this case, the interlocking testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, taken together, exemplify a case
where conviction can be upheld on the basis of
circumstantial evidence. First, prosecution witness Rolando
Gruta, the driver of the pedicab that accusedappellant rode
on, testified that he knew for a fact that she worked as a
housemaid of the victims, and that he positively identified
her as the person hurriedly leaving the house of the victims
on 2 January 2001 at 4:45 a.m., and acting in a nervous
manner. That while riding on the pedicab, accused
appellant was unsure of her intended destination. Upon
reaching the place where he originally picked up accused
appellant only a few minutes after dropping her off,
Rolando Gruta saw the Separas house being gutted by a
blazing fire. Second, Remigio Bernardo testified that he
and his tanods, including Rolando Gruta, were the ones
who picked up accusedappellant Edna at Balasan Street
(where Rolando Gruta dropped her off) after receiving a
call that there was a woman acting strangely at said street
and who appeared to have nowhere to go. Third, SPO4
Danilo Talusan overheard accusedappellant admit to
Carmelita Valdez, a reporter of
_______________
37 People v. Briones, G.R. No. 97610, 19 February 1993, 219 SCRA 134.
38 People v. Ayola, G.R. No. 138923, 4 September 2001, 364 SCRA 451,
461.
39 Id.
40 People v. Sevilleno, G.R. No. 152954, 10 March 2004, 425 SCRA 247,
256; People v. Leao, G.R. No. 138886, 9 October 2001, 366 SCRA 774,
786; People v. Balderas, G.R. No. 106582, 31 July 1997, 276 SCRA 470,
483.
323
VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 323

People vs. Malngan
Channel 2 (ABSCBN) that said accusedappellant started

the fire, plus the fact that he was able see the telecast of
Gus Abelgas show where accusedappellant, while being
interviewed, confessed to the crime as well. The foregoing
testimonies juxtaposed with the testimony of Mercedita
Mendoza validating the fact that accusedappellant
confessed to having started the fire which killed the Separa
family as well as burned seven houses including that of the
victims, convincingly form an unbroken chain, which leads
to the unassailable conclusion pinpointing accused
appellant as the person behind the crime of simple arson.
In her second assigned error, accusedappellant
questions the admissibility of her uncounselled
extrajudicial confession given to prosecution witnesses,
namely Remigio Bernardo, Mercedita Mendoza, and to the
media. Accusedappellant Edna contends that being
uncounselled extrajudicial confession, her admissions to
having committed the crime charged should have been
excluded in evidence against her for being violative of
Article III, Section 12(1) of the Constitution.
Particularly, she takes exception to the testimony of
prosecution witnesses Remigio Bernardo and Mercedita
Mendoza for being hearsay and in the nature of an
uncounselled admission.
With the above vital pieces of evidence excluded,
accusedappellant is of the position that the remaining
proof of her alleged guilt, consisting in the main of
circumstantial evidence, is inadequate to establish her
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
We partly disagree.
Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution in part
provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an

offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxxx
324

People vs. Malngan
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this

Section or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence.
We have held that the abovequoted provision applies to the

stage of custodial investigationwhen the investigation is
no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime 41
but
starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect. Said
constitutional guarantee has also been extended to
situations in which an individual has not been formally 42
arrested but has merely been invited for questioning.
To be admissible in evidence against an accused, the
extrajudicial confessions made must satisfy the following
requirements:
(1) it must be voluntary;

(2) it must be made with the assistance of competent
and independent counsel;
(3) it must be express; and
43
(4) it must be in writing.
Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay

Chairman, in this particular instance, may be deemed as
law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III,
Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused
appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning
of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the
only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses as well
as killed the whole family of Roberto Separa, Sr. She was,
therefore, already under custodial investigation and the

rights guaranteed by Article III, Section 12(1), of the
Constitution should have already been observed or applied
to her. Accusedappellants confession to Barangay
Chairman Remigio Bernardo was made in response to the
interrogation made by the latteradmittedly conducted
without first informing accusedappellant of her rights
under the Constitution
_______________
41 People v. Andan, G.R. No. 116437, 3 March 1997, 269 SCRA 95, 106.
42 Sanchez v. Demetriou, G.R. Nos. 11177177, 9 November 1993, 227
SCRA 627, 639.
43 People v. Tan, G.R. No. 117321, 11 February 1998, 286 SCRA 207,
214.
325
VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 325

People vs. Malngan
or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the

confession of accusedappellant, given to Barangay
Chairman Remigio Bernardo, as well as the lighter found
by the latter in her bag are inadmissible in evidence
against her as such were obtained in violation of her
constitutional rights.
Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of accused
appellants confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio
Bernardo and the lighter as evidence do not automatically
lead to her acquittal. It should well be recalled that the
constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations
do not apply to those not elicited through questioning by
the police or their agents but given in an ordinary manner
whereby the accused verbally admits to having committed
the offense as what happened in the case at bar when
accusedappellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of
the neighbors of Roberto Separa, Sr., to having started the
fire in the Separas house. The testimony of Mercedita
Mendoza recounting said admission is, unfortunately for
accusedappellant, admissible in evidence against her and
is not covered by the aforesaid constitutional guarantee.
Article III of the Constitution, or the Bill of Rights, solely
governs the relationship between the individual on one
hand and the State (and its agents) on the other; it does not
concern itself with the relation between a private
individual and another private individualas both
accusedappellant and prosecution
44
witness Mercedita
Mendoza undoubtedly are. Here, there is no evidence on
record to show that said witness was acting under police
authority, so appropriately, accusedappellants
uncounselled extrajudicial confession to said witness was
properly admitted by the RTC.
Accusedappellant likewise assails the admission of the
testimony of SPO4 Danilo Talusan. Contending that
[w]hen SPO4 Danilo Talusan testified in court, his story is
more of events, which are not within his personal
knowledge but based from accounts of witnesses who
derived information allegedly from the accused or some
other persons x x x. In other words, she objects to the
testimony for being merely
_______________
44 People v. Marti, G.R. No. 81561, 18 January 1991, 193 SCRA 57, 67.
326

People vs. Malngan
hearsay. With this imputation of inadmissibility, we agree

with what the Court of Appeals had to say:
Although this testimony of SFO4 Danilo Talusan is hearsay

because he was not present when Gus Abelgas interviewed
accusedappellant EDNA, it may nevertheless be admitted in
evidence as an independently relevant statement to establish not
the truth but the tenor of the statement or the fact that the
statement was made [People v. Mallari, G.R. No. 103547, July
20, 1999, 310 SCRA 621 citing People v. Cusi, Jr., G.R. No. L
20986, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 944.]. In People vs. Velasquez,
G.R. Nos. 132635 & 14387275, February 21, 2001, 352 SCRA
455, the Supreme Court ruled that:
Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, regardless of

their truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have been made is
relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and the statements are
admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is
not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact
in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a
45
fact.
As regards the confession given by accusedappellant to the

media, we need not discuss it further for the reporters were
never presented to testify in court.
As a final attempt at exculpation, accusedappellant
asserts that since the identities of the burned bodies were
never conclusively established, she cannot be responsible
for their deaths.
Such assertion is bereft of merit.
In the crime of arson, the identities of the victims are
immaterial in that intent to kill them particularly is not
one of the elements of the crime. As we have clarified
earlier, the killing of a person is absorbed in the charge of
arson, simple or destructive. The prosecution need only
prove, that the burning was intentional and that what was
intentionally burned is an inhabited house 46
or dwelling.
Again, in the case of People v. Soriano, we explained
that:
_______________
45 Rollo, pp. 1920.

46 Supra at note 30.
327
VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 327

People vs. Malngan
Although intent may be an ingredient of the crime of Arson, it

may be inferred from the acts of the accused. There is a
presumption that one intends the natural consequences of his act;
and when it is shown that one has deliberately set fire to a
building, the prosecution is not bound to produce further evidence
47
of his wrongful intent.
The ultimate query now is which kind of arson is accused

appellant guilty of?
As previously discussed, there are two (2) categories of
the crime of arson: 1) destructive arson, under Art. 320 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659; and 2) simple arson, under Presidential Decree No.
1613. Said classification is based on the kind, character

and location of the property
48
burned, regardless of the value
of the damage caused, to wit:
Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659,

contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public
and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels,
aircraft, factories and other military, government or
commercial establishments by any person or group of
49
persons.[ ] The classification of this type of crime is
_______________
47 Curtis, A Treatise on the Law of Arson (1st ed., 1986), Sec. 283, p.
303.
48 People v. Soriano, G.R. No. 142565, 29 July 2003, 407 SCRA 367.
49 Under Art. 320, as amended, the enumeration of the instances for
Destructive Arson is exclusive: (a) one (1) or more buildings or edifices,
consequent to one single act of burning, or as a result of simultaneous
burning, or committed on several or different occasions; (b) any building of
public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or where
people usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not
limited to, official governmental function or business, private transaction,
commerce, trade workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely
incidental to a definite purpose, such as but not limited to, hotels, motels,
transient dwellings, public conveyance or stops or terminals, regardless of
whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons in said
building or edifice at the time it is set on fire and regardless also of
whether the building is actually inhabited or not; (c) any train or
locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation or
conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or leisure; (d) any building,
factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto, which are
devoted to the service of public utilities; (e) any building the burning of
which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence of another
328

People vs. Malngan
known as Destructive Arson, which is punishable by reclusion

perpetua to death. The reason for the law is selfevident: to
effectively discourage and deter the commission of this dastardly
crime, to prevent the destruction of properties and protect the
lives of innocent people. Exposure to a brewing conflagration
leaves only destruction and despair in its wake; hence, the State
mandates greater retribution to authors of this heinous crime.
The exceptionally severe punishment imposed for this crime takes
into consideration the extreme danger to human lives exposed by
the malicious burning of these structures; the danger to property
resulting from the conflagration; the fact that it is normally
difficult to adopt precautions against its commission, and the
difficulty in pinpointing the perpetrators; and, the greater impact
on the social, economic, security and political fabric of the nation.
[Emphasis supplied.]
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts
penalized under Art. 320, death should result, the mandatory
penalty of death shall be imposed.
On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321 to 326B
of The Revised Penal Code remains the governing law for Simple
Arson. This decree contemplates the malicious burning of public
and private structures, regardless of size, not included in Art. 320,
as amended by RA 7659, and classified as other cases of arson.
These include houses, dwellings, government buildings,
farms, mills, plantations, railways, bus stations, airports,
50
wharves and other industrial establishments.[ ] Although
the purpose
_______________
violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or

defrauding creditors or to collect from insurance; (f) when committed by
two (2) or more persons, regardless of whether their purpose is merely to
burn or destroy the building or the burning merely constitutes an overt
act in the commission of another violation of law; (g) any arsenal,
shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory, ordinance,
storehouse, archives or general museum of the Government; (h) in an
inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive
material.
50 Sec. 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1613 enumerates the Other Cases of
Arson which are punishable by the penalty of reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua: (a) Any building used as offices of the government or
any of its agencies; (b) Any inhabited house or dwelling; (c) Any industrial
establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel; (d)
Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard,
bamboo grove or forest; (e) Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill, or mill
central; and, (f) any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse.
329
VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 329

People vs. Malngan
of the law on Simple Arson is to prevent the high incidence of fires

and other crimes involving destruction, protect the national
economy and preserve the social, economic and political stability
of the nation, PD 1613 tempers the penalty to be meted to
offenders. This separate classification of Simple Arson recognizes
the need to lessen the severity of punishment commensurate to
the act or acts committed, depending on the particular facts and
circumstances of each case. [Emphasis supplied.]
To emphasize:
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple

Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the criminal
offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal
Code (as amended) constituting Destructive Arson are
characterized as heinous crimes for being grievous, odious and
hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are
repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of
51
decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society. On
the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting
Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and
viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other
words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant
social, economic, political and national security implications than
Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under Simple Arson may
nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on
52
the qualifying circumstances present. [Emphasis supplied.]
Prescinding from the above clarification visvis the

description of the crime as stated in the accusatory portion
of the Information, it is quite evident that accused
appellant was charged with the crime of Simple Arson
for having deliberately set fire upon the twostorey
residential house of ROBERTO SEPARA and family x x x
knowing the same to be an inhabited house and situated in
a thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof a
conflagration ensued and the said building, together with
some seven (7) adjoining residential houses, were razed by
fire. [Emphasis supplied.]
_______________
51 See Preamble, Republic Act No. 7659.

330

People vs. Malngan
The facts of the case at bar is somewhat

53
similar to the facts
of the case of People v. Soriano. The accused in the latter
case caused the burning of a particular house.
Unfortunately, the blaze spread and gutted down five (5)
neighboring houses. The RTC therein found 54the accused
guilty of destructive arson under paragraph 1 of Art. 320
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659. This Court, through Mr. Justice Bellosillo, however,
declared that:
x x x [T]he applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of

PD 1613, which imposes a penalty of reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua for other cases of arson as the properties
burned by accusedappellant are specifically described as
houses, contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings under the
aforesaid law. The descriptions as alleged in the second Amended
Information particularly refer to the structures as houses rather
than as buildings or edifices. The applicable law should therefore
be Sec. 3, Par. 2, of PD 1613, and not Art. 320, par. 1 of the Penal
Code. In case of ambiguity in construction of penal laws, it is well
settled that such laws shall be construed strictly against the
government, and liberally in favor of the accused.
The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a)
there is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned
is an inhabited house or dwelling. Incidentally, these elements
55
concur in the case at bar.
As stated in the body of the Information, accusedappellant

was charged with having intentionally burned the two
storey residential house of Robert Separa. Said
conflagration likewise spread and destroyed seven (7)
adjoining houses. Consequently, if proved, as it was
proved, at the trial, she may be convicted, and sentenced
accordingly, of the crime of simple arson. Such is the case
notwithstanding the error in the designation of the offense
in the information, the information remains effective
insofar as
56
it states the facts constituting the crime alleged
therein. What is controlling is not the title of the
complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the

par
_______________
53 Supra.
54 1. One (1) or more building or edifices, consequent to one single act of
burning, or as a result of simultaneous burnings, or committed on several
or different occasions.
56 People v. Librado, G.R. No. 141074, 16 October 2003, 413 SCRA 536.
331
VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 331

People vs. Malngan
ticular law or part thereof allegedly violate, x x x, but the

description of the57
crime charged and the particular facts
therein recited.
There is, thus, a need to modify the penalty imposed by
the RTC as Sec. 5 of PD No. 1613 categorically provides
that the penalty to be imposed for simple arson is:
SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson.If by reason of or on

the occasion of arson death results, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death shall be imposed. [Emphasis supplied.]
Accordingly, there being no aggravating circumstance

alleged in the Information, the imposable penalty on
accusedappellant is reclusion perpetua.
Apropos the58 civil liabilities of accusedappellant, current
jurisprudence dictate that the civil indemnity due from
accusedappellant
59
is P50,000.00 for the death of each of the
victims. However, the monetary awards for moral and
exemplary damages given by the Court of Appeals, both in
the amount of P50,000.00, due the heirs of the victims,
have to be deleted for lack of material basis. Similarly, the
Court of Appeals award of exemplary damages to Rodolfo
Movilla in the amount of P50,000.00 for the destruction of
his house, also has to be deleted, but in this instance for
being improper. Moral damages cannot be award by this
Court in the absence of proof of mental or physical 60
suffering on the part of the heirs of the victims.
Concerning the award of exemplary damages, the reason
for the deletion being
_______________
57 People v. Dimaano, G.R. No. 168168, 14 September 2005, 469 SCRA

647, 666.
58 People v. Bulan, G.R. No. 143404, 8 June 2005, 459 SCRA 550;
People v. Masagnay, G.R. No. 137364, 10 June 2004, 431 SCRA 572;
People v. Comadre, et al., G.R. No. 153559, 8 June 2004, 431 SCRA 366;
and People v. Bagnate, G.R. Nos. 13368586, 20 May 2004, 428 SCRA 633.
59 Article 2206 of the New Civil Code provides that when death occurs
as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to be
indemnified without need of any proof thereof.
60 People v. Abut, G.R. No. 137601, 24 April 2003, 401 SCRA 498.
332

People vs. Malngan
that no aggravating circumstance had been 61

alleged and
proved by the prosecution in the case at bar.
To summarize, accusedappellants alternative plea that
she be acquitted of the crime must be rejected. With the
evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the
findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals. It is
indubitable that accusedappellant is the author of the
crime of simple arson. All the circumstantial evidence
presented before the RTC, viewed in its entirety, is as
convincing as direct evidence and, as such, negates
accusedappellants innocence, and when considered
concurrently with her admission given to Mercedita
Mendoza, the formers guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
twice as evident. Hence, her conviction is effectively
justified. More so, as it is propitious to note that in stark
contrast to the factual circumstances presented by the
prosecution, accusedappellant neither mustered a denial
nor an alibi except for the proposition that her guilt had
not been established beyond reasonable doubt.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 2 September 2005, in CAG.R. CR HC No.
01139, is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as the conviction of
accusedappellant EDNA MALNGAN Y MAYO is
concerned. The sentence to be imposed and the amount of
damages to be awarded, however, are MODIFIED. In
accordance with Sec. 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1613,

accusedappellant is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION
PERPETUA. Accusedappellant is hereby ordered to pay
the heirs of each of the victims P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (C.J.), Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares

Santiago, SandovalGutierrez, Carpio, AustriaMartinez,
Corona, CarpioMorales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Garcia
and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed with modification.
_______________
61 Art. 2230 of the New Civil Code dictates that, in criminal offenses,
exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when
the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.
333
VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 333

National Power Corporation vs. San Pedro
Notes.Corpus delicti means the substance of the

crimeit is the fact that a crime has actually been
committed. In arson, the corpus delicti rule is generally
satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire and of
its having been intentionally caused. (People vs. Gutierrez,
258 SCRA 70 [1996])
There is treachery where the victim was hit by one of
the four bullets fired by the accused while said victim was
helping his brother extinguish the fire on the roof of their
house. (People vs. Gargar, 300 SCRA 542 [1998])
o0o
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4/24/2016 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 503

294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. EDNA

Criminal Law; Arson; Homicide; There is no complex crime of

Same; Same; Same; In cases where both burning and death

VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 295

People vs. Malngan

objective of the malefactor.In cases where both burning and

Same; Witnesses; The credibility given by trial courts to

records to indicate that they are suborned witnesses. The records

Same; Same; Where the defense failed to show any evil or

296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Malngan

presumption is that their testimonies are true and thus entitled

Same; Same; Same; Circumstantial Evidence; Requisites;

constitute an unbroken chain, which leads to one fair and

Same; Rights of Suspects; Miranda Doctrine; Extrajudicial

Same; Same; Same; Same; Arguably, the barangay tanods,

VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 297

People vs. Malngan

III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused

the interrogation made by the latteradmittedly conducted

Same; Same; Same; Same; It should well be recalled that the

298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Malngan

priately, accusedappellants uncounselled extrajudicial confession

Same; Arson; Homicide; In the crime of arson, the identities of

Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; What is controlling is

crime alleged therein. What is controlling is not the title of the

VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 299

People vs. Malngan

Same; Same; Damages; Moral damages cannot be awarded in

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 41, in Criminal Case

1 Penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas with

300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

cide or Arson resulting to the death of six (6) people, and

From the personal account of Remigio Bernardo, the Barangay

residents and thereafter, firemen from the Fire District 1NCR

3 CA decision, pp. 25; Rollo, pp. 47.

VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 301

identified the woman as accusedappellant EDNA who was the

302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

That on or about January 2, 2001, in the City of Manila,

thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof a

1. Roberto Separa, Sr., 45 years of age

sustained burn injuries which were the direct cause of their

When arraigned, accusedappellant with assistance of

4 Records, pp. 12.

VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 303

doza and Rodolfo Movilla to establish its charge that

family, namely his wife, Virginia, and his children,

304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Q: When was that?

That was a statement of an alleged dead person, your

Rolando Gruta, the pedicab driver and one of the barangay

9 TSN, 19 June 2001, pp. 2326.

VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 305