Rethinking the National Interest

American Realism for a New World

What is the national interest? This is a question that I took up in 2000 in these pages. That
was a time that we as a nation revealingly called "the post-Cold War era." We knew better
where we had been than where we were going. Yet monumental changes were unfolding --
changes that were recognized at the time but whose implications were largely unclear.
And then came the attacks of September 11, 2001. As in the aftermath of the attack on Pearl
Harbor in 1941, the United States was swept into a fundamentally different world. We were
called to lead with a new urgency and with a new perspective on what constituted threats and
what might emerge as opportunities. And as with previous strategic shocks, one can cite
elements of both continuity and change in our foreign policy since the attacks of September
11.
What has not changed is that our relations with traditional and emerging great powers still
matter to the successful conduct of policy. Thus, my admonition in 2000 that we should seek
to get right the "relationships with the big powers" -- Russia, China, and emerging powers
such as India and Brazil -- has consistently guided us. As before, our alliances in the
Americas, Europe, and Asia remain the pillars of the international order, and we are now
transforming them to meet the challenges of a new era.
What has changed is, most broadly, how we view the relationship between the dynamics
within states and the distribution of power among them. As globalization strengthens some
states, it exposes and exacerbates the failings of many others -- those too weak or poorly
governed to address challenges within their borders and prevent them from spilling out and
destabilizing the international order. In this strategic environment, it is vital to our national
security that states be willing and able to meet the full range of their sovereign
responsibilities, both beyond their borders and within them. This new reality has led us to
some significant changes in our policy. We recognize that democratic state building is now
an urgent component of our national interest. And in the broader Middle East, we recognize
that freedom and democracy are the only ideas that can, over time, lead to just and lasting
stability, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq.
As in the past, our policy has been sustained not just by our strength but also by our values.
The United States has long tried to marry power and principle -- realism and idealism. At
times, there have been short-term tensions between them. But we have always known where
our long-term interests lie. Thus, the United States has not been neutral about the importance
of human rights or the superiority of democracy as a form of government, both in principle
and in practice. This uniquely American realism has guided us over the past eight years, and
it must guide us over the years to come.
GREAT POWER, OLD AND NEW
By necessity, our relationships with Russia and China have been rooted more in common
interests than common values. With Russia, we have found common ground, as evidenced by
the "strategic framework" agreement that President George W. Bush and Russian President
Vladimir Putin signed in Sochi in March of this year. Our relationship with Russia has been
sorely tested by Moscow's rhetoric, by its tendency to treat its neighbors as lost "spheres of
influence," and by its energy policies that have a distinct political tinge. And Russia's internal
course has been a source of considerable disappointment, especially because in 2000 we
hoped that it was moving closer to us in terms of values. Yet it is useful to remember that
Russia is not the Soviet Union. It is neither a permanent enemy nor a strategic threat.
Russians now enjoy greater opportunity and, yes, personal freedom than at almost any other
time in their country's history. But that alone is not the standard to which Russians
themselves want to be held. Russia is not just a great power; it is also the land and culture of
a great people. And in the twenty-first century, greatness is increasingly defined by the
technological and economic development that flows naturally in open and free societies. That
is why the full development both of Russia and of our relationship with it still hangs in the
balance as the country's internal transformation unfolds.
The last eight years have also challenged us to deal with rising Chinese influence, something
we have no reason to fear if that power is used responsibly. We have stressed to Beijing that
with China's full membership in the international community comes responsibilities, whether
in the conduct of its economic and trade policy, its approach to energy and the environment,
or its policies in the developing world. China's leaders increasingly realize this, and they are
moving, albeit slowly, to a more cooperative approach on a range of problems. For instance,
on Darfur, after years of unequivocally supporting Khartoum, China endorsed the UN
Security Council resolution authorizing the deployment of a hybrid United Nations-African
Union peacekeeping force and dispatched an engineering battalion to pave the way for those
peacekeepers. China needs to do much more on issues such as Darfur, Burma, and Tibet, but
we sustain an active and candid dialogue with China's leaders on these challenges.
The United States, along with many other countries, remains concerned about China's rapid
development of high-tech weapons systems. We understand that as countries develop, they
will modernize their armed forces. But China's lack of transparency about its military
spending and doctrine and its strategic goals increases mistrust and suspicion. Although
Beijing has agreed to take incremental steps to deepen U.S.-Chinese military-to-military
exchanges, it needs to move beyond the rhetoric of peaceful intentions toward true
engagement in order to reassure the international community.
Our relationships with Russia and China are complex and characterized simultaneously by
competition and cooperation. But in the absence of workable relations with both of these
states, diplomatic solutions to many international problems would be elusive. Transnational
terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, climate change and instability
stemming from poverty and disease -- these are dangers to all successful states, including
those that might in another time have been violent rivals. It is incumbent on the United States
to find areas of cooperation and strategic agreement with Russia and China, even when there
are significant differences.
Obviously, Russia and China carry special responsibility and weight as fellow permanent
members of the UN Security Council, but this has not been the only forum in which we have
worked together. Another example has emerged in Northeast Asia with the six-party
framework. The North Korean nuclear issue could have led to conflict among the states of
Northeast Asia, or to the isolation of the United States, given the varied and vital interests of
China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States. Instead, it has become an
opportunity for cooperation and coordination as the efforts toward verifiable denuclearization
proceed. And when North Korea tested a nuclear device last year, the five other parties
already were an established coalition and went quickly to the Security Council for a Chapter
7 resolution. That, in turn, put considerable pressure on North Korea to return to the six-party
talks and to shut down and begin disabling its Yongbyon reactor. The parties intend to
institutionalize these habits of cooperation through the establishment of a Northeast Asian
Peace and Security Mechanism -- a first step toward a security forum in the region.
The importance of strong relations with global players extends to those that are emerging.
With those, particularly India and Brazil, the United States has built deeper and broader ties.
India stands on the front lines of globalization. This democratic nation promises to become a
global power and an ally in shaping an international order rooted in freedom and the rule of
law. Brazil's success at using democracy and markets to address centuries of pernicious social
inequality has global resonance. Today, India and Brazil look outward as never before, secure
in their ability to compete and succeed in the global economy. In both countries, national
interests are being redefined as Indians and Brazilians realize their direct stake in a
democratic, secure, and open international order -- and their commensurate responsibilities
for strengthening it and defending it against the major transnational challenges of our era. We
have a vital interest in the success and prosperity of these and other large multiethnic
democracies with global reach, such as Indonesia and South Africa. And as these emerging
powers change the geopolitical landscape, it will be important that international institutions
also change to reflect this reality. This is why President Bush has made clear his support for a
reasonable expansion of the UN Security Council.
SHARED VALUES AND SHARED RESPONSIBILITY
As important as relations are with Russia and China, it is our work with our allies, those with
whom we share values, that is transforming international politics -- for this work presents an
opportunity to expand the ranks of well-governed, law-abiding democratic states in our world
and to defeat challenges to this vision of international order. Cooperation with our democratic
allies, therefore, should not be judged simply by how we relate to one another. It should be
judged by the work we do together to defeat terrorism and extremism, meet global
challenges, defend human rights and dignity, and support new democracies.
In the Americas, this has meant strengthening our ties with strategic democracies such as
Canada, Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, and Chile in order to further the democratic development
of our hemisphere. Together, we have supported struggling states, such as Haiti, in locking in
their transitions to democracy and security. Together, we are defending ourselves against
drug traffickers, criminal gangs, and the few autocratic outliers in our democratic
hemisphere. The region still faces challenges, including Cuba's coming transition and the
need to support, unequivocally, the Cuban people's right to a democratic future. There is no
doubt that centuries-old suspicions of the United States persist in the region. But we have
begun to write a new narrative that speaks not only to macroeconomic development and trade
but also to the need for democratic leaders to address problems of social justice and
inequality.
I believe that one of the most compelling stories of our time is our relationship with our
oldest allies. The goal of a Europe whole, free, and at peace is very close to completion. The
United States welcomes a strong, united, and coherent Europe. There is no doubt that the
European Union has been a superb anchor for the democratic evolution of eastern Europe
after the Cold War. Hopefully, the day will come when Turkey takes its place in the EU.
Membership in the EU and NATO has been attractive enough to lead countries to make
needed reforms and to seek the peaceful resolution of long-standing conflicts with their
neighbors. The reverse has been true as well: the new members have transformed these two
pillars of the transatlantic relationship. Twelve of the 28 members of NATO are former
"captive nations," countries once in the Soviet sphere. The effect of their joining the alliance
is felt in a renewed dedication to promoting and protecting democracy. Whether sending
troops to Afghanistan or Iraq or fiercely defending the continued expansion of NATO, these
states have brought new energy and fervor to the alliance.
In recent years, the mission and the purpose of the alliance have also been transformed.
Indeed, many can remember when NATO viewed the world in two parts: Europe and "out of
area," which was basically everywhere else. If someone had said in 2000 that NATO today
would be rooting out terrorists in Kandahar, training the security forces of a free Iraq,
providing critical support to peacekeepers in Darfur, and moving forward on missile
defenses, hopefully in partnership with Russia, who would have believed him? The
endurance and resilience of the transatlantic alliance is one reason that I believe Lord
Palmerston got it wrong when he said that nations have no permanent allies. The United
States does have permanent allies: the nations with whom we share common values.
Democratization is also deepening across the Asia-Pacific region. This is expanding our
circle of allies and advancing the goals we share. Indeed, although many assume that the rise
of China will determine the future of Asia, so, too -- and perhaps to an even greater degree --
will the broader rise of an increasingly democratic community of Asian states. This is the
defining geopolitical event of the twenty-first century, and the United States is right in the
middle of it. We enjoy a strong, democratic alliance with Australia, with key states in
Southeast Asia, and with Japan -- an economic giant that is emerging as a "normal" state,
capable of working to secure and spread our values both in Asia and beyond. South Korea,
too, has become a global partner whose history can boast an inspiring journey from poverty
and dictatorship to democracy and prosperity. Finally, the United States has a vital stake in
India's rise to global power and prosperity, and relations between the two countries have
never been stronger or broader. It will take continued work, but this is a dramatic
breakthrough for both our strategic interests and our values.
It is now possible to speak of emerging democratic allies in Africa as well. Too often, Africa
is thought of only as a humanitarian concern or a zone of conflict. But the continent has seen
successful transitions to democracy in several states, among them Ghana, Liberia, Mali, and
Mozambique. Our administration has worked to help the democratic leaders of these and
other states provide for their people -- most of all by attacking the continental scourge of
HIV/AIDS in an unprecedented effort of power, imagination, and mercy. We have also been
an active partner in resolving conflicts -- from the conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement, which ended the civil war between the North and the South in Sudan, to active
engagement in the Great Lakes region, to the intervention of a small contingent of U.S.
military forces in coordination with the African Union to end the conflict in Liberia.
Although conflicts in Darfur, Somalia, and other places tragically remain violent and
unresolved, it is worth noting the considerable progress that African states are making on
many fronts and the role that the United States has played in supporting African efforts to
solve the continent's greatest problems.
A DEMOCRATIC MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT
Although the United States' ability to influence strong states is limited, our ability to enhance
the peaceful political and economic development of weak and poorly governed states can be
considerable. We must be willing to use our power for this purpose -- not only because it is
necessary but also because it is right. Too often, promoting democracy and promoting
development are thought of as separate goals. In fact, it is increasingly clear that the practices
and institutions of democracy are essential to the creation of sustained, broad-based economic
development -- and that market-driven development is essential to the consolidation of
democracy. Democratic development is a unified political-economic model, and it offers the
mix of flexibility and stability that best enables states to seize globalization's opportunities
and manage its challenges. And for those who think otherwise: What real alternative worthy
of America is there?
Democratic development is not only an effective path to wealth and power; it is also the best
way to ensure that these benefits are shared justly across entire societies, without exclusion,
repression, or violence. We saw this recently in Kenya, where democracy enabled civil
society, the press, and business leaders to join together to insist on an inclusive political
bargain that could stem the country's slide into ethnic cleansing and lay a broader foundation
for national reconciliation. In our own hemisphere, democratic development has opened up
old, elite-dominated systems to millions on the margins of society. These people are
demanding the benefits of citizenship long denied them, and because they are doing so
democratically, the real story in our hemisphere since 2001 is not that our neighbors have
given up on democracy and open markets; it is that they are broadening our region's
consensus in support of democratic development by ensuring that it leads to social justice for
the most marginalized citizens.
The untidiness of democracy has led some to wonder if weak states might not be better off
passing through a period of authoritarian capitalism. A few countries have indeed succeeded
with this model, and its allure is only heightened when democracy is too slow in delivering or
incapable of meeting high expectations for a better life. Yet for every state that embraces
authoritarianism and manages to create wealth, there are many, many more that simply make
poverty, inequality, and corruption worse. For those that are doing pretty well economically,
it is worth asking whether they might be doing even better with a freer system. Ultimately, it
is at least an open question whether authoritarian capitalism is itself an indefinitely
sustainable model. Is it really possible in the long run for governments to respect their
citizen's talents but not their rights? I, for one, doubt it.
For the United States, promoting democratic development must remain a top priority. Indeed,
there is no realistic alternative that we can -- or should -- offer to influence the peaceful
evolution of weak and poorly governed states. The real question is not whether to pursue this
course but how.
We first need to recognize that democratic development is always possible but never fast or
easy. This is because democracy is really the complex interplay of democratic practices and
culture. In the experience of countless nations, ours especially, we see that culture is not
destiny. Nations of every culture, race, religion, and level of development have embraced
democracy and adapted it to their own circumstances and traditions. No cultural factor has
yet been a stumbling block -- not German or Japanese "militarism," not "Asian values," not
African "tribalism," not Latin America's alleged fondness for caudillos, not the once-
purported preference of eastern Europeans for despotism.
The fact is, few nations begin the democratic journey with a democratic culture. The vast
majority create one over time -- through the hard, daily struggle to make good laws, build
democratic institutions, tolerate differences, resolve them peacefully, and share power justly.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to grow the habits of democracy in the controlled environment of
authoritarianism, to have them ready and in place when tyranny is lifted. The process of
democratization is likely to be messy and unsatisfactory, but it is absolutely necessary.
Democracy, it is said, cannot be imposed, particularly by a foreign power. This is true but
beside the point. It is more likely that tyranny has to be imposed.
The story today is rarely one of peoples resisting the basics of democracy -- the right to
choose those who will govern them and other basic freedoms. It is, instead, about people
choosing democratic leaders and then becoming impatient with them and holding them
accountable on their duty to deliver a better life. It is strongly in our national interest to help
sustain these leaders, support their countries' democratic institutions, and ensure that their
new governments are capable of providing for their own security, especially when their
nations have experienced crippling conflicts. To do so will require long-term partnerships
rooted in mutual responsibility and the integration of all elements of our national power --
political, diplomatic, economic, and, at times, military. We have recently built such
partnerships to great effect with countries as different as Colombia, Lebanon, and Liberia.
Indeed, a decade ago, Colombia was on the verge of failure. Today, in part because of our
long-term partnership with courageous leaders and citizens, Colombia is emerging as a
normal nation, with democratic institutions that are defending the country, governing justly,
reducing poverty, and contributing to international security.
We must now build long-term partnerships with other new and fragile democracies,
especially Afghanistan. The basics of democracy are taking root in this country after nearly
three decades of tyranny, violence, and war. For the first time in their history, Afghans have a
government of the people, elected in presidential and parliamentary elections, and guided by
a constitution that codifies the rights of all citizens. The challenges in Afghanistan do not
stem from a strong enemy. The Taliban offers a political vision that very few Afghans
embrace. Rather, they exploit the current limitations of the Afghan government, using
violence against civilians and revenues from illegal narcotics to impose their rule. Where the
Afghan government, with support from the international community, has been able to provide
good governance and economic opportunity, the Taliban is in retreat. The United States and
NATO have a vital interest in supporting the emergence of an effective, democratic Afghan
state that can defeat the Taliban and deliver "population security" -- addressing basic needs
for safety, services, the rule of law, and increased economic opportunity. We share this goal
with the Afghan people, who do not want us to leave until we have accomplished our
common mission. We can succeed in Afghanistan, but we must be prepared to sustain a
partnership with that new democracy for many years to come.
One of our best tools for supporting states in building democratic institutions and
strengthening civil society is our foreign assistance, but we must use it correctly. One of the
great advances of the past eight years has been the creation of a bipartisan consensus for the
more strategic use of foreign assistance. We have begun to transform our assistance into an
incentive for developing states to govern justly, advance economic freedom, and invest in
their people. This is the great innovation of the Millennium Challenge Account initiative.
More broadly, we are now better aligning our foreign aid with our foreign policy goals -- so
as to help developing countries move from war to peace, poverty to prosperity, poor
governance to democracy and the rule of law. At the same time, we have launched historic
efforts to help remove obstacles to democratic development -- by forgiving old debts, feeding
the hungry, expanding access to education, and fighting pandemics such as malaria and
HIV/AIDS. Behind all of these efforts is the overwhelming generosity of the American
people, who since 2001 have supported the near tripling of the United States' official
development assistance worldwide -- doubling it for Latin America and quadrupling it for
Africa.
Ultimately, one of the best ways to support the growth of democratic institutions and civil
society is to expand free and fair trade and investment. The very process of implementing a
trade agreement or a bilateral investment treaty helps to hasten and consolidate democratic
development. Legal and political institutions that can enforce property rights are better able
to protect human rights and the rule of law. Independent courts that can resolve commercial
disputes can better resolve civil and political disputes. The transparency needed to fight
corporate corruption makes it harder for political corruption to go unnoticed and unpunished.
A rising middle class also creates new centers of social power for political movements and
parties. Trade is a divisive issue in our country right now, but we must not forget that it is
essential not only for the health of our domestic economy but also for the success our foreign
policy.
There will always be humanitarian needs, but our goal must be to use the tools of foreign
assistance, security cooperation, and trade together to help countries graduate to self-
sufficiency. We must insist that these tools be used to promote democratic development. It is
in our national interest to do so.
THE CHANGING MIDDLE EAST
What about the broader Middle East, the arc of states that stretches from Morocco to
Pakistan? The Bush administration's approach to this region has been its most vivid departure
from prior policy. But our approach is, in reality, an extension of traditional tenets --
incorporating human rights and the promotion of democratic development into a policy
meant to further our national interest. What is exceptional is that the Middle East was treated
as an exception for so many decades. U.S. policy there focused almost exclusively on
stability. There was little dialogue, certainly not publicly, about the need for democratic
change.
For six decades, under both Democratic and Republican administrations, a basic bargain
defined the United States' engagement in the broader Middle East: we supported authoritarian
regimes, and they supported our shared interest in regional stability. After September 11, it
became increasingly clear that this old bargain had produced false stability. There were
virtually no legitimate channels for political expression in the region. But this did not mean
that there was no political activity. There was -- in madrasahs and radical mosques. It is no
wonder that the best-organized political forces were extremist groups. And it was there, in the
shadows, that al Qaeda found the troubled souls to prey on and exploit as its foot soldiers in
its millenarian war against the "far enemy."
One response would have been to fight the terrorists without addressing this underlying
cause. Perhaps it would have been possible to manage these suppressed tensions for a while.
Indeed, the quest for justice and a new equilibrium on which the nations of the broader
Middle East are now embarked is very turbulent. But is it really worse than the situation
before? Worse than when Lebanon suffered under the boot of Syrian military occupation?
Worse than when the self-appointed rulers of the Palestinians personally pocketed the world's
generosity and squandered their best chance for a two-state peace? Worse than when the
international community imposed sanctions on innocent Iraqis in order to punish the man
who tyrannized them, threatened Iraq's neighbors, and bulldozed 300,000 human beings into
unmarked mass graves? Or worse than the decades of oppression and denied opportunity that
spawned hopelessness, fed hatreds, and led to the sort of radicalization that brought about the
ideology behind the September 11 attacks? Far from being the model of stability that some
seem to remember, the Middle East from 1945 on was wracked repeatedly by civil conflicts
and cross-border wars. Our current course is certainly difficult, but let us not romanticize the
old bargains of the Middle East -- for they yielded neither justice nor stability.
The president's second inaugural address and my speech at the American University in Cairo
in June 2005 have been held up as rhetorical declarations that have faded in the face of hard
realities. No one will argue that the goal of democratization and modernization in the broader
Middle East lacks ambition, and we who support it fully acknowledge that it will be a
difficult, generational task. No one event, and certainly not a speech, will bring it into being.
But if America does not set the goal, no one will.
This goal is made more complicated by the fact that the future of the Middle East is bound up
in many of our other vital interests: energy security, nonproliferation, the defense of friends
and allies, the resolution of old conflicts, and, most of all, the need for near-term partners in
the global struggle against violent Islamist extremism. To state, however, that we must
promote either our security interests or our democratic ideals is to present a false choice.
Admittedly, our interests and our ideals do come into tension at times in the short term.
America is not an NGO and must balance myriad factors in our relations with all countries.
But in the long term, our security is best ensured by the success of our ideals: freedom,
human rights, open markets, democracy, and the rule of law.
The leaders and citizens of the broader Middle East are now searching for answers to the
fundamental questions of modern state building: What are to be the limits on the state's use of
power, both within and beyond its borders? What will be the role of the state in the lives of
its citizens and the relationship between religion and politics? How will traditional values and
mores be reconciled with the democratic promise of individual rights and liberty, particularly
for women and girls? How is religious and ethnic diversity to be accommodated in fragile
political institutions when people tend to hold on to traditional associations? The answers to
these and other questions can come only from within the Middle East itself. The task for us is
to support and shape these difficult processes of change and to help the nations of the region
overcome several major challenges to their emergence as modern, democratic states.
The first challenge is the global ideology of violent Islamist extremism, as embodied by
groups, such as al Qaeda, that thoroughly reject the basic tenets of modern politics, seeking
instead to topple sovereign states, erase national borders, and restore the imperial structure of
the ancient caliphate. To resist this threat, the United States will need friends and allies in the
region who are willing and able to take action against the terrorists among them. Ultimately,
however, this is more than just a struggle of arms; it is a contest of ideas. Al Qaeda's theory
of victory is to hijack the legitimate local and national grievances of Muslim societies and
twist them into an ideological narrative of endless struggle against Western, especially U.S.,
oppression. The good news is that al Qaeda's intolerant ideology can be enforced only
through brutality and violence. When people are free to choose, as we have seen in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq's Anbar Province, they reject al Qaeda's ideology and rebel
against its control. Our theory of victory, therefore, must be to offer people a democratic path
to advance their interests peacefully -- to develop their talents, to redress injustices, and to
live in freedom and dignity. In this sense, the fight against terrorism is a kind of global
counterinsurgency: the center of gravity is not the enemies we fight but the societies they are
trying to radicalize.
Admittedly, our interests in both promoting democratic development and fighting terrorism
and extremism lead to some hard choices, because we do need capable friends in the broader
Middle East who can root out terrorists now. These states are often not democratic, so we
must balance the tensions between our short-term and our long-term goals. We cannot deny
nondemocratic states the security assistance to fight terrorism or defend themselves. At the
same time, we must use other points of leverage to promote democracy and hold our friends
to account. That means supporting civil society, as we have done through the Forum for the
Future and the Middle East Partnership Initiative, and using public and private diplomacy to
push our nondemocratic partners to reform. Changes are slowly coming in terms of universal
suffrage, more influential parliaments, and education for girls and women. We must continue
to advocate for reform and support indigenous agents of change in nondemocratic countries,
even as we cooperate with their governments on security.
An example of how our administration has balanced these concerns is our relationship with
Pakistan. Following years of U.S. neglect of that relationship, our administration had to
establish a partnership with Pakistan's military government to achieve a common goal after
September 11. We did so knowing that our security and that of Pakistan ultimately required a
return to civilian and democratic rule. So even as we worked with President Pervez
Musharraf to fight terrorists and extremists, we invested more than $3 billion to strengthen
Pakistani society -- building schools and health clinics, providing emergency relief after the
2005 earthquake, and supporting political parties and the rule of law. We urged Pakistan's
military leaders to put their country on a modern and moderate trajectory, which in some
important respects they did. And when this progress was threatened last year by the
declaration of emergency rule, we pushed President Musharraf hard to take off his uniform
and hold free elections. Although terrorists tried to thwart the return of democracy and
tragically killed many innocent people, including former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, the
Pakistani people dealt extremism a crushing defeat at the polls. This restoration of democracy
in Pakistan creates an opportunity for us to build the lasting and broad-based partnership that
we have never achieved with this nation, thereby enhancing our security and anchoring the
success of our values in a troubled region.
A second challenge to the emergence of a better Middle East is posed by aggressive states
that seek not to peacefully reform the present regional order but to alter it using any form of
violence -- assassination, intimidation, terrorism. The question is not whether any particular
state should have influence in the region. They all do, and will. The real question is, What
kind of influence will these states wield -- and to what ends, constructive or destructive? It is
this fundamental and still unresolved question that is at the center of many of the geopolitical
challenges in the Middle East today -- whether it is Syria's undermining of Lebanon's
sovereignty, Iran's pursuit of a nuclear capability, or both states' support for terrorism.
Iran poses a particular challenge. The Iranian regime pursues its disruptive policies both
through state instruments, such as the Revolutionary Guards and the al Quds force, and
through nonstate proxies that extend Iranian power, such as elements of the Mahdi Army in
Iraq, Hamas in Gaza, and Hezbollah in Lebanon and around the world. The Iranian regime
seeks to subvert states and extend its influence throughout the Persian Gulf region and the
broader Middle East. It threatens the state of Israel with extinction and holds implacable
hostility toward the United States. And it is destabilizing Iraq, endangering U.S. forces, and
killing innocent Iraqis. The United States is responding to these provocations. Clearly, an
Iran with a nuclear weapon or even the technology to build one on demand would be a grave
threat to international peace and security.
But there is also another Iran. It is the land of a great culture and a great people, who suffer
under repression. The Iranian people deserve to be integrated into the international system, to
travel freely and be educated in the best universities. Indeed, the United States has reached
out to them with exchanges of sports teams, disaster-relief workers, and artists. By many
accounts, the Iranian people are favorably disposed to Americans and to the United States.
Our relationship could be different. Should the Iranian government honor the UN Security
Council's demands and suspend its uranium enrichment and related activities, the community
of nations, including the United States, is prepared to discuss the full range of issues before
us. The United States has no permanent enemies.
Ultimately, the many threats that Iran poses must be seen in a broader context: that of a state
fundamentally out of step with the norms and values of the international community. Iran
must make a strategic choice -- a choice that we have sought to clarify with our approach --
about how and to what ends it will wield its power and influence: Does it want to continue
thwarting the legitimate demands of the world, advancing its interests through violence, and
deepening the isolation of its people? Or is it open to a better relationship, one of growing
trade and exchange, deepening integration, and peaceful cooperation with its neighbors and
the broader international community? Tehran should know that changes in its behavior would
meet with changes in ours. But Iran should also know that the United States will defend its
friends and its interests vigorously until the day that change comes.
A third challenge is finding a way to resolve long-standing conflicts, particularly that
between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Our administration has put the idea of democratic
development at the center of our approach to this conflict, because we came to believe that
the Israelis will not achieve the security they deserve in their Jewish state and the Palestinians
will not achieve the better life they deserve in a state of their own until there is a Palestinian
government capable of exercising its sovereign responsibilities, both to its citizens and to its
neighbors. Ultimately, a Palestinian state must be created that can live side by side with Israel
in peace and security. This state will be born not just through negotiations to resolve hard
issues related to borders, refugees, and the status of Jerusalem but also through the difficult
effort to build effective democratic institutions that can fight terrorism and extremism,
enforce the rule of law, combat corruption, and create opportunities for the Palestinians to
improve their lives. This confers responsibilities on both parties.
As the experience of the past several years has shown, there is a fundamental disagreement at
the heart of Palestinian society -- between those who reject violence and recognize Israel's
right to exist and those who do not. The Palestinian people must ultimately make a choice
about which future they desire, and it is only democracy that gives them that choice and holds
open the possibility of a peaceful way forward to resolve the existential question at the heart
of their national life. The United States, Israel, other states in the region, and the international
community must do everything in their power to support those Palestinians who would
choose a future of peace and compromise. When the two-state solution is finally realized, it
will be because of democracy, not despite it.
This is, indeed, a controversial view, and it speaks to one more challenge that must be
resolved if democratic and modern states are to emerge in the broader Middle East: how to
deal with nonstate groups whose commitment to democracy, nonviolence, and the rule of law
is suspect. Because of the long history of authoritarianism in the region, many of the best-
organized political parties are Islamist, and some of them have not renounced violence used
in the service of political goals. What should be their role in the democratic process? Will
they take power democratically only to subvert the very process that brought them victory?
Are elections in the broader Middle East therefore dangerous?
These questions are not easy. When Hamas won elections in the Palestinian territories, it was
widely seen as a failure of policy. But although this victory most certainly complicated affairs
in the broader Middle East, in another way it helped to clarify matters. Hamas had significant
power before those elections -- largely the power to destroy. After the elections, Hamas also
had to face real accountability for its use of power for the first time. This has enabled the
Palestinian people, and the international community, to hold Hamas to the same basic
standards of responsibility to which all governments should be held. Through its continued
unwillingness to behave like a responsible regime rather than a violent movement, Hamas has
demonstrated that it is wholly incapable of governing.
Much attention has been focused on Gaza, which Hamas holds hostage to its incompetent and
brutal policies. But in other places, the Palestinians have held Hamas accountable. In the
West Bank city of Qalqilya, for instance, where Hamas was elected in 2004, frustrated and
fed-up Palestinians voted it out of office in the next election. If there can be a legitimate,
effective, and democratic alternative to Hamas (something that Fatah has not yet been),
people will likely choose it. This would especially be true if the Palestinians could live a
normal life within their own state.
The participation of armed groups in elections is problematic. But the lesson is not that there
should not be elections. Rather, there should be standards, like the ones to which the
international community has held Hamas after the fact: you can be a terrorist group or you
can be a political party, but you cannot be both. As difficult as this problem is, it cannot be
the case that people are denied the right to vote just because the outcome might be unpleasant
to us. Although we cannot know whether politics will ultimately deradicalize violent groups,
we do know that excluding them from the political process grants them power without
responsibility. This is yet another challenge that the leaders and the peoples of the broader
Middle East must resolve as the region turns to democratic processes and institutions to
resolve differences peacefully and without repression.
THE TRANSFORMATION OF IRAQ
Then, of course, there is Iraq, which is perhaps the toughest test of the proposition that
democracy can overcome deep divisions and differences. Because Iraq is a microcosm of the
region, with its layers of ethnic and sectarian diversity, the Iraqi people's struggle to build a
democracy after the fall of Saddam Hussein is shifting the landscape not just of Iraq but of
the broader Middle East as well.
The cost of this war, in lives and treasure, for Americans and Iraqis, has been greater than we
ever imagined. This story is still being written, and will be for many years to come. Sanctions
and weapons inspections, prewar intelligence and diplomacy, troop levels and postwar
planning -- these are all important issues that historians will analyze for decades. But the
fundamental question that we can ask and debate now is, Was removing Saddam from power
the right decision? I continue to believe that it was.
After we fought one war against Saddam and then remained in a formal state of hostilities
with him for over a decade, our containment policy began to erode. The community of
nations was losing its will to enforce containment, and Iraq's ruler was getting increasingly
good at exploiting it through programs such as oil-for-food -- indeed, more than we knew at
the time. The failure of containment was increasingly evident in the UN Security Council
resolutions that were passed and then violated, in our regular clashes in the no-fly zones, and
in President Bill Clinton's decision to launch air strikes in 1998 and then join with Congress
to make "regime change" our government's official policy in Iraq. If Saddam was not a threat,
why did the community of nations keep the Iraqi people under the most brutal sanctions in
modern history? In fact, as the Iraq Survey Group showed, Saddam was ready and willing to
reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction programs as soon as international pressure had
dissipated.
The United States did not overthrow Saddam to democratize the Middle East. It did so to
remove a long-standing threat to international security. But the administration was conscious
of the goal of democratization in the aftermath of liberation. We discussed the question of
whether we should be satisfied with the end of Saddam's rule and the rise of another
strongman to replace him. The answer was no, and it was thus avowedly U.S. policy from the
outset to try to support the Iraqis in building a democratic Iraq. It is important to remember
that we did not overthrow Adolf Hitler to bring democracy to Germany either. But the United
States believed that only a democratic Germany could ultimately anchor a lasting peace in
Europe.
The democratization of Iraq and the democratization of the Middle East were thus linked. So,
too, was the war on terror linked to Iraq, because our goal after September 11 was to address
the deeper malignancies of the Middle East, not just the symptoms of them. It is very hard to
imagine how a more just and democratic Middle East could ever have emerged with Saddam
still at the center of the region.
Our effort in Iraq has been extremely arduous. Iraq was a broken state and a broken society
under Saddam. We have made mistakes. That is undeniable. The explosion to the surface of
long-suppressed grievances has challenged fragile, young democratic institutions. But there is
no other decent and peaceful way for the Iraqis to reconcile.
As Iraq emerges from its difficulties, the impact of its transformation is being felt in the rest
of the region. Ultimately, the states of the Middle East need to reform. But they need to
reform their relations, too. A strategic realignment is unfolding in the broader Middle East,
separating those states that are responsible and accept that the time for violence under the
rubric of "resistance" has passed and those that continue to fuel extremism, terrorism, and
chaos. Support for moderate Palestinians and a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and for democratic leaders and citizens in Lebanon have focused the energies of
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and the states of the Persian Gulf. They must come to see that a
democratic Iraq can be an ally in resisting extremism in the region. When they invited Iraq to
join the ranks of the Gulf Cooperation Council-Plus-Two (Egypt and Jordan), they took an
important step in that direction.
At the same time, these countries look to the United States to stay deeply involved in their
troubled region and to counter and deter threats from Iran. The United States now has the
weight of its effort very much in the center of the broader Middle East. Our long-term
partnerships with Afghanistan and Iraq, to which we must remain deeply committed, our new
relationships in Central Asia, and our long-standing partnerships in the Persian Gulf provide
a solid geostrategic foundation for the generational work ahead of helping to bring about a
better, more democratic, and more prosperous Middle East.
A UNIQUELY AMERICAN REALISM
Investing in strong and rising powers as stakeholders in the international order and supporting
the democratic development of weak and poorly governed states -- these broad goals for U.S.
foreign policy are certainly ambitious, and they raise an obvious question: Is the United
States up to the challenge, or, as some fear and assert these days, is the United States a nation
in decline?
We should be confident that the foundation of American power is and will remain strong --
for its source is the dynamism, vigor, and resilience of American society. The United States
still possesses the unique ability to assimilate new citizens of every race, religion, and culture
into the fabric of our national and economic life. The same values that lead to success in the
United States also lead to success in the world: industriousness, innovation,
entrepreneurialism. All of these positive habits, and more, are reinforced by our system of
education, which leads the world in teaching children not what to think but how to think --
how to address problems critically and solve them creatively.
Indeed, one challenge to the national interest is to make certain that we can provide quality
education to all, especially disadvantaged children. The American ideal is one of equal
opportunity, not equal outcome. This is the glue that holds together our multiethnic
democracy. If we ever stop believing that what matters is not where you came from but
where you are going, we will most certainly lose confidence. And an unconfident America
cannot lead. We will turn inward. We will see economic competition, foreign trade and
investment, and the complicated world beyond our shores not as challenges to which our
nation can rise but as threats that we should avoid. That is why access to education is a
critical national security issue.
We should also be confident that the foundations of the United States' economic power are
strong, and will remain so. Even amid financial turbulence and international crises, the U.S.
economy has grown more and faster since 2001 than the economy of any other leading
industrial nation. The United States remains unquestionably the engine of global economic
growth. To remain so, we must find new, more reliable, and more environmentally friendly
sources of energy. The industries of the future are in the high-tech fields (including in clean
energy), which our nation has led for years and in which we remain on the global cutting
edge. Other nations are indeed experiencing amazing and welcome economic growth, but the
United States will likely account for the largest share of global GDP for decades to come.
Even in our government institutions of national security, the foundations of U.S. power are
stronger than many assume. Despite our waging two wars and rising to defend ourselves in a
new global confrontation, U.S. defense spending today as a percentage of GDP is still well
below the average during the Cold War. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have indeed put an
enormous strain on our military, and President Bush has proposed to Congress an expansion
of our force by 65,000 soldiers and 27,000 marines. The experience of recent years has tested
our armed forces, but it has also prepared a new generation of military leaders for
stabilization and counterinsurgency missions, of which we will likely face more. This
experience has also reinforced the urgent need for a new kind of partnership between our
military and civilian institutions. Necessity is the mother of invention, and the provincial
reconstruction teams that we deploy in Afghanistan and Iraq are a model of civil-military
cooperation for the future.
In these pages in 2000, I decried the role of the United States, in particular the U.S. military,
in nation building. In 2008, it is absolutely clear that we will be involved in nation building
for years to come. But it should not be the U.S. military that has to do it. Nor should it be a
mission that we take up only after states fail. Rather, civilian institutions such as the new
Civilian Response Corps must lead diplomats and development workers in a whole-of-
government approach to our national security challenges. We must help weak and poorly
functioning states strengthen and reform themselves and thereby prevent their failure in the
first place. This will require the transformation and better integration of the United States'
institutions of hard power and soft power -- a difficult task and one that our administration
has begun. Since 2001, the president has requested and Congress has approved a nearly 54
percent increase in funding for our institutions of diplomacy and development. And this year,
the president and I asked Congress to create 1,100 new positions for the State Department
and 300 new positions for the U.S. Agency for International Development. Those who follow
us must build on this foundation.
Perhaps of greater concern is not that the United States lacks the capacity for global
leadership but that it lacks the will. We Americans engage in foreign policy because we have
to, not because we want to, and this is a healthy disposition -- it is that of a republic, not an
empire. There have been times in the past eight years when we have had to do new and
difficult things -- things that, at times, have tested the resolve and the patience of the
American people. Our actions have not always been popular, or even well understood. The
exigencies of September 12 and beyond may now seem very far away. But the actions of the
United States will for many, many years be driven by the knowledge that we are in an unfair
fight: we need to be right one hundred percent of the time; the terrorists, only once. Yet I find
that whatever differences we and our allies have had over the last eight years, they still want
a confident and engaged United States, because there are few problems in the world that can
be resolved without us. We need to recognize that, too.
Ultimately, however, what will most determine whether the United States can succeed in the
twenty-first century is our imagination. It is this feature of the American character that most
accounts for our unique role in the world, and it stems from the way that we think about our
power and our values. The old dichotomy between realism and idealism has never really
applied to the United States, because we do not really accept that our national interest and our
universal ideals are at odds. For our nation, it has always been a matter of perspective. Even
when our interests and ideals come into tension in the short run, we believe that in the long
run they are indivisible.
This has freed America to imagine that the world can always be better -- not perfect, but
better -- than others have consistently thought possible. America imagined that a democratic
Germany might one day be the anchor of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. America
believed that a democratic Japan might one day be a source of peace in an increasingly free
and prosperous Asia. America kept faith with the people of the Baltics that they would be
independent and thus brought the day when NATO held a summit in Riga, Latvia. To realize
these and other ambitious goals that we have imagined, America has often preferred
preponderances of power that favor our values over balances of power that do not. We have
dealt with the world as it is, but we have never accepted that we are powerless to change the
world. Indeed, we have shown that by marrying American power and American values, we
could help friends and allies expand the boundaries of what most thought realistic at the time.

How to describe this disposition of ours? It is realism, of a sort. But it is more than that --
what I have called our uniquely American realism. This makes us an incredibly impatient
nation. We live in the future, not the past. We do not linger over our own history. This has led
our nation to make mistakes in the past, and we will surely make more in the future. Still, it is
our impatience to improve less-than-ideal situations and to accelerate the pace of change that
leads to our most enduring achievements, at home and abroad.
At the same time, ironically, our uniquely American realism also makes us deeply patient.
We understand how long and trying the course of democracy is. We acknowledge our birth
defect, a constitution founded on a compromise that reduced my ancestors each to three-fifths
of a man. Yet we are healing old wounds and living as one American people, and this shapes
our engagement with the world. We support democracy not because we think ourselves
perfect but because we know ourselves to be deeply imperfect. This gives us reason to be
humble in our own endeavors and patient with the endeavors of others. We know that today's
headlines are rarely the same as history's judgments.
An international order that reflects our values is the best guarantee of our enduring national
interest, and America continues to have a unique opportunity to shape this outcome. Indeed,
we already see glimpses of this better world. We see it in Kuwaiti women gaining the right to
vote, in a provincial council meeting in Kirkuk, and in the improbable sight of the American
president standing with democratically elected leaders in front of the flags of Afghanistan,
Iraq, and the future state of Palestine. Shaping that world will be the work of a generation,
but we have done such work before. And if we remain confident in the power of our values,
we can succeed in such work again.