EN BANC the peace in the present case protested against his alleged illegal ouster, upon the

ground that his term of office was fixed by Act No. 2041; that Act No. 3107 could
[G.R. No. 24806. February 13, 1926. ] have no application to him nor to his term of office; that said Act No. 3107, so far as
it was applicable to him, was illegal and void. Whether or not the period of limitation
JULIO AGCAOILI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALBERTO SUGUITAN, Defendant- mentioned in section 216 of Act No. 190 is applicable to public officials of the
Appellee. Government and not only to officials of corporations, qurere.

The appellant in his own behalf. 3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; PUNCTUATION. The punctuation used in
statutes may be referred to for the purpose of determining the meaning and
The appellee in his own behalf. construction of a law. A semicolon is a mark of grammatical punctuation, to indicate
a separation in the relation of the thought, a degree greater than that expressed by
SYLLABUS comma, and what follows the semicolon must have relation to the same matter which
1. "QUO WARRANTO;" JUSTICES OF THE PEACE: LEGALITY OF A precedes it. What follows a semicolon always has relation to the same subject matter
PROVISION IN AN ACT OF THE LEGISLATURE TO WHICH NE REFERRENCE of that which precedes it. A semicolon is not used for the purpose of introducing a new
IS MADE IN THE TITLE, DISCUSSED AND CASES CITED. One of the idea. A semicolon is used for the purpose of continuing the expression of a thought, a
subsections of section 3 of the Jones Law provides "That no bill which may be enacted degree greater than that expressed by a mere comma. It is never used for the purpose
into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in of introducing a new idea. The comma and semicolon are both used for the same
the title of the bill." The title of Act No. 3107 of the Philippine Legislature reads as purpose, namely, to divide sentences and parts of sentences, the only difference being
follows: "An Act to amend and repeal certain provisions of the Administrative Code that the semicolon makes the division a little more pronounced than the comma. The
relative to the judiciary in order to reorganize the latter; increasing the number of punctuation used in a law may always be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining
judges for certain judicial districts; increasing the salaries of judges of Courts of First the true meaning of a doubtful statute.
Instance; vesting the Secretary of Justice with authority to detail a district judge
temporarily to a district or province other than his own; regulating the salaries of 4. ID.; PASSING, "SUB SILENTIO," THE PROVISION OF A LAW BY THE
justices of the peace; abolishing the municipal court and justice of the peace court of COURTS; EFFECT OF. It has been frequently decided that the fact that a statute
the City of Manila and creating in lieu thereof a municipal court with three branches; has been accepted as valid, and invoked and applied for many years in cases where its
regulating the salaries of clerks of court and other subordinate employees of Courts of validity was not raised or passed on, does not prevent a court from later passing on its
First Instance, and for other purposes." It will be noted that the only reference to validity, where that question is squarely and properly raised and presented. Where a
justices of the peace in said title is "regulating the salaries of justices of the peace." question passes the court, sub silentio, the case in which the question was so passed is
Section numbered 203 of said Act provides." . . That justices and auxiliary justices of not binding on the court. (McGirr V8. Eamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil., 563.)
the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five
years." It will be noted from reading the above title of said Act that no reference is
made therein indicating in the slightest degree that the body contains any provision DECISION
whatever, limiting the period of service of justices of the peace. The courts are
unanimous in holding that a provision in the organic law of the state, like that above
quoted from the Jones Law is mandatory and not directory; that a violation of such a JOHNSON, J. :
provision is fatal; that any important provision of an Act of the Legislature, to which
no reference is made in the title, is illegal, null and void. (Central Capiz v. Ramirez,
40 Phil., 883, 889; Walker v. State, 49 Ala., 329; People v. Parks, 58 Cal., 624; This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Ilocos
Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 111; Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, Norte. Its purpose was to obtain the extraordinary legal writ of quo warranto. The
179, 180.) petition was denied by the trial court and the plaintiff appealed. The questions
presented by the appeal are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
2. ID.; ID.; STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. When a justice of the peace is, by
intimidation and threats of criminal prosecution by a representative of the (a) Is the provision of Act No. 3107, in so far as it provides that "justices of the peace
Government, forced or compelled to vacate his office under protest upon the ground shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of 65 years," valid and
that the law does not require him to vacate his office, the statute of limitations does constitutional, when applied to justices of the peace appointed under Act No. 2041,
not begin to run against him until the legality of his protest is decided. The justice of section 1, to serve "during good behavior?" And,
 same section (203) contains provisions for the jurisdiction of justices of the peace
(b) Is the present action barred by the statutes of limitations? while section 207 contains provisions defining the "qualifications for justices of the
peace. Section 210 of said Act provides for the "filling of vacancies in the office of
The facts involved in the decision of those questions are as follows:chanrob1es justices of the peace." There is nothing in the title of the Act which in any way
virtual 1aw library indicates that the Act contains said provisions. Attention is here called to the
provision of the Act of Congress of the 29th day of August, 1916, and to section 3
(a) That the said Julio Agcaoili was appointed as justice of the peace of the thereof, which provides "That no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace
municipality of Laoag, of the Province of Ilocos Norte, by His Excellency, Francis more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill." The
Burton Harrison, on the 25th day of March, 1916, with authority "to have and to hold effect of a violation of said provision of said Act of Congress will be discussed later.
the said office with all the powers, privileges, and emoluments thereunto of right
appertaining unto him, subject to the conditions prescribed by law."cralaw virtua1aw (c) That on the 9th day of April, 1923, the Undersecretary of Justice sent the
library following letter to the said Julio Agcaoili, through the Judge of the Court of First
Instance of the Third Judicial District, of the Province of Ilocos Sur. Said letter is in
"The conditions prescribed by law" to which the appointee was "subject" at the time the words and figures following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
of his appointment, are found in section 1 of Act No. 2041 (vol. 8, Public Laws,
153). Said section is an amendment to section 67 of Act No. 136, and provides "MANILA, April 9, 1923
among other things for the "appointment and term of justices of the peace." It
provides that one justice of the peace and one auxiliary justice shall be appointed by "SIR: In view of the provision of section 203 of the Administrative Code as amended
the Governor-General, etc., for each municipality organized according to the by section 1 of Act No. 3107, which, in part, provides that justices and auxiliary
Municipal Code. Said section further provides that "All justices of the peace and justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of
auxiliary justices shall hold office during good behavior . . ." Said Act No. 2041 took sixty-five years, and in view of the fact that the record shows that you are over
effect on the 1st day of July, 1911. At the time Act No. 2041 was adopted, the sixty-five years of age already, I have the honor to hereby advise you that, upon
Philippine Legislature was composed of the United States Commission and the receipt hereof, you cease to be a justice of the peace by operation of said amendment
House of Representatives. of the Administrative Code.

(b) That on the 17th day of March, 1923, the Philippine Legislature, composed of the "Respectfully,
Senate and House of Representatives, adopted Act No. 3107, which was "an Act to
amend and repeal certain provisions of the Administrative Code relative to the (Sgd.) "LUIS P. TORRES
judiciary in order to reorganize the latter; increasing the number of judges for certain
judicial districts; increasing the salaries of judges of Courts of First Instance; vesting "Undersecretary of Justice"
the Secretary of Justice with authority to detail a district judge temporarily to a
district or province other than his own; regulating the salaries of justices of the Said letter was received by Julio Agcaoili, the justice of the peace, on the 26th day of
peace; abolishing the municipal court and justice of the peace court of the City of April, 1923. It was handed to him by the clerk of the Court of First Instance of the
Manila and creating in lieu thereof a municipal court with three branches; regulating Province of Ilocos Norte.
the salaries of clerks of court and other subordinate employees of Courts of First
Instance, and for other purposes."cralaw virtua1aw library (d) It will be noted that in the letter of April 9, 1923, the Secretary of Justice directed
or ordered Julio Agcaoili, then justice of the peace, "upon receipt of said letter, to
Notwithstanding the fact that the title of said Act (3107), so far as the same relates to cease to be a justice of the peace." Against the order contained in said letter of April
justice of the peace, provides only for "regulating the salaries of justices of the 9th, Julio Agcaoili entered a protest dated April 28, 1923, in the following language:
peace," said Act in section 203 provides for "the appointment and distribution of
justices of the peace" with the proviso in said section." . .That justices and auxiliary "JUSTICE OF THE PEACE COURT OF LAOAG, ILOCOS NORTE
justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of
sixty-five years." Attention is here called to the fact again that there is nothing in the "P. I.
title of the Act, which, in the slightest degree, indicates that said Act contains
provisions for "the appointment of justices of the peace" nor as to the period during "April 28, 1923
which they may serve after appointment. Attention is also invited to the fact that the
"The Hon. LUIS TORRES
"Has this amendment retroactive effect 7 In the first place the legislature could not
"Undersecretary of Justice of give or have given this Act such a character, and if it had intended to do so, it would
have so stated; and in the second place, because not only is such express declaration
the Philippine Islands lacking in the law but Act No. 3107 very clearly provides that the justices of the
peace and auxiliary justices of the peace to be appointed shall hold office until they
"SIR: The undersigned, Julio Agcaoili, justice of the peace of Laoag, capital of the attain the age of 65 years.
Province of Ilocos Norte, has the honor to state that on April 26, 1923, he received,
through the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, your communication "Very respectfully,
of April 9, 1923, informing the undersigned that, having attained the age of 65 years,
he ceased to be justice of the peace of Laoag under the provision of section 1 of Act (Sgd.) JULIO AGCAOILI
No. 3107, amending section 203 of the Administrative Code, which is Act No. 2711
enacted in the year 1919, and which section 1 of said Act No. 3107 provides in part "Justice of the Peace of Laoag, Ilocos Norte"
that the justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to
serve until they attain the age of 65 years. A further protest against the said order of the Secretary of Justice was made by Julio
Agcaoili on the 7th day of July, 1923, and is couched in the following
"With all due respect, the undersigned has the honor to state that he believes that the language:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
aforecited part of the provision of section 1 of Act No. 3107 does not include those
justices of the peace who had already been appointed justices of the peace, like the "I, Julio Agcaoili, Justice of the Peace of the Municipality of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, do
undersigned, before the passage and enactment of said Act No. 3107 and the hereby state that on this day, July 7, 1923, Mr. Buenaventura Ocampo, Provincial
amended Administrative Code, nor can this be the intention of the legislator, for if it Fiscal of Ilocos Norte, appeared at my office and thereupon showed me the telegram
were so, it should have so stated in order that the justices of the peace already of Undersecretary of Justice Torres, addressed to said provincial fiscal. After reading
appointed, who were discharging the functions of the office and who had attained the said telegram I asked the provincial fiscal to furnish me a copy thereof and he
age of 65 years when said Act was passed and enacted, should cease from their furnished me a copy of the telegram.
office.
"Said telegram of the Undersecretary of Justice in substance orders the provincial
"The undersigned was appointed justice of the peace of Laoag on March 25, 1916, fiscal to cause me to deliver the office and all the documents and records thereof to
and therefore under Act No. 2041, enacted February 3, 1911. Section 1 of this Act, the auxiliary justice of the peace, because according, to said Undersecretary of
which amended section 67 of Act No. 136, was not amended by any subsequent Act Justice I must cease from the office under Act No. 3107, and that I be prosecuted for
and provides: All justices of the peace and auxiliary justices shall hold office during violation of article 370 of the Penal Code should I fail to comply with the telegram
good behavior and those now in office who have not the qualifications required by sent to me on the 2d instant by the same Undersecretary of Justice.
this Act shall continue in office until their successors are appointed.
"I do also state that I have never had any malicious intention to disobey the orders of
"Has section 203 of the Administrative Code amended or repealed section 1 of Act the Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Torres, one given by telegram and the other by
No. 2041? The undersigned believes that it has not, judging from the context of both letter. I only desired to study the spirit of the law and this is the reason why I did not
laws, nor was it repealed because if this were the case the Governor-General would leave the office until the present time, because I was and am of the opinion that I
have renewed the appointments of all the justices of the peace and auxiliary justices must not cease from the office of the justice of the peace under the provision of Act
of the peace under said section 203 of the Administrative Code. No. 2041 under which I was appointed justice of the peace of the capital, and which
Act was not repealed by any subsequent one, nor by Act No. 3107, which Act No.
"The undersigned was appointed justice of the peace of Laoag on March 25, 1916, 2041 provides that the justices of the peace to be appointed under it, should hold
under the said Act No. 2041 and continues in the discharge of the duties of the office office during good behavior. This Act does not say anything as to limitation of age,
up to the present time, without the Governor-General having renewed his and therefore I believe myself entitled to continue in, and retain the office.
appointment under said section 203 of the Administrative Code.
"I do also state that lest the Undersecretary of Justice should think that I do not duly
"Then Act No. 3107 came, section 1 of which amends section 203 of the respect the constituted authorities, I now deliver under protest the office of the justice
Administrative Code. of the peace of Laoag and all its documents and records, as well as the furniture
therein contained, to Mr. Alberto Suguitan, auxiliary justice of the peace, in the the 23d day of July, 1925, and the second on the 8th day of September, 1925.
presence of the provincial fiscal, in compliance with the telegram of the contain, in resume, the foregoing facts. To the petition the respondent Alberto
Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Torres, received by me through the provincial fiscal Suguitan answered and set up the defense of prescription. Upon the issue thus
of Ilocos Norte. I make under protest the delivery of the office and its documents and presented, the Honorable Fermin Mariano, judge, sustained the defense of
records because I think, as I have stated, that I must not cease from the office of prescription and denied the petition for the extraordinary legal remedy of quo
justice of the peace, and in order that my right may be defined, I shall institute an warranto. From that judgment Julio Agcaoili appealed, and now contends in a
action in the proper court of justice to decide the case. vigorous and logical argument that his remedy has not prescribed.

(Sgd.) "JULIO AGCAOILI Considering the first question suggested above, attention is again called to one of the
provisions of section 3 of the Jones Law (Act of Congress, August 29, 1916, vol. 12,
"I received the things of the office. Public Laws of the Philippine Islands). The "Jones Law" is the constitution of the
Philippine Islands providing a government therefor. Subparagraph 16 of section 3 of
(Sgd.) "ALBERTO SUGUITAN the Jones Law provides "That no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace
more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill."
"In the presence of:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Under said provision, may the legislature adopt a law which contains important
provisions to which no reference is made in the title of the Act? The effect of
(Sgd.) "BUENAV. OCAMPO violating said provision of the Jones Law has been brought before the courts many
times. The effect of violating said provision has already been passed upon by this
"Provincial Fiscal" court. (Central Capiz v. Ramirez, 40 Phil., 883, 889.)

Julio Agcaoili patiently waited in vain for a resolution by the Secretary of Justice of In the case of Central Capiz v. Ramirez, supra, it was decided that said provision of
the protest which he presented on the 28th day of April and on the 7th day of July, the Jones Law was mandatory and not directory and its violation was fatal to any
1923; and not having received any reply to his protest, filed a petition for a writ of provision of the law to which no reference was made in the title. In the decision of
quo warranto in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Ilocos Norte on the 23d this court in the case of Central Capiz v. Ramirez, the decisions of the courts of many
day of April, 1925, which petition was amended by the filing of another petition in of the states of the Union were followed. Many of the constitutions of the states of
the same court on the 8th day of September, 1925. the Union contain similar provision to that quoted above from the Jones Law.
Among such states may be mentioned Alabama, California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
A careful reading of the two protests (April 28, 1923, and July 7, 1923) shows that Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota,
they contain arguments in support thereof which, in all equity and justice, demanded Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon,
a reply, but no reply was forthcoming. The arguments in support of his protests find Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin
a counterpart and are fully supported in the decision of this court in the case of and Wyoming.
Segovia v. Noel, of March 4, 1925 (47 Phil., 543), wherein the Supreme Court held
that Act No. 3107 could not be applied to and enforced against justices of the peace Mr. Justice Sutherland, now an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
who had been appointed prior to the 17th day of March, 1923. Had the Secretary of States, in his valuable work on "Statutory Construction," vol. 1, 2nd ed.) at section
Justice answered said protest, the great injustice which has been done to Julio 111, states the reason and the purpose of such a constitutional provision. He
Agcaoili perhaps might have been avoided. says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

(e) That Julio Agcaoili being threatened with a criminal prosecution unless he turned "In the construction and application of this constitutional restriction the courts have
his office over to the auxiliary justice of the peace, and to avoid scandal, disgrace kept steadily in view the correction of the mischief against which it was aimed. The
and humiliation which might come to him by virtue of said prosecution, on the 7th object is to prevent the practice, which was common in all legislative bodies where
day of July, 1923, still protesting, delivered the possession of his office, as justice of no such restriction existed, of embracing in the same bill incongruous matters having
the peace, to the auxiliary justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag. It is a no relation to each other, or to the subject specified in the title, by which measures
matter of common knowledge that Julio Agcaoili had been entrusted with the highest were often adopted without attracting attention. Such distinct subjects represented
office in his province which the people could confer upon him. diverse interests, and were combined in order to unite the members of the legislature
who favor either in support of all. These combinations were corruptive of the
The petitions presented by Julio Agcaoili in the Court of First Instance, the first on legislature and dangerous to the state. Such omnibus bills sometimes included more
than a hundred sections on as many different subjects, with a title appropriate to the "The purposes of the constitutional requirement must be borne steadily in mind,
first section, and for other purposes. when it becomes necessary to determine whether there has been legislative
observance of it. The exposition of these purposes by Judge Cooley is accepted, we
"The failure to indicate in the title of the bill the object intended to be accomplished believe, in all the states in which a like limitation prevails. . . ." (120 Ala., 172.)
by the legislation often resulted in members voting ignorantly for measures which
they would not knowingly have approved. And not only were legislators thus misled, In the case of People v. Parks (58 Cal., 624) the Supreme Court of the State of
but the public also; so that legislative provisions were stealthily pushed through in California had occasion to discuss the question now before us and
the closing hours of a session, which, having no merit to commend them, would have said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
been made odious by popular discussion and remonstrance if their pendency had
been seasonably announced. The constitutional clause under discussion is intended to "At the least, then, two heterogeneous subjects are embraced in the act, one of which
correct these evils; to prevent such corrupting aggregations of incongruous measures, is not expressed in the title, and they cannot be segregated. The title does not express
by confining each act to one subject or object; to prevent surprise and inadvertence the objects of legislation embodied in the provisions of the act. It is, therefore,
by requiring that subject or object to be expressed in the title."cralaw virtua1aw narrower than the body of the act, and fails to impart that notice of the measures
library enacted, which the Constitution requires. To prohibit such legislation was the sole
end and aim of the constitutional requirement.The practice, says the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Alabama, in discussing the effect of the violation of Missouri, of comprising in one bill subjects of a diverse and antagonistic nature,
of a similar provision of the constitution of that state in the cases of Walker v. State in order to combine in its support members who were in favor of particular measures,
(49 Ala., 329) and Lindsay v. United States Savings & Loan Association (120 Ala., but neither of which could command the requisite majority on its own merits, was
156), had the following to say, quoting with approval, what Mr. Justice Cooley in his found to be not a corruptive influence in the Legislature itself, but destructive of the
Constitutional Limitations, at page 143, had said upon that best interests of the State. But this was not more detrimental than that other
question:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph pernicious practice, by which, through dexterous and unscrupulous management,
designing men inserted clauses in the bodies of bills, of the true meaning of which
"The object sought to be accomplished, and the mischief proposed to be remedied by the titles gave no indication, and by skillful maneuvering urged them on to their
this provision, are well known. . . . Legislative assemblies for the dispatch of passage. These things led to fraud and injury, and it was found necessary to apply a
business often pass bills by their titles only, without requiring them to be read. A corrective in the shape of a constitutional provision. (City of St. Louis v. Tiefel, 42
specious title sometimes covered a legislation which, if its real character had been Mo., 590.) This provision has been framed in the constitutions of many of the States
disclosed, would not have commanded assent. To prevent surprise and fraud on the of the Union; and courts, whenever it has come before them, have liberally construed
legislature is one of the purposes this provision was intended to accomplish. Before it as the will of the people in the interests of honest legislation."cralaw virtua1aw
the adoption of this provision, the title of a statute was often no indication of its library
subject or contents. . . .
Decisions to the same effect are found in the following cases: City of St. Louis v.
"An evil this constitutional requirement was intended to correct was the blending in Tiefel (42 Mo., 578); Cannon v. Mathes (8 Heisk. [Tenn. ] , 504); Ryerson v. Utley
one and the same statute of such things as were diverse in their nature, and were (16 Mich., 269); Board of Public Education for the City of Americus Its. Barlow (49
connected only to combine in favor of all the advocates of each, thus often securing Ga., 232); Spier v. Baker (120 Cal., 370).
the passage of several measures, no one of which could have succeeded on its own
merits. Mr. Cooley thus sums up his review of the authorities, defining the objects of Mr. Justice Sutherland, in a further discussion of the question, at section 112 of his
this provision: It may, therefore, be assumed as settled, that the purpose of these work on Statutory Construction, said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
provisions was: First, to prevent hodge-podge, or log-rolling legislation; second, to
prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature, by means of provisions in bills of "The efficiency of this constitutional remedy to cure the evil and mischief which has
which the titles gave no information, and which might therefore be overlooked and been pointed out depends on judicial enforcement; on this constitutional injunction
carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and, third, to fairly apprise the people, being regarded as mandatory, and compliance with it essential to the validity of
through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the legislation. The mischief existed notwithstanding the sworn official obligation of
subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have legislators; it might be expected to continue notwithstanding that the obligation is
opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise if they shall so desire." formulated and emphasized in this constitutional injunction, if it be construed as
(49 Ala., 330, 331.) addressed exclusively to them, and only directory. It would, in a general sense, be a
dangerous doctrine to announce that any of the provisions of the constitution may be
obeyed or disregarded at the mere will or pleasure of the legislature, unless it is clear prescription of action in an action for quo warranto, neither could there be, for the
beyond all question that such was the intention of the framers of that instrument. It reason that it was an action by the Government and prescription could not be plead
would seem to be a lowering of the proper dignity of the fundamental law to say that as a defense to an action by the Government. The ancient writ of quo warranto was a
it descends to prescribing rules of order in unessential matters which may be high prerogative writ in the nature of a writ of right by the King against any one who
followed or disregarded at pleasure. The fact is this: That whatever constitutional usurped or claimed any office, franchise or liberty of the crown, to inquire by what
provision can be looked upon as directory merely is very likely to be treated by the authority the usurper supported his claim, in order to determine the right. Even at the
legislature as if it was devoid of moral obligation, and to be therefore habitually present time in many of the civilized countries of the world the action is still
disregarded."cralaw virtua1aw library regarded as a prerogative writ and no limitation or prescription is permitted to bar the
action. As a general principle it may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation,
In the case of Cannon v. Mathes, supra, Mr. Chief Justice Nicholson, in discussing civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding brought to enforce a
the effect of the violation of a constitutional provision like the one before us, public right. (McPhail v. People ex rel. Lambert, 160 Ill., 77; 52 Am. St. Rep., 306;
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph People ex rel. Moloney v. Pullmans Palace Car Co., 175 Ill., 125; 64 L. R. A., 366.)

". . . This is a direct, positive, and imperative limitation upon the power of the In all public matters a writ of quo warranto is a writ of right at the suit of the state,
Legislature. It matters not that a bill has passed through three readings in each house, and issues as a matter of course upon demand of the proper officer (State ex rel .
on three different days, and has received the approval of the Governor; still it is not a Washington County v. Stone, 25 Mo., 555; Commonwealth v. Allen, 128 Mass.,
law of the State if it embraces more than one subject. . ."cralaw virtua1aw library 308), and the court has no authority to withhold leave to file a petition therefor.

The Supreme Court of Alabama, in the case of Walker v. State, supra, If the statutes of limitation or prescription cannot run against the state, it is difficult
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph to understand how in the same action they may be used as a defense against a public
officer who has been forcibly, with threats and intimidation, ousted from a public
"It is the settled law of this court, founded on reasoning which seems to us office by the Government itself as was done in the present case. The principle that
unanswerable, that this provision of the Constitution is not a mere rule of legislative acts of limitation do not bind the King (the State) or the people, applies to proceeding
procedure, directory to the general assembly, but that it is mandatory, and it is the by quo warranto, the rule being that the representative of the state may file an
duty of courts to declare void any statute not conforming to it. . ."cralaw virtua1aw information on behalf of the people at any time; and the lapse of time constitutes no
library bar to the proceeding, in conformity with the maxim Nullum tempus occurrit regi.
(Catlett v. People ex rel. States Attorney, 151 Ill., 16.) For the state to claim that the
Mr. Justice Cooley in his valuable work on Constitutional Limitations (pp. 179, 180) statutes of limitation do not apply to it and yet insist that it may plead such statutes to
states that our courts have held, without exception, that such constitutional provision bar the action of quo warranto brought by one of its public officials whom it itself
is mandatory. has ousted from office, appears to us to be unjust, unfair, unreasonable, and not
within the contemplation of sound jurisprudence.
Considering that the great weight of authority is to the effect that the provision like
the one above quoted from the Jones Law is mandatory; and considering that there is So much for the general rule concerning limitation of action in quo warranto
nothing in the title of Act No. 3107 which indicates in the slightest degree that said proceedings. Is there a statute in the Philippine Islands of limitation, limiting the
Act contains a provision "that justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be action of a public official of the Government who has been duly appointed and
appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years," we are forced qualified, and who has, by force and intimidation, been ousted from such office, to
to the conclusion that, that provision is illegal, void and contrary to the mandatory defeat his action of quo warranto?
provision of the Jones Law, and that said law (3107) cannot be applied to justices
and auxiliary justices of the peace who were appointed prior to the 17th day of On the 7th day of August, 1901, the United States Philippine Commission adopted
March, 1923; and that when Julio Agcaoili was forcibly, by means of threats and Act No. 190 which had been considered privately and publicly for several months
intimidation, ordered to leave his office as justice of the peace, he was forced to do theretofore. Its provisions were published throughout the Philippine Islands long
so illegally, without just cause, and should therefore be restored to his position as prior to its adoption. While said Act was adopted on the 7th day of August, 1901, it
justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag, without delay. did not take effect, even though it had been published, until the 1st day of October,
1901. (Act No. 212.) An examination of said Act (190) shows that it provides
With reference to the second question above suggested, in re prescription or remedies for the usurpation of office or franchise, etc. (secs. 197-216). Said Act No.
limitation of the action, it may be said that originally there was no limitation or 190 was published in both English and Spanish Section 216, in English, provided
that "Nothing herein contained shall authorize an action against a corporation for is a semicolon. Does that which follows the semicolon have reference to the same
forfeiture of charter, unless the same be commenced within five years after the act subject matter which precedes it? A semicolon is a mark of grammatical punctuation,
complained of was done or committed; nor shall an action be brought against an in the English language, to indicate a separation in the relation of the thought, a
officer to be ousted from his office unless within one year after the cause of such degree greater than that expressed by a comma, and what follows the semicolon must
ouster, or the right to hold the office, arose." The same section (216), as published in have relation to the same matter which precedes it. What follows a semicolon always
Spanish, reads as follows: "Ninguna de estas disposiciones facultara la iniciacion de has relation to the same subject matter of that which precedes it. A semicolon is not
un juicio contra una corporacion por la perdida de sus derechos d.e concesion, a used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. A semicolon is used for the purpose
menos que el juicio se lleve a efecto dentro de los cinco aos siguientes a la comision of continuing the expression of a thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a
u omision del hecho objeto de la accion. Tampoco se podra iniciar un juicio contra la mere comma. It is never used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. The comma
persona que ejerza un cargo en una corporacion para desposeerla, a menos que se and semicolon are both used for the same purpose, namely, to divide sentences and
lleve a efecto dentro del ao seguiente a la fecha de la comision del hecho que dio parts of sentences, the only difference being that the semicolon makes the division a
motivo a su privacion, o que se puso en duda su derecho para ocupar el little more pronounced than the comma. The punctuation used in a law may always
cargo."cralaw virtua1aw library be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the true meaning of a doubtful statute. It
follows therefore that, inasmuch as all of the provisions of said section 216 which
Said section (216), as published in Spanish and translated into English, reads as precede the semicolon refer to corporations only, that which follows the semicolon
follows: "Nothing herein contained shall authorize an action against a corporation for has reference to the same subject matter, or to officers of a corporation.
forfeiture of its corporate rights, unless the same be commenced within five years
after the commission or omission complained of took place. Neither may an action But even granting, for the sake of the argument, that the word "officer" as used in the
be brought against an officer to oust him from office, unless the same is commenced latter part of said section applies to public officers who have been ousted from their
within one year after the commission of the act which caused the deprivation thereof, position, and not only to officers of corporations, then we have the question
or after the right to hold the office arose."cralaw virtua1aw library presented: Had the one year mentioned in said section expired on the 23d day of
April, 1925, when the first complaint was filed in the present action? When did the
Said section 216, as above quoted in Spanish, was published in vol. 1 of the Public year begin to run if said section is applicable to the appellant?
Laws of the Philippine Islands and distributed to the public officers throughout the
Philippine Islands. It is a fact of general information that even now, in 1926, the It will be remembered that on the 7th day of July, 1923, the appellant was ousted
Spanish copy of the Public Laws are consulted by the people in remote parts of the from his office as justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag. Not only did he
Philippine Islands for the purpose of knowing what the law is. It is not strange, surrender his office on that date under protest, but also on the 28th day of April,
therefore, that the appellant did not believe that said section 216 applied to public 1923, when he was notified by the Secretary of Justice that he cease to be a justice of
officers; that it only applied to officers of corporations as it appeared in the Spanish the peace of his municipality, he then protested and gave a long and lucid argument
translation. Is it just and fair and reasonable for the Government of the Philippine in support of his protest. In all justice to him, did he not have a right, without any
Islands to oust one of its officers from an office to which he had been legally legal action to protect his right, to await the solution of his protest of the 28th day of
appointed, by force and intimidation and without just cause, and then to defeat his April, 1923? He had a right to believe that the grounds upon which his protest was
action in quo warranto by invoking the provisions of a public statute, different from based would be convincing to the Secretary of Justice and that he would not be
the one which the Government itself had furnished its public officers? The appellant removed. Until this very hour the record contains no reply from the Secretary of
is familiar with the Spanish but not with the English language. He naturally relied Justice and no answer whatever to the legal grounds presented by the appellant upon
upon the Spanish version of the law for his information as to what the law really was. his right to continue as justice of the peace and not to be ousted.
Not only had the appellant the right to rely upon the provisions of section 216 as they
appeared in Spanish in the Public Laws of the Philippine Islands, but the reading of In our opinion, even granting that section 216 is applicable to the appellant, the
the three or four sections immediately preceding section 216 will show that they period of prescription had not begun to run at the time of the commencement of the
refer specifically to corporations only. The appellant, therefore, was justified in present action. He was justified in delaying the commencement of his action until an
believing that said section 216 as it appeared in Spanish was correct. At least the answer to his protest had been made. He had a right to await the answer to his
Government should give him credit with having acted in good faith. protest, in the confident belief that it would be resolved in his favor and that action
would be unnecessary.
But, even granting that the appellant is bound by the provisions of section 216 as it
appears in English, is the same applicable to the appellant? By reference to said It is contended, however, that the question before us was answered and resolved
section above quoted in English, it will be seen that after the word "committed" there against the contention of the appellant in the case of Bautista v. Fajardo (38 Phil.,
624). In that case no question was raised nor was it even suggested that said section
216 did not apply to a public officer. That question was not discussed nor referred to Believing as I do, that the success of free institutions depends upon a rigid adherence
by any of the parties interested in that case. It has been frequently decided that the to the fundamentals of the law, I have never yielded, and I hope that I may never
fact that a statute has been accepted as valid, and invoked and applied for many years yield, to considerations of expediency in expounding it. There is also some plausible
in cases where its validity was not raised or passed on, does not prevent a court from reason for the latitudinarian constructions which are resorted to for the purpose of
later passing on its validity, where that question is squarely and properly raised and acquiring power some evil to be avoided, or some good to be attained by pushing
presented. Where a question passes the court sub silentio, the case in which the the powers of the Government beyond their legitimate boundary. It is by yielding to
question was so passed is not binding on the Court (McGirr v. Hamilton and Abreu, such influences that the courts and legislatures are gradually undermining and finally
30 Phil., 563), nor should it be considered as a precedent. (U. S. v. Noriega and overthrowing constitutions. It is by yielding to such influences that constitutions are
Tobias, 31 Phil., 310; Chicote v. Acasio, 31 Phil., 401; U. S. v. More, 3 Cranch [U. gradually undermined and finally overthrown. It has been, and is my purpose, so far
S. ], 159, 172; U. S. v. Sanges, 144 U. S., 310, 319; Cross v. Burke, 146 U. S., 82.) as it is possible for me, to follow the fundamental law of the land regardless of
For the reasons given in the case of McGirr v. Hamilton and Abreu, supra, the consequences. If a particular law does not work well the people or the legislature
decision in the case of Bautista v. Fajardo, supra, can have no binding force in the may amend it. If, however, the legislature or the courts undertake to cure defects in
interpretation of the question presented here. the law by forced and unnatural constructions, they inflict a wound upon the
constitution of the state which nothing can cure. One step taken by the legislature or
The present case is anomalous under American sovereignty. An officer was the judiciary in enlarging the powers of the Government, opens the door for another
appointed in accordance with the law to the judiciary to serve "during good which will be sure to follow; and so the process goes on until all respect for the
behavior." After he had faithfully and honestly served the Government for a number fundamental law is lost and the powers of the Government are just what those in
of years the legislature adopted a new law which arbitrarily, without giving any authority are pleased to call them. (Oakley v. Aspinwall, 3 Comstock [N. Y. ], 547,
reason therefor, provided that said officer cease to be such when he should reach the 568.) I cannot give my consent to a rule or doctrine which will permit a Government
age of 65 years. Said law contained no express provision or method for its to throw an honest and efficient official out of office without reason and without
enforcement. The Executive Department, through its Undersecretary of Justice, authority of law, refuse to consider a protest, and then permit the application of a law
without any authority given in said law, notified the said officer that he was no to prevent a recovery of that which he has lost illegally and without reason.
longer an officer in the judicial department of the Government and must vacate his
office and turn the same over to another, who was designated by said The judgment appealed from should be revoked, and a judgment should be entered
Undersecretary. When the officer protested against such arbitrary action, giving ordering the restoration of the appellant to the office from which he was illegally
reasons therefor, and without answering said protest, he was threatened with a ejected. We should follow the effect of the doctrine announced solemnly by this
criminal prosecution if he did not immediately vacate his office. The history of this court in the case of Segovia v. Noel (47 Phil., 543). So ordered.
case reads more like a story of the Arabian Nights than like a procedure under a well-
organized Government. It seems impossible to believe, and we could not believe it, Villamor, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
were the facts not actually supported by the record.
Johns, J., concurs in the result.
Why the undersecretary of Justice did not follow the orderly procedure marked out
by Act No. 190 is not explained. The appellant was given no hearing. Even his Separate Opinions
protest, couched in most humble and respectful language, fell upon deaf ears.
Absolute indifference was shown to the respectful protest and the able argument
given in support thereof. The only answer to his protest was a threat of a criminal MALCOLM, J., concurring and dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
prosecution if he did not vacate his office. His humility was met with austereness.
His humble petition was met with a threat. His patient waiting for a reply to his (1) I concur in so much of the opinion of Mr. Justice Johnson as relates to the legal
protest was ended by a demand that he be prosecuted for refusing to comply with an issue presented in the lower court and here, pertaining to the question of whether or
order by one who was not willing to follow the well-defined and well-beaten road of not the present action was barred by the Statute of Limitations, and am in entire
"due process of law" by preferring charges and giving the appellant an opportunity to accord with the reversal of the judgment and the reinstatement of Julio Agcaoili, the
be heard and to defend his right. Nothing of that character took place. The whole appellant, in his office as justice of the peace of Laoag, Ilocos Norte. My reasons are
procedure, from beginning to end, in ousting the appellant from an office to which he these:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
had been legally appointed and against whom no complaint has been made, is
anomalous in the jurisprudence under the American flag. (A) Act No. 3107, providing that justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be
appointed to serve until they have reached the age of 65 years, should not be given
retroactive effect. That was expressly decided in the analogous case of Segovia v. "(3) The lower court erred in finding that the period of prescription must be counted
Noel ([1925], 47 Phil., 543). from July 7, 1923, instead of March 4, 1925.

(B) Plaintiffs action is not barred by the provisions of section 216 of the Code of "(4) The lower court finally erred in not granting the relief invoked by the petitioner;
Civil Procedure. That section particularly confines itself to an action "against a in not ousting the respondent from the office of justice of the peace of Laoag, Ilocos
corporation." Thereafter following a semicolon, comes the clause "nor shall an action Norte, in not reinstating the petitioner in said office and in not sentencing the
be brought against an officer," which plainly relates back to "corporation." respondent to pay the costs and damages caused to the petitioner in the sum of
Otherwise, the new idea would either have been expressed in a separate section or in P5,000."cralaw virtua1aw library
a separate sentence. That this is true is further borne out by the Spanish translation,
making use of the phrase "la persona que ejerza un cargo en una corporacion," which There is not one word either in appellants brief or in appellees brief on the subject
we are privileged to consult to explain an ambiguity in the English text. of the constitutionality of Act No. 3107.

(C) Even under the supposition that section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure Had not the constitutional question been discussed and decided without it being
applies, still it is not clear that one year has elapsed "after the cause of such ouster, . . suggested anywhere in the bill of exceptions, in the assignments of error, or in the
. arose." In reality, no cause for ouster has arisen since it was an erroneous briefs, it would hardly be necessary to cite such well known principles as
interpretation of the law which met with the disapproval of the Supreme Court, these:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
which resulted in the attempt to force Mr. Agcaoili out of office and to place the
auxiliary justice of the peace in office. The most that could be said of the attempted "It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legislative enactment void
ouster is that the auxiliary justice of the peace merely became a justice of the peace is one which the judge, conscious of the fallibility of the human judgment, will
de facto. shrink from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard
to duty and official oath decline the responsibility . . .
(2) I dissent from so much of the opinion of Mr. Justice Johnson as discusses the
question of whether or not the provisions of Act No. 3107 are constitutional, as ". . . The task . . . is a delicate one, and only to be entered upon with reluctance and
unnecessary to a decision, as not submitted for decision, and so as entirely uncalled hesitation . . .
for.
"Neither will a court, as a general rule, pass upon a constitutional question, and
The complaint for quo warranto presented in the Court of First Instance contained decide a statute to be invalid, unless a decision upon that very point becomes
the usual allegations without, however, making any reference at all to the necessary to the determination of the cause.While courts cannot shun the discussion
constitutionality of Act No. 3107. The answer set up prescription. The trial judge of constitutional questions when fairly presented, they will not go out of their way to
announcing the theories of the parties said: "The defense of the defendant is that the find such topics. They will not seek to draw in such weighty matters collaterally, nor
action brought by the plaintiff has prescribed because since July 7, 1923, when he on trivial occasions. It is both more proper and more respectful to a coordinate
left his office, no complaint was filed until April 23, 1925, and, therefore, more than department to discuss constitutional questions only when that is the very lis mota. . .
one year had elapsed. The plaintiff in turn alleges that there is no such prescription," ." (Cooleys Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., pp. 227, 228, 231.)
and then proceeded to deny the petition. On appeal to this court, the errors assigned
by Mr. Agcaoili as appellant are these:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph STREET, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

"(1) The lower court erred in holding that the action of the petitioner had prescribed This is an action of quo warranto instituted in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
on account of the same not having been brought within one year from July 7, 1923, Norte by Julio Agcaoili for the purpose of securing his restoration to the office of
when by an illegal order of the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, the petitioner justice of the peace of Laoag and to secure the removal of the defendant, Alberto
forcibly ceased to discharge the duties of the office of justice of the peace of Laoag, Suguitan, from the present enjoyment of the same office. Upon hearing the cause the
Ilocos Norte, and the respondent assumed said office and began to act as such justice trial judge, while recognizing the theoretical right of the plaintiff to the office in
of the peace. question, nevertheless held that the plaintiffs right of action had been barred by the
limitation prescribed in section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He therefore
"(2) The lower court erred in applying to the instant case the provisions of section denied the writ, with half costs, and the plaintiff appealed.
216 of Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure).
It appears that on March 25, 1916, the plaintiff was appointed by the Governor- "SEC. 216. Limitations. Nothing herein contained shall authorize an action
General to the office of justice of the peace of Laoag, in the Province of Ilocos Norte, against a corporation for forfeiture of charter, unless the same be commenced within
effective from April 10, 1916, subject to the conditions prescribed by law. This five years after the act complained of was done or committed; nor shall an action be
appointment was approved by the Philippine Senate, and the plaintiff entered upon brought against an officer to be ousted from his office unless within one year after
the discharge of his duties in due course. At that time there was no age limit upon the the cause of such ouster, or the right to hold the office, arose."cralaw virtua1aw
tenure of office of justices of the peace, but on March 17, 1923, Act No. 3107 of the library
Philippine Legislature went into effect. By this Act, section 203 of the
Administrative Code, covering the appointment of justices of the peace, was The same section as it stands in a current version of the Spanish translation differs
amended by the addition of a proviso to the first paragraph of said section to the somewhat, in the second member from the English version, as will be seen by
effect: "That justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve comparing the Spanish version, which is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
until they have reached the age of sixty-five years."cralaw virtua1aw library
"ART. 216. De las limitaciones. Ninguna de estas disposiciones facultara la
In the year 1923 the plaintiff herein had attained the age of 65; and the Secretary of iniciacion de un juicio contra una corporacion por la perdida de sus derechos de
Justice, supposing that the new proviso to section 203 of the Administrative Code concesion, a menos que el juicio se lleve a efecto dentro de los cinco aos siguientes
was applicable to the case, brought administrative pressure to bear upon the plaintiff, a la comision u omision del hecho objeto de la accion. Tampoco se podra iniciar un
with the result that the plaintiff ceased to exercise the functions of justice of the juicio contra la persona que ejerza un cargo en una corporacion para desposeerla, a
peace for Laoag and the defendant, Alberto Suguitan, was duly appointed by the menos que se lleve a efecto dentro del ano siguiente a la fecha de la comision del
Governor-General to the same office. This appointment having been approved by the hecho que dio motivo a su privacion, o que se puso en duda su derecho para ocupar
Senate, the said Suguitan entered upon the discharge of the duties thereof. el cargo."cralaw virtua1aw library

On March 4, 1925, this court promulgated the decision in the case of Segovia v. Noel Upon comparison of these versions it will be seen that the word office (cargo) in the
(47 Phil., 543), wherein we decided that the amendment contained in Act No. 3107 second sentence of the Spanish version is qualified by the expression "en una
to section 203 of the Administrative Code should be given prospective application corporacion." The plaintiff, relying upon the Spanish version, insists that the
only, with the result that said provision is not applicable to a justice of the peace provision is not applicable to a public office, like that of justice of the peace; and it is
appointed prior to the enactment of the amendatory law. When this decision was further insisted that the whole section deals exclusively with the subject of the writ of
promulgated it came to the attention of the plaintiff, and the present action was quo warranto as used against a corporation or against a person in possession of a
instituted by him shortly thereafter for the purpose of obtaining his restoration to the corporate office.
office. Practically the only defense insisted upon in the court below was to the effect
that the action had prescribed under the one-year limitation contained in section 216 I am unable to accede to this view of the law. Upon examination of sections 197 to
of the Code of Civil Procedure; and the only question made in this appeal arises upon 216, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, it will be found that two subjects are
the application of said section. there treated, namely, usurpation of franchise by corporation and usurpation of
office; and the evident purpose of this part of the Code is to define the conditions
It appears from the record that the plaintiff was ousted from office on July 7, 1923, under which the writ of quo warranto may be used in both kinds of cases.
and that the defendant, as auxiliary justice of the peace, then entered upon the Accordingly in the final section (sec. 216) dealing with the subject, a limitation is
discharge of the duties of the office, by direction of Governor-General Wood, in the prescribed for both. The first member of the section, down as far as the semicolon in
character of a temporary appointee to the vacancy. Later, as already stated, Suguitan the English version, prescribes a limitation of five years upon any action instituted
entered upon the discharge of the duties of the office under commission from the against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter. In the matter following the
Governor-General, approved by the Philippine Senate, effective from December 13, semicolon is found the limitation appropriate to the case where an office is involved
1923. It is therefore apparent that more than a full year had elapsed between the and the action of quo warranto is instituted to oust the incumbent and to secure the
removal of the plaintiff from office and the date of the institution of the present office for the person unlawfully kept from the occupancy thereof. The prescription
action; and more than a year had also elapsed after the defendant began the discharge established for this case is one year.
of the duties of the office as a regularly commissioned justice of the peace.
A careful perusal of the section, in connection with related provisions of the Code,
The section of the Code of Civil Procedure, the application of which is here in leaves no room for doubt that the second member of the section was intended to
question, reads, in English, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph apply to actions over public offices as well as corporate offices; and in this sense said
provision has been applied by this court. (Bautista v. Fajardo, 38 Phil., 624.) The
author, or authors, of the Code of Civil Procedure could hardly have intended for this
provision to be applied only to corporate officers, since there is a public interest in (b) That the defense of limitation or prescription contended for by the respondent
public offices which requires there should be a prescriptive provision applicable to does not apply to the petitioner under the particular facts of this cause.
actions over these offices no less than to actions over the offices of corporations. The
insertion by the translator into the Spanish version of the expression "en una Modifying the decision heretofore announced, as herein indicated, and basing the
corporacion" after the word "cargo" was evidently a mere mistake, resulting from a decision upon the two grounds above-mentioned only and eliminating all remarks
superficial attention to the context; and it will be found that in the Spanish edition of made about the action and conduct of the Acting Secretary of Justice, said motions
the Code of Civil Procedure edited by C. M. Recto this phrase has been dropped. It are hereby denied. Avancea, C.J., Street and Ostrand, JJ., adhering to the dissenting
goes without saying that the English version of the Code of Civil Procedure is opinion heretofore promulgated, concur nevertheless in this resolution.
controlling, and in case of conflict the courts must be governed by this version. The
suggestion contained in the opinion of the court that the Spanish version ought to be
accepted as controlling in this case for the reason that the plaintiff knows only the
Spanish language is novel and if followed by us in the future will be the source of
much uncertainty in the interpretation and application of our statutes. The opinion of
the court contains a lengthy dissertation intended to demonstrate that the amendment
of section 203 of the Administrative Code contained in Act No. 3107 is
unconstitutional, for defect in the title of the Act. With this proposition I am also
unable to agree. The title to Act No. 3107 begins with these words: "An Act to
amend and repeal certain provisions of the Administrative Code relative to the
judiciary." These words are general and in my opinion broad enough to include the
amendment of section 203 relating to the appointment of justices of the peace. By
examining the analysis of Title IV of the Administrative Code it will be found that
justices of the peace are there treated as a part of the judiciary, as in fact they are;
and although the provisions of Act No. 3107 are various, they have this in common,
that they deal with different parts of the judiciary establishment and are intended to
effect changes in this system alone. It will be noted that a pronouncement as to the
constitutionality of the amendment in question was by no means called for in this
case, not only because the point was not raised in the discussion of the case but for
the further reason that we are all agreed that said amendment is not applicable to the
plaintiff.

Avancea, C.J. and Ostrand, J., concur.

RESOLUTION UPON PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION

February 26, 1926 - The Clerk having before it for consideration, (a) the motion of
Alberto Suguitan for a reconsideration of the decision of the court promulgated on
February 13, 1926, and (b) the motion of the Secretary of Justice, praying for leave
to appear in said cause as amicus curiae; and after a careful review of said decision in
relation with said motions, it is hereby ordered and decreed that said decision,
heretofore announced, be modified, to the end that the decision of all the questions
involved in said decision be limited to the following alone:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

(a) That said Act No. 3107 can have no application to the petitioner herein, following
the doctrine heretofore announced in the case of Segovia v. Noel (47 Phil., 543); and,