STATE OF MARYLAND IN THE

* CIRCUIT COURT
v.
* FOR

ADNAN SYED , * BALTIMORE CITY

Defendant . * Case Nos. 199103042-46

SYEDS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PRETRIAL RELEASE

Adnan Syed, by undersigned counsel, hereby replies to the States response to his

Motion for Release Pending Appeal. This Reply is intended to briefly clarify some of the

States mischaracterizations of Maryland law.

When the law is properly applied to the facts of this case, it is apparent that Syed

is both legally eligible for release and factually qualified for release. He is neither a flight

risk nor a danger to the community, and the States arguments fail to demonstrate

otherwise.

What is perhaps most remarkable about the States Response is what it fails to

address. The State does not dispute Syeds extensive community support, or his non

violent record while incarcerated. The State does not dispute that the credibility of its star

witness is virtually nonexistent. The State does not dispute that forensic evidence makes

its timeline entirely implausible. Nor does the State address this Courts rejection of the

States misleading theory about incoming phone calls allegedly tying Syed to the scene

where the victim was buried. Slip Op. at 43.

Instead , the State seems to be asking this Court to ignore these well grounded

facts based on a series of legally flawed procedural arguments.

The State makes three fundamental errors in its analysis of the pretrial release

question. First, the State mischaracterizes the Maryland statute permitting pretrial release

under the current procedural posture. Second, the State misconstrues Marylands primary

bail statute, which sets forth the factors a court must consider when making a bail

determination. Third, the State mistakenly suggests that the Court should consider the

evidence against the defendant as it stood in 1999, not as it stands today. Each of these

issues is addressed in turn.

a. The Maryland Code provides for pretrial release.

Contrary to what the State argues, this Court may issue a stay - as it has done -

and also release Syed on bail. This interpretation of the controlling Maryland statute is

based upon fundamental principles of statutory construction and relevant case law

explaining the effect of a stay.

The statute in question, and upon which Syed relies, is Md. Code Ann., Crim.

Proc. 7-109(b)(2). The statute states the following: [i]f the Attorney General or a

States Attorney states an intention to file an application for an appeal under this section,

the court may: ( i ) stay the order; and ( ii) set bail for the petitioner.

To interpret this (or any ) statute, the Court must determine legislative intent, and,

if possible, accomplish this by giving the words in the statute their commonly understood

meaning. Comptroller of Treasury v. Fairchild Industries, 303 Md. 280, 284 (1985).

The pertinent language in this statute is straightforward. Subsections (i) and ( ii)

are joined by the word and, thereby making the phrases conjunctive. Conjunctive

phrases have a cumulative relationship.

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 The Court of Appeals has analyzed the word and in a similar context. In

Comptroller of Treasury v. Fairchild Industries, the court did so by looking at the words

dictionary definition. The court noted that Blacks Law Dictionary defines and as [a]

conjunction connecting words or phrases expressing the idea that the latter is to be added

to or taken along with the first ... 303 Md. 280, 285 (1985) (quoting Black's Law

Dictionary 79 (5th ed. 1979)). Applying this plain meaning to the statute produces an

-
obvious result: the Court may stay the post conviction order and grant Syed pretrial

release.

The State, though, has fundamentally mischaracterized the statute by grafting the

disjunctive or where the legislature used and. If the legislature had intended to strip

this Court of its power to grant bail upon the issue of a stay, the statute would state that

the the court may: (i) stay the order; or ( ii) set bail for the petitioner. It did not do so.

This plain -language interpretation of the statute is consistent with the legal theory

behind a stay. In Weston Builders & Developers, Inc. v. McBerry, LLC , 167 Md. App. 24,

44 (2006), the Court of Special Appeals considered the breadth of a stay, and whether it

applied to the judgment itself or to merely the execution of the judgment. The court ruled

that the stay only applied to the execution of the judgment. We are not dealing with a

plenary stay of anything and everything, the court stated. Most empathetically for

present purposes, a stay does not trigger a universal freeze of the status quo. Id. In other

words, the stay did not undo the judgment in favor of the prevailing party ; it only put on

hold the execution of the judgment (or remedy ).

Likewise, here, the Court vacated Syeds conviction, and ordered a new trial. The

stay did not alter the basic fact that the Court vacated the conviction. As much as the

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State may want to wish away the vacatur of the conviction, the finding that Syeds trial

was unconstitutional persists. What the stay does do, however, is put the new trial on

hold. It means that the Court does not have to conduct an initial appearance and an

arraignment, nor does the speedy trial clock start to run . The Court may exercise its

statutory power to simultaneously effect complementary results: the temporary halting of

the new trial and the pretrial release of the defendant. This is supported by the plain

-
meaning of Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. 7 109(b)(2). It also makes good sense.

b. The Court must consider the nature of the States evidence .

The State is incorrect when it contends that the Court may not consider the

strength (or weakness) of the evidence against Syed when contemplating pretrial release.

Quite to the contrary , the Court must take into account the States evidence.

The controlling rule setting forth the factors a court must weigh in a bail hearing

is Maryland Rule 4-216(e)(1)(A). When discussing the rule in its Response,1 however,

the State omits the most relevant language from this provision. The actual rule states the

following: In determining whether a defendant should be released and the conditions of

release, the judicial officer shall take into account the following information, to the extent

available: (A) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the nature of the

evidence against the defendant, and the potential sentence upon conviction... Md. Rule

4-216(e)( l ) (emphasis added).

The phrase the nature of the evidence against the defendant means what it says,

and the relative strength of the States evidence, when available, must be considered in a

1
The State in its brief actually cites to a non-existent rule, Maryland Rule 4-
216(d)(1 )(A), but this appears to be a mistake. For purposes of this argument, Syed will
-
assume the State intended to refer to Maryland Rule 4 216(e)(1 )(A).
2
Available at http://www .marylandattorneygeneral .gov/ News%20Documents/Rules_
4
bail inquiry. The courts analysis in Schmidt v. State , 60 Md . App. 86 (1984), is

instructive. In Schmidt , the Court of Special Appeals reviewed a colloquy between a

judge and a defendant that occurred during a bail review hearing . Specifically , the court

had asked the defendant whether he was acquainted with the victim , thereby attempting

to ascertain whether the victim could identify the defendant at trial with certainty . The

court explained the rationale for this inquiry: Whether the victim and the accused

were acquaintances or total strangers may affect the nature and strength of the evidence

against the accused . Id . at 99. The court, while considering a different issue , noted that

this was a proper inquiry at a bail hearing , and that these factors are clearly relevant to

pretrial release. Id .

The same reasoning applies here. If the States case has fallen apart and there

remains no credible evidence, the Court must consider this at the detention hearing.

Conversely , if the State possesses overwhelming evidence of guilt, that too must factor

into the equation .

The States position in its Response appears also to be at odds with the Attorney

General s recent statements regarding bail reform . On October 11 , 2016, the Attorney

General issued a letter to members of the General Assembly urging reforms to Md . Rule

4-216, and making clear that a defendant has the right to individualized inquiry before

[a] determination of pretrial release.2 The Attorney General wrote that [i]n DeWolfe v

Richmond, 434 Md. 403, 429 (2012) (Richmond I), the Court [of Appeals] observed that

the determination of whether to allow pretrial release involves a fact-laden inquiry into

2
Available at http://www .marylandattomeygeneral .gov / News%20Documents/Rules_
_ _ _
Committee_ Letter on Pretrial Release.pdf .

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considerations listed in Rule 4-216, which would necessarily include a review of the

nature of the evidence against the defendant. And the Attorney General further explained

that the specified factors listed in Rule 4-216 are ones that a judicial officer must

consider during a pretrial release proceeding. So the States position here - that now is

not an appropriate . . . occasion to consider the evidence in this case,3 Resp. at 4 - is

contrary not only to the statute governing this issue but also to the guidance recently

offered by the Attorney General himself.

Meanwhile , the State offers no credible support of its contrary position .4 The only

case the State cites is a Ninth Circuit case that has nothing to do with this matter . Syed

respectfully suggests that this Court must follow the statute and the law and consider the

States evidence against the defendant when making a bail determination .

c. The State cannot turn back the clock .

Finally, in what may be the States most puzzling argument, the State urges the

Court to consider the evidence as if it were frozen in time, circa 1999-2000. Never mind

that the cell tower evidence was discredited by this Court. Never mind that the States

star witness admitted in a recent interview to having given false testimony. Never mind

that a credible witness testified under oath that she was with Syed when the State

theorized the murder took place. And never mind that this Court determined that there is

a substantial possibility that . . . the result of the trial would have been different if Syed

had been represented by constitutionally effective counsel.

3
Curiously , the State appears to suggest that only defendants who plead guilty are
suitable for bail . See Resp. at 7 (stating that Syed is an exquisitely unsuitable candidate
for parole since he refuses to accept responsibility . . . .).
4
The State also misleadingly quotes in its Response Maryland Rule 4-349( b). This rule,
however , applies to when a defendant has been convicted and is seeking direct review
from the appellate court - a scenario inapposite to Syeds procedural posture.

6
 The States argument makes no sense. The whole purpose of the Court assessing

the strength of the evidence against the accused, Schmidt , 60 Md . App. at 99, is so that

the Court can make a determination of the likelihood that the defendant will be convicted

at trial . If the evidence is overwhelmingly strong , the Court might conclude that the

defendant is likely to have incentive to flee. If the evidence is weak , the Court might

conclude the opposite - that the defendant is likely to show up in court to clear his name

- or the Court might conclude that an individual who is presumed innocent should not

have his liberty taken away based on the mere possibility of a conviction on flimsy

evidence.

There would be no utility , however , in the Court analyzing facts that are no longer

applicable. While these arguments may make for colorful reading, they have no bearing

on whether Syed is a flight risk or a danger to the community. If the Court now knows

that some - if not most of - of the evidence presented 17 years ago is unreliable, it should

not consider that evidence.

Conclusion

For the reasons described above, Syed respectfully asks that this Court grant him

a bail hearing, consider the statutorily relevant factors, and fashion conditions of pretrial

release that will ensure the safety of the community and his attendance at future court

proceedings.

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Respectfully Submitted,

l . Justtp'Brown
BROTN & NIETO, LLC

^
23 ast Baltimore Street, Suite 1102
Baltimore, Maryland 21202
Tel: 410-244-5444
Fax: 410-934-3208

Steven F. Barley
David I. Sharfstein
Samantha G. Spiro ( pro hac vice pending)
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
100 International Drive
Baltimore, MD 21202
Tel: 410-659-2700

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Baltimore, MD 21202

C. itfstin Brown