Libya: Civil War and the Fall of Qaddafi

AFS311 Conflict and Conflict Management in Africa

Peter Kwame Womber AR/BAA/12/0153
Ella Petrini UCC/GU/14/0002

DR. ALEX WILSON

[Skriv sammanfattningen av dokumentet hr. Det r vanligtvis en kort
sammanfattning av innehllet i dokumentet.]
BODY OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................................. 3
COUNTRY PROFILE/ BRIEF HISTORY OF LIBYA................................................................................................... 3
TYPES OF CONFLICT ......................................................................................................................................................... 5
NATURE OF ETHNIC CONFLICT ........................................................................................................................................5
NATURE OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICT ..................................................................................................................................6
NATURE OF POLITICAL CONFLICTS................................................................................................................................8
ECONOMIC FACTORS TO CONFLICT ........................................................................................................................ 8
METHODS OF RESOLUTION ........................................................................................................................................... 9
UNITED NATIONS.....................................................................................................................................................................9
MILITARY INTERVENTION ............................................................................................................................................... 11
NATIONAL TRANSITION COUNCIL (NTC) ................................................................................................................. 12
WEAKNESSES OF THE RESOLUTION METHODS .............................................................................................. 13
THE AFTERMATH ............................................................................................................................................................. 14
POST- 2011 CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION: BUILDING A NEW LIBYA........................................................ 14
THE BEGINNING OF A NEW CIVIL WAR .............................................................................................................. 15
REFERENCES ...................................................................................................................................................................... 17
INTRODUCTION
Conflict is part of human culture. Conflict can be referred to as any form or kind or contradictions
causing from differences in interest, ideas, ideologies, orientations, perceptions, and tendencies
(Nnoli, 1998: 1). Adegoju, 2009:59, opines that, if conflict is perceived as a social process, seeking to
resolve it then should be seen as a means towards achieving an end that will be beneficial to
society. It is bound to happen in every human relationship. Despite the fact that is bound to come,
necessary measures must be taken to ensure that, they do not escalate into it worse form known as
crisis. Conflicts help to correct errors in human endeavor and also seek to ensure that future
occurrences are avoided. Africa has been noted to be one of the continents in the world that has
suffered conflict unrest in most countries. These conflicts have erupted to crisis which has rendered
many people homeless due to the facts that, appropriate measures were not taken to handle them.
This does not mean Africa does not have her own indigenous forms of conflict resolution. Obviously
it does have but neo colonial sentiments, globalization and technological advancement has
rendered some of these indigenous form of conflict resolution irrelevant when it comes to issues of
national conflict. Rather, international agencies are resorted to mediate. This essay will be critically
examining the conflict situation in Libya and show how it was resolved.

COUNTRY PROFILE/ BRIEF HISTORY OF LIBYA

Libya is a country in northern Africa that borders the Mediterranean Sea. Libya is one of the largest
countries in Africa. Despite its size Libya is thinly settled. The Sahara, the vast desert of northern
Africa, covers much of the country. Nearly all of Libyas inhabitants live near the coast. Tripoli,
located on the Mediterranean coast, is the capital and largest city. Most of Libyas people are
descended from a mixture of Berbers, the countrys original inhabitants, and Arabs, who arrived in
the 7th century. Small numbers of Berbers still live in the extreme south of the country. The great
majority of the people are Muslims, and Islam is the official state religion. Arabic is the official
language. Libya was a poor country until the discovery of oil in the 1950s. Since then its large
reserves of petroleum have made Libya one of the wealthiest countries in Africa. Many of its people,
however, still live by farming and grazing livestock, despite the extremely limited amount of good
farmland.

Toyin Falola, The end of Colonial Rule: Nationalism and Decolonization, 2002, opines that, at the
end of the War II (September 1, 1939), Libya was essentially a nomadic nation with strong belief in
particularism. Its inhabitants did not live under a political authority that unified the disparate
elements of its polity. We learn from Toyin Falola that, the site of ancient Phoenician, Roman, and
Arab settlements, Libya was colonized by Italy in about 1922. The country became an independent
monarchy in December 1951 (the first North African colony to achieve independence), and in 1969
young army officer Muammar al-Qaddafi ousted King Idris and seized power. Qaddafi proceeded to
create a new Libya based on his theories of socialism and Arab nationalism. We learn that the new
ruling junta, composed of Colonel Qaddafi and a number of young army officers, abolished the
monarchy and proclaimed republic. We are told that inspired by the career of President Nasser of
Egypt, Qaddafis administration dismissed all state functionaries associated with the old regime,
vigorously attacked manifestations of European influence, demanded the removal of British and
American bases at El Adem and Wheelus Field, and established cordial diplomatic relations with the
United Arab Republic and the Sudan. Qaddafi is said to have renamed the country the Great
Socialist Peoples Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. The word Jamahiriya was coined by Qaddafi, and it
means a state run by its entire people. Most outsiders viewed Libya as a military dictatorship. Libya
over the years has suffered diverse form of internal conflicts that have rendered the country as
unstable and war prone area by most people. This essay will be focusing on the nature of conflicts
in the country, factors that accounted for them, and the methods employed in resolving these
conflicts. The following paragraphs will treat each type of conflict in detail. The three most
important conflict forms identified were religious, ethnic, and political conflicts, but the economic
factors to conflict will be discussed as well. Since every country is made of different ethnic groups,
the countries cohesion and bonding will depend on the peace and harmony that churns through the
ethnic boundaries. When the harmony is discorded, chaos erupts.
TYPES OF CONFLICT

NATURE OF ETHNIC CONFLICT

In the end of the colonial era, Arab ethnic groups in the eastern regions of Libya came together
under the leadership of the Senussi order to fight against the Italian colonial masters. When Libya
became independent in 1951, its first head of state King Idris, was a Senussi. Qaddafis coup in 1969
overthrew the Senussi monarchy and their allied ethnic groups, who were subjected to harsh
treatment and violence. There was a shift in political power from Benghazi in the East to Tripoli in
the West (Chivvis & Martini, 2014).

The Warfalla, Libya's largest ethnic group, play a dominant role in Bani Walid. Along with the
Qadhadhfa, former ruler Muammar al-Qaddafi's ethnic group, the Warfalla used to be especially
powerful. By way of ethnic relations, Bani Walid is connected to the former Qaddafi stronghold
Sirte on the Mediterranean coast and to Sebha, capital of the country's southwest region. In all three
towns, the majority supported the regime in 2011. Destruction can be seen everywhere in Bani
Walid. In 2011, NATO troops bombed the town, and after a further state-ordered military attack in
October 2012, Bani Walid looks like a ruinous fort. It became a target because of tensions with the
port city of Misrata, a stronghold of Qaddafi's opponents. The conflict between Misrata and Bani
Walid is just one example of local rivalries all across the country. Most of them originate where
armed ethnic groups fight for influence, land and resources.

What begins as a skirmish often turns into days of battles and, ultimately, the displacement of the
weaker group. Ethnic feuds have existed for centuries. But Qaddafi aggravated existing tensions by
adopting the policy of divide and rule, as a way to diffuse power and make sure that no ethnic group
would become powerful enough to overthrow him. During his rule, Qaddafi privileged ethnic
groups such as his own group, the Gadhadhfa, and the allied Magarha and Warfalla tribes that are
all dominant in the west. These tribes had advantages when it came to state employment and
generally enjoyed the benefits of growth more than the other ethnic groups. Moreover, ones ethnic
identification was an important factor for entrance into the loyalist security forces of the regime.
When conflict broke out in 2011, it became apparent that Qaddafis mode of governance facilitated
mobilization along ethnic lines. The security vacuum that was created when Qaddafi was removed
from power aggravated these tensions and since then, violent conflicts between ethnic groups have
increased (Chivvis & Martini, 2014). For example, After Qaddafi's ouster and death in October 2011,
the rebels began seeking retribution for war crimes. All 30,000 residents of the former Qaddafi-
stronghold Tawergha were arrested, chased away or killed by rebel troops from the neighboring
Misrata. The city has been deserted ever since.

Settling scores from 40 years of dictatorial rule keeps the cycle of violence alive. Some of the
landowners whose land was confiscated by Qaddafi are resorting to violence to reclaim their
estates. Ethnic groups like the Awlad Suleiman, which faced repression under the dictator, are now
pushing to the fore. The minorities - Berbers, Tuareg and Tubu - want more say in their fates and
are increasingly threatening violence if they continue to be ignored. Their representatives have
already quit parliament in anger after no agreement could be reached on Libya's new constitution.

In Ghat, a city in the western Fessan region, the Libyan Tuareg ethnic group recently held an
assembly and set up a committee to represent their interests. A Berber activist claims that plans are
being made to create a minority coalition to oppose the government. In eastern Libya, a protest
movement is pushing for the independence of the region. Protestors challenge the government by
blocking oil ports, and there are reports that similar campaigns are underway in Fessan. Local
leaders in Fessan are asking where the country's patriots are, but the latter, too, are now largely
given over to their own ethnic' interests.

NATURE OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICT

Today, the country has a new, democratically elected government and a diverse political landscape
of parties and coalitions. Contemporary Libya is clearly a nation in the making, rather than just a
conglomeration of Ethnic groups ready to be at each other's throat. Libyans, however, are still
experiencing some conflicts. It is on records that local Salafist groups have been attacking Sufi
gathering places and teaching centers in different parts of the country. Libyan politicians have
repeatedly commented on these episodes of violence, but the number of attacks seems to be
increasing. An interior minister, Fawzi Abdellahi, resigned in protest at criticism from others in
government over his failed handling of the religious violence. Libya has not collapsed into a
constellation of ethnic groups, but the country does seem to be prone to the risk of disintegration
along religious lines.

Doubtlessly the religious conflicts between Salafis and Sufis shed light on a number of issues that
the new administration is struggling to resolve, most of all the diffusion of violent Salafi activism.
However, it is important to clarify that religious conflicts are not the product of the Libyan
revolution. On the contrary, they are the legacy of the old regime. To understand these events in
their proper context, it is important to look at the recent history of the country. Specifically, it is
important to remember that before Qaddafi's coup in 1969, Libya was a kingdom with a Sufi king.

In the colonial era the powerful Sanusi Sufi brotherhood fought against the Italian occupiers with
the help of Britain, and after the liberation of the country Idris, head of the Sanusis, was elected the
first king of Libya. When Qaddafi's Free Officers Movement took power, it overthrown the
monarchy, dismantled the Sanusi order and identified Sufism as an anti-revolutionary agent.

In the first two decades of the regime, Qaddafi publicly condemned the Sufi brotherhood in his
speeches, and ordered a number of their meeting places to be destroyed, actions very much like
what the Salafis are doing today. People associated with Sufism were closely monitored by the
police, and often arrested. For years, the Qaddafi regime effectively fuelled anti-Sufi sentiment in
the country, publicly portraying Sufism as a heretical form of Islam and as a fossil of monarchic
Libya that had no place in a "revolutionary" nation.

By criticizing Sufi Islam, Qaddafi planted a seed, the fruits of which are apparent today. The roots of
anti-Sufi violence in Libya, in other words, can be traced back to the actions of the regime. There is a
history behind them. It is also interesting to notice that during the last years of his regime, Qaddafi
decided to publicly rehabilitate Sufism, as a counter-balance to the spread of Salafism. He perceived
the Salafis to be a local extension of the Saudi government (an old enemy of his Jamahiriya, or
peoples' state).

Worried that a number of Libyans were showing sympathy for Saudi-style understandings of Islam,
Qaddafi decided that Sufism was, in a sense, the lesser evil. All of a sudden Sufism was revealed to
be a useful propaganda tool. In the late 1990s, Qaddafi began to praise Sufis in public, presenting
them as an alternative to Salafis. Following his familiar strategy of "divide and rule," the dictator
fuelled the Sufi/Salafi antipathy on a local level, paving the way for today's violence. This change of
attitude by the regime created an association between Qaddafi and Sufism, in the minds of many
Libyans. This association is doubtlessly incorrect: Sufis were for many years heavily persecuted by
Qaddafi, and were never loyal to him. As a result of this association, however, a number of
revolutionaries who fought against Qaddafi now perceive Sufism to be a remnant of the
dictatorship.
The religious conflicts that are taking place in Libya at the moment are neither new nor unexpected.
For four decades, Qaddafi maneuvered different groups, both religious and ethnic groups, as a way
of keeping his grip on the country.

NATURE OF POLITICAL CONFLICTS

Following the successful toppling of leaders in Tunisia and Egypt via peaceful demonstrations in
early 2011, Libyan protesters also took to the streets in February 2011 demanding that Colonel
Qaddafi step down from power. Within days of the start of the uprising, his opponents took control
of the oil-rich eastern part of the country, which also saw the most intense fighting. Leaders of the
uprising announced they had formed a "national council" in the East, which they claimed not to
constitute an interim government, however. A disputed number of mercenaries are reportedly
employed by Colonel Qaddafi as part of his army of supporters, as well as possibly African migrants.

Qaddafi's violent response to protesters was strongly condemned by the international community,
with the UN Human Rights Council ordering an inquiry into alleged abuses and Libya subsequently
suspended from this body. The United States unilaterally imposed sanctions on Libya on 25
February 2011. The next day, the UN Security Council unanimously voted in favour of an arms
embargo and asset freeze against the country, while also referring the situation to the International
Criminal Court for alleged crimes against humanity perpetrated against protesters (Resolution
1970 of 2011). In the 11 March 2011 declaration, the European Union (EU) called for the rapid
holding of a summit between the Arab League, the African Union and the EU.

The Arab League called on the UN Security Council to impose a no-fly zone over Libya, arguing that
Qaddafi had been using aircraft to combat civilian protesters. On 17 March 2011, acting under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council authorized the use of "all necessary measures"
to protect civilians in Libya. On 31 March 2011, NATO officially took command of operations in
Libya.

ECONOMIC FACTORS TO CONFLICT

Libya is very rich in oil reserves, which has influenced the fate of the country in a number of ways.
Since the era of King Idris, Libyas economy has been completely centred on the oil. The minimal
diversification has created a situation were the state of Libyas economy is almost entirely
determined by the oil production (Paoletti, 2011). The oil sector stands for 95% of Libyan export
earnings, 25% of GDP and 80% of government revenue. Libyas oil reserves are concentrated in the
eastern region Cyrencia, as much as 80% is located in Sitre Bassin. However, during Qaddafis rule,
Benghazi and other Eastern cities lagged after Tripoli in socioeconomic development as Qaddafi
controlled the oil and privileged the western regions, which lead to increasing frustration in
Cyrencia. Considering this, it is not peculiar that the revolts against Qaddafi began in Benghazi
(Chivvis & Martini, 2014). Because in Libya, controlling the oil sector is essential political power,
different armed groups have been fighting for the control over important oil fields ever since the
fall of Qaddafi (Vira, Cordsman & Burke, 2011).

Oil has been an important factor in Libyas relations with the international community, as many
powerful nations have vested economic interests in their oil reserves. For example, countries, such
as Austria, Ireland and Italy (Vira et. al, 2011) that rely on imports of Libyan oil will in a conflict
situation be keen on securing a well-functioning oil production (Wood, 2012).

Further, the wealth accumulated from oil revenues has not trickled down to the population, poverty
and unemployment is widespread. It have been suggested that having a large number of
unemployed youths pays the way for militarization, as it is easy for the militias to recruit young
men who otherwise might not have any prospects of earning their livelihoods (Vira, et. al, 2011).

METHODS OF RESOLUTION

UNITED NATIONS
The United Nations played a leading role in the conflict resolution in Libya. Libyas conflicts were so
tensed that, it outweighed the indigenous intervention in it resolution. The AU and the Arab league
were seen to be less silent during the whole conflicting period. Below is an outline of a portion of
the resolutions carved by the United Nations in resolving Libyas conflict. Resolution 1973 was
adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter with 10 votes for, none against and 5 abstentions.
Voting for it were the Council's permanent members United States, Britain, France and non-
permanent members Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Gabon, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, and
South Africa. Abstaining were permanent members Russia, China and non-permanent members
Germany, Brazil, and India. The resolution was adopted on Thursday, 17 March 2011. American
Ambassador Susan Rice described as strengthening the sanctions and travel bans in earlier
resolution 1970. It was promoted by the French and United Kingdom governments, but with the
strong presence of the United States in the background pulling the strings. At the meeting was the
new French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe. Although as former Prime Minister he was not new to the
UN, he arrived just weeks after his predecessor had been replaced for having accepted favours from
a Libyan businessmen and just days after his government became the first Western government to
recognize the forces fighting against the government in Libya's raging civil war as the legitimate
representatives of the country. The Libyan government did not have a representative present at the
meeting after its nominated Ambassador, former President of the General Assembly Ali Abdelsalem
Treki was denied admission to the United States. The first section calls for an "immediate cease-
fire" in its first paragraph and for respect for international law including "the rapid and unimpeded
passage of humanitarian assistance." A curious second operational paragraph "stresses the need to
intensify efforts to find a solution to the crisis" and goes on to qualify this as responding "to the
legitimate demands of the Libyan people" and leading to "the political reforms necessary to find a
peaceful and sustainable solution." Such vague and board language leaves open both the question of
which Libyans legitimate demands must be met and what political reforms are necessary.

Legally these requirements also appear to be a direct interference with Libya's internal affairs in
violation of article 2(7) of the UN Charter, which all UN Security Council resolutions are bound to
respect according to article 25 of the Charter. This apparently irreconcilable discrepancy will fuel
speculation that the resolution is another example of politics refusing to respect international law.
Paragraphs 4 and 5, concern the protection of civilians with the latter paragraph focusing on the
regional responsibility of the League of Arab States.

The largest operative part of the resolution is then devoted to the creation of a no-fly zone in
paragraphs 6 through 12. Article 6 creates the no-fly zone "on all flights in the airspace of the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians." Paragraph 7 then enumerates several
humanitarian exceptions. It is perhaps paragraph 8 that will focus the mind of most international
lawyers where it states that States may "take all necessary measures to enforce compliance with
the ban on flights." The use of the term "all necessary measures" opens the door to the use of force.
Paragraphs 13 through 16 call for an arms embargo and "deplores the continuing flows of
mercenaries" into the Libya. In doing so paragraph 13 decides that paragraph 11 of resolution 1970
(2011) shall be replaced with a new paragraph that "authorises Member States to use all measures
commensurate to the specific circumstances to carry out such inspections." Again this language
indicates that force may be used against seafaring vessels suspected of carrying arms to Libya in
violation of the embargo. In paragraphs 17 and 18 States are required to deny take off, landing or
overfly rights to "any aircraft registered in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya or owned or operated by
Libyan nationals or companies."

Paragraphs 19 to 21 extend the asset freeze imposed by paragraph 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution
1970 (2011) to "all funds, other financial assets and economic resources" that are "owned or
controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Libyan authorities ... or by individuals or entities acting on
their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them. Paragraphs 22 and
23 extend the travel restrictions and the asset freeze in resolution 1970 (2011). Paragraph 24
creates a new body, a Panel of experts, to assist the Committee created in Resolution 1970, to
"gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies, regional
organisations and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures" in
resolution 1970, to "make recommendations ... to improve implementation of the relevant
measures," and to "provide to the Council an interim report on its work no later than 90 days after
the Panel's appointment, and a final report to the Council no later than 30 days prior to the
termination of its mandate with its findings and recommendations."

Paragraph 27 says all States "shall take the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie in
connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was affected by reason of
the measures taken by the Security Council in resolution 1970 (2011), this resolution and related
resolutions.

MILITARY INTERVENTION

It is reported that on 19 March 2011, a multi-state coalition began a military intervention in Libya
to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. The United Nations Intent and
Voting was to have "an immediate ceasefire in Libya, including an end to the current attacks against
civilians, which it said might constitute crimes against humanity, imposing a ban on all flights in the
country's airspace a no-fly zone and tightened sanctions on the Qaddafi regime and its
supporters." It is also reported that the resolution was taken in response to events during the
Libyan Civil War, and military operations began, with American and British naval forces firing over
110 Tomahawk cruise missiles, the French Air Force, British Royal Air Force, and Royal Canadian
Air Force undertaking sorties across Libya and a naval blockade by Coalition forces. Air strikes
against Libyan Army tanks and vehicles by French jets were since confirmed. The official names for
the interventions by the coalition members are Opration Harmattan by France; Operation Ellamy
by the United Kingdom; Operation Mobile for the Canadian participation and Operation Odyssey
Dawn for the United States (wikipedia, 2011: military intervention in Libya; Crisis Group Middle
East, 14 September 2012).

NATIONAL TRANSITION COUNCIL (NTC)

During the transition period, the NTC and the government executive it appointed responded to
communal conflicts haphazardly. An official from the prime ministers office said, we knew, in
general, that these tensions and issues existed, but it was impossible to know in advance which
were going to spill over into violence. The NTC both blessed and backed local notables to lead the
reconciliation councils; some members participated on the NTCs behalf. But the NTCs own follow-
up councils designed to monitor ceasefire implementation lasted at most a few days or weeks, until
revolutionary brigades would impose the ceasefire on the armys behalf and local notables would
compel warring communities not to resume firing.

The NTCs efforts thus had only limited impact; at most, they served to communicate the NTCs
interest and create a temporary sense of activity. For most of the emerging political class the NTC
and its advisers as well as nascent political parties that was not enough. They believed the
governments role primarily should be to use military means to bring armed groups under control.
The sentiment mirrored a broader yearning for a strong military presence that extended across the
social and political spectrums. The prime ministers spokesman acknowledged this: We know that
there has been fighting in Zuwara, Sebha and Kufra for years. Naturally, with the revolution, the
states control is weaker and violence has increased. We need a strong unified military to re-impose
control.

If anything, the NTCs steps were headed in the opposite direction. Along with revolutionary
brigades, it unwittingly presided over the emergence of a plethora of local military councils and
armed groups only nominally under interior and defence ministry authority. The army and police
were in disarray. Officers and soldiers who did not defect had fled, been killed or jailed; the new
army, its weapons and equipment ransacked, had a deficit in personnel and equipment.
To its chagrin, better-armed revolutionaries created their own, parallel organisations, culminating
in the Libyan Shield Forces (LSF, Quwwat Dira Libya), over which though technically it answered
to the chief of staff the army had no control. The interior minister reached out to those who had
coordinated armed civilian resistance during the uprising, creating a Supreme Security Committee
(SSC) that operated in parallel to the police. As ministers and revolutionary leaders sought a way
out of the confusion of parallel institutions and chains of command, they were confronted with the
legacies of the revolution and its aftermath (Crisis Group Middle East, 14 September 2012)

WEAKNESSES OF THE RESOLUTION METHODS

International human rights law applies as well. This law applies during wartime or peacetime. It
imposes a higher standard than in an armed conflict, limiting lawful force to what is absolutely
necessary to achieve a lawful goal. In this case, the use of air power and then anti-aircraft guns on
land-based persons a trademark of the NATO supported rebels throughout the armed conflict
would very likely constitute excessive force in violation of the right to life. In any event, the
summary execution of a prisoner would clearly violate the right to life. In a civil war it is hard to see
how such a determination can be made, as both sides often commit gross violations. However, it
would have been sound to base the decision to intervene based on an on-the-ground fact-finding
investigation. Fact-finding missions by the UN Human Rights Council and the Security Council were
not used in Libya prior to the military intervention carried out by the West and the NATO. While
there is little doubt Western governments, such as the United States have significant abilities to
determine what is happening in Libya with distant surveillance methods, this did not provide
sufficient evidence of whether the Qaddafi regime was complying with the Security Council's
resolutions. Only on-the-ground observers have the legitimacy to determine this, as we have seen
from the misinformation spread about Iraq's actions based on third party and distant surveillance
sources.

What NATO did was to supervise and assist the looting, ransacking and wanton acts of murder
committed by their land based mercenaries trained and armed by them. As the AU stated, more
efforts for negotiation with the Qaddafi regimes should been made before the decision to intervene
was taken, in order to avoid civilian casualties and destroyed infrastructure. It is possible that the
peaceful means of resolving the conflict between the Eastern rebel groups and the Qaddafi regime
were not entirely exhausted. Although the facts are far from clear, most reports now seem to
confirm that Muammar Gaddafi was killed after his convoy was attacked by NATO planes, including
aircraft from the US and France, and after he was captured alive. If these facts are correct, they
point to yet another serious violation of international law involving the US. In this case, the use of
air power and then anti-aircraft guns on land-based persons a trademark of the NATO-led rebels
throughout the armed conflict would very likely constitute excessive force in violation of the
right to life. In any event, the summary execution of a prisoner would clearly violate the right to life.

The armed conflict in Libya, however, had undoubtedly become international once NATO
intervened. It makes no difference in this classification that the intervention was based on a UN
Security Council resolution. The NATO and its allies overstepped their UN approved mandate and
there were unnecessary attacks on civilians. Indeed, international humanitarian law applies to any
international armed conflict, and therefore, both sides should be held accountable in the court of
law for their crimes during the war.

THE AFTERMATH

POST- 2011 CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION: BUILDING A NEW LIBYA

After the fall of Qaddafi, the first democratic election was held in June 2012, and was generally
considered to be successful. It was peaceful, had a 60% participation rate and a smooth transition
of power from the interim government, the National Transitional Council (NTC) to the General
Nation Congress (GNC) was ensured. However, the Islamist parties failed to win popular support
and only got 19 of 80 seats assigned to parties in the new legislature, and the militias were shut out
of the political process, which would lead to problems later on (The Economist).

The new government was faced with a number of challenges that needed to be overcome in order
to build a lasting and stable peace. Following the defeat of Qaddafi, one of the most pressuring
issues was the security vacuum, which the National Army established by NTC was unable to fill,
leading to the sustained reliance on local militias and revolutionary brigades for the protection of
civilians, but these groups also threatened the security. The GNC failed to disarm the militias and to
reintegrate the soldiers into society. Different Islamist groups, some with affiliations to the al-Qaida,
profited from this security vacuum and managed to gain a foothold in some Libyan regions.
Meanwhile, unemployment was high, providing a large recruitment base for militias. All of these
factors contributed to the sustained militarization of the country. In addition, the international
community did not deploy any peacekeeping or stabilization forces, as is usually the strategy for
post-conflict stabilization after military interventions conducted by UN-approved missions (Chivvis
& Martini, 2014).

Rivalries and violent conflicts between ethnic groups have become more common after the fall of
Qaddafi, as the centralized control seized. The GNC was mostly powerless to stop such disputes.
One reason for that is the state's attempt to integrate whole rebel groups into the army. The militias
and rebel groups are often organized along ethnic lines, and tend to prioritize the interests and
commands from their ethnic groups over the national good. Thus, the prospects for national unity
and centralization of political power remained weak.

Under the rule of Qaddafi, Libya had not had the chance to foster a political culture, because the
regimes personalized mode of governance. The state of Libyas institutions of governance and
administration were in a devastating state. In Libya, loyalty to kinship genealogies and ethnic
groups has championed over political organization according to ideology (Paoletti, 2011). Many
international actors such as the UN, the World Bank and the IMF identified state-building and
political education as being of absolute importance to the peace process.

The war had led to a slowdown in the oil production, which meant that the economic growth was
stifled. Though the oil sector recovered relatively well, there is still an urgent need for economic
reform, in order tackle the issue of the notoriously high unemployment rates.

THE BEGINNING OF A NEW CIVIL WAR

As of 2014, Libya is once again at war. The relatively small-scale conflicts between the militias
following the overthrow of Qaddafi have evolved into a religious and ideological struggle between
Islamists and nationalists. The situation started to escalate in early 2014 when GNC refused to step
down when their term expired, which caused the National Army, led by Mr Haftar, to disband the
GNC. Mr Haftar then went on to create a movement called Dignity in order to fight against Islamist
groups in Benghazi. The parliamentary elections held in June to replace the GNC fired up tensions
between Dignity and the Islamists groups. During Election Day, many voters found it to unsafe to go
out and vote and participation was extremely low, only 18%. The Islamists suffered heavy defeats,
contested the result and together with Berber and Mistratan miltias, formed a countermovement
called Libya Dawn. They claimed that former Qaddafi loyalists dominated the new parliament. The
Libya Dawn attacked Tripoli and forced the newly elected parliament to migrate to Tobruk in the
east. This marked the starting point of the new civil war. Libya now had two parallel parliaments:
Libya Dawn in and Haftars/the National Armys Dignity. The conflict has split the country along
ethnic and religious lines, where the Berbers, Mistratan and many Arab tribes support Dignity and
others Libyan Dawn. Another issue is Libya Dawns suspected connections to the Islamic State, IS,
who are currently using armed force, mass killings and rape to establish an overarching Islamic
State with Sharia laws. Even though the Western powers see Islamization of the region as a threat,
they are unlikely to intervene this time around, as they are worried about being dragged into a
long-term conflict that will drain their armies of economic resources.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

The group would like to make the following recommendations for the resolution of the Libyan civil
war and the many ethnic conflicts:

- Because of the security vacuum that and the Libyan governments failure to provide
protection for its civilian population, the AU should consider supporting Libya by providing
peacekeeping troops until the civil war has de-escalated.
- A third party mediator should lead negotiations for a ceasefire and eventual peace
agreements. We believe that the AU could act as good mediator in this conflict.
- When a peace treaty has been signed, a national commission on truth and reconciliation
should be established in order to recognize the crimes committed by all conflicting parties.
- Indigenous methods of reconciliation should be used so as to lay the ground for national
unity and resolve ethnic conflicts at a grassroots level. Inspiration could be drawn from the
gacaca traditions, for example.
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