Republic of the Philippines Same; Same; Writ of Execution; General Rule: A court cannot refuse to

SUPREME COURT issue a writ ofexecution upon a final and executory judgment, exceptions.
Manila More than that, a writ of execution is a matter of right in favor of a
prevailing party once a judgment becomes final and
SECOND DIVISION ________________

G.R. No. L-45825 June 30, 1988 * SECOND DIVISION.

238
NGO BUN TIONG petitioner,
vs. 238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
HON. MARCELINO M. SAYO, PRESIDING JUDGE BR. XXXIII, COURT OF ANNOTATED
FIRST OF INSTANCE OF RIZAL and GALAURAN & PILARES
CONSTRUCTION CO., respondents. Ngo Bun Tiong vs. Sayo
executory (Garcia vs. Echiverri, 132 SCRA 631 [1984]); Pamantasan
T.F .Manalo Law Office for petitioner. ng Lunsod ng Maynila vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 311
[1986]). A court cannot refuse to issue a writ of execution upon a final and
Arturo A. Joaquin for respondents. executory judgment, except when certain facts and circumstances
transpired after the judgment becomes final and which could render the
VOL. 163, JUNE 30, 1988 237 execution of the judgment unjust (Cabonas vs. Adil, 135 SCRA 354 [1985]).
That the exceptions to the general rule do not obtain in this case cannot be
Ngo Bun Tiong vs. Sayo
reasonably disputed. The records show that subject judgment has been
No. L-45825. June 30,1988. *
fully satisfied upon the issuance of a Certificate of Sale for the full amount
NGO BUN TIONG, petitioner, vs. HON. MARCELINO M. SAYO, of the judgment on January 26, 1977, and therefore, as stated by this Court,
PRESIDING JUDGE BR. XXXIII, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE it is "when the judgment has been satisfied that the same passes beyond
OF RIZAL and GALAURAN & PILARES CONSTRUCTION CO., j*eview, for satisfaction thereof is the last act and end of the proceedings."
respondents. (Seavan Carrier, Inc. vs. G.T.I. Sportswear Corporation, 137 SCRA 587
[1985]).
Courts; Judgment; Policy ofjudicial stability: thejudgment ofa court of Same; Same; Rule that the filing ofseveral cases against the same party
competent jurisdiction may not be interfered by any court of concurrent over the same issue, after the appellate court has decided adversely against
jurisdiction.It has long been settled that no court has the power to them constitutes contumacious defiance of the authority ofcourts and
interfere by injunction, with the judgments or decrees of a court of impedes speedy administration ofjustice.This practice has long been
concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the relief censured by this Court in a line of decisions. We have ruled that the filing
sought by injunction (Cabigao vs. del Rosario and Lim, 44 Phil. 182 [1922] of several cases against the same party over the same issue, after the
reiterated in National Power Corporation vs. de Veyra, 3 SCRA 645 [1961]; appellate court has decided adversely against them, constitutes
Hacbang vs. Diaz, 8 SCRA103 [1963]). Even more emphatically, this Court contumacious defiance of the authori'ty of and flagrant imposition on the
ruled that "Pursuant to the policy of judicial stability, the judgment of a courts and impedes the speedy administration of justice (Pacquing vs.
court of competent jurisdiction may not be interfered with by any court of Court of Appeals, 115 SCRA117 [1982]; Ferinion vs. Sta. Romana, et al., 16
concurrent jurisdiction. For the simple reason that the power to open, SCRA 370, 374; 375 [1966]; Gabriel vs. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 273
modify or vacate a judgment is not only possessed by, but is restricted to [1976]). More specifically, this Court explained: "It is an important
the court in which the judgment was rendered." (Mas vs. Dumara-og, 12 fundamental principle in Our judicial system that every litigation must
SCRA37U964]). come to an end. Access to the courts is guaranteed. But there must be a

1
limit thereto. Once a litigant's rights have been adjudicated in a valid final payment by the defendant to the plaintiff of the sum of P67,052.32 plus interests,
judgment of a competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled attorney's fees and costs.
license to come back for anotber try. The prevailing party should not be
harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless litigations were to be The decision having become final and executory, the court a quo issued a Writ of
encouraged, unscrupulous litigants will multipl^ in number to the Execution on August 20, 1976 and an "Alias Writ of Execution" on December 6,
detriment of the administration of justice." (Pacquing vs. Court of 1976 to collect the balance of the judgment debt (Rollo, p. 9).
Appeals, supra).
However, prior to the issuance of the "Alias Writ of Execution", private
respondent filed with the same court an "Opposition to the Motion for Writ of
PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to review the order of the Execution" and a "Motion for Reconsideration and To Set Aside Decision". Both
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Br. 33. motions were denied by the Court a quo as well as its motion for new trial filed
later. On certiorari and mandamus in the Court of Appeals, the petition was
PARAS, J.: dismissed in the resolution of October 21, 1976, in C.A. G.R. No. SP-05893, as
follows:
This is a petition for certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed as a special civil action under Sections 1 The defendant (herein petitioner) being validly declared as in
and 2, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeking: (1) the annulment or default, it is then proper for the respondent court, as it had
setting aside of the order of respondent court * dated February 25, 1977 and its subsequent correctly done, to allow plaintiff (private respondent) to submit
orders in Civil Case No. C-6131, issued prior to the filing of the instant petition; and (2) a judgment ordering
respondent court to desist from further proceeding in the said case now pending before it (Court of First Instance,
evidence "ex-parte" (Second sentence, Section 1, Rule 18, Rules
Branch XXXIII, Caloocan City), meantime praying for the immediate issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction of Court). Consequently, the decision rendered by the respondent
and/or restraining order to preserve the rights of the parties pending resolution and decision of the instant petition. court on the basis of the evidence presented is valid and whether
or not the trial court had committed errors of judgment is not a
The dispositive portion of the questioned order of February 25, 1977 (Rollo, p. proper subject matter of herein petition for certiorari and
32) reads as follows: mandamus.

WHEREFORE, let a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory With respect to the issuance of the writ of execution, the petition
injunction restraining defendants from pulling out or removing any failed to show to this Court by what manner did the respondent
such property of the plaintiff from its compound, and ordering court commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
defendants to return immediately upon receipt of copy of the writ jurisdiction.
of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction, such
equipments and properties now in their possession which were WHEREFORE, for the reasons herein-before-stated, the petition
removed or hauled by them by virtue of the sale allegedly had for certiorari and mandamus is hereby DISMISSED. (Rollo, pp.
between them, upon the filing by plaintiff of a bond in the sum of 40-41, L-45443).
P80,000.00 duly approved by the court, conditioned to answer for
any and such damages that the defendant shall suffer if it will be Meanwhile, on January 6, 1977 Deputy Sheriff Emilio Z. Reyes served a notice of
found after trial that the plaintiff was not entitled to the said writ. levy and a copy of the Alias Writ of Execution on Galauran and Pilares
Construction. After due posting of notices of sale, a Certificate of Sale was
As gathered from the record, the factual background of this case, is as follows: issued to the petitioner who was the highest bidder for P80,000.00, on January
26, 1977.
Sometime on February 23, 1976, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
XIII rendered a decision in a civil action entitled "Caltex (Phil.) Inc. vs. Pilares On review by certiorari of the above-quoted decision of the Court of Appeals, this
Construction Co. docketed as Civil Case No. 96351, ordering among others, the Court denied the petition in L-45443 in the resolution of the First Division on
January 31, 1977 which reads:

2
 L-45443 (Galauran and Pilares Construction Company vs. Court petitioner herein Ngo Bun Tiong, in default, for their failure as defendants to file
of Appeals, et al.).--The petition for review on certiorari of the any responsive pleading within the reglementary period (Rollo, p. 45).
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals with preliminary
injunction, is DENIED for having been filed late and for late The instant petition was filed with this Court on March 24, 1977 (Rollo, p. 2). On
payment of the legal fees both on January 25, 1977, due date March 30, 1977, the Second Division of this Court resolved, without qqqivin due
being December 29, 1976. (Rollo, p. 129) course to the petition, to require the respondents to comment thereon and to
issue a temporary restraining order, restraining the further hearing on the
Before the issuance of the above resolution and despite the pendency of the annulment of the execution sale of the properties subject of Civil Case No. C-
aforementioned case before this Court, private respondent on January 26, 1977 6131 (Rollo, p. 64). The case was considered submitted for decision as of
filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXIII, December 29, 1977.
Caloocan City, against herein petitioner and Emilio Z. Reyes for "Declaration of
Nullity of the Auction Sale and Damages", docketed as Civil Case No. 6131 and The lone issue raised by petitioner is whether or not a Court of First Instance or a
on April 27, 1977 a Motion to Annul Certificate of Sale and to declare alleged branch thereof, has jurisdiction to annul or set aside, for alleged irregularities an
auction sale with the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII, Civil Case No. execution sale, held by virtue of a decision rendered by another Court of First
96351, as null and void. Instance or a branch thereof, and subsequently to order the return of the
properties sold at public auction to the judgment debtor.
On the same date, January 26, 1977, the Court of First Instance, Caloocan,
Branch XXXIII issued a temporary restraining order enjoining defendants therein, Private respondents contend that it filed Civil Case No. C-6131 before the Court
Emilio Reyes and Ngo Bun Tiong, and all other persons acting for and in their of First Instance of Caloocan where private respondent has its residence, as "a
behalf, from taking out any equipment from Galauran & Pilares Construction desperate attempt to stave off the grave and irreparable injury it has already
Company, and from moving out the equipment which are already in their suffered by virtue of the premature, improper and illegal execution. . ." of the
possession, further enjoining them from selling or otherwise encumbering the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII, in Civil Case No.
same equipment until further orders from this Court, pending the hearing on the 96351 which it maintains has not yet become final and executory (Rollo, p. 112).
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction (Rollo, p. 31).
This contention is untenable.
Finally, on February 25, 1977 respondent court issued the questioned order.
The records show that Pilares Construction Co., private respondents here, was
A motion for reconsideration of the order of February 25, 1977 was filed by declared in default for failure of its counsel to appeal at the scheduled date of
petitioner on March 4, 1977 (Rollo, p. 39). In its order of March 7, 1977, pre-trial. After Caltex (Phil.), plaintiff in Civil Case No. 96351, presented its
respondent court declared the motion moot and academic "in view of the evidence ex-parte, judgment was rendered ordering private respondent to pay
manifestation and assurance made by defendant Ngo Bun Tiong on the witness Caltex (Phil.) the sum of P67,052.32 with interest at the stipulated rate of 12%
stand during the hearing on the motion to hold him in contempt that he is per annum from August 1, 1974 until fully paid and 20% of the total amount due
returning the equipment now in his possession subject of the writ of mandatory as stipulated, for attorney's fees (Rollo, p. 140). On March 26, 1976, defendant
preliminary injunction issued on March 1, 1977". (Rollo, p. 42). company filed a motion for reconsideration and to set aside the decision (Rollo,
p. 79). On May 3, 1976, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the motion
Two other orders were issued by respondent court on March 7, 1977, to wit: (1) for lack of merit (Rollo, p. 141). It is, therefore, beyond dispute that the decision
An order declaring petitioner in contempt Of court for his contumacious in Civil Case No. 96351 had already become final and executory when the writ of
disobedience and disrespect to the respondent court in view of his refusal to execution was issued.
return the properties of plaintiff now in his possession, which are subject of the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by that court on March 1, 1977, Hence, private respondent's opposition to motion for writ of execution and motion
notwithstanding his assurance while on the witness stand, that he is ready to for reconsideration and to set aside decision on July 6, 1976 (Rollo, p. 172), and
comply with the aforesaid court order. Accordingly, a warrant of arrest was its motion for new trial on July 31, 1976, have all been filed after the decision had
issued against him (Rollo, p. 43); and (2) An order declaring Emilio Reyes and become final and executory.

3
Still further, the Court of First Instance of Manila had already granted the final and executory judgment, except when certain facts and circumstances
issuance of a writ of execution, when private respondent filed with the Court of transpired after the judgment becomes final and which could render the
Appeals a petition for certiorari and mandamus docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP- execution of the judgment unjust (Cabonas vs. Adil, 135 SCRA 354 [1985]).
05993 with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, seeking to set aside the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII, for being null and That the exceptions to the general rule do not obtain in this case cannot be
void. As above-stated, the petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals (Rollo, reasonably disputed. The records show that subject judgment has been fully
p. 140) and the petition for review on certiorari of the said decision was also satisfied upon the issuance of a Certificate of Sale for the full amount of the
dismissed by this Court in L-45443 (Rollo, p. 120). judgment on January 26, 1977, and therefore, as stated by this Court, it is "when
the judgment has been satisfied that the same passes beyond review, for
It has long been settled that no court has the power to interfere by injunction, with satisfaction thereof is the last act and end of the proceedings." (Seavan Carrier,
the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction Inc. vs. G.T.I. Sportswear Corporation, 137 SCRA 587 [1985]).
having equal power to grant the relief sought by injunction (Cabigao vs. del
Rosario and Lim, 44 Phil. 182 [1922] reiterated in National Power Corporation vs. But just as important is the fact, that the allegations of private respondent in the
de Veyra, 3 SCRA 645 [1961]; Hacbang vs. Diaz, 8 SCRA 103 [1963]). Even case at bar are the very same issues raised by it as petitioner in CA-G.R. No.
more emphatically, this Court ruled that "Pursuant to the policy of judicial stability, SP-05893 which were already settled when the Court of Appeals dismissed the
the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be interfered with by petition for certiorari and mandamus before it, in the resolution of October 21,
any court of concurrent jurisdiction. For the simple reason that the power to open, 1976 ** (Rollo, pp. 33-34, L- 45343) the review of which (before this Court in L-45443) was denied in the
modify or vacate a judgment is not only possessed by, but is restricted to the resolution of January 31, 1977. (Rollo, p. 19, L-45443).
court in which the judgment was rendered." (Mas vs. Dumara-og, 12 SCRA 37
[1964]). For obvious reasons, the matter should have been laid to rest, but private
respondent instead again filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of
But private respondent insists that the Court of First Instance or a branch thereof Rizal, Branch XXXIII against petitioner and Sheriff Emilio Z. Reyes, raising the
has the authority and jurisdiction to take cognizance of and to act in, a suit to very same issues which eventually found their way again to this Court for another
annul a final and executory judgment or order rendered by another court of first adjudication.
instance or by another branch of the same court, citing Dulap vs. Court of
Appeals, 42 SCRA 537 [1971]; Gianan vs. Imperial, 55 SCRA 755 [1974]; This practice has long been censured by this Court in a line of decisions. We
Francisco vs. Aquino, 72 SCRA 140 [1976]). have ruled that the filing of several cases against the same party over the same
issue, after the appellate court has decided adversely against them, constitutes
However, a careful scrutiny of this argument, reveals a misconception of the contumacious defiance of the authority of and flagrant imposition on the courts
process. It is noteworthy, that what is being sought in the case at bar is not the and impedes the speedy administration of justice (Pacquing vs. Court of Appeals,
annulment of the final and executory judgment of the Court of First Instance of 115 SCRA 117 [1982]; Ferinion vs. Sta. Romana, et al., 16 SCRA 370, 374; 375
Manila, Branch XIII but to set aside for alleged irregularities the execution sale [1966]; Gabriel vs. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 273 [1976]).
held on January 14, 1977 by virtue of said decision (Rollo, p. 121).
More specifically, this Court explained:
Aside from the fact that, as found by the Court of Appeals in SP-05893, the
petition failed to show in what manner did the respondent court commit any grave It is an important fundamental principle in Our judicial system that
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in this regard, it is readily every litigation must come to an end. "Access to the courts is
apparent that the cases abovecited by private respondent are not applicable. guaranteed. But there must be a limit thereto. Once a litigant's
rights have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a
More than that, a writ of execution is a matter of right in favor of a prevailing party competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled license to
once a judgment becomes final and executory (Garcia vs. Echiverri, 132 SCRA come back for another try. The prevailing party should not be
631 [1984]; Pamantasan ng Lunsod ng Maynila vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless litigations were to
143 SCRA 311 [1986]). A court cannot refuse to issue a writ of execution upon a be encouraged, unscrupulous litigants will multiply in number to

4
 the detriment of the administration of justice. (Pacquing vs. Court
of Appeals, supra).

However, in the case at bar, the records do not show that private respondent and
its counsel were required to explain why they should not be cited in contempt of
court for relitigating the same issues which have already been resolved.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, 1) the order of respondent court dated February 25,

SO ORDERED.