Republic vs. CA and Alpuerto (G.R. No. L-45202, Sept.

11, 1980)

Topic: Other Remedies

Facts:

Alpuerto filed for the reopening of cadastral proceedings. The court adjudicated
the subject land to him and thereafter OCT was issued in his favor, and subsequently
portions of land were transferred to various persons.

Prior thereto however, the provincial fiscal filed motion for reconsideration on the
ground that the decision was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation and deceit
since it was improperly reopened despite the absence of the necessary conditions.

The OSG filed also for an annulment, cancellation of titles and for reversion of
lots on the ground that the decision of the court adjudicating the land to Alpuerto and
the subsequent transfers were all null and void and without legal effect because the
court had no jurisdiction to allocate the inalienable land since it is part of the timber and
mineral land.

The respondents contended that the action is barred by a prior judgment and
that the court lacks jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit.

Issue: W/N the certificate of title may be cancelled.

Held: Yes. It is void at law since the officer who issued had no authority to do so.

The land in question is not within the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands but of
the Director of Forestry. The same law explicitly states that timber and mineral lands
shall be governed by special laws. And the Forestry Law now vests in the Director of
Forest Development the jurisdiction and authority over forest or timberland.

The cancellation may be pursued through an ordinary action therefor. This

action cannot be barred by the prior judgment of the land registration court, since the
said court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. And if there was no such
jurisdiction, then the principle of res judicata does not apply.

The State may still seek the cancellation of the title issued to Perpetuo Alpuerto
and his successors-in-interest pursuant to Section 101 of the Public Land Act. Such title
has not become indefeasible, for prescription cannot be invoked against the State.
(Republic vs. Animas, supra)
Roque vs. Aguada (G.R. No. 193767, April 7, 2014)

Facts:

Spouses Roque and the original owner, Velia Rivero executed a Deed of
Conditioal Sale over a portion of land with a term and condition that initial payment
shall be made and the balance shall be payable upon the registration of the subject
portion of land. The spouses Roque took possession of the land and made improvement
thereon.

Sabug Jr. applied for a free patent over the entire lot and later was issued an
OCT. He then sold the land to Aguado, who obtained a TCT under her name. Aguado
mortgaged the land and was eventually consolidated under the ownership of Landbank.

Roque filed for re-conveyance. But Sabug, Jr and NCCP denied any knowledge of
Conditional Sale through which the portion had been purportedly conveyed to spouses
Roque. Aguado raised the defense of an innocent purchaser for value. Landbank also
averred that it had no knowledge of the spouse Roques claim relative to the subject
portion of the land.

Issue: W/N CA erred in not ordering the re-conveyance of the subject portion of land
to Spouses Roque.

Held: No. The action for re-conveyance is incumbent upon the aggrieved party to show
that he has a legal claim on the property superior to that of the registered owner and
that the property has not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.

The court find that the stipulation shows that the Deed of the Conditional Sale is
actually in the nature of contract to sell and not one of sale contrary to Spouse Roques
belief. The spouses Roque have not fully paid the purchase price and thus the transfer
of ownership of the subject portion of land from seller to the buyer cannot be deemed
to have been fulfilled. The spouses did not even take any active steps to protect their
claim because the deed of conditional sale was not registered and they have not seek
the actual and physical segregation of the said portion.

Since it is only a contract to sell, reconveyance is not a remedy.

Antonio vs. Santos (G.R. No. 149238, 538 SCRA 1, Nov. 22, 2007)

Facts:

The RTC declared Antonio as the true and absolute owner in fee sample of the
two parcels of land he applied for, but it set aside its decision with respect to Lot No.
11703, CAD 688-D to avoid duplication of issuance of titles since the subject land was
already titled in the name of respondents.

Antonio filed the complaint for Reconveyance, Annulment of Title and Damages
against respondents, averring that respondents committed fraud in their application for
titling because they made it appear in their application for registration that the subject
property was not properly described, its location with particularity and appeared to be a
different area. He argued that Original Certificate of Title No. 108 (OCT No. 108) in
respondents names, insofar as it included Lot No. 11703, CAD 688-D, is, therefore, null
and void because it was obtained through fraudulent misrepresentations and
machinations.

In response, the respondents averred that OCT over the subject land was duly
issued to them by the Register of Deeds and alleged that prior to the issuance of OCT
they had always been in peaceful possession of the property and at no time had
Antonio possessed the property, nor did he ever make any claim against the said
property.

Issue: W/N the Honorable Court of Appeals seriously erred in not holding that the
respondents have fraudulently registered and titled subject property in their names.

Held: The court ruled that when two certificates of title are issued to different persons
covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail, and in case
of successive registrations where more than one certificate is issued over the same
land, the person holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a person
who relies on a subsequent certificate. We agree with respondents that petitioner
cannot rely on the decision in LRC No. 142-A. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals,
even if a title had been issued to petitioner based on said decision, his title would be of
a later date than the title of respondents, hence inefficacious and ineffective.
De La Merced vs. GSIS, et al (G.R. No. 16740, Nov. 23, 2011)

Facts:

Parcels of land were owned by spouses Zulueta, which were registered in their
names in a mother title. Later, they mortgaged several lots contained to the GSIS,
which eventually foreclosed on the mortgaged properties, including other parcels of
land sold to Dela Merced which were consolidated in TCT no. 26105, and which was
cancelled and issued in favor of GSISs ownership.

Upon learning of the foreclosure, petitioners predecessor, Francisco Dela Merced,

later on substituted by his heirs, filed a complaint praying for the nullity of the GSIS
foreclosure on the subject properties on the ground that he, not the Zuluetas, was the
owner of these lots at the time of the foreclosure. Dela Merced also impleaded Victor
and Milagros Manlongat, who were claiming one lot by virtue of a sale executed by the
GSIS in their daughters favor, Elizabeth Manlongat. Dela Merced argued that, due to
the nullity of GSISs foreclosure over the subject properties, it had no ownership right
that could be transferred to Elizabeth Manlongat.

After a protracted litigation, the SC rendered a Decision in the petitioners favor

and nullified GSISs foreclosure of the subject properties because these lots were never
part of its mortgage agreement with the Zulueta spouses. Pursuant to the finality of the
Decision, petitioners filed a Motion for Execution which GSIS opposed on the basis of
Section 39 of the GSIS Act of 1997 (RA 8291) which allegedly exempts GSIS funds and
properties from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy and other court processes. A
writ of execution was finally issued.

After the resolution of the issue of GSISs exemption, petitioners encountered

more problems with the execution of the Decision. According to the RD of Pasig City,
Policarpio Espenesin, he could not cancel the titles of GSIS over Lots 78 because it no
longer had title over these two lots and had already conveyed the same to two other
persons. Hence, the RD claimed that the writ of execution must first be modified to
include the cancellation of derivative titles of the GSIS title.

Issue: Does an order to cancel title to a particular property include an order to provide
technical descriptions and segregate it from its mother title?

HELD: Yes. Whether these titles are individual or contained in a mother title is of no
consequence. The RD has to cause their cancellation. If the cancellation can only be
carried out by requiring GSIS or the Bureau of Lands to provide the necessary
information, then they can be compelled to do so. Otherwise, the Courts decision would
be rendered inefficacious, and GSIS would retain ostensible ownership over the lots by
the simple expedience that they are included in a mother title, instead of individual
titles. That result is manifestly contrary to the Courts ruling and would subvert the very
purpose of bringing this case for a complete resolution.
Locsin vs. Hizon (G.R. No. 304369, Sept. 17, 2014)

Facts:

Locsin was the registered owner of a lot covered by TCT. She filed an ejectment
case against one Billy Aceron to recover possession over the land in issue. Eventually,
the two entered into a compromise agreement.

Locsin later went to the United States without knowing whether Aceron has
complied with his part of the bargain under the compromise agreement. In spite of her
absence, however, she continued to pay the real property taxes on the subject lot.

When Locsin discovered that the subject lands TCT was missing she filed a
petition for administrative reconstruction in order to secure a new one. Her counsel
found out that the said property was sold to Bolos, which was subsequently sold to
Hizon and titled in the name of the son of the latter.

Locsin, through counsel, sent Carlos a letter requesting the return of the
property since her signature in the purported deed of sale in favor of Bolos was a
forgery. Carlos replied denying Locsin's request, claiming that he was unaware of any
defect or flaw in Bolos' title and he is, thus, an innocent purchaser for value and good
faith. Later, Carlos sold the property to his sister and her husband, who obtained TCT
thereafter, and mortgaged the same to Damar Credit Corporation.

With this, Locsin filed an action for reconveyance, annulment of TCT of the
subject property, the cancellation of the mortgage lien annotated thereon, and
damages, against Bolos, Bernardo, Carlos, the Sps. Guevara, DCC, and the Register of
Deeds. The charges against DCC, however, were dropped on joint motion of the
parties. This is in view of the cancellation of the mortgage for failure of the spouses
Guevara to avail of the loan/credit facility DCC extended in their favor.

Issue: W/N the respondents are innocent purchasers for value.

Held: NO. An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of
another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in it, and who
pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of
another person's claim. As such, a defective title or one the procurement of which is
tainted with fraud and misrepresentation may be the source of a completely legal and
valid title, provided that the buyer is an innocent third person who, in good faith, relied
on the correctness of the certificate of title, or an innocent purchaser for value. A
person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens certificate of title
and to dispense with the need of inquiring further except when the party has actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to
make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title
in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into
the status of the title of the property in litigation. The presence of anything which
excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the
certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said
certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent
purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith and, hence, does not merit the
protection of the law.

Viewmaster Construction vs. Maulit, et al (G.R. No. 136283, Feb. 29, 2000)

Facts:

The subject property is known as the Las Pias property registered in the name of
Peltan Development Inc. covered by TCT.

Defendant Allen Roxas, one of the stockholders of State Investment Trust, Inc.
applied for a loan with First Metro Investment, Inc. without collateral, but with a
guarantor/surety/solidary co-debtor, Viewmaster, in consideration for the latters
participation in a Joint Venture Project to co-develop the real estate assets of State
Investment Trust, Inc. Notwithstanding the lapse of two (2) years defendant Allen
Roxas failed to take the necessary action to implement the Joint Venture Project with
petitioner Viewmaster to co-develop the subject properties.

Thus, petitioner Viewmaster filed a Complaint for Specific Performance,

Enforcement of Implied Trust and Damages against State Investment Trust, Inc.
Northeast Land Development, Inc., State Properties Corporation (formerly Peltan
Development, Inc.) and defendant Allen Roxas, in his capacity as Vice-Chairman of
State Investment Trust, Inc., and Chairman of Northeast Land Development, Inc., State
Properties Corporation.

Also, petitioner Viewmaster filed a Notice of Lis Pendens with the Register of
Deeds for the annotation of a Notice of Lis Pendens on Transfer Certificate of Title,
registered in the name of Peltan Development, Inc. (now State Properties Corporation).
However, the respondent Register of Deeds Administrator, Maulit, denied the request
for annotation of the Notice of Lis Pendens on the ground that the request for
annotation and the complaint do not contain an adequate description of the subject
property and the petitioner's action only has an incidental effect on the property in
question.
Issue: W/N the petitioner failed to adequately describe the subject property in its
complaint and in the notice of lis pendens.

Held: NO. A copy of the TCT was attached to and made an integral part of both
documents. Consequently, the notice of lis pendens submitted for registration, taken as
a whole, leaves no doubt as to the identity of the property, the technical description of
which appears on the attached TCT. The Court stressed that the main purpose of the
requirement that the notice should contain a technical description of the property is to
ensure that the same can be distinguished and readily identified. In this case, we agree
with petitioner that there was substantial compliance with this requirement.

The purpose of lis pendens is (1) to protect the rights of the party causing the
registration thereof and (2) to advise third persons who purchase or contract on the
subject property that they do so at their peril and subject to the result of the pending
litigation. One who deals with property subject of a notice of lis pendens cannot acquire
better rights than those of his predecessors-in-interest. In

The court held that the doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reason of public policy
and necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the subject matter of the litigation within
the power of the court until the judgment or decree shall have been entered;
otherwise, by successive alienations pending the litigation, its judgment or decree shall
be rendered abortive and impossible of execution. Purchasers pendente lite of the
property subject of the litigation after the notice of lis pendens is inscribed in the Office
of the Register of Deeds are bound by the judgment against their predecessors.

Without a notice of lis pendens, a third party who acquires the property after relying
only on the Certificate of Title would be deemed a purchaser in good faith. Against such
third party, the supposed rights of petitioner cannot be enforced, because the former is
not bound by the property owner's undertakings not annotated in the TCT.