Congo 20021031
Congo 20021031
Congo 20021031
I have the honour to refer to the statement by the President of the Security
Council dated 19 December 2001 (S/PRST/2001/39), whereby the Security Council
renewed for a period of six months the mandate of the Panel of Experts on the
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Council requested the Panel to submit to it
an interim report after three months, followed by a final report at the end of its
mandate. I refer also to the letter dated 12 July 2002 from the President
(S/2002/763), by which the Security Council extended the mandate of the Panel
until 31 October 2002.
I have the honour to transmit to you the final report of the Panel, which was
submitted to me by its Chairman, Mr. Mahmoud Kassem. This independent report
comprises an evaluation of the situation on the ground and the Panel’s observations
on the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. I should be grateful if you would bring the report to the attention of the
members of the Security Council.
Annex
Letter dated 8 October 2002 from the Chairman of the Panel of
Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and
Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
addressed to the Secretary-General
[Original: English]
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Contents
Paragraphs Page
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1–11 4
II. Change in tactics by elite networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12–21 5
III. Government-controlled area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22–64 7
IV. Rwanda-controlled area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65–96 14
V. Uganda-controlled area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97–131 19
VI. Collaboration of the Panel with the Porter Commission in Uganda . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132–138 24
VII. Transit and end-user trade issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139–148 26
VIII. Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149–154 28
IX. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155–160 29
X. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161–188 30
Annexes
I. Companies on which the Panel recommends the placing of financial restrictions
II. Persons for whom the Panel recommends a travel ban and financial restrictions
III. Business enterprises considered by the Panel to be in violation of the OECD Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises
IV. Countries visited and representatives of Governments and organizations interviewed
V. Abbreviations
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Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as that in it impossible to maintain large forces in the Democratic
neighbouring Burundi. The Lusaka Ceasefire Republic of the Congo. The Governments of Rwanda
Agreement of 1999 and the Arusha Agreement on and Zimbabwe, as well as powerful individuals in
Peace and Reconciliation, of 2000, served as important Uganda, have adopted other strategies for maintaining
points of reference for its work. The Sun City, Pretoria the mechanisms for revenue generation, many of which
and Luanda Agreements have also informed the Panel’s involve criminal activities, once their troops have
work. departed.
10. The Panel was composed as follows: 14. The Uganda People’s Defence Forces continue to
provoke ethnic conflict, as in the past, clearly
Ambassador Mahmoud Kassem (Egypt),
cognizant that the unrest in Ituri will require the
Chairman
continuing presence of a minimum of UPDF personnel.
Jim Freedman (Canada)
The Panel has evidence that high-ranking UPDF
Mel Holt (United States of America)
officers have taken steps to train local militia to serve
Bruno Schiemsky (Belgium)
as a paramilitary force, directly and discreetly under
Moustapha Tall (Senegal).
UPDF command, which will be capable of performing
11. Two part-time technical advisers, Gilbert Barthe the same functions as UPDF. There will be little change
(Switzerland) and Patrick Smith (United Kingdom of in the control that Ugandans now exercise over trade
Great Britain and Northern Ireland), also served with flows and economic resources. As UPDF continue to
the Panel. In addition, two political officers, an arm local groups, only less conspicuously than before,
administrator and a secretary assisted the Panel. the departure of Ugandan armed forces is unlikely to
alter economic activities by those powerful individuals
in the north-eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.
II. Change in tactics by elite networks
15. Like UPDF, and under pressure from its closest
12. The regional conflict that drew the armies of allies, Rwanda has started withdrawing. It has prepared
seven African States into the Democratic Republic of for withdrawal by putting in place economic control
the Congo has diminished in intensity, but the mechanisms that do not rely on an explicit presence of
overlapping microconflicts that it provoked continue. the Rwandan Patriotic Army. It has replaced Congolese
These conflicts are fought over minerals, farm produce, directors of parastatals with businessmen from Kigali
land and even tax revenues. Criminal groups linked to to ensure continuing revenue from water, power and
the armies of Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe and the transportation facilities. It has replaced local currency
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with Rwandan currency. RPA battalions that specialize
have benefited from the microconflicts. Those groups in mining activities remain in place, though they have
will not disband voluntarily even as the foreign ceased wearing RPA uniforms and will continue the
military forces continue their withdrawals. They have activities under a commercial guise. The Panel’s
built up a self-financing war economy centred on sources have reported that RPA recently undertook an
mineral exploitation. operation to obtain a large number of Congolese
passports so as to give an appropriate identity to RPA
13. Facilitated by South Africa and Angola, the officers who continue to be stationed at strategically
Pretoria and Luanda Agreements have prompted the important sites in the Democratic Republic of the
recent troop withdrawals from the eastern Democratic Congo.
Republic of the Congo. Welcome as they may be, these
withdrawals are unlikely to alter the determination of 16. The Panel has learned of other tactics for
Rwanda and Zimbabwe, and Ugandan individuals, to disguising the continuing presence of an armed force
exercise economic control over portions of the loyal to Rwanda. Reliable sources have reported an
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The departure of initiative by the Chief of Staff of the Armée nationale
their forces will do little to reduce economic control, or congolaise, Major Sylvain Mbuki, to reorganize the
the means of achieving it, since the use of national RCD-Goma forces in order to accommodate large
armies is only one among many means for exercising numbers of RPA soldiers inside ANC units and local
it. All three countries have anticipated the day when defence forces made up of pro-Rwanda elements. Most
pressure from the international community would make of the ANC units have had RPA leadership for some
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time, and now, with this reorganization, a significant Zimbabwe joint ventures have attracted, which tends to
number of RPA soldiers will be integrated into the inform the current United Nations Panel investigations
ANC rank and file. Instead of departing for Rwanda, into our commercial activities.” It also refers to plans
large numbers of Rwandan Hutus serving in RPA have to set up a private Zimbabwean military company to
been provided with new uniforms and assigned to ANC guard Zimbabwe’s economic investments in the
brigades as Congolese Hutu. Rwanda has diverted Democratic Republic of the Congo after the planned
attention from those soldiers staying in the Democratic withdrawal of ZDF troops. It states that this company
Republic of the Congo by drawing particular attention was formed to operate alongside a new military
to those who depart. Ceremonies have been held at company owned by the Democratic Republic of the
points of re-entry. In fact, the number of soldiers who Congo.
have left the Democratic Republic of the Congo is so
19. At the same time, local militias and local
far only a portion of the total number of RPA troops in
politicians have supplemented the role that State
the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, which
armies previously played in ensuring access to and
various sources estimate at between 35,000 and 50,000.
control of valuable resources and diverting State
Simultaneously with the RPA troop withdrawals,
revenue. The looting that was previously conducted by
Rwandan officials have repatriated to North Kivu
the armies themselves has been replaced with
thousands of Congolese Tutsi refugees under duress
organized systems of embezzlement, tax fraud,
from the camps around Byumba and Kibuye Provinces
extortion, the use of stock options as kickbacks and
in Rwanda. Schools in the Rwandan camps have
diversion of State funds conducted by groups that
remained closed and some camp structures have been
closely resemble criminal organizations.
razed to encourage further repatriations. All the Panel’s
sources have also suggested that this movement could 20. Such activities have become increasingly
be part of the new tactic for maintaining Rwanda’s prominent in the techniques of exploitation in the
presence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Panel has
Congo. identified three distinct groups engaged in activities in
three different areas and refers to them as elite
17. Although troops of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces
networks. These elite networks have control over a
have been a major guarantor of the security of the
range of commercial activities involving the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
exploitation of natural resources, diversion of taxes and
against regional rivals, its senior officers have enriched
other revenue generation activities in the three separate
themselves from the country’s mineral assets under the
areas controlled by the Government of the Democratic
pretext of arrangements set up to repay Zimbabwe for
Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda,
military services. Now ZDF is establishing new
respectively.
companies and contractual arrangements to defend its
economic interests in the longer term should there be a 21. The Panel has identified the following elements
complete withdrawal of ZDF troops. New trade and that are common to all of the elite networks and that
service agreements were signed between the are essential to understanding the nature of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zimbabwe just exploitation carried out by these networks in the
prior to the announced withdrawal of ZDF troops from Democratic Republic of the Congo:
the diamond centre of Mbuji Mayi late in August 2002.
• The networks consist of a small core of political
18. Towards the end of its mandate, the Panel and military elites and business persons and, in
received a copy of a memorandum dated August 2002 the case of the occupied areas, selected rebel
from the Defence Minister, Sidney Sekeramayi, to leaders and administrators. Some members of the
President Robert Mugabe, proposing that a joint elite networks occupy key positions in their
Zimbabwe-Democratic Republic of the Congo respective Governments or rebel groups.
company be set up in Mauritius to disguise the
• Members of these networks cooperate to generate
continuing economic interests of ZDF in the
revenue and, in the case of Rwanda, institutional
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The memorandum
financial gain.
states: “Your Excellency would be aware of the wave
of negative publicity and criticism that the DRC-
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• The elite networks ensure the viability of their 24. Even if present moves towards peace lead to a
economic activities through control over the complete withdrawal of Zimbabwean forces, the
military and other security forces that they use to network’s grip on the richest mineral assets of the
intimidate, threaten violence or carry out selected Democratic Republic of the Congo and related
acts of violence. businesses will remain. Zimbabwe’s political-military
elite signed six major trade and service agreements in
• The networks monopolize production, commerce
August 2002 with the Government of the Democratic
and fiscal functions.
Republic of the Congo. Reliable sources have told the
• The elite networks maintain the facade of rebel Panel about plans to set up new holding companies to
administrations in the occupied areas to generate disguise the continuing ZDF commercial operations in
public revenues that they then divert into the the Democratic Republic of the Congo and a ZDF-
networks, thereby depleting the public treasury. controlled private military company to be deployed in
the country to guard those assets.
• The elite networks derive financial benefit
through a variety of criminal activities including
theft, embezzlement and diversion of “public” The elite network
funds, undervaluation of goods, smuggling, false
invoicing, non-payment of taxes, kickbacks to 25. The elite network in the Government-held area
public officials and bribery. comprises three circles of power, namely, Congolese
• The elite networks form business companies or and Zimbabwean government officials and private
joint ventures that are fronts through which businessmen. Chief figures in the Congolese branch of
members of the networks carry on their respective the network are the National Security Minister,
commercial activities. Mwenze Kongolo, a shareholder and deal-broker for
both diamond and cobalt ventures; the Minister of
• The elite networks draw support for their Presidency and Portfolio, Augustin Katumba Mwanke,
economic activities through the networks and a former employee of Bateman’s mining company in
“services” (air transport, illegal arms dealing and South Africa and a key power broker in mining and
transactions involving the natural resources of the diplomatic deals; the President of the State diamond
Democratic Republic of the Congo) of organized company, Société minière de Bakwanga (MIBA), Jean-
or transnational criminal groups. Charles Okoto; the Planning Minister and former
Deputy Defence Minister, General Denis Kalume
Numbi, a stakeholder in the lucrative Sengamines
III. Government-controlled area diamond deal and in COSLEG; and the Director
General of Gécamines, Yumba Monga, pivotal in
22. The elite network of Congolese and Zimbabwean facilitating several asset-stripping joint ventures
political, military and commercial interests seeks to between the State mining company and private
maintain its grip on the main mineral resources — companies.
diamonds, cobalt, copper, germanium — of the
Government-controlled area. This network has 26. The Congolese branch also includes active, but
transferred ownership of at least US$ 5 billion of assets less visible members. Frédéric Tshineu Kabasele is a
from the State mining sector to private companies director of three joint ventures with Zimbabwe using
under its control in the past three years with no the COSLEG platform — the diamond trading
compensation or benefit for the State treasury of the Minerals Business Company, the logging company
Democratic Republic of the Congo. SOCEBO and the First Banking Corporation Congo.
The Director of the National Intelligence Agency,
23. This network benefits from instability in the Didier Kazadi Nyembwe, has oversight of many of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Its representatives private commercial operations and has been linked by
in the Kinshasa Government and the Zimbabwe several sources to arms supplies for Burundi opposition
Defence Forces have fuelled instability by supporting groups and Mayi-Mayi groups in Maniema and South
armed groups opposing Rwanda and Burundi. Kivu. COSLEG, a Congo-Zimbabwe joint stock
company, remains a key vehicle for military-backed
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commerce involving mostly diamonds, banking and Colonel Tshinga Dube of Zimbabwe Defence Industries
timber in the Government-held areas. The Technical to the Ukrainian diamond and arms dealer Leonid
Director of COSLEG, Mfuni Kazadi, specializes in the Minim, who currently faces smuggling charges in Italy.
writing of joint venture contracts to accommodate the The diamond mining operations have been conducted
private interests of the elite network. in great secrecy.
27. The key strategist for the Zimbabwean branch of 30. Among the businessmen in the elite network, a
the elite network is the Speaker of the Parliament and Belgian national, George Forrest, pioneered the
former National Security Minister, Emmerson exploitative joint venture agreements between private
Dambudzo Mnangagwa. Mr. Mnangagwa has won companies and Gécamines. Mr. Forrest owes his
strong support from senior military and intelligence commercial ascendancy to his long-standing ties to the
officers for an aggressive policy in the Democratic establishment in the Democratic Republic of the
Republic of the Congo. His key ally is a Commander of Congo. One of his companies also makes and markets
ZDF and Executive Chairman of COSLEG, General military equipment. Since 1994, he has owned 100 per
Vitalis Musunga Gava Zvinavashe. The General and cent of New Lachaussée in Belgium, which is a leading
his family have been involved in diamond trading and manufacturer of cartridge casings, grenades, light
supply contracts in the Democratic Republic of the weapons and cannon launchers. In a flagrant conflict of
Congo. A long-time ally of President Mugabe, Air interest, Mr. Forrest was appointed Chairman of
Marshal Perence Shiri, has been involved in military Gécamines from November 1999 to August 2001 while
procurement and organizing air support for the pro- his private companies negotiated new contracts with
Kinshasa armed groups fighting in the eastern the explicit intention of using Gécamines’ assets for
Democratic Republic of the Congo. He is also part of personal gain. During that time he built up the most
the inner circle of ZDF diamond traders who have wide-ranging private mining portfolio in the
turned Harare into a significant illicit diamond-trading Democratic Republic of the Congo. He benefits from
centre. strong backing from some political quarters in Belgium
where some of his companies are based. His operations
28. Other prominent Zimbabwean members of the
have been strongly criticized (one Belgian diplomatic
network include Brigadier General Sibusiso Busi
cable referred to Mr. Forrest running a “strategy of
Moyo, who is Director General of COSLEG. Brigadier
attrition” in the mining sector of the Democratic
Moyo advised both Tremalt and Oryx Natural
Republic of the Congo) and have recently come under
Resources, which represented covert Zimbabwean
the scrutiny of the Belgian Senate’s investigation into
military financial interests in negotiations with State
resource exploitation in the Democratic Republic of the
mining companies of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo.
Congo. Air Commodore Mike Tichafa Karakadzai is
Deputy Secretary of COSLEG, directing policy and 31. The techniques used by Mr. Forrest have since
procurement. He played a key role in arranging the been replicated by Zimbabwean-backed entrepreneurs
Tremalt cobalt and copper deal. Colonel Simpson John Arnold Bredenkamp and Mr. Al-Shanfari. Mr.
Sikhulile Nyathi is Director of defence policy for Bredenkamp, who has an estimated personal net worth
COSLEG. The Minister of Defence and former of over $500 million, is experienced in setting up
Security Minister, Sidney Sekeramayi, coordinates with clandestine companies and sanctions-busting
the military leadership and is a shareholder in operations. Mr. Al-Shanfari has gained privileged
COSLEG. The Panel has a copy of a letter from Mr. access to the Government of the Democratic Republic
Sekeramayi thanking the Chief Executive of Oryx of the Congo and its diamond concessions in exchange
Natural Resources, Thamer Bin Said Ahmed Al- for raising capital from some powerful entrepreneurs in
Shanfari, for his material and moral support during the the Gulf such as Issa al-Kawari who manages the
parliamentary elections of 2000. Such contributions fortune of the deposed Amir of Qatar. Also working
violate Zimbabwean law. with ZDF is a convicted criminal based in South
Africa, Nico Shefer, who has arranged for Zimbabwean
29. In June 2002, the Panel learned of a secret new
officers to be trained in diamond valuation in
ZDF diamond mining operation in Kalobo in Kasai
Johannesburg. Mr. Shefer’s company, Tandan
Occidental run by Dube Associates. This company is
Holdings, has a 50 per cent stake in Thorntree
linked, according to banking documents, through
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Industries, a joint venture diamond-trading company the clans also have ties with Amal and Hezbollah.
with ZDF. Some businesses associated with the clans are Sierra
Gem Diamonds, Asa Diam, Triple A Diamonds and
32. Zimbabwean Billy Rautenbach headed a joint
Echogem. A group linked to the clans operations is
venture cobalt-mining company and was Chief
providing counterfeit United States dollars to former
Executive of Gécamines from November 1998 to
generals from the time of President Mobutu, who are
March 2000. Although stripped of his cobalt
trying to overthrow the Government of the Democratic
concessions in Katanga, Mr. Rautenbach told the Panel
Republic of the Congo.
that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo had offered his company, Ridgepointe
International, mining rights to Gécamines concessions Strategies and sources of revenue
at Shinkolobwe, which include substantial deposits of
uranium, copper and cobalt. Mr. Rautenbach’s 35. The Panel has identified five strategies for
representatives said that any new agreement would be generating revenues for the elite network through
subject to the new mining code of the Democratic diamond, copper and cobalt mining companies. The
Republic of the Congo and any uranium mining network coordinates its operations between its
operations would be open to inspections by the political, military and business wings to generate
International Atomic Energy Agency. maximum income.
33. Such high levels of mineral exploitation would be
impossible without the collusion of highly placed Asset stripping of State mining companies
government officials who provide mining licences and 36. The richest and most readily exploitable of the
export permits in return for private gain. The Panel has publicly owned mineral assets of the Democratic
compiled extensive documentation of such Republic of the Congo are being moved into joint
facilitations. For example, in its attempts to buy rights ventures that are controlled by the network’s private
to the Kolwezi Tailings, First Quantum Minerals companies. These transactions, which are controlled
(FQM) of Canada offered a down payment to the State through secret contracts and off-shore private
of $100 million, cash payments and shares held in trust companies, amount to a multi-billion-dollar corporate
for Government officials. According to documents in theft of the country’s mineral assets. Some 30
the possession of the Panel, the payments list included businessmen, politicians and military officers are the
the National Security Minister, Mwenze Kongolo; the main beneficiaries of the arrangements. The elite
Director of the National Intelligence Agency, Didier network has been trying to legitimize such corporate
Kazadi Nyembwe; the Director General of Gécamines, theft and market these assets to legitimate international
Yumba Monga; and the former Minister of the mining companies.
Presidency, Pierre-Victor Mpoyo. The FQM share offer
to those officials was premised on a sharp rise in its 37. The Panel has now obtained documentary
share price once it was announced that it had secured evidence that Mr. Al-Shanfari’s company, Oryx Natural
some of the most valuable mineral concessions in the Resources, is being used as a front for ZDF and its
Democratic Republic of the Congo. military company OSLEG. Sengamines claims an 800
square kilometre concession, just south of Mbuji Mayi,
34. The Panel has documents showing that three carved out of the concession of the Société Minière de
“clans” of Lebanese origin, who operate licensed Bakwanga. According to company officials,
diamond businesses in Antwerp, purchased diamonds Sengamines’ diamond concessions would be worth at
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo worth least $2 billion if they were put into full production.
$150 million in 2001, either directly through Kinshasa
or through comptoirs in the Republic of the Congo. The 38. Sengamines claimed that it had reconfigured its
three “clans” — Ahmad, Nassour and Khanafer — are equity after a failed attempt to be listed on the London
distinct criminal organizations that operate Stock Exchange in June 2000, as follows: 49 per cent
internationally. Their activities, known to intelligence for Oryx Natural Resources, 35 per cent for COMIEX-
services and police organizations, include Congo, and 16 per cent for MIBA. The Panel has
counterfeiting, money-laundering and diamond learned that this purported buyout never happened. It
smuggling. Several credible sources have reported that was a device to disguise the close association between
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Sengamines and ZDF, and to deceive international of the Congo, Mwenze Kongolo had pressured their
investors. ZDF, through OSLEG, owns the 49 per cent negotiators to agree to the joint venture contract
of Sengamines that is publicly claimed by Oryx. In the despite its negative implications for the State
course of a meeting held on 1 August 2000, OSLEG company’s finances. The ultimate owners and
nominated Oryx to hold its 49 per cent interest in beneficiaries of Tremalt are hidden behind a web of
Sengamines; 35 per cent is held by COMIEX-Congo, trusts and private holding companies registered in the
and 16 per cent has been allocated to MIBA. British Virgin Islands and the Isle of Man to whose
records the Panel was not allowed direct access.
39. Tremalt Ltd., represented by Mr. Bredenkamp,
holds the rights to exploit six Gécamines concessions
Control of procurement and accounting
containing over 2.7 million tons of copper and 325,000
tons of cobalt over 25 years. Tremalt paid the 42. Management control is essential to the elite
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo network’s strategy for extracting maximum revenue
just $400,000, but the estimated worth of the six from the joint ventures. Much of the revenue from the
concessions exceeds $1 billion. The joint venture joint ventures is off the balance sheet in overpriced
running the concession is the Kababankola Mining subcontracting and procurement arrangements with
Company, in which Tremalt has an 80 per cent share to companies and individuals linked to the network. The
Gécamines’ 20 per cent. Under this agreement, the two biggest Zimbabwe-Democratic Republic of the
Panel has learned that Gécamines derives no direct Congo joint ventures — Sengamines and KMC — are
financial benefit. Although Tremalt representatives told declaring huge losses.
the Panel that they have invested $15 million to date,
there are no signs of substantial investments having Enterprise General Malta Forrest and Groupe
been made on the concessions, nor has any schedule of George Forrest
investment in the form of a business plan been released
43. Groupe George Forrest (GGF) in partnership with
to Gécamines.
the United States-based OM Group currently runs one
40. Like Oryx, Tremalt insists that its operations are of the most profitable mining operations from the
not linked to ZDF or the Government of Zimbabwe. Democratic Republic of the Congo with only the most
However, the Panel has obtained a copy of the marginal benefit for the State mining company,
confidential profit-sharing agreement, under which Gécamines. Through this venture, the Scories du Terril
Tremalt retains 32 per cent of net profits, and de Lubumbashi (STL), also known as the Big Hill
undertakes to pay 34 per cent of net profits to the Project, Mr. Forrest and OM Group have secured
Democratic Republic of the Congo and 34 per cent to access to a copper and cobalt stockpile which contains
Zimbabwe. This profit-sharing agreement was the over 3,000 tons of germanium, a rare metal used in
subject of a confidential memorandum from the optical fibres, infrared lenses and telecommunication
Defence Minister, Mr. Sekeramayi, to President satellites. This stockpile, formerly the property of
Mugabe in August 2002. Tremalt also undertakes to Gécamines, has a current market value of more than $2
provide the Congolese and Zimbabwean militaries with billion. Although the shareholdings for the STL project
motor vehicles, trucks, buses and cash payments as are divided between OM Group (55 per cent), GGF (25
necessary. These are to be subtracted from the two per cent) and Gécamines (20 per cent), the State
countries’ part of the profit share. A forum has been company has been expressly excluded from the
established between Tremalt and ZDF to plan strategy revenues derived from the germanium processing.
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and “look
44. Gécamines officials complain that OM Group and
after the interests of the Zimbabweans”. Meeting
GGF have deliberately ignored the agreed technical
monthly, the forum’s main members are General
plan for the STL project, which provided for two
Zvinavashe, Brigadier Moyo, Air Commodore
electric-powered refineries and a converter to be built
Karakadzai, Mr. Bredenkamp, the Managing Director
adjacent to the copper and cobalt stockpile. This would
of KMC, Colin Blythe-Wood, and the Director of
have meant that all the germanium would have been
KMC, Gary Webster.
processed within the Democratic Republic of the
41. Gécamines officials told the Panel that the Congo, and Gécamines would have been entitled to a
National Security Minister of the Democratic Republic revenue share. Instead the semi-processed ore is
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shipped to OM Group’s plant in Finland where the sources have informed the Panel that managers in
germanium is extracted. The former Chairman of several companies, with support from the members of
Gécamines, Mr. Forrest, whose construction companies the elite network, collude in these thefts.
built the STL project, has declined to intervene on
48. The State-owned Société minière de Bakwanga
behalf of the State company. Gécamines has rejected an
diamond company has been plundered by a
offer by OM Group to cede the State company just 5
management that condones widespread theft by
per cent of the revenues from the germanium
company insiders. Three theft rings operate in the
processing in Finland.
MIBA compound known as the polygone. The first of
45. Mr. Forrest has used his position in the elite these rings was organized and operated by 48
network in an attempt to control the mining sector in Zimbabwean soldiers who had been stationed at five
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, according to different locations throughout the large mining site.
several reliable sources. For example, the Kinross Gold Zimbabwe military personnel allow groups of people to
Corporation of Canada had sought to invest up to $1 enter the polygone and dig for diamonds, and in
billion in copper and cobalt mining operations, but was exchange receive compensation in the form of money
thwarted by interventions from Mr. Forrest and senior and diamonds.
Government officials. The company returned to the
49. A second theft ring is operated by the Brigade
Democratic Republic of the Congo late in 2001 as part
Minière or provincial mining police, who are trained to
of Kinross-Forrest Ltd., a company registered in the
guard the mine. Previously sacked for theft, Brigade
British Virgin Islands. A smaller Belgian-based
Minière Commander Mushitu has returned to the force.
company, Madsa, obtained the support of the World
In exchange for protection, the Commander receives
Bank and the United Nations Industrial Development
sacks of diamond-rich gravel. However, the diamond
Organization for a $20 million development package to
diggers are often caught in exchanges of fire between
build processing plants to service the mining sector: a
the Brigade Minière and the Zimbabweans in their
smelter, an acid manufacturing plant and a cement
efforts to control the diamond thefts.
factory. Mr. Forrest and his business allies have
opposed this development, in part, it seems, because it 50. These losses are probably modest compared to
would cut their profits from the current overpriced the losses from a third theft ring that involves high-
procurement contracts. level MIBA managers and occurs inside the cleaning,
sorting and classification operation facility. The thefts
Tremalt Ltd. (John Bredenkamp) include gem and near-gem production. About 50 per
cent of all company revenues are generated by the 3 to
46. Tremalt’s 80 per cent stake in KMC gives it
4 per cent of gem and near-gem production. The drop
management control over day-to-day administration
in revenues resulting from theft has been estimated at
and longer-term strategic decisions about exploiting the
about 25 per cent of total revenue, roughly 25 million
concession. Tremalt also procures equipment for ZDF
dollars per annum. Under pressure from its creditors,
and the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC), the cost of
MIBA was obliged to engage the services of a private
which it deducts from their share of KMC profits.
security firm, Overseas Security Services, which
Although Ridgepointe International, run by Mr.
determined that a criminal syndicate was operating
Rautenbach, the previous foreign investor in the
inside the classification operation.
Kababankola concessions, had to operate with much
more dilapidated processing plants, it generated more
Using the corporate facade as a cover for
than $20 million profit within 18 months of taking
criminal activities
over. Industry analysts say that Tremalt’s claimed
losses of more than $13 million from February 2001 to 51. Some members of the elite network running joint
July 2002 are not credible. ventures are linked to the smuggling of precious metals
and gems, arms trafficking, illegal foreign exchange
Organized theft trading and money-laundering. The Panel has received
extensive documentation and first-hand testimony
47. FAC and ZDF officers who controlled security at
explaining the mechanics of these criminal operations.
the main joint venture sites have been involved in and
facilitate high levels of theft from production. Reliable
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52. Sengamines supplements its revenues by Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
laundering diamonds smuggled from Angola and Sierra to salary payments for ZDF. It has received a document
Leone. Sengamines also smuggles its own diamonds recording a transfer of MIBA funds requested by
out of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Brigadier General François Olenga for the purchase of
Panel has learned of specific instances, times, places weapons for FAC.
and persons involved. For example, in March 2001, Mr.
55. Oryx Natural Resources has a close working
Al-Shanfari instructed his security chief to smuggle
relationship with Avient Air, a military company which
diamonds from the Sengamines concession to
supplies services and equipment to ZDF and FAC. In
Johannesburg, South Africa, and deliver them to Ken
April 2002, Avient Air brokered the sale of six attack
Roberts, the chief executive of Serengeti Diamonds.
helicopters to the Kinshasa Government. Bank records
53. Sengamines has also served as a front for illegal show several transactions between Avient and accused
foreign exchange transactions using several routes into trafficker Leonid Minim. Under the management of
and out of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Most Andrew Smith, a former British army captain, Gerry
of the latter involved breaking the country’s foreign O’Brien and Lewis Kling, Avient was contracted to
exchange laws and profiting from arbitrage between organize bombing raids into the eastern Democratic
differential exchange rates for the United States dollar Republic of the Congo in 1999 and 2000. At the same
and Congolese franc in Kinshasa and the eastern time Avient organized logistics and transportation of
Democratic Republic of the Congo, respectively. In one mining equipment for Sengamines and enjoyed security
example, on 13 March 2000, Oryx officials in Kinshasa clearance as a military company working with ZDF.
loaded an aircraft belonging to Mr. Bredenkamp with The Panel has a record of a payment in September
eight crates of Congolese francs for shipment to 2001 of $35,000 from the Oryx account at Banque
Harare. The Panel also has documentation Belgolaise to Avient Ltd., Avient Air’s sister company
substantiating information that an Oryx employee based in the United Kingdom.
regularly transported parcels of United States dollars
56. John Bredenkamp, who has a history of
($500,000 at a time) that were withdrawn from
clandestine military procurement, has an investment in
the Oryx account at Hambros Bank, London, to
Aviation Consultancy Services Company (ACS). The
Kinshasa without declaring them to the Congolese
Panel has confirmed, independently of Mr.
authorities; at Kinshasa the money was changed into
Bredenkamp, that this company represents British
Congolese francs and further transported to Harare
Aerospace, Dornier of France and Agusta of Italy in
and the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Africa. Far from being a passive investor in ACS as
Oryx employees said they were asked to pay
Tremalt representatives claimed, Mr. Bredenkamp
Mr. Mnangagwa a commission on these transactions
actively seeks business using high-level political
which contravened Zimbabwe law. Despite repeated
contacts. In discussions with senior officials he has
claims by Mr. Bredenkamp’s representatives that he has
offered to mediate sales of British Aerospace military
no business relationship with Mr. Al-Shanfari,
equipment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
the Panel has received a document — dated January
Mr. Bredenkamp’s representatives claimed that his
2001 and jointly signed by Mr. Bredenkamp and
companies observed European Union sanctions on
Mr. Al-Shanfari — guaranteeing a $1.5 million loan to
Zimbabwe, but British Aerospace spare parts for ZDF
Oryx Natural Resources from Python Services Ltd.
Hawk jets were supplied early in 2002 in breach of
those sanctions. Mr. Bredenkamp also controls
Mining revenues and the military
Raceview Enterprises, which supplies logistics to ZDF.
54. The procurement of military equipment and The Panel has obtained copies of Raceview invoices to
services is a major source of revenue for the elite ZDF dated 6 July 2001 for deliveries worth
network. Several joint venture mining companies have $3.5 million of camouflage cloth, batteries, fuels and
strong links with the military supply companies who lubricating oil, boots and rations. It also has copies of
facilitate their operations in the Democratic Republic invoices for aircraft spares for the Air Force of
of the Congo. The Panel has information that diamond Zimbabwe worth another $3 million.
revenues were used to pay for arms purchases for FAC
and indirectly used to finance the contribution of the
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Case study of a commercial chain involving no longer function and the fifth, in the city of Mbuji
diamonds Mayi, is said to function at less than 20 per cent
capacity. Of the six water production plants in Kasai
57. The Democratic Republic of the Congo-
Occidental, five no longer function; the sixth, in the
Zimbabwe joint venture Minerals Business Company
city of Kananga, operates at best at 10 per cent
represents Zimbabwe’s interests in the lucrative
capacity.
diamond trade of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. It buys and markets production from the joint 60. Government officials blame the precipitous
venture Sengamines, which has attempted to conceal its decline in public spending on the war. Most soldiers
links with ZDF. The Minerals Business Company uses are unpaid and become social predators, financing
Zimbabwe’s military and political influence to evade themselves through theft and pillage, living off the
the legal requirements of the Democratic Republic of population they are presumed to protect, and provincial
the Congo and to avoid paying the costly licensing governments make little effort to discourage them.
fees. The refusal of MBC to honour its obligations to Taxes and licensing fees have nevertheless increased,
the public treasury has prompted official complaints as have the forced acquisition of the resources of State
from the Ministry of Mines demanding that MBC enterprises in the name of the war effort. The
comply with the law. MBC officials have asserted that Government has therefore benefited from the state of
Zimbabwean entities are not obliged to adhere to the war by using it as a pretext, not only to justify an
laws of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. increase in demands on the population to increase
government revenues, but also to justify a decrease in
58. The Minerals Business Company allows a limited
expenditure. Insecurity in the Government-controlled
number of other diamond companies to take advantage
area is only a small part of the consequences of support
of the privileged status it enjoys in Kinshasa. Sandrian
for the military in war. It is much more a consequence
Mining, based in Kinshasa, has a contractual
of the deliberate neglect of the military, who by virtue
relationship with MBC. Thorntree Industries, a joint
of this neglect turn their weapons on the population.
venture between South Africa-based Nico Shefer’s
Tandan group and ZDF, also has contracts with MBC, 61. The pretext of war, increased government levies,
as does Mixen Trading, which has offices in unpaid salaries and the absence of government services
Zimbabwe. MBC sells to the United States-based have combined to precipitate a collapse in the urban
Flashes of Color, and the Swiss-registered Ibryn & economies of Mbuji Mayi, Kananga and, to a lesser
Associates, as well as to the Belgian-registered Jewel extent, of Lubumbashi. Banks no longer offer credit in
Impex, Komal Gems and Diagem. One of the most the Kasai Provinces. The absence of local credit and
important trading partners of MBC is the Belgian- the decline of road transport have forced most local
based company Abadiam, which buys from MBC as industries in Kananga to close.
well as directly from Sengamines. The Panel has bank
records dated September 2001 showing transfers of Katanga
more than $1 million from the Belgian account of Oryx
62. Lubumbashi, and southern Katanga generally,
Natural Resources to Abadiam.
have been affected by Rwanda’s presence in the north.
The occupation by RPA of the northern portion of
Collapse of the public sector; armed Katanga, the rich agricultural plains around Nyunzu
conflict and its humanitarian and Kongolo, has cut the southern portion off from
consequences what was once the breadbasket of Katanga.
63. A recent study by Médecins sans Frontières in
Kasai Oriental and Kasai Occidental Kilwa, a representative town in southern Katanga south
59. The diversion of funds from State companies and of the front line, with a population of 350,000, has
public coffers, by fraud or under the pretext of effort de found a death rate for children under 5 of 3.2 per
guerre, has contributed to eliminating funds available 10,000 per day. Over the course of a year this means
for public services. The public sector in the two Kasai that 12 per cent of all children under 5 years old will
Provinces has effectively disappeared. Of the five die, and one out of every four children die over a
water production plants in Kasai Oriental, four plants period of two years. Notably, virtually none (0.6 per
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cent) of the deaths resulted from violence. Deaths governmental organization, Tous pour la paix et la
instead result from illness — malaria and dysentery: démocratie, aiming to conscript Hutus of all political
conditions closely linked to malnutrition and the persuasions to throw in their lot with the Rwandans.
absence of medical facilities. Their purpose, as described by the Nord Kivu Reveil in
a circular dated 16 April 2002, has been to “express
64. Malaria and dysentery are treatable. International
allegiance to Rwanda by joining its efforts to control
non-governmental organizations — World Vision and
the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo”.
Médecins sans Frontières in this case — try to step in
where government facilities no longer function. 68. A 30-year-old Interahamwe combatant living in
However, the soaring death rates in the Government- the area of Bukavu described the situation in a taped
held areas around Ankoro, Kilwa, Dubie and Lwanza, interview with a United Nations officer in early 2002.
especially where medical facilities are non-existent and
We haven’t fought much with the RPA in
where State medical professionals receive no salaries,
the last two years. We think they are tired of this
are indications of Government negligence. The rates of
war, like we are. In any case, they aren’t here in
malnutrition and mortality are measures of that
the Congo to chase us, like they pretend. I have
negligence and are the consequence, in part, of
seen the gold and coltan mining they do here, we
diverting State resources from State companies such as
see how they rob the population. These are the
Gécamines into the private accounts of Zimbabwean
reasons for their being here. The RPA come and
individuals, other private interests, and Congolese
shoot in the air and raid the villagers’ houses but
individuals.
they don’t attack us any more. If you are lucky,
and you have a big brother in the RPA, he might
IV. Rwanda-controlled area be able to get you some food and ammunition.
69. On the basis of its analysis of considerable
65. The claims of Rwanda concerning its security documentation and oral testimony, the Panel holds the
have justified the continuing presence of its armed view that the rationale for Rwanda’s presence is to
forces, whose real long-term purpose is, to use the term increase the numbers of Rwandans in the eastern
employed by the Congo Desk of the Rwandan Patriotic Democratic Republic of the Congo and to encourage
Army, to “secure property”. Rwanda’s leaders have those settled there to act in unison to support its
succeeded in persuading the international community exercise of economic control. The recent departure of
that their military presence in the eastern Democratic troops should not be interpreted as a sign of Rwanda’s
Republic of the Congo protects the country against willingness to reduce its considerable involvement in
hostile groups in the Democratic Republic of the the evacuation of valuable resources, to reduce the
Congo, who, they claim, are actively mounting an level of armed conflict or to diminish the humanitarian
invasion against them. crisis in the region. Economic exploitation in its
66. The Panel has extensive evidence to the contrary. various forms will continue, relying on a less
For example, the Panel is in possession of a letter, conspicuous armed force and alternative strategies for
dated 26 May 2000, from Jean-Pierre Ondekane, First carrying out the exploitative activities.
Vice-President and Chief of the Military High
Command for RCD-Goma, urging all army units to The elite network
maintain good relations “with our Interahamwe and
Mayi-Mayi brothers”, and further, “if necessary to let 70. The elite network’s operations in the eastern
them exploit the sub-soil for their survival”. Democratic Republic of the Congo are managed
67. Prominent members of a Congolese Hutu group, centrally from the RPA Congo Desk, which serves to
Benemugabohumwe, recently began to encourage link the commercial and military activities of RPA. The
Hutus living in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Panel has described this function in some detail in
some of them opposition groups, to work instead for previous reports. The Panel continues to receive
the cause of Rwanda in the country. Eugene Serufuli, documentation on ways in which the proceeds of the
RCD-Goma Governor of North Kivu Province and RPA commercial wing finance an armed presence. As
reportedly himself a Hutu, has promoted a non- an illustration, the Panel has recently acquired
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documents showing coltan sales being negotiated by Mr. Ruprah, played a key role in this counterfeit
ranking Congo Desk officials. The Panel has copies of operation. Another group, the Muamba Nozi
faxes sent from the office of RPA Major Dan Munyuza counterfeiting operation, also provides counterfeit
on behalf of Maniema Mining Company and another Congolese francs to RCD-Goma. Its regional base of
fax sent from the office of RPA Chief of Staff General operations is located at Nairobi, where they print and
James Kaberebe. distribute to the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo large quantities of counterfeit Congolese francs.
71. While revenues and expenditure in the Congo
Officials in the Central Bank of Kinshasa have
Desk are considerable, they are kept strictly separate
informed the Panel that Mr. Muamba Nozi’s counterfeit
from Rwanda’s national budget. A reliable source
activities are politically motivated and designed to
associated with the Congo Desk has calculated that
deliberately destabilize the present regime by
income to the Desk provided 80 per cent of all RPA
weakening the currency.
expenditure in 1999. The official Rwandan budget for
1999 allocated $80 million to the military. If this
official budget allocation of $80 million represents the Strategies and sources of revenue
20 per cent referred to by the Panel’s source as the
portion of military expenditure not covered by the Coltan
Congo Desk, then the total military budget from all
sources would approximate $400 million. This comes 74. The end of the SOMIGL coltan monopoly in
to 20 per cent of GNP for 1999 and approximately 150 April 2001 was less a consequence of the falling price
per cent of recurring budget expenditure for that year. of coltan and more a consequence of Rwanda’s
The Congo Desk’s contribution to Rwanda’s military determination to capture more of the revenue that was
expenses would therefore have been in the order of being taken in taxes by the RCD-Goma rebel
$320 million. The activities funded by revenues administration. The termination of the agreement with
generated by the Congo Desk strongly shape Rwanda’s SOMIGL made it possible for RPA to frustrate the
foreign policy and directly influence national decision- efforts of RCD-Goma to raise revenue for its own
making in a number of domains. These transactions purposes.
are, however, hidden from the scrutiny of international 75. The bulk of coltan exported from the eastern
organizations. Democratic Republic of the Congo, as much as 60 to
72. The elite network maintains close commercial 70 per cent, has been mined under the direct
ties with transnational criminal networks, including surveillance of RPA mining détachés and evacuated by
those of Victor Bout, Sanjivan Ruprah and Richard aircraft from airstrips near mining sites directly to
Muamba Nozi. Victor Bout’s aircraft are utilized for a Kigali or Cyangugu. No taxes are paid. Rwandan
number of purposes including transport of coltan and military aircraft, Victor Bout’s aircraft and small airline
cassiterite, the transport of supplies into mining sites, companies are used in the evacuation of the coltan.
and the transport of military troops and equipment. RPA has maintained control over most of the coltan
During the last major military campaign in Pweto, sites where rich deposits are found, where the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Victor Bout’s percentage of tantalum is high, and where local
aircraft were used to transport RPA personnel to the airstrips are accessible. A variety of forced labour
area. regimes are found at sites that have been managed by
RPA mining détachés, some for coltan collection, some
73. While Sanjivan Ruprah has frequently worked for transport, others for domestic services. Many
within Victor Bout’s criminal organization, he accounts report the widespread use of prisoners
maintains an independent affiliation with the Congo imported from Rwanda who work as indentured labour.
Desk in Kigali. On 7 February 2002, Mr. Ruprah was
arrested in Belgium on suspicion of planning to 76. A smaller portion, perhaps 15 to 25 per cent of
provide 6 million new zaire banknotes — still valid in the total coltan exported, is purchased by comptoirs
the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo — to owned by Rwandans who buy from local négotiants at
RCD-Goma with financing by diamond dealers based remote coltan sites or from the agents of local defence
in Belgium. The President of RCD-Goma, Adolphe groups. More typically these comptoirs, owned by
Onusumba, who has kinship and business ties with Rwandan army officers or those closely linked to the
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Government of Rwanda, such as MHI comptoir, Eagle Rwanda-controlled coltan comptoirs, Eagle Wings
Wings or Rwanda Metals, have obtained their own collaborates with RPA to receive privileged access to
mining sites and conscript their own workers to exploit coltan sites and captive labour.
the sites under severe conditions.
80. Approximately 25 per cent of Eagle Wings coltan
77. The smallest portion of coltan is purchased by the is shipped from Kigali to the Ulba Metallurgical Plant
few remaining Congolese-owned comptoirs at one of of NAC Kazatomprom, in Kazakhstan. Another 25 per
the large number of coltan sites in remote areas. Most cent is sold to the parent company of Eagle Wings,
of the Congolese comptoirs have found it impossible to Trinitech International Inc. in the United States, which
compete with the RPA or Rwanda-owned comptoirs. arranges for sales to both Ulba and to the Chinese
processing facility at Ningxia Non-Ferrous Metals
78. As mining profits to the Congo Desk have
Smeltery (NNMS). H. C. Starck, based in Germany and
increased, the share of RCD-Goma has declined. The
a subsidiary of the transnational corporation Bayer AG,
Congo Desk has perennially deprived its junior partner,
purchases about 15 per cent of Eagle Wings coltan.
RCD-Goma, of any significant share in resources and
H. C. Starck has denied on numerous occasions
prerogatives, and RCD-Goma has perennially
obtaining coltan originating from Central Africa. In a
complained. RCD-Goma administrators have
press statement issued on 24 May 2002, H. C. Starck
frequently pointed out that they were unable to manage
reiterated that the company had purchased no material
their army without sufficient revenue. Lacking
originating in Central Africa since August 2001. The
financial support, the ANC brigades have turned to
Panel possesses documents showing the contrary. In the
pillaging villagers throughout the eastern Democratic
same press release, H. C. Starck claimed that its coltan
Republic of the Congo. The third Brigade has stolen a
originates from “peasant suppliers” and not from rebel
large number of cattle around Kalemie, and the first
groups. In fact, no coltan exits from the eastern
Brigade has taken diamonds from Opala. The Panel
Democratic Republic of the Congo without benefiting
possesses extensive documentation on these activities.
either the rebel group or foreign armies.
Most of these rebel forces are under the command of
RPA officers. They have little hesitation, when so 81. In one instance on which the Panel has
directed, in attacking local self-defence groups who documentation, Mozambique Gemstone Company
obstruct their commercial operations, to eliminate provided false documents establishing Mozambique as
specific enemies, to provide security around gold, the origin of a shipment of coltan originating in
coltan and diamond rich areas, to provide police Rwanda and transiting through South Africa.
services in urban areas and occasionally to keep a force Mozambique Gemstone Company then sold the
present along the front lines. Since ANC troops are consignment to AMC African Trading and Consulting
neither paid nor disciplined, they use their weapons to Company Ltd., based in South Africa, which
prey on the population, frequently burning whole subsequently sold the consignment to H. C. Starck Ltd.
villages to acquire property and food. in Rayong, Thailand, on 21 September 2001. H. C.
Starck sent a letter of credit for this consignment on
Case study of a commercial chain involving 9 May 2002 to Chemie Pharmacie Holland, which
coltan oversaw the transaction, and which is a commercial
partner of Eagle Wings providing logistical and
79. Eagle Wings Resources International, a coltan
financial services. Eagle Wings is the only coltan
comptoir in Bukavu, is a subsidiary of Trinitech
source for Chemie Pharmacie. Eagle Wings has no
International Inc., based in Ohio, United States. Eagle
operations in Mozambique.
Wings has offices in Rwanda, Burundi and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The manager of 82. The Panel has also had direct contacts with the
Eagle Wings in Kigali has close ties to the Rwandan Chinese processing facility, NNMS, to determine
regime. Consequently, Eagle Wings operates in the whether they use coltan originating in the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo as a Rwanda- Democratic Republic of the Congo. NNMS
controlled comptoir with all the privileges derived categorically denied doing business with “any
from this connection. Eagle Wings is not obliged to individual or any entity that represents somebody or
fulfil its full responsibilities to the public treasury some entity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”
managed by the RCD-Goma administration. Like other In fact, a number of brokers trading in coltan
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originating from the eastern Democratic Republic of Khalil was undervaluing the diamonds, and the
the Congo have informed the Panel of their sales to consequence was a reduction in taxes payable to RCD-
NNMS. A publicity presentation prepared by NNMS Goma’s public treasury as well as a greater margin of
itself has stated that the reason that they are able to profit for Mr. Khalil and the Congo Desk. The study
provide low prices for their output is that NNMS buys concludes that “The public treasury would have four
significant amounts of cheap raw material from Central times the present revenue from diamonds were it not
Africa. One NNMS report notes that 50 per cent of all for fraudulent practices and the under-valuation of
coltan purchased for processing originates in Central diamonds”.
Africa. Frequent follow-up Panel enquiries with NNMS
were ignored. Imports, taxation and requisition by the
public sector
Diamonds
86. The controversial “conflict” diamonds from
83. The diamond market was the prize Rwanda Kisangani are marketed by criminal networks.
fought Uganda to have for its own. After the last clash Proceeds from these criminal sales are laundered by the
in Kisangani in June 2000, RPA worked through the purchase of large quantities of household goods in
RCD-Goma administration to funnel all the diamonds Dubai — sugar, soap, cloth and medicines — which are
in Kisangani through the Congo Desk control. The then imported to the Democratic Republic of the Congo
technique was to oblige all local diamond traders to and offered to local sellers at attractive prices. The
sell to one principal comptoir holding exclusive export Rwandan wholesalers use the profits in Congolese
rights. francs to buy dollars and, to close the trade circuit, to
purchase diamonds.
84. The Congo Desk gave Aziz Nassour the first
monopoly. Aziz Nassour fell out of favour with the 87. The interest of the RPA commercial wing in
Congo Desk and was replaced by an Israeli diamond selling consumables at attractive prices is not only to
dealer, Philippe Surowicz. Diamond traders in launder money from criminal diamond sales, but also
Kisangani remember the Surowicz period as a “reign of to place the once-thriving Kisangani economy under
terror”. Diamond sellers frequently reported entering Rwanda’s control. The cloths that were once
“Monsieur Philippe’s” comptoir only to be confronted manufactured at the Kisangani Sotexki factory and
with RPA military who named a derisory price and renowned for their quality no longer compete with the
took the diamonds. The Congo Desk replaced cheaper imports, and the result is that the Sotexki
Mr. Surowicz in October 2001 with a Lebanese, Hamad labour force, once 2,000, now stands at 100. The palm
Khalil, who worked through the Bakayoko comptoir in oil once produced locally at the Unilever-owned plant
Kisangani. can no longer compete with the imported oil that is
sold in Kisangani at a third of the price of locally
85. In mid-November 2001, the Department of
produced oil. The Unilever-owned palm oil plants in
Lands, Mines and Energy of RCD-Goma conducted a
Kisangani are practically at a standstill. Weakening
study of Hamad Khalil’s performance in the first month
local production not only undermines the local
of his tenure. His quota had been set at a minimum of
manufacturing economy and makes the Kisangani
$500,000 per month. Mr. Khalil met his quota
population captive consumers, it also shifts Kisangani’s
exporting diamonds valued at $576,380 over a period
manufacturing economy to Kigali.
of 27 days. The performance was adequate, but it was
far below the Kisangani sales potential of up to 88. Another strategy for raising revenue is to use
$2 million per month. His poor performance raised the RCD-Goma’s public sector facade to requisition funds
suspicion that the Congo Desk was using Mr. Khalil to from public enterprises. On 21 November 2001, the
divert revenues that might otherwise accrue to the Secretary General of RCD-Goma requisitioned by
RCD-Goma administration. A similar inspection of decree all revenues generated by public utilities and
diamond production in the Sankuru and Lodja areas of parastatals. On the following day the Secretary General
Northern Kasai the week before had also revealed that annulled all existing collective agreements for workers
RPA officers were clandestinely taking large quantities in those enterprises. The decrees were applicable to all
of diamonds out of Northern Kasai directly to the public enterprises, including the water utility, the
Congo Desk in Kigali. RCD-Goma determined that Mr. airport authorities, the electricity utility, the road and
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transport authority among others. RCD-Goma declared au Congo and others detailing thefts of cattle valued at
the requisitions to be in the public interest. Within a more than $15 million, thefts of over $1 million worth
month, the water utility lacked sufficient funds to of retail goods and the destruction or fraudulent sale of
purchase water purification chemicals in Kisangani and equipment from the Société nationale de chemin de fer
Bukavu and power stations stopped functioning for du Congo.
lack of necessary repairs. The International Committee
91. The Catholic Church in the eastern Democratic
of the Red Cross has stepped in to provide 60 tons of
Republic of the Congo has spoken out boldly about the
chemicals for water purification and has financed
thefts, killings, torture, extortions, rapes and piracy on
costly repairs at Tshopo power station to avert a
Lake Tanganyika perpetrated originally by RPA and
discontinuation of water supply in Kisangani and avert
continued by ANC, the RCD-Goma police and the
a cholera outbreak. The parastatal transport company
Banyamulenge militia. The Church, and most notably
ceased to function, and the airport authorities appealed
the Bishop of Kalemie-Kirungu, recently headed a
to RCD-Goma to restore a portion of the requisitioned
campaign to expose these abuses. Directors of RCD-
funds since no salaries had been paid for six months.
Goma’s Department of Security and Information
89. Following a decree on 15 March 2002, new taxes responded by threatening to kill prominent church
were introduced and all existing tax rates have been leaders. The Catholic Diocese published a list of those
increased. Over an 18-month period, since the previous threats on 15 May 2002.
tax decree of September 2000, taxes on electrical
92. The multiplication of armed forces and fighting
consumption have increased by 200 per cent. Licences
in the interior have all but destroyed farm production
for trading in agricultural products increased fourfold.
on the rich plateau in the interior of northern Katanga.
Most licensing fees for operating a business were
Excesses by RPA in requisitioning resources for the
doubled or tripled. The number of different taxes
“war effort” set a standard for behaviour by the far less
collected in the area under RCD-Goma administration
disciplined ANC rebel forces, who have ravaged the
has increased four times since 1998. None of the tax
countryside. Growers are reluctant to invest in crops
revenue is used to provide public services.
when they are so likely to be stolen. Large numbers of
persons have been displaced from their homes and have
Armed conflict and its consequences abandoned their lands out of fear. The Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has estimated
90. Medical practitioners, church workers, and non- that, in the northern Katanga area alone, 350,000
governmental organizations in northern Katanga all displaced persons are living away from their homes,
attest to rapidly escalating disorder in Kalemie and an with neighbours, in the cities or in the bush.
increased use of arms by a wide range of groups, some 93. Armed conflict along the Masisi-Walikale-Goma
affiliated with RCD-Goma and others not. Fighting axis arises from tensions between the large numbers of
between RPA and FAC has been limited to Rwanda’s RPA in place to manage mining operations and Hutus
seizure of northern Katanga in November 1998 and a who may be resident, but who are also imported or
government counter-offensive in October 2000. These conscripted by Rwandan forces to carry out mining
confrontations resulted in considerable displacement of under forced labour conditions. Separate Rwanda-
populations in the path of troop movements. However, owned comptoirs have quarrelled among themselves
it was the aftermath of those confrontations that for access to sites. RPA forces have attacked and
resulted in the most severe armed conflict. Rwandan burned villages to seize coltan mined by some Hutu
troops seized material for their campaigns. The RCD- groups or local villagers. The Panel has taken
Goma third ANC Brigade, following Rwanda’s testimony from villagers who have been forced to leave
example in their own random fashion, seized food and their villages following attacks. With minor exceptions,
other property. Armed movements arose among local the objective of military activity is to secure access to
populations for self-defence, and occasionally these mining sites or ensure a supply of captive labour.
local militias banded together with other local militias
to create larger armed groups. The Panel has received 94. Population displacement is the outcome of
extensive documentation from local lawyers, Catholic frequent armed conflict, with the predictable
and Protestant churches, the Fédération des Entreprises consequences of food insecurity, malnutrition and high
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mortality rates for both the displaced and host covered the period from August 1998 to April 2001. If
populations. The Office for the Coordination of one assumes mortality to have continued at the same
Humanitarian Affairs estimated that 1.5 million rate, this would mean that more than 3.5 million excess
persons were displaced in March 2001 in the areas deaths would have occurred from the beginning of the
occupied by Rwanda in North and South Kivu, war up to September 2002. These deaths are a direct
Maniema and Katanga, nearly 14 per cent of the result of the occupation by Rwanda and Uganda.
population. More than three quarters of families living Extensive mortality, especially mortality among
in the rural areas have probably been forced to move at children, is the consequence of a cycle of aggression,
least once in the last five years. This degree of armed the multiplication of armed forces, a high frequency of
conflict undermines local authority and encourages an conflict and its consequences, especially displacement.
abusive social environment. Public infrastructure is One should not be surprised to find, in areas most
destroyed. School enrolment in Shabunda has dropped affected by the conflict, a mortality rate for children
56 per cent since 1998. Men are led to abuse women on under 5 years of 35 per cent.
a surprising scale throughout the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo. International non-governmental
organizations have provided comprehensive reports V. Uganda-controlled area
about groups of women being taken hostage and
submitted to long periods of sexual abuse. Children 97. The objective of the elite network in the areas
become instruments of war, forced to work in the controlled by Uganda has been to exercise
mines and conscripted into armed forces. United monopolistic control over the area’s principal natural
Nations officials have suggested that the number of resources, cross-border trade, and tax revenues for the
child soldiers in the rebel armies is much higher than purpose of enriching members of the network.
reported by the rebel administrations, and that 50 per Notwithstanding the current political rapprochement
cent of local defence and Mayi-Mayi groups are and the apparent momentum towards normalizing
children. relations between Uganda and the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, the elite network continues to increase its
economic hold over the area.
Malnutrition and mortality
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of these companies may concentrate on one or two Ltd., is a key partner with Lt. General Saleh in
commercial niches, though these may change. The role supporting this paramilitary group and that Lt. General
of the companies is to manage their respective niche Saleh himself is a 25 per cent owner in Saracen.
activities by assembling the personnel, logistics and Saracen’s managing director also provides military
occasionally the financing for the operations. training and arms to members of this group. In an
interview with Panel members, the Managing Director
100. The network generates revenue from the export of
of Saracen Ltd. categorically denied any involvement
primary materials, from controlling the import of
with Lt. General Saleh’s activities in the north-eastern
consumables, from theft and tax fraud. The success of
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
the network’s activities in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo relies on three interconnected features, 103. Panel sources report that Lt. General Saleh and
namely, military intimidation; maintenance of a public Mr. Horn consulted President Joseph Kabila to obtain
sector facade, in the form of a rebel movement support for this covert operation. Its primary objective
administration; and manipulation of the money supply has been to replace Mbusa Nyamwisi with Roger
and the banking sector, using counterfeit currency and Lumbala as head of RCD-K/ML in order to ensure
other related mechanisms. access to the diamond-rich areas around Buta and Isiro
controlled by Mr. Lumbala’s rebel group, RCD-
101. The Uganda People’s Defence Forces and their
National. This objective has largely been achieved.
associated rebel militias have been used as the de facto
Their more long-term objective is to bring about the
enforcement arm of the network, ensuring the
downfall of Jean-Pierre Bemba, adding the growing
network’s pre-eminent commercial position through
number of dissidents in Mr. Bemba’s ranks to the new
intimidation, and the threat and use of force. UPDF or
rebel movement RCD-Congo. With increased numbers
militias associated with individual UPDF officers have
and training, they will then be in a position to confront
established physical control over areas containing
RCD-Goma and Rwanda.
commercially viable natural resources — coltan,
diamonds, timber and gold. They establish authority in 104. Members of the Ugandan network are typically
major urban and financial centres, such as Bunia, Beni tax exempt. The Panel is in possession of documents
and Butembo, where they use the rebel administration showing that the network uses its control over the
as a public sector facade to generate revenue, RCD-K/ML rebel administration to request tax
specifically to collect taxes under various pretexts, exonerations for imports of high-value commodities.
including licensing fees for commercial operators, The granting of numerous tax exonerations to UPDF
import and export duties and taxes on specific Colonel Otafiire between late 2001 and early 2002 is
products. one of numerous cases. Not only did Colonel Otafiire
benefit financially but, eventually, those exonerations
102. Uganda has recently agreed to withdraw all
forced local competitors out of markets in Bunia and
UPDF troops except for a reinforced battalion in Bunia
Beni, leaving the petrol trade largely under the control
and a small number of units on the slopes of the
of the network.
Ruwenzori Mountains. In anticipation of this
withdrawal, a paramilitary force is being trained under 105. Local commercial operators are, however,
the personal authority of Lt. General Saleh which, required to pay substantial import and export duties.
according to the Panel’s sources, is expected to These operators may be favoured with discounted tax
continue to facilitate the commercial activities of payment deals, in the form of prefinancing
UPDF officers after UPDF have departed. This military arrangements, but tax payment for local operators is
group draws on dissidents from Jean-Pierre Bemba’s mandatory. Prefinancing arrangements involve the
MLC, members of the Uganda-supported RCD-Congo payment by an importer of discounted tax payments in
including its leaders Professor Kin-kiey Mulumba and exchange for a financial payment to an authorizing
Kabanga Babadi, and others in the north-eastern rebel politician or administrator. None of these
Democratic Republic of the Congo who have supported payments to the rebel administration is used to finance
UPDF in the past. It has been reported that Lt. General public services.
Saleh discreetly provides financial support for this new
106. The network uses its economic influence to
rebel group. The Panel’s sources have indicated that
control the banking sector, which in turn allows the
Heckie Horn, Managing Director of Saracen Uganda
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network to further control access to operating capital dramatically. However, Ms. Piskunova told the Panel
for commercial operators in the area. Economically that the continuing international interest in coltan from
speaking, this region has become a captive region, where the Democratic Republic of the Congo is due to the
the types of commercial ventures are manipulated and “very low” labour costs for extracting the mineral.
the viability of local businesses is controlled. Therefore, the company continued to buy coltan from
Furthermore, the flow of money is regulated by the its office at Butembo in the Democratic Republic of the
network through currency trading and the widespread Congo. She said that their purchase price for coltan
introduction of counterfeit Congolese francs. with a 30 per cent tantalum content was $10 per
kilogram. The same coltan was then sold for $17 per
107. As in the past, the network continues to involve
kilogram.
the transnational criminal group of Victor Bout. Mr.
Bout recently purchased the Uganda-based non- 110. Ms. Piskunova went on to tell the Panel that the
operational airline company Okapi Air. The purchase company’s coltan was transported by road across the
of the company allowed Victor Bout to use Okapi’s border between the Democratic Republic of the Congo
licences. The company was subsequently renamed and Uganda at Kasindi to Entebbe International
Odessa. The Panel is in possession of a list of outbound Airport, where it was then transported by Boeing 707,
flights from 1998 to the beginning of 2002 from via Sharjah, United Arab Emirates, at a cost of
Entebbe International Airport, which confirms the $140,000 per flight, to Ulba, Kazakhstan, for
operational activities of Mr. Bout’s aircraft from processing.
Ugandan territory. Currently, Mr. Bout’s aircraft share
111. In addition to the profit made on the sales of
the flight times and destinations (slots) with Planet Air,
coltan, LA CONMET also experienced savings by
which is owned by the wife of Lt. General Salim Saleh
being granted “full exoneration” for “all activities
and which facilitates the activities of Mr. Bout by filing
involving exploitation for the territory of Beni-Lubero”
flight plans for his aircraft.
(Democratic Republic of the Congo), including
freedom from paying fiscal and customs duties. The
Strategies and sources of revenue document granting the exonerations is in the possession
of the Panel. It was signed at Kampala by Mbusa
Coltan Myamwisi, then Commissioner General for RCD-
Kisangani, on 5 January 2000, identifying Salim Saleh
108. Coltan has been exploited extensively in as the owner of LA CONMET and designating his
Orientale Province by various armed groups under the representatives as “the Russian group LA CONMET”.
protection of UPDF. A number of coltan operations,
especially under the supervision of UPDF Colonels Diamonds
Muzora and Burundi, have been coordinated under the
front company Trinity Investment, where UPDF Major 112. The network coordinates all elements of the
General Kazini is the principal figure. Armed groups diamond trade, local buying houses, Lebanese
frequently identified with militias under the command exporters, army protection from UPDF and individual
of UPDF officers manage sites in remote locations militias, tax exonerations from the public sector, and
where diggers pay a daily fee to exploit an area. Lebanese connections in Antwerp, under the aegis of
the front company, the Victoria Group. Considerable
Case study of a commercial chain evidence available to the Panel has named the
involving coltan Lebanese-born, Khalil Nazeem Ibrahim, and another
known as Mr. Abbas, as the present focal points in
109. During March 2002, Panel members met with Kampala for Victoria’s diamond operations. The Panel
Valentina Piskunova who, together with her husband has credible evidence that Khalil Nazeem Ibrahim used
Anatoly Piskunov, represents and operates the company the capital and marketing services of Hemang Nananal
LA CONMET from its base in Kampala. During Shah, proprietor of Nami Gems in Antwerp. Lt.
discussions with the Panel, Ms. Piskunova explained General Saleh is recognized by the Panel’s sources in
that, because of the collapsed international coltan Bunia, Kisangani and Kampala as the founder and
market, prices for the mineral in the eastern director of the Victoria Group and as the mastermind of
Democratic Republic of the Congo had dropped its operations.
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113. The Lebanese individuals, together with their evacuate wood from North Kivu and the Ituri area.
families, who are commonly named in connection with Tree plantations have been raided in the areas of
the Victoria Group, are also regarded as closely Mahagi and Djugu along the north-eastern border with
associated with the Lebanese families Khanafer and Uganda. Concerned citizens and research by local non-
Ahmad. Khanafer Nahim, in particular, has been named governmental organizations have identified Colonel
as a key figure in Victoria Group operations. He is well Peter Karim and Colonel Otafiire, in addition to the
known by a number of national intelligence and police Ugandan parliamentarian Sam Ngola, as key figures in
organizations for the production of counterfeit the illegal logging and fraudulent evacuation of wood.
currency, money-laundering and diamond smuggling
117. Many of the cattle removed have been forcibly
on behalf of generals who were prominent in President
taken from villages that have been the objects of attack
Mobutu’s time and are still interested in returning to
by Hema militia supported by UPDF troops. The Panel
power. The Victoria Group’s use of counterfeit United
has received reports from ranchers in areas to the south
States currency in Bunia to purchase gold from local
of Bunia as well as to the north in Mahagi detailing the
comptoirs is widely known.
removal of large numbers of cattle by UPDF troops.
The representative of the Food and Agriculture
Tax fraud and the requisition of assets
Organization of the United Nations in Bunia has
114. Control over imports is as lucrative as the reported the more recent UPDF practice of offering
monopolization of exports. Exoneration from import protection to ranchers against attacks that they
duties gives the network an advantage in the north- themselves have orchestrated, in exchange for regular
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo over local payment in animals. UPDF have also required local
importers who pay duties and taxes. An across-the- butchers to hand over hides from animals butchered
board exoneration was recently proclaimed in the locally, and these hides are then transported to
Protocole d’Accord issued by RCD-K/ML on 22 Kampala where they are reputedly sold to Bata Shoe
February 2002, which ensured Ugandan commercial Manufacturing.
operators complete exoneration from all taxes in the
area under their control. Economic exploitation and ethnic conflict
115. But increased profit margins from tax-free 118. The ongoing armed conflict between members of
imports provide only a fraction of the benefits. Equally the Hema and Lendu clans stems, in part, from
lucrative is access to the taxes themselves, attempts by powerful Hema businessmen and
monopolized by the network that uses the rebel politicians to increase the benefits they derive from the
administration’s facade of a public treasury and its commercial activities of the elite network through their
collection agents to raise revenue from local front companies, the Victoria Group and Trinity
businessmen and the population at large. Hundreds of Investment, in the Ituri area.
containers are imported each month into the Butembo,
119. Hema clan members, particularly members of the
Beni and Bunia areas, and importers are obliged to pay
sub-clan Gegere, have justified the purchase of arms
an average of $8,000 per container. Revenue from these
and the training of their own militia by the need to
import duties can be considerable. Some revenue is
defend themselves against their traditional enemies, the
also diverted through prefinancing arrangements,
Lendu. It is true that a long-festering dispute over land
which provide discounted import duties in exchange
has resulted in discord between the two groups.
for kickbacks to rebel politicians. The Panel’s sources
Recently, however, the traditional enmity over land and
insist that the revenues generated from import duties
the ongoing feud between the two groups is used as a
and prefinancing payments are diverted to UPDF
rationale by the Hema, and especially by the extremist
officers. None is utilized for public services.
sub-clan Gegere, for importing arms and training their
116. Trinity Investment’s local transporters in Bunia, own militia with the ultimate unspoken objective of
the Savo family group among others, carry agricultural consolidating their economic strength in the region.
products, wood and cattle from Bunia to Kampala
120. The Gegere sub-clan plays an important role in
exempt from UPDF toll barriers and export taxes.
the operation of the elite network. The majority of
Trinity investment also works with another front
transporters and local traders in Bunia come from this
company under the name of Sagricof to fraudulently
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S/2002/1146
group. Jacob Manu Soba, Manasse Savo and other 123. The Protocole d’Accord was signed a week after
members of the Savo family are among those who have UPDF had been involved in a succession of attacks,
provisioned UPDF in the area and who provide from 11 to 16 February 2002, on villagers at Geti. The
transport, logistical services and local commercial Panel’s sources on the matter stated that the attack had
links. They have established close links with a been financed by Hema businessmen in Bunia. The
succession of UPDF commanders and troops in the UPDF motive was clarified even further in the course
area and work closely with them in conducting cross- of a meeting with RCD-K/ML department chiefs on 12
border trade. July 2002, when a Panel member was informed that the
Hema businessmen in question sought to have control
121. The Hema fill an important niche in the operation
over gold deposits in the Geti area, and that in fact the
of the criminal enterprises as truck owners and
ethnic conflict was a minor issue.
businessmen. They transport shipments of primary
products from Ituri across the border to Uganda under
the protection of UPDF troops and return with Armed conflict and its consequences
gasoline, cigarettes and arms, all exempt from taxation.
They benefit from the trade and the generous profit 124. UPDF military operations have contributed to the
margins, and from their association with the Trinity arming of large numbers. UPDF have trained the
Group’s Ugandan patrons. But their niche has remained militia of their Ituri commercial allies, the Hema, and
marginal. They control none of the primary product provoked the need for the victims of Hema attacks to
exports themselves. They remain peripheral to the defend themselves. Lendu villages have mounted their
alliance between RCD-K/ML leaders, the Ugandan own local forces, and they in turn have frequently
patrons and UPDF. The plot to replace Mr. Nyamwisi attacked Hema villages. The creation of local self-
with Mr. Lubanga, which appears now to be a fait defence groups is a familiar pattern: local ethnic groups
accompli in Bunia, is part of an attempt by these Hema frequently assemble armed groups to defend their
traders to secure greater control over the spoils villages or collectivities.
available to inside members of RCD-K/ML.
125. Armed conflict has spread throughout society, as
122. UPDF have created the conditions that require the economic and personal insecurity reach extreme levels.
presence of troops and their continued involvement in Large numbers of young men join one or another
commercial operations. This has entailed providing armed group because they have no other means of
arms to both sides in the ethnic conflict, the Lendu and finding food or medicine or because they have no one
the Hema. The consequent increase in ethnic fighting to care for them. The young men in the Armé
has resulted in UPDF being urged to assist in furthering Patriotique Congolaise are unpaid but are provided
the peace process in Bunia. This function was with weapons and a uniform giving them the tools for
formalized in an official Protocole d’Accord signed on menacing others. Widespread armed activity is
22 February 2002 by Mbusa Nyamwisi and John characterized by opportunistic and chaotic encounters.
Tibasima as President and Vice-President of RCD- Children are killed, adult victims are eviscerated,
K/ML and by Colonel Noble Mayombo as an official women are raped, property stolen, houses burned,
representative of the Government of Uganda. The churches demolished and whatever infrastructure exists
Protocole d’Accord gave UPDF official responsibility is laid waste.
for reducing the conflits armés inter-ethnique en Ituri
and for assisting in bringing about a retour de la paix 126. In the cities, young men dressed in military
by keeping a contingent in place for observation and uniform and equipped with guns target businesses,
for negotiating an eventual long-term solution. In households and churches. In the countryside, armed
exchange, UPDF were promised a monthly stipend of groups target whole villages. The attack on the village
$25,000 from the RCD-K/ML public treasury, and all of Mpingi on 24 December 2001 is illustrative. A small
Ugandan enterprises that were approved by UPDF were Mayi-Mayi group had teamed up with a group claiming
accorded exoneration from all duties and taxes due to to be members of a Hutu opposition to set up a
the rebel administration. This has given UPDF a roadblock on the road from Butembo to Kanyabayonga.
legitimate cover for continuing military support for the When the roadblock drew the attention of APC, the
elite network’s activities in the area. Mayi-Mayi group withdrew to the west into the village
of Mpingi where they sought refuge. APC followed
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them in force and attacked the entire village of Mpingi, received attention recently when the Governor of
destroyed and burned houses, vandalized the church, Bunea, Jean-Pierre Molondo, revealed that, of the
razed the school and clinic and forced the residents to recruits being trained for the extremist Hema militia,
flee. Targeting whole villages with violence, brutally 60 per cent were under the age of 18.
raping and murdering residents, removing livestock,
food and other property and dispersing residents has
been the trademark of armed aggression. A portion of Malnutrition and mortality
those who flee seek protection in nearby villages,
abandoning their own productive activities in their 130. Population displacement has a direct impact on
home village while becoming dependent on the agricultural production, food security and levels of
resources of host populations. malnutrition. The threat of attack and displacement is
so prevalent in this area that farm families adopt
127. A portion of the displaced population take refuge farming strategies that minimize losses under
in urban areas where they benefit from somewhat better conditions of extreme insecurity. They cease raising
security but have little, if any, means for survival. animals, since animals can be easily stolen. Fewer
Unemployment rates in cities and towns often reach 90 families raise protein-rich legumes, since these crops
per cent. An income survey by civil society groups in require attention through the growing cycle, and this
Butembo found that 90 per cent lived on a few cents a attention can rarely be given. Malnutrition, in turn,
day and ate one meal a day. Urban families break up to substantially increases the exposure of the population
seek survival in separate ways. The women engage in to life-threatening illnesses.
prostitution, the older men may return to what remains
of their villages or mining sites and the young men 131. The International Rescue Committee surveys
enter the rebel army, swelling both the ranks of its provide the most comprehensive research into mortality
forces and the numbers of young boys without in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. None
subsistence possessing weapons. of the health zones sampled in its two major surveys
was in the areas now controlled by Uganda. However,
128. In March 2001, the Office for the Coordination of the pattern of armed conflict, population displacement,
Humanitarian Affairs estimated that there were food insecurity and malnutrition in Uganda-controlled
620,000 displaced persons in North Kivu, which areas resembles the pattern that explains the very high
amounted to 16 per cent of the total population. The mortality rates in the seven health zones where the
area covered by the Office’s survey includes both research was conducted. The Committee’s team judged
Uganda-controlled and Rwanda-controlled areas, but the similarities to be sufficient to warrant extrapolating
the conditions surveyed are representative of the the results of areas sampled in the Kivus to the entire
Uganda-controlled area. Given the frequency of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, including
displacement in the area, this would mean that four out areas under Ugandan control. The Panel concurs. One
of five rural residents have been forcibly displaced at can expect the same range of mortality for children
one time or another since 1998. This is the highest under 5, from nearly 30 per cent per year in areas of
number ever registered for Africa. These aggregates extreme insecurity without health facilities to 7 per
have been confirmed for specific localities surveyed by cent in areas where there is less insecurity and some
international non-governmental organizations. services. For the more than 20 million people living in
129. The spread of HIV/AIDS, the large numbers of the five eastern provinces, the number of excess deaths
child soldiers and the rape of women are other directly attributable to Rwandan and Ugandan
consequences of the pervasive armed conflict. Many occupation can be estimated at between 3 million and
soldiers are young boys who hardly seem capable of 3.5 million.
wielding the weapons they carry. The issue of child
soldiers surfaced when 700 young recruits from the VI. Collaboration of the Panel with the
Bunia area were discovered at a UPDF training camp
in Tchakwanzi, Uganda, of whom 165 were between 14
Porter Commission in Uganda
and 16 years of age. The programme to demobilize
those 165 children, two of whom were girls, has 132. During its previous mandate, the Panel’s relations
attracted considerable attention. The issue also with the Judicial Commission of Inquiry headed by
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Justice David Porter (Porter Commission) were analysis and used this analysis to imply that they may
occasionally strained. However, with the be forgeries. The analysis of those documents,
encouragement of Member States, notably the members however, suggested that the signatures were probably
of the Security Council, the Panel established an genuine. During a specially arranged hearing aimed at
amiable working relationship with the Commission. corroborating the authenticity of certain documents
This relationship is unique in the history of panels of transmitted by the Panel, the Porter Commission
experts mandated by the Council, given the degree and submitted one of the Panel’s informants to an unusually
the nature of the cooperation developed between the aggressive questioning designed to frighten the
two bodies. individual and discredit his testimony.
133. Panel members held frequent discussions with the 136. When the Commission recalled Major General
Porter Commission. From the outset, Justice Porter was James Kazini in May 2002 to question him on the basis
critical of the quality of the Panel’s reports and the of documents supplied by the Panel, the UPDF military
credibility of its sources. At the same time, he claimed commander finally admitted that the signatures on the
that the Commission’s investigations, ongoing now for documents were indeed his and accepted that the
more than a year, were stymied primarily because of a documents related to his actions as the former
“conspiracy of silence” within UPDF. Under the commander of UPDF operations in the Democratic
Commission of Inquiry Act, the Commission has the Republic of the Congo. Justice Porter commented
power to conduct searches and compel the production during the questioning that General Kazini, who had
of documents and testimony. consistently denied under oath any involvement in such
illicit economic exploits, had perjured himself
134. The Panel made evidence available to the
repeatedly during both that hearing and his original
Commission, including copies of 12 letters and a
testimony before the Commission the previous year.
statement from a witness, together with five original
The head of the Commission also conceded, according
audiotapes containing testimony given by a primary
to transcripts of the hearing, that the Panel’s
source. These materials represent only a small sample
“allegations” about General Kazini’s involvement in
of the documentation gathered by the Panel on the
exploitation activities, including those related to the
involvement of leading Ugandan military and senior
diamond trade and tax revenues, “were actually true”.
Ugandan Government personnel. They provide
Justice Porter reconfirmed these observations in
evidence of criminal activity by such ranking Ugandan
meetings with the Panel, again conceding that the
authorities. They show officials demanding extortionist
conclusions of the Panel’s earlier reports about this
payments and tax exonerations from Congolese rebel
officer and the involvement of UPDF in the illicit
movements, including the UPDF Chief of Staff
exploitation were “right”. In an electronic message
demanding that his vehicles transporting coltan be
dated 25 May 2002, Justice Porter wrote to the
allowed to cross the border without paying export
Chairman of the Panel regarding the documentary
duties. The Panel also arranged for one of its sources to
evidence provided and General Kazini’s second
testify before the Commission at a special hearing in
appearance before the Commission. He expressed his
spite of the risk of exposure to the source. In exchange,
appreciation to the Panel, saying, “We feel, and hope
the Porter Commission provided the Panel with copies
you agree, that with your assistance we have at last
of the testimony of certain high-ranking military
been able to break what we have described as a
officers, Government officials, private businessmen
conspiracy of silence within UPDF, at least in relation
and other individuals who had appeared before it.
to diamonds and ‘security payments’, and we are
135. The Panel’s many efforts to establish a extremely grateful to you for enabling us to do so.”
constructive relationship with the Commission have
137. During the Panel’s last meeting with the
mostly been met with attempts to dismiss its
Commission in September 2002 in Kampala, Justice
credibility. The Commission has challenged the
Porter explained that any recommendation by the
authenticity of letters provided by the Panel that show
Commission to refer an individual for criminal
significant payments to UPDF officers from rebel
prosecution as the result of its enquiries must first be
movement budgets, even when reliable witnesses have
approved by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and
testified to their validity. It has submitted other
President Museveni. A criminal investigation would
documents signed by ranking officials to handwriting
25
S/2002/1146
then be necessary before the authorities could authorities mentioned the impounding of a cargo of
determine if grounds for prosecution existed. The Panel smuggled ivory. South African officials confirmed the
also understood that, in spite of the Commission’s seizure of a sizeable clandestine shipment of diamonds
extensive investigative powers, its terms of reference from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but
restrict the scope of its enquiries into the activities of provided no details. None of the authorities in these
military personnel. It is not empowered to obtain countries gave any indication that Congolese resources
military records and documents from the Defence traded through their territories should or could be
Ministry. Nor can it conduct audits of individual regarded as conflict goods. Almost none of the
officers’ finances. countries proposed any meaningful measures to help
curb trade in Congolese commodities that are tainted
138. The Porter Commission’s mandate has now been
by criminality and militarization. Kenya, however,
extended beyond that of the Panel, to 15 November
proposed the reopening of the Northern Corridor route,
2002, allowing it the opportunity to comment on the
under the Transit Transport Coordination Authority,
Panel’s report. In the event that the Porter Commission
with the assistance of the international community.
ignores or rejects the validity and evidentiary value of
the documents provided or attempts to further discredit 140. Reliable sources have told the Panel that gem
the Panel’s work, the Chairman of the Panel requests diamonds from Mbuji Mayi in the Democratic
that the Security Council authorize the Panel to Republic of the Congo account for much of the
respond to the Commission’s report in a letter phenomenal increase in diamonds transiting through
addressed to the Security Council, which would be Dubai in recent years. Exports from the United Arab
circulated as a United Nations document. Emirates to Antwerp increased to $149.5 million in
2001 from $4.2 million in 1998 according to the
Diamond High Council’s statistics. The Panel has been
VII. Transit and end-user trade issues told of chartered flights direct from Mbuji Mayi to
Dubai, and other routes via Dar es Salaam, on which
Transit countries illicit diamond exports have been carried. Likewise,
139. The Panel identified 11 African States through Dubai has become a transit point for coltan from the
whose territory goods originating in the Democratic Uganda-controlled area and a portion of the diamonds
Republic of the Congo are likely to pass. Some are originating from Kisangani in the Rwanda-controlled
directly involved in the conflict, namely, Burundi, area. The arms and diamond smuggler Victor Bout uses
Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe. The remaining seven the United Arab Emirates as his permanent base, with
are the Central African Republic, Kenya, Mozambique, nine of his aircraft stationed at Ra’s al Khaimah
the Republic of the Congo, South Africa, the United International Airport.
Republic of Tanzania and Zambia. The Panel submitted
questions to all 11 countries and held substantive End-user countries
discussions with government representatives from five. 141. In an effort to determine what measures might be
The Panel enquired about relevant legislation, taken at the end of the commercial chain to control the
investigations into the flow of the commodities, trade in resources of the Democratic Republic of the
measures taken to curb those flows, other possible Congo and sever its links to the armed conflict, the
action to be taken and those Governments’ needs for Panel surveyed 17 end-user countries in Asia, Europe,
assistance. Four of the 11 countries — the Republic of the Middle East and North America. Many of these
the Congo, Mozambique, the United Republic of countries serve as secondary transit points and
Tanzania and Zimbabwe — declined to respond. The processing centres as well as major consumer markets.
Panel later identified yet another transit point for They included Belgium, China, France, Germany,
Congolese coltan, Nigeria, and requested information India, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Malaysia,
about this trade. No response was received. Virtually the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, Switzerland,
none of the countries that responded to the Panel’s Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, the United
questions had conducted any investigations or adopted Kingdom and the United States. In its requests, the
any specific procedures for the identification or Panel stressed that its aim was not to obstruct trade, but
inspection of the transiting of commodities from the to identify mechanisms or practices that would
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Ugandan
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eliminate the costs in war and human lives that occur in should not hinder legitimate trade in primary
the course of extracting and commercializing resources commodities or “impose an excessive burden on the
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In seeking countries participating in such trade”. Several
these countries’ views, the Panel made reference to a European Union members, including France and the
range of possible initiatives, while leaving open the Netherlands, observed that any measures affecting
possibility for innovation based on lessons learned trade flows would have to be taken within the
from other conflict situations. Four countries did not framework of the European Union and its trade
respond: India, Kazakhstan, Malaysia and the United regulations. Belgium and the United Kingdom stressed
Arab Emirates. Few respondents commented explicitly that the burden of ensuring transparency in commercial
on the role that the trade in these commodities plays in and financial flows or supply chains should be borne
fuelling the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the primarily by private companies and should be based on
Congo. either voluntary measures or the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises. Germany echoed this, saying
142. The responses nevertheless indicated that efforts
that it had appealed to German companies to adhere to
are being stepped up to tackle the illicit trade in natural
those guidelines as well as the principles of the
resources and that awareness is growing of the ethical
European Union Commission’s Green Paper on Social
responsibilities posed by conflict-driven trade in
Responsibility and the United Nations Global Compact
commodities. France, Japan, Israel, Thailand and the
in their business activities in the region. Germany also
United States emphasized the adequacy of existing
encouraged the Panel to continue its efforts to increase
certificates of origin or product certification regimes in
the transparency of the commercial chains for the
stemming the illegal trade, including the certification
natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the
scheme now in the process of being implemented under
Congo, especially by intensifying its dialogue with
the Kimberley Process. Like China, the Russian
private companies. Only Belgium suggested the
Federation stressed that its participation in the
possibility of imposing targeted sanctions against
Kimberley Process is aimed at helping to sever the
businesses or individuals profiting from the trade in
links between the illegal trade in rough diamonds and
conflict goods. The Netherlands expressed the view
armed conflict, particularly in Africa. Germany stated
that the verification of commodities would be less
that companies in transit and end-user countries should
difficult and costly if carried out at the beginning of the
cease all commercial and transport activities related to
commercial chain.
the trade in resources from the region, “unless their
counterparts are able to provide clearly documented 144. Belgium, Germany and the United States also
certificates of origin”. Most responses did not evaluate highlighted the re-establishment of the State’s authority
the comparative successes and failures of certification throughout the territory of the Democratic Republic of
regimes in the face of highly criminalized or opaque the Congo as essential to combating the illicit
commercial chains. Switzerland expressed the view exploitation, and the need for capacity-building to help
that until the Kimberley Process certification scheme achieve this. Similarly, Lebanon said that the customs
had entered into force and more experience had been administration of the Democratic Republic of the
gained from its implementation, it would be premature Congo should be reinforced so that it could more
to comment on the use of such regimes in regulating effectively control borders, monitor trade flows and
the trade in commodities from certain regions. End- prevent smuggling.
user countries did not specifically call for countries
bordering the Democratic Republic of the Congo such International and regional organizations
as Burundi, the Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and
145. The Southern African Development Community
Uganda, which also trade in rough diamonds, to join
shared the view of some end-user States that existing
the Kimberley Process. Lebanon suggested that
certificates of origin were adequate for demonstrating
standardized, mandatory certificates of origin could be
that products had been legally produced and acquired.
developed for certain precious commodities through
Customs intelligence and investigative capability for
the relevant United Nations body or bodies.
combating smuggling are still being developed within
143. The Russian Federation cautioned that any SADC. Issues of capacity-building and information-
proposed measures on curbing conflict-linked trade
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sharing within the region will have to be addressed as humanitarian situation are some of the consequences of
this process advances. four years of war and the lack of a central government
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the
146. The World Customs Organization informed the
authority and capacity to protect its citizens and
Panel that it had established a network of Regional
resources.
Intelligence Liaison Offices, each assigned to a number
of countries, to facilitate the exchange of information 150. The withdrawal of foreign forces is an important
and cooperation within a region. The Democratic step towards ending the illegal exploitation of natural
Republic of the Congo and many francophone resources. Yet the necessary networks have already
countries in the surrounding region are attached to the become deeply embedded to ensure that the illegal
Liaison Office at Douala, Cameroon. WCO observed exploitation continues, independent of the physical
that the use of the Liaison Office and the WCO presence of the foreign armies.
Internet-based Customs Enforcement Network by the
151. Another step towards halting the exploitation of
Douala region’s members was quite low. It stressed that
natural resources will be the early establishment of an
curbing fraudulent trade in commodities transiting
all-inclusive transitional government in the Democratic
through a region depends on effective communication
Republic of the Congo, which would ensure that
between the countries concerned.
central government control is reinstated and that viable
147. With regard to trade flows, the World Trade local administrations are empowered to protect and
Organization explained in its reply to the Panel that regulate the exploitation activities to the benefit of the
two provisions of the 1994 GATT, a component of the populace. However, it is clear that, even with the
WTO treaty, authorize members to take measures that establishment of an all-inclusive government,
otherwise would be inconsistent with GATT/WTO exercising effective control over territory and natural
rules. These rules generally prohibit trade restrictions resources would require time and would be possible
and discrimination. Articles XXI (c) and XX describe only within the context of a broader framework of
situations and policy aims permitting exceptional sound institution-building. In the interim, it is the view
measures. The former, the security exception provision, of the Panel that continued monitoring and reporting on
refers to exceptions related to a State fulfilling its the illegal exploitation of resources will at least serve
obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. to deter these activities.
This might serve as justification for Members taking
152. The most important element in effectively halting
action in compliance with a Security Council resolution
the illegal exploitation of resources in the Democratic
on maintaining peace and security, commented WTO.
Republic of the Congo relates to the political will of
Article XX, the provision on general exceptions, may
those who support, protect and benefit from the
be evoked if the measure is adopted pursuant to one or
networks. This may pose a great challenge, given the
more policies listed in the article’s subparagraphs. For
intricate relationships they have forged and the
example, subparagraph (b) refers to measures
dependency they have developed on the profits from
necessary to protect human life.
these activities. The war economy controlled by the
148. The Economic Commission for Africa concurred three elite networks operating in the Democratic
with Belgium that “smart sanctions” should be part of Republic of the Congo dominates the economic
the solution to ending the illegal trade. It added that the activities of much of the Great Lakes region. Yet the
Governments of the countries involved should also be Lusaka, Pretoria and Luanda Agreements do not
“held accountable for the illegal activities of address this all-important economic component of the
individuals and/or companies as well as banks that are conflict.
operating in their country since they have the power to
153. Armed groups, whether foreign or Congolese,
regulate them”.
who are benefiting from these exploitation activities,
should also be taken into account in efforts to halt the
VIII. Observations exploitation. Years of lawlessness and a Government
incapable of protecting its citizens have allowed the
149. The illegal exploitation of natural resources, armed groups to loot and plunder the country’s
gross violations of human rights and a dire resources with impunity. While some hide behind a
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political agenda, all are pursuing illegal economic of foreign troops; measures to drastically curb the
activities as a matter of survival. It is hoped that illegal exploitation and encourage legal exploitation;
progress in the peace process, together with an and the application of serious leverage through
effective and responsive programme of disarmament, multilateral pressures and incentives. To these elements
demobilization, rehabilitation, reintegration and must be added a dynamic monitoring process. All must
resettlement, would provide better alternatives to the be phased, interlinked and ongoing. This dynamic
armed groups. This would require the necessary package would not only advance the peace process in
funding for reintegration programmes and security the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but would also
assurances for those who are not wanted for war crimes lead to a peaceful and final settlement of the
or acts of genocide. The international community must, exploitation issue, ensuring that legal modes of
therefore, provide the assistance to these programmes, resource exploitation prevail. The first two elements
invest in publicizing them and encourage the armed seem to be finding their way to an interlinked and
groups to participate. phased implementation as a result of the recent
agreements signed in Pretoria and Luanda. The third
154. The Panel is hoping that this report will
element is intrinsically linked with the fourth, namely
contribute to a shift in policies — in the light of the
applying leverage through incentives and disincentives.
recent encouraging political and military developments
on the ground — that will bring the exploitation of 158. In order to readjust the present process of illegal
resources back to a legally acceptable level. exploitation and encourage legal exploitation, which
could contribute to the economic stability of all parties,
there is a need to apply forceful disincentives and
IX. Conclusions incentives. These should be monitored through a
proactive monitoring body. Until now, all the parties
155. An embargo or a moratorium banning the export involved in the illegal exploitation have had no strong
of raw materials originating in the Democratic incentive to alter the economic status quo. It is
Republic of the Congo does not seem to be a viable necessary, therefore, to find measures that address their
means of helping to improve the situation of the fears of losing revenues. Such measures will however
country’s Government, citizens or natural environment. be effective only if a political process is undertaken
Massive technical and financial assistance for the simultaneously.
population would be required to offset the
humanitarian impact of such restrictive measures. At 159. Reconstructing and reorienting the region’s
the same time, if the Panel in its report does not economies are essential to peacemaking and peace-
recommend any punitive measures to curb the illegal building. The Panel believes that a peace dividend in
exploitation and trade originating in the Democratic the form of economic incentives should be emphasized
Republic of the Congo, this will only encourage a by the international community in order to promote the
continuation of the exploitation by different criminal parties’ adherence to the peace agreements and
organizations. This could easily lead to an increase in encourage confidence-building. The Panel also
these activities. There must be sustained efforts to deter proposes in its recommendations that a set of
illicit and illegal exploitation. disincentives be enacted to apply pressure in the case
of non-compliance with the agreements.
156. Restrictive measures nevertheless need to be
taken vis-à-vis the role of companies and individuals 160. Many of the Panel’s conclusions about the
involved in arms supply and resource plundering. The economic roots and consequences of the conflict have
international and multinational dimension of these been echoed in ideas associated with the proposals for
illegal activities is very important. Ethical and an international conference on peace, security,
transparent business practices are needed to combat democracy and sustainable development in the Great
these illegal activities. Lakes region. Recently signed agreements may signal
that the time for organizing this conference is
157. The establishment of a transitional government in approaching. Such a conference would be an ideal
Kinshasa should be accompanied by four elements, forum to address the need to reorient the regional
namely, the disarmament of all rebel groups in the trading system to post-conflict imperatives and for
Democratic Republic of the Congo; phased withdrawal negotiating the framework of a multilateral agreement
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to carry this out. This reorientation will require the country’s natural resources and borders without
providing the incentives and means to promote regional foreign intervention.
economic integration, which would marginalize
164. A fast-track programme is needed to retrain and
criminal and military-driven trade in favour of
professionalize the entire national security apparatus,
legitimate commercial development that is transparent
including military and intelligence, law enforcement
and growth-oriented. Supporting regional economic
and regulatory bodies, such as customs, revenue
integration could help to gradually draw the countries
authority, immigration and natural resources agencies.
involved in the conflict closer and act as a barrier to
This process will require extensive international aid
future outbreaks of armed conflict.
and careful monitoring of progress over a sustained
period. There is a need for multilateral and bilateral
X. Recommendations donors, together with international organizations, to
coordinate their efforts, draw on best practices
Peace dividend developed during other post-conflict transitions and
encourage the participation of all sectors of Congolese
161. In the light of the new dynamic and progress society.
created by the signing of the political and military 165. The priority areas for reform and the
agreements in Sun City, Pretoria and Luanda, the Panel strengthening of national or central institutions would
believes that a set of agreements or initiatives on include:
reconstruction and sustainable development are needed
to address the economic dimension of the Lusaka peace • Combating the widespread criminalization in the
process and provide incentives for continuing progress. Democratic Republic of the Congo
The first set of initiatives could be for quick-disbursing • Enhancing scrutiny and transparency
aid for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the
other Great Lakes countries involved in the conflict, • Increasing accountability and ending the impunity
for reconstruction and rehabilitation programmes, enjoyed by high-ranking officials and various
aimed at creating jobs, rebuilding infrastructure and levels of civil servants
improving conditions for local populations, notably in • Building regulatory capacity and controls
the areas of education, health, water and sanitation.
• Professionalizing institutions and their personnel,
162. Regional economic integration and trade could be including ensuring their independence and
the focus of an agreement or set of agreements that neutrality
could emerge from discussions regionally, including at
the international conference on peace, security and • Reforming customs and revenue administrations,
sustainable development. The international community, such as the Office des douanes et accises and the
in particular the United Nations and the developed Direction générale des recettes administratives,
countries that have actively supported the signing of judiciaires, domaniales et de participations
the recent agreements, can take a leading role in • Building the capacity of ministries and
convening this conference. specialized agencies related to natural resources
such as the Centre d’évaluation, d’expertise et de
certification des matières précieuses and the
Institutional reforms
Institut congolais pour la conservation de la
nature.
Capacity-building for the State institutions
163. Reconstructing and reforming the State Promoting legitimate and accountable civil
institutions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, administrations in the eastern Democratic
particularly the State’s capacity to secure its territory Republic of the Congo
and borders, is the counterpoint to the withdrawal of
166. The Panel recommends that a comprehensive
the foreign troops. The main purpose should be to
economic and social development programme in the
enable the legitimate transitional government to control
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo be set up to
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assist a transition to a legitimate civilian administration series of measures be taken against the concerned
with a capable security and law-enforcement apparatus. parties.
Such a programme may be partially financed from the
substantial assistance commitments pledged by the Role of Governments
European Union, the World Bank and the International
170. The Governments of the countries where the
Monetary Fund for post-conflict reconstruction in the
individuals, companies and financial institutions that
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
are systematically and actively involved in these
activities are based should assume their share of the
Good governance in the Democratic Republic
responsibility. The Governments have the power to
of the Congo and its compliance with peace
regulate and sanction those individuals and entities.
agreements
They could adapt their national legislation as needed to
167. The Panel regards the quick disbursal of effectively investigate and prosecute the illegal
development assistance as essential to addressing the traffickers. In addition, the OECD Guidelines offer a
pressing social and economic needs of the Democratic mechanism for bringing violations of them by business
Republic of the Congo. However, it also recommends enterprises to the attention of home Governments, that
that disbursal should be contingent on the adherence of is, Governments of the countries where the enterprises
the Government to the peace agreements it has signed are registered. Governments with jurisdiction over
with Rwanda and Uganda, its commitment to these enterprises are complicit themselves when they
democratization and its progress in curbing the illegal do not take remedial measures.
exploitation of its natural resources.
Reducing official development assistance
Reform of natural resource sectors
171. The Panel’s exchange of views with bilateral and
168. Reforms of the mining and the forestry sectors multilateral organizations, as well as a review of
should include the review of all concessions and applicable agreements such as the Cotonou
contracts signed during both wars. The resolution Convention, indicates that there is ample justification
adopted during the inter-Congolese dialogue, for donors to respond to a Security Council
establishing a special commission to examine the resolution — which might be necessary — which
validity of economic and financial agreements, could would propose certain reductions in official aid to
serve as the framework for this process. On the basis of promote peace and good governance.
the Panel’s findings, this could also target all informal
172. Measures should also be aimed at making aid
agreements on the awarding of concessions and the
disbursements to Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and
implementation of contracts. The international
Zimbabwe conditional on their compliance with the
community, including the World Bank, the
relevant agreements in the Lusaka peace process and
International Finance Corporation and UNDP, could
on verifiable measures taken to halt the illegal and
collaborate closely with this commission and provide
illicit exploitation of the resources of the Democratic
the support necessary for it to carry out its work in a
Republic of the Congo which can help to achieve
thorough and objective manner. This could include
multiple objectives. Non-compliance would
expert advice and technical assistance, part of which
automatically trigger a review and reduction of
could be focused on raising long-term international
assistance programmes for those countries. It should be
investment for the rehabilitation of the mining and
stipulated that reductions of aid disbursements are to
forestry sectors and sustainable revenue generation.
be applied to institutional budget support, stabilization
lending or project lending and not sector-specific
Financial and technical measures allocations.
173. Implementation would proceed in three stages:
169. In the event of non-compliance with the recently
signed agreements, and the continuing illicit and illegal (a) A brief grace period to permit the
exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic verification of the compliance of all the parties to the
Republic of the Congo, the Panel recommends that a conflict;
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(b) An initial period when aid disbursements institutions and from receiving funding or establishing
are reduced by a modest percentage if the countries a partnership or other commercial relations with
involved have not met withdrawal targets; international financial institutions.
(c) A subsequent period during which the aid is
Adherence of business enterprises to the OECD
proportionately reduced at regular increases at regular
Guidelines
intervals unless troop withdrawals and compliance with
the peace agreements meet the required standards. 177. The Panel has drafted another list of business
enterprises (annex III) which, in the view of the Panel,
Restrictions on business enterprises and are in violation of the OECD Guidelines for
individuals Multinational Enterprises. Countries which are
signatories to those Guidelines and other countries are
174. The Panel has compiled an extensive list of
morally obliged to ensure that their business
business enterprises and individuals whose
enterprises adhere to and act on the Guidelines.
involvement in the commercial activities of the three
elite networks active in the Democratic Republic of the 178. The OECD Guidelines outline a procedure for
Congo is well documented. At this time it is however, bringing violations of the Guidelines to the attention of
focusing its recommendations regarding restrictive the Governments of the States where the business
measures on only a small number of enterprises (annex enterprises are registered. Home Governments have the
I) and individuals (annex II) — many of them cited in obligation to ensure that enterprises in their jurisdiction
this report — as a result of the wealth of information do not abuse principles of conduct that they have
and documentary evidence gathered on them by the adopted as a matter of law. They are complicit when
Panel. they do not take remedial measures. The monitoring
body, as described below, will contribute to
175. By contributing to the revenues of the elite
implementing these procedures by verifying and
networks, directly or indirectly, those companies and
updating its list of business enterprises in violation of
individuals contribute to the ongoing conflict and to
the OECD Guidelines and transmitting evidence of
human rights abuses. More specifically, those business
those violations to the OECD National Contact Points
enterprises are in violation of the OECD Guidelines for
in the home Governments of the enterprises.
Multinational Enterprises. Therefore, the Panel
recommends that the Security Council consider
Transit trade and regional organizations
imposing certain restrictions on a selected number of
business enterprises and individuals involved in 179. To promote post-conflict peace-building
criminal and illicit exploitation that are identified in programmes, the Panel recommends that the
this report. The list emphasizes the implication of international community support the following
foreign enterprises as well as nationals of the confidence-building measures:
Democratic Republic of the Congo in the economic
(a) Encouraging the East African Community,
exploitation.
composed of Kenya, Uganda and the United Republic
176. There could be a short grace period of four to five of Tanzania, to include Rwanda and Burundi in its
months before the restrictions set out below are membership;
applied, during which the targeted entities and
(b) Helping to re-establish historical and legal
individuals would have the opportunity to prove that
trading patterns, for example by reopening the
they have ceased all involvement in the exploitation
Northern Corridor transit route to legal trade among the
activities. The restrictive measures could include:
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Rwanda,
(a) Travel bans on selected individuals Uganda and Kenya;
identified by the Panel;
(c) Assisting the relevant African regional trade
(b) Freezing of the personal assets of persons organizations to improve their customs and trade
involved in illegal exploitation; monitoring mechanisms. These might include
juxtaposed border control facilities, harmonization of
(c) Barring selected companies and individuals
controls to promote the system and use of certificates
from accessing banking facilities and other financial
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of origin and destination, and assistance in developing Protecting timber and forestry products
national legislation for monitoring financial flows
184. The Panel recommends that Member States
related to trade;
actively support the efforts by intergovernmental and
(d) Improving air traffic control services in the non-governmental organizations at both the
Great Lakes region. The Technical Cooperation international and regional levels to halt illegal logging
Programme of ICAO can provide assistance to States in and to develop an international definition of “conflict
the region that need to improve their air traffic control timber”.
service.
Trade in endangered species
Regulating commodity trade from conflict areas
185. Trade involving endangered species of wild fauna
180. Specialized industry organizations such as the and flora taken from protected areas of the eastern
Tantalum Niobium International Study Centre, the Democratic Republic of the Congo is another activity
International Gold Council and the International Coffee in which elements of the criminal networks are
Federation could be requested, in cooperation with the engaged. Member States are asked to support the Task
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Force established under the Lusaka Agreement on
to monitor trade in commodities from conflict areas. Cooperative Enforcement Operations Directed at
This would result in a reliable body of data that Illegal Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora by
includes information relating to the evacuation of (a) strengthening their national legislation to reinforce
commodities, transit routes through neighbouring the powers of investigation and prosecution of the Task
countries and information on end-users and their Force’s personnel and (b) ensuring that their National
operations. The data produced could be the basis of Bureaus, established under that Agreement, intensify
industry policing of those individuals, companies and their investigations into the criminal traffic in
financial institutions that trade in commodities from endangered species of wild animals and plants as
conflict areas. The data could also serve in the event outlined by CITES.
that a moratorium is called for on the illegal trade in
commodities originating in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, such as coltan. Monitoring process
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Annex I
Companies on which the Panel recommends the placing of
financial restrictions
Name Address Business Principal officers Comment
1
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11 EXACO Exploitation
Cobalt,
Copper in the
DRC
12 GREAT LAKES BP 3737 Mineral Maj Dan MUNYUZA Tel/Fax:
GENERAL TRADE KIGALI, trading +250.78.792
RWANDA Mr. E. GATETE
Mr. Steven K.
AKHIMANZI
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3
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Annex II
Persons for whom the Panel recommends a travel ban and
financial restrictions
Passport
Last name First name Alias Date of birth number Designation
4
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Passport
Last name First name Alias Date of birth number Designation
5
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Passport
Last name First name Alias Date of birth number Designation
6
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Annex III
Business enterprises considered by the Panel to
be in violation of the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises
Country signatory of
Name of company Business Country OECD Guidelines
7
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Country signatory of
Name of company Business Country OECD Guidelines
8
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Country signatory of
Name of company Business Country OECD Guidelines
9
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Country signatory of
Name of company Business Country OECD Guidelines
10
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Annex IV
Countries visited and representatives of Governments and
organizations interviewed
The Panel wishes to express its deep appreciation to the Government officials,
diplomats, United Nations agencies, donor institutions, non-governmental
organizations, civil society groups, journalists, commercial operators and others
with whom it met and who have assisted in making possible the present report.
The Panel also wishes to extend special thanks to the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In addition, the
Panel would like to thank the United Nations Office in Burundi and the UNDP
offices in Bangui, Brazzaville, Bujumbura, Kampala, Kigali, Kinshasa, Pretoria and
Yaounde for their assistance and support.
Austria
International organizations
United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention
Belgium
Government officials
Inter-Ministerial Ad Hoc Working Group on the Illegal Exploitation of the
Natural Resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Parliamentary Inquiry Commission on the Illegal Exploitation of the Natural
Resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
State representatives
European Union Commission
Others
Arslanian Frères
International Peace Information Service
Sibeca
Sogem mineral trading company (division of Umicore)
Tantalum Niobium International Study Center
Vrije Universiteit Brussel
Burundi
Government officials
Minister of Defence
Minister of Energy and Mines
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Minister of Finance
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Department of Customs (Ministry of Finance)
State representatives
Embassy of Belgium
Embassy of France
International organizations
Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Burundi
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP
UNHCR
UNICEF
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Burundi
Others
Affimet
ASYST mineral trading company
Comptoir minier des exploitations du Burundi (COMEBU)
HAMZA mineral trading company
Government officials
Ministry of Economy
Ministry of Equipment, Transport and Settlement
Ministry of Finance and Budget
Minister of Mines, Energy and Hydraulics
Minister of Trade and Industry
Department of Customs
State representatives
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Embassy of France
European Union
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International organizations
Representative of the Secretary-General in the Central African Republic
ASECNA
UNHCR
UNDP
Government officials
Minister of Defence
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister of Land Affairs, Environment and Tourism
Minister of Planning and Reconstruction
Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs
Vice-Minister of Mines
Deputy Chief of Staff of the FAC
Governor of the Central Bank
Governor of Equateur Province
Governor of Katanga
Governor of Mbuji Mayi
Vice-Governor, in charge of the Economy, Finance and Development, Equateur
Province
Centre d’évaluation, d’expertise et de certification
Comité interministériel de “Small Scale Mining”
Générale des carrières et des mines (Gécamines)
Office national des transports
Régie des voies aériennes
Société minière de Bakwanga (MIBA)
State representatives
Ambassador of Angola
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of Canada
Ambassador of Germany
Ambassador of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Ambassador of the United States of America
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Belgian Consul
Embassy of Denmark
Embassy of France
European Union
International organizations
Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo
European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO)
FAO
GTZ
MONUC
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP
UNHCR
UNICEF
World Bank
World Food Programme
World Health Organization
MLC
President
Secretary-General
RCD-Goma
Vice President
Commissioner of the Interior
Governor of Kalemie
Department of Mines and Energy
Vice-Governor of Kisangani
Customs officials
RCD-K/ML
Second Vice-President
Minister of Interior
Acting Chief of Staff for the APC
Governor of Bunia
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Others
Action contre la faim
ADETE
Agro Action Allemand
Associazione per la Cooperazione Internationale e l’Ainto Umanitario
Anglican Church
Ashanti Goldfield
Association africaine des droits de l’homme (ASADHO)
Banque internationale de commerce
BEP Productique (BEPROD)
Conseil african et malgache pour l’enseignement supérieur (CAMES)
Caritas
Centre d’information et d’animation missionnaire (CIAM)
Centre d’etudes national sur le développement populaire (CENADEP)
Centre de formation, recherches en conservation forestière
Centre national d’appui au développement et à la participation populaire
(CENADEP)
Church of Christ of the Congo
Comité provincial des diamantaires (CPD)
Commissions diocésaines Justice et Paix (CDPJ)
Conseil apostolique des laïques catholiques au Congo (CALCC)
Conference on Central Africa Moist Forest Ecosystems participants
Confédération de petites et moyennes enterprises du Congo (COPEMECO)
COSLEG (joint venture of COMIEX Congo and OSLEG)
Dara Forêt
Exploitation forestière, sciérie raffinage de la papaine (ENRA)
Fédération des entreprises du Congo (FEC — Kinshasa, Kisangani, Mbandaka,
Beni, Goma, Gémena, Bukavu)
Fédération nationale des parents d’élèves du Congo (FNPEC)
Fédération des ONG laïques à vocation économique au Congo (FOLECO)
Forces novatrices pour l’union et la solidarité (FONUS)
Groupe de recherches et d’échanges technologiques (in Kabinda)
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Groupe Lotus
Groupe musulman des droits de l’homme
GST (Gécamines labour union)
Héritiers de la justice
International Human Rights Law Group
International Rescue Committee
Inter Press Service (IPS)
JAMS
Journalistes en danger
Justice et Paix
Ligue des avocats pour les droits de l’homme
Kababankola Mining Company
Kotinne Plantation
Jardin botanique d’Eala
Maintenance, Assistance, Technique and Design
Mayi-Mayi representatives
Médecins sans Frontières (of Belgium and France)
Mennonite Church
Mouvement nationale congolais Lumumba (MNCL)
Mouvement des pionniers de l’indépendence
Mouvement populaire de la révolution (MPR)
National Commission of Experts on the illegal exploitation of the natural
resources and other forms of wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
National Congolese Railway Society (SNCC)
National Council of Development NGOs (CNONGD)
Nganga Plantation
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)
Organisation concertée des ecologistes et amis de la nature (OCEAN)
OKIMO
Oxfam
Parti démocrate et social chrétien (PDSC )
Parti lumumbiste unifié (PALU)
Pharmakina
Pole Institute
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France
Government officials
Ministry of Economy and Finance
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Others
Air France Cargo
Germany
Government officials
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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Others
H. C. Starck
Karl-Heinz Albers Mining and Minerals Processing
Kenya
Government officials
Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Trade and Industry
Ministry of Transport and Communications
Kenya Revenue Authority
State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
High Commissioner of the Republic of South Africa
Ambassador of Rwanda
High Commissioner of Uganda
Belgian Ministry of Defence
German Embassy
Belgian Parliamentary Inquiry Commission
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Democratic Republic of the Congo National Parks representatives
Institut congolais de conservation de la nature (Ministry of Environment,
Democratic Republic of the Congo)
International organizations
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region
Special Adviser to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
World Customs Organization
World Wildlife Fund
Others
Association of Cargo Airliners
Congolese Commission of National Experts
Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund
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Government officials
Minister of Environment
Ministry of Transport
Department of Customs (Ministry of Finance)
State representatives
Embassy of Belgium
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
European Union
International organizations
UNDP
Rwanda
Government officials
Special Envoy of the President for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
Burundi
Office of the President of Rwanda
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism
Customs Commission
State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of France
Ambassador of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Ambassador of the United States of America
European Union
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International organizations
MONUC
UNICEF
World Bank
Others
President of RCD-Goma
Eagle Wings Resources
SDV Transintra
SOGERMI mineral trading company
South Africa
Government officials
Acting Director-General for Foreign Affairs
Department of Foreign Affairs
Department of Defence
Department of Home Affairs
Department of Minerals and Energy
Financial Intelligence Centre
National Intelligence Agency
National Intelligence Coordinating Committee
National Prosecuting Authority
National Treasury
Secretariat for Safety and Security
South African Diamond Board
South African Police
South African Revenue Service
State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of France
Ambassador of the United States
High Commission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland
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Others
Banro
Bateman Minerals and Metals
Centre for the Study of Economic Crime
Cobalt Metals Company
Compliance Institute
De Beers Group
DiamondWorks
Executive Outcomes
Fluxmans Attorneys
Grove Family Trust
International Institute of Security Studies
Kimberley Process Secretariat
Money Laundering Forum
Overseas Security Services
PricewaterhouseCoopers Forensic Services Division
Rand Afrikaans University
Rand Merchant Bank
SaferAfrica
STK Consulting
Tandan Holdings
Trans Hex
Ware Associates
University of South Africa at Pretoria
University of Witwatersrand/South African Institute for International Affairs
Uganda
Government officials
First Deputy Prime Minister
Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister of Defence
Chief of Staff of UPDF
Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry
Bank of Uganda
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State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of Denmark
Ambassador of France
High Commissioner of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland
Ambassador of the United States of America
Head of the Delegation of the European Union
International organizations
UNDP
UNICEF
World Bank
Others
Amnesty International
Judicial Commission of Inquiry
Saracen Uganda Ltd.
Uganda Debt Network
Government officials
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Government officials
Department of Justice
State representatives
Belgian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Permanent Representatives to the United Nations, Security Council members
and other Member States
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International organizations
International Monetary Fund
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and
Armed Conflict
UNDP
Forum on Forests
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
World Bank
Others
Human Rights Watch
Oxfam
Winston Strawn and Partners
Zambia
Others
Non-governmental organizations
Zimbabwe
Government officials
Ministry of Mines
State representatives
British High Commission
Others
Renaissance Bank
Dozer Parts
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Annex V
Abbreviations
ADB African Development Bank
ANC Armée nationale congolaise (army of RCD-G movement)
APC Armée patriotique congolaise (army of the RCD-ML rebel group
ASECNA Agence pour la sécurité de la navigation aérienne en Afrique et à
Madagascar
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
CITES Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora
coltan columbo-tantalite
COMIEX Compagnie mixte d’import-export
COSLEG COMIEX-OSLEG joint venture
FAC Forces armées congolaises
ex-FAR former Forces armées rwandaises
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Gécamines Générale des carrières et des mines
GTZ Deutsche Gesellschafte für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German
Government agency for technical cooperation)
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
KMC Kababankola Mining Company
MIBA Société minière de Bakwanga
MLC Mouvement de libération congolais
MONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OKIMO Office des Mines de Kilo-Moto
OSLEG Operation Sovereign Legitimacy
RCD Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (Rally for Congolese
Democracy)
RCD-Congo Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (newly formed rebel
group made up of MLC and RCD-Goma dissidents)
RCD-Goma Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie, based in Goma
RCD-K/ML Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie — Mouvement de
libération, initially based in Kisangani, now headquartered in Bunia
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