THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M.

NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY,
ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

PONENTE: Leonen
Object 2
1

TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property

FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound
housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6) by ten
feet (10) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first
tarpaulin contains the message IBASURA RH Law referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012
or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin
contains the heading Conscience Vote and lists candidates as either (Anti-RH) Team Buhay with a
check mark, or (Pro-RH) Team Patay with an X mark. The electoral candidates were classified
according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law.
Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising Team Patay,
while those who voted against it form Team Buhay.
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate.
Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not
of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political question,
hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Courts power of review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as
the case was not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated
petitioners fundamental right to freedom of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or modesty.
There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction
granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of a
constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming
arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the
tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a
truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are,
then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government
properly acted within such limits.
A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally imposed
limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally
imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this
court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any
instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any
doubt that a political question brings.
SECOND ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in
this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy
is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the prerequisite that something had by then been
accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government before a court may
come into the picture.
Petitioners exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium, had
understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELECs letter threatening the filing of
the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The
impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC
suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.
THIRD ISSUE: No.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they
had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these provisions pertain to
candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political
party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to
freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that every citizens expression with political consequences enjoys a high
degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondents argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being
petitioners way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted
for it, holds no water.
 The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named
candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin
was not paid for or posted in return for consideration by any candidate, political party, or party-list
group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored
messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation
about some issue, fostering informed and civic minded deliberation. On the other hand, commercial
speech has been defined as speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction. The
expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions based on the subject matter of the
utterance or speech. In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of
the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is
not easily divorced from the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the
clear and present danger rule as measure.
Under this rule, the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. Only when the challenged act has
overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government
having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There
is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify
curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right
of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does
not affect anyone elses constitutional rights.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin
remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the
Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or
constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant
to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers
should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizens private property. Consequently, it
violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived of his
property without due process of law.
SEVENTH ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this
court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to
qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The
enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech
with political consequences and not religious speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that
take religion specifically into account not to promote the governments favored form of religion, but to
allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect
therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a persons or institutions religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the government may take religion into account . . . to exempt,
when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs
and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an
atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.
Lemon test
A regulation is constitutional when:
Administrative Assistants
Check
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Ambit
Bacolod City
Banc
1. It has a secular legislative purpose;
2. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
3. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.

Maria Carolina Araullo vs Benigno Aquino III

July 16, 2014
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Political Law Constitutional Law Separation of Powers Fund Realignment Constitutionality of

the Disbursement Acceleration Program
Power of the Purse Executive Impoundment
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the
economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary
Florencio Butch Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program
(DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the
Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next
years appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being
undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the
Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as savings by the Executive and said funds will
then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as
economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted
by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act
(GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that he, and other
Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment
of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP
but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within
the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B
for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National
Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for
Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several
other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the
DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that no money shall
be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to
augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and
authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program
by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government
spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the
Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an
appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by
the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the Presidents
power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason.
Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national
government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the case
at bar because whats involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and
even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make
realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made within their
respective offices. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP,
this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to
the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing
project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these
projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them
in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the
GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is
unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under
the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an
excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally
abandoned. The GAA does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project.
Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis
at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under
the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then
being declared as savings by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because
under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the
effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification
was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being
declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped
stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all
actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be
undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially so that
they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable
to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals
(civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.
G.R. No. 166923, November 26, 2014
PHILIPPINE MIGRANTS RIGHTS WATCH, INC., ON ITS OWN BEHALF AND ON
BEHALF OF ITS MEMBER-OVERSEAS FILIPINO WORKERS, JESUS REYES AND
 RODOLFO MACOROL, Petitioners, v. OVERSEAS WORKERS WELFARE
ADMINISTRATION AND ITS BOARD OF TRUSTEES COMPOSED OF HON. PATRICIA A.
STO. TOMAS, VIRGILIO R. ANGELO, MANUEL G. IMSON, THE SECRETARY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPRESENTED BY UNDERSECRETARY JOSE S. BRILLANTES,
ROSALINDA BALDOZ, THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
REPRESENTED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY EDUARDO P. OPIDA, MINA C. FIGUEROA,
VICTORINO F. BALAIS, CAROLINE R. ROGGE, GREGORIO S. OCA, CORAZON P.
CARSOLA AND VIRGINIA J. PASALO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set
aside the Orders dated August 31, 20041 and January 14, 20052 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasay City, Branch CXI (111), in Civil Case No. 04-0077 dismissing the same for lack of jurisdiction.

The antecedent facts are as follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On September 19, 2003, respondent Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) issued Board
Resolution No. 0383 entitled the OWWA Omnibus Policies to provide guidelines on matters concerning
OWWA membership and its coverage, collection of contributions, and availment of benefits.

On February 18, 2004, petitioners Philippine Migrants Rights Watch, Inc., on behalf of its member-
overseas Filipino workers, together with Jesus P. Reyes and Rodolfo B. Macorol, returned overseas
Filipino workers, filed a Complaint4 before the RTC of Pasay City seeking to annul the Omnibus
Policies, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of Article II, Sections 5(C) (H) of Article III, and Articles
IV, V, VI, VII,VIII, the pertinent portions of which provide:
Article II
OWWA Mandate

xxxx

Section 7. Clientele. The clients of OWWA are its member-OFWs.

Article III
Organization and Management

x x x x

Section 5. Board Proceedings. The Board proceedings shall be guided by the following
rules:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

x x x x

c.) Attendance of Proxies. The Board members may designate their permanent alternate
in writing subject to the acceptance of the Board. The designated alternate shall have voting
rights. His decision shall be deemed the decision of his principal.
The Alternate cannot further delegate such representation. However, in the event that the
member and his permanent alternate are absent, any representative sent shall be on observer
status.
cralawred

x x x x

h.) Records Management and Archiving of Board Documents. The Board Secretary shall
ensure a thorough recording of all proceedings during a Board meeting. The minutes of the
previous meeting shall be made available for approval during the scheduled Board Meeting.
The Minutes of the Meeting shall basically contain the attendance, business arising from
the minutes, major agreements reached, corresponding resolutions, and other items noted or
discussed, and instructions issued by the Board. All minutes, tapes, and other documents
pertaining to the business of the Board shall be kept and archived pursuant to standard
records management systems and procedures. The minutes, transcripts and tapes are
classified confidential and are not for public circulation unless otherwise authorized
by the Board/Administrator.

Article IV
MEMBERSHIP

Section 1. Membership. Membership in OWWA may be obtained in two ways:

(a) By enrollment upon processing of contract at the POEA; and

(b) By voluntary registration of OFWs at job-sites overseas.

Section 2. Proof of Membership. All members shall be issued Official Receipt upon
payment of contribution. They shall likewise be issued an OWWA E-Card.

POEA and OWWA are required to maintain database of member-OFWs and to

update this regularly.

Section 3. Effectivity of Membership. OWWA membership, either through the

compulsory or voluntary coverages, shall be effective upon payment of membership
contribution until expiration of the employment contract.

In case of voluntary members who register on-site, membership coverage shall not
exceed two (2) years.

Section 4. Renewal of Membership. Membership shall be renewed upon payment of

contribution on contract renewal/issuance of new contract. In the case of voluntary
membership, coverage shall be renewed upon payment of contribution.

Article V
COLLECTION POLICY

Section 1. Legal Basis for Collection of Membership Contribution. Letter of Instructions

(LOI) No. 537 mandates the compulsory payment of OWWA membership contribution
in the amount of US$25.00 or its equivalent.
 x x x x

Section 3. Frequency of Membership Collection. The membership contribution shall be

collected on a per contract basis.

xxxx

Article VIII
BENEFITS AND SERVICES

Section 1. Guiding Principle. In pursuance of its mandate, it shall deliver social insurance
benefits, loan assistance, education and training, social services and family welfare
assistance subject to the qualification requirements and availability of OWWA funds. All
benefits and services shall be over and above the provisions of the employment contract,
offer of employers, or the laws of the receiving country.

Section 2. Benefits and Services for OWWA Members. For a US$25.00 membership
contribution, an OWWA member shall be entitled to the following benefits and services: x
x x5

According to petitioners, respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in issuing the Omnibus Policies, the provisions of which are contrary to the Constitution
and its enabling laws. Petitioners alleged that the OWWA was created by law to provide welfare
services to all Filipino overseas contract workers, without limiting the same to member-contributors
only. However, because of the passage of the Omnibus Policies, the OWWA benefits shall be available
only to those overseas contract workers who have paid their monetary contribution on a per contract
basis. It imposed on the overseas workers the compulsory payment of OWWA membership
contribution in the amount of US$25.00, which was originally collected from their employers. This,
petitioners contend, is violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution for it created a
distinction between Filipino overseas workers who contributed to the OWWA Fund and those who have
not. Moreover, petitioners likewise assailed as invalid the provisions which allow the OWWA Board
members to designate their proxies to vote in their stead in the Board meetings as well as those which
classify the minutes, transcripts, and other documents of the OWWA as confidential and cannot be
publicly circulated without authorization from the Board.

Respondents countered that the assailed Omnibus Policies do not violate the equal protection clause for
the same is germane to the purpose of the law, which requires registration and documentation of
overseas workers for their protections from exploitation in foreign countries. Moreover, the prescribed
membership fees chargeable to the employers had long been implemented pursuant to Letter of
Instructions (LOI) No. 537 signed by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on May 1, 1977, which was
formalized by the issuance of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1694 on May 1, 1980, as amended by PD
No. 1809 issued on January 16, 1981, creating the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers (hereinafter
referred to as the Welfund). According to respondents, these issuances expressly instructed the
collection of fees for the promotion of Filipino overseas workers interests. Hence, there was no undue
implementation of the law. Furthermore, the Omnibus Policies do not violate petitioners right to free
access to information as the approved minutes and official resolutions of the OWWA were made
available upon legitimate request by the public, pursuant to OWWA Resolution No. 006, Series of
2004.

On August 31, 2004, the RTC promulgated its Order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
According to the lower court, the determination of constitutionality of the assailed resolution rests, not
within its jurisdiction, but within the jurisdiction of this Court. As such, it ruled that the appropriate
remedy to annul and set aside the subject issuance was a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, the lower court held that it
could not arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve the constitutionality of the administrative act.

On February 18, 2005, petitioners filed the instant petition essentially invoking the following argument:
I.

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN

DISMISSING CIVIL CASE NO. 04-0077 ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF
JURISDICTION FOR REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
TO HEAR AND DECIDE CASES INVOLVING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OR
VALIDITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND REGULATIONS.

Petitioners fault the RTC for abruptly dismissing their complaint for lack of jurisdiction when it is well
established in law and jurisprudence that Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over cases involving
the constitutionality or legality of administrative rules and regulations, such as the Omnibus Policies
promulgated by respondents herein. The reliance on our ruling in Fortich v. Corona, petitioners posit, is
misplaced for the same involves a resolution issued by the Office of the President in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial functions. Hence, the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is not the appropriate remedy in the instant case.

In their Comment, respondents counter that petitioners, in filing the instant action with this Court,
committed serious procedural error for violating the doctrine of judicial hierarchy of courts. According
to respondents, petitioners should have first filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA), pursuant
to Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. 6 Respondents further reiterated the validity of the
subject Omnibus Policies.

We rule in favor of petitioners.

Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that the mode of appeal in all cases involving only
questions of law shall be by petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court in accordance with
Rule 45.7 chanrobleslaw

Time and again, this Court has distinguished cases involving pure questions of law from those of pure
questions of fact in the following manner:
A question of fact exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsity of
alleged facts. If the query requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses or the
existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the
issue in that query is factual. On the other hand, there is a question of law when the doubt
or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts and which does not call for
an existence of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. In a
case involving a question of law, the resolution of the issue rests solely on what the law
 provides on the given set of circumstances.8

In the present petition, the appeal interposed by petitioners stems from the Orders of the RTC
dismissing their complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The issue raised herein is one of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, specifically, whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over petitioners complaint
challenging the constitutionality of the Omnibus Policies issued by respondents.

Jurisdiction is the right to act or the power and authority to hear and determine a case. 9 It is conferred
only by the Constitution or by statute. 10 The question as to whether or not the dismissal by the lower
court for lack of jurisdiction is proper involves the determination of whether, admitting the facts
alleged in the complaint to be true, the trial court has jurisdiction over the same in light of the laws
governing jurisdiction.11 As such, jurisdiction is neither a question of fact or of fact and law but a
matter of law. For this reason, We have consistently held that a courts jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case is a question of law,12 and have, in fact, affirmed dismissals by the CA of appeals
brought to them involving pure questions of law.13 Considering that only questions of law was raised in
this petition, direct resort to this Court is proper.14 chanrobleslaw

We cannot, therefore, give credence to the lower courts contention that the appropriate remedy to
annul and set aside the issuance subject of this case is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. Certiorari, as a special civil action, is available only if: (1) it is directed against a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or
officer acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.15 chanrobl eslaw

In this case, respondents did not act in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity in issuing the assailed
resolution. They were not called upon to adjudicate the rights of contending parties to exercise, in any
manner, discretion of a judicial nature. Instead, their issuance of the challenged resolution was done in
the exercise of their quasi-legislative and administrative functions within the confines of the granting
law. Hence, contrary to the lower courts contention, certiorari is not the proper remedy in the instant
case.

As to whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter involved in this case, it is settled in law
and jurisprudence that the RTC has jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, presidential
decree, executive order, or administrative regulation, as recognized in Section 2(a), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution, which provides:
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: chanrobl esvirtuallawlibrary

x x x x

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,

international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.16
In view of the foregoing provision, the jurisdiction of regular courts involving the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation cannot be denied. We have had several occasions wherein We
affirmed the power of the RTC to take cognizance of actions assailing a specific rule or set of rules
promulgated by administrative bodies for the power of judicial review is vested by the Constitution not
only in this Court but in all Regional Trial Courts. 17 It was, therefore, erroneous for the RTC to
abruptly dismiss the complaint filed by petitioners on the basis of lack of jurisdiction since said court
clearly had the power to take cognizance of the same. In so doing, the lower court failed to ascertain
factual issues necessary to determine whether the subject issuance is, indeed, invalid and violative of
the Constitution. Considering the settled rule that this Court is not a trier of facts, 18 a remand of this
case to the RTC for the proper determination of the merits of the complaint is just and proper.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional
Trial Court, dated August 31, 2004 and January 14, 2005, in Civil Case No. 04-0077, are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. This case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXI (111),
Pasay City, for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED. cralawl awlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr., Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 182970 July 23, 2014
EMILIANO S. SAMSON, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES JOSE and GUILLERMINA GABOR, TANAY RURAL BANK, INC., and REGISTER
OF DEEDS OF MORONG, RIZAL, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Order1 dated August 18, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City
in Civil Case No. 70750 and Decision2 dated May 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 88335.
The antecedents of the case are as follows:
Respondent spouses Jose and Guillermina Gabor are the registered owners of a parcel of land with an
area of Sixty-One Thousand Eighty-Five (61,085) square meters, more or less, situated at Barrio
Mapunso, Tanay, Rizal Province, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. M-25565
issued by the Register of Deeds of Morong.3
On November 14, 1985, the Spouses Gabor executed a Deed of Assignment transferring Twenty
Thousand Six Hundred Thirty-One (20,631) square meters undivided portion of the aforementioned
parcel of land in favor of petitioner Emiliano S. Samson as attorneys fees in payment for the services
rendered by the latter for the former.
On October 22, 1987, petitioner Samson executed a Deed of Assignment transferring the same
undivided portion in favor of Ma. Remedios P. Ramos. Upon learning of the sale, respondent spouses
filed an action for legal redemption with the RTC of Tanay, Rizal. Immediately thereafter, petitioner
Samson and Ramos executed an Agreement of Rescission revoking the transfer of the undivided
portion.4 On July 25, 1989, the RTC dismissed the suit for legal redemption. On appeal, however, the
CA, in CA-G.R. CV No. 25530, reversed the decision of the RTC and upheld the Spouses Gabors right
of legal redemption. No further appeals were pursued.
Instead, during the pendency of CA-G.R. CV No. 25530, petitioner Samson filed an action for Partition
of Real Property and Damages5 against respondent spouses with the RTC of Morong, Rizal, which
dismissed the same on the ground that the finalityof CA-G.R. CV No. 25530 effectively barred the
action for partition.6 Agreeing with the RTC, the CA, in CA-G.R. CV No. 38373,7 upheld the lower
courts decision, in the following wise:
The appeal is not meritorious. In view of the final and executory decision in CA-G.R. No. 25530
upholding the right of defendantsappellees to exercise their right oflegal redemption over the 20,631
square meters involved, plaintiff-appellant is devoid of any legal right or personality to ask for partition
of [the] subject property formerly owned in common. Having assigned his undivided share therein to
Ma. Remedios P. Ramos, plaintiff-appellant ceased to be a co-owner. By exercising their right of legal
redemption, which thisCourt upheld by final judgment, defendants-appellees now own the entire area
covered by TCT No. M-25565.
The subsequent execution of the Agreement of Rescission by plaintiff-appellant and Ma. Remedios P.
Ramos did not divest defendantsappellees of the right of legal redemption vested in them upon the
consummation of the assignment plaintiff-appellant made to Ma. Remedios P. Ramos. x x x
When the pending appeal in CA-G.R. No. CV 25530 was decided and judgment therein became final
and executory, the lower court had to follow what was adjudged by this Court,and while plaintiff-
appellant was not a party in the said Civil CaseNo. 125-T and CA-G.R. CV No. 25530, plaintiff-
appellant is bound by the judgment therein because he was fully aware of the pendency of such cases.
Asa matter of fact, he testified in Civil Case No. 125-T. Therefore, the Agreement of Rescission he later
entered into with Ma. Remedios P. Ramos during the pendency of the said case, did not deprive
defendants-appellees of their right of legal redemption. The supposed re-acquisition by plaintiff-
appellant of his undivided share in question, having been effected pendente lite, the same was subject
to the outcome of the case.8
Petitioner Samson then appealed to this Court via petition for review on certiorari,but the same was
dismissed in a minute resolution9 dated June 8, 1994 for failure to submit an affidavit of service. This
court further denied Samsons motion for reconsideration with finality in its Resolution10 dated July
25, 1994 for having no compelling reason to warrant the reconsideration sought.
On April 4, 2006, petitioner Samson filed a Complaint11 before the RTC of Pasig City for Recovery of
Property or its Value against respondent spouses, Tanay Rural Bank, Inc., and the Register of Deeds of
Morong, Rizal, claiming that he had been payinghis one-third (1/3) share of realty taxes covering the
subject portion of land for the years 2002 to 2004. In 2005, however, his payment was rejected by the
Municipal Treasurer of Tanay, Rizal, at such time he discovered that respondent spouses had already
mortgaged the entire property in favor of respondent Bank back in November 2002.
On August 18, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City dismissed the complaint on the grounds of improper venue,
res judicata, and that the complaint states no cause of action.12 It held that the suit is a real action
which should be filed in the RTC of Morong, Rizal, where the property subject of the case is situated.
Moreover, the lower court pointed out that as early as 1991, herein petitioner had already filed a
Complaint for Partition of Real Property and Damages involving the same subject property against the
same parties, which complaint was already dismissed by this Court with finality. Thus, the principle of
res judicataapplies. Finally, the trial court held that petitioners complaint states no cause ofaction
against herein respondent Bank as it does not allege any details as to the liability or any violation of
petitioners rights.
Claiming that the lower court erred in dismissing his complaint, petitioner Samson filed an appeal with
the CA, which likewise dismissed the same for having been improperly brought before it. The appellate
court ruled in its Decision13 dated May 9, 2008 that since petitioners appeal raised only issues purely
of law, it should be dismissed outright.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition invoking the following arguments:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONERS APPEAL FROM
THE ORDER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG CITY.
II.
SINCE THE PETITIONERS COMPLAINT IS BOTH REAL AND PERSONAL, IT WAS
PROPERLY FILED WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG CITY.
III.
PETITIONERS COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION.
IV.
PETITIONERS COMPLAINT IS NOT BARRED BY RES JUDICATA.
The petition lacks merit.
We agree with the CAs decision to dismiss petitioners appeal, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which mandates the dismissal of an appeal that raises only questions of
law.14 The appeal of petitioner, as correctly held by the CA, essentially raised issues purely of law.
Time and again, this Court has distinguished cases involving pure questions of law from those of pure
questions of fact in the following manner:
A question of fact exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsity of alleged facts. If
the query requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses or the existence or relevance of
surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual. On the
other hand, there is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on
certain state of facts and which does not call for an existence of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties-litigants. In a case involving a question of law, the resolution of the issue rests
solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Ordinarily, the determination of
whether an appeal involves only questions of law or both questions of law and fact is best left to the
appellate court.All doubts as to the correctness of the conclusions of the appellate court will be
resolved in favor of the CA unless it commits an error or commits a grave abuse of discretion.15
In the instant case, petitioner appealed the Order of the trial court which dismissed his complaint for
improper venue, lack of cause of action, and res judicata.16 Dismissals based on these grounds do not
involve a review of the facts of the case but merely the application of the law, specifically in this case,
Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The issue to be resolved is limited towhether or not
saidrule was properly applied, which will only involve a reviewof the complaint, the motions to
dismiss, and the trial courts order of dismissal, but not the probative value of the evidence submitted
nor the truthfulness or falsity of the facts. Considering, therefore, that the subjectappeal raised only
questions of law, the CA committed no error in dismissing the same.
We, likewise, agree with the decision of the RTC of Pasig City dismissing petitioners complaint on the
ground that the same should have been filed in the RTC of Morong, Rizal, where the property subject
of this case is situated. Petitioner claims that as shown by the caption of his complaint which reads "For
Recovery of Property or its Value," his cause of action is in the alternative, both real and personal. As
such, his action may be commenced and tried where the petitioner resides or where any of the
respondents resides, at the election of the petitioner.17 Petitioners argument is misplaced. In Latorre v.
Latorre,18 we ruled that:
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide an answer to the issue of venue.
Actions affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest therein (real actions) shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court that has territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real
property is situated. On the other hand, all other actions (personal actions) shall be commenced and
tried in the proper courts where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides. x x x.
In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the principle that the nature of an action is determined by the
allegations in the Complaint itself, rather than by its title or heading. Itis also a settled rule that what
determines the venue of a case is the primary objective for the filing of the case. x x x19 While the
complaint of the petitioner was denominated as one for "Recovery of Property or its Value," all of his
claims are actually anchored on his claim of ownership over the one-third (1/3) portion of the subject
property. In his complaint, petitioner sought the return of the portion of the subject property or its value
on the basis of his co-ownership thereof. Necessarily, his alternative claim for the value of the property
is still dependent on the determination of ownership, which is an action affecting title to or possession
of real property or an interest therein. Clearly, petitioners claim is a realaction which should have been
filed in the court where the property lies, which in this case, is the RTC of Morong, Rizal.
We further agree with the RTC of Pasig City when it dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground
that the same states no cause of action in the following wise:
The complaint states no cause of action as herein defendant was impleaded without stating any details
ofits liabilities nor any allegation of its violations to the plaintiffs rights. The only allegation of the
rights violated are Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. More importantly, there are no allegations
in the complaint that defendant TRB has violated the aforesaid laws. There is no detailon why the
defendant TRB has been impleaded in the instant case.20
A perusal of the complaint would show that aside from the fact that respondent spouses had mortgaged
the property subject herein to respondent bank, there is no other allegation of an act or omission on the
part of respondent Bank in violation ofa right of petitioner. In Spouses Zepeda v. China Banking
Corporation,21 We had occasion to discuss the definition of the term "cause of action," to wit:
A cause of action is a formal statement of the operative facts that give rise to a remedial right. The
question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined by its averments regarding the
acts committed by the defendant. Thus it "must contain a concise statement of the ultimate or essential
facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action." Failure to make a sufficient allegation of a cause of
action in the complaint "warrants its dismissal."
As defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, a cause of action is the act or omission by which
a party violates the right of another. Its essential elements are as follows:
1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created;
2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises, giving the plaintiff
the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. In
determining whether an initiatory pleading states a cause ofaction, "the test is as follows: admitting the
truth of the facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer?" To be
taken into account are only the material allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and
circumstances or other matters aliundeare not considered. The court may consider in addition to the
complaint the appended annexes or documents, other pleadings of the plaintiff, or admissions in the
records.22
As already mentioned, there is nothing in the complaint herein which states specific overt acts to show
thatrespondent Bank acted in disregard of the petitioners rights. Nowhere in the complaint was it
alleged that respondent Bank had knowledge nor could have known with the exercise of due diligence
that respondent spouses had acted illegally, in order to commit a wrong against the petitioner. Petitioner
should have at least specified the details of his cause of action against respondent Bank. The complaint
of petitioner in Nacua-Jao v. China Banking Corporation,23 sheds light on the specific allegations
which must at least bestated to constitute a statement of cause of action, to wit:
We are unable to subscribe to the foregoing view of the CA. Even a cursory reading of the Complaint
readily reveals a clear statement of the cause of action of petitioner. The Complaint reads:
"x x x xxx xxx
3. That plaintiff is the lawfulowner of Lot No. 561 and its improvements xxx covered by Title
No. T-525552 issued in her name xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
9. That sometime this year, plaintiff was only shocked to learn that a falsified and fraudulent
Deed of Absolute Sale executed on January 19, 1996 was presented to the Register of Deeds
xxx in order to cause the cancellation of plaintiff's title x x x.
10. That consequently, TCT No. T-525552 xxx was illegally cancelled and replaced by TCT No.
T-602202 in the name of defendant Gan spouses x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
12. That Lot No. 561, now covered by TCT No. T-602202 (Annex "H") in the name of
defendantGan spouses is presently mortgaged to defendant China Banking Corporation in the
amount of P1,600,000.00; the mortgage is annotated at the backof Annex "H" and the
annotation is marked as Annex "H-1"; all the proceeds thereof went to defendant Gan Spouses.
13. That on knowing the falsification and the illegal cancellation of her title, plaintiff wrote
defendant Jackson Gan and defendant China Banking Corporation protesting against the
unlawful transactions that not onlyinvolved Lot No. 561 at Ternate, Cavite but also Lot No. 9,
Blk. 89 at Paraaque, Metro Manila; machine copies of the letter-protestsare hereto attached as
Annexes "I" and "J", respectively, and made integral parts hereof;
xxx xxx xxx
15. That from the foregoing, therefore, it is very evident that defendants had connived and
conspired to effect the so-called sale and mortgage of Lot No. 561 and the transfer of the title
thereof to Gan spouses' name. (Emphasis ours)
xxxx
It appears that the aforementioned properties were unlawfully and criminally mortgaged to your
Bankby one Jackson Gan xxx who forged or caused to be forged and/or falsified or caused to be
falsified two (2) separate instruments of sale in his favor, covering the aforesaid properties making it
appear that the said instruments were signed by our client when in truth and in fact were not."
In sum, the Complaint recites that (1) petitioner was the registered owner of the subject property; (2)
she was defrauded of her rights to the property when title thereto was transferred in the name of
Spouses Gan based on a forged deed of sale; and (3) she was further defrauded of her rights to the
property when respondentaccepted the same as security for the payment of a loan acquiredby Spouses
Gan even when the latter's title to the property is void.x x x24
In contrast, the most that petitioners complaint herein stated was Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil
Code and that "he found out that in November 2002, defendants Gabor mortgaged the whole property x
x x in favor of the defendant bank."25 Said bare allegation is insufficient to establish any right or cause
of action in favor of the petitioner.
Going now to the fourth and final argument, petitioner insists that his current action for Recovery of
Property or its Value is not barred by res judicata. He claims that not all the elements of the principle of
res judicata are present in this case, since the decision of this Court in the prior partition case was not a
judgment on the merits but due to sheer technicality and that the cause of action in the prior case is
partition while the cause of action herein is for recovery of property.26
We disagree. In order for res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the
disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and
second action, identity of parties, subject matter, causes of action as are present in the civil cases below.
The foundation principle upon which the doctrine of res judicatarests is that parties ought not to be
permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that when a right or fact has been judicially tried
and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long asit remains unreversed, it should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.27
In Selga v. Brar,28 we held that:
Res judicatameans "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing ormatter settled
by judgment." It lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, without
fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is
conclusive ofthe rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any
other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.
It must be remembered that it is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by
the parties over a subject fully and fairly adjudicated. The doctrine of res judicatais a rule that pervades
every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds embodied in various
maxims of the common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which dictates that it would be in
the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation republicae ut sit litium; and (2) the
hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause nemo debet bis vexari
pro una et eadem causa. A contrary doctrine would subject public peace and quiet to the will and
neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part ofsuitors to the
preservation of public tranquility and happiness.
Res judicatahas two concepts. The first is bar by prior judgment under Rule 39, Section 47(b), and the
second is conclusiveness of judgment under Rule 39, Section 47(c).These concepts differ as to the
extent of the effect of a judgment or final order as follows:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a
court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as
follows:
 xxxx
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or
as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or
special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face
to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto.
Jurisprudence taught uswell that res judicata under the first concept or as a bar against the prosecution
of a second action exists when there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action in the first
and second actions. The judgment in the first action is final as to the claim or demand in controversy,
including the parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and
received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might
have been offered for that purpose and of all matters that could have been adjudged in that case. In
contrast, res judicata under the second concept or estoppel by judgment exists when there is identity of
parties and subject matter but the causes of action are completely distinct. The first judgment is
conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to
matters merely involved herein.29
Guided by the above discussion, Weobserve that the case at hand satisfies the essential requisites of res
judicataunder the first concept. With respect to the first three (3) requisites,We find that the judgment
sought to bar the instant case was a judgment on the merits by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties, which properly obtained its finality. As the records reveal, the decision to
dismiss petitioners earlier complaint for Partition ofReal Property and Damages30 was rendered by the
RTC of Morong, Rizal, having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, after a consideration
of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case. Saidjudgment was
rendered based on the evidence and witnesses presented by the parties who were given ample
opportunity to be heard as well as a valid judgment by the CA, in the separate legal redemption case
upholding spouses Gabors right of legal redemption, which became final and executory upon the
expiration of the period of appealing the same, the parties pursuing no further appeal.
In the same way, petitioners complaint for partition likewise obtained finality when it was dismissed
by this Court of last resort.1wphi1 Petitioner contends that his Petition for Review on Certiorari was
dismissed in a minute resolution31 dated June 8, 1994 for failure to submit an affidavit of service, a
sheer technicality, which is not a judgment on the merits. He failed to mention, however, that this Court
further denied his motion for reconsideration with finality in its Resolution32 dated July 25, 1994 for
having no compelling reason to warrantthe reconsideration sought. Thus, while this Court initially
dismissed petitioners appeal on a mere technicality, it had sufficient opportunity to reverse its
dismissal on motion for reconsideration if it found that any error or injustice has been committed. It,
however, did not and in fact evenaffirmed the dismissal by further denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration. There is no question, therefore, that the dismissal of petitioners partition case is final
and executory.
Anent the fourth and final requisite, it is undisputed that there exists an identity of the parties and
subjectmatter between the prior action for partition and the instant subsequent action for recovery of
property, the same being filed by herein petitioner against the same spouses Gabor over the same
portion of land in Tanay, Rizal. The fact that respondents Bank and Register of Deeds were only
impleaded in the subsequent case is of no moment since absolute identity of parties is not required;
mere substantial identity of parties, or a community of interests between the party in the first case and
the party in the subsequent case, shall suffice.33
Petitioner, however, contends that the causes of action in both cases differ inasmuch as in the prior
case, the cause of action is partition while in the case at hand, the cause of action is the recovery of
property or its value.34
Petitioner is mistaken. In Philippine National Bank v. Gateway Property Holdings, Inc.,35 we have laid
down certain guidelines in determining whether there is identity of causes of action in the following
manner:
The crux of the controversy in the instant case is whether there is an identity of causes of action inCivil
Case Nos. TM-1022 and TM-1108.
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as "the act or omission by which a
party violates a right of another." Section 3 of Rule 2 provides that "[a] party may not institute more
than one suit for a single cause of action." Anent the act of splitting a single cause of action, Section 4
of Rule 2 explicitly states that "[i]f two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of
action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the
dismissal of the others."
Apropos, Carlet v. Court of Appealsstates that:
As regards identity of causes ofaction, the test often used in determining whether causes of action are
identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the second action
would have been sufficient toauthorize a recovery in the first, even if the forms or nature of the two
actions be different. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both actions, the two actions are
considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action;
otherwise, it is not.36
Applying the above guideline to the instant case, while the two cases are captioned differently,
petitioner cannot claim that there is no res judicata by simply changing the title of the action from
"Complaint for Partition of Real Property and Damages" to a "Complaint for Recovery of Property or
its Value." The records clearlyreveal that the evidence submitted by the parties in both cases are
identical. Petitioner, in claiming that he had either the right to partition or to recover the subject
property, submitted the same Deed of Assignment37 transferring in his favor the subject property as
payment for his legal services as well as the same Agreement of Rescission of his earlier transfer of the
subject property to Ms. Ramos. As previously mentioned, all of his claims in both actions are actually
anchored on his claim of ownership over the one-third (1/3) portion of the subject property. If it be
proven that he is not a co-owner of the subject portion, he will neither have the right to partition in the
prior action nor will he have the right to recover the subject property or its value in the
subsequentaction. Hence, the ultimate question which the trial court had to resolve in both cases was
whether or not petitioner is a co-owner ofthe subject property.
Contrary to petitioners allegation thatan action of partition is merely a possessory action which could
not bar a subsequent action, the issue of ownership or co-ownership is necessarilyresolved before the
trial court may issue an order of partition,as we have held in Reyes-De Leon v. Del Rosario,38 viz.:
The issue of ownership or co-ownership, to be more precise, must first be resolved in order to effect a
partition of properties. This should be done in the action for partition itself.As held in the case of
Catapusan v. Court of Appeals:
In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the property, unless it first
makes a determination as to the existence of co -ownership. The court must initially settle the issue of
ownership, the first stage in an action for partition. Needless to state, an action for partition will not lie
if the claimant has no rightful interest over the subject property.In fact, Section 1 of Rule 69 requires
the party filing the action to state in his complaint the "nature and extent of his title" to the real estate.
Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition
of the properties. x x x.39
Considering, therefore, that the RTC of Morong had long before resolved the issue of co-ownership
against petitioner in his complaint for Partition of Real Property, which was affirmed with finality by
this Court, no less, petitioners subsequent claim for Recovery ofProperty or its Value must likewise
necessarily fail. To reiterate, even if the forms or nature of actions in both cases are different, since the
issues raised essentially involve the claim of ownership over the subjectproperty, there isidentity of the
causes of action.40
It is, therefore, clear from the discussion above that since all of the elements of res judicata are present,
the instant suit for Recovery of Property or its Value is barred by said principle. As we have
consistently held, a udgment which has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, hence,
may no longer be modified in any respect except to correct clerical errors or mistakes, all the issues
between the parties being deemed resolved and laid to rest.41 It is a fundamental principle in our
judicial system that every litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is
essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final,
the winning party be, not through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict.42
Exceptions to the immutability of final judgment are allowed only under the most extraordinary of
circumstances.43 Yet, when petitioner is given ample opportunity to be heard, unbridled access to the
appellate comis, as well as unbiased judgments rendered after a consideration of evidence presented by
the parties, as in the case at hand, We cannot recklessly reverse the findings of the courts below.
In view of the foregoing, we find no compelling reason to disturb the findings of the RTC of Pasig City
and CA. The RTC of Pasig City correctly dismissed the complaint on the grounds of improper venue,
res judicata, and that the complaint states no cause of action. The CA likewise correctly dismissed
petitioner's appeal for raising only issues purely of law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Order dated August 18, 2006
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in Civil Case No. 70750 and Decision dated May 9, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88335 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Original Jurisdiction
The authority of a tribunal to entertain a lawsuit, try it, and set forth a judgment on the law and facts.
Original jurisdiction is distinguishable from appellate jurisdiction, which is the power of a court to hear
and enter judgment upon a case brought for review. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court's caseload
consists almost entirely appellate cases from the circuit courts of appeal.

A court's power to hear and decide a case before any appellate review. A trial court must necessarily
have original jurisdiction over the types of cases it hears.

Exclusive jurisdiction refers to power of a court to adjudicate a case to the exclusion of all other
courts. It is the sole forum for determination of a particular type of case. Exclusive jurisdiction is
decided on the basis of the subject matter dealt with by a particular court. For example, the U.S. district
courts have exclusive jurisdiction on bankruptcy matters [28 USCS 1334]. Exclusive jurisdiction is
conferred on courts by the U.S. constitution, various statutes or contract between the parties.
The jurisdiction is said to be concurrent when two or more different courts possess the authority to hear
and decide on the same matter within the same territory

SPECIAL JURISDICTION?
a court that has the power to handle certain cases that are specified by law and is called a court of
special jurisdiction.

Object 3

General Jurisdiction
The legal authority of a court to entertain whatever type of case comes up within the geographical area
over which its power extends.
General jurisdiction differs from special or limited jurisdiction, which is the power of a court to hear
only certain types of cases, or those in which the amount in controversy is below a certain sum or that
is subject to exceptions.

Universal Jurisdiction
The term universal jurisdiction refers to the idea that a national court may prosecute individuals for
any serious crime against international law such as crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide,
and torture based on the principle that such crimes harm the international community or
international order itself, which individual States may act to protect. Generally, universal jurisdiction is
invoked when other, traditional bases of criminal jurisdiction do not exist, for example: the defendant is
not a national of the State, the defendant did not commit a crime in that States territory or against its
nationals, or the States own national interests are not adversely affected.
The definition and exercise of universal jurisdiction varies around the world. A national or
international courts authority to prosecute individuals for international crimes committed in other
territories depends on the relevant sources of law and jurisdiction, such as national legislation or an
international agreement, which may, for example, require that only individuals within the countrys
national territory be subject to prosecution.

Limited Jurisdiction Law and Legal Definition

Limited jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear only certain types of cases, or those in which the
amount in controversy is below a certain sum or that is subject to exceptions. Within the U.S., most
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. For example, bankruptcy court is a limited jurisdiction court as
it can hear only bankruptcy cases. Likewise, family law courts can hear only family law cases, and
small claims courts can only hear cases involving damages up to a certain monetary amount.
Limited Jurisdiction is also known as special jurisdiction.

Concurrent Jurisdiction
The authority of several different courts, each of which is authorized to entertain and decide cases
dealing with the same subject matter.
State and federal courts possess concurrent jurisdiction over particular civil lawsuits, such as an action
to declare a state law unconstitutional. Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over other matters,
such as cases involving Patents.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION. The jurisdiction which a superior court has to bear appeals of causes
which have been tried in inferior courts. It differs from original jurisdiction, which is the power to
entertain suits instituted in the first in stance. Vide Jurisdiction; Original jurisdiction.

Excess of Jurisdiction Law and Legal Definition

Excess of Jurisdiction is a court's acting beyond the limits of its power, usually. in one of three ways:
(1) when the court has no power to deal with the kind of matter at issue, (2) when the court has no
power to deal with the particular person concerned, or (3) when the judgment or order issued is of a
kind that the court has no power to issue. 2. A court's departure from recognized and established
requirements of law, despite apparent adherence to procedural form, the effect of which is a deprivation
of one's constitutional right. It is also termed excess jurisdiction.

Grave abuse of discretion, under Rule 65, has a specific meaning. It is the arbitrary or despotic
exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or
capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined
by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been done with
grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross.1
By grave abuse of discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.2

Judicial Discretion in Decision Making

Discretion is the power or right to make official decisions using reason and judgment to choose from
among acceptable alternatives.
Legislatures, the president and the governors of the various states, trial and appellate judges, and
administrative agencies are among the public officers and offices charged with making discretionary
decisions in the discharge of public duties. All discretionary decisions made are subject to some kind of
review and are also subject to reversal or modification if there has been an Abuse of Discretion.
An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is not an acceptable alternative. The decision may be
unacceptable because it is logically unsound, because it is Arbitrary and clearly not supported by the
facts at hand, or because it is explicitly prohibited by a statute or Rule of Law.
Discretion in decision making can be viewed from the perspective of the flexibility and choices granted
to the decision maker based on the decision being made. Only the Constitution, through judicial
enforcement, can limit discretionary decision making by legislative bodies to pass laws. Great
flexibility is granted to the Executive Branch in the area of foreign relations decision making. Statutes
and prior judicial decisions limit the flexibility and discretion of a judge in a court of law. Moreover,
Congress has granted broad decision-making authority to administrative agencies and their
administrators, giving them great flexibility to make decisions within their area of concern.

Question of Fact
An issue that involves the resolution of a factual dispute or controversy and is within the sphere of the
decisions to be made by a jury.
A question of fact is a factual dispute between litigants that must be resolved by the jury at trial. It is an
issue that is material to the outcome of the case and requires an interpretation of conflicting views on
the factual circumstances surrounding the case.
A question of fact is best understood by comparing it to a Question of Law. Whether a particular issue
in a civil case is a question of fact or law is significant because it can determine whether a party wins
the case on Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is a judgment on the merits of the case without a
trial. A civil respondent may move for summary judgment at any time after the suit has been filed, but a
plaintiff generally must wait a short period after filing the suit (for the defendant to respond) before
moving for summary judgment. In determining whether to grant a motion for summary judgment, a
court may consider admissions by the parties in their pleadings, answers to interrogatories and
depositions, and affidavits of personal knowledge of facts.

Question of Law
An issue that is within the province of the judge, as opposed to the jury, because it involves the
application or interpretation of legal principles or statutes.
At any stage in a proceeding, before or during trial, a judge may have to determine whether to let a jury
decide a particular issue. In making this determination, the judge considers whether the issue is a
question of law or a QUESTION OF Fact. If the question is one of fact, it should be decided by the jury at
trial. If the question is one of law, the judge may decide it without affording the parties the opportunity
to present evidence and witnesses to the jury.
A question of law involves the interpretation of principles that are potentially applicable to other cases.
In contrast, a question of fact requires an interpretation of circumstances surrounding the case at hand.
Resolving QUESTIONS OF FACT is the chief function of the jury. Resolving questions of law is a chief
function of the judge.

political question
Examples
noun, Law.
1.
a question regarded by the courts as being a matter to be determined by another department of
government rather than of law and therefore one with which they will not deal, as the recognition of a
foreign state.

stare decisis
the doctrine that rules or principles of law on which a court rested a previous decision are authoritative
in all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same.
Origin of

obiter dicta
(oh-bitter dick-tah) n. remarks of a judge which are not necessary to reaching a decision, but are made
as comments, illustrations or thoughts. Generally, obiter dicta is simply "dicta." (See: dicta, dictum)

court of equity
n. originally in English common law and in several states there were separate courts (often called
chancery courts) which handled lawsuits and petitions requesting remedies other than damages, such as
writs, injunctions, and specific performance. Gradually the courts of equity have merged with courts of
law. Federal bankruptcy courts are the one example of courts which operate as courts of equity. (See:
equity, chancery, court of law)

ratio decidendi
the rule in a decision. This is a crucial part of the understanding of the way in which the common law
works. Once a system has been adopted of binding PRECEDENT, it has to be discovered what it is in
the previous decision that binds the court later in time. While it is sometimes possible to peruse the
opinion of the judge to find the rule, this is not by any means a reliable way of discovering the rule in
the case. The soundest general method is to discover the material facts of the case, determine what the
decision was and then to draw the proposition that most closely marries the material facts to the actual
decision. It is difficult enough to do this with a single opinion but very much harder with multiple
opinions such as come from the Court of Appeal, the Inner House and the House of Lords. Sometimes
it is said to be impossible to form a ratio of general application. Anything that is said that is not part of
the ratio is said to be an OBITER DICTUM.

Prima Facie
[Latin, On the first appearance.] A fact presumed to be true unless it is disproved.
In common parlance the term prima facie is used to describe the apparent nature of something upon
initial observation. In legal practice the term generally is used to describe two things: the presentation
of sufficient evidence by a civil claimant to support the legal claim (a prima facie case), or a piece of
evidence itself (prima facie evidence).
For most civil claims, a plaintiff must present a prima facie case to avoid dismissal of the case or an
unfavorable directed verdict. The plaintiff must produce enough evidence on all elements of the claim
to support the claim and shift the burden of evidence production to the respondent. If the plaintiff fails
to make a prima facie case, the respondent may move for dismissal or a favorable directed verdict
without presenting any evidence to rebut whatever evidence the plaintiff has presented. This is because
the burden of persuading a judge or jury always rests with the plaintiff.

Tort
A tort is an act or omission that gives rise to injury or harm to another and amounts to a civil wrong for
which courts impose liability. In the context of torts, "injury" describes the invasion of any legal right,
whereas "harm" describes a loss or detriment in fact that an individual suffers.1